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GAZETTEER.

OF THE

PERSIAN GULF, 'OMAN,

AND

CENTRAL ARABIA.

Under such a system it follows necessarily that a topic of considerable prominence during one period may have no sequel in the period immediately following though it may possibly be, and often is, continued in a later one.

In order therefore to enable the reader to follow up the thread of any one particular subject a "detailed table of contents" has been prepared on the following lines.

The various "periods" in each chapter have been given a number. Each period has again been sub-divided into "subject headings" each of which has been lettered.

When any particular subject is continued in a later period an entry to that effect in italics immediately below the "subject heading" concerned has been made, giving the number of the "period" and the letter of the "subject heading" in which the continuation will be found.

It should be noted however that though the above system has been found capable of application in the majority of chapters and periods, instances occur throughout the volume in which special subjects (especially British policy and relations) are so inextricably woven into the general history of the State under review that no definite sub-division of its "periods" into "subject headings" is possible and in such cases the sequel to a particular subject can only be traced by a careful perusal of the general text.

In addition to the twelve chapters referred to above Volume I includes a number of Appendices, also written by the late Mr. Lorimer dealing separately with subjects of special importance or interest in the Persian Gulf Region, and also a series of genealogical trees of the ruling families of States in the same area.

A table of chapters, annexures, appendices and genealogical trees will be found at page 5 and the "detailed table of contents" at page 9.

For convenience of binding Volume I has been divided into three parts.

Part I consists of the first nine chapters, i.e., the General History of the Persian Gulf Region, the Histories of 'Oman, of the Arab States on the western shores of the Persian Gulf, of Central Arabia and of Turkish 'Iraq, in fact of what may conveniently be termed the "Arabian' portion of the Volume.

Part II consists of the remaining three chapters, i.e., of the Histories of 'Arabistan, of the Persian Coast and Islands, and of Makran, in other words of the "Persian' section of the work and of the Appendices.

For facility of reference, the "Introduction," the "Table of chapters" and the "detailed table of contents" have been prefixed to both Parts I and II

Part III consists of a portfolio containing genealogical trees, maps, etc.

L. BIRDWOOD.

SIMLA;
10th October 1914.

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CHAPTER X.

HISTORY OF 'ARABISTAN.

Of events in the Perso-Arabian province of 'Arabistān, which has generally been under Persian influence but is inhabited principally by Arabs, we have little information until the middle of the 18th century is reached. The situation of the tract, isolated as it is from the neighbouring territories by mountains, rivers or marshes, seems for long to have protected it from the interference, unless occasional, of Persian and Turkish officials.

17TH CENTURY.*

In 1604, when the Portuguese Jew Pedro Teixeira passed up the Shatt-al-'Arab, the whole of the country immediately to the east of that river was ruled by Mubārak-bin-Mutlub, an Arab chief who maintained a claim to Basrah and was perpetually at war with the Turks. The Turks had many forts or blockhouses upon the river to protect their territory against raids by Mubārak's subjects; and the most important among these, one of the functions of which was to secure the anchorage of large ships visiting Basrah, was situated on the Persian side of the stream at a point opposite Sarāji, about three miles below Basrah. The chief places in Mubārak's territory were Hawīzeh, "Magdom" (probably Maqtū', a place on the right bank of the Kārūn, twenty miles below the present Nāsiri), and Dōraq (the modern Fallāhīyeh); and from this fact it would seem that he was one of the so-called "Wālis of Hawīzeh" who ruled†, the greater part of 'Arabistān before the rise of the Ka'ab tribe. The plains of 'Arabistān adjoining the Shatt-al-'Arab lay at

Condition of 'Arabistan in 1604.

^{*} The chief general authority for the history of 'Arabistan from 1600 to 1763 is Mr. J. A. Saldanha's Selections from State Papers, Bombay, regarding the East India Company's connection with the Persian Gulf, with a Summary of Events, 1600-1800, printed in 1905. The Travels of Pedro Teixeira, 1902, referring to 1604, and the Travels of Sig. Pietro della Valle, 1665, referring to 1625, are of antiquarian interest. The following are of value in connection with Ka'ab affairs: Niebuhr's Description de l'Arabie, 1774, and Voyage en Arabie, 1776; Major Rawlinson's Memorandum on the Dispute between Turkey and Persia, 1844; and Ainsworth's Personal Narrative of the Euphrates Expedition, 1888.

[†] The legendary history of these Walis is related by Layard in his Description of the Province of Khúzistán, 1846.

this time "widely waste, not barren, but untilled for fear of the Turks;" and it seems that the Portuguese, when they were on bad terms with the Turks, sometimes made liberal offers to Mubārak to induce him to enter into an offensive and defensive alliance with them against the Ottoman, but that he did not respond to their advances.

Affairs in 'Arabistān about 1625.

In 1625, at the time of the Italian Pietro della Valle's visit to Basrah, Mubārak had been dead for some years. On his decease his brother, named Mansur, had been appointed by the Persian monarch to the governorship of Hawizeh,* but, finding the yoke of Shāh 'Abbās too heavy for his liking, he had entered into a treasonable correspondence with the Pāsha of Basrah, then Afrāsiyāb, with a view to asserting his independence. In order to bring his loyalty to the test, the Shāh, on the occasion of the successful expedition against Baghdad in 1623, required Mansur to join the Persian army; but Imam Quli Khan, though on the march from Shīrāz to Bachdād he waited for him many days at Hawīzeh, could not induce him to move. After this the Shah several times summoned Mansur to wait on him at Isfahan, but the cautious Shaikh, while he invariably returned a soft answer, did not obey; and at length Shāh 'Abbās became incensed and ordered him to repair to Isfahān on pain of losing his head. The only answer, however, which Mansur returned to this ultimatum was: "That if the Shah was King in Persia, himself was King in Hawizeh, and that he did not value him;" and Imam Quli Khān was accordingly despatched with a large force to capture or kill Mansur and to set up in his place his nephew Muhammad, a son of the late Mubārak, who had been educated at the Safavi court. In the latter part of his task the Persian general was successful; but Mansur escaped and sought refuge, accompanied by 500 followers, with the Pasha of Basrah, 'Ali Pasha, who granted him a place to settle at in Basrah territory closely adjoining Hawizeh. The former subjects of Mansur acquiesced in the installation of Muhammad as their governor on the condition, which Imam Quli Khan granted, that no Persian garrison should be left at Hawizeh. These events occurred at the beginning of 1625, immediately before the Persian movement against Basrah in March of that year.

Immigration of the Ka'ab into 'Arabistān.

The Ka'ab tribe, who were afterwards during more than one generation to play a leading part in the politics of 'Arabistan, appear to have

^{*} This may have been in 1621, for we find that on the 8th of January 1622 at Mīnāb, where the Khān of Shiraz had then arrived on his way to attack Hormūz, a great "feast and triumph was also made for the joyful news of the King's taking in of a great Countrie in Arabia, and of Aweiza the chiefe Citie of that Countrie."

entered the province at some time in the seventeenth century; and their first settlements, among which the principal was Qubbān, seem to have been situated near the head of the Khor Qanāqeh branch of Khor Mūsa. The quarter from which they came and the reasons for their change of habitat are not certainly known.*

PERIOD 1700-63.

Conduct of the Wali of 'Arabistan, 1722.

In 1722, when Afghān invaders were attacking the monarch of Persia in his capital, the Persian forces defending Isfahān were commanded by a Wāli of 'Arabistān whose conduct, especially in refusing to second the spirited efforts of the Armenians of Julfa, caused his loyalty to his master to be seriously suspected. On the fall of the place,

* The principal authorities on the early history of the Ka'ab are Niebuhr in his Description de l'Arabie, 1774, page 276, and his Voyage en Arabie, 1776, page 186; Major Rawlinson in his Memorandum on the Dispute between Turkey and Persia, 1844; Sir A. H. Layard in his Description of the Province of Khūzistān, 1846; and the article "Ka'ab" in the Geographical Volume of this Gazetteer, page 961. The information embodied in the last was obtained from Muhammareh. Major Rawlinson insists on the existence of a close connection between the Ka'ab, both before and after their appearance in 'Arabistan, and the Turkish Government; but Niebuhr and local tradition are silent on this point, and Major Rawlinson, in his Memorandum, has not clearly distinguished facts capable of documentary or other proof from the ex parte assertions of Turkish officials, or from his own historical speculations and geographical conjectures. The following extract from a letter, addressed by the Agent and Council at Basrah on the 9th April 1767 to the Honourable Court of Directors, correborates to some extent the view of Major Rawlinson; but it is open to the criticism that it represents the opinion of an Agent (Mr. Moore), who was notoriously pro Turk and anti-Persian in his proclivities: "The Chaub is originally "a subject of the Turks, and has for many years possessed a considerable territory "within their dominions bordering upon the Persian Empire, for which he ought, "and did for some years, annually to pay (sic) a large sum into the treasury of "this Pachaship. A few years after the death of Nadir Shah, and in the troubles that "followed it, he also got possession of a territory in the Persian dominions; by "this means he became a subject of both powers. The territory of Gaban and "its districts is the name of that he possesses on the Turkish, and Durack, that "in (P on) the Persian (P side)." Tradition, we may add, seems to point to a date somewhat earlier than 1683, which is mentioned by Major Rawlinson, as that of the first settlement of the Ka'ab in 'Arabistan; and, with reference to this date and to the supposed unbroken connection of the Ka'ab with the Turks, it should not be forgotten that Basrah only came under the direct control of the Turks about 1669, that some years previously to 1691 it fell into the hands of the Persians, and that the Turks did not resume possession of it until about 1695.

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however, the Wāli was not put to death, as were other traitors from the Persian side, by the victorious Afghān Commander Mahmūd: but he was disgraced, and his possessions in the province of Khūzistan,—that is of 'Arabistān, —were given to his younger brother. There is nothing to show to what family this Wāli of 'Arabistān belonged, but that he may have been a member of the old ruling family of Hawīzeh appears not improbable.

From 1722 to 1734 the Ka'ab tribe are said to have been ruled by a Shaikh named Farai Ullah.

Growth of the power of the Ka'ab, 1700-66.

Seizure of Doraq by the Ka'ab, 1747. After this the power of the Ka'ab in 'Arabistān began rapidly to increase; and in or about 1747 they wrested Dōraq, now Fallāhīyeh, from their neighbours the Afshār or 'Aushār Turks, who, with that place as their capital, had hitherto been the dominant tribe in the country. Their success was attributed to aid from the Arab Wāli of Hawīzeh, following a stratagem of their own.

The Ka'ab Shaikh Salmān, 1737-66.

The progress of the Ka'ab at this time was largely due to the energy and ability of their chief, Shaikh Salmān or Sulaimān, under whom it is probable that their numbers grew rapidly large by accretion, as even at the present day a tribe in 'Arabistān may grow under a popular and successful leader. Salmān succeeded his brother Tahmaz Khanfar, who was murdered in 1735, and Khanfar's son Bandar, who ruled from 1735 to 1737 and was then also murdered; his own reign lasted from 1737 to 1766; and except during the last two years of it another brother, named 'Othmān, was associated with him in power. Salmān obtained, or maintained, his virtual independence by playing off the Persian and Turkish authorities against one another; and before long he was ruler over a great part of the districts which are now Fallāhīyeh and Muhammareh without interference on the part of either power; while his influence in some measure extended also to those of Ahwāz, Jarrāhi, and even Hindiyān.

First expedition of Karim Khan against the Ka'ab, 1757.

In 1757 Karīm Khān, whose authority in Persia was not yet fully consolidated, made an expedition against the Ka'ab for the purpose of

subjugating them and obliging them to pay revenue; but difficulties in other and more important quarters prevented his remaining long in the country; and he withdrew after receiving a small sum as tribute.

Difficulties between the Ka'ab and the Turkish Government, and first two Anglo-Turkish expeditions against the tribe, 1758-63.

The very partial success of Karīm Khān against the Ka'ab in 1757 only rendered Shaikh Salmān more confident and aggressive than before; and the fact that in the very next year he built his first Gallivat seems to show that the advantage of possessing a maritime force had been somehow brought home to his mind by the Persian expedition against him.

In 1761 the Turks, following the example of the Persians, embarked on operations against the Ka'ab and achieved, with British assistance, a temporary success; but in 1762 the Ka'ab blockaded Basrah by water, and in 1763 they invaded the Turkish districts on the western side of the Shatt-al-'Arab. A second Anglo-Turkish expedition against the Ka'ab followed: it also was inconclusive. The events here shortly referred to are more fully described in the history of Turkish 'Irāq, to which they properly belong.

KARIM KHĀN.

1763-79.*

Hostilities between the Ka'ab on the one side and the Turks and the British on the other were renewed in 1765, but not until a second attempt at reducing the tribe had been made by Karīm Khān.

Second expedition of Karim Khan against the Ka'ab, 1765.

At the beginning of May 1765, Karīm Khān was encamped at Qubbān in 'Arabistān with a large force and had requested the co-opera-

^{*}The chief authorities for the Zand period (1763-1795) in 'Arabistan are Mr. J. A. Saldanha's Selections from State Papers, Bombay, 1600-1800, and Niebuhr's Voyage on Arabic, 1776, mentioned in the footnote to the title of Chapter Eleventh.

tion of the Turks against the Ka'ab, which was readily promised but could not be immediately afforded.

Escape of the Ka'ab across the Shatt-al-'Arab.

In consequence of the unpreparedness of the Turks, Shaikh Salmān, who now possessed a fleet of 10 or 12 war Gallivats besides some 70 trading Dānaks, had no difficulty in eluding Karīm Khān by crossing one stream or back-water after another; and ultimately he found safety in Ottoman territory on the western bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab. The Vakīl, disgusted by the non-arrival of his allies, abandoned the campaign just at the moment when the Turks had completed their preparations and were on the point of starting from Basrah; and about the middle of May he apparently broke up his force, sending a part of it to join in the operations which were then being commenced by his general Amīr Kuhneh Khān against Mīr Mahanna, the piratical chief of Rīg.

Destruction of Dorag and the Sableh dam.

Karīm Khān had however been able, besides destroying Dorag. which he found deserted, to inflict a very serious and permanent injury upon the rebellious tribe. The lands of Qubban, the original capital of the Ka'ab in 'Arabistan, seem from a recent examination of the ground to have been watered by two canals or streams from the Karun, of which one left the river by the Marid creek and fell into Khor Qanaqeh near Qubban, while the other, known as the Salmaneh or Salmaniveh possibly from the name of Shaikh Salman himself, had its head near an island similarly named. The supply of water in the former was dependent on a masonry dam, of which the remains are still visible close to the entrance of the Marid creek. Opposite to Marid, on the right bank of the Kārūn, was another Ka'ab settlement, Sābleh or Sableh, by which name the dam was commonly called. Karim Khān, in the course of his operations, demolished the Sableh dam, thereby greatly impairing the prosperity of Qubban; and it seems probable that the Sableh settlement also, of which nothing is heard in the later history of the Ka'ab tribe. was annihilated on the same occasion. It is probable that the transfer of the Ka'ab capital from Qubban to Fallahiyeh took place at this time.

Third Anglo-Turkish expedition against the Ka'ab and depredation of the tribe upon British shipping, 1765.

Third Anglo-Turkish expedition, The Turks, as related in the history of Turkish 'Irāq, had now secured British aid at Basrah and were unwilling to abandon, merely

on account of the withdrawal of the Persians from the affair, their projected campaign against the Ka'ab; but they carried it out in such a spiritless manner, without even crossing the Shatt-al-'Arab into the enemy's country or making use of a British vessel which they had engaged, that they actually suffered more loss than they inflicted. Before the return of the Turks to Basrah, a nominal peace was arranged between them and the Ka'ab, in which the British—so the Ka'ab Shaikh afterwards asserted—were not mentioned; and not long afterwards the name of Salmān, whom the hostile attitude of the British had greatly exasperated, became known even in distant Europe through an audacious attack, unprecedented in the annals of the Persian Gulf, upon British shipping.

June 1765; its failure.

After the failure of the Anglo-Turkish expedition the British representatives at Basrah had at first some fear of consequences; but, having overcome it, they sent a sloop or yacht belonging to the Company to Khārag, where she arrived about the 20th of June, to make it generally known that there was no longer any danger from the Ka'ab. On the 10th of July, however, part of the Ka'ab fleet was seen near Khārag, apparently united to that of Mīr Mahanna, with whom Shaikh Salmān was ordinarily on bad terms, but whom he now resembled in being at war with Persia and in having a grievance against the British; and on the 18th of July, as the "Sally," a two-masted snow from Madras, was sailing up the Shatt-al-'Arab by night, she was met not far from Basrah by several boats, to which the officer of the watch paid no attention, but from which a number of Ka'ab presently threw themselves on board the "Sally" with loud shouts, capturing her almost before the captain could leave his cabin.

Capture by the Ka'ab of the "Sally," 18th July 1765.

Meanwhile the Company's yacht, which had left Khārag on the 9th of July under convoy of the "Fort William," a Bengal ship of three masts, for fear of Mīr Mahanna's Gallivats, had arrived in the river; and, on the day after the misfortune to the "Sally," she too was encountered and taken by the Ka'ab, as they were going down the river with their prize.

Capture by the Ka'ab of a British yacht, 19th July 1765.

The success of the Arabs did not end here, for near the mouth of the river they came upon the "Fort William" herself, whose commander, seeing two British vessels already in their power stood back for the Gulf to gain sea-room for his ship; but she unfortunately ran aground upon the bar. The Ka'ab, perceiving what had happened, waited until the ebb threw her upon her side and so rendered her guns useless, when they

Capture by the Ka ab of the "Fort William," 19th July 1765. boarded and captured her also, taking the whole crew prisoners. The traveller Niebuhr narrowly escaped becoming a passenger by this vessel from Khārag to Basrah: had it been otherwise an interesting chapter might have been added to his journal. On the "Fort William" floating again with the rise of the tide, the Ka'ab carried her off to Qubbān along with the "Sally" and the yacht, presumably by way of Khor Mūsa and Khor Qanāqeh. The value of the two larger vessels and their cargoes was afterwards estimated at Rs. 3,90,930.

Consequent negotiations between the Agent at Basrah, the Ka'ab Shaikh and the Turks, July-August 1765.

The East India Company's Agent at Basrah, Mr. Wrench, on the assumption that the Ka'ab were subjects of the Porte, immediately applied to the Mutasallim of Basrah for redress; and the Mutasallim, accepting the position, at once sent a messenger to Shaikh Salmān with letters from himself and the Agent.

The answer of the Shaikh, received on the 26th of July, was that he had a claim against the East India Company arising out of proceedings of their Resident, Mr. Shaw, and their Agent, Mr. Price, the former of whom he represented as having seized lands, the property of his subjects, at Magil and Silaik; but this was a mere falsehood, for the lands in question were known to have been regularly purchased by Mr. Shaw from the rightful owners. The Agent was successful, however, in obtaining the release of Captains Phillips and Holland with all their officers, but only by sending the Shaikh, at his own request, "a treaty of peace to be continued on the old footing between the Hon'ble Company and him," and Salmān refused to restore the captured ships until the treaty should have been approved and returned by the Bombay Government.

The Agent, who evidently regarded the treaty with the Shaikh "as a matter of form, only calculated on purpose to get our people out of his hands," then proceeded to discuss the situation with the Turkish authorities, who promised, on condition of being supported by a British naval force, to attack the Ka'ab by land, and agreed that the British on these terms should receive half the spoils of war, excepting of course the British vessels taken, which, if recovered, were to go entirely to the owners.

In addressing the Government of Bombay, the Agent and Council laid much stress on the interruption to commerce which would ensue if the Ka'ab Shaikh were not quickly brought to his senses; and they recommended the despatch from India "of two at least of the capital cruizers "with the 'Eagle' or any small vessels that draw but little water, also

"four or more Gallivats which last will be much wanted to pursue him "up the creek, but which however we submit to your better judgment."

During the month of September 1765 the Ka'ab occupied themselves, as explained in the history of Turkish 'Irāq, in stripping the date plantations in Turkish territory immediately below Basrah of their fruit; and their example was followed by the Muntafik tribe, who also moved into the district on pretext of defending it against the Ka'ab.

Fourth Anglo-Turkish expedition against the Ka'ab, 1766.

The gravity of the situation seems to have been appreciated by the Bombay Government, who, at the beginning of January 1766, complied with the suggestions of the Agent and Council by despatching a naval and military force to the Gulf under the command of Captain Lesly Baillie and Captain John Brewer. It consisted of the grab "Bombay," the ketch "Success," the schooners "Dolphin" and "Tyger," the Gallivat "Wolf," and the storeship "Fame," the last mentioned of these being a chartered vessel, and of 50 European infantry, 15 European artillery, 150 sepoys and 25 lascars. Captain Baillie, at starting, received orders to establish a naval blockade of the Ka'ab on his way to Basrah, by stationing some of his vessels at suitable points.

The instructions sent to the Agent and Council were that they should, immediately on the blockade being formed, address a direct demand to the Ka'ab for restitution of the British ships and their cargoes and for compensation on account of their detention and of the expense incurred by the East India Company in sending the expedition; and, should these points be conceded, they were then, on condition of the Ka'ab Shaikh undertaking never in future to molest the Company's trade, to engage that the Company on their part should not again interfere in any dispute between him and his neighbours. If, however, the Shaikh proved impracticable, the Agent and Council were to have recourse to the Turks and propose joint action with them against the Ka'ab, upon condition of the Turkish forces being prepared to start immediately and of the Turkish officials agreeing to make satisfactory arrangements for the discharge of a large debt then due by one Hāji Yūsuf to the Company; but, if these requirements were not fulfilled, the British force was to "proceed alone and pursue the most effectual measures for re-taking our vessels and destroying those of the Chaub."

Action and orders of the Government of Bombay, January 1766.

Proceedings of the Agent and Council at Passah on arrival of the expedition, March-May 1766.

Captain Baillie, with the vessels under his command, touched at Bushehr on the 10th of March 1766 and left again for Basrah on the 18th. It appears that the Agent and Council at Basrah, partly because they believed that a separate peace between themselves and the Ka'ab would not avail to restore commercial security, while it would certainly injure their relations with the Turks, partly because they had led the Pāsha and Mutasallim to rely on British assistance being granted, and partly because, in the opinion of the Commanders, the British force was too weak to attempt operations on land without allies, took upon themselves to disregard the instructions which they had received from Bombay for dealing with the Ka'ab alone in the first instance, and at once proceeded to arrange for the co-operation of a Turkish force. One preliminary engagement only seems to have taken place between the vessels of the British expedition and the Ka'ab fleet; and the latter having had the worst of it, retired "with a most artful alacrity" into the neighbourhood of Doraq, where they were at once safe from naval attack. The Turks as usual were slow to move, and, at the Mutasallim's request, an unsuccessful application was made to the Shaikh of Büshehr for his assistance; but eventually, before the end of May, a Turkish camp was formed somewhere below Basrah; and the British snow "Tartar," which had meanwhile arrived from the Gulf, was sent to lie beside it. The bulk of the British expeditionary force had now, apparently, been collected in or near Khor Mūsa: it was under the command of Captain Andrew Nesbitt, probably on account of the illness of Captain Baillie, who died only a few weeks later.

Repulse of a British attack on Mansur fort, May 1766. Towards the end of May, Captain Nesbitt sent Lieutenant Dutton with a number of armed boats "to reconnoitre and examine the river of * Dourack;" and the result was the discovery of a number of native vessels, which were lying, without their upper masts, in a small creek near to a newly-erected fort named Mansur. Captain Nesbitt, though he feared that little could be effected without the assistance of the Turks, sent the "Success," "Dolphin," and "Wolf," along with a launch, the barge of the "Bombay," and two or three armed Trankis, to destroy the vessels sighted,—a task which they effectually performed; but a further attempt to take the fort itself was unsuccessful, "for want of water and people to drag the guns, being

^{*}The details of the expedition are not easily followed, as but few names are given in the records, and not all of these are identifiable with certainty. The "river of Dourack" may have been either what is now known as Khor Dōraq, or the great Khor—Khor Mūsa—of which Khor Dōraq is a branch,

seven miles from the place of their landing;" and it ended in a midnight retreat. The casualties however were small, consisting of Lieutenant (not Captain) Nesbitt and a European gunner killed and four others wounded.

Before this check occurred, the Ka'ab Shaikh had opened a correspondence with the Agent and Council at Basrah, to whom he even made proposals for an accommodation, and, in reply, he had been informed of the British demands; but it was not believed that he had, as yet, any serious desire for a settlement.

The Agent and Council also endeavoured, without success, to induce the Mutasallim of Basrah to take the field with his troops. The excuse of that official was, at first, that he must await reinforcements which would probably be sent him from Baghdad; and, after the news of the British reverse had been received, he declined to move on the ground that the Kehiyah was actually on his way from the capital with a body of troops, which proved to be the case. That the Turks were thus, in the end, induced to move was probably due to an announcement by the Agent that the services of the British squadron—some vessels of which already stood in need of repairs, while sickness, though the hot weather had not yet begun, was increasing on board-must, if continued beyond the end of June, be paid for by the Turkish Government at the rate of 1,000 Tumans a month; and such was the anxiety of the Pasha lest he should be left to deal with the Ka'ab alone, or lest the Company's factory should be withdrawn, as was also threatened, from Basrah, that he readily agreed to these somewhat* stringent terms. The Kehiyah, Muhammad or Mahmud Agha, ultimately arrived at Basrah on the 25th of June, bringing with him about 1,500 men; and a few days later he joined the Turkish camp, relieving the Mutasallim not only of the command of the military forces but also of the principal civil or political control.

A letter which the Agent addressed to Karim Khān, the Vakīl of Persia, requesting him not to afford asylum to any fugitive Ka'ab, remained unanswered.

To trace with precision the movements of the forces employed in Turkish 'Arabistan is impossible; but it would seem that, while the British operated from the side of Khor Mūsa, the Turks had their base

Negotiations of the Agent and Council with the Ka'ab, the Turks, and the Persians. May-June 1766.

advance into 'Arabistan, July-August 1766.

^{*} According to a letter from the Agency, the rate fixed was in excess of the actual cost of maintaining the squadron; but there were, of course, other heavy items of expense to the Company, such as wear and tear of ships and loss of profitable employment.

somewhere on the Kārūn. One of the first proceedings of the Turkish Commander was to order the Captain Pasha to proceed with all his galleys to Qubban, where he duly* arrived in safety, accompanied by the British Gallivat "Wolf;" and so great was the moral effect produced by his appearance there that not only did the Ka'ab garrison evacuate the Qubban fort without resistance, but a whole tribe of Shaikh Salman's subjects, those who were accounted his best musketeers, deserted him and came in, partly to the Kehiyah's camp and partly to the British ships, asking protection for themselves and their families. The Ka'ab Shaikh was now supposed to be in great straits, it was even reported that "his troops wou'd all desert him, but that he keeps their chiefs continually within his sight and on the least suspicion commits the most horrid barbarities," and a strong impression prevailed that, if the Turks would only advance into the heart of his country, he must yield; but the Turkish Commander had now begun to discover pretexts for delay. Fresh overtures were made by Shaikh Salman, at this time, to the British authorities; advantage was taken of them to stimulate the Kehiyah, who did not desire a settlement at this stage, to more vigorous action. In the end he was persuaded to advance against the Ka'ab, and promised to push on until he should reach Khor Mūsa and encamp beside the British flect.

Accidental fray and destruction of the "Sally" and "Fort William," 23rd August 1766.

On the 23rd of August, no junction between the British squadron and the Turkish land forces having as yet been effected, Captain Nesbitt was persuaded to meet Ghānim, at son of the Ka'ab Shaikh, on shore within a mile of the so-called "lower fort" of the Ka'ab, where the "Sally" and "Fort William," the two captured British vessels, were then lying. Ghānim, however, instead of proposing reasonable terms, behaved with great insolence; and Captain Nesbitt, discovering by various indications that a treacherous massacre of himself and his whole party was intended, took the initiative and attacked the Arabs. In this affair, which occurred about 5 o'clock in the afternoon, the British had one European and one sepoy killed and five Europeans and three Indians wounded, while on the other side Ghānim was dangerously wounded and several Shaikhs and others were killed and wounded. About 10 o'clock the same evening, Captain Nesbitt attempted to recapture the "Sally" and the "Fort William" by boarding, but the enemy at

^{*} As the Sableh dam had been destroyed in 1765, it is probable that the Kapitan Pasha went to Qubban $vi\hat{a}$ the Shatt, the Persian Gulf, Khor Musa and Khor Qanaqeh.

[†] According to another account this Ghanim, if he was the same who afterwards became Shaikh of the Ka'ab, was a nephew not a son of Shaikh Salman.

the last moment set them on fire, and the British were consequently unable to do more than ensure their complete destruction by standing by until they had burned down to the water's edge.

The Agent and Council, who had previously given orders that persons appearing to treat for peace on behalf of the Ka'ab should be sent under a safe conduct to Basrah, censured Captain Nesbitt for having presumed to treat with Ghānim himself, especially in such dangerous surroundings; but they agreed that, "on account of the bravery the common men had shown in the affair," some booty taken on this occasion "shou'd be publickly disposed of for their benefit on the quarter-deck."

On the 30th of August, a week after the incidents just described, Captain Nesbitt brought the Turkish galleys away from Qubbān, where the Turkish camp then was, and wrote to the Kehiyah, who seems to have been at some other place, to march by land to the "lower Ka'ab fort." At the same time a military force under Captain Brewer, to which was attached a party of seamen under Lieutenants Hall and Smith, was proceeding up the "river"—in this case probably Khor Dōraq—with ammunition for the artillery. In short, a general concentration had begun, probably against the Ka'ab's main position at or near the modern Fallāhīyeh. The Kehiyah at this juncture wrote to the British Agent at Basrah, begging him to come in person to the spot, and Mr. Wrench at once set out; but, before his arrival, two serious disasters had overtaken the allied arms.

Concentration against the Ka'ab main position, September 1766.

The first befell the Turks, nine of whose galleys out of twelve, among them the flagship, were burnt by the enemy: this accident was due to the negligence of the Turks "in not sending out the necessary scouts," and it entailed the loss of all their powder and of most of their other ammunition. After this, on several successive nights, the Ka'ab attempted to take the remaining Turkish galleys; but on each occasion they were beaten off, with heavy loss, by the British schooners. On the night of the 17th September they attacked the schooners themselves with a force estimated at over a thousand men; but again they were repulsed, and the Turks, pursuing them with horse and foot in their retreat, killed and captured a large number, and drove the rest into their "fort." Meanwhile one of the Trankis belonging to the British fleet was surprised and burnt by the enemy, in consequence of 2 Naiks and 20 sepoys who were on board of her having all gone to sleep; but only one of the detachment fell into the hands of the Ka'ab, who returned him to

Destruction of Turkish galleys, September 1766. the camp the next morning with his right hand, nose and ears cut off,—"which kind of cruelty had been mutually practis'd between the Chaub and the Turks all along."

Backwardness of the Turks. Captain Brewer, apparently on the 18th of September, waited upon the Mutasallim with proposals for an assault upon the enemy's "redoubts," which were at first favourably considered; but, "upon the "entrance of Shaikh Dorris, one of the principal * Ions, everything was "disconcerted, and he had reason to believe the Chaub had intelligence "thereof that night from the same quarter." The Mutasallim afterwards requested Captain Brewer to wait for three days, as he was in expectation of receiving help from the Persians; and that officer, who had now begun to despair even of Turkish assistance, got timber ready for scaling ladders, and made other dispositions for carrying out the assault with his own unaided resources.

Absence of medical aid with the British forces.

The doctor with the British forces being ill, Captain Brewer applied for one to be sent from Basrah; and the Council there were able, after some delay, to obtain the services of the physician to the French Residency, on pay of three francs a day in addition to his food and an allowance for a servant or interpreter.

Failure of British assault on the Ka'ab redoubts, 23rd September 1766, and re-embarkation of the British force. On the 23rd of September, the very day of the Agent's arrival in the "Tartar" at Doraqistan, by which the entrance of Khor Mūsa is probably meant, a most unlucky attack was made on the Ka'ab redoubts by a British force without the co-operation, it would appear, of the Turks: it resulted in the loss of Captain Brewer, two Lieutenants, a sergeant and 18 others, killed on the spot, and of 32 dangerously wounded, besides which the field guns landed were captured by the enemy, also 13 chests of ammunition. After this disaster, under the instructions of Mr. Wrench, who was dissuaded from proceeding up the Khor on the ground that both banks were now lined by the enemy and that his presence would serve no useful purpose, the British force was reembarked, with the exception of six gunners who were left on shore with the Turks to help them in throwing shells.

Withdrawal of the Turks from the campaign, October 1766.

At this point in the proceedings, messengers from Karīm Khān, the Vakīl of Persia, arrived upon the scene with letters for the Kehiyah and the British Agent at Basrah, in which he required them to desist from attacking the Ka'ab, who were his subjects, and to withdraw from Persian territory, but in which he promised at the same time to compel

^{*} That is, A'yan or native notables of the Basrah district: see page 1215 ante.

the Ka'ab Shaikh to make reparation for the injuries inflicted by him on the British and on the Turks. The Kehiyah opened, and for some time withheld, the letter from the Agent, though it had been handed to him by a British officer for transmission; but he communicated the substance of it to Mr. Wrench, who had meanwhile returned to Basrah, informing him that he intended to comply with the Persian demand, as, if he did not, war between Persia and Turkey might be the result. The Turkish force then retired from the neighbourhood of the Ka'ab capital upon Qubbān.

After receiving the Kehiyah's communication on the 7th of October, the Agent and Council deputed Mr. Skipp, one of their number, to visit the Kehiyah and protest against his decision, explaining that the British looked to the Turks for redress and that they had nothing to do with the Persians. Mr. Skipp, in the "Tartar," left Basrah on the 10th of October for Khor Mūsa; but, discovering by the way that the Kehiyah was now at Qubban, he dismissed his vessel and proceeded thither via the Karun. The Kehiyah assured Mr. Skipp that his retirement was provisional, pending the receipt of replies from the Pasha of Baghdad and Karīm Khān, to both of whom he had written, and that his Council of notables had been unanimous in considering it necessary; he particularly requested that the British vessels might be left where they were then stationed, their expenses still continuing to be defrayed by the Turks; he undertook that certain promises which he had made to the Agent at Basrah, in consideration of the help given to the Turks, should be fulfilled; and he excused himself for his detention of Karim Khān's letter to Mr. Wrench, which he now handed to Mr. Skipp, by alleging that he had feared it might miscarry. The Kehiyah also announced that, in the course of a few days, he would remove his camp to the mouth of the Kārūn, "where he entreated the Agent wou'd favour him with an interview, when he would settle every point with him so as to give full satisfaction." Mr. Skipp returned to Basrah on the 16th of October and made his report in Council on the following day,

On the 19th, Mr. Skipp having fallen ill, it was decided to send Mr. Hollamby to the Kehiyah to impress on him very clearly the responsibility of the Turks for redress of injuries suffered by the British from the Ka'ab, to insist on the punctual discharge of the instalments of the subsidy for the squadron, and to decline the interview offered to the Agent on the ground that the latter was indisposed; but the result of

this further step, if indeed it was actually taken, is not ascertainable,

Deputation
of Mr. Skipp
to the
Kehiyah,
10th—16th
October
1766.

Proposed deputation of Mr. Hollamby to the Kehiyah, 19th October 1766.

Subsequent negotiations and unsuccessful blockade, 1766-69.

Despatch of reinforcements by the Government of Bombay, January 1767.

The seriousness of the situation resulting from the defeat of the allies by the Ka'ab was clearly realised by the Government of Bombay, who resolved, on learning of the defeat, "to take the most speedy and effectual measures for retrieving our credit and bringing matters to such "an issue, as will admit of our force being returned to the Presidency, "the long detention of which in the Gulph is of the utmost detriment "to our Hon'ble Masters' interest here, and attended with many incon-"veniences to their affairs." They accordingly despatched to Basrah, in or about January 1767, the "Solebay," the "Defiance," the bomb-ketch "Salamander," the snow "Eagle," and a chartered merchant ship carrying provisions; in these sailed military reinforcements to the extent of one complete company of European infantry, two officers and 30 men of the artillery, and 75 sepoys.

Ultimate failure of the British to obtain satisfaction for Ka'ab outrages, 1767-68.

The Presidency were, however, opposed to the continuance of the war by the British without efficient local allies; and the instructions which they gave resulted, in conjunction with an embassy soon after sent by Karīm Khān to Basrah and Baghdād, in the settlement of the Ka'ab case being transferred to Shīrāz, as is fully related in the history of the Persian Coast. The negotiations at the Persian capital, which were entrusted to Mr. Skipp, lasted from April to September 1767. They ended in an agreement by the Vakil to pay five lakhs of rupees to the East India Company, but fonly on condition of their lending him effectual aid against the pirate Mīr Mahanna of Khārag, as compensation for the damage done by the Ka'ab and the costs of the expedition; but, in consequence of the failure of the British attack on Khārag in May 1768 and the ill-judged recall of Mr. Skipp from a second mission to Shīrāz in the following September, for which the Agent at Basrah (Mr. Moore) was responsible, the understanding apparently lapsed. In the end no satisfaction at all was obtained, from any quarter, for the outrages which had been committed by the Ka'ab upon British shipping.

Naval blockade of the Ka'ab, 1766-69. Notwithstanding the political negotiations described in the last paragraph, the naval blockade of the Ka'ab waterways, established at the beginning of the war, appears to have been steadily maintained for about two years. In October 1767, when the ill-fated "Defiance" and other vessels were sent on an expedition against Hormuz, the grab "Bombay," a schooner and a Gallivat were apparently retained in the Shatt-al-'Arab

for this service; and at the beginning of February 1768 the mouth of the Kārūn was still watched by two schooners, a Gallivat, and some small Turkish vessels. By October 1768 the blockade had probably been relaxed, for it was reported by the Agent and Council at Basrah that the Ka'ab were building forts "on each side of the river," presumably of the Shatt-al-'Arab; that the Turks were not in a position to prevent it: and that they themselves were resolved not to interfere, but intended in the future to keep half of the British squadron at Basrah, as a measure of precaution.

The Squadron, it should be mentioned, had now fallen into such a "melancholy condition as well with respect to stores as men," that the Agent and Council feared that they might presently be obliged to lay up the smaller cruisers in order to man and store the larger ones: and about the same time the Ka'ab ventured to send the "Fort William's" cargo over to Basrah, where it was sold, obliging the Agent and Council to take action "as well with respect to the Moor and Armenian merchants, as Mr. Robert Garden in behalf of his Bengal constituents."

The famous Ka'ab Shaikh Salman* appears to have died about the Chiefship critical year 1766, probably after the conclusion of the British operations against the tribe, for no mention is made before then of his decease. He was succeeded by his son or nephew Ghanim, who was murdered in 1769.

of the Ka'ab, 1766-69.

Relations of the Ka'ab with the British and the Turks from 1769 to 1779.

In the autumn of 1769, as related in the history of Turkish 'Iraq, the Ka'ab actually came to the assistance of the Turkish government of Basrah against the Muntafik with 14 Gallivats, of which 9 proceeded up the river on service with the Captain Pasha, while 5 remained anchored off Manawi. On this occasion the following not unnatural entry was made in the Diary of the British Factory at Basrah: "It is a galling "circumstance to have the Chaub's Gallivats under the very muzzles of our

Assistance lent by the Ka'ab to the Turks against the Muntafik. 1769.

^{*}Lieutenant A. T. Wilson states, on native authority, that Shaikh Salman died in 1768; that his immediate successor was his son Ghānim, who died a year later; that Ghanim was followed in the Shaikhship by Dawud-bin-Salman, who was killed after six months; and that Dawud was succeeded by Barhat-bin-'Othman in 1769. See his Précis of the Relations of the British Government with the tribes and Shaikhs of 'Arabistan, 1912, page 5.

"Cruizers and not dare to touch them—to think of it would be madness, "considering the Chaub's present connection with the Turks and our "present situation." It was said at the time that both the Pāsha and the Mutasallim had sent the Qurān with their signets to the Ka'ab Shaikh as pledges for the security of the Gallivats sent to their assistance, and that the Shaikh—now no longer Salmān—was heartily disgusted with the Persian connection to which his tribe were committed, and which had cost them more in taxes in three years than their previous dependence on the Turks in twelve.

Tribal affairs and suggested revival of the British claim, 1771. In August 1771 the Ka'ab fleet consisted of 14 or 15 Gallivats, and a new Shaikh of the tribe, probably Barkat, who is said to have ruled from 1770 to 1782, was reported to have put out the eyes of Bāsbūs, the sole surviving son of his uncle and predecessor Salmān. At this time the Government of Bombay had suggested to the Agent and Council at Basrah that they should approach the Ka'ab Chief on the subject of compensation for the losses of 1765; but the local officials were opposed to such a step, partly because the regnant Shaikh was "by all accounts as avaritious as the former ones" and would never disgorge anything except under compulsion, and partly because virtual peace prevailed, which might be disturbed by the revival of old demands, especially if these were not backed by force; and no action apparently was taken. The Turks, notwithstanding that they were on friendly terms with the Ka'ab, were still unable to obtain payment of an old claim for over Rs. 20,000 which they entertained.

Fresh rupture between the Ka'ab and the Turks, 1773.

Apparent disinclination of the Ka'ab to assist the Persian Government, 1773-74. Towards the end of 1773, the Ka'ab and the Turks were again at variance, and the former had blockaded the Shatt-al-'Arab with three Gallivats, stopping the trade of Basrah.

A little later, having received orders from Karīm Khān to reinforce a fleet which was being collected at Kangūn for action against the Imām of Masqat, the Ka'ab Shaikh, it was stated, scuttled some of his vessels and displayed them in that condition to the messengers of the Vakīl as a proof of his inability to obey. Early in the next year, likewise, the Shaikh excused himself from complying with a demand that he should send a contingent of 500 men to the assistance of Zaki Khan at Bandar 'Abbās; and not long after, when rumours that Karīm Khān had designs on Basrah began to circulate, he assured the Turkish Mutasallim of Basrah that instead of helping the Persians to attack the place, he would at once, upon their troops marching from Shīrāz, remove from Dōraq with the whole of his fleet. Indeed, the allegiance of the Ka'ab to Persia was at this time so doubtful that the Mutasallim seems to

have had hopes of active assistance from the tribe; and he even thought it worth while to obtain an assurance from the British Agent that the Ka'ab vessels, if they came to take part in the defence of Basrah against the Persians, should not be molested by the British squadron.

So far, however, was the Ka'ab Shaikh from being at heart well affected to the Turks that, on the arrival of a Turkish vessel, the "Faiz Islām." at the mouth of the Shatt-al-'Arab, he despatched the whole of his fleet, consisting of 14 Gallivats and 8 armed boats, to take her. Mutasallim of Basrah, having received notice of this movement, applied to the British Agent for help; and the "Revenge" was immediately sent to the spot. Arriving at the place on the 13th April 1774, she found the "Faiz Islām" anchored outside the bar and the Ka'ab fleet inside it, in which position they had been facing each other for three days; and, from the circumstance that the Ka'ab Chief's Vakil was withdrawn from Basrah that very morning, it seems probable that, but for the opportune appearance of the "Revenge," the ship would shortly have been attacked The Ka'ab vanished at the sight of the British cruiser; by the Gallivats. and the" Revenge "and the "Faiz Islam," in company, reached Basrah safely on the 15th of April. The Ka'ab Shaikh then assumed a threatening attitude, recalled his subjects from Basrah, whence they withdrew on the evening of the 17th of April, and collected his fleet at the mouth of the Kārūn; and it was suspected that, possibly at the instigation of Karīm Khān, he meditated a descent upon Basrah town, or a night attack upon the British squadron stationed there; but the apparent crisis passed harmlessly over.

In January 1775, when fears of a Persian attack on Basrah had again begun to be entertained, much alarm was caused there by the conduct of the Ka'ab, who, in revenge for the execution by the Mutasallim of a robber belonging to their tribe, came up the river in small boats on several nights in succession, entered the town in parties, and plundered private houses, disappearing towards the morning with their booty. The Mutasallim, to put a stop to these disorders, strengthened the town guard by hiring Arabs from Zubair and compelling the citizens to take a share in the duties of watch and ward; but the great extent of the town favoured the intruders, who continued to pillage as before, several times beat off armed parties sent to oppose them, and on one occasion attempted to set fire to the bazaar.

On the 21st of March 1775, a few days before the siege of Basrah by the Persians actually began, 14 Ka'ab Gallivats passed up the river to join the Persian camp near Qurnah and were attacked, as they went,

Attempt by the Ka'ab to capture the Turkish vessel "Faiz Islām," 1774.

Nocturnal raids by the Ka'ab on Basrah town, January 1775.

Proceedings of the Ka'ab fleet at the sieze of Basrah by the Persians, including a collision with the British squadron, 1775-76.

by the British squadron at Basrah, with the results described in the history of Turkish 'Irāq. One of them, captured by the "Eagle," was $8\pm$ feet long and 24 feet broad, "built forward like a London wherry, with a pink or lute stern;" she had one tall mast, raking forward, to which was attached a big sail; she could be propelled also with 24 oars; and her armament consisted of ten 6-pounders, mounted on carriages. In April 1776, after the surrender of the town by the Turks, the whole of the remaining Ka'ab Gallivats were reported to be anchored off Manāwi except two or three which had been sent to Dōraq for repairs. On learning of the success of the Persian operations at Basrāh, Karīm Khān sent orders to Sādiq Khan to "summons the Chaub Shaikh Barrakat thither and advice him of the result;" but nothing is known of either the reason or the outcome of these instructions.

Seizure and return by the Ka'ab of the property of Bushehr merchants, 1778-79.

In August 1777, some property belonging to Büshehr merchants was captured, probably at sea, by the Ka'ab Shaikh or his subjects; but about January 1778, in consequence of orders from Karīm Khān, the goods were restored to the owners.

RULERS OF THE ZAND DYNASTY AFTER KARĪM KHĀN, 1779-95.

A sketch of the general history of Persia under the immediate successors of Karīm Khān will be found in the chapter of this volume which deals with the affairs of the Persian Coast. It will be seen, on referring to the account there given, that 'Arabistān was not the scene during the period in question of any transaction of national importance. A part of the province must have been included in the jurisdiction of Ja'far Khān, when, during the reign of his father Sādiq Khān, he was governor over Behbehān and Shūshtar.

Internal history of 'Arabistan, 1779-95.

Successive Shaikhs of the Ka'ab. Of the internal history of the province under the later Zands very little is known; but it seems certain that the Ka'ab tribe continued to be predominant in the districts of 'Arabistan adjoining the Persian Gulf and to enjoy virtual independence in all local matters. The Ka'ab

Shaikh Barkat was murdered in 1782, when he was succeeded by his cousin Ghadhbān-bin-Salmān; and the latter was killed in 1792, Mubārak-bin-Barkat taking his place. Mubārak was ousted by Fāris-bin-Dāwud in 1794; and Fāris, in his turn, made way for a stranger or distant relation named 'Alwān in 1795.

Of Shūshtar, "a city of considerable importance in regard to the commercial intercourse which subsists between it and Basrah, and on account of its manufacture of chintz," it was reported in 1790 that the government "is in the hands of a Khan who, secure in his situation, has "for some years past but slightly acknowledged the superiority of the "Government at Sherauze, but his independence is restrained at home by "the authority possessed by the elders of the city, who are always "watchful to prevent his abuse of power."

Shushtar in

External relations of 'Arabistan, 1779-95.

During the latter part of the eighteenth century, a political crisis at Basrah was sure to attract the instant close attention of the Ka'ab Shaikh; and the evacuation of the town by the Persians in the spring of 1779 formed no exception to the general rule. The irreproachable conduct of the Ka'ab on this occasion, towards the temporary Arab government of the town and towards the British Residency, is described in another place, in the history of Turkish 'Irāq. Sādiq Khān, the commander of the retiring Persian garrison, passed through Dōraq on his homeward march.

The Ka'ab at the evacuation of Basrah, 1779.

The Tangistāni Chief, Bāqir Khān, in his usurpation of the government of Būshehr in July 1779, "depended much upon succour from the Chaub, whom he solicited as soon as he got possession of Bushire;" but, as related in the history of the Persian Coast, the Ka'ab Shaikh, who was then engaged in an unsuccessful war with some powerful neighbour, failed to afford him any real assistance.

The Ka'ab and Baqir Khān's seizure of Büshehr 1779.

In July 1780 the Ka'ab tribe were at war with the 'Utūb, both of Zubārah in Qatar and of Kuwait; but the causes, character and results of the conflict are all equally unascertainable.

The Ka'ab at war with the 'Utūb, 1780.

With the Turks and Arabs of the Basrah neighbourhood, the relations of the Ka'ab continued to be uncertain and fluctuating. Under their Shaikh Barkat the Ka'ab, at some time prior to 1782, "seized from the Turkish proprietors the extensive and fertile district of Boojidee between Tamar and Haffar, and bestowed it upon the Bawee Arabs, into which tribe he had married." Towards the end of 1784 there was war between

Relations of the Ka'ab with the Turks, 1784: 91. the Turks and the Ka'ab; and the Muntafik tribe, whose chief Thuwaini was at this time acting with the Turks, made a remarkable incursion into the Ka'ab country in the month of November, mention of which is made in the history of Turkish 'Iraq. In 1787, on the other hand, when Basrah was temporarily seized by Thuwaini, the Ka'ab appear to have co-operated with the Turkish authorities in suppressing his rebellion. Shaikh Ghadhbān, who ruled from 1782 to 1792, it is* recorded that he "took possession of the entire left bank of the Shat-el-Arab as far up as "Gardelan, and even colonised with the Chaab the right bank of the river "from the sea to within ten miles of Bussorah. He might have taken "possession of the town of Bussorah itself; but he dreaded the too great "extension of his territory, and eventually he deemed it his safer policy "to withdraw altogether from the right bank of the Shat-el-Arab and "to concentrate his forces between the Shat and the Jerrahi." autumn of 1791, as is more fully explained in the history of Turkish 'Iraq, a naval encounter took place between the Ka'ab flect and some 'Omāni ships with cargoes of coffee, which were bound for Basrah. Ka'ab, whose maritime efficiency must now have been on the decline, were worsted by the stranger vessels and had the greater number of their Gallivats destroyed,-a loss which they prepared to revenge by intercepting the 'Omanis on their return from Basrah, and for which they also proposed to hold the Turks responsible. At the end of the year there was an inconclusive engagement between a Turkish fleet, convoying the visitors down the Shatt-al-'Arab and some batteries which the Ka'ab had erected on the Turkish bank of the river; but the Turks, though greatly irritated by the action of the Ka'ab, do not appear to have taken any further measures against them. During the continuance of this dispute "the Chaub Shaik gave very acceptable proofs of his friendship "towards the English nation in permitting the Gallivat hired by the "Resident for the conveyance of Major MacDonald from Bussora to "Muscat to pass his batteries in the most honourable manner, as on other "occasions."

ĀGHA MUHAMMAD KHĀN.

1795-97.

We have little information regarding the condition of 'Arabistān or the progress of events in that province during the reign of Agha Muhammad Khān, the first of the Qājār sovereigns of Persia, who ruled

^{*} See Major Rawlinson's Memorandum on the Dispute, etc., 1844.

from 1795 to 1797. The Shaikhship of the Ka'ab tribe was apparently held at this time by 'Alwan, who usurped it in 1795 and retained it till 1801. Pīshkash or tribute to the amount of 4,000 Tūmāns per annum, being the sum paid by the Afshār inhabitants of the district before their expulsion by the Ka'ab, was now assessed upon the latter in their place by the Persian Government; but on the average not more than one-fourth of the demand could be collected. Presents of horses and money were frequently sent, however, by the Ka'ab Shaikh to the Governor-General of Fārs at Shīrāz.

FAT-H 'ALI SHAH, * 1797-1834.

Under Fat-h 'Ali Shāh 'Arabistān began to be treated as a province, in fact as well as in theory, of the Persian Empire; and one result of the change was that it emerged, in part at least, from the obscurity in which it had remained shrouded since the Anglo-Turkish expedition against the Ka'ab tribe in 1766.

Relations of the Persian central Government with 'Arabistān, 1797-1834.

One of the first Governors of 'Arabistān appointed, or continued in office, by Fat-h 'Ali Shāh was Mīrza Abul Hasan, a travelled Persian, afterwards Envoy to the British Court. The seat of his administration was Shūshtar, then by far the most important place in the province. He was a nephew, on his mother's side, of the Prime Minister Hāji Ibrāhīm, whose daughter he also married; and in 1801 or 1802, on the downfall of his influential relative, his tenure of 'Arabistān came to a sudden end.

in Government of Mirza
Abul
on Hasan,
H e before 1801.

Mīrza Abul Hasan was succeeded immediately, or after a short interval, by Fat-h 'Ali Shāh's eldest son, Muhammad 'Ali Mīrza, who held charge of Kirmānshāh and Persian Kurdistān, and with them apparently of 'Arabistān, from 1806, or some earlier date, until his death in 1821-22.

Government of Muhammad 'Ali Mirza, circa 1806-21.

^{*} The principal authorities for the history of 'Arabistan, during this period are Stocqueler's Fifteen Months' Pilgrimage, 1832; Major Rawlinson's Memorandum on the Dispute between Turkey and Persia regarding Mohamerah and the Political Position of the Chaab Tribe, 1844; Mr. A. H. Layard's Description of the Province of Kházistán, 1846; and Lord Curzon's Persia, Vol. II, 1892. See also Lieutenant A. T. Wilson's Précis of the Relations of the British Government with the Tribes and Shaikhs of 'Arabistans 1912.

This prince signalised his governorship by repairing the principal public works at Shūshtar, viz., the two dams which span the Āb-i-Gargar at its head and the Pul-i-Dizfūl; but the bridge last-mentioned, though the work on it (which was completed in 1810) had occupied four years, had cost a large sum of money, and had been executed under British supervision, was again partially destroyed by a flood in 1832. In 1818 Muhammad 'Ali Mīrza led, or sent, a force against Fallāhīyeh, and a sum of 13,000 Tūmāns was wrung from the Ka'ab Shaikh on account of arrears of the tribute which was claimed from him by the Persian Government.

Later administration, 1822-34. The Persian arrangements for the administration of 'Arabistān after 1822 are not ascertainable; but it seems likely that the province remained in a semi-subdued condition, revenue being collected at irregular intervals by military expeditions, on the withdrawal of which the local chiefs—such as the Ka'ab Shaikh and the Wāli of Hawizeh—resumed or were nominally replaced in charge of their hereditary jurisdictions. During some portion at least of Fat-h 'Ali Shāh's reign one of the principal Persian officials at Shīrāz received part of his salary in the form of an annual assignment of 1,000 Tūmāns on the tribute due from the Ka'ab tribe.

Internal history of 'Arabistan, 1797-1834.

Affairs of the Ka'ab tribe. At the beginning of Fat-h 'Ali Shāh's reign the Shaikhship of the Ka'ab was still held by 'Alwān. 'Alwān was ousted in 1801, by Muhammad-bin-Barkat, who retained his position until 1812. The successor of Muhammad was Ghaith, a grandson of the famous Shaikh Salmān; his rule began in 1812 and ended in 1828, when he was murdered. Ghaith was followed by his brother Mubādir or Mubāshir, who reigned for three years; and the latter by a Shaikh named 'Abdullah-bin-Muhammad. In or about 1832 Thāmir-bin-Ghadhbān became chief of the tribe.

Rise of the Muhaisiu tribe, and foundation and growth of Muhammarch. The foundation of the town of Muhammareh, which is assigned to the year 1812, was an important event. It contributed materially to the progress of the Muhaisin tribe, who were at first an insignificant body, but whose chief was destined in the end to supplant the Shaikh of the Ka'ab as the principal political power in Southern 'Arabistān. Muhammareh was established under the orders of Shaikh Ghaith, Ka'ab, as a military outpost against the Turks or the Arab tribes under Turkish influence, and it stood originally on both sides of the Kārūn River. The

actual founders were Mīrdāo,—the head of the Muhaisin, but a vassal or servant of the Ka'ab Shaikh,—and his son Hāji Yūsuf. These two chiefs were succeeded about 1819 by Hāji Jābir, son of Mīrdāo and brother of Hāji Yūsuf. Hāji Jābir, who resided in the part of the settlement on the right or northern bank of the Kārūn, early evinced an inclination to assert his independence of the Ka'ab chief, and engaged in various intrigues. The Ka'ab Shaikh, in order to counteract Hāji Jabir's schemes, then tightened his hold upon the part of Muhammareh situated on the left or southern bank of the river, which consequently came to be known as Kūt-ash-Shaikh or "the (Ka'ab) Shaikh's Castle." During the rule of Shaikh Ghaith the Ka'ab garrison of Kūt-ash-Shaikh was commanded by his brother Mubādir or Mubāshir; and the latter, when he succeeded to the headship of the Ka'ab, placed another brother, Thamir, in charge of the Kut. By 1830, Muhammareh -by which name only the right-bank settlement, controlled by the Muhaisin, was now meant, -had increased from a petty fort to a commercial emporium of considerable importance and had began to attract general attention.

The plague which prevailed in Turkish 'Iraq in 1831-32 also visited 'Arabistān, where it made great havoc, probably in 1832. According to a tradition, doubtless exaggerated, which was current not many years later, it even carried off a half of the entire population of the province. Shūshtar, hitherto the most important town of 'Arabistān, certainly declined about this time with extraordinary suddenness to a secondary place, being superseded by Dizfūl; and one cause of the change appears to have been the plague, which affected Shūshtar more severely than it did Dizfūl. The epidemic dealt a heavy blow to the prosperity of Hawīzeh also.

Relations of 'Arabistān with Turkey, 1797-1834.

We have seen that, during the generation which followed the unsuccessful Anglo-Turkish expedition against them in 1766, the Ka'ab tribe encroached to a considerable extent upon Ottoman territory, and at one time even planted colonies of their own upon the right or western bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab. Shaikh Ghaith, however, between 1812 and 1828, *" restored...the ancient limits of the Chaab territory as estab-"lished by Shāikh Salmān, retaining possession of nothing higher up "the Shat-el-Arab than the district of † Tamar, but he was influenced "in this withdrawal rather by a disinclination to come into collision "with the growing power of the Muntefik tribe and by the necessity

Relinquishment by the Ka'ab Shaikh of

encroach-

ments in

Basrah,

direction of

Ravages of

the plague,

circa 1832.

^{*}See Major Rawlinson's Memorandum on the D ispute, etc., 1844.

[†] The name is Tămār, not Tāmār or Tāmr, and the district has recently been identified. It lies on the east bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab about 4 miles above Failīy:h See a report by Lieutenant A. T. Wilson, on Special Duty, to the Resident in the Persian Gulf, dated 5th May 1912.

"of preparation against Persia, than by any respect for the rights or "deference to the wishes of the Turkish Government;" and it was in connection with this policy of concentration that he arranged, as already mentioned, for the establishment of a fortified frontier post on the spot where the town of Muhammareh afterwards came into existence.

Boundary between 'Arabistan and Turkish 'Iraq. The treaty which concluded the Turco-Persian frontier war of 1821-22 merely re-affirmed, in the matter of boundaries, an ancient convention of 1639 between Sultān Murād IV of Turkey and the Safavi Shāh of Persia, whereby "Khūzistān" was assigned to Persia and "'Irāq-i-'Arab" to Turkey. The meaning of such an agreement was, of course, open to dispute.

Difficulties between the Ka'ab Shaikh and the Turkish auhorities at Basrah, 1827. In 1827 Shaikh Ghaith, the Ka'ab chief, finding himself involved in difficulties with the Turkish authorities at Basrah, sought the aid of the Sultan of 'Omān; but whether for offensive or for defensive purposes is not apparent. His request was referred by the 'Omāni ruler to the British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and, having been disapproved by that authority, no aid was sent him from Masqat. Shaikh Ghaith accordingly came to terms with the Pāsha of Baghdād, to whom he sent envoys. Before peace was made he seems to have succeeded in repelling more than one attack made on Fallāhīyeh by the Turks and their allies, the Muntefik and the people of Kuwait.

British relations with 'Arabistan, 1797-1834.

Temporary sojourn of the British Political Assistant in Turkish 'Iraq at Muhammareh, 1820. Towards the end of the year 1820, as explained in the history of Turkish 'Irāq, Captain Taylor, the British Political Assistant at Basrah, removed temporarily with his establishment to Muhammareh. This he did under orders from his superior officer, the Resident at Baghdād, in consequence of a difficulty which had arisen with the Pāsha of Baghdād in regard to British rights and privileges. The fact tends to show that Muhammareh was at the time regarded as lying outside the Turkish empire, or at least beyond the range of Turkish administration and effective influence.

Visit of Mr. Stocqueler to 'Arabistan, 1831. In 1831 Mr. J. H. Stocqueler, an Anglo-Indian journalist, made a tour in the capacity of a private traveller in 'Arabistan, where he found Sheikh Mubadir ruling over the Ka'ab tribe. His observations on his visit to the country are contained in his book entitled "A Fifteen Months' Pilgrimage through untrodden Tracts of Khuzistan and Persia."

MUHAMMAD SHĀH, 1834-1848.*

During the reign of Muhammad Shāh over Persia, the principal events of which are related in the chapter on the history of the Persian Coast and Islands, a part of the province of 'Arabistān—including Muhammareh—was at first in dispute between Persia and Turkey, but was in the end awarded to Persia. In the internal history of 'Arabistān the most remarkable features of the period were an obstinate contest for superiority between the Shaikh of the Ka'ab at Fallāhīyeh and his erstwhile vassal, the Shaikh of the Muhaisin at Muhammareh, and the extension by the Persian Central Government of their own authority, in a more or less effective form, to the very banks of the Shatt-al-'Arab.

The conflict over the possession of Muhammareh, not only between Persia and Turkey but also between the Shaikh of the Ka'ab and the Shaikh of the Muhaisin, renders the political history of the province at this time so confused that it will be better to depart here to some extent from our usual division of the subject, and to treat of events chronologically in so far as Persian and Turkish interests are concerned. British and other foreign interests, however, will be separated as elsewhere from other matters and disposed of in one place for the whole period.

At the beginning of Muhammad Shāh's reign 'Arabistān consisted of three administrative districts; that of Dizfūl and Shūshtar, which was

Administrative divisions of Arabistna, 1834.

^{*} For nearly all questions connected with the history of 'Arabistan during this period Layard is the chief authority, principally in his Early Adventures in Persia, Susiana and Babylonia, 1887, but also in his Description of the Province of Khuzistun (Journal of the Royal Geographical Society), Vol. XVI, 1846, pages 1 to 105. Major Rawlinson's Memorandum on the Dispute between Turkey and Persia regarding Mohamerah and the Political Position of Chaab Tribe, 1844, contains valuable information regarding the subjects indicated by the title; and Observations on a Persian Memorandum, 1844, also by Rawlinson, throwing some light on the capture of Muhammereh by the Turks in 1837, will be found appended to Mr. Alwyn Parker's Memorandum respecting the Frontier between Mohammerah and Turkey, printed for the use of the Foreign Office in April 1912. Matters of river navigation are dealt with by Layard; but the professional authority under this head is Selby, whose Account of the Ascent of the Karun and Dizful Rivers and the Ab-i Gargar Canal to Shuster will be found in the Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, Vol. XIV, 1844, pages 219 to 246. Lieutenant C. R. Low's History of the Indian Navy, 1877, may also be consulted. Other useful works are Baron C. A. de Bode's Travels in Luristan and Arabistan, 1845; Loftus' Travels and Researches in Chaldaea and Susiana, 1857; Lord Curzon's Persia and the Persian Question, 1892; and Lieutenant A. T. Wilson's Précis of the Relations of the British Government with the Tribes and Shaikhs of Arabistan, 1912. Bombay Selection No. XXIV, The Persian Gulf, 1856, is of occasional value.

nominally under the rule of an official appointed by the Persian Government; that of Fallahiyeh and Muhammareh, which was governed by the hereditary Shaikh of the Ka'ab; and that of Hawizeh, which was subject to a hereditary Wali of Arab and Saiyid lineage.

Shūshtar and Dizfūl,

The Persian Governor "of 'Arabistān " ordinarily had his residence at Dizfūl. His authority extended only to that town and to Shūshtar, to some of the Arab tribes dependent on those two centres, and to the districts immediately adjacent. The Governor's escort rarely exceeded 50 or 60 horsemen and his salary, which he collected himself, was 5,000 Tūmāns or £2,500 a year. The Government revenue assessed on the tract under his jurisdiction was 40,000 Tūmāns annually, and account of it was kept by a Mustaufi or Accountant-General, an officer of the Central Government. Internally the towns of Dizfūl and Shūshtar were administered, in a disorderly way, by their own turbulent chiefs; but Saiyid notables, Mujtahids, and Mulla's also exercised a considerable influence in public affairs there. The Persian Governor had little real power and was generally murdered or expelled, for some act of injustice or oppression, before one year of his government had elapsed.

Fallähiyeh and Muhammareh.

The greatest power in the whole province, if we exclude the Bakhtivāri Khāns whose influence, though external, permeated the northern districts of 'Arabistan, was undoubtedly, at the beginning of the period, the Shaikh of the Ka'ab tribe, whose seat was Fallāhīyeh. authority extended in a general manner over the districts of Fallahiveh. Muhammareh, Ahwāz, Jarrāhi and Hindiyān; his control over his own tribe was almost absolute, and over the Muhaisin as yet considerable; and the Bawiyeh and Bani Tamim tribes, in the latter of which the * Sharifat seem to have been at that time included, rendered him a somewhat doubtful allegiance. His available military force, drawn from the Ka'ab, Muhaisin and Haiyādir, totalled about 7,000 men, of whom 3,000 were footmen well armed with muskets and matchlocks, 1,000 were horsemen, and the rest were indifferently equipped with swords and spears. Additional levies might possibly have been raised by him, but they would have been unprovided with useful weapons. The Shaikh's artillery consisted of three small but serviceable † English guns, respectably mounted, and served by 40 Persians who had been trained by a deserter from the Persian artillery. He possessd also several old unmounted guns

^{*} The Sharifat are represented as so numerous at this period that it almost seems necessary to suppose them identical with the present Bani Tamim.

[†] They were a 4-pounder, an 8-pounder and a 12-pounder, and may have been those lost in action by the British near Fallāhīyeh in 1766.

of various calibres and two or three mortars, which he was unable to use. Among the Shaikh's unreliable dependents, the Bāwīyeh had about 1,000 horsemen, besides some footmen destitute of good weapons, while the Sharīfāt (or Beni Tamīm) mustered 2,000 horse and 700 foot.

The annual tribute paid by the Shaikh to the Persian Governor-General of Fārs with whom and not with the Persian Governor of 'Arabistān his fiscal relations were until 1840, was only 3,400 Tūmāns or £1,700 a year, and no representative of the Persian Government resided in his dominions,—two sure indications of his virtual independence,

The holder of the Ka'ab Shaikhship in 1834 was Thāmir-bin-Ghadhbān of the Āl Bū Nāsir subdivision of the Drīs division of the tribe, who, as before mentioned, had succeeded his relative 'Abdullah-bin-Muhammad about 1832. His Wazīr or chief adviser was Hāji Mash'al of the Nassār division. Layard* says:—

Shaikh
Thāmir,
Chief of the
Ka'ab, 18321837 and
1838-1841:
his character
and internal
policy.

The countenance of Sheikh Thamer was not prepossessing. He was tall and had a somewhat commanding appearance, but his features were coarse and vulgar—unlike those of the generality of high-bred Bedouins. His forehead was almost as prominent as that of a negro, and he probably had black blood in his veins, like the descendants of many Arabs who had renounced their nomad lives, and had married slaves.

. Sheikh Thamer was undoubtedly, for an Arab, a remarkable man. The country over which he ruled owed much of the prosperity which it then enjoyed to the encouragement which he gave to agriculture and commerce, and to the protection which he afforded to strangers and merchants in his territories. Canals and

The Bawiyeh and the Sharifat were a source of constant trouble to Shaikh Thamir, and the former tribe more than once rose in arms against him. The manner in which they were accustomed to take part with his enemies, when opportunity offered, will appear in the course of our narrative.

But a greater cause of embarrassment to the Ka'ab Shaikh than the insubordination of the Bāwīyeh or Sharīfāt was the independent attitude and growing wealth, and power of his vassal, the Muhaisin Shaikh of

Relations of Shaikh Thāmir with Hāji Jābir, Shaikh of the Muhai-

[•] See his Early Adventures, Vol. II, pages 63-66.

[†] His authority extended to the infliction of death and mutilation besides other sinpunishments.

Muhammareh, at this time Hāji Jābir. The Muhammareh Shaikh was not yet in a position to throw off the allegiance due by him to Fallāhīyeh; and he continued to contribute his quotum towards the annual sum payable by his superior to the Shīrāz Government, and to send tribal levies to aid in the defence of Fallāhīyeh when threatened. But his fulfilment of these obligations was reluctant and imperfect; and he maintained private relations, which were little short of treasonable to his overlord, with the Persian Governor "of 'Arbistān" and the Wāli of Hawīzeh, perhaps even with the * Turkish Governor of Basrah. To watch the proceedings of Shaikh Jābir and to hold him in check, if necessary, Shaikh Thāmir sent his nephew Fāris-bin-Ghaith to reside on his behalf at Kūt-ash-Shaikh opposite to the main town of Muhammareh, as he himself had resided there at an earlier time on the part of his brother Mubādir.

Relations of Shaik Thamir with Turkey. Shaikh Thamir, "fully sensible of the advantage of an uncertain dependency in deterring Persia from attempting to increase the extent or to systematize the character of her interference in the affairs of the Chaab tribe," cultivated more friendly relations with his Turkish neighbours than any of the earlier Shaikhs of his tribe. He was careful not to admit the authority of the Governor of Basrah over himself in any essential point; but he frequently presented the Mutasallim with horses and sums of money, and received in return an occasional Khil'at or robe of honour.

Hawizeh.

Hawizeh, formerly a flourishing district, was † about this time reduced to insignificance by a singular calamity: this was the collapse of a great dyke at Kūt Nahr Hāshim on the Karkheh, some 15 miles above Hawīzeh town. The results were as instantaneous as they were fatal. The Karkheh changed its entire course below Kūt Nahr Hāshim in a single night; Hawīzeh town and the cultivated districts were left high and dry; and other tracts, formerly of some value for grazing or tillage, were converted into profitless swamps. Formerly a large town, Hawīzeh sunk rapidly into a village of 400 or 500 inhabitants; and the Wāli was ruined by the impoverishment of his subjects. The tribute payable by the Wāli to the Persian authorities, most probably at Dizfūl had hitherto been 6,000

^{*} Major Rawlinson says, in his Memorandum on the Dispute, etc., 1844: "he settled directly with the Government of Busscrah for the land rent of the town of Muhammerah; but that eminent authority does not mention the source from which he derived so important a piece of information.

[†] Layard (Early Adventures, Vol. II, page 166, and Description of the Province of Khuzistan, page 35) gives the date of the accident to the dyke as 1837, while Loftus (Travels, page 359) assigns it to 1832. The former date has been adopted in the Geographical Volume of this Gazetteer on the high authority of Layard; but the latter is perhaps the correct one for Layard himself states that the failure of the dyke shortly preceded the epidemic, the year of which was almost certainly 1832.

Tumans or £3,000 per annum; but now he was hardly able to scrape together enough ready money for the needs of his own household, and by 1840 his contributions to the Persian Treasury were 24,000 Tumans in He continued to have about 5,000 fighting men at his disposal, but they were indifferently armed. Saiyid Faraj Ullah, who was Wali at this time, was a man of little ability and generally unpopular; but the sacred character of Saiyid gave him a certain advantage in political intrigues. One of his wives known as "the Bībi," was evidently much trusted by him, for she was accustomed to manage his affairs at Hawizeh in his absence. The Wali was at heart ill-affected to the Persian Government, which continued to harass him with demands for a revenue that he could no longer pay and for a time kept him a prisoner at Kirmānshāh.

In 1837 'Ali Pāsha, the Turkish ruler of Baghdād, organised a sudden Capture of expedition against Muhammareh and apparently conducted it himself. The motive usually attributed to him is jealousy of the prosperity of Muhammareh, which, as no customs duties were levied there, was drawing trade away from Basrah to the detriment of the Turkish public revenues. It is not impossible, however, that the notorious preoccupation of the Shah with designs on Herat merely suggested to his mind the feasibility of making a convenient addition to the Ottoman Empire. any case he seems to have had no difficulty in carrying his purpose into effect.

Muhammareh by the Turks, 1837.

The Persian version of what occurred, communicated to His Majesty's Government by the British Minister at Tehran in 1844, was as follows:

Amongst the Arabs of those parts there are two particular tribes, named respectively Derissis and Ansar, who have risen into great power, and to whom is owing the ruin of Mohammerah. Jaaber, having been deputed by Sheikh Thamir Khan to govern Mohammerah, appropriated to himself the entire revenues which arose from the gardens without admitting the Keab Arabs to any participation. On the arrival accordingly of the Pasha of Bagdad, and enmity having at the same time broken out between the two tribes,*a project was formed for the assassination of Jaaber, who, however, obtaining information of the plot three days after the Pasha's arrival and before any slaughter had commenced, fled away in a boat with his family and servants. On this intelligence getting abroad, the whole population was seized with a sort of panic and cast themselves into the water of the Shatt; women and children unable to swim perished in the waves; about 4,000 souls were carried into slavery by the Arna outs and Turkish soldiers, others saved themselves by flight. The Mahommedans of Bussorah purchased many of these children for 18 or 20 kurnah (? Qrans) a head, and restored them to their parents.

^{*} Viz., the Dris and Nassar divisions of the Ka'ab; but dissensions between these had, as we shall see further on, little or nothing to do with the matter.

On this account of the affair the following observations *were made by Major Rawlinson, the British Political Agent at Baghdad:

The rivalry always subsisting between the two subdivisions of the Chaab tribe, named Edris and Nasara, appears to have had but little effect on the condition of Mohammerah. Hajee Jaaber was of neither one tribe nor the other, and admitted few of them into his town; he formed and supported his own garrison, and, as far as I have been able to ascertain, was well and faithfully served by them.

This account of the capture of Mohammerah is strongly perverted. Treachery was never imputed to the garrison, nor did Jaaber fly from his own people but from the Turkish soldiery. Relying in fact on support from Fellahiah which was withheld by Shaikh Thāmir from jealousy of his rival's power he rejected all overtures and determined to defend his town to the last. The place was accordingly formally invested, battered, breached and finally taken by assault, Sheikh Jaaber escaping in his boats by the Bamishere river when the Turkish troops were occupied in plundering the town.

Mohammerah was stormed on the west face, and when the troops were fairly in possession of the breach there was a general rush to the boats on the Hafar, which runs along the southern wall of the town, and numbers of persons who were without the means of flight throwing themselves into the canal were drowned; the total population of the place when it was captured, including the Arab garrison of fighting men, may have been 3,000 souls, and as always happens when a place is carried by assault, the loss of life was no doubt considerable. I have never been able, however, to collect any satisfactory information on this point, nor can I obtain an approximate estimate of the extent and value of the plundered property.

Further proceedings of the Turks: their expulsion οf Shaikh Thamir and appointment of Abdur Rizabin-Muhammad and Musallimbin-Muhammad as joint Shaikhs of the Ka'ab: 1837. Return and later government of Shaikh Thamir. 1838-1839.

Be the details of the capture of Muhammareh what they may, it is certain that the Turks obtained temporary possession of the place, pillaged the bazaars and warehouses, and rendered the place defenceless by throwing down the fortifications and carrying off the artillery. They then made a demonstration against Fallāhiyeh, whereupom Shaikh Thāmir fled to† Kuwait; and 'Abdur Riza‡ and Musallim, sons of Muhammed, his distant relations, were set up in his place as joint Shaikhs and Turkish vassals.

The Turks, for some unexplained reason, presently withdrew from 'Arabistan; and the joint Shaikhs of the Ka'ab installed by them were not able, though supported by the Bāwīyeh, to maintain themselves for long

^{*} See also de Bode's Travels in Luristan and Arabistan, Vol. II, pages 118-120.

[†] Layard (Description of the Province of Khuzistan, page 38) says, however, that he took refuge with the Bakhtiyāri chief Muhammed Taqi Khān. This seems not improbable as Muhammad Taqi afterwards, as we shall see, took refuge with him.

[‡] Rawlinson calls him 'Abdur Razzāq: see his Memorandum on the Dispute etc., 1844.

against Shaikh Thāmir, who promptly* returned and repossessed himself of Fallāhīyeh.

On the Bāwīyeh soliciting his pardon, he invited their chief Shaikh to his capital and there treacherously caused him to be shot dead, along with another leading man, while drinking coffee at an official reception. A new Shaikh, 'Aqil, was then placed by him over the Bāwīyeh.

Probably not long after this, Mir Mahannar, the Shaikh of the Sharifāt, rebelled against Shaikh Thāmir; he defended himself for some months in his fort at Deh Mulla in the Hindiyān district, but in the end had to surrender and was deported to Fallāhīyeh. A Shaikh named Mīr Madhkūr, a Saiyid, was installed in his place.

Shaikh Jābir of Muhammareh, to whom the destruction of that place was a severer blow than it was to Shaikh Thāmir, fled at first to Būshehr and there endeavoured, but without success, to enlist the support of the Persian Governor-General of Fārs. Subsequently he returned quietly to his ruined and dismantled town; and not many years elapsed before it was again in as flourishing a state as ever.

In 1839 Manūchehr Khān, better known as the Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh, a Georgian of Christian parentage but reared as a Muhammadan slave, was appointed by the Persian Government, probably under Russian influence, to be Governor of Isfahān, Luristān, and 'Arabistān. This able but tyrannical official, who, like Āgha Muhammad Khān, the ferocious founder of the Qājār dynasty, was a eunuch, soon made his authority cruelly felt throughout the length and breadth of the provinces assigned to him. His policy was clear and consistent; but bad faith was its principal instrument, and he revelled in the invention and infliction of appalling tortures. †" He was beardless, had a smooth colourless face, with hanging cheeks, and a weak, shrill, feminine voice. He was short, stout and flabby, and his limbs were ungainly and slow of movement. His features, which were of the Georgian type, had a wearied and listless appearance, and were without expression or animation."

In the autumn of 1840 the Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh made preparations for enforcing the payment of revenue by the inhabitants of the

Appointment of Manüchehr Khān, Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh, as Persian Governor of Isfahān, Luristān and 'Arabistān, 1839.

Movements of Hāji Jābir.

^{*} Rawlinson in his Memorandum states that Shaikh Thamir then "signed for his own personal ends a convention with the Pasha of Baghdad, securing himself in occupation of the Sheikhship, and pledging the allegiance of his tribe to Bussorah." He adds that Shaikh Jābir refused to be bound by this convention, asserted and maintained thereafter his independence of Thamir, and threatened to call in — if interfered with — the protection of the Persians.

[†] Layard's Early Adventures, Vol. I, page 313.

Dealings of the Mo'tamad-ud-Daulah with Muhammad Taqi Khān, Bakhtiyāri chief, 1840-1841. southern districts under his jurisdiction. His first demands were addressed to Muhammad Taqi Khān, the principal chief of the Chahārlang division of the Bakhtiyāri tribe, who had his seat at Qa'leh Tul, and whom he required to pay immediately an instalment of 10,000 Tūmāns, or about £5,000, on account of revenue arrears. Alarming suspicions were insinuated by the Mo'tamad of the chief's being disloyal to the Shāh, because he had refused to honour Persian Government drafts drawn on him, and of his maintaining a treasonable correspondence with refugee Persian princes at Baghdād.

Muhammad Taqi Khān was unable, had he even been willing, to furnish at such short notice the large sum required of him; but he hesitated to defy the Governor, and eventually allowed him to pass unmolested through the Bakhtiyari mountains with a force consisting of one regiment of regular Persian infantry—that of Khoi, 1,000 mounted Ghulams, some well armed Cavalry, and three small field pieces with 150 artillerymen. A meeting then took place, in February 1841, on the plain of Mal-Amir, where the Mo'tamad and Muhammad Tagi Khān remained encamped together for about six weeks, during which the former continued to press his conditions for a settlement and the latter to resist them as best he could. The Mo'tamad had been preceded at Mal-Amir by Baron de Bode, the First Secretary of the Russian Legation at Tehran, who remained with him there for a few days. Muhammad Taqi Khān had collected a force of about 5,000 men as against the Mo'tamad's 2,500; it included, besides his own Bakhtiyāris, Arabs from the plains about Shūshtar and even from the banks of the Jarrāhi. Had he chosen to take the Mo'tamad at a disadvantage, he might, perhaps, have destroyed him and his whole force.

The Mo'tamad eventually left for Shūshtar, to collect the revenue of the low countries, without having settled the affairs of Muhammad Taqi Khān; but, soon after his arrival at his destination, he summoned that chief to appear before him. Muhammad Taqi Khān refused to obey; and the Mo'tamad, after formally proclaiming him a rebel, prepared to march against him. These proceedings so alarmed the Bakhtiyāri chief that he weakly placed his eldest son and one of his nephews in the hands of the Mo'tamad as hostages for his loyalty; this he did in consideration of an oath taken by the Mo'tamad to abandon his expedition, if it were done, and return with his troops to Isfahān. Manūchehr Khān, however, who had in the meanwhile obtained a reinforcement of two regiments of Persian infantry and some artillery besides the help of the Faili Lurs and of some Arab Shaikhs, was only acting with his usual perfidy; and no

sooner were the children in his power than he announced that they would be put to death if Muhammad Taqi Khan did not at once surrender. The Bakhtiyari chief then came down into the near neighburhood of Shushtar; but, as the Mo'tamad would grant him no reliable guarantee for his life, sight and liberty should he come in, he in the end fled for safety in the direction of Fallahiyeh, pursued by the Mo'tamad and his troops. A large number of his own Bakhtiyāris accompanied Muhammad Taqi Khān in the first stages of his flight, but he persuaded them to return to their native hills. After parting from them he and his party were attacked and plundered by the Sharifat.

Mr. Layard, the English traveller, who was a spectator of most of the transactions described above, states that the officers of the regular Persian troops and the persons employed in the service of the Mo'tamad were "a dissolute and debauched set of fellows, and feasted, drank arak, and spent most of their time, half-drunk, in listening to music and watching dancing boys and girls."

The energetic Governor sent Ghulams far and wide to various chiefs of the country, among them to Mīrza Koma, Ruler of Behbehān, between whom and Muhammad Taqi Khan there were boundary disputes, and to Shaikh Thāmir, the head of the Ka'ab Arabs. The emissary to Behbehān was stripped of everything, on his way back, by robbers on the plains of Rāmuz; but the messenger to Fallāhīyeh, whose mission probably related to Persian demands on the Ka'ab for payment of revenue, returned safely to his master. The whole countryside was now in a turmoil and appeared deserted except by robbers, who swarmed on every side.

Mr. Layard, between whom and the chivalrous Bakhtiyāri chief a romantic attachment existed, followed Muhammad Taqi Khān towards Fallāhīyeh. He struck the Jarrāhi river at Gharaibeh, about twelve miles above Fallahiyeh, where he learned the next morning that his Bakhtiyāri friend had crossed the river three miles further up during the night.

Before daybreak orders arrived from Shaikh Thamir for his subjects to abandon the upper Ka'ab villages upon the Jarrāhi; and the whole population immediately engaged with frantic energy in dismantling their reed huts, and in forming the materials into rafts on which to float down to safer quarters in the vicinity of Fallahiyeh along with their provisions, cooking utensils, bedding, and even poultry. Flocks and herds were hastily Fallahiyeh. driven away; and, to hamper the movements of the enemy, dykes were cut and the whole country was laid under water. "All were screaming at the top of their voices, and sometimes the men, ceasing from their

Expedition of the Mo'tamadud-Dauleh against Shaikh Thamir of the Ka'ab and his guest Muhammad Tagi Khān at Fallahiyeh, 1841.

Movements of Mr. Layard.

Evacuation by the Ka'ab of their upper Jarrahi villages, and their concentration at work and joining hands, would dance in a circle, shouting their warsong,"— a touch that will not be lost on those who have experienced the noisiness and inconsequence of Arabs. The Bāwīyeh, except the Bani Khālid section, had thrown in their lot with the Mo'tamad; and great fear prevailed, especially in the villages on the right bank of the river, lest the horsemen of that tribe should suddenly appear. By evening the upper villages were practically deserted.

Mr. Layard, after the moon rose, made himself a raft in the same manner as the Arabs and drifted down the river to Fallāhīyeh, where he arrived early the next afternoon. The scene by the way was one of extraordinary bustle and excitement. The ripe crops had been set on fire by the owners, from which it would appear that the season was late spring or early summer, and were sending up clouds of smoke on all sides into a clear sky. Shaikh Thāmir received Mr. Layard well, but swore solemnly that Muhammad Taqi Khān was not in the Ka'ab country.

In the evening Mīrza Koma, the ruler of Behbehān, on whom the operations of the Mo'tamad in 'Arabistān had encouraged the Governor-General of Fārs to put pressure, rode into Fallāhīyeh as a fugitive at the head of a way-worn body of about 50 horsemen.

Further movements of Mr. Layard.

The next morning Mr. Layard was successful in finding for himself the tent of Muhammad Taqi Khān, which was pitched on a dry piece of ground surrounded by marshes near the bank of the Buziyeh canal, and he spent the rest of the day and the following night in the Bakhtiyāri's quarters. On his return to Fallāhīyeh he took with him a letter from Muhammad Taqi Khān in which Shaikh Thāmir was begged to treat him with confidence; and the Shaikh then declared that the Bakhtiyāri chief's presence in his dominions had hitherto been concealed, even from the Ka'ab, in the hope of averting a Persian invasion.

Shaikh Thāmir's preparations for defending Fallāhīyeh. Shaikh Thamir afterwards took Mr. Layard to view the preparations which were being made for the defence of Fallahīyeh by throwing up earthworks and mounting artillery; and he listened attentively the Englishman's advice, which was to trust more in the impenetrability of the sloughs and marshes surrounding the town than in the strength of the artillery, but in any case to test the safeness of the older guns before bringing them into use. Layard says:—

* Arabs from the neighbouring tribes came in large numbers to Fellahiyah, accompanied by the wild music of drums and oboes, displaying their flags and singing their war-songs. When they reached the town they danced in a circle round their Sheikhs and standard-bearer, yelling their war-cries, and chanting, in chorus, some

impromptu verses in defiance of the enemy, or in praise of Sheikh Thamer—such as Let no one give his daughter to the Bowi' (an Arab tribe hostile to the Cha'b), 'Thamer is a burning fire,' 'Thamer is the lion of war'—accompanying the words with fierce gestures, brandishing their swords and spears, and discharging their match-locks. This dancing, and yelling, and firing never ceased night or day. The faces and limbs of these Arabs were almost black from constant exposure to the sun. They'were nearly nakel, and their hair was plaited in long tresses shining with grease.

In addition to these armed auxiliaries the town, and the palm groves for a considerable distance around it, were crowded with men, women, and children, who, with their sheep, camels and buffaloes, had taken refuge from the advancing Persian. It was a mystery to me how Shaikh Thamer could provide provisions for such a multitude.

One morning Shafi' Khān, a Bakhtiyāri chief sent by the Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh, entered Fallāhīyeh along with some Persian officers; he was charged with a communication for Muhammad Taqi Khān. Shaikh Thāmir, however, persisted that he knew nothing of the Bakhtiyāri chief's movements or whereabouts.

Later a second envoy from the Mo'tamad appeared in the person of Ja'far 'Ali Khān, an arrogant Persian in Manūchehr Khān's confidence, and sought to intimidate Shaikh Thāmir into surrendering his Bakhtiyāri guest. He was effectually answered by Mīr Mahanna, a Shaikh and doughty warrior of the Ka'ab, who took upon himself the responsibility of having brought Muhammad Taqi Khān to Fallāhīyeh without Shaikh Thāmir's knowledge, and whose fiery speech raised such a tumult in the assembly that the Mo'tamad's emissary, as cowardly as he was boastful, beat a hurried retreat.

After this the Mo'tamad, advised and supported by the * Wali of Hawīzeh, to whom as well as to the Shaikh of the Bāwīyeh he had promised the headship of the Ka'ab in case Shaikh Thāmir should be deprived of it, advanced his camp to Gharaibeh. He found the place deserted and destroyed, and all his efforts to establish himself nearer to Fallāhīyeh were foiled by the inundations and the stout resistance of the Ka'ab musketeers. Little help was needed from Shaikh Thāmir's artillery, to the fire of which the Persians were careful not to expose themselves. The Sharīfāt professed neutrality, but joined the Persian camp, while the Zarqān tribe associated themselves with the Ka'ab in supporting Shaikh Thāmir.

Finding that his troops began to suffer from malaria and the daily increasing heat, the Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh again resorted to negotiations. He reminded Muhammad Taqi Khān of the Bakhtīyāri hostages in his hands, to whose number Āgha Karīm, a brother of Muhammad Taqi, had

Mission of Shafi' Khān from the Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh to Fallāhīyeh.

Mission of Ja'far 'Ali Khān to Fallāhīyeh.

Advance of the Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh to Gharaibeh.

Treacherous seizure of Muhammad Taqi Khān by the Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh.

^{*} The Wali of Hawizeh was at enmity with Muhammad Taqi Khān, who it would seem had temporarily taken possession of his capital, the town of Hawizeh, in 1839.

lately been added, and threatened to put them all to death unless the Khān himself surrendered. On the other hand he promised the Bākhtīvari a free pardon, the favour of the Shāh, and even the governorship of Arabistan, if only he would make his submission. The intermediary in the renewed discussions was Shafi Khān, Bakhtīyāri, who himself believed in the sincerity of the Mo'tamad on this occasion. Finally it was proposed by Mo'tamad that an oath should be taken by a Mujtahid and by* Sulaiman Khan, the Commander of the Persian troops, as a guarantee for the faithful observance of the terms offered, and that Muhammad Taqi Khān should then visit the Persian camp in safety. The Bakhtiyāri Chief, who knew that his presence at Fallahīyeh was a cause of much danger and loss to the Ka'ab Shaikh and his subjects, at length decided to trust the Mo'tamad: the required oath was taken by the Mujtahid and Sulaiman Khan, who further undertook that in three days the Persian forces should leave the Ka'ab country; and Muhammad Taqi Khān. disregarding the entreaties of his family and even, it would appear, the wishes of Shaikh Thamir, proceeded to the Persian camp accompanied by the Mujtahid, Sulaiman Khan, Mr. Layard, and others.

The Mo'tamad, with his usual cynicism, merely taxed the Bakhtiyāri on arrival with being a rebel against the Shāh, and had him thrown intotchains. Even Sulaimān Khān seemed ashamed of this dénouement and protested to Mr. Layard that it was totally unforeseen by himself.

Demands of the Mo'tamad on Shaikh Thāmir. The act of treachery caused great indignation in Fallāhīyeh, which was heightened by the arrival, almost as soon as the Muhammad Taqi Khān's fate became known, of a messenger from the Mo'tamad demanding from Shaikh Thāmir the instant payment of 12,000 Tūmāns, or about £6,000, as the price of the retirement of the Persian army from his country. The Shaikh was at first disposed to refuse; but he yielded to the persuasion of a Saiyid who visited him on the part of the Mo'tamad,—a kind of influence to which he was peculiarly amenable,—and compounded the claim for 5,000 Tūmāns on an assurance that the Persians would retire on the next day, and that a brother of Muhammad Taqi Khān would be set over the Bakhtiyāris.

No sooner had the money been paid, however, than the Mo'tamad, who had just received another reinforcement in the shape of three regular regiments of infantry, some guns, and a large body of Lur and Arab

^{*} Sulaimān Khān was a Georgian or Armenian Christian and was a near relative of the Mo'tamad, probably his nephew. He had received his military training under British officers in the Persian service, and his rank was that of General.

[†] Muhammad Taqi Khān and his eldest son died in captivity at Tchrān some years later. The women of his family were reduced to abject distress.

auxiliaries, suddenly annexed a fresh condition to the departure of himself and his army: it was that every member of Muhammad Taqi Khān's family then in Ka'ab territory, together with all the Bakhtiyāri Chiefs' dependents there, should be given up to him. To enforce it he moved his camp nearer to Fallāhīyeh, pitching it on the bank of the Umm-as-Sakhar Canal.

The new demand, compliance with which was forbidden by Arab custom,

and which appeared the more outrageous on account of what had gone site before, provoked a night attack upon the Persian camp, made with the object of rescuing Muhammad Taqi Khān. The Bakhtiyāris, to whom Mr. Layard attached himself on this occasion, took the lead in the affair, and they were seconded by the Ka'ab tribesmen; but Shaikh Thāmir did not personally participate, fearing to place himself too unmistakably in rebellion against the Persian Government. The Mo'tamad's camp was successfully surprised; great confusion arose in it; much random firing of small arms took place in the dark; Bakhtiyāri and Arab riders careered through the lines, cutting down all that they met; the horses of the Persian cavalry stampeded; and a Persian battery opened with grape shot on a seething crowd which appeared to be advancing against the Mujtahid's pavilion, but which really consisted of a Persian regiment

Night attack on the Persian camp.

The Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh, apparently nothing daunted, replied to this sortie by again attempting to approach nearer to Fallāhīyeh; but his efforts to bridge a canal that blocked the way were opposed by Shaikh Thāmir's Arabs with an obstinacy that threatened to make progress beyond it, if bridged, impossible to the disheartened Persian troops. The Mo'tamad also feared that Shaikh Thāmir might, if too closely pressed, throw himself into the arms of the Turks. He therefore closed the campaign and retired to Shūshtar for the summer with his army.

losses and were much discouraged.

in retreat. Muhammad Taqi Khān, unfortunately, could not be found, for at the first alarm he had been removed from his usual place of confinement to the presence of the Mo'tamad; and the Ka'ab, who had lost a number of men including one of their principal Shaikhs, began to waver and fall back. The attack thus failed in its principal purpose; but Āgha Karīm, Muhammad Taqi Khān's brother, recovered his liberty; Shafi' Khān, the Bakhtiyāri Chief whom the Mo'tamad had employed as a go-between, escaped to his friends; and the Persians suffered heavy

On his return to Shushtar the Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh amused himself by wringing money out of the unfortunate inhabitants of that town, of

Later proceedings of the Mo'ta-mad-ud-Dauleh in Northern Arabistān and Hawīzeh, 1841.

Dizful and of the surrounding districts, and out of such of the Arab tribes as had not withdrawn in alarm to a distance. The following account of his proceedings is given* by Sir A. H. Layard who was in the province at the time:

With this object the leading inhabitants of the towns, the 'Ket-Khudâs' of the villages, and the Arab Shaikhs who had fallen into his hands had been imprisoned in the castle and underwent almost daily tortures. The sticks were constantly in use, and men of the highest character and the greatest repute in Khuzistan were ignominiously subjected to the bastinado. The merciless and brutal eunuch had even devised new tortures for those whom he accused of withholding or concealing their property, and consequently of being in rebellion against the Shah. Some poor wretches, principally petty Arab Shaikhs who had joined the Cha'b in resisting the Persian troops, or had endeavoured to fly to avoid paying the money demanded of them, were, it was said, bound up in wool soaked in naphtha, which was then set on fire. They were thus left to suffer a lingering and horrible death.

Throughout the summer and part of the autumn he employed himself in the congenial task of

† collecting the revenue and raising money from the province. With this object he had imprisoned, bastinadoed, and otherwise tortured many of the principal inhabitants of Shuster who were supposed to have property, and had reduced them to penury. The houses and the bazars had been sacked by the Persian soldiers, who were allowed to do so with impunity, as they were clamouring for their pay, of which they were many months in arrear. Officers, with bodies of irregular horsemen, had been sent to collect the taxes from the villages, which they did by cruelly ill-treating the inhabitants and devastating the country. The result had been that the population had for the most part taken refuge with the Arabs, or had fled to the mountains, and a region naturally of great richness and fertility had been almost reduced to a wilderness.

Sulaimān Khān, the Persian military commander, even invaded the plains to the west of the Diz river with a Persian force and fell upon the Bani Lām, one of whose sections, it was said, lost 12,000 sheep, a large number of camels, horses and other animals, besides which many of their women were captured and outraged by the Persian soldiery.

The only authority towards whom the Mo'tamad showed himself complaisant was the Wāli of Hawīzeh, who had helped in the expedition against Fallāhīyeh; him he allowed to compound for his arrears of revenue and ultimately appointed Governor of 'Arabistān.

Later proceedings of Shaikh Thamir, 1841. On the departure of the Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh from Fallāhīyeh, Shaikh Thāmir entered into communication with the Pāsha of Baghdād and made a visit of inspection to Muhammareh, which, to the Turks, he professed himself ready to hold as a vassal of the Sultān in return for

^{*} Layard's Early Adventures, Vol. II, pages 145-146.

[†] Layard's Early Adventures, Vol. II, page 270.

help and protection; Mr. Layard, being specially invited to do so, accompanied the Shaikh to Muhammareh, which he found to be "a settlement of mud-built huts, with a bazar for the sale of provisions and a few European commodities." The Shaikh's object was to examine the defences of the place, where some batteries and earthworks had been constructed to command the entrance of the Kārūn and the approach to the town on the landward side; for his real desire was to retain his semi-independence, and with this purpose he was endeavouring to make Muhammareh tenable against both Turks and Persians.

Shaikh Thāmir did not forget to visit the Bāwīyeh with his displeasure on account of their having joined the Mo'tamad in his expedition against Fallāhīyeh. He expelled them from Ismā'īli on the Kārūn, which they then occupied, driving them to Ahwāz and the lower part of the plain of Rāmuz.

In the autumn of the same year the Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh, who had not relinquished his determination to get the better of Shaikh Thāmir, descended the Kārūn river to Muhammareh, and in November 1841 occupied that place in force. His movements, before their scope was clear, threw even the Bani Lām into a panic of fear and led them to congregate on the banks of the Tigris in Turkish territory, where they thought that he would not venture to attack them.

Advised by the Wāli of Hawīzeh and the Bāwīyeh tribe, the Mo'tamad had planned to attack Fallāhīyeh this time from the southwest; but Shaikh Thāmir, many of whose tribal allies and dependents he had succeeded in detaching, did not wait for his coming. Considering successful resistance to be impossible in the altered circumstances, Shāikh Thāmir hurriedly embarked his guns and all his property and removed with his family to Kuwait. On his departure his nephew Fāris-bin-Ghaith succeeded him as Shaikh of the Ka'ab and was recognised as such by the Persian authorities.

The Mo'tamad's approach had been the signal for the flight also of Hāji Jābir, the Muhaisin Shaikh who actually held possession of Muhammareh; but the Mo'tamad affected to consider his absence a matter of no moment, and he made no objection, apparently, to the management of local affairs being carried on by Hāji Muhammad, a nephew whom Hāji Jābir had left in charge of the town. Before his departure, however, the Mo'tamad appointed an officer to reside at Muhammareh on the part of the Persian Government, as a mark of sovereignty and as a check upon the intrigues of the local Shaikhs and of the Turks.

Occupation of Muhammarch by the Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh, flight of Shaikh Thāmir and succession of Shaikh Fāris, 1841.

Departure of the Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh from Arabistān, 1842.

By March 1842 the Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh, finding that no more money could be squeezed out of the province, had turned his back upon 'Arabistān and was on his way to Ispahān. He left the Karkheh border a prey to the Bani Lām, the Ka'ab districts in a state of anarchy, and Muhammareh with its trade temporarily ruined. Strangely enough, however, almost his last official act was an attempt to restore prosperity to Hawīzeh by rebuilding the dyke at Kūt Nahr Hāshim,—an undertaking in which he was defeated by an unusually high rise of the river.

The* effect of the Mo'tamad's proceedings in 'Arabistān upon Perso-Turkish relations is described in another place.†

Blood feud between Fāris Ka'ab Shaikh, of Fallāhīyah and Hāji Jābir, Muhaisin Shaikh of Muhammareh, 1842.

In 1842, shortly after the Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh had quitted Muhammareh, Hāji Jābir, the Muhaisin Shaikh of that place, sent his nephew Hāji Muhammad to Fallāhīyah to concert measures with the new Shaikh of the Ka'ab for mutual support in case of a second invasion of the country by the Persian central authorities. Shaikh Fāris, however, caused the young man to be shot as a rebel and a traitor; Hākim, a brother to whom Shaikh Fāris had assigned the cadet's duty of watching the Muhaisin from Kūt-ash-Shaikh, made an unsuccessful attempt to seize Muhammareh; and Hāji Jābir, alarmed at the attitude of the Ka'ab called in the Persian authorities. Some Persian troops from Dizful accordingly arrived at Muhammareh in the spring of 1843; but a few months later Hāji Jābir, who no longer needed their support, succeeded in getting them taken away again by creating commissariat difficulties. A Persian officer with a small escort continued, however, to reside at Muhammareh as the representative of his Government; and Shaikh Jābir, who had to consider the danger in which he stood from Turkish as well as Persian encroachments, thought it well to manifest to him an outwardly conciliatory demeanour. The breach created between the chiefs of

^{*}It is alleged by Major Rawlinson—see his Memorandum on the Dispute, etc., 1844,—that, from the time of the occupation of Muhammareh by the Mo'tamad, an annual payment of 500 paistres or about £40 which has hitherto been regularly made to the Turkish authorities at Basrah by or on behalf of the Ka'ab Shaikh as ground rent for the town, ceased; but that, ever after the occupation, a payment of 300 tons of dates in kind continued to be made year by year to the Basrah officials on account of the tracts known as Tamār and Haffār. No authority is given by Major Rawlinson for these statements, which perhaps therefore only reflect the assertions of Turkish officials at Basrah. It is worth noting that nowhere else in the works and records consulted in the compilation of this Gazetteer has any reference been found to the payment of land revenue by the Ka'ab or Muhaisin to the Turkish Government; and, from the history of their relations, such payment would seem improbable. A reference to the article "Haffār" in Volume II of this Gazetteer will show that the tract really so named lies well within the Kārūn, some distance above Muhammareh.

[†] Vide page 1374 ante.

Muhammareh and Fallāhīyah by the murder of Hāji Muhammad was irremediable; a blood feud was declared, or at least existed; and former secret suspicion gave place to open enmity.

Muhammareh, as it existed in 1843, was a quadrangular enclosure about 350 yards long by 300 yards broad. The mud wall which surrounded it was of the most ordinary kind; its defences were destitute of artillery. It contained only one caravanseral for the accommodation of merchants; and it consisted, for the rest, of rude Arab huts of mud and reeds. When Major Rawlinson, the British Political Agent at Baghdad, visited Muhammareh in that year, he found about a dozen vessels which had recently discharged their cargoes anchored at the place. To avoid a Turkish brig of war that had been stationed at the mouth of the Kārūn to prevent vessels with Indian goods from entering the port, boats from the sea now ordinarily approached Muhammareh by the Bahmanshīr instead of by the Shatt-al-'Arab, or else landed their cargoes on 'Abbādān Island below the embouchure of the Kārūn, whence the goods were conveyed by land to a point opposite Muhammareh. There were no customs duties at the port, which was a main cause of its prosperity; but it seemed probable that, in consequence of the extension of either Persian or Turkish effective control to it, that advantage was likely before long to be lost.

A contemporary writer gives the following account of the political distribution of the tracts about Muhammareh in 1843; but* for the reasons noted below, it must be received with caution:

Possession of Muhammareh and immediately adjacent tract, 1843.

Muham-

1843.

*The writer is of course Major Rawlinson, Political Agent at Baghdad, in his Memorandum on the Dispute, etc., 1844. With the greatest respect for his high authority it may be pointed out that his reiterated statements regarding payments to the Turkish Government at Basrah on account of the tracts disputed between Persia and Turkey seem to stand alone in official correspondence, and that he gives no indication of the evidence on which they were based. See foot note on page 40 ante. From his transposition of Nahr Yusuf and Shakhureh, of El Khagin (evidently Khaiyain) and Durband, it may be inferred that he had not himself any very close acquaintance with the tracts in question. His "Boojidee" is, doubtless, the modern Failiyeh which stands on the Abu Jadī Canal; the "Bawa Arabs" must be the Bāwīyeh; and his "Tamar-El-Jadeed" may be another instance of defective information, as there are two distinct tracts, Tamar and Jadid, more than a mile apart and separated from each other by Khumaiseh, Nahr Yusuf, and another tract. Haffar, which Major Rawlinson seemingly supposed to be near the Shatt-al-'Arab, is in fact a tract on the Karun some distance above Muhammareh town : see Volume II of this Gazetteer, articles "Haffar" and "Muhammareh District." The question of the relative positions of the disputed tracts has now been cleared up by Lieutenant A. T. Wilson's admirable map and report dated 4th and 5th May 1912.

It must be remembered that, at the beginning of the discussions which resulted is the Second Treaty of Erzeroum (1847), the British authorities favoured the Turkish claim to Muhammareh. They may have been unconsciously influenced by the fact that Russia supported the claim of Persia, who had recently shown herself (1836-41) sub-

....... there are at present independent of the island of Abadan 12 places inhabit ed by the Chaab, north of the Haffar canal which hard in dispute between Persia and Turkey. Of these Muhammareh and Heezan belong to Shaikh Jaabir, and are at present dependent upon Persia, that Power however deriving no pecuniary benefit from them at all commensurate with the value of her protection. Boojidee and Kootel-Nawasir pay their revenues to the Bawa Arabs, who consider themselves subjects of the Persian crown either as dependents upon Dizfül, upon Howizah or upon Fellahiah—, and Tamar-El-Jadeed, Khomeisah, Shakhoora, Nahr Yoosoof, Darband, El Khagin and El Haffar are under the immediate surveillance of the Chief of Koot-El-Sheikh, acting as the Deputy of the Sheikh of Fellahiah, and are subject to the payment of 300 tons of dates yearly for land rent to the Government of Bussorah.

Case of piracy by Qawasim, 1838.

British relations with 'Arabistan, 1834-1848.

In 1838 a piracy, accompanied by the murder of several persons, was committed on a Khārag vessel in the northern part of the Persian Gulf by Qawāsim, the ringleaders being a certain Sultān-bin-Sohār and his brother

missive to Russian influence and unfriendly to Britain. The ultimate adherence of Britain to the Persian view regarding Muhammareh was regarded by Layard, at least (see his Early Adventures, Volume II, page 437), as an unworthy concession to Russia. Major Rawlinson, employed as he was in Turkey, was necessarily exposed to the full play of Turkish ex-parte assertions and arguments; and this may partly account for the resemblance between his attitude and that of the British Agent at Basrah in 1767. (See footnote, page 1627.) Mr. Layard, on his part, cannot but have been prejudiced against the Persian authorities by their abominable treatment of his friends, the ruling family of the Chahārlong division of the Bakhtiyār is.

It may be noted that the two theories on which Muhammareh was claimed as Turkish territory are mutually destructive. The first was that of Rawlinson, who believed that the Bahmanshir was originally an eastern mouth of Shatt-al-'Arab, of which the Muhammareh waterway was consequently a branch. The second was that of Layard who regarded the Muhammareh waterway as in its origin an artificial canal dug from the Kārūn into the Shatt-al-'Arab. Rawlinson cites ancient geographers in support of his theory (Notes on the Ancient Geography of Mohamrah and the Vicinity, Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, Vol. XXVII, 1857); but he has no evidence to offer of the reversal of the flow of the water in the Muhammareh stream which his theory necessarily involves. Layard's explanation seems to be based on the etymology of the word "Haffār" which, however, would mean "digger" not "dug," while moreover the Haffār tract is not on the Muhammareh waterway but altogether above it.

The present opportunity may be taken to correct, in the light of Lieutenant A. T. Wilson's recent researches, a statement in this Gazetteer regarding the defacto Perso-Turkish boundary on the Shatt-al-'Arab, above the mouth of the Kārūn: see Volume II of this work, page 157, article "Southern Arabistān." For the words "at the larger Khaiyain creek opposite to the Turkish island of Shamshamīyah" should be substituted, apparently, "at a point on the Nahr Khaiyain sabout 1,500 yards, below the mouth of the Nahr Da'aiji and immediately above the mouth of a creek known as the Nahr Abul 'Arābīd." When the second volume was completed it was not known that the Turkish tracts of Sulaimānīyah, Kharnūbīyah, and Buwārīn were surrounded by water, or that the mainland tracts of Saiyid Thālib and Tamār, lying behind Kharnūbīyah and Buwārīn, were under the jurisdiction of the Shaikh of Muhammarch. These and other necessary corrections in the article is Shatt-al-'Arab" (Volume II pages 110-111, Gazetteer) should be made in accordance with Lieutenant Wilson's map

Muhammad. One of the victims was a wealthy subject of the Ka'ab Shaikh, who had fled from Muhammareh when it was attacked and taken by the Turks in 1837, and who was returning to his home.

The case was taken uplenergetically by the British Resident at Büshehr, with the result that Sultān-bin-Sohār was found and arrested at Lingeh, while his brother Muhammad and the Nākhuda of the offending vessel were also captured, but released on giving bonds to pay 100 crowns each. The principal delinquent was sent by the Resident to the Ka'ab Shaikh for punishment, but history does not record his ultimate fate.

The Qawāsim of Lingeh and Rās-al-Khaimah, whose boats were accustomed to make an annual voyage to Basrah, fearing the vengeance of the Ka'ab, sent them in this year in one fleet of 22 vessels for mutual protection and begged the British Resident to explain to Shaikh Thāmir that the chiefs of both the Qāsimi ports were not responsible for the outrage, and that the chief of Lingeh had in fact been at great trouble and expense to obtain reparation. The Resident apparently complied with this request, and no reprisals were made by the Ka'ab on the Qāsimi fleet during its voyage.

Friendly, though not very close, relations seem to have been maintained by the British Local Authorities with Shaikh Thāmir during his tenure of the Ka'ab Shaikhship. He occasionally met with officers of the Indian Navy at Muhammareh; and, until his flight in 1841, he maintained a correspondence with the British representative at Basrah and received from him "kindness and assistance on various occasions when he was in trouble." The very civil reception which he gave to the English traveller Mr. Layard, in 1841, is accounted for by these circumstances.

With the Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh, during his Governorship of 'Arabistan, the British authorities had no relations; but Mr. Layard, in the course of his remarkable wanderings in the province, was more than once brought into contact with him. The Mo'tamad evidently entertained strong objections to Mr. Layard's presence in the country, being no doubt persuaded that he was a British spy or political agent and also afraid that, if any harm befell the traveller, the British Government might hold the Persian Government responsible for the mischance. It is an extraordinary fact that, in a conversation *with Mr. Layard in the summer of 1841, the Mo'tamad described as an accomplished fact the massacre of the British Envoy, Sir W. Macnaghten, and other British Officers at Kābul which actually took place, very much in the manner described, some months later. Eventually he was said to have issued an order for Mr. Layard's

British Political relations with Shaikh Thāmir.

The Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh and the British, 1841.

^{*} See Layard's Early Adventures, Vol. II, pages 138-139.

arrest; but, before any opportunity of executing it occurred, it was rendered innocuous by the return of the British Mission to Tehran and the resumption of good relations between Britain and Persia.

Muhammad Taqi Khān, Bakhtiyāri Chief, and the British, 1840-41. At the end of 1840, when the attitude of the Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh towards him became threatening, Muhammad Taqi Khān, the great Bakhtiyāri Chief, employed his friend Mr. Layard as an intermediary in making overtures to the British Political authorities. At the time there was no British Legation in Persia; diplomatic relations between Britain and Persia were suspended; the island of Khārag had been occupied by a British force; and war between Britain and Persia was generally expected by native politicians in Arabistān. Muhammad Taqi Khān accordingly proposed that, if a rupture occurred, the British should avail themselves of his armed assistance against Persia, undertaking in return to protect him, after the conclusion of peace, from the vengeance of the Shāh and to recognise him as paramount chief of 'Arabistān.

During a fortnight's sojourn on Khārag, Mr. Layard brought the offer to the knowledge of Captain Hennell, the British Resident in the Persian Gulf; but no hope of its being entertained was held out to him by that officer, who rightly judged that a peaceful solution of the difficulties between Britain and Persia was impending.

Mr. Layard and the Sabians of 'Arabistan, 1841. During his residence in 'Arabistān Mr. Layard was led to take an interest in the down-trodden Sabians of the province, whose lot—humble, moral, and industrious though they were—was rendered hard by religious persecution of an official rather than a popular character. To several Sabian families at Shūshtar he was able to render some service by personal remonstrances with the Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh; and he afterwards took charge of a petition addressed by the Sabian community generally to the Queen of England, and endeavoured, not without success, to enlist the co-operation of Colonel Taylor, the British Political Agent at Baghdād, on their behalf. It does not appear whether his efforts on the larger scale had any * immediate result.

Prospects of British trade in 'Arabistan. It was one of the principal objects of Mr. Layard, when a traveller in 'Arabistān, to open the province to British trade both with the United Kingdom and with India; and he was successful in interesting a number of his native friends and acquaintances in his projects.

^{*}Many years afterwards, as Sir A. H. Layard and Her Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople, he obtained a Farman from the Sultan for the protection of the Sabians of Turkish 'Iraq and was the medium through which Her Majesty Queen Victoria personally sent some pecuniary relief to the Sabians (Early Adventures, Vol. II, pages 170-171).

He at first relied chiefly on the aid of Muhammad Taqi Khān, the Bakhtiyāri Chief, for the realisation of his ideas; and his mission to Khārag from that chief in December 1840 had a commercial as well as a political side. Muhammad Taqi Khān was a man of some enlightenment; he had once attempted on his own account to export productions of the country direct to Bombay, but the * vessel with which the experiment was made foundered on the way; and he was prepared to establish trade routes connecting his territory with the shores of the Persian Gulf and Shatt-al-'Arab. On the 18th December 1840 Mr. Layard addressed a commercial letter on behalf of Muhammad Taqi Khān to Mr. Frith, a prominent Bombay merchant, for communication to the Bombay Chamber of Commerce, and that body at once responded with an invitation to forward samples; but the troubles in which the Bakhtiyāri Chief was soon after involved and his capture by the Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh frustrated Mr. Layard's schemes as originally conceived.

On his journeys in 'Arabistān in 1841, and particularly at Shūshtar, Mr. Layard collected a quantity of commercial as well as of geographical and political information; he obtained promises from a number of the chiefs of the country and notables of the towns that they would do all in their power to promote and facilitate British trade, if established; and on his return to Baghdād, early in 1842, he was able to induce some of the British merchants there, especially Mr. A. Hector, to turn their attention to the exportable products of 'Arabistān. The more intelligent among the inhabitants of the province were at this time anxious to develop external trade relations, which, as Mr. Layard explained to them, would tend to check local Persian tyranny and misgovernment by making 'Arabistān affairs more prominent in the eyes of the world.

In 1841-42, while the "Nitocris" and "Nimrod" were absent on an expedition to the upper Euphrates conducted by Lieutenants Lynch and Campbell, I.N., the remaining vessels of the British Mesopotamian flotilla, the "Euphrates" and the "Assyria," under Lieutanant W. B. Selby, I.N., continued to have their head-quarters at Baghdād.

In May 1841 Lieutenant Selby took one of them to the Kārūn, which he ascended as far as Ahwāz, a point already reached by Major Estcourt with the "Euphrates" in 1836, and made fresh surveys and memoranda.

Navigation of the Kārūn, Karkheh Shatait, Gargar, Diz and Bahmanshīr rivers by the "Assyrīa," 1841-42. Kārūn.

^{*} According to Selby (Account of the Ascent of the Kārūn, ētc., page 237) the attempt was made through "an English adventurer who had been in his service...... without security of any kind"; but Layard only says that the supercargo was a Christian (Early Adventures, Volume I, page 458).

Karkheh.

In October 1841, accompanied by Mr. Layard, he navigated the Suwaib in the "Assyria" to about 10 miles from the Shatt-al-'Arab, but was stopped by the sub-division of the stream higher up into a number of small channels. The idea of extending steam navigation to Hawizeh by way of the Karkheh was accordingly abandoned, it being clear that the collapse of the Kūt Nahr Hāshim dyke in 1832 or 1837 had rendered the lower course of that river unnavigable, which before it probably was not.

Kārūn.

* Steps were next taken for examining the Kārūn river and its branches above Ahwāz, the steamer used being again the "Assyria."

Lieutenant Selby was accompanied, as before, by Mr. Layard; and Dr. Ross, the Surgeon of the Baghdād Residency, was also of the party. The Kārūn was entered at the beginning of March 1842, the water in the river being then high, and the Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh, whose antipathy to British enterprise in 'Arabistān was notorious, having left the province for the northern districts of his charge. The rapids at Ahwāz, which were expected to prove a serious obstacle, were surmounted without difficulty by eking out deficient steam power with towage from the bank and the "Assyria' entered the upper river.

Shatait.

From Band-i-Qīr the Shatait branch of the Kārūn was first followed, and the steamer reached a point about six miles short of Shūshtar, where a sudden fall of the floods left her stranded at a distance from the ordinary channel. The predicament was awkward, for no preliminary arrangements regarding the visit had been made with the local authorities, and the country was full of roaming bands of Arab marauders. The best possible face was therefore put on the matter by inviting the leading citizens of Shūshtar to a reception on board, at which Lieutenant Selby and Dr. Ross welcomed them in uniform: this expedient was suggested by Mr. Layard. Afterwards, the "Assyria's" guns were disembarked and mounted on earthworks thrown up around her; and efforts were made,

^{*}It is difficult to know to whom to assign the credit of having suggested the expedition to the Kārūn, which is claimed both by Sir A. H. Layard and by Lieutenant Selby: see Layard's Early Adventures, Volume II, pages 342 and 355-56 (footnote) and Selby's Account of Ascent of the Kāurūn, etc., at pages 219-220 of the Journal of the Royal Geographical Society, Volume XIV, 1844. There are also other discrepancies between the accounts of the two authorities. Selby says that Captain Hennell, the British Resident at Būshehr, had written to the Government of Bombay urging that, for political reasons, no attempt to bring vessels of the British Mesopotamian flotilla up the Kārūn should be allowed, which obliged Selby to undertake the expedition at his own responsibility and risk; whereas according to Layard the enterprise was approved by Colonel Taylor, the British Political Agent at Baghdād, under whose orders the flotilla then was. It would certainly seem, from the Baghdād Residency Surgeon's being detailed to accompany the cruise, that it was more than a personal and unauthorised venture on the part of Lieutenant Selby.

with local assistance, to move her towards the river by means of rollers. but in vain. Lieutenant Selby then proceeded to lighten ship, by removing all machinery and stores, and to dig a deep trench through which the vessel might be floated back into the Shatait. His arrangements were almost completed when a sudden and unseasonable rise of the river, after endangering the machinery and stores landed which were saved not without difficulty, released the "Assyria," fortunately undamaged, from her uncomfortable position.

Returning to Band-i-Qīr, the "Assyria" entered the Gargar and ran Gargar. up it to within a mile of Shushtar. Her European sailors and marines freely visited the town, where they conducted themselves with propriety and were invariably well treated. At the departure of the vessel from Shushtar some of the leading citizens of the place were taken on board for a trip, and, on their landing to return home, were honoured with a salute from the ships guns,—attentions by which they were greatly delighted.

Before returning to Muhammareh, the "Assyria" mounted the Diz Diz. affluent of the Kārūn to a place some miles above Kūt Bandar, and might have advanced even nearer to Dizful town, had not prudence and a falling river counselled a retreat.

In the course of these explorations, which lasted into April, lions, then common in 'Arabistan, were more than once sighted.

Lieutenant Selby also demonstrated the navigability of the Bahman- Bahmanshir, shir by carrying one of his steamers from Muhammareh to the sea and back vid that channel; but whether this was done in 1841, or in the execution of the Kārūn programme of 1842, is not clear.

In December 1844 Shaikh Fāris, the Shaikh of the Ka'ab tribe, caused a Batil belonging to the Arab port of the Abu Dhabi to be seized at Muhammareh, where she happened to call, together with her cargo worth about His excuse was a Ka'ab claim against the people of Abu Dhabi, more than 30 years old, — one which, moreover, had been cancelled by later events.

On the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi's requesting that either satisfaction should be obtained for him or he should be allowed to take forcible measures himself, the British Resident at Büshehr wrote to Shaikh Faris advising him to give up the boat; but the Ka'ab chief merely replied that he proposed to carry on hostilities against Abu Dhabi until his claim was satisfied. Major Hennell on this, in February 1845, sent his Assistant. Captain Kemball to Muhammareh in the schooner "Emily"; but Faris, though he was at a place only two days' journey inland, did not come to Muhammareh in the eleven day during which Captain Kemball waited for him there, nor did he answer a letter which was delivered to him. The

Difficulties wth Shaik Fāris of the Ka'ab, arising out of his unwarranted seizure of an Abu Dhabi vessel, 1844Resident then referred the matter to Tehrān, where the British Minister, Colonel Sheil, obtained a Farmān from the Shāh and a letter from the Prime Minister of Persia for General Sulaimān Khān at Muhammareh in which it was ordered that restitution should be made. The Ka'ab Shaikh next had recourse to shifts and evasions, necessitating a fresh application to the Persian Prime Minister.

At length, in May 1845, the Batil and her stores were recovered from the Ka'ab and taken in charge by Lieutenant Ford, who had been sent in the schooner "Constance" to obtain her release.

Relations of other foreign countries with 'Arabistan, 1834-1848.

Besides Britain no European power, unless possibly Russia, exhibited at this time any interest in the affairs of 'Arabistān.

Visit of the Baron de Bode to 'Arabistān, 1840-41.

Baron C. A. de Bode, the First Secretary of the Russian Legation at Tehrān, travelled in 'Arabistān during the winter of 1840-41, passing from Behbehān to Māl-Amīr, and thence to Shūshtar and Dizfūl. He appeared to be on good terms with the Persian Governor of the province, the Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh; but his journey had no visible political results, and from his own account of it would seem to have been undertaken * without any political object.

NĀSIR-UD-DĪN SHĀH, 1848-1896. +

The reign of Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shāh is characterised by a marked

^{*} See Baron de Bode's Travels in Luristān and 'Arabistān, especially Volume II, pages 104-105.

[†] The chief official sources of information relating to 'Arabistan in the reign of Nasir-ud-Din Shah are Mr. J. A. Saldanha's Précis of Persian Arabistan Affairs. 1904, and Lieutenant A. T. Wilson's Précis of the Relations of the British Government with the Tribes and Shaikhs of Arabistan, 1912. These cover the whole period and are supplemented, from 1872 onward, by the Persian Gulf Residency Administration Reports. Loftus's Travels and Researches in Chaldaea and Susiana, 1857, contains some information in regard to local events in 1850-52. The main authorities for the operations of the warlof 1856-1857 are Captain G. H. Hunt's Outram and Havelock's Persian Campaign, 1858, containing spirited sketches by the author; General Sir J. O. Outram's Persian Campaign in 1857, 1860, with despatches, demiofficial correspondence, and plans; Lieutenant C. R. Low's History of the Indian Navy, 1877; and Colonel Mark Bell's Account of the British Wars with Persia, 1889, Madame J. Dieulafoy's La Perse, la Chaldée, et la Susiane, 1887, and A Suse, 1888, contain a few political data. The principal modern work in which the province is treated of is Lord Curzon's Persia and the Persia Question, 1892. Mr. V. Chirol's A iddle Eastern Question, 1903, and Mr. H. T. Whigham's Persian Problem, 1903, especially the former, supply later information in regard to British enterprise on the Kārun river, etc.

development of the power of the Tehran Government in 'Arabistan, to which province its attention had been drawn by the dispute with Turkey regarding Muhammareh, settled in 1847 by the Treaty of Erzeroum. In local affairs the most outstanding feature was the definitive supersession of the Ka'ab Shaikh of Fallahiyeh by the Muhaisin Shaikh of Muhammareh as the chief tribal authority in Southern 'Arabistan.

Persian administration of 'Arabistan, 1848-1896.

At the beginning of the period the ruler of 'Arabistan on the part Government of the Shāh's Government was Sulaimān Khān, known as the Hisāmud-Dauleh, a Christian, the relation and apparently the immediate 1851. successor of Manuchehr Khan, the infamous Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh. His administration seems to have been as efficient as was possible in the circumstances; but in 1850 the paramount chief of the Bakhtiyāris defied his authority, and there was fighting upon the Karkhah between the Bani Lam and the Al Kathir which the Governor could not prevent, and in which the former tribe seem to have had the advantage. The Al Kathir had been brought regularly under Persian authority for the first time in the reign of Muhammad Shāh, and in 1850 the revenue assessed on them was 2,500 Tūmāns or about £1,250. Towards the end of 1850 Sulaiman Khan's position had become precarious, as explained by a * British traveller who gave the following account of him and his affairs:-

of Sulaiman Khān, till

This Christian governor of a Mohammedan province was an extraordinary man, and it is, as I have said, difficult to understand how he sustained his position among the bigoted community. He was a jolly, stout old gentleman, and perhaps, if his red nose did not belie him, addicted to veritable shiráz, or something stronger. He was full of fun and courage; but the sun of his greatness had well nigh set; the days of his dignity were numbered. In an evil hour he was ordered to quell an insurrection at Behbehán, in the adjoining district of Fírúz Mírza, the Sháh's uncle, which the prince had failed to do. Suleyman Khán was successful, and the prince, indignant that a ghyáwr had outdone himself, intrigued to effect the discharge of his successful competitor from the office he filled with such ability. The old gentleman complained severely, and with justice, of this conduct, and was soon about to deliver up the reins of Government.

In 1851 the province came under the administration of His Royal Highness Khānlar Mīrza, afterwards the Ihtishām-us-Saltaneh, regarding

Government of Khānlar Mirza, 1851 to about 1860.

whose assumption of power the details below have been *preserved by the author just quoted:—

The threatened discharge of Suleyman Khán from the administration of the province actually took place: bribery and court intrigue had done their work. The Christian had played the same game, and ventured a high stake; a purse of tománs to the Sháh, and 20,000 more to the Amír were spent in vain, — Khánler Mírza, the favourite uncle of the Sháh took possession of the province. He had previously governed the Gulpaigán district, near Isfahán, where his stern and unflinching distribution of justice gained him the greatest respect. To this were now added Lúristán, Khúzistán, and the Bakhtiyári mountains, so that Khánler Mírza ruled over the largest, richest, and most important region throughout Persia. As a natural consequence of the change of governors, the whole of the above districts were in an excited state, and with difficulty prevented from breaking out into open rebellion. A few judicious examples were made by the Prince, whose iron rule soon made itself felt, alike among Lúrs and Arabs. At the end of 1851, the only disaffection still existing throughout the Prince's dominion was at its north-western extremity, among a division of the Feylí Lúrs.

Early in 1852 Khānlar Mīrza visited Kūt Nahr Hāshim, intending to repair the dyke there, the failure of which had ruined Hawīzeh some 15 or 20 years earlier; but it does not appear that his efforts were crowned by any greater success than those of the Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh in 1842.

The traveller already twice cited † has left this description of the Prince Governor as he was in 1852:

His Highness, Khánler Mírza, might then be about thirty-five years of age, and was a remarkably handsome man, although somewhat pale, the result, it was whispered, of dissipation. His intelligent features, high forehead, full black eyes, and aquiline nose, would have anywhere rendered him an object of attraction. He did not generally bear a good name, but, from circumstances which afterwards presented themselves to my notice, I arrived at the conclusion that he was an admirable governor of a Persian Province, stern and unrelenting to the criminal, but usually mild and lenient towards others. If he called on his subjects for a large increase of their taxes (the chief charge against him), it was, I would fain believe, with the intention of applying the proceeds to the public good. He was building and repairing bridges, erecting dams for the better distribution of water, and engaged in other substantial works, which, if fully carried out, would be of the utmost consequence to the prosperity of Khúzistán. He was reported to be cruel in his punishments, but that is as much the fault of the people as of their rulers: they never have a due respect for the authority of a governor unless a few executions take place on his assumption of office.

The Persian forces expelled from Muhammareh and Ahwāz by the British in the war of 1856-57 were commanded by Khānlar Mīrza, but the Prince retained the government of 'Arabistān for some time after.

^{*} Loftus, in his Travels and Researches, pages 355-356.

[†] Ibidem, pages 361-362.

The Ihtishām-us-Saltaneh was succeeded about 1860 by the Ziya-ul-Mulk, who remained in office till 1862. The successors of the Ziya-ul-Mulk were His Royal Highness Farhād Mīrza (1862-69) and His Royal Highness Hamzah Mīrza (1869-80) known as the Hashmat-ud-Dauleh, two uncles of the Shāh, of whom the latter was already known in connection with Khurāsān affairs, while the former was distined to become at a later date Governor-General of Fārs. The nominal seat of the Hashmet-ud-Dauleh was Khurramābād, Luristān as well as 'Arabistān being under his control; but, in the later days of his administration, he was generally engaged in collecting the revenue of the low countries with the aid of a military force and in such circumstances made Shūshtar his headquarters. The total revenue of 'Arabistān in 1878-79 was 137,000; Tūmāns, of which about a quarter was appropriated by the Prince Governor as Pīshkash for himself, the remainder, called Dīvān, being credited to the Imperial Treasury.

Governments of the Ziyaul-Mulk,
Farhād
Mirza, and
Hamzah
Mīrza, from
about 1860
to 1880.

In March 1880 the Zill-us-Sultan, the eldest surviving but not the favourite son of the Shah, was entrusted with the administration of 'Arabistan in addition to that of Isfahan and other territories; but Isfahan was his place of abode, and he did not, apparently, visit 'Arabistan. Instead he appointed local Governors to represent him, at first Ja'far Quli Khān, then Amīrzadeh 'Abdullah Mīrza, and finally, not later than in 1882, His Royal Highness Khānlar Mīrza, Ihtishām-us-Sultaneh who had governed the province 30 years on his own account. The Ihtishām-us-Sultaneh who generally lived at Dizfūl not Shūshtar, visited Muhammareh in May 1883 with a regiment of Persian infantry. In 1884 or 1885 the Zill-us-Sultan cancelled the appointment of the Ihtishām-us-Saltaneh, and 'Arabistān and Luristān were combined under the Muzaffar-ul-Mulk, His Royal Highness's Governor of Burujird and Khurramābād who in 1885 made a tour to Fallāhīyeh and Muhammareh with two Persian regiments, causing many Arab Shaikhs to prepare to seek safety in Turkey.

Government of the Zillus-Sultān, by deputy, 1880-1887.

In 1887 or 1888 a new Governor was appointed to 'Arabistān in the person of the * Nizām-us-Saltaneh, probably by the Persian Central Government, for it was at this epoch that the glory of the Zill-us-Sultān suffered eclipse. He had ruled for some years over nearly a half of Persia, including all the southern and south-western provinces, which were now taken away leaving him only Isfahān. The Nizām-us-Saltaneh,† who

Governments of the Nizām-us-Saltaneh, the Shahāb-ul-Mulk, and His Royal Highness the Hisāmus-Saltaneh, 1888-1896,

^{*} At an earlier period the Nizām-us-Saltaneh was known as the Sa'ad-ul-Mulk, a title which was subsequently conferred on his brother, the Governor of Būshehr.

[†] Lord Curzon's Persia, Volume II, 'pages 380-381.

"though neither of good family nor distinguished antecedents" possessed "the inimitable manners of a Persian Gentleman," "acquired a fair reputation for justice as well as energy of administration," but in 1891 he was translated to Büshehr, being promoted later to the Governor-Generalship of Färs. His place was taken by Hāji Ghulām Husain Khān, known as the Shahāb-ul-Mulk, who remained for two years, making way in March 1893 for His Royal Highness the Hisām-us-Sultaneh, who visited Muhammareh in January 1894. The administration of this Prince was on the whole successful, and he retained the Government until March 1895, when the Nizām-us-Saltaneh was reappointed to 'Arabistān.

The Province suffered from a visitation of cholera in 1893.

Persian public works, 1848-1896.

Public Works were not entirely neglected by the Persian authorities in 'Arabistan, especially after the opening of the Karun to navigation in 1888, but the results of their endeavours were not very remarkable. In 1879 Shushtar and Muhammareh were temporarily brought into telegraphic communication with Tehran via Dizful; but the line was badly constructed and frequently cut in the Lur country, and it did not long remain in operation. In 1889 a Government House, barracks. a landing stage, and a public bath were built by the Nizām-us-Saltaneh at Muhammareh; other erections, such as barracks, were begun at Nāsiri; and large sums were spent, but without avail, in trying to restore the Difzūl bridge at Shūshtar. In February 1891 a Persian post office was opened at Muhammareh; and in August Muhammareh, Ahwaz, Shushtar and Dizful were joined by a Persian telegraph line, which in the following year was connected, by way of Rāmuz, Behbehān, Dīlam, and Rīg, with the main system of telegraphs at Burāzjān. In 1894, a weekly Persian postal service which had been instituted between Muhammareh and Shushtar collapsed for want of funds, and the offices were closed until the following year.

Extension of the Karguzar system to Arabistan, 1889.

One consequence of the opening of the Kārūn to the world was the extension to 'Arabistān of the system under which the Persian Foreign Office are represented at centres where important foreign interests exist by Kārguzārs or departmental agents, charged with the conduct of all public business relating to foreigners, dealing directly with Tehrān, and not subject to the control of any local Persian authority. At Būshehr as related elsewhere, this system had already for a long time been a fertile cause of difficulties. In January 1889 Sartīp Mīrza Kāzim Khān arrived at Muhammareh, where he had been appointed Kārguzār under the Persian Ministry of Foreign Affairs; and a similar official,

dependent however on the department of the Amīn-us-Sultīn, Farmer-General of the customs of Persia, was posted to Nāsiri.

Internal affairs of Northern 'Arabistan, excluding Ramuz, 1848-96.

We may now briefly review the internal history of the districts of 'Arabistān more directly under the supervision of the Persian Governor than those adjoining the Shatt-al-'Arab and Persian Gulf.

Rise of Dizful and decline of Shushtar.

By 1879 Shūshtar, long the principal town of Northern 'Arabistān, had been superseded in importance by Dizfūl. The following reasons were assigned for the change by a well informed authority:*

"The plague," of 1831-32, "which dealt lightly with Dispul, left few living people in Shūshter. The Lúrs and Persians, whom its magnificent and warlike Khāns had hitherto kept at a respectful distance, fastened on the weakened, but still wealthy city, and plundered it unmercifully. The surrounding country became infested by Lúr and Arab robbers, and the Persian trade, which had been prosecuted by the Kárún, Shushter and Ispahan, took other and safer routes. One of these was that by Amárah on the Tigris, Dispul and Khoramabad, and Dispul thus benefited by the ruin of Shushter. It is now a thriving and busy place, and a contrast to the rest of the province."

The assessment of Shūshtar town and district in 1883-84 was 230,000 Qrāns.

In the spring of 1888 the Bakhtiyāri country was in a very disturbed state, a deposed Il-Khāni having raised an insurrection against the Persian Government; but the rebel was brought in and order restored by the Nizām-us-Saltaneh, Governor of 'Arabistān, who marched with Persian troops from Isfahān and was assisted by Bakhtiyāris not belonging to the late Il-Khāni's party. In 1892 there was fresh trouble with the Bakhtiyāri tribes, and the former Il-Khāni and his successor were both arrested and sent to Tehrān; but in the following year the Bakhtiyāri country was removed from the jurisdiction of the Governor of 'Arabistān and placed under the Zill-us-Sultān at Isfahān, who restored the two exiled chiefs to power over the tribes and banished their principal rival.

The attitude of the Bakhtiyāris in 1888, together with the Government's expedition against them, unsettled some of the districts of Northern 'Arabistān; but tranquillity returned on the success of the

Bakhtiyāri troubles, 1888-1893.

General lawlessness, 1888-1896.

^{*} Mr. P. J. C. Robertson, Assistant Political Agent, Basrah, in the Persian Gulf Residency Administration Report, 1878-1879.

Persian operations becoming known. In October 1891 'Anafijeh tribesmen attacked a caravan near Shūshtar and carried off some rifles: but Shaikh Farhan, on whom they depended, made his peace with the Government; and thereafter an improvement was noticeable in the state of the surrounding country, which had been seriously disturbed. 1892 there was a partial failure of crops, which, aided by the weakness of the Shahab-ul-Mulk's administration, caused raids by Bani Turuf in the neighbourhood of Ahwaz and by Sagward Lurs on the Dizfūl-Shūshtar road. In 1894 the Dizfül-Khurramābād road became unsafe for caravans. and the Hisām-us-Saltanah resorted to military operations against the Dīrakwand Lurs, in which he was assisted by some of the Bakhtiyāris. In May a number of the Dirakwand were captured and deported, but the road remained impassable; feuds broke out among the Bakhtiyāris themselves; and the security of the Dizful-Shushtar road also was affected. In 1895-96 the Al Kathir committed raids in the vicinity of Dizful, in revenge for the alienation of lands which they claimed, and a punitive expedition against them became necessary; while the Lur tribes were guilty of such depredations as to cause many settled villages to be deserted by their inhabitants.

Affairs of the Rāmuz district, 1848-1896.

1879.

About the year 1879 the district of Rāmuz was farmed, by the Persian Government, sometimes to a member of the Shaikh of Muhammareh's family, sometimes to one of the Bakhtiyāri Khāns.

The district was assessed by the Persian Government in 1883-84 at 140,000 Qrāns.

1888.

In or about 1888 a rebellion took place at Rāmuz, which resulted in the ejectment of a Local Governor appointed by the Persian authorities and in the setting up of another by the people themselves. The Nizam-us-Saltaneh confirmed the popular candidate, after exacting increased Pīshkash from him.

Affairs of the Hawizeh district, 1848-1896.

Hawizeh was a district over which, on account of its marshy character, the Persian Government could exercise but little control; and great care was required on their part in appointing a local governor, as revenue could not be recovered from the inhabitants except through an authority approved by them.

In 1872 the Prince Governor of 'Arabistan visited Hawizeh, where 1872. he installed a new ruler in the person of Maula Muhammad.

In 1879 there were many Arabs from Turkish territory settled in 1879. the Hawizeh district, who had fled from beyond the Tigris to escape the exaction of the Shaikh of the Muntafik. Such immigrants were accustomed to pay revenue to the Maula or chief of Hawizeh when he was strong. and to refuse it when they found him weak.

In the autumn of 1881 Maula Mutallib was recognised by the 1881-88. Persian authorities as ruler of Hawizeh. In 1883-84 this individual still held the district on an assessment of 230,000 Qrans; but about 1888, though supported by the Persian Government, he had to make way for a more popular rival, Maula Nāsir Ullah with whom the Nizām-us-Saltaneh profited by the occasion to stipulate for higher Pishkash than before.

In May 1891 there were serious disturbances at Hawizeh, due to 1891. the appointment of an unacceptable Governor, for which the Bani Turuf were chiefly responsible. The rebels were defeated by Persian troops in a sharp action outside Hawizeh village, and the Shaikh who led them soon afterwards made his submission. The outbreak was afterwards attributed to misconduct on the part of the Mustaufi or Persian Revenue Accountant of 'Arabistan, who was accordingly thrown into irons.

In 1894, there was again trouble at Hawizeh, the inhabitants rising 1894-95. against the "military commander," possibly a Persian officer who had been sent there; and in December of that year two factions of the Bani Turuf embarked on mutual hostilities which did not cease until the Prince Governor of the Province himself proceeded to the spot with troops and a fort belonging to one of the parties was destroyed. The Hawizeh border was at this time greatly disturbed, the Arab tribes dependent on Persia and Turkey freely raiding each other across it.

In 1896, as a direct consequence of the intervention of the Ihtishām- 1896. us-Saltaneh in the previous year, hostilities took place about Hawīzeh in which the Bani Salih tribe were involved and Saiyid Na'ameh, of whom the Persian authorities had made use, was threatened; but an armistice was patched up by the Shaikh of Muhammareh.

Affairs of the Shaikhdom of Muhammareh, 1848-1896.

Muhammareh and its dependencies continued to be governed under Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shāh, as they had been during the reign of Muhammad Shāh and a great part of that of Fat-h 'Ali Shāh, by Shaikh Hāji Jābir, Muhaisin, whose tenure of power extended from 1819 to 1881.

Position at the close of the Anglo-Persian war, 1857. In April 1857, on news of the peace concluded between Britain and Persia reaching Muhammareh, though the British were still in military occupation of that town, Shaikh Jābir opened negotiations with His Royal Highness Khānlar Mīrza, the Persian Governor of 'Arabistān, who had retreated to Dizfūl, with a view to ensuring his own retention as Shaikh of Muhammareh; and he seems to have thought that his own loyalty would be rendered more conspicuous in the eyes of the Persian Government were the British authorities to set up in his place—as had been proposed and as he perhaps hoped—his rival, the Ka'ab Shaikh Fāris.

Shaikh Jābir's residence was at this time at *Da'aiji in Turkish territory, whither he had apparently retired on or before the arrival of the British military expedition; and, with his usual astuteness, he did not hesitate to engage in a correspondence on the subject of Muhammareh with the Turkish authorities at Basrah also, to whose designs of making good the Turkish claim to the place he even pretended to lend himself. All these manœuvres of his were not regarded as a bar to the restitution of Muhammareh to his representative by the British authorities, on the cessation of the British military occupation; and the Prince Governor, after the departure of the British forces, not only confirmed Shaikh Jābir in possession of Muhammareh but placed him in charge of Fallāhīyeh, also, removing Shaikh Fāris to make way for him.

Displacement of Shaikh Jābir from Muhammareh, 1860— 62. On the recall of His Royal Highness Khānlar Mīrza from 'Arabistān and the appointment in his stead of the Ziya-ul-Mulk, Shaikh Jābir fell for a time on evil days. A successful rebellion against his authority took place at Fallāhīyeh; the Ka'ab defeated the Muhaisin in a great battle at Munīkh on the Bahmanshīr and even occupied Muhammareh, where Shaikh Fāris, with Persian military support, installed his brother Hāshim as his representative; and the new Persian Governor, having treacherously decoyed Shaikh Jābir from his asylum at Da'aiji in Turkish territory to his own camp at Morān on the Kārūn, on pretence of arranging with him for a joint attack upon Fallāhīyeh, there treacherously made him a prisoner. The Shaikh was afterwards sent in custody to Shūstar, his son being handed over as a hostage to the Ka'ab chief, and apparently remained under detention until the end of the Ziya-ul-Mulk's Government.

In 1862, on the appointment of His Royal Highness Farhād Mīrza to the Government of 'Arabistān, Shaik Jābir was at once liberated and sent back to Muhammareh as Deputy Governor, with the support of Persian soldiery and guns. On his arrival at his own town two Ka'ab Shaikhs, Sultān-bin-Thāmir and Hāshim-bin-Ghaith, the latter a brother of Shaik Fāris, were killed; but the circumstances of the affair are obscure. In the same year Shaikh Jābir received the title of Nusratul-Mulk from the Persian Government.

Restoration of Shaikh Jabir to Muhammareh, 1862.

From his restoration in 1862 until his death at a very advanced age, probably over 90, in 1881, Shaikh Jābir governed his ancestral possessions with conspicuous ability and success. Between 1873 and 1875 he urged the improvement of the Kārūn river, with a view to the extension of steam navigation to Shūshtar; but he was unable to interest the Persian Government in his schemes, and by himself he could do nothing to carry it into effect. In 1875 there were difficulties between him and the Persian Government on the subject of the revenue payable for Muhammareh, and he was accused of having resisted the Persian Governor's troops and of aiming at independence; but apparently the charges were without foundation and blew over.

Later administration of Shaikh Jābir, 1862-21; his death and character.

In February 1879, his physical powers beginning to fail, though his mental ability and political influence remained unaffected, Shaikh Jābir visited Bombay for medical advice. In his absence his son Muhammad Khān waited on the Persian Governor of the province, His Royal Highness Hamzeh Mîrza, at Shūshtar, as bearer of the Muhammareh revenue, by which means it was hoped that a personal visit by the Hashmat-ud-Dauleh to Muhammareh might be averted; and meanwhile Miz'al Khān, a younger son of Shaikh Jābir, remained in charge at Muhammareh itself. A proposal that the Ka'ab districts should be farmed to the Shaikh of Muhammareh, of which Muhammad Khān was the mouth-piece, was at least favourably entertained by the Prince Governor; but it was intimated that Shaikh Jabir's sojourn at Bombay was regarded with disfavour by the Persian Government, for political reasons, and that he ought to return to Muhammareh. This he did: and the Prince Governor's apprehended visit to Muhammareh then took place, "with the usual financial result."

By 1880 the health of Shaikh Jābir had become very precarious; and, after a final rally, he died in October of the following year, having governed Muhammareh for more than 60 years.

Shaikh Jābir was "a shrewd, calculating Arab, far beyond his race in intelligence and civilisation." He owned several vessels and carried

on an extensive trade with Masqat and Bombay, by which means "and by wise investments in land, principally in Turkey, he gradually acquired a large fortune and the influence that money brings." The tact and moderation which he generally displayed in his dealings with the Persian Government, combined with the natural strength of his position, enabled him to maintain to the end an effective independence of them in matters of internal administration.

Succession, in 1881, and subsequent Government, of Shaikh Miz'al Khān at Muhammareh.

Shaikh Jābīr left, at his death, only two sons capable of succeeding him; these were Muhammad Khān and Miz'al Khān, already mentioned. There was also a son Khaz'al, who was at the time too young to be a competitor for the Shaikhship; and another, named Salman, if still alive, was dull and unambitious. Shaikh Jābir himself seems to have hesitated in the choice of his successor. Both Muhammad Khān and Miz'al Khān were accounted good fighting men; and in ability and popularity there was, perhaps, little difference between them. Until 1879 or later Shaikh Jabir treated the senior of the two as his successor and appeared to regard the other with a sort of senile jealousy; but for some months before his death he employed the junior as his agent in all matters of business, and apparently expressed a formal wish that he should be recognised as heir to the Shaikhdom. On the decease of Shaikh Jabir the Government of Muhammareh was provisionally assumed, pending orders from the Persian authorities, by Muhammad Khān as the elder son, and he spared no efforts to conciliate his younger brother; but the Muhaisin, as a body, and the Drīs division of the Ka'ab preferred Miz'al Khān. On this fact coming to the knowledge of the Zill-us-Sultan, then Governor General of 'Arabistan and of other provinces, the Persian Farman of appointment was made out in the name of Shaikh Miz'al Khān. Muhammad Khān, contrary to the general expectation, did not attempt to dispute the award by force but proceeded to Ispahan, where the Zill-us-Sultan caused him to be detained; and the peace of Muhammareh remained undisturbed.

1883-88.

By 1883, after the reduction in August of some rebellious Ka'ab of the Nassār section, whom the Shaikh of Kuwait was believed to have incited to revolt, the power of Shaikh Miz'al Khān appeared to be locally well consolidated; but in 1884 his brother Muhammad Khān was allowed to escape from Dizfūl, where he had been confined, and made his way to Fallāhīyeh, while the Shaikh himself seemed afraid that the increasing demands of the Persian authorities might oblige him in the end to resign the Government of Muhammareh. It was granted to him only from year to year, and had been farmed to him in the beginning for

450,000 Qrans or Rs. 1,80,000 per annum. In 1883 or 1884 the Sa'adul-Mulk from Büshehr visited Muhammareh with a view to the transfer of the customs house from the Shaikh to the Persian authorities; but the project was successfully resisted by Shaikh Miz'al. In 1885 a nominal reconciliation was effected between the Shaikh and his brother Muhammad Khān, and it was arranged that the latter should reside at Sabīlivāt-apparently the place of that name in Turkish territory on the west bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab- and that a monthly allowance of 100 Tumans a month and a date plantation should be assigned to him for his support. In 1887 the authority of the Shaikh was again defied by the Nassār Ka'ab, and the services of the Persian gunboat "Persepolis" were lent him for the purpose of reducing them to obedience, which was apparently effected. In 1888 Shaikh Miz'al received the title of Mu'azzus-Saltaneh, which, with visits to Muhammareh by various Persian officials, cost him 20,000 Tumans over and above the ordinary revenue payments of the year.

It was believed that Shaikh Miz'al Khān designedly obstructed the growth of Muhammareh, lest any appearance of prosperity there should tempt the Persian authorities to increase their demands on him as Shaikh; and he certainly regarded every extension of the power of the central Persian Government in 'Arabistān with alarm, this perhaps being the principal reason of his hostility to general navigation on the Kārūn river, concerning which we shall have more to say hereafter.

By degrees the popularity of the Shaikh with the tribes under his Government waned, chiefly in consequence of the avariciousness of his behaviour. Besides increasing taxation generally, a matter in which the demands of the Persian Government possibly left him no option, he claimed the personal ownership of land at Muhammareh and in its neighbourhood, to which his father had never pretended, and asserted a right of evicting the hereditary cultivators of date groves in favour of higher bidders. In 1895 he was still able to maintain excellent order in his dominions, but his subjects were extremely dissatisfied with him, and most of the headmen of tribes had already signed documents pledging themselves to support his younger brother Khaz'al in certain eventualities.

Affairs of the Ka'ab districts, 1848-96.

The evolutions of Shaikh Jabir at the close of the Anglo-Persian war of 1856-57 have already been mentioned. They resulted in the deporta-

Government of

Fallahiyeh by the Shaikh of Muhammareh, about 1857— 60. tion to Tehran of Shaikh Fāris, the Ka'ab Shaikh who had governed Fallāhīyeh since 1841, and who yet meekly obeyed a summons from His Royal Highness Khānlar Mīrza, Governor of 'Arabistān, to appear before him; also in the appointment of Shaikh Jābir himself as Persian Deputy-Governor of Fallāhīyeh in addition to Muhammareh. Shaikh Jābir sent his son Muhammad Khān to represent him at Fallāhīyeh; but during his absence at Burūjird, where the Persian Governor had required him to attend, the Ka'ab rose against this deputy. The loss of his new districts was averted only by his own immediate return and the capture by him of Fallāhīyeh.

Later Government of Shaikh Fāris, Ka'ab, at Fallāhīyeh, 1860—68.

On the appointment of the Ziya-ul-Mulk to the Government of 'Arabistān, Shaikh Fāris was released from his detention at Tehrān, while his relation Lutf Ullah raised most of the Ka'ab tribes against the Muhaisin administration, to which however the Drīs division of the Ka'ab remained faithful. The result, as already noted, was a serious defeat of Shaikh Jābir at Munīkh and the temporary establishment of a Ka'ab government at Muhammareh itself, after which Shaikh Jābir was seized and in his turn deported by the Persian authorities. In 1862 Shaikh Jābir was replaced in authority at Muhammareh; and in 1868 Shaikh Fāris became blind and was succeeded in the chiefship of the Ka'ab districts by his son Muhammad.

Murder of Shaikh Lutf Ullah and Government of Fallahiyeh by Shaikh Rahmah, Shaikh Ja'far, and Shaikh 18 Jabalah, 1878—95. In May 1878 Shaikh Luft Ullah-bin-Mubādir, generally known as Shaikh Lufti, a member of the Shaikhly family of Fallāhīyeh but a worn-out debauchee and occasional sufferer from delirium tremens, who had ousted Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Fāris from the Shaikhship in 1872 or earlier, was murdered with his son Ghadhbān in the Jarrahi district by Ja'far and Salman, sons of the said Muhammad.

Rahmah-bin-'Isa, a nephew of Shaikh Fāris, was appointed in Shaikh Lufti's place by the Persian authorities on his promising a total revenue, for the Fallāhīyeh district only, of 10,000 Tūmāns a year. At the same time the Jarrāhi and Hindiyān districts, as well as Ma'shūr, were detached from the Ka'ab Shaikhdom and farmed to Amīr 'Abdullah, of Dih Mulla in Hindiyān, on an annual assessment of 12,000 Tūmāns in addition to 9,000 Tūmans which he already paid for Dih Mulla. The season being a bad one Amīr 'Abdullah failed to meet his engagements; and Shaikh Rahmah, the new chief of Fallāhīyeh, whose control was feeble, found himself unable to raise more than 4,000 Tūmāns of the amount due by him. Upon this, to enable Shaikh Rahmah to recover the demand, Persian troops were sent to Fallāhīyeh under Asad Ullah Khān, the Wazīr of the Persian Governor.

In 1880, after negotiations for a lease of the districts to Shaikh Jabir 1880-84. of Muhammareh, of which the issue is not certainly known, and after an unsuccessful trial of Ja'far-bin-Muhammad—a grandson of Shaikh Fāris-as Shaikh, Rahmah was again set over Fallāhīyeh, while Amīr 'Abdullah apparently continued to hold the other Ka'ab distriots. In 1881 Shaikh Rahmah was confirmed in the Government, which he retained until 1884, when being found incompetent, he was displaced in favour of Ja'far-bin-Muhammad, the due payment of revenue by whom to the Persian authorities was guaranteed for one year by the Shaikh of Muhammareh; and the new Shaikh was installed by the help of Shaikh Miz'al Khān, notwithstanding the existence of a strong party which still favoured Shaikh Rahmah. The Persian assessment of the Fallāhīyeh district in 1883-84 was 150,000 Qrans.

In 1885, in which year the Muzaffar-ul-Mulk, Governor of 'Arabistan, personally visited Fallähiveh, Shaikh Ja'far was temporarily removed and Shaikh Rahmah re-instated, the Shaikh of Muhammareh being requested to support him; but this substitution was cancelled almost as soon as made.

In September 1888 the Nizām-us-Saltaneh, Governor of 'Arabistan, 1888. visited Fallāhīyeh with a force of 500 Persian infantry and some Bakhtiyari horse; his coming was apparently connected with the recent expulsion by the Ka'ab of Shaikh 'Abdullah, probably a brother so named of Shaikh Rahmah, who had some months previously been appointed instead of Shaikh Ja'far; but the people were in no mood to discuss the question with him, they flooded the country round Fallahiveh inaking the place impregnable by his force, and he was unable to advance nearer than Gharaibeh on the Jarrahi River.

In 1893 the Ka'ab became dissatisfied with Shaikh 'Abdullah and 1893-95. deposed him in favour of Shaikh Jafar; but the Shaikh of Muhammareh. who preferred 'Abdullah, succeeded in persuading the Hisām-us-Saltaneh to reappoint him. The opposition of the Ka'ab was so strong, however. that in January 1894, while on a visit to Muhammareh, the Prince Governor reversed his action and recognised Shaikh Ja'far. In the course of the year there was a movement of the tribes in support of Shaikh 'Abdullah, and their wishes were again met by his restoration to power. Difficulties then at once arose in regard to arrears of revenue: an attempted compromise failed; and by 1895 Shaikh Ja'far was once more in power.

The Ka'ab Shaikhdom, as is evident, had now entirely fallen to pieces. There was no longer any permanency in the Shaikh's tenure of power:

his selection depended on the Persian authorities and was sometimes influenced by the Shaikh of Muhammareh; he had sunk, in fact, into a mere collector of taxes for the Persian Government and he had become the puppet of his nominal subjects, instead of governing as his ancestors had done.

Relations of 'Arabistan with Turkey, 1848-1896.

General relations of Persia with Turkey on the Muhammareh-Basrah border. Matters connected with the general relations of Persia and Turkey on the Muhammareh-Basrah frontier are dealt with, for the most part, in the chapter on the history of Turkish 'Irāq: such, in particular, are questions concerning the position of the common boundary and piracies committed in the Shatt-al-'Arab. The attempted delimitation of the 'Arabistān section of the Perso-Turkish frontier in 1850—1852 is described at length in the chapter mentioned, as are also the proceedings at a later time in regard to Shalhah Island.

1893.

In October 1893 the Turkish authorities began to levy duties at Fāo in the Shatt-al-'Arab on goods consigned to or exported from Muhammareh, and it was understood that the Wāli of Basrah had been instructed to treat Muhammareh and the Persian bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab as Turkish territory. The Persian Government complained; and some British Indian vessels having been interfered with under the new arrangements, a strong protest was lodged by His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople. The Porte then disowned the pretensions attributed to them, and the irregular levy of duties at Fāo was discontinued.

Relations of the Persian Governors of 'Arabīstān with the Turkish authorities, 1878.

The Persian Governors of 'Arabīstān were brought but little into contact with the officers of the Porte, the districts under the personal supervision of the former meeting Turkish 'Irāq only in the wild tribal tracts upon the Hawīzeh border.

In the spring of 1878 a serious raid was made by Bani Lām of doubtful nationality in the neighbourhood of Shūshtar, whence they carried off a number of mules and sheep; but a Bakhtiyāri chief, at the instance of the Persian Governor, fell upon them in Persian territory and almost, it was said, annihilated them. There was great difficulty, however, in recovering from the Bakhtiyāri himself the property lost by the Shūshtaris, and in the end the Persian Government fined him 30,000 Tūmāns.

Large quantities of land in Turkish territory were purchased by Shaikh Jābir of Muhammareh on his personal account, chiefly between 1860 and 1880; one reason for his making investments abroad was their greater security out of reach of the Persian Government, who could deal with him as they pleased, he being a Persian subject, in their own dominions. The influence which Shaikh Jābir acquired in the Basrah Wilāyat through his estates there was very great; but it was not abused by him, and its existence does not seem to have been resented by the Turkish authorities of the day. The local Turkish officials did not, in his time, show any aggressive disposition towards the ruler of Muhammareh,—a circumstance due partly to the moderation which distinguished Shaikh Jābir's external as it did his internal policy, and partly to the weakness of the Turkish Government at Basrah.

Relations of the Shaikhs of Muhammarch with the Turkish authorities, 1848—1881.

Later, in the days of Shaikh Jābir's successor, the attitude of the Turks to Muhammareh became less complacent; but the steady growth of the power and resources of the Shaikhdom still deterred them from hostile proceedings; and Shaikh Miz'al Khān, though always conciliatory in his dealings and ready to co-operate for the suppression of piracy on the Shatt-al-'Arab, never showed himself in the least degree subservient to the Turkish authorities.

1881-96.

In 1894 raids were committed on one another by Arab tribes residing respectively in Persian and Turkish territory between Hawizeh and the Shatt-at-'Arab. Complaints were made at Tehrān by the Turkish Government, but the culpability of Persian subjects was denied by the Shaikh of Muhammareh, and the matter went no further.

British relations with 'Arabistān before the Anglo-Persian War, 1848—56.

In October 1848 Major Rawlinson, Political Agent in Turkish Trāq, found it necessary to address a strong remonstrance on the subject of vaxatious opposition to British trade at Muhammareh to Hāji Jābir, as Shaikh of that port. His action was occasioned by interference with the operations at Muhammareh of Messrs. A. Hector & Co., a British firm having their head-quarters at Baghdād, and was founded upon the rights secured to British merchants in Persia by the Anglo-Persian Commercial Treaty of 1841.

Proposed British naval demonstration against Muhammareh, 1848-1849.

Major Rawlinson at the same time referred to Colonel Farrant, His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d' Affaires at Tehrān, and requested Major Hennell, Political Resident at Büshehr, to send one ormore vessels of the Indian Navy squadron in the Persian Gulf to co-operate with the armed steamer "Nitocris" of the Baghdād Political Agency in a demonstration against Muhammareh. Major Hennell complied by despatching, at the end of December 1848, the sloop of war "Elphinstone" and the brig of war "Euphrates;" but the "Euphrates" went ashore on the island of Khargu en route, and was so seriously damaged that she had to return to Büshehr. In the meanwhile, also, Major Rawlinson received from Tehrān orders addressed by the Shāh to Sulaimān Khān, then Governor of 'Arabistān, who was "no less distinguished for his liberal principles than for his firm administration!;" and, good prospects of redress by ordinary means being thus afforded, the plan of a British naval demonstration was laid aside.

The action of Major Rawlinson and Major Hennell was disapproved by the Government of Bombay, who considered that they ought not to have entered on preparations for the use of force without instructions from His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d' Affaires at Tehran; and, as the Political Agent in Turkish 'Iraq was under the direct orders of the Government of India, they reported the case to that authority. Major Hennell justified his part in the proceedings by referring to orders which had been issued by the Government of India at the time of Major Rawlinson's appointment to Baghdad in 1843, authorising that officer "to issue directions and to address requisitions to all the political and naval officers in the Persian Gulf, as occasion may require "; but the Government of Bombay did not exonerate him from blame, it having been laid down in the orders quoted that the discretionary power conferred on Major Rawlinson was not to be used "on all ordinary occasions," but only in circumstances "demanding its immediate exercise," such as did not in the present instance exist. The Government of India concurred in the views of the Government of Bombay and informed Major Rawlinson of them for his future guidance.

Proposed assembling of British naval vessels at Muhammareh, 1849. Towards the close of 1849 Colonel Williams, the British representative on the Commission for the delimitation of the Perso-Turkish Frontier, then assembled at Baghdād, asked Captain Kemball, the Political Agent in Turkish 'Irāq, to communicate with the Resident at Būshehr with a view to British cruisers being sent to Muhammareh, where the work of the commission was to begin, to "give to the opening scene of their labors a judicious éclat, as well as a moral influence over the population of the Chaab district."

On the ground that no measures of coercion or intimidation were involved, this request was recommended by Capitain Kemball, who

informed the Government of India of his having done so, to Major Hennell, the Resident at Büshehr, but whether any British vessels were afterwards assembled at Muhammareh to grace the advent of the Commission is not clear.

Operations of the Anglo-Persian War in 'Arabīstān, 1856-57.

The British campaign in Southern Persia in 1856-57 concluded with operations at Muhammareh and on the Kārūn River.

It was Sir J. Outram's intention to proceed to Muhammareh, where the bulk of the Persian army in 'Arabistān were stationed under His Royal Highness Khānlar Mīrza, immediately on his return from the Burāzjān raid, described in the history of the Persian coast; but the tardy arrival from India of a considerable portion of the 2nd Division occasioned a delay of about six weeks. Another serious consideration was the safety of Būshehr, which it was thought that the Persian army in Fārs might attack on a reduction being made in the garrison; accordingly a force of some 3,000 men remained for its defence, including artillery, which with field and heavy guns, were placed in the redoubts already built to strengthen the entrenched camp. General Jacob, commanding the 1st Division, was left in charge of Būshehr.

The military force detailed for the expedition to 'Arabistan consisted of one troop of the 14th Dragoons and some of the Sind Horse, together 392 sabres; the 3rd Troop of Horse Artillery and No. 2 Light Field Battery, each 6 guns, with 166 and 176 men respectively, besides 109 Bombay and 124 Madras Sappers and Miners; and the 64th Foot, 78th Highlanders, 23rd and 26th Native Infantry, and Native Light Battalion, varying in strength from about 700 to 900 men each and giving a total of 3,919 infantry; in all 4,886 men of all arms, of whom nearly 2,000 were Europeans, with 12 guns. The vessels of the Indian Navy employed on which the brunt of the fighting, as will presently be seen, fell were: the "Ferooz," steam frigate, four 68-pounders and four 32-pounders; the "Assaye," steam frigate, ten 68-pounders; the "Semiramis," steam frigate, six 68-pounders; the "Ajdala," steam frigate, two 68-pounders and two 32-pounders; the "Victoria," steam vessel, four 32-pounders; and the "Clive" and "Falkland," sailing sloops, the former carrying fourteen 32-pounders. Most of these ships had, in addition to their

British preparations for the invasion of 'Arabistan. principal armament, two 12-pounders and two 3-pounder boat guns; but of their heavy guns, which were mounted in broadside, only half could be brought to bear at the same time on river-bank fortifications.

The despatch of the troops from Büshehr began on the 4th March, and the leading ships crossed the bar and entered the Shatt-al-'Arab on the 8th, anchoring off Ma'āmareh on 'Abbādan Island; but General Havelock and the staff of the 2nd Division did not arrive there until the 15th; and the coming of Sir J. Outram to assume the general direction of affairs was still further retarded by various causes, among which were expectations of a Persian attack on Bushehr, delay in the completion of the 2nd Division without which it would be difficult both to hold Büshehr and attack Muhammareh, the suicides of General Stalker and Commodore Ethersey, and, finally, bad weather. While the fleet of war vessels and transports was assembling at Ma'āmareh, all landing by the troops on either side of the river was prohibited,—in order to avoid, on the Persian bank, loss of life in useless skirmishes, and, on the Turkish, violation of the neutrality of Turkey. Irregulars of the enemy who occupied a village opposite the anchorage in considerable strength gave no sign of hostility, except by firing on boats that approached the left bank of the river too closely. Sir J. Outram arrived at Ma'āmareh on the 21st March in the "Ferooz"; and on the 24th the whole fleet. numbering nearly 50 vessels exclusive of ships of war, moved up the Shatt-al-'Arab and anchored off the village of Hartheh on 'Abbadan Island, three or four miles below the mouth of the Kārūn. Some of the larger vessels, which encountered difficulties by the way, did not reach the rendezvous with the others; and the attack on Muhammareh which had been resolvedion was consequently postponed from the next day to the day after.

It had been impressed upon the Arab tribes on the Persian side through the medium of Captain Kemball, Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, and the Rev. Mr. Badger, one of the chaplains to the force and Arabic interpreter to the Lieutenant General Commanding, that they should remain neutral in the ensuing operations; and as Sir J. Outram wrote from Hartheh, "the success of Captain Kemball's negotiations with them was remarkably displayed as we steamed up to the present anchorage," for, "at several of the villages, the Arabs, male and female, approached the river waving their flags, and we had hardly anchored when several came on board the "Feroze," volunteering to give us any information in their power as to the numbers and disposition of the enemy." A

proclamation calculated to dispel any alarm that they might feel on their own account was also distributed among the tribesmen.

Meanwhile the Persians had not been idle at Muhammareh, which they rightly regarded as the key of 'Arabistān, and which for some months they had been engaged in strengthening secundum artem. On either side of the Kārūn at its junction with the Shatt-al-'Araba solid earthen battery, the parapets 20 feet high and 18 feet thick, the embrasures casemated and revetted with date-tree logs, had been constructed; that on the northern bank of the Kārūn was arranged for 18, and that on the southern for 11 guns. These batteries, though open in rear, were excellently placed for commanding the river below, opposite, and above the Persian position; and there were also various subsidiary works, including a small battery on the right bank of the Kārūn a short way above the main battery on the point, while long lines of breast works extended from the left and right flanks of the main battery up the Kārūn, and the Shatt-al-'Arab.

Persian
preparations
for the
defence of
Arabistan.

Captain Maisonneuve of the "Sybille," a 50-gun French frigate which had been sent to cruise in the Persian Gulf and had lately visited Basrah in connection with the loss of some French antiquities in Mesopotamia, informed Sir J. Outram at Būshehr at the beginning of March that he had personally inspected the Persian fortifications at Muhammareh and had found them much stronger than they were generally reputed, the Persian garrison he estimated at 10,000 regulars with 4,000 to 5,000 irregulars, and the number of their serviceable guns at about 20. According to later information obtained by Captain Kemball and the Rev. Mr. Badger, the Persian guns were 31, exclusive of some old ship guns, and the Persian forces consisted of 600 trained Persian artillery, 6,300 regular Persian infantry, 300 Persian cavalry and 1,200 Bakhtiyāri horse, 1,200 Bakhtiyāri matchlockmen, 3,000 Arab levies, and 400 Balūch mercenaries,—in all 13,000 men.

The position was, for various reasons, favourable to the Persians. The western bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab being Turkish territory, British counter-batteries could not be erected there; and little would have been gained by a successful landing of the British force on 'Abbādān Island, where the Persians evidently expected the first attempt to be made, because the rapidly flowing Kārūn would still remain to be crossed under fire, before they could reach the enemy. In these circumstances Sir J. Outram decided to make a direct naval attack upon the

Attack on and capture of Muhammareh, 26th March 1867.

Principal Persian works, following it up, as soon as their fire was sufficiently subdued. by a disembarkation on the left bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab above the Persian position and an immediate advance against the Persian camps, which were in the desert behind Muhammareh town. The 25th of March passed in transferring troops, guns, etc., from the larger to the smaller vessels of the fleet at Hartheh; and in the evening some hundreds of the enemy began to throw up cover for two field guns. which they brought with them, near the anchorage; but a few shells from the "Assaye" drove them off. Already on the night of the 24th-25th, an island opposite the Persian north battery, at the present day forming part of that known as Umm-al-Khasāsīf, was examined with a view to establishing a mortar battery on it, but was found to be too low and muddy for the purpose; consequently, on the 25th, a raft to carry two 8-inch and two 51-inch mortars was constructed, which on the following night was moored in a channel to the west of the modern island of Umm-al-Khasā īf, close to the village of Zain on the Turkish shore and about 1,000 yards from the Persian batteries. The service of this raft, which was commanded by Captain Worgan of the Artillery and which was towed into position after dark by the Baghdad Political Agency steamer "Comet," was extremely dangerous. It was even accounted a sort of forlorn hope, because, should the enemy—as was probable—discover its presence during the night, nothing could prevent their capturing it, far removed as it was from all support; but it escaped their observation. Apparently from the location of the mortar battery at this spot, the eastern part of the island of Umm-al-Khasāsīf is called Umm-ar-Risās or the "Bullet Place," to this day.

The order of events in the attack upon Muhammareh on the 26th March is not precisely ascertainable, there being some discrepancy in the time assigned by the principal authorities to the successive British movements. At dawn the mortar raft opened fire on both the principal Persian batteries, and an immediate and considerable effect was produced by its 8-inch shells; but those of its lighter pieces fell short. According to Sir J. Outram, Captain Worgan "engaged the enemy's batteries for some two hours before he was supported by the men of war, evincing much coolness and great galantry," and though few of the Persian guns could be brought to bear on the raft, it did not escape without injury and a boat attached to it was sunk. The mortars remained in action for about five hours and discharged, from first to last, 102 shells.

The British war vessels having got under way when the boom of the mortars was heard, the "Semiramis" towing the "Clive" and followed by

the "Ajdaha," first ascended the channel on the Turkish side of the river to support the raft; but, as soon as the enemy had been shaken by their combined fire, these vessels returned to the main river to reinforce the "Ferooz," "Assaye" and Victoria," which, the last named towing the "Falkland," next proceeded up-stream to engage the Persian batteries at short range. At about 7 A.M., the "Ferooz," backed by the "Assaye," came into action against the Persian north battery, while the "Semiramis," "Victoria" and "Falkland" devoted their attention to the southern one and to the subsidiary battery on the northern bank of the According to an * eyewitness, "The morning being very clear, with just sufficient breeze to prevent the smoke from collecting, a more beautiful scene than was then presented can scarcely be imagined. The ships, with ensigns flying from every mast-head, seemed decked for a holiday; the river glittering in the early sun-light, its dark datefringed banks contrasting most effectively with the white canvas of the "Falkland," which had loosened sails to get into closer action; the sulkylooking batteries just visible through the grey fleecy cloud which enveloped them; and groups of brightly-dressed horsemen flitting at intervals between the trees where they had their encampment, formed altogether a picture from which even the excitement of the heavy cannonade around could not divert the attention." The distance of the ships from the Persian works was only 200 to 300 yards, and the parapets rapidly crumbled under their fire. About 7-45 A.M., only 3 or 4 guns in the Persian batteries then remaining in action, Commodore J. W. Young, who commanded the fleet and had hoisted his flag on the "Ferooz," made the signal to close, whereupon the "Ferooz" and "Assaye" laid themselves within 60 yards of the Persian north battery, the other vessels being in line astern, and a heavy fire was poured into the Persian works opposite each. In this last phase of the naval engagement the British ships anchored except the "Assaye," which alternately steamed up to the "Ferooz" and dropped down with the current, raking as she did so the Kārūn face of the northern battery.

The enemy's artillery being practically silenced, though a hot musketry fire from his batteries and breast works still continued and was answered by European riflemen on board the ships, it was time for the transports carrying the troops prepared for disembarkation to advance up to the river. Captain J. Rennie, I.N., of the "Ferooz," a dauntless

^{*}Captain Hunt; see his Outram and Havelock's Persian Campaign, pages 249-250.

seaman whom Sir J. Outram described as "the life and soul of the fleet" proceeded in a rowing boat, under fire, to accelerate this movement. About 9 A.M., the transport flotilla passed up the stream, sometimes within 100 vards of the Persian shore, exposed to an occasional fire from field pieces, to which some of the transports having guns replied, and to a hot musketry fusillade: but, the decks being well protected with bales of compressed fodder, the only casualties were two or three native followers killed through incautiously exposing themselves. nice," carrying General Havelock, his staff, the 78th Highlanders, and some details, in all about 1,400 men, went safely by, though several times struck; but the moment of passing the Persian batteries was an anxious one for her Commander, Lieutenant Chitty, I.N., who steered the vessel himself. The landing took place, rapidly and in good order, under General Havelock at a * point on the Shatt-al-'Arab some distance above the Persian north battery, and for the most part direct from the ships' sides to terra firma. Just as the disembarkation began, or perhaps earlier, the chief magazine in the enemy's batteries exploded: and after this various smaller explosions took place in the same vicinity. The "Semiramis" entered the Kārūn to silence a work which still fired from one gun; and a landing party from the "Assaye" occupied the Persian north battery, while others from the "Semiramis." "Victoria." "Clive" and "Falkland" took possession of the southern one in the face of some resistance.

Owing to the rise of the tide the horse artillery and cavalry, except a troop of Sind Horse, could not immediately be set ashore; but about 1-30 or 2 p.m., a field battery and the infantry portion of the force, after being landed and formed, advanced first through the river side date groves and then over open plain, against two entrenched camps which the enemy had pitched, one—for his cavalry and artillery—a little to the north, the other—for his infantry—slightly to the west, of the town of Muhammareh. The Persians were drawn up in order of battle near the former of these camps, that which had been occupied by His Royal Highness Khānlar Mīrza himself; but on the approach of the British line, consisting from right to left of the field battery, the 78th Highlanders, a wing of the 26th Native Infantry, His Majesty's 54th Regiment, the Native Light Battalion, and the 23rd Native Infantry, they suddenly lost heart and disappeared as if by enchantment, leaving almost every-

^{*}The accounts vary greatly as to the place of disembarkation, one putting it only a few hundred yards above the Persian battery, another as much as two miles above. Possibly each transport went alongside where she found a good berth.

thing behind them in their flight. Just as they evacuated the place an enormous magazine, that containing the whole of their reserve ammunition, was blown up,—whether designedly or by accident remained uncertain. The British force continued in pursuit of the Persians for three or four miles beyond Muhammareh in the direction of Ahwāz, but overtook none of them except wounded stragglers; finally they bivouacked on their ground. At the close of the day a thanksgiving service was held on the "Assaye" by the Rev. Mr. Badger and was attended by Sir J. Outram and his staff, Captain Kemball, and others.

The exact loss of the Persians was difficult to ascertain, but 80 or 90 bodies were found unburied in their batteries and the total number of their killed was estimated at 200. Among the partially wounded was Sartīp Ágha Jān Khān, one of their most esteemed officers, who fell in the north battery, and whom they carried off with them in their Considerable execution was found to have been done in the Persian camps, though far distant from the river, by a fire of shell and grape which had from time to time been turned in their direction by the ships. Few Persian wounded were seen, but many were afterwards reported to have been murdered by Arabs while endeavouring to make good their escape. The enemy abandoned 16 guns, 6 to 18-pounders, which fell into the hands of the British troops, also an 8-inch brass mortar; but the mortar and some of the guns, as captured, were in an unserviceable condition. The Persians took away with them 5, or possibly 6 field guns; and the others which their batteries had been reported to contain were presumed to have been thrown into the rivers or creeks, in the mud of which two of those taken were recovered. Many small arms and some quantities of ammunition, including 3,600 rounds, for the artillery, 4,000 loose shot and shell, mostly for 9 and 12-pounders, and 14,400 lbs. of powder, were collected; and it was calculated that about 144,000 lbs. of powder must have been destroyed in the explosions which took place in the Persian lines during or after the action. Tents to the number of 132 and a large amount of provisions were captured. One reason of the Persians' being obliged to abandon most of their effects was that, perfectly assured of their ability to defend Muhammareh with success, they had sent their animal transport away to Ahwāz, where fodder was more easily obtainable. What they did succeed in carrying off was plundered, to a large extent, by Arabs who beset them in their retreat.

The British loss in the whole engagement was trifling: in the fleet it amounted only to 5 killed, and one officer—Lieutenant Harries, I.N.,

—and 17 others wounded; but some of the vessels were considerably damaged, especially the "Victoria," which grounded under fire 200 yards from the mouth of the Kārūn and received 18 shots in her hull; and 300 bullets were found embedded in the broadside of the "Ferooz." Of the military force not a single fighting man was even wounded.

The action was essentially a naval one; and, as Sir J. Outram himself observed: "Nothing (more) was left for the army to do, after being conducted by the navy past the silenced batteries, than to land and take possession of the enemy's entrenched camp."

Occupation of Muhammarch, 27th March 1857. On the night of the 26th and morning of the 27th March, a troop of the Sind Hore under Captain Green followed the retiring Persians to a point 11 miles beyond that reached by the infantry; but the fugitives were found to be moving at a pace which in the absence of a strong cavalry force, precluded all possibility of successful pursuit. Accordingly on the next day, though the rest of the scanty mounted troops had in the meanwhile been landed, the British force returned to Muhammarch; the Persian entrenched camps there were occupied by it; and guards were stationed in the town to maintain order and security. By the 1st April the baggage of the whole force had been landed and tents pitched for all, which was opportune, for the weather had suddenly grown very hot.

Reconnaissance to Ahwāz, 29th March to 4th April 1857. On the 29th March, under orders from Sir J. Outram who for want of transport could not at the moment undertake any far reaching operations by land, an expedition was despatched up the Kārūn River. The instructions to the officer in command,* Acting Commodore J. Rennie, were to push on to Ahwāz, reconnoitre the place, and, if practicable, destroy any stores or supplies which the enemy had collected there. His flotilla consisted of the armed steamer "Comet" of the Baghdād Political Agency and the river steamers "Planet" and "Assyria," each of which towed a gunboat mounting two 24-pounder howitzers and manned by European sailors. The steamers carried, distributed among them, 150 men of the 78th Highlanders and an equal number of the 64th Foot, these troops being under the command of Captain G. H. Hunt of the former regiment; and Captain Kemball, Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, accompanied the force in the capacity of political officer.

^{*} Commodore Young had been obliged, immediately after the capture of Muhammarch to obtain leave for reasons of health; and his place was taken by Captain Rennie of the "Ferooz."

The steamers anchored for the first night at Kūt-al-'Abīd, where traces of the passage of the enemy were found on the right bank of the Sab'eh was reached early the next afternoon, and Ismā'īli on the evening of the 30th March. At Sab'eh signs were discovered of a recent Persian bivouac, together with the wheel marks of five guns and of a small carriage. There were also several freshly made graves, and it was afterwards ascertained that Sartīp Āgha Jān Khān, mortally wounded at Muhammareh, had been buried there. At Ismā'īli communication with the people of the country was opened, and from them it was learned that the Persian army in retreat had passed on the previous day, towing one gun, of which the carriage was broken, in a boat on the river; here also new graves were discovered. An early start was made on the morning of the 31st and in the afternoon the force reached Kūt-al-'Amaireh, where positive information was obtained of the arrival of the Persian army at Ahwaz on the day preceding. The hour was then too late to admit of a nearer approach being made with safety to the enemy's position; but at 3 A.M. on the 1st April the flotilla got under way and pressed on towards Ahwaz with the utmost despatch.

Cavalry patrols of the enemy were descried before long, but they did not approach very near. At length the main body of the Persian army came in view, crowning the ridge which forms a continuation, to the west of the river, of the Ahwāz hills on its eastern side. A boat was captured under the left bank and was found to contain the disabled gun, a handsome 12-pounder, which was at once hoisted on board the "Comet."

Meanwhile information was received according to which the village of Ahwāz was very weakly held by the enemy, while the Persian army on the opposite bank had no means of crossing the river to reinforce it; and presently it was decided to attempt a coup de main. Two gunboats were sent up the river in advance, to distract the attention of the Persians by bombarding their principal position from the shelter of an island immediately below the Ahwāz rapids; and between 10 and 11 a.m., the whole 300 infantry were landed on the left bank about three quarters of a mile below the gunboats. The troops having been formed by Captain Hunt in such a manner as to give them, in the then bush-grown country, the appearance of a large force, closed upon the village of Ahwāz from its landward side and occupied it without resistance a little before noon. Meanwhile Acting Commodore Rennie, with the "Comet," had taken up a position in the river from which he could both support the gunboats

and afford help, if needed, to the land force; but none was required. The Shaikh of Ahwāz at once coming out and making his submission to Captain Hunt and Captain Kemball.

At this juncture the Persian Army on the other side of the river began to retire, in tolerably good order but leaving, as usual, much of their property behind: this movement was due partly to the fire of the gunboats, which they seemed unable to return; partly to their flank being turned by the occupation of Ahwaz; but most of all, probably, to a fear that the British force in sight might be only the advanced guard of one much larger. The spectacle presented by the enemy as they rapidly retreated northwards, was as interesting and impressive as the cause of it was absurd. Their infantry, which with four guns led the line of march, numbered about 6,000 men and was divided into four great masses; a small green palanquin carriage with glass windows and a mule litter such as Persian ladies use on a journey could be distinctly seen, surrounded by a strong escort; and the rear was brought up by some 2,000 Persian and Bakhtiyāri horse, whose appearance was nothing short of magnificent. The Persians had hardly quitted their lines when one of the gunboats transferred to the further bank some officers and a small party of Highlanders, by whom a small quantity of ammunition abandoned by the enemy was promptly destroyed. 2 P.M. the Persian host had disappeared from view.

In the interim the property of the Persian Government in Ahwāz village had been taken possession of by working parties: it comprised 154 stand of new English muskets bearing the Tower mark, 56 fine mules in excellent condition, pack-saddles, entrenching tools, a flock of 230 sheep, and enormous quantities of flour, wheat and barley, sufficient to have provisioned the Persian host for 15 to 20 days. So much of the grain and as many of the sheep as could not be consumed or carried away in the steamers were distributed gratis to the local Arabs.

During the 2nd and 3rd of April the British force remained at Ahwāz, by way of enhancing the effect of the raid and to allow of Captain Kemball's communicating with the surrounding tribes; and on the 4th April the whole returned to Muhammareh, having achieved a great moral success over the enemy without a single casualty.

It was intended, after the occupation of Muhammareh, that Shaikh Jābir of that place and Shaikh Fāris of Fallāhīyeh should visit Sir J. Outram and be formally reinstated by him in the positions of authority which they had held under the Persian Government; but a few

British relations with the Muhaisin and Ka'ab Shaikhs, and evacuation of

days' delay was caused by the absence of Captain Kemball with the reconnaissance to Ahwāz; and, almost simultaneously with his return, news reached the Lieutenant-General Commanding of the conclusion of peace between Britain and Persia. The outward demeanour of the Shaikhs, who had until then been loud in their professions of attachment and good will to the British Government, at once underwent a not unnatural charge; they began to refer with alarm to their own future position under the Persian Government, and to seek from the British authorities guarantees of protection which could not be granted, far exceeding as they did the provisions of the amnesty clause of the Treaty of Peace. The Ka'ab Shaikh, it was believed, was still willing to be placed in charge of Muhammareh by the British authorities, as the only means open to him of supplanting his Muhaisin rival there; but Sir J. Outram, who did not feel himself justified, or see any practical advantage,

Muhammareh on 17th May 1857.

Under these circumstances, I have determined not to disturb the relative possessions of the two Chaab chiefs, nor to excite the ambition of the one, or test the sincerity of the other, by insisting upon either presenting himself in person. Should the war continue, I may count, I believe, upon the complete subserviency of both to the extent originally contemplated. And in the opposite case, it will be sufficient for me to have gained our objects without hampering the Government by inconvenient guarantees, and also without needlessly impairing the authority, to which the Persian Government lays claim, over the country.

in interfering to such an extent in local affairs, wrote on the 11th April:

The position of the Prince Governor of 'Arabistān after the British raid to Ahwāz, which shored him of the last remnant of his prestige, was desperate and even pitiable. His troops had not enough ammunition to force their way back to central Persia through the Lur and Bakhtiyāri countries, which had become hostile: indeed an attempt made by His Royal Highness to reach Burūjird had to be abandoned on account of the attitude of the hill tribes. Imprisoned as the Prince Governor and his Persian troops thus were in the plains, it seems probable that, as Sir J. Outram himself held, an advance by the British into Northern 'Arabistān might have brought about a surrender by them en masse.

The re-embarkation of the British troops at Muhammareh began on the 9th May and was completed on the 17th, when Sir J. Outram himself apparently left for Baghdād. On the 15th the town of Muhammareh was made over to Shaikh 'Ali Khān, a nephew whom Shaikh Jābir deputed to represent him in resuming the civil government of the place. A naval force was left temporarily at Muhammareh to mark its formal retention by the British and to deter His Royal 'Highness Khānlar

Mīrza, to whom a letter was also addressed by Sir J. Outram, from attempting its military re-occupation pending fulfilment by the Persian Government of the terms of the Treaty of Peace.

The operations left enduring marks and memories behind. In* 1911 "many old trees in the Jabiriyeh lands could still be seen with the gashes in them caused by round shot, which were frequently found in the gardens"; and "the loot of the Persian camp was still a popular theme amongst the grevbeards of Muhammareh."

British relations with 'Arabistan after the Anglo-Persian War, 1857-96.

The "Cashmere " case. 1872-73.

The piracy committed at Basrah in June 1872 on the British mail steamer "Cashmere" and the proceedings in Turkey to which it gave rise are described † in the chapter on the history of Turkish 'Iraq, but official action was required in 'Arabistan also, to various districts of which province some of the robbers had retired with their spoil.

Immediately after the commission of the offence, on its becoming known that members of the gang responsible for it had taken refuge in Persia, Shaikh Jabir of Muhammareh was addressed: he replied with assurances of aid which the event proved to be sincere. The crime was one which scandalised the public authorities both in Turkey and in Persia, and Shaikh Jābir, as a merchant and ship-owner himself, might be expected to feel special sympathy with the sufferers; but the fact that the fugitives in Persia had placed themselves under the protection of his rival and enemy the Ka'ab Shaikh, at this time Shaikh Lutf Ullah or Lufti, probably raised his enthusiasm or justice to a higher pitch than it would otherwise have attained. At the beginning of July the Naqib of Basrah and Qasim-az-Zuhair, Chalabi, President of the Mercantile Court there, whom the Turkish authorities had sent to Muhammareh to communicate with Shaikh Jabir, returned bringing two prisoners and their share of the plunder, valued at Rs. 1,485; and before the middle of the month the Chalabi had recovered, with the Shaikh's help, a further amount of Rs. 4,200.

About the 3rd July 1872 the Persian Government to whom the British and Turkish Legations at Tehran had applied for assistance,

^{*} Lieutenant A. T. Wilson's Précis of the Relations, etc., 1912, page 10.

[†] Vide page 1458 ante.

elegraphed to Shaikh Jābir directing him to arrest and hand over to the Turkish officials at Basrah such of the absconding criminals as were Turkish subjects, and to recover what he could of the plunder; and the Shaikh at once called on Prince Anūshīrvān Mīrza, probably a relative of His Royal Highness Hamzeb Mīrza, the Hashmat-ud-Dauleh, Prince Governor of 'Arabistān, and on Shaikh Lufti of Fallāhīyeh, to co-operate with him in carrying out the orders. Shaikh Lufti, however, at first refused to surrender the pirates in his jurisdiction, alleging that to do so would be a breach of the obligations of Arab hospitality; and Shaikh Jābir profited by his recusancy to propose joint military operations by himself and the Persian authorities against Fallālīyeh, at the same time suggesting—a suggestion which the Turks seem to have adopted—that the Shaikh of Kuwait should be asked to take measures for preventing the escape of the offenders from Fallālīyeh by sea.

At the beginning of August 1872 Colonel Herbert, British Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, placed the Baghdad Agency steamer "Comet" at the disposal of Mr. P. J. C. Robertson, British Agent at Basrah, for use in connection with the Persian developments of the case. immediately on the vessel's arrival Mr. Robertson proceeded in her to Failiyeh, Shaikh Jābir's residence, and took delivery from him of nine of the pirates, Turkish subjects, whom the Shaikh had in the meanwhile persuaded or intimidated the Ka'ab Chief into surrendering, and whom Mr. Robertson at once made over to the Turkish Governor of Basrah. The Persian Government shortly afterwards declared themselves responsible for dealing with those of the pirates who might prove to he Persian subjects, and cautioned Shaikh Jabir against extraditing such to Turkey; but whether their instructions in this respect were observed seems doubtful, for those subsequently arrested were like the first nine sent to Basrah, though one of them was the slave of a leading family at Buziyeh. During the latter part of August and earlier part of September Shaikh Lufti was absent from his head quarters, having gone to wait upon and doubtless consult the Prince Governor, who was then apparently at Khurramābād; and it was currently reported that he paid him a bribe of 25,000 Qrans and returned home with a presentation belt,-circumstances which did not augur well for the progress of the case.

These manœuvres on the part of Shaikh Lufti caused energetic representations to be made by the British Minister at Tehrān, with the result that Hāji Hāshim Khān, a Muhassil or Foreign Office bailiff, was despatched to 'Arabistān by the Persian Government to aid in the

proceedings. A suggestion by Colonel Herbert that a Ghulām or messenger of the British Legation should also be sent was not adopted by Mr. Thomson, the Minister, who thought that the Persian Government's sense of responsibility might be weakened by his presence. Meanwhile fresh recoveries of plunder were effected by Shaikh Jābir.

The movements of the Persian Muhassil were leisurely in the extreme; and it seems doubtful whether he would ever, without British supervision, have reached his destination at all. In November 1872 he was by an accident discovered at Baghdad, where he was trifling away his time, and was packed off to Basrah, arriving there on the 4th December. At once on his arrival Mr. Robertson went in the "Comet" to Failiyeh where he was joined by the Naqib and the Chalabi; and on the 16th the "Comet" reached Umm-at-Tamair on the Kārūn, carrying Mr. Robertson, the Chalabi, and the Muhassil. It was known by this time that some of the criminals whose arrest was desired were at Hawizeh, where the Prince Governor himself had arrived at the beginning of November and had since remained; others at Fallāhīyeh; and others at * Dār-al-Mulla, where they were protected by a certain Mīr 'Abdullah. The Muhassil and a Qawwās of Mr. Robertson then proceeded to Hawizeh, where a list of the outlaws required was handed by them to the Hashmat-ud-Dauleh; and on the 24th December the latter, with Prince Anushīrvān Mīrza and Shaikh Lufti, joined Mr. Robertson on board the "Comet" and were conveyed to Failiych, which was reached on the 26th. The next day a meeting was held at which Mr. Robertson, Prince Anūshīrvān Mīrza, the two Turkish representatives, and Shaikh Jabir were present and interrogated Shaikh Lufti, who had been ostensibly deposed from the Ka'ab Shaikhship and placed under arrest; but the Prince Governor took no proceedings, pleading indisposition; and Mr. Robertson was constrained to report that, though he made many fair promises, his attitude was really obstructive.

On the 3rd January 1873 the pretence of Shaikh Lufti's deposition was abandoned; and arrangements were made by the Prince Governor for arresting the offenders still at large, partly by Shaikh Lufti's instrumentality. The Hashmat-ud-Dauleh had now become very restless, and he frequently begged for the loan of the "Comet" to carry him to Ahwāz; Mr. Robertson, however, would not accede to his request, but

^{*} So styled throughout the correspondence; but Dih Mulla in the Hindiyan district is perhaps meant which was governed a few years after this by one Amīr 'Abdullah.

telegraphed instead to superior authority protesting against his being allowed to take his departure thus prematurely. Orders were accordingly sent and repeated by the Persian Government that the Prince Governor should remain on the spot until the case was finished; but, disregarding them, he left for Ahwāz on the 11th January in a steam launch belonging to Shaikh Jābir. Towards the close of his stay, irritated by the pressure that was being brought to bear on him, he refused to recognise officially the Naqīb and the Chalabi, whom the Governor of Basrah had duly, though not in writing, empowered to act as Turkish representatives; and it was not until after his departure that orders for their recognition were received from Tehrān.

The arrangements made by the Prince Governor proved, however, unexpectedly effectual. On the 16th January Ahtaib, one of the men wanted, arrived in custody at Muhammareh from Failiyah and was conveyed in the "Comet" to Basrah; and on the 22nd two prisoners from Hawizeh were brought in and similarly disposed of, the Maula of Hawizeh giving a formal certificate of the death of a third whose surrender had been demanded.

On the 23rd January 1873, under instructions from Colonel Herbert, Mr. Robertson started in person for Fallahiyeh. Leaving the Nagīb of Basrah at Failīyeh, he proceeded with Qāsim-az-Zuhair, Chalabi, in the "Comet" to 'Ali-ibn-al-Husain on the Kārūn, whence the pair made their way to an encampment on the Ja'fari canal near Fallāhīveh. The Prince Governor, who had spent at Ahwaz the interval since the last proceedings in the case, encamped close by with a force of 500 or 600 men, and the Muhassil also rejoined them: but Shaikh Lufti was absent at Dar-al-Mulla. It had now been ascertained that part of the plunder of the "Cashmere" was in the possession of some Shaikhs of the Ka'ab. On the 3rd February Shaikh Lufti came in; and soon after an effort was made to postpone restitution by the Ka'ab Shaikhs implicated, but was frustrated by Mr. Robertson. By the 10th February Mr. Robertson had succeeded in recovering a further sum of 11,947 Qrans; but his endeavours to secure the arrest of the pirates supposed to be at Dar-al-Mulla were unsuccessful, and those men were never captured. On the 22nd February Mr. Robertson and the Chalabi regained Failiyeh, and this time the former was able to report that the Prince Governor had "behaved with the greatest courtesy and kindness," and that "his action in supporting our claims, without admitting question as to their validity, was doing us more than justice,

and more than we looked for." In all 20,631 Qrāns were recovered on this expedition, including a sum paid in by Shaikh Jābir on behalf of Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Fāris, and a deposit of 5,200 Qrāns made by the Prince Governor on account of plunder which the prisoner Ahtaib, a slave, was supposed to have made over to his owners, the Halail family, Shaikhs of Buziyeh.

In all the equivalent of Rs. 13,430 had been recovered and 12 prisoners arrested on Persian soil, and more could not be obtained, though some of the "Cashmere" property was unaccounted for and a few criminals remained at large. The conduct of Shaikh Jabir had been so praiseworthy throughout that the Government of India sanctioned the presentation to him in acknowledgment thereof, on Colonel Herbert's recommendation, of a six-oared cutter from Bombay to cost Rs. 600 or 700; and the single gun still fired as a salute by the vessels of the British India Steam Navigation Company in passing the Shaikh of Muhammareh's riverside residence commemorates the gratitude of the owners of the "Cashmere" for Hāji Jābir's exertions. The "Comet" was employed for seven months in connection with the case, and Mr. Robertson spent in all 122 days on board of her; but the energy, time, and money devoted by the British authorities to enforcing reparation in Turkey and Persia were not disproportionate to the result. The effects of their assiduity, without which substantial satisfaction would not have been obtained, were salutary and durable; and in the forty years that have since elapsed no offence against British shipping at all comparable with the "Cashmere" piracy has been registered in either Persian or Turkish waters.

Piracy in Khor Dōraq, 1873. About the middle of October 1873 a small native-rigged sailing vessel under British colours was plundered in the Dōraq or Buziyeh branch of Khor Mūsa; but strong orders for the arrest of the robbers and the recovery of the value of the articles taken were obtained from the Persian Government at Tehrān.

Alleged intrigues between the British Government and the Shaikh of Muhammareh, 1875. In 1875, when relations between Shaikh Jābir of Muhammareh and the Persian Central Government were somewhat disturbed, as has been mentioned before, an article by Dr. Pollak formerly physician to the Shāh of Persia, appeared in the Neue Freie Presse newspaper of Vienna, suggesting that the Shaikh was about to throw off his allegiance to the Persian Government and transfer his principality to the British, to whom it would be a valuable acquisition as affording them a line of military advance into the interior of Persia and, consequently, a means of counteracting Russian progress in Central Asia. A translation of this

article was said to have excited anger and suspicion in the Shah, who in his mind probably connected the designs that it attributed to the British Government with the interest that the British authorities had for some time past been showing in projects for the establishment of steam navigation on the Kārūn River.

In 1879, when the death of Shaikh Jābir at no distant date began to appear probable, and when the rivalry between his sons Muhammad Khān and Miz'al Khān was such as to suggest the likelihood of an armed conflict between them on his demise, Mr. Robertson, the Assistant Political Agent at Basrah, sought instructions as to the attitude which he should assume on the occurrence of the expected event. He did not propose to interfere directly between the brothers, but he thought that he might be authorised to give formal advice to Miz'al Khān, which, he had little doubt, would result in the retirement of that Chief from the arena without a contest. The question was referred by Colonel Ross, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, to the British Minister at Tehran; but it does not appear whether orders on the subject were given.

Attitude of the British Government towards the succession to the Shaikhship of Muĥammarch, 1879.

In April of this year a tour was made in 'Arabistan by Mr. W. S. and Lady Anne Blunt who entered the province from the Bani Lam country in Turkish 'Iraq, visited Dizful, Shushtar, and Ramuz, and thence made their way vid Dilam and the coast to Büshehr.

Before his accession to the Shaikhdom of Muhammareh Miz'al Khan Relations of maintained very close relations with the British Assistant Political Agency at Basrah, then filled by Mr. Robertson, on whom at one period he remained in almost constant attendance. After he became Shaikh, probably for prudential reasons connected with his dependence on Persia, his intimacy with the British Agency became less marked; but in 1888 he visited Mr. Robertson at Basrah to consult him with reference to apprehended aggressions by the Amin-us-Sultan's Government, which had already taken in hand the subjection to Tehran of the Bakhtiyāri country and of the Persian Coast and Islands, and which was supposed to aim at the abolition of the Muhammareh Shaikhdom also, and the appointment of a Persian Governor in Southern 'Arabistan. The following extract from a report written by Mr. Robertson at the time throws considerable light on the attitude of Shaikh Miz'al towards the British authorities, at this critical period :-

Miz'al with the British. 1881-96.

Were the Persians to acquire direct authority over the Arabs of 'Arabistan and substitute Persian Governors for the hereditary Chiefs of Mohammerah, our influence and practical power in these parts would be inconveniently affected. Sheikh Miz'al Khan, like his father Hajī Jabīr Khān, has always placed his information and authority at the disposal of this Agency, and he would at once, if called upon, hold himself and his tribe at the orders of the British Government. While he is the Chief, the position and resources of Mohammerah are potentially under British control for the extension of commerce or other purposes, and it is possibly a knowledge of this that has at the present juncture occasioned the desire of the Persian Government to depose him.

After the opening of the Kārūn to navigation, and the death in 1889 of his friend Mr. Robertson, Shaikh Miz'al's relations with the British became much less friendly than they had been. The most evident causes were annoyance at the competition of a British firm with himself in the carrying trade of the Kārūn; the action of the British representative at Muhammareh, who was often obliged, after the institution of a British Vice-Consulate there in 1890, to appeal to the Persian Kārguzār or the Persian Governor of 'Arabistān against his proceedings; and, finally, the old fear of incurring the distrust of the Persian Government.

In 1895, when disaffection towards Shaikh Miz'al became rife among his own subjects, Khaz'al Khān, whose succession to the Shaikhdom began to appear probable, assured the British Vice-Consul at Muhammareh that he knew that "his political salvation lay in assisting and not opposing the British," and that, if as Shaikh he should be called on to choose a policy, it would be one of sincere friendship with the British Government, though the exigencies of politics might dictate concealment of its real nature.

British official matters in 'Arabistan, 1848-96.

Until near the close of the period now under consideration there was no permanent representative of the British Government, European or native, in 'Arabistān, the reason apparently being that no important British interests as yet existed in the province. In these circumstances, Muhammareh being remote from Būshehr and very near to Basrah, the British Agency at the latter place naturally became the chief medium of British superintendence and action in 'Arabistān affairs. As we have already seen it was the British Agent at Basrah who was employed in 'Arabistān in 1872-73, under the orders of the British Political Agent at Baghdād, to obtain reparation in the "Cashmere" piracy case; and in 1878 Mr. Robertson wrote a valuable account of the province, with which circumstances had evidently made him well acquainted.

This geographically convenient but somewhat irregular arrangement led, in 1878, to a conflict of jurisdiction between British political authorities. On the assassination of the Ka'ab Shaikh Lutf Ullah in that year Colonel Nixon, the British Political Agent in Turkish 'Iraq, called on Mr. Robertson, the Assistant Political Agent at Basrah, for a full report on the occurrences, at the same time remarking that the crime called for earnest reprobation. On the correspondence reaching the Government of India, Colonel Nixon was asked by telegram to report what connection there was between the affairs of the Ka'ab tribe and British interests such as could justify his instructions to Mr. Robertson; and Colonel Ross. the Resident in the Persian Gulf, pointed out that the instructions in question implied a more decided supervision over 'Arabistān affairs than had heretofore been exercised by the Baghdad Agency. Colonel Nixon, in his reply to the Government of India, cited orders given him in the previous year to keep them informed of the assembling of Persian troops and other matters of importance in the neighbourhood of Muhammareh; but the Government of India did not regard these as relevant, inasmuch as they bore special reference to the Russo-Turkish War. The Political Agent in Turkish 'Iraq was accordingly informed that "the Government of India, having regard to the general inexpediency of interfering in internal disputes along the coast of the Persian Gulf, which do not affect British interests and general politics, consider that the detailed enquiry which you ordered Mr. Robertson to institute into the circumstances of the murder of Sheikh Lufti was unnecessary;" and it was added that ' the country occupied by the Ka'ab Arabs is subject to Persia, and for all matters occurring in Persian territory the Resident in the Persian Gulf is the officer primarily responsible to the Government of India, though the Resident and the Political Agent in Turkish Arabia should co-operate in dealing with political affairs in which both officers may have a mixed interest."

In March 1889 the British representative at Basrah informed the Resident in the Persian Gulf that there was urgent necessity for the appointment of a British political or consular officer at Muhammareh to protect the interests of British firms which, in consequence of the opening of the Kārūn, had engaged in trade there; and after discussion between His Britannic Majesty's Legation at Tehrān and the Būshehr Residency, an Assistant from the latter appears to have been deputed to Muhammareh as a temporary measure. It was then proposed by Colonel Ross, the Resident, that the British Consul at Basrah should

Conflict of jurisdiction between the British Political Agency in Turkish 'Irāq and the British Political Residency in the Persian Gulf, 1878.

Appointment of a British Vice-Consul at Muhammareh, 1890.

be appointed Vice-Consul also for Muhammareh, an addition being made to his salary and a steam launch provided for his use; but the Government of India declined to consider any proposal involving an increased charge on the Indian revenues. In the end Her Majesty's Government decided that a British Vice-Consulate was required at Muhammareh: and on the 14th June 1890 Mr. W. McDouall, till then a clerk on the staff of the Indo-European Telegraph Department in the Persian Gulf. who had a good knowledge of Persian and a sufficient knowledge of Arabic, was appointed to the new post. He was placed under the superintendence of the British Resident at Büshehr, whose commission as Consul-General was at the same time modified so as to include 'Arabistān. The Vice-Consul's legal jurisdiction was to be exercised, however, under the Persia Order in Council, 1889, not under that of the same year applying to the Persian Coast and Islands.

British Vice-Consulate building at Muhammareh, 1891-1892. There was at first some difficulty in regard to the provision of a suitable Vice-Consulate building at Muhammarch; but ultimately Shaikh Miz'al undertook, by an agreement signed in 1891, to erect a house in accordance with plans furnished by Mr. McDouall, and to lease it to him on certain conditions. On the 26th July 1892, about the time that the building was finished and occupied, a regular lease for ten years was executed; *but the Shaikh's copy of this later document may have been lost, for his successor Shaikh Khaz'al always refers to the construction agreement of 1891 as the paper governing the tenancy. This agreement, regarded as authoritative by the Shaikh, is more favourable to the interests of the British Government, as containing no time limit, than the subsequent lease.

British postal subsidy for the Kārūn and British post office at Muhammareh, 1889-1896.

In 1889 Messrs. Lynch Brothers, who had recently inaugurated British Steam Navigation on the Kārūn, applied to the British Government for a postal subsidy on the ground that their service on the Kārūn was being maintained at a loss, and that they already carried 300 to 400 postal covers and parcels on every voyage. The Government of India, on being consulted by Her Majesty's Government, expressed unwillingness to grant a postal subsidy to an enterprise that did not benefit the Indian Post Office, but signified that they were prepared to contribute a sum not exceeding £1,000 a year, for five years, if the maintenance of the service was considered desirable for political reasons by Her Majesty's Government. Eventually it was arranged to make Messrs. Lynch an allowance of £3,000 a year for two years, apparently

^{*} Lieutenant A. T. Wilson's Précis of the Relations, etc., pages 76-77.

with retrospective effect from 1889, and an allowance of £2,000 a year for the three years following, rather by way of assistance to a struggling British enterprise than as a postal subsidy proper; and the cost of the arrangement was divided equally between the Home and the Indian Treasuries.

In 1892, the British India Steam Navigation Company and other British lines having made Muhammareh a port of call, a British Indian post office was instituted there; but it was the only one in 'Arabistān, and its creation did not therefore introduce any new consideration with reference to the carriage of mails upon the Kārūn.

In 1894 Messrs. Lynch, who on the Kārūn still continued to work at a loss, and whose subsidy (as the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company) for the carriage of the British mails between Basrah and Baghdad was reduced in that year from Rs. 36,000 to Rs.24,000 per annum requested a renewal of the Kārūn subsidy for another five years; and the Government of India suggested that their continuing to contribute half of the Kārūn subsidy should be made conditional on Her Majesty's Government's assuming liability for half of the Tigris subsidy paid to the same Company, the cost of which had hitherto fallen entirely on Her Majesty's Government, however, declined to contribute to India. the Tigris subsidy; and the Government of India consequently stated that they were not disposed to find any part of the Karun subsidy, the objects of which appeared to be Imperial and not Indian. Ultimately, as Messrs. Lynch represented that the non-continuance of the subsidy would entail their withdrawal from the navigation of the Kārūn, the grant of £2,000 a year was renewed to them for 5 years at the joint expense of Her Majesty's Government and the Government of India, the latter paying provisionally half of the whole cost on the understanding that the question of the permanent division of the Tigris and Kārūn subsidies between the Home Government and themselves should be referred to a Royal Commission which was then dealing with the financial relations of Britain and India.

Navigation schemes and enterprises in 'Arabistān, 1871—96.

The greatest of all the changes that took place in Arabistan under Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shāh was the introduction of steam navigation on the Kārūn. The navigability of the river by steam vessels had been demonstrated in the reign of Muhammad Shāh, but the question of turning it to account was not seriously discussed until thirty years later, and more than half a century elapsed between the first ascent of a steam vessel to Ahwāz and the establishment of regular steam communication on the river. As will become apparent further on, the navigation of the Kārūn was not an end in itself, but was regarded by British merchants and the British Government, to whom its inception was due, as a step towards making the markets of central and northern Persia easily accessible to British trade from the Persian Gulf. The same idea was the parent of various schemes for road or railway communication between the limit of navigation on the Kārūn and the north of Persia, which will be mentioned in their place; and its development was stimulated by the great activity of Russia, that threatened shortly to place British trade at a disadvantage throughout the greater part of Persia.

Messrs. Gray, Paul, and Co.'s proposals, 1871—75.

The earliest practical suggestions for steam navigation on the Kārūn seem to have emanated from the British firm of Messrs. Gray, Paul, and Co. at Bushehr, who in July 1871 addressed Colonel Pelly, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, on the subject. The substance of these was that the Persian Government might be induced to sanction and subsidise the running of steamers which the firm were prepared, under suitable conditions, to place on the Kārūn between Muhammerah and Shūshtar. This early scheme, with which a railway project was associated, was recommended by Colonel Pelly to His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran and to the Government of India; but it did not secure the favourable attention of either, Sir C. Alison remarking that the time was unpropitious on account of the famine then prevailing in Persia, for coping with which all the resources of the Persian Government were required. As Messrs. Gray, Paul, and Co. were the agents in the Persian Gulf of the British India S. N. Co., it may perhaps be inferred that the initiative really belonged to that great shipping association.

In June 1873 the question of Kārūn navigation was raised again by a member of the same British firm, in combination with proposals for road construction; but again without result.

Two years later, however, British official opinion, influenced by Russian movements in the direction of Merv, began to veer towards action in southern Persia; and Lord Northbrook, then Governor-General of India, wrote in an official minute:—"I should be disposed to encourage and support any substantial proposal for opening out communications between the Persian Gulf and the interior of Persia. This

would not only increase the trade between India and Persia, but also strengthen our military position, if we are ever called upon to advance into the interior of Persia." Consequently, when in 1875, after personally inspecting the route between Isfahān and Shūshtar, which he recommended as suitable for a road, Mr. Mackenzie of Messrs. Gray, Paul, and Co. submitted fresh proposals for the navigation of the Kārūn through the Resident at Būshehr, the Government of India took them into sympathetic consideration.

In 1874 a small steamer, owned apparently by the Shaikh of Muhammerah, who was anxious that the channel of the Kārūn should be improved by the Persian Government, was plying on the lower part of the Kārūn and carrying a small local traffic, but at a loss.

In November 1875 the Euphrates and Tigris S. N. Co., practically identical with Messrs. Lynch, having become aware of Messrs. Gray, Paul, and Co.'s plans, addressed Her Majesty's Government requesting that, if a concession for the navigation of the Kārūn were obtained from the Persian Government, their own past services to British trade in Turkish 'Irāq and Persia might be recognised by their being allowed to tender for any mail service of which the establishment on that river was contemplated. The firm also requested the Government of India to support their claims to consideration in the matter.

At the end of 1875 the Government of India, who now attached considerable importance to the Kārūn project, proposed that, in event of its reaching the stage of action, some subsidy might be granted to Messrs. Gray, Paul, & Co. or to Messrs. Lynch from Indian revenues to enable them to carry it into execution; and about the same time Mr. Mackenzie, on behalf of the former firm, approached His Majesty the Shāh with a suggestion that Messrs. Gray, Paul & Co., should be allowed to place steamers on the Kārūn and run them without any subsidy from the Persian Government. His proposals at first found favour, and a council composed of Princes, Ministers, and other high officials recommended that the navigation of the Kārūn should be thrown open to the world,—a result apparently acquiesced in by Mr. Mackenzie, who perhaps did not consider a * monopoly essential to the success of the enterprise. The matter appeared to be settled, when, unexpectedly, it was announced by the Persian Government that raver,

Modified proposals of Messrs. Gray, Paul, and Co., and unsuccessful support of them by the British Government, 1875—77.

Action of Messrs. Lynch, and Co., 1875.

^{*} In 1882, however, Messrs. Gray, Paul, & Co. did not consider that they could safely engage in navigation on the Karun unless they were granted exclusive rights for 50 years. This may account for their placing no steamer on the river when it was afterwards opened to general navigation.

navigation, and port dues, such as were realised in Europe, would be claimed by them on the Kārūn; and in consequence of this requirement, to which Mr. Mackenzie did not think it proper to submit, as no conveniences would be provided by the Persian Government, the negotiations abruptly came to a standstill.

Her Majesty's Government, the Government of India, and the British representative at Tehrān, Mr. Thomson, were now in complete accord as to the great desirability of the Kārūn route being opened to British trade; but the last named did not consider the time suitable for pressing the matter. In November 1876, under instructions from London, he reminded the Persian Government of their acceptance of the principle of free navigation on the Kārūn; but, though he frequently returned to the subject, he could not induce them to take any action.

In August 1877 the British firm chiefly interested again sought the aid of Her Majesty's Government in pushing their scheme; the opportunity seemed favourable, for war between Russia and Turkey had to a great extent closed communications in the north and trade showed a southward tendency; and Mr. Thomson was directed to make fresh representations at Tehran. He did so, but with untoward results. The reply of the Persian Minister of Foreign Affairs was adverse and put an end to all discussion for the time, being couched in the following terms; "In reply, I beg to state most respectfully that the Persian Ministers always feel thankful for the sincere friendship and interest shown by the British Government, and are at all times anxious to respect and carry out, as far as possible, the representations made by the legation. But as regards the Kārūn river and its navigation by steamers, in consideration of political obstacles at present existing, to specify which is unnecessary, they beg to be completely excused for the present, and regret their inability to carry out this undertaking at the present moment."

Further unsuccessful negotiations, 1878-79. Mr. Thomson, however, neglected none of the opportunities which discussions concerning proposed concessions to other foreign nations in Persia afforded for impressing on the Persian Government the advantages to themselves of the Kārūn scheme. He pointed out that it would give the country direct communication with the outer world viā the Persian Gulf and the open sea, and that this would be safer than a railway system the connection of which with Europe Russia was in a position to interrupt; and at length some effect seemed to have been produced on the mind of the Shāh, who in August 1878 professed to

have arrangements in view for the navigation of the Kārun among other matters. Very soon, however, the attitude of the Shah to the British proposals again became hostile; and it was at last discovered, or rather conjectured, that the cause of all his hesitation was a fear lest, if the value of Muhammareh as a port should be greatly increased, the temptation to annex it might become irresistible to the British Government. At length, in January 1879, His Persian Majesty's irritation at the perseverance of the British Legation exploded in a letter which he wrote to his Minister for Foreign Affairs, with ill-considered instructions that it should be read to Mr. Thomson: it bore "that the insistence of Her Majesty's Government with reference to the Karun aroused his suspicions; that Persia was not a dependent but an independent power: that, if his consent was requested in the matter, he declined to give it; and that, if force was contemplated, that was another thing." The communication was afterwards retracted; but the Kārūn remained closed to navigation by foreigners.

In 1881 the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs promised the British representative at Tehrān that, if only the British Government would use their influence to procure the removal from the frontier of the Kurdish chief 'Obaid Ulleh, a Turkish subject, who was threatening Persian territory, the Persian Government would on their part open the Kārūn to foreign navigation and even connect Shūshtar by a road with Tehrān. The desired representations were accordingly made by His Britannic Majesty's Ambassador at Constantinople; but, possibly in consequence of an impression at Tehrān that the deportation of the turbulent chief was due more to Russian than to British influence, Mr. Thomson, when he reverted to the question of the Kārūn, met only with evasions.

Meanwhile the Zill-us-Sultān, son of the Shāh, had been appointed Governor-General of 'Arabistān in 1880 and of Fārs in 1881, in addition to other provinces and had established friendly relations with Colonel Ross, the British Resident at Būsheln; and at the beginning of 1882, the question of the Kārūn having been referred to him by his royal father for an opinion, he undertook to obtain permission for navigation of the river by British vessels, provided that a British decoration were promised him. A Persian engineer whom he employed reported, however, in July 1882, that the admission of foreign ships to the Kārūn would be a military danger, recommending at the same time that the Persian Government should place steamers of its own on the river; and the Zill-us-Sultān's influence, if it were really exerted, proved unequal to

Renewed unsuccessful negotiations, 1881-82. the task of removing the Shāh's prejudices. At the end of 1882, it was understood that the Prince had definitively failed to secure, not only a special British concession for navigation such as Colonel Ross sought, but even the opening of the river to foreign trade in general, in regard to which he had corresponded with Mr. Thomson.

The Shaikh of Muhammareh at this time possessed a steamer of some size, the "Kārūn", which made voyages on the river.

Closer examination of the Kārūn route scheme by the British authorities, 1881-82.

While the above negotiations were in progress the Ahwaz rapids. which formed the chief difficulty in the way of steam navigation on the Kārūn, were visited, carefully surveyed, and reported on in December 1881 by Captain H. Wells, R.E., who was accompanied Mr. W. Baring, First Secretary of the British Legation at Tehran, and who also examined the road question. In 1882 the practicability, as a trade route, of the Kārun supplemented by a road leading northward was discussed, with reference to both physical and political obstacles, by Sir H. Rawlinson, Sir O. St. John, and Mr. W. Baring of the Tehran Legation, in elaborate papers. The opinion of Sir H. Rawlinson was most unfavourable, he regarding "the whole question of opening up the Kārūn" as "a delusion and a snare"; and the opiniors of the other authorities were guarded. Their memoranda were reviewed in the following year by His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehrān, after a report on the road question had been submitted by Captain Wells; but the final result of the whole discussion was vague and inconclusive for want of precise data in the form of surveys.

Kārān-Karkheh navigation project of M. Vauvillier, 1883,

During the lull which ensued in the British proceedings with reference to the opening of the Kārūn, a curious scheme was propounded to the Zill-us-Sultān by M. Vauvillier, a French engineer in the Persian service. His report, dated 26th February 1883, though closed at Kermānshāh, bore no internal evidence of personal acquaintance with the country to be traversed. His idea was to connect the Diz river and the Karkheh near Dizfūl by a navigable canal; and the means of exploration which he suggested were two or three steam launches and a short transportable Décauville railway, the launches to carry the railway where there was a sufficiency of water and the railway to carry the launches where there was not, the whole expedition thus progressing triumphantly from Muhammareh to Kermānshāh. It does not appear whether any steps were taken to give effect to this seemingly crude and fantastic project.

The British negotiations for the opening of the Kārūn to foreign trade remained in abeyance until 1888, when they were resuscitated and successfully concluded by Sir H. Drummond Wolff, His Britannic Majesty's Minister in Persia.

Opening of the Kārūn to the commercial navigation of all nations, Oct. 1888.

On the 18th September 1888 the British representative addressed a note to the Shāh's Government, referring to previous encouraging assurances, pointing out that Persia was as yet practically closed to the trade of the world and that her northern communications with places abroad were commanded by a single foreign power, and explaining that the British Government claimed no exclusive privileges but only gave well meant advice to Persia, whose integrity and independence they had guaranteed; the note concluded: "Her Majesty's Government therefore, as the friends and allies of Persia, have instructed me to enquire when they may expect that the assurances and promises given may be carried into effect, and they trust that the official answer they receive may be in full accordance with those feelings of friendship and cordial understanding between the two countries which it is the desire of Her Majesty's Government to consolidate and maintain."

It was found that the Shāh was now disposed to throw the river open to general trade and saw only two difficulties in the way: the first was a promise that he had given in 1887 not to permit the construction of any railway or waterway in Persia by a foreign company without first consulting the Emperor of Russia; the second, a fear that foreign Governments might erect forts on the Kārūn or make use of the river for military purposes. The first of these was removed by the argument that the opening of the Kārūn was a national measure, not a concession to any foreign company; the other by pointing out that the Persian Government had it in their power to prohibit by regulations the erection of forts, the importation of arms, and other dangerous operations by foreigners.

Ultimately the Shāh decided to accede to the wishes of the British Government on condition of receiving two steamers as a gift, besides some assurance of protection against Russia in case the opening of the Kārūn should be resented by that power. These terms having been accepted, it was intimated to His Britannic Majesty's Minister on the 25th October 1888 that the Persian Government had sanctioned the opening of the river below Ahwāz to foreign shipping and trade, reserving the right to issue regulations for navigation and to levy tolls; that a road for wheeled traffic from Dizfūl to Ispahān or Qum would be completed within three years; and that a tramway round the Ahwāz rapids

would be constructed by the Persian Government to facilitate transhipment between the lower and the upper river, the exclusive right of navigation on the latter of these being at the same time reserved to the Persian Government. The whole transaction was to be treated as secret until a notification opening the river should have appeared in the Tehrān Gazette.

Persian regulations for the navigation of the Kārūn, 1888

The promised notification, it would seem, was published without any undue delay and embodied the Persian regulations for the navigation of the Kārūn, which were conceived as follows:—

Karun River Regulations.

- *The Persian Government in order to facilitate commerce, increase the wealth of the country and render her lands profitable, has opened the river Kārūn, subject to the following regulations, and has allowed the navigation from Muhammareh to Ahwaz by the merchantile marine of all nations. The vessels navigating the Kārūn will carry out the regulations of the Government, which regulations shall hold good for ten years without fail after which they will be modified according to the exigencies of circumstances.
- (1) The commercial steamers of merchants of friendly Governments must not remain at the landing places or in the river longer than necessary for the purpose of loading, unloading and provisioning themselves for the journey.
- (2) Persons whose presence is detrimental to order and who would cause difficulties by their presence should not be taken on board the vessels, whoever comes should be provided with a passport from his own Government otherwise if any one arrives without a passport it is impossible to understand what his business may be.
- (3) Under no pretext whatsoever will any vessel have the right protect any Persian subject in any way.
- (4) The transport of arms is absolutely prohibited and if this rule is disregarded the same will be seized,
 - (5) No explosive goods whatsoever shall be transported.

^{*}This translation of the Kārūn Regulations is taken from Lieutenaut A. T. Wilson's *Précis of the Relations, etc.*, 1912, pages 90-91, where the author has subjoined to it the following notes:

Note 1.—Above translation was received on 27th October 1890 at Her Majesty's Vice-Consulate, Muhammarch, from Residency, Bushire.

Note 2.—As the "mercantile marine" is mentioned, protests have been made by the Karguzar whenever, Royal Indian Marine Steamer "Lawrence" has entered the Kārūn, as also when it, or any man-of-war, has anchored in the Kārūn opposite or above Her Majesty's Consulate. Nothing has ever followed from these protests, and the question never seems to have been taken up by the Persian Foreign Office in Tehrān. But as it is not to our interest to admit the right of foreign warships to anchor in the Kārūn below Muhammareh, no stebs have leen taken in recent years to accurate the latest the latest and the right of the steps was the steps to achieve the latest and the right of the steps was the steps to achieve the latest and the steps have leen taken in recent years.

Muhammareh, no steps have teen taken in recent years to assert such a right.

Note 3.—(Paragraph 14.) This was modified in 1890 by the Amin-es-Sultan who ordered that 1 kran per ton of the vessel's registered tonnage should be paid for the upward trip, if loaded; ½ kran if empty. On the return trip 1 kranper ton on the vessel'. actual cargo, if loaded, nothing if empty.

In the case of the steam launch "Asp" it was decided in 1893 that no dues whatever should be levied from it, and the same custom has hitherto been followed in the case of the steam launches "Bulbul" and "Ishtar."

- (6) Shipowners shall not erect any buildings whatsoever, such as coal depots, warehouses, shops, caravanserais or manufactories, etc., on the banks of the river.
- (7) For the storage of merchandise and coal depôts and warehouses as well as landing places in sufficient quantity will be constructed on the part of the Persian Government or Persian merchants.
- (8) Reasonable rates, to be paid by the shipowners, will be fixed for the hire of the depôts and warehouses.
 - (9) The storekeepers of the coal stores shall be Persian subjects.
 - (10) The ships shall not proceed higher than Ahwaz.
- (11) For the merchandise depôts a trustworthy man shall be chosen in Persia and another shall be chosen on the part of the whole of the shipowners, together they shall look after the depôts.
- (12) The watchmen of the depôts, such as guards, etc., shall all be appointed by the Persian Government.
- (13) No one belonging to any vessel has any right whatsoever to buy, sell, or mortgage, etc., any property from or to any Persian subject.
- (14) From the vessels navigating the Kārūn to Ahwaz, for going and returning, if a steam vessel a tonnage of one kran per ton and if a sailing vessel ten shahis as toll and right of way will be levied. Unladen vessel shall pay half tolls. Sailing vessels belonging to Persian subjects under 30 tons will be exempted from these due.
- (15) Porters for the porterage from the landing places to the vessels and from the vessels to the loading places shall be provided by the Persian Government, who will keep a register of them and supply them with a badge.
- (16) When a Persian subject who with the permission of the Persian Government has entered the service of the vessels renders himself liable to the law, his trial and punishment shall be conducted by the Persian representative without any interference.
- (17) With reference to the flags of the vessels they will be regulated by the general maritime laws on the subject.
- (18) Employés of the vessels are prohibited from lending Persians generally any sums of money in excess of two tomans, trading being excepted.
- (19) No friendly Government has any right whatsoever to interfere with the depth, course or bed of the river.
 - (20) The number, names and employment of persons who, with the permission of the Government, are employed on the vessels of friendly Governments shall be entered in the Government books and should have a Persian passport, otherwise they are not allowed to take service.
 - (21) As this permission to the mercantile marines of friendly Governments to navigate the Kārūn is solely for the purpose of facilitating and stimulating trade and nothing else, this will by no means be allowed to be made a pretext for political discussions of any sort.
 - (22) The regulations obtaining regarding wrecks on shores generally shall govern such cases and the salvage shall be paid to the natives of the shore.
 - (23) Dangerous goods such as arms, etc., shall not be sold by the employés of the vessels to Persian subjects, nomads or tribes, if sold they will be seized and their value returned.
 - (24) Should any one vessel of a friendly power violate these regulations, if a steamer 600 tomans, and if a sailing vessel 300 tomans, fine will be inflicted and the vessel shall be prohibited from the navigation for two years.

Addendum.—In case of dispute the Persian text to be gone by.

Examination of the Bahmanshir, December 1888.

In December 1888, in order to determine the value of the Bahmanshīr as a water way, in connection with the opening of the Kārūn, that stream was explored to a distance of 20 miles from the sea by the Būshehr Residency steamer R.I.M.S. "Lawrence;" and Captain Butterworth afterwards descended it throughout its length, taking soundings by the way. The results of this examination were to show that it was impracticable in its actual state, as a passage for ocean steamers.

Inauguration of
British
Steam
Navigation
on the lower
Karun.
1888—92.

On the 30th October 1888, immediately on the receipt of telegraphic information that navigation on the Kārūn below Ahwāz had been declared free, the steam launch "Arab" belonging to Messrs. Grey Mackenzie, & Co., the Basrah house of Messrs. Grey, Paul, & Co., was despatched from Basrah to the Kārūn as a pioneer and to establish the right of way; but, as she drew five feet of water and the river was then at its lowest, she was immediately followed by the "Bloss' Lynch," a large side paddle steamer owned by the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, of which the draft was three feet. The Shaikh of Muhammerah not having as yet received any orders from the Persian Government to permit foreign vessels to enter the Kārūn, though the issue of such had been promised at Tehrān, it was arranged in order not to compromise him that both these vessels should pass Muhammareh at night, and that their Captains should report to the Nizām-us-Saltaneh, Governor of 'Arabistān, the fact of their having done so.

Fortnightly runs between Muhammareh and Ahwāz were made for some months by the "Blosse Lynch," after which, being found too long and too deep for a river so full of sharp bends and in some seasons so shallow as the Kārūn, she was replaced by the "Shushan," a stern-wheeler 100 feet in length and of 2½ feet draft with three rudders, built originally for the Nile Expedition; but again in 1890, the "Sushan" having been removed to the upper river, the maintenance of Messrs. Lynch's service on the lower Kārūn once more devolved for a time on the "Blosse Lynch." In July 1891, a launch towing a barge was substituted, but was replaced in 1892, by the "Malamir," a vessel of the same type as the "Blosse Lynch" but not so large.

The Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation Company, experimented on the Kārūn for a while with a small steamer, the "Iran;" but the return obtained was inadequate and they shortly withdrew her, leaving Messrs. Lynch the only British firm in the field, with none, but Persian rivals.

In 1889, with a view to realising the profits of navigation above Ahwaz which they had reserved for themselves, the Persian Government placed the "Susa," a river steamer obtained from Germany in 1885, upon the upper Kārūn; but she was of * an unsuitable type, besides heing badly managed, and Messrs, Lynch had to obtain facilities from the Persian authorities for the transfer of their cargoes between Ahwaz and Shushtar in native sailing boats under Persian management.

Inauguration of Steam Navigation on the upper Kārun, and gift of the "Shushan" to the Shah. 1889--91.

To fulfil the conditions made by the Shah in opening the river it was at first arranged, in November 1888, that he should be presented with a pair of steam vessels worth about £10,000 each, of which one should be paid for by Messrs. Lynch and the other by the British and Indian Governments in equal shares. In December 1889, it was decided that the "Shushan," then working on the lower river, should be offered to the Shah on the part of Messrs. Lynch; but contentious matters connected with the navigation of the river had begun to crop up, and the opportunity was utilised to settle some of these. At length in February 1890 His Majesty was graciously pleased to accept the "Shushan" for "the transport of passengers and merchandise between Ahwaz and Shushtar and Dizful," an assurance in writing being at the same time given by his principal Minister, the Amīn-us-Sultān, to Sir H. Drummond Wolff that she should "work continuously and in connection with the steamers" of Messrs. Lynch, "unless prevented by extraordinary celestial events"; while verbal promises were given by the Persian to the British Minister that the representatives of Messrs. Lynch should be consulted in the appointment of the "Shushan's" Captain and Engineer; that her hours of sailing and the rates of freight on cargo carried by her should be decided by arrangement between them and the Persian authorities; and, finally, that the Persian customs duty on goods should be collected at Muhammareh, Ahwaz, or Shushtar according to their destination. These points having been settled, the "Shushan" was taken over the Ahwaz rapids on the spring rise of 1890 and handed over to the Persian authorities. In 1891 the "Susa" and the "Shushan" were both in use between Ahwaz and Shushtar, the former on the Gargar, the latter on the Shatait. The second vessel promised to the Shah was not in the end given; possibly it had been shown that there was not work for a third ship.

Unfortunately the Kārūn Regulations were applied in a spirit even more illiberal than that in which they had been drafted, the interpretations placed upon them by the local Persian authorities, especially the Lynch and

Initial difficulties of Messrs.

^{*} The" Susa" was of 36 tons and originally carried guns; she was not built for trade.

Company, 1888-94.

Kārguzārs at Muhammareh and Nāsiri (Ahwāz), being perversely stringent and even unreasonable. At first an impression seemed to prevail in the Persian official mind that by means of the Regulations the general treaty rights of British subjects in Persia had been abrogated in 'Arabistān, which as regards treatment of foreigners was to be considered an exceptional province.

Other circumstances for which they were not responsible combined to make Messrs. Lynch unpopular and so to aggravate the difficulties of their position; the Arab Shaikhs and tribesmen looked on them with disfavour as the cause of more Persian officials having been imported into the country; the native merchants and caravan men disliked them as competitors in business and their obduracy in the principle of not paying bribes was bitterly resented by the Persian authorities whose chief duty was to supervise their proceedings.

The first difficulty of the firm arose from the articles in the Regulations (Nos. 6, 7 and 8) which debarred shipowners from erecting buildings, etc., on their own account and made them dependent for accommodation on the Persian Government or Persian merchants. Under these articles they were frustrated in their endeavours to obtain land on which to construct wharves, warehouses and offices at Muhammareh and Nāsiri; and His Britannic Majesty's Minister thought it inexpedient to intervene on their behalf, possibly because -as will appear elsewhere in the history of the Persian Coast and Islands—the question of the business premises of foreigners in Persia was already a vexed question of treaty right; and Messrs. Lynch were obliged to make the best arrangements they could with the rapacious individuals, or the equally rapacious Government at whose mercy they found themselves. At Nāsiri, where a concession for providing them with accommodation had been granted to the Mu'in-ut-Tujjār, a rich merchant of Bushehr and a friend of the Nizām-us-Saltaneh, the negotiations continued without success during three years, the firm in the meantime occupying a mat shed for which they paid the exorbitant rent of 600 Tumans or about £170 a year,—the rent of the, as yet non-existent, building; and it was only in 1894 that they at last obtained a * lease for a building which they were themselves to erect on account of the Persian Government, and for which they were to pay rent at the rate of 15 per cent, a year on the total cost of construction. At Shalaili, the landing place for Shushtar, they were unable to secure premises of

^{*} Lieutenant A. T. Wilson's Précis of the Relations, etc., pages 81-82.

any sort for storing cargo; and there the most elementary facilities for loading and unloading goods were denied them.

The employés of Messrs. Lynch at Nāsıri and Shūshtar were at first subjected to every kind of harassment and vexation. Aspersions were made on the moral character of Mr. J. C. Gaskin, their Nāsiri agent, the chief foundation of which was that he sometimes wore native costume; and, when he wished to engage a private servant in addition to a Christian cook that he had brought with him, the Persian authorities insisted on appointing the man themselves, employed him on their own business also, and muleted him of part of his salary. result of these tactics was that Mr. Gaskin could not keep a local man in his service; and the only pretext of the Persian officials for their interference was the article in the Regulations (No. 15) which provided that porters for working the cargo of vessels must be supplied by the Persian Government. The Karguzar even went so far as to protest against Mr. Gaskin's employment at Nāsiri at all, on the ground of his being a European; even the Regulations affording no warrant for an objection of such a nature, he subsequently fell back upon the article (No. 2) referring to persons whose presence was "detrimental to order." Mr. Gaskin was firmly sustained by his employers, who felt that to remove him would be to lower British prestige and to encourage the Persians in obstructive action; his character was vindicated by Colonel Ross, the Resident in the Persian Gulf; no notice was taken by the Nizām-us-Saltaneh, the Persian Governor of 'Arabistān, of the charges against him; and after a time the trouble subsided.

Messrs. Lynch's first representative at Shūshtar found difficulty in the beginning in supplying himself with the commonest necessities of life, even drinking water; and a boycott of British trade, as well as an interdict on personal intercourse with the agent, seemed at this centre to have been declared. By 1890, however, the position of both agents had greatly improved, and it was reported that the good relations which they had succeeded in establishing with their surroundings were equally creditable to themselves and advantageous to the business.

A dispute early arose as to the meaning of the article in the Regulations (No. 14) referring to tonnage dues, the Kārguzār at Muhammareh claiming one Qrān per ton of a vessel's registered tonnage for each journey up or down the river, while Messrs. Lynch contended that this charge should cover the round voyage from Muhammareh to Nāsiri and back. It was decided to refer the point to Tehrān; and

meanwhile Messrs. Lynch offered to give a bond for payment in full of the Persian claim in case His Majesty the Shāh, on his return from Europe, should decide in favour of the Kārguzār; but such a bond the Kārguzār refused to accept. At length a compromise was arranged at the capital whereby vessels ascending the river in cargo were to pay one Qrān per ton register and unladen vessels half that amount, while vessels descending were to be liable to a charge of one Qrān per ton of actual cargo only.

The question of the actual tonnage of the "Blosse Lynch" gave rise to disagreeable discussions. The Kārguzār of Muhammareh demanded the production of the builders' original certificate of tonnage and Messrs. Lynch at first stated that it was in their head office in London, but afterwards informed the Kārguzār that it was lost. A certificate of tonnage verified by a British consular authority was then furnished by them, but was rejected by the Kārguzār until orders for its acceptance had been obtained from the Persian Government at Tehrān.

It was long before the local Persian authorities could be induced to act in accordance with the arrangement, sanctioned at Tehrān early in 1890, under which customs duty on cargo consigned to Ahwāz and Shūshtar was to be collected at those places instead of Muhammareh. This was an important privilege, as in its absence merchandize for up country was opened for examination at Muhammareh, which entailed loss and damage, besides extra charges to importers. The inconvenience of being unable to obtain direct bills of lading for Ahwāz and Shūshtar was greatly felt by merchants, and they had also to pay transit dues on the river for goods on which they had already paid customs duty at Muhammareh. In June 1891, for this last reason goods for Shūshtar were still generally conveyed to Shūshtar by land but, in the October following, transhipment in bond from ocean to river steamers at Muhammareh was begun, removing the difficulties as regards imported goods.

The "Shushan" on the upper river though presented to the Shāh, was also the cause of considerable unpleasantness. The Persian Government objected to a proposal by Messrs. Lynch, who under agreement had a voice in the matter, that, on account of the risks of navigation above Ahwāz, her captain and engineer should be Europeans on salaries amounting to about 500 Qrāns a month: these salaries were payable by the Persian Government. It was then arranged that the vessel should be

entirely managed by Messrs. Lynch for three months upon the Shah's account: but, as the result of her running was a deficit, the Persian Government, which declined to make it good, left her permanently in Messrs. Lynch's hands; and Messrs. Lynch seem to have considered the loss thus imposed on them a lesser evil than that all the steamers on the upper river should be under Persian management. The deficit of the "Shushan" thus falling entirely upon Messrs. Lynch, the Persian authorities (or concessionaires representing them) proceeded to run the "Susa" the other vessel above Ahwaz, in opposition to her; and in June 1891, though the "Shushan" had been accepted by the Shah expressly for the carriage of passengers and goods to Dizful as well as to Shushtar, the Governor of 'Arabistān protested against her being sent to the Diz, where the "Susa" had already gone: in the following August, however, the objection was withdrawn. In January 1892 Colonel Talbot, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, visited Nāsiri, was well received by the Shahāb-ul-Mulk, and, in company with Mr. Dicey, Messrs. Lynch's Agent at Basrah. and Messrs. Gaskin and Holland, their Agents at Nāsiri and Shūshtar, ascended the Diz as far as the "Shushan" could take them, but the impression which he formed of the capabilities of the river was unfavour-In May 1892 the "Shushan" was sent to Basrah for repairs; and the lowness of the river, after these had been executed, prevented her passing the Ahwaz rapids again until the month of December following. Messrs. Lynch applied for leave to substitute, during this interval, a steam launch and barge on the upper river; but the request was In March 1893 the British Resident in the Persian Gulf, with his First Assistant, was able again to test the navigability of the Diz in the "Shushan." Colonel Talbot on this occasion almost reached Küt 'Abdush Shāh, the highest point ever attained by a steam vessel; but a sudden fall of the river obliged him to beat a hasty retreat and satisfied him as to the inutility of the Diz as a commercial highway.

The towing of barges was also another subject of controversy. After permission for the use of two barges had been given by the Persian Government, the Kārguzār of Muhammareh argued that only wooden boats were included in the term barge ("dūbah"), and tried to prevent the mooring at Muhammareh of an iron barge which Messrs. Lynch had had especially built for use on the upper Kārūn. Instructions from Tehrān were required to convince him of his error.

It even happened, though perhaps at a later date, that the article in the Regulations (No. 19) prohibiting interference with the depth, course, and bed of the river, was invoked to prevent the removal therefrom of natural obstacles to navigation.

Demonstration against Messrs. Lynch's agent at Shūshtar, 1893.

In July 1893, at the height of the Shī'ah Muharram celebrations, a fanatical demonstration was made by a crowd of 3,000 persons against the residence of Messrs. Lynch's agent at Shūshtar, whose life even was threatened. Providentially the Persian Governor of 'Arabistān received information of it in time to avert a catastrophe by sending an armed force which dispersed the mob. An enquiry into the circumstances was held by Her Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul from Muhammareh, and the result was to discredit certain charges against the agent which the promoters of the riot had invented in palliation of their conduct; indeed, a written disclaimer of all cause of complaint against Messrs. Lynch's agent was furnished by the Persian Deputy Governor of Shūshtar.

Assault by Persian soldiers on Messrs. Lynch's representatives at Nāsiri, 1895. In March 1894 the Resident in the Persian Gulf, Colonel Wilson, made a tour to Nāsiri and Shūshtar.

In November 1895, the lawless proceedings of Persian soldiers having occasioned a fracas on board Messrs. Lynch's steamer at Nāsiri, the firm's local representatives proceeded to the residence of the Deputy Governor to lodge a complaint. Upon this the Persian Military garrison at Nāsiri, who were noted at the time as a violent and disorderly body, rushed to arms including some of those actually on duty at the Deputy Governor's house, and savagely assaulted the gentlemen, causing them serious injuries. A show was made by the Persian authorities of punishing the soldiers concerned in the affair on the steamer; but those implicated in the assault were allowed to escape altogether, and eight months passed before compensation was paid to the sufferers.

The Persian Nāsiri Company, 1887— 96. In 1887, before the opening of the Kārūn navigation, it was proposed with the countenance of the Amīn-us-Sultān, the most powerful Persian Minister of the day, to form a Persian syndicate headed by the Malik-ut-Tujjār for the exploitation of a monopoly of trade on the Kārūn which the Persian Government would grant them. The Malik-ut-Tujjār, though a Persian, was born in British India; he professed willingness to admit British capital to the enterprise; and the scheme seems to have been welcomed by the British firm, Messrs. Gray, Paul, and Company of Būshehr as preferable to the continued virtual closure of the river.

At the end of 1888, after the lower river had been thrown open to general traffic, a special* concession and monopoly were given by the Shāh

^{*} See Lieutenant A. T. Wilson's Précis of the Relations, etc., pages \$1-93.

to a Persian syndicate, styled the Nāsiri Company, of which the most prominent members were the Malik-ut-Tujjār (Hāji Muhammad Mehdi, Mo'tamad-us-Sultān) and the Mu'īn-ut-Tujjār (Hāji Agha Muhammād, a wealthy merchant of Būshehr). The Company were invested with exclusive rights of navigation on the Kārūn and its branches above Ahwāz, an exception being made in favour of the Shāh's steamer "Susa"; the privilege of providing accommodation for Messrs. Lynch at Muhammareh* and Shūshtar was assigned to them; they were to construct a quay, caravanserais, and shops at Nāsiri, where they were permitted to levy landing dues except from pilgrims; a cart or tramway service for the passage of the Ahwāz rapids was to be organised by them, for the use of which they were authorised to demand payment according to a fixed scale; and various other advantages were conferred and duties imposed on them by the terms of the concession, which was declared incapable of being transferred to foreigners.

Behind the Nāsiri Company, thus established, stood the Amīn-us-Sultān, and the Nizām-us-Sultaneh, Governor of the province; and, Shaikh Miz'al Khān of Muhammareh having been drawn into the concern, his great influeuce was utilised—though secretly—to obstruct Messrs. Lynch. This was done by deflecting business from them by order; by manipulating the customs of Muhammareh, of which the Shaikh was the farmer, so as to favour clients of the Nāsiri Company; by deterring labourers from working for Messrs. Lynch; by cutting off supplies from their employés; and generally, by penalising relations of any sort with them on the part of natives of the country. The result in 1891-92 was that while Messrs. Lynch obtained most of the passenger traffic, the Persian steamers carried about four-fifths of the cargo, though their freights were much higher.

Though under their concession they were required to maintain at least two vessels on the upper river, it is not clear that the Nāsiri Company always—or ever—did so; but by 1891 they owned in all three steamers of which at least one, "the Nāsiri", 63 feet long, towing 2 barges, ran on the lower Kārūn in competition with Messrs. Lynch; and they had constructed, after two years' delay, a Nāsiri-Ahwāz portage

^{*} Nāsiri was not mentioned in this connection in the Company's charter; but there too Messrs. Lynch were placed in the hands of the Mu'in-ut-Tujjār, their principal trade rival and a member of the syndicate.

[†] In December 1890 it was found necessary to urge the Persian Government to expedite the construction of this tramway and His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehrān obtained a formal assurance from the Shāh that it would not be longer deferred.

tramway. The charges on the tramway were kept within bounds only by the competition of mule carriage, a factor which the Persian authorities at one time tried to eliminate by intimidation of the muleteers. Caravanserais and bazaars were duly built at Nasiri by the Company.

In May 1893 the Nāsiri Company announced that they had opened the Diz river to traffic and had placed on it the "Susa", which was now worked by them. This vessel made several trips on the Diz, but on one occasion had great difficulty in returning, being nearly wrecked below Kūt Bandar, and leaving behind a barge which she had in tow. There was also a hitch as to customs facilities by this route, and the service ceased. In this year the Company's, or perhaps more correctly the Shaikh of Muhammareh's, operations on the lower Kārūn were discontinued, and Messrs. Lynch were left for a time in sole possession of the lower river.

In 1895 a new Persian Company, known as the Shāhanshāhi, was formed by the Shaikh of Muhammareh and some Shūshtar merchants for the carrying trade of the Kārūn, and almost at once recaptured from Messrs. Lynch the bulk of the local shipping trade to Nāsiri and of the through trade to Shūshtar.

Embargoes on the export of grain from the Kārūn districts, 1889—96. Arbitrary and useless embargoes on the exportation of food stuffs from 'Arabistān, similar to those from which the trade of the Persian Coast suffered, retarded the natural development of trade on the Kārūn by restricting the operations of British merchants and other wholesale exporters, so discouraging producers from increasing their output.

The Kārūn had hardly been opened to navigation when an interdict on the exportation of wheat was imposed on the lower river and was presently extended to the upper, though the existence of scarcity appeared doubtful and the accumulation of grain in the country seemed unlikely, in any case, to benefit the people at large. Again in 1891 the export of wheat from the upper Kārūn was prohibited in July, from Muhammareh in November.

1891.

1893-1894.

In 1893—1894 the crops on the Kārūn were good, but the export of grain was again temporarily prevented.

1895.

Yet again, about the middle of 1895, notwithstanding the sufficiency of the preceding harvest, an embargo on grain was suddenly imposed; but, the notice given being unreasonably short in view of local difficulties connected with purchase and land and river transport, a postponement of the date of its coming into force was with difficulty obtained. This embargo caused inconvenience to the Shaikh of

Muhammareh and his subjects, who complained in consequence that they found it hard to meet the Persian revenue demand for the year; but it was largely evaded by the clandestine removal of grain from Hawizeh and other districts to Basrah in Turkish territory, and by the shipment of Rāmuz produce from the Persian port of Ma'shūr, where the embargo was not enforced. Thus the restriction while it injured the honest trade of British firms, stimulated smuggling by natives of the country and failed in its ostensible object, which was the retention of grain in Persia. The period for which the interdict would remain in force being uncertain, and indications existing of its having been contrived by the Persian officials for reasons which they could not avow, foreign merchants continued to purchase wheat in the expectation that sooner or later, by one means or another, they would be enabled to export it; but this did not suit the wire-pullers behind the scenes; and presently not the exportation of grain alone but even its purchase and collection for storage were declared illegal.

In January 1896 the embargo was partially relaxed by the Persian Governor of 'Arabistan, who permitted certain stocks to be exported, apparently without proper authority from Tehran, though the central Government were now disposed to let grain already bought leave the country, provided that no fresh purchases were made by exporters until the next crop was assured. At this time the whole of the arrangements connected with the embargo were in a state of chaos which bespoke the fraudulent motives underlying it, the Karguzar refusing to recognise orders passed by the Governor, and the Shaikh of Muhammareh recovering export duty on consignments upon which the Governor had levied it already. For the double payments made by British exporters redress could not be obtained nearer than Tehrān. March the Governor capriciously put a stop to exportation, although the spring harvest, which was at hand, gave excellent promise. Presently however, he withdrew his effective veto once more; and the embargo. was then understood to be at an end, every one acting as if it were; but its cessation was never officially notified.

In spite of the numerous impediments described above, Messrs. Lynch Growth of persevered in their Kārūn enterprise; and though for some years at least the postal subsidy paid them by the British and Indian Governments 1888-1896. failed to cover a deficit on their operations on the lower river—to say nothing of the loss which they incurred on the Shah's behalf on the upper, a considerable impulse was given to the general prosperity of the

1896.

trade by the Karun,

country through its trade. Import showed no decided increase but between 1890 and 1896 exports were more than doubled. Muhammareh grew rapidly in size and importance, and even Nāsiri became a considerable place.

Road projects connected with 'Arabistan, 1873-1896.

The question of placing the province of 'Arabistān in communication with the central and northern districts of Persia by means of a road practicable for caravans, if not for wheeled vehicles, became prominent in the later years of Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shāh's reign in connection with the Kārūn trade route scheme. Such a road was indispensable, in the absence of a railway, if goods imported by the Persian Gulf were to be placed on favourable terms in the markets which it was desired to capture. The road problem was two-fold: it had to be determined, firstly, which was the best alignment for a road uniting 'Arabistān and northern Persia; and, secondly, whether a road following that alignment could be rendered superior to one following the old established trade route from the Persian Gulf to the interior of Persia by Būshehr, Shīrāz, and Isfahān.

Rival road projects, 1873—83.

Messrs. Gray, Paul and Co., the British firm by which the Karun trade route scheme was principally pushed until the opening of the river to navigation, evidently held that a road to the north could be made from 'Arabistān which would be preferable to any Būshehr-Isfahān road, and they at one time inclined to a Shūshtar-Isfahān alignment; but the opinion regarding alignment, to which they did not absolutely commit themselves, rested on rather slender data. The 'Arabistan road question was somewhat elucidated in the discussion of the Kārūn trade route scheme in 1882-83, in which Sir H. Rawlinson, Sir O. St. John, Mr. Baring, Captain Wells, and Mr. R. Thomson took part; but there was little agreement among the contributors to the debate, Sir H. Rawlinson preferring the Büshehr-Shīrāz-Isfahān route to any road northwards from 'Arabistan; while Sir O. St. John thought a mule path from Shūshtār to Isfahān or from Dizfūl to Khurramābād would be better, and Mr. Baring suggested a new but unsurveyed line from Būshehr vid Behbehān to Isfahān. The information on the subject available at the time was in fact too scanty to admit of a final decision being reached. It was established, however, that the shortest road from

a southern port to Tehrān would be one from Dizfūl by Khurramābād and Burūjird, which would be about 400 miles in length as against 590 miles, the length of the next shortest, from Baghdād to Tehrān, and 760 miles, the length of one from Būshehr by Shīrāz and Isfahān to Tehrān; and there was a general consensus of opinion that the line from Shūshtar to Isfahān would be found impracticable except as a caravan road.

In the winter of 1888-89 'Arabistān was visited by a Persian Survey Commission, headed by the Najm-ul-Mulk. It was charged with the duty of reporting on roads as well as on other engineering works important to the province.

Persian
Survey
Commission,
1888-89.

In August 1890 a concession for the construction and exploitation of a commercial road from Tehran to Ahwaz, with a branch from Burujird to Isfahan, was granted by the Persian Government. almost immediately transferred by the original Persian concessionnaire to the Imperial Bank of Persia, not without the approval of the Persian Government, and so became a British interest. The concession,* which was for a period of 60 years, conferred the right of constructing the road, of establishing a regular transport service for goods and passengers thereon, and of levying tolls at bridges; together with certain limited privileges of cultivation at particular points. Foreign capital might be employed in the enterprise and foreign employés entertained. but the number of the latter was not to exceed 30. The road was to be completed within 21 years, - a period which was subsequently extended to the 27th May 1913; and the Persian mails were to be carried by the Company at half rates.

Tehrān-Ahwāz Road Concession, 1890.

In 1896 Messrs. Lynch succeeded in arranging for the insurance as far as Isfahān, against all risks including robbery, of goods forwarded through them to Nāsiri and there by caravan track over the Bakhtiyāri hills to central Persia.

Nāsiri-Isfahān route, 1896.

Railway projects connected with 'Arabistan, 1871-1896.

As a prolongation of the line of fluvial transport which it was hoped to establish on the Kārūn, the alternative to a road northwards from 'Arabistān was a railway; and consequently, after 1871, railway projects with a bearing on the province from time to time made their appearance.

^{*} See Lieutenant A. T. Wilson's Precis of the Relations, etc., pages 113-115.

Mr. Dawse' suggestions, 1871—1873.

In 1871 Mr. Dawes of the firm of Messrs. Gray, Paul and Co., suggested the construction of a railway, to which the Persian Government should afford a guarantee, or material aid in some other form, from Shūshtar by Isfahān to Tehrān. This suggestion, which did not meet with acceptance, was repeated by him two years later, with the observation that a line from Dizfūl by Khurramābād might possibly be found more advantageous than one from Shūshtar by Isfahān.

Adoption of a Shūshtar-Isfahān-Tehrān project, 1876-1877. After an interval, Persia having become desirous of the assistance of European capitalists for developing an internal railway system, the question of railways between the Persian Gulf and Tehrān again came to the front in 1876; and as Baron Reuter had outstanding claims on the Persian Government Her Majesty's Government decided to support him as a competitor for a southern railway concession. The line recommended by Her Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehrān was one from Tehrān to Shūshtar by Isfahān, which, he pointed out, would benefit by pilgrimages to Qum from both sides and would also carry Persian pilgrims proceeding to and returning from the shrines of Turkish 'Irāq and the Hijāz. The project, however, coupled as it was with distasteful proposals for the navigation of the Kārūn by foreign vessels, was repelled by the Persian Government.

Conflicting railway policy of Britain, and Russia in Persia, 1878.

Russian advice was undoubtedly a factor in the protracted opposition of the Persian Government to the British scheme of a Kārūn trade route and to the road and railway projects connected therewith; and, similarly, British influence was exerted to prevent the acquisition by Russia of railway advantages in the north. In 1878 the British Minister at Tehrān opposed projected railways between Rasht and Tehrān and between Tehran and Tabriz; but the former was discountenanced by the Russian Minister also, the Russian view being that any Persian railway which might be constructed should connect with the Russian system at Julfeh, according to a Russian scheme (General Falckenhagen's) which had been pressed in 1874-75. Mr. Thomson pointed out the dangers from Russia to which the proposed lines in the north would expose Persia and dwelt on the innocuous character of the railway communications with the south the creation of which was desired by Britain; but apparently without result. A concession for a Rasht-Tehran railway was, in fact, granted to a French Company: but the evident intention of Russia to prevent its commercial success by measures taken within her own borders prevented, in combination with other difficulties, its execution.

The discussion of the Kārūn trade route scheme by British experts in 1882, already twice referred to, embraced, though not expressly, the subject of railways as well as that of roads. The most interesting opinion in regard to railways was expressed by Sir O. St. John, who argued, quoting parts of Spain and the western coast of South America as instances in point, that cartroads were unsuitable to southern Persia and that there was no useful vid medid between a mule path and a light railway; and he evidently favoured the idea of a light railway running northwards from 'Arabistān. Captain Wells regarded a line of railway following a direct line from Shāshtar to Isfahān as not feasible, but he thought that a practicable alignment between those two centres might be found by Behbehān and Shīrāz.

Examination of the railway question by British experts, 1882.

In 1887 a project was mooted for the construction of a railway between Ahwāz and Tehrān, apparently by a British Company. Security was demanded by the projectors in the shape of one half of whatever increase might be obtained in the customs revenue of the Persian Government from Muhammareh, Shūshtar, and Būshehr, and the British Government also would seem to have been asked for some guarantee; but the project, as framed, did not meet with the approval of Her Majesty's Minsters. Nothing came of it, unless an undertaking by the Shāh in 1889, noticed elsewhere, that Britain should receive a preference in connection with railway construction in Southern Persia.

Ahwaz-Tehrān Railway project, 1887.

Irrigation projects in 'Arabistan, 1875-83.

Attention having once been directed to 'Arabistan by the Karun trade route scheme, it was inevitable that proposals for irrigating the province by a restoration of the ancient ruined barrage at Ahwaz should follow.

In December 1875 Dr. Tholozan, physician to the Shāh, with whom he had great influence, and himself a man of much ability, approached the Persian Government on the subject of a concession for the general development of 'Arabistān, which he suggested might be granted to a French company. The concession should authorise the reconstruction of the Ahwāz dam by the company, together with the reclamation, and irrigation of the large tracts of fertile country which it would command; and it should also convey to them the right of working mines and forests

Dr. Tholozan's scheme, 1875 1882. and of establishing manufactories of all kinds. The working of the draft concession was general, but the object in view seemed to be to acquire preferential if not exclusive rights for France, without exciting the suspicions or wounding the susceptibilities of the Persian Government. The grant of this concession was opposed by the British Minister at Tehran on the ground that it would render impossible an amicable adjustment of the claims of Baron Reuter, a British concessionaire, upon the Persian Government; and the Shāh, yielding to his pressure, rejected the French proposals in July 1876.

Meanwhile, an indigenous scheme for extending irrigation and the cultivation of indigo for home consumption in the neighbourhood of Shushtar came before the Shāh's Council in January 1876; but nothing resulted from it.

When the Shah visited Paris in 1878 Dr. Tholozan's scheme was again brought up and discussed; but the only information which His Majesty, on his return to Tehran, would import to the British Minister was that a concession for irrigation at Ahwaz was included in a Projet de Reformes which he had prepared. At the beginning of September 1878 it became known that the French concession had been approved by the Council of State; and in October, notwithstanding representations by Her Britannic Majesty's Minister that an equitable settlement of the claims of Baron Reuter should receive precedence, it was given to Dr. Tholozan, largely—it was believed—as an inducement to him to continue in medical attendance upon the Shah. The concession as soon as it had been actually granted, was attacked by the British Minister on the ground of its being a violation in two respects, of British treaty rights; for one of its articles gave the French concessionaires complete control of navigation locks which they were empowered to construct at the Ahwaz dam, ipso facto excluding the British from most-favoured nation treatment; and by another article the right of building anywhere on lands irrigated from the restored barrage, in other words over a great part of the plains of 'Arabistan, was illegally reserved to the concession holders. The infringement of Baron Reuter's unjustly cancelled concession was also emphasised. Thereupon the French concession, which for some reason was not supported or even favourably regarded by the French Government or their representative at Tehran, was revoked by the Shah, with the assent of Dr. Tholozan.

The French project seems to have lingered on, though without much prospect of realisation, until January 1882 when an engineer of the French Government M. Dieulafoy, in the course of a journey in Persia and

Turkish 'Irāq examined the Ahwaz dam with reference to irrigation and navigation projects on the Kārūn. His report seems to have been unfavourable; and it is certain that, from the time of his visit onwards, French political interest in 'Arabistan declined until it finally disappeared. The Persian Survey Commission under the Najm-ul-Mulk and the British engineer Captain Wells inspected the Ahwaz dam, the latter in connection with navigation only, in the same season as M. Dieulafoy.

In the spring of 1883 His Royal Highness the Zill-us-Sultan held a concession for irrigation from the Ahwaz dam, one of its conditions being that only Persian capital should be employed. The Prince hoped that he might be able to get this restriction removed; and Her Britannic Majesty's Minister in Persia did not fail to remind him, in case he should succeed in this, of the preferential rights of Baron Reuter; but there was no practical outcome of the proceedings. A Persian engineer employed by the Zill-us-Sultan had previously advocated, in July 1882, the reconstruction of the Ahwaz dam, both as a means of irrigation and to bar the access of foreign shipping to the upper Kārūn.

Concession to the Zillus-Sultan, 1883.

Antiquarian research in 'Arabistan, 1850-96.

Antiquarian discoveries do not fall within the scope of this book; but the British and French excavations at Shush may be mentioned, on account of the connection, though slight, which they had with politics.

The first examination of the Shush site was made in the spring of British 1850 by Messrs. Loftus and Churchill under the orders of Colonel excavations Williams, the British representative on the Perso-Turkish frontier 1850-52. Delimitation Commission of 1849—52, to which they were attached. Though furnished by Marza Ja'far Khan, the Persian member of the Commission, with letters to Sulaiman Khan, the Persian Governor of 'Arabistan, and to other authorities, Messrs. Loftus and Churchill could get no workmen for digging operations; but they were able in a few days to prepare a general plan of the mounds.

After a month, during which Mr. Loftus remained at Dizful incapacitated by a riding accident, Colonel Williams and the rest of the British party arrived; and the summer was spent by them in travelling in the hills, and central plateau of Persia, where they visited Kirmanshah.

Hamadān, Isfahān, Shīrāz, etc. Towards the end of the year they returned to Dizfūl, and a Farmān for excavations at Shūsh having meanwhile been obtained from the Shāh, Mr. Loftus and Lieutenant Glascott, R.N., preceded the others to take possession of the site. About a month was spent in experimental excavations, not without useful results; and the party then returned to Muhammareh to resume the work of the Commission for the season.

In the course of 1851 a sum of £500 was granted by the British Parliament for work at Shūsh, which it was arranged should be carried out by Mr. Loftus under the supervision of Major Rawlinson, Political Agent at Bāghdad. Mr. Loftus arrived at Shūsh early in 1852, after a somewhat adventurous journey thither from the camp of the Commission at Mandali; and, having been joined by Lieutenant Jackson, I. N., another attaché of the Commission, he carried on excavation work for about three months, in the course of which the British personnel of the Commission under Colonel Williams paid a flying visit to his camp. His operations were greatly hampered by the lawlessness of the surrounding tribes and the fanaticism of the religious classes at Dizfūl, on whose superstitious minds an epidemic of cholera that followed the excavations of 1850 had produced a sinister effect; but his work, though not prolific of material objects of interest, fully established the identity of Shūsh with the Susa of classical literature and the Shushan of the Bible.

French excavations at Shush, 1885-86. The next excavators of Shūsh were M. Dieulafoy, the French Government engineer, who in 1882 had examined the Ahwāz dam, and his wife.

Formal sanction for their operations, which were directed and subsidised by the French Government, was obtained from the Shāh in 1884 and their first season's work extended from the end of February to the middle of May 1885. At the end of the year they returned to 'Arabistān, the French gunboat "Scorpion" being specially placed at their disposal for the journey, and prosecuted excavations at Shūsh with energy and success from the middle of December 1885 till the end of March 1886.

Like Mr. Loftus they had serious difficulties to contend with, arising from the unsettled state of the country and from religious fanaticism, even from official obstruction. Returning to civilisation at the end of their first season by way of 'Amārah and the Tigris, the objects obtained by them at Shūsh were impounded by the Turkish authorities, apparently on the absurd pretext that Shush was in Turkish territory; but

diplomatic representations, assisted by the appearance of the "Scorpion" in the Shatt-al 'Arab in November 1885, at last brought about a restitution. At the end of the second season an attempt was made by the Muzaffar-ul-Mulk, Governor of 'Arabistān, to enforce a division of the finds with the Persian Government, a proceeding for which there was no warrant in the arrangements made between the French and Persian Governments but it was relinquished on hopes being held out of a French decoration being conferred on the Zill-us-Sultān, the Governor General

The articles obtained in the second season's work filled over 300 cases, and invaluable assistance was rendered by Shaikh Miz'al Khān of Muhammareh in the difficult task of bringing them down to the Shatt-al 'Arab. The combined result of M. and Mme. Dieulufoy's two campaigns at Shūsh was a collection of remarkable interest and importance.

On the 12th May 1895 a general concession for antiquarian research in Persia was obtained by the French Government from the Government of the Shāh; but no work was done under it in 'Arabistān until the reign of the next Shāh when, in December 1897, systematic excavations were begun at Shūsh by M. J. de Morgan.

French activity in 'Arabistan, 1875-96.

There were other indications, besides Dr. Tholozan's Ahwāz irrigation scheme and the French excavations at Shūsh, that attention had been attracted in France to the province of 'Arabistān.

In 1881 communication was established between Marseilles and Basrah by a French line of steamers; and commercial agents, who appeared to be naval and military officers,—a circumstance which gave a political complexion to the enterprise,—appeared at Muhammareh and engaged there in the exportation of grain and the importation of breech loading arms and ammunition. There was reason to believe that these occurrences were connected with Dr. Tholozan's scheme, which the British Legation had so far successfully combated, considering that the establishment of French interests and a French community in 'Arabistān would be prejudicial to Britain for commercial and even military reasons, and that it might increase friction between Britain and France. According to the Zill-us-Sultān, who was then in correspondence with Colonel Ross, the

Resident in the Persian Gulf, on the subject of the navigation of the Kārūn, the French Minister at Tehrān and Dr. Tholozan were busily engaged at the end of 1881 in endeavouring to secure an exclusive concession for the utilisation of that river, their efforts being countenanced by Russia, who would gladly have seen the British excluded from the Kārūn in favour of some other power.

In 1885, however, French schemes on the Kārūn and French trade at Muhammareh having in the meantime ceased, the French steamer service from Europe was discontinued. The line, though heavily subsidised by the French Government, had carried principally British goods; and if British sbipowners had suffered by its competition, British merchants had benefited by the lowering of freights.

*MUZAFFAR-UD-DĪN SHĀH, from 1896.

The years following 1896 witnessed a rapid increase of political and commercial activity in 'Arabistān, and a considerable growth of British interests and establishments.

Persian administration and general history of 'Arabistān, 1896-1905.

Government of the Nizām -us-Saltaneh, 1896. The Nizām-us-Saltaneh, who had governed 'Arabistān since March 1895, was removed in the course of 1896. His recall was connected with a serious failure to do justice in the case of a British subject, described further on; and it was said that the Persian Government had proscribed him and his family from official employment on the Persian Coast and in 'Arabistān for a period of years.

Government of the A'laud-Dauleh, 1897-98. The A'la-ud-Dauleh, afterwards Governor-General of Fars in 1903-04, was appointed to succeed the Nizām-us-Saltaneh and arrived at Shūshtar in February 1897. Interim charge of the province seems to have been

^{*}The chief official sources of information for this period are:—M. J. A. Saldanha's Précis of Persian 'Arabistān Affairs, 1904; Lieutenant A. T. Wilson's Précis of the Relations of the British Government with the Tribes and Shaikhs of 'Arabistān, 1912; and the Administration Reports of the Persian Gulf Political Residency. Works by private authors containing information are Lady Durand's Autumn Tour in Western Persia, 1902, and Mr. V. Chirol's Middle Eastern Question, 1903.

held, before his arrival, by the Il-Khāni of the Bakhtiyāris, who was afterwards employed as Governor of Northern 'Arabistān under him.

The Sardār-i-Akram (or Sa'ad-us-Saltaneh) followed the A'la-ud-Dauleh and seems to have remained in office for a year only. He was in some sort a nominee of the Nizām-us-Saltaneh, the former Governor General, who had acquired valuable estates in the province and needed an agent on the spot to recover the rents.

Government of the Sardar -i-Akram, 1898-99.

The next Governor-General of 'Arabistān was His Royal Highness the 'Ain-ud-Daulah, afterwards Prime Minister of Persia. Luristān also was placed under his control; and he retained both provinces until December 1900, when he was recalled to Tehrān and became Governor of the capital.

Government of H. R. H. the 'Ain-ud-Dauleh, 1899-1909.

The successor of the A'la-ud-Daulah was the Sālār-ud-Dauleh, third son of the reigning Shah; he was supposed to be favourably disposed towards British interests. Luristān was combined with 'Arabistān under his administration, and his headquarters were at Burujird. He personally visited Dizfül and Shushtar in 'Arabistan, and at the end of 1901 proposed to inspect Muhammareh; but on the advice of the Shaikh of Muhammareh, who asserted that trouble would follow if the Prince were to enter any of the Arab districts, the central Government forbade him to travel further south than Shushtar. After this the Salar-ud-Dauleh seems to have given little attention to 'Arabistan affairs and to have left the Governor of Northern 'Arabistan--after July 1901 the A'zam-us-Saltaneh-to contend as best he could with ever-increasing confusion and anarchy. The impression left of the Sālār-ud-Dauleh's personality, when he relinquished charge of the combined provinces in 1904, was one of youth, wilfulness, and imprudence. In June 1903, before the Sālār's departure, the place of the A'zam-us-Saltaneh was taken by the Yamin-i-Nizām, a military officer.

Government of H. R. H. the Salar-ud-Dauleh, 1901-1904.

The A'zam-us-Saltaneh, the Sālār-ud-Dauleh's whilom assistant, became Governor-General of 'Arabistān in 1904 and reached Shūshtar in July, after the province had remained for some time derelict. As an administrator he was a nonentity.

Government of the A'zam -us-Saltaneh, 1904-05.

The only event of provincial importance during the period was an epidemic of cholera. The disease appeared in June 1904 at Dizfūl, where it carried off, it was said, 2,000 persons. Later it broke out at Shūshtar, where its ravages were less serious, and at Nāsiri, where in September it brought about an almost complete cessation of trade.

Cholera epidemic, 1904.

The next Governor-General of 'Arabistān after the A'zam-us-Saltaneh was the Sālār-i-Mu'azzam, who shortly after his assumption of office

Government of the Sālār-i-

Mu'azzam (Sālār-i-Mukarram) from 1905. in May 1905 received the higher title of Sālār-i-Mukarram,—perhaps the most remarkable member of a somewhat remarkable family of Persian officials. Of Qazvīni origin, but educated at Tehrān, the Sālār-i-Mukarram was a nephew of the Nizām-us-Saltaneh and the Sa'ad-ul-Mulk, who in their time had held many important posts in Southern Persia, the former having been twice Governor-General of 'Arabistān and once of Fārs; and the Sālār himself was no novice in the art of administration as practised in Persia, for he had been Governor of the Gulf Ports from 1901 to 1903, in which last year he was deputed to receive Lord Curzon, Viceroy and Governor-General of India at Lingeh.

His conduct of affairs in 'Arabistān will be described later: his personal character was summed up by Lieutenant Lorimer, His Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul for 'Arabistān in the words—

"The Sālār is a man of force and ability, but avaricious more than cruel, and entirely selfish. He seems incapable of any generous sentiment, and one seeks in vain in his acts for any trace of compassion or even mercy."

His principal lieutenant in 'Arabistān was the Mu'izz-ul-Mamālik, an individual who, like the Sālār himself, had been known as an official at Būshehr. The Sālār amassed a handsome private fortune during his Governor-Generalship of 'Arabistān.

Internal affairs of Northern 'Arabistan, 1896-1905.

The history of Northern 'Arabistan during the period under consideration is a record of well-nigh continuous and intolerable disorder.

1896.

In 1896 the Arab tribes about Dizfūl and Shūshtar made common cause, under their Shaikhs, against the Persian Government and the Lurs ravaged the country in the neighbourhood of Dizfūl. In June the Īl-Khāni of the Bakhtiyāri tribe, whose help had been invoked for the suppression of these disorders, was defeated by the rebels; and there was a panic in Shūshtar, where the people, seeing the Persian authorities helpless proposed—as did also the surrounding rural population—to pay the year's revenue to the Arabs instead of to the Government. Faction fights and collisions between the populace and the authorities occurred even in the towns of Dizfūl and Shūshtar; and at Ahwāz an affray took place between the inhabitants and the Persian military garrison, which last at this time was rather the cause of disturbances than a prop of order and authority.

In 1897, after the arrival of the A'la-ud-Dauleh, steps were taken to 1897. enforce order at Shushtar, where outrages had been committed against persons under British protection. The first result of these was a general upheaval in the town, which, but for the appearance of a force of 3,000 Bakhtiyāris on the scene, might have ended disastrously for the local Government. As it was, the revolt was suppressed after three weeks' desultory fighting, in which 25 rioters and 5 of the Governor-General's men were killed. But the measures adopted by the A'la-ud-Dauleh were not approved by the Persian Government, and he resigned and left the province without waiting to be relieved by his successor. deputy, the Shahāb-us-Saltaneh, Bakhtiyāri, withdrew simultaneously taking his followers with him, and the country remained for a time a prey to unbridled anarchy.

In the next year there was an outbreak at Dizful, the inhabitants of 1898. one quarter attacking the Governor, who defeated them, but thought it well to withdraw from the town in order to avoid further fighting. The insecurity at Shushtar was still so great in 1898 that representative of European firms could not reside there.

In 1901, which was a year of scarcity, trouble again became acute 1901-02. in the northern districts; and there was no improvement in 1902 when, as related further on, a serious attack was made on the "Shushan" at Shalaili, a barge belonging to the influential Mu'in-ut-Tujjār being also louted at Wais.

In 1903 the Farāhān Regiment of Persian Infantry, 800 strong, was 1903. sent from the north to assist in quelling the disorders; but it suffered disaster by the way, being attacked by Lurs on the 3rd February 1903 between Khurramābād and Dizfūl. Eighty of the soldiers were said to have been killed and the rest disarmed; and a caravan which was travelling under the protection of the troops was plundered to the amount, it was alleged, of 40,000 Tumans. On one occasion the Wali of Pusht-i-Küh showed himself at Dizfül, but his intervention produced no result; the Lur attack on the troops was avenged, however, to some extent, by a Bakhtiyari levy. The "Shushan" was again fired on.

In 1904 the roads near Dizfül and Shüshtar were still very unsafe, 1904, and the general state of affairs grew progressively worse, while the local Persian authorities remained paralysed or apathetic. In March 1904, the caravan of two members of the French archæological Mission at Shush was looted between that place and Nasiri, and in April another attack was made on the "Shushan" at Shalaili. For two or three

months in the early summer of 1904, between the departure of the Sālār-ud-Dauleh and the arrival of the Sālār-i-Mukarram, temporary but efficient arrangements were made by the Shaikh of Muhammareh, at the request of the Persian Government, for the preservation of order in parts of Northern 'Arabistān, particularly on the upper Kārūn.

1905.

It was only on the arrival of the Sālār-i-Mukarram (then Mu'azzam) in 1905 that the difficulties of the situation were at last firmly grappled with. The Sālār brought with him a force of 2,000 men, but he had nevertheless to purchase a safe-conduct through the Lur country from the chiefs of the Dīrakwand. On reaching 'Arabistan his first task was to set the affairs of the Hawizeh district in order, this being the object of his mission before his appointment to the Governor-Generalship had been resolved on; but it was not long ere he turned his attention to Shūshtar and Dizfūl with rapid and surprising results. As remarked by Lieutenant Lorimer, Vice-Consul for 'Arabistan, it was "only fortunate that, for the furtherance of his own designs, he found it convenient to exercise his redoubtable powers towards introducing peace and security into the country." His success was largely due in the opinion of Lieutenant Ranking, Lieutenant Lorimer's successor, to the good relations that he maintained with the Shaikh of Muhammareh and the help that he received from him; and the same officer described the Sālār as having quickly attained to "a power and authority which had not been known in any ruler of the province since * Sulaīmān Khān, " Most of his administrative achievements belong to a later period, but by the end of 1905 he had the towns of Shushtar and Dizful under strict control, as also the Arab tribes whose territory most nearly adjoined them.

Affairs of the Hawizeh district, 1896-1905.

The position of the Hawizeh district for some time remained indeterminate, but by the end of the period, in consequence of the steadily increasing power of the Shaikh of Muhammareh, it had become more or less definitely attached to Southern 'Arabistān.

1896.

At the end of 1896 internal troubles that had prevailed in Hawizeh earlier in the year broke out afresh, but intervention by the Shaikh of Muhammareh caused them for a second time to be suspended.

In 1902, the revenue payable by the Bani Turuf of the Hawizeh 1902-04. district being greatly in arrear and the Persian Government being about to resort to coercion, the Shaikh of Muhammareh interposed and paid a large sum into the Persian Treasury on account of the tribe. This advance not being repaid him, Shaikh Khaz'al in the autumn of 1903 obtained leave from the Persian Government to put pressure on the Bani Turuf, and proceeded to collect a force of his own subjects, with a few guns, at Bandar Muzaffari on the Kārūn. Before the end of January 1904 he had received a reinforcement of some Persian cavalry from Dizful, and the Bakhtiyari Khans had sent him a contingent of 100 mounted men along with a complimentary message. In February a small detachment of Persian infantry from Büshehr, and at the beginning of March another from Dizful, joined his camp. The Yamīn-i-Nizām, as commanding the Persian military forces in 'Arabistān and as representing His Royal Highness the Sālār-ud-Dauleh, who was in Luristan, also came to Bandar Muzaffari; and at the end of March the heterogeneous force under its two leaders, advanced on Hawizeh. The Bani Turuf submitted without resistance, and within a fortnight it had been arranged that they should pay 8,000 Tumans immediately to a Persian official and discharge the balance of their arrears, amounting to 50,000 Tumans, within a short period. Hostages for the performance of this contract were offered by the tribe, but were declined by the Shaikh of Muhammareh.

The Bani Turuf having neglected to fulfil their obligations, the 1905. Sālār-i-Mu'azzam, who presently became Governor-General of 'Arabis-(an, was sent by the Persian Government to punish them in conjunction with the Shiakh of Muhammareh. The joint expedition, to which the Sālār contributed 1,300 men, started on the 19th October 1905. Again there was no fighting; but the settlement made was more satisfactory than on the previous occasion. Out of a balance of 87,000 Tumans said to be now due by the Bani Turuf on account of seven years' arrears, it was stated that they paid up 40.000, and had given security, though of a doubtful kind, for the remainder; one of their Chiefs, Haji Sabhan, who refused to submit to the overlordship of the Shaikh of Muhammareh, was driven into exile; 'Ali Minaishid and Zair 'Ali, two other chiefs, were placed in charge of the tribe; and another, named Sharhan was given up to Shaikh Khaz'al Khan as a hostage.

In the same year fighting took place between the Bani Saleh and the Shurafa of Hawizeh, in which the former were victorio

Affairs of the Shaikhdom of Muhammareh (Southern 'Arabistān), 1896—1905.

Assassination of Shaikh Miz'al and accession of Shaikh Khaz'al to the Shaikhdom of Muhammareh, June 1897.

On the 2nd June 1897 Shaikh Miz'al Khān, the ruler of Muhammareh, whose personal unpopularity with his subjects had become very great, was suddenly shot dead, along with a nephew named 'Abdul Jalīl, while disembarking from a Ballam at his residence at Failīyeh. The actual assassins were three negroes, but a large force of Arabs and negroes under Salmān-bin-Mansūr, a cousin of the Shaikh, was at hand to support them if necessary; and the crime was countenanced, though probably not instigated, by the Shaikh's youngest brother, Khaz'al Khān, who was now the only other surviving son of Shaikh Jābir. Haji Muhammad 'Ali, Raī-ut-Tujjār, who afterwards became Khaz'al Khān's principal adviser, was believed to have been privy to the deed. Shaikh Miz'al Khān died regretted by none, and without issue.

Khaz'al Khān was brought from his house on the night of the murder by Salmān-bin-Mansūr, and at once took charge of the affairs of the Shaikhdom; afterwards, having become Shaikh of the Muhaisin by tribal election, he was recognised by the Persian Government as Governor on their behalf of Muhammareh. The assassination of Shaikh Miz'al caused some local excitement, and the Arabs of Muhammareh went armed for a few days after; but no disturbances occurred. H. M. S. "Sphinx" was sent to Muhammareh as a precaution, but her presence was not required. One of the first acts of the new ruler was to send, unsolicited, an armed guard for the protection of the British Vice-Consulate at Muhammareh. The liberality of the new Shaikh's rule over his subjects was generally appreciated by them as a change from the austere selfishness of Miz'al's later years.

Tribal affairs under Shaikh Miz'al and absorption of the Ka'ab Shaikhdom, 1897-1905.

1897-98.

The general policy, however, of the ruling family of Muhammareh, initiated by Shaikh Jābir, was in no way weakened by the change of head. In the districts adjoining Muhammareh the administration was, if anything, strengthened; and before long the power of the Shaikh showed a tendency to expand beyond its * traditional limits.

An important event was the final extinction of the Ka'ab Shaikhdom of Fallāhīyeh, which in 1895, as we have seen, was already in a

^{*} These limits are defined in a local Arab saying that "When the Bāwīyeh were strong, Hāji Jābir stopped at Salmāneh; whon the Ka'ab were strong he was afraid to go to Munīkh." The reference to Munīkh suggests the defeat of the Muhaisin by the Ka'ab there in or about 1860.

parlous plight. A contest for its possession still continued between Shaikh Ja'far and Shaikh 'Abdullah, two members of the Ka'ab ruling family, of whom the former, then in actual possession, was supported in 1897 by the Shaikh of Muhammareh, while the latter was favoured by the Sardar-i-Akram, the Persian Governor-General of 'Arabistan. Each of the authorities interested exerted his influence with the central Government to the utmost for the purpose of preventing the appointment of his rival's nominee. The Sardar represented that, if the Shaikh's advice were taken in opposition to his own, Muhammareh would shortly be found separated from Persia and reposing under British protection. The Shaikh threatened that, if his wishes were disregarded, he would cease to hold himself responsible for affairs outside his own district of Muhammareh; and this threat was of serious import to the Nizām-us-Saltaneh, ex-Governor-General of 'Arabistān, for he could not hope without the Shaikh's assistance to derive any profit from large estates which he owned in the Jarrahi district and to the west of the Kārūn, and in which the Mushīr-ud-Dauleh, soon afterwards Prime Minister of Persia, was his partner. In these circumstances the Sardār-i-Akram was ordered by the Persian Government not to change the Governors of Fallahiyeh and Jarrahi; but he defied their instructions and appointed Shaik 'Abdullah to the former, and one Mir Mirai to the latter district. The Sardar-i-Akram apparently relied, in this manœuvre, on Bakhtiyāri support; but, when matters came to a point, he could not induce the Bakhtiyāri Khāns to install Shaikh 'Abdullah at Fallāhīyeh unless Jarrāhi were placed at their disposal, or in any circumstances to accept responsibility for the affairs of either district. On the Sardar's nominees proceeding to Ramuz on their way to Fallāhīyeh and Jarrāhi the rival nominees of the Shaikh of Muhammareh, who seem to have been now a certain Shaikh Jābir and a certain Mir Fadhail, assembled their forces with the approval of Shaikh Khaz'al Khān; and the Shaikh himself engaged in negotiations on the subject with the head of the Sagwand tribe of Lurs. In April 1898 there was a collision between the contending parties in the eastern districts, and a son of Mir Fadhail was killed. The further developments of the case are not traceable in detail; but eventually the Sardar-i-Akram found himself obliged to withdraw his interference, two Shaikhs of the Ka'ab ruling family were deported from Fallahiyeh to Muhammareh, and Fallāhīyen was thereafter governed by the Shaikh of Muhammareh through local headmen.

In the autumn of 1898 Shaikh Khaz'al made an expedition against the Bāwīyeh in the country between the Kārūn and the Jarrāhi and reduced them to submission.

1898-1905.

After this, under the Shaikh's government, order reigned as a rule throughout Southern 'Arabistān.

Ka'ab of the Nassār section, settled on 'Abbādān Island, who had given trouble to Shaikh Miz'al in 1883 and again in 1887, having again attempted to raise their heads, Shaikh Khaz'al in 1905 settled 1,500 male immigrants of the 'Īdān tribe from Turkish territory at Qasbeh on the Shatt-al-'Arab and temperarily posted 500 tribal levies there: the result was the firm establishment of his authority in a remote and hitherto sparsely inhabited corner of the Muhammareh district, and a decided check to piracy on the Shatt-al-'Arab.

In the same year the Al Bu Rawayeh of the Ahwaz district, aided by another tribe, made an unsuccessful attack on the Bani Tamim; and such was now the state of the country that the occurrence was remarked as unusual.

Relations between the Shaikh of Muhammareh and the Bakhtiyāri Khāns, 1897 -1905. While the influence of the Shaikh of Muhammareh was advancing northwards, as well as in other directions, that of the Bakhtiyāri Khāns was extending southwards. About 1896 the district of Rāmuz had been purchased by the Bakhtiyāris from the Persian Government and about 1898 they acquired the plain of 'Aqīli from its original Shūshtari proprietors, besides which a large part of the country between Shūshtar town and the Diz river, and even a tract between the Karkheh and Shaūr rivers to the north of Shūsh, passed into their hands.

1898-1904.

A common distrust of the Persian Government formed a bond of union between the Khāns and the Shaikh of Muhammareh, but there was also a tendency to a collision between their interests. In 1898, as has been mentioned, the Persian Governor-General of 'Arabistān could not persuade the Khāns to interpose decidedly in Fallāhīyeh affairs in a manner unfavourable to the Shaikh; but the Bakhtiyāri road, between Ahwāz and Ispahān, opened at the end of 1899, threatened at one time to become a cause of dissension, for, while the prestige and profits of the road went to the Khāns, the Shaikh was required to protect the portion of it in the Ahwāz district. In 1903 a caravan travelling on the road was attacked in the low country by Khasraj (Bani-Lām) raiders, and a dispute as to responsibility followed, in which the decision of the Persian Government was adverse to the Shaikh. Nevertheless, as has been mentioned, the Bakhtiyāri Khāns helped Shaikh Khaz'al in his expedition against the Bani Turuf in 1904.

In 1905 a difference which had arisen regarding the ownership of a 1905. tract named Raghaiweh, situated on the Bakhtiyāri Road on the confines of the Ahwāz district, was aggravated by the flight to it of refugees from the Shaikh's authority, whom the Khāns refused to surrender. Eventually an order was obtained from Tehrān for the forcible repatriation of the Raghaiweh refugees, but it was abused in the execution, and Shaikh Khaz'al Khān then apparently relinquished his claim and complaints.

Relations of the Shaikh of Muhammareh with the Turkish Government, 1896-1905.

The question of piracies on the Shatt-al-'Arab, the most important upon the Muhammareh Basrah frontier, in which Persia and Turkey had a joint interest, is fully discussed in the chapter on the history of Turkish 'Irāq.

Piracies on the Shatt-al-'Arab, 1896-1905.

Other questions, 1896-1905.

In his dealings with the neighbouring Turkish authorities of the Basrah Wilayat, Shaikh Khaz'al generally maintained the independent but not provocative attitude of his predecessors Shaikh Jābir and Shaikh His interests in Turkish territory were large, consisting partly as explained in the history of Turkish 'Iraq, in the allegiance of large numbers of his own tribesmen cultivating lands to the west of the Shattal-'Arab; and he did not fail to add, by fresh purchases, to the estates in Turkey left him by his father and his brother. At Basrah his representative Mirza Hamzah, a Turkish subject, enjoyed considerable influence and respect; but the increasing power of the Shaikh at home and abroad was regarded with jealousy by the local Turkish officials and friction between Basrah and Muhammareh became not infrequent. occurring in Turkish territory were the commonest cause of difficulty, the Turkish authorities often alleging that they were committed by subjects of the Shaikh, and sometimes that they were the work of his personal dependents, acting under instructions. It was true that the Shaikh had in his service a number of bad characters, but he justified his employment of them as the best means of keeping them under observation and restraint; and the charge that he sometimes promoted outrages in Turkish territory, as a means of retaliating on the Turkish authorities for unfriendly acts, was one that could not be proved. Turkish allegation, that the Shaikh generally prevailed by bribing

Turkish officials, was probably not ill-founded; for in Turkey there was still no effective means but bribery of getting official business transacted.

Relations of the Shaikh of Muhammareh with the Persian Government, 1896—1905.

There seems to have been, from the time of Khaz'al Khān's accession to the Shaikhdom of Muhammareh, considerable distrust between him and the central Persian Government. The Shāh's ministers did not regard with favour the exceptional position in Persia which the Shaikh had inherited, enjoyed, and sought to improve; and he, on his part lived, in fear of encroachments by them on his autonomy and semi-independence.

Recognition of Shaikh Khaz'al by the Persian Government, 1897-98. Soon after assuming charge of Muhammareh, Shaikh Khaz'al sent his Secretary Hāji Muhammad 'Ali, Raīs-ut-Tujjār, to Tehrān to negotiate with the Persian Government for his confirmation in the position to which he had succeeded by inheritance and popular choice. The Hāji arrived at the capital in December 1897 and was well received by the Sadr-i-A'zam, who did not long delay to issue the documents of recognition.

The conflict over Fallāhīyeh affairs in which the Shaikh became involved with the Sardār-i-Akram occasioned him much anxiety, the question of his confirmation being then as yet unsettled or only just settled, for the Persian Governor-General showed signs of bringing forward a new candidate for the Shaikship in the person of Khaz'al's cousin 'Abūd; but, with the frustration of the Sardār's designs in the Ka'ab country, this danger passed away.

The Persian Government had long been desirous of taking the management of the Customs of 'Arabistān out of the hands of the Shaikh of Muhammareh. So early as 1884 an unsuccessful attempt had been made by the Governor of Būshehr to induce Miz'al Khān to resign control of them to the Persian authorities; and in 1897 endeavours were made to establish a Government Custom House at Muhammareh, but were foiled by the opposition of Shaikh Khaz'al. Under the system which existed before the changes about to be described, Muhammareh was practically the only Customs port of

Transfer of the 'Arabistān Customs from the Shaikh of Muhammareh to the Imperial Persian Customs in 1902, events leading

'Arabistan, no pretence being made of taxing exports and imports by sea in Fallahiveh and the other districts to eastward; and even at Muhammareh the principal commodities exported (such as dates, wool, and dried fruits) and imported (such as tea, coffee, sugar, arms, and ammuniton) were exempt from duty, while the Shaikh and his headmen and other local officials enjoyed in addition certain personal immunities. The Muhammareh Customs were regranted to the Shaikh year by year for a contract sum which was fixed at Naurūz.

thereto, and subsequent difficulties, 1897-1904.

In 1900, the net annual proceeds of the 'Arabistan Customs being 1900. then estimated at £3,000 only, and arrangements being on foot for the extension of Imperial Persian Customs system to the whole of Persia, the Persian Government began to move in the matter of Muhammareh. Up to the 11th March 1900, when a meeting took place between Shaikh Khaz'al and Colonel Meade, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, the former, though he had been sounded on the subject of a transfer of the Customs, had received no official notice of the intentions of the Persian Government. He had, however, fully considered the threatened innovation in all its bearings, and he informed Colonel Meade that his subjects, being unaccustomed to pay, would not tolerate a duty on dates any more than his headmen would on other articles; that the tribes of Fallāhīyeh and Jarrāhi would probably resist the introduction of Customs in those districts; and that he himself, if he acceded to the wishes of the Government, would be regarded by his people as having betrayed their trust in him, and must in the end either rebel or retire to his estates in Turkey. The Resident, under telegraphic instructions from His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran, pointed out in reply that the Persian Government had unquestionably a right to collect customs at Muhammareh, which was one of their ports, and confined himself, for the rest, to expressing a hope that some compromise between the Shaikh and the Government would be found possible; but steps were taken by the British Legation for protecting the Shaikh's interests, so far as possible: and an assurance was given them by the Persian Government that he would be treated with every consideration, and compensated for pecuniary loss. The services of the Resident in the Persian Gulf were also utilized, at the request of the Persian Minister of Customs, Mr. Naus, for the purpose of re-assuring the Shaikh as to the real intentions of the Persian Government. What the Shaikh dreaded more than the loss of the Customs was that the Government, after taking them ever, might proceed to deprive him of his districts one by one, and destroy his power altogether.

In 1901 the attitude of the Shaikh was unchanged, and he professed 1901. to think that the policy of the Persian-Government towards him had been suggested by Russia because of his favourable attitude to British interests, of which, he said, successive Karguzars of Muhammareh had complained to the Persian Foreign Office. In January 1901 Mr. Simais, a Belgian Director-General of Customs from Bushehr, visited Muhammarch and formed the opinion that there would be no real difficulty in depriving the Shaikh of the Customs; but he proposed that a reduction of 30,000 Tumans should be made in the revenue annually payable by the Shaikh, which included the farm of the Customs, and that an allowance of 12,000 to 15,000 Tumans a year should be granted him besides instead of an exemption of his merchandise from customs duty which he had hitherto enjoyed. A suggestion that payment of the indemnity to be assigned to the Shaikh on the removal of the Customs from his charge should be guaranteed by the British Government was discussed among various British authorities, but without practical result. It came to the knowledge of His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran that the Persian Government intended, if the Shaikh remained obdurate, to station their gunboat "Persepolis" in the Shatt-al-'Arab and prevent the landing at Muhammareh of cargo on which duty had not previously been paid at Büshehr. In August 1901 the Shaikh received a telegram from the Persian Governor-General of 'Arabistan in which he was ordered to hand over the management of the Muhammareh customs to Imperial Officials; but, by representing that scarcity prevailed and that public feeling was unsettled, he succeeded in obtaining a respite, nominally of five months. During this delay it became evident that the Shaikh was supported in his resistance by encouragement from some of his neigh-The chiefs of the Dashtistan district near Bushehr were said to have promised their aid to the Shaikh if he resisted the establishment of an Imperial Customs house at Muhammareh by force; and the Bakhtiyāri Khāns, on whom the Persian Government were believed to rely in case coercion became necessary, not only declared that they would not lend themselves to such a policy, but went so far as to profess great friendliness for him.

1902. In March 1902 the Russian Legation at Tehran addressed the Persian Government, protesting against irregularities in the collection of customs at Muhammareh and urging that, for the sake of uniformity and with a view to fair and equal treatment of the merchants of all nations, a proper Customs administration should be established there without

further delay. It may be mentioned that Būshehr and the greater part of the Persian coast had already, 1901-02, been placed in charge of the Imperial Persian Customs. Shaikh Khaz'al immediately despatched his Secretary to Tehrān to discuss the subject with the Shāh's Ministers; and Hāji Raīs, who arrived there early in April and consulted the British Legation freely during his negotiations, eventually succeeded in obtaining a compromise not unfavourable to his master, besides concessions of the greatest moment in matters not connected with the Customs.

By a Farman issued in June or July 1902, His Majesty the Shah appointed Shaikh Khaz'al Khan to be Director-General of the Customs of 'Arabistan under the Persian Ministry of Customs, subject to the condition that Mr. Waffelaert, a Belgian Director of the Imperial Persian Customs—who was, however, to be regarded as his subordinate—should be associated with him in their management, as also Mīrza Yantz, a Persian subject. The Belgian Director was to treat the Shaikh with deference and respect, and comply with his instructions and advice in all questions affecting Arabs and natives of the country; and the Shaikh on his part must show friendliness to the new Customs officials and afford them his co-operation and support. Duty was to be taken at a uniform ad valorem rate of 5 per cent on goods of all kinds; no further charges were to be levied in the interior on goods which had paid Customs duty; and the Shaikh was to place his steam launches at the disposal of the Customs whenever their services were required, inferior Customs staff were to be selected and appointed with the Shaikh's approval; and the Shaikh himself, as Director-General, was to receive a salary of 1,000 Tūmāns a month out of the Customs receipts.

In another document handed to the Shaikh's agent at about the same time, the Persian Government undertook that the exportation of dates and other fruits, fresh or dried, should always be allowed duty free; but grain was made liable to the same export duty as might be imposed in other provinces. It was also promised that a reduction should be made in the amount of the revenue (Mālyāt) payable by the Shaikh, which had hitherto included a sum on account of customs: in 1900 this sum had been estimated at 15,000 Tūmāns out of a total amount of 90,000. A guarantee was also given that the Customs administration would not be allowed to interfere in executive matters.

Under these arrangements, which, it will be seen, amply safe-guarded the general prestige and executive authority of the Shaikh, the Customs establishments of 'Arabistān, including Custom houses at Nāsiri,

Shushtar, and apparently Dizful, as well as Muhammareh, came under the control of the Persian Ministry of Customs with effect from the 23rd September 1902.

At the end of the year, on a request being preferred by the British representative at Tehrān that the text of the arrangements understood to have been concluded between the Persian Government and the Shaikh might be communicated to him, the Atabaig-i-A'zam, who did not know that the original documents had been seen by the British Legation, denied that any written understanding existed and objected to the use of the word "agreement" as describing the alleged arrangements. He gave, however, a verbal assurance that the Shaikh would be retained as titular head of the 'Arabistān Customs; and he took no exception to an intimation by the British Minister that, if further changes were attempted at Muhammareh, His Britannic Majesty's Government might feel obliged to interfere.

1903.

On the 14th February 1903 a new customs tariff, superseding the uniform 5 per cent. ad valorem duties, was brought into force throughout Persia; and in 'Arabistān, although it caused no less discontent there than in other parts of the Gulf, no disturbances occurred. In December of the same year the Shaikh complained that the Persian Government were preparing to violate the arrangements that they had made with him in 1902 by introducing additional Belgian officials and generally undermining his authority, and also to depart from assurances which they had more lately given him that no duty would be levied on articles lawfully imported by him for his personal use. On his bringing his fears to the knowledge of the British Minister in Persia, who was then at Muhammarch, he was informed, on the authority of His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that in the opinion of the British Government he would be justified in resisting any attempt by the Persian Government to break through the arrangements of 1902.

1904.

In 1904 fresh difficulties arose between the Shaikh and the Persian Government in Customs matters. In autumn of that year, though the Shaikh had not failed to provide steam launches when needed under the arrangements of 1902, the Imperial Persian Customs steamer "Muzaffari" and gunboat "Persepolis" were stationed on the Shatt-al-'Arab and began to search native vessels for illicit arms within the jurisdiction of the Shaikh, without any reference to his authority. Remonstrances against these proceedings by His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehrān resulted in their discontinuance, being assisted perhaps by a

protest which the Turkish Wâli of Basrah made, through the Persian Consul-General at that place, on the ground that some of the vessels searched were bound for Basrah and not for any Persian port. The removal to Büshehr, for trial, of an absconding cashier of the Muhammareh Customs house who had been extradited from British India on a warrant issued by the Shaikh, was resented by the latter as an infringement of his criminal jurisdiction; and he successfully resisted an attempt made in October 1904 to charge "office dues" at Muhammareh on shipments of dates, which he regarded as a breach of the undertaking that exportation of fruit should be free.

It remains to notice the other valuable concessions obtained by Hāji Raīs, the Shaikh's agent, on his visit to Tehrān in 1902.

The first of these was a Farman, promised in June or July 1902 but not issued until January 1903, by which the Shah granted, "as perpetual property, to the Sardār-i-Arfa' and his Arabs * and tribes " all Persian Government lands in the Muhammareh, 'Abbādān, Bahmanshīr, and Kārūn districts on which "the Arans and the tribes and tribesmen of His Excellency Shaikh Khaz'al Khan, Mu'izz-us-Saltaneh, Sardar-i-Arfa' have, from the time of their forefathers and grandfathers until now, grown date palms and trees and constructed buildings." on condition of payment of "the usual revenue." On the Sardar-i-Arfa' himself were conferred, moreover, "all the lands which are barren and without date palms and trees until now, as perpetual property, so that he may give them to his tribe and tribesmen, who should grow date palms and trees thereon and do what is necessary for rendering the place populous." It was added that the Persian Government should have no right to resume any of the lands conferred on the Shaikh, unless by way of expropriation at a reasonable price, and that the Shaikh and his subjects should not be entitled to alienate the lands granted to them, or immoveable property situated thereon, to subjects of foreign Powers. It was at first the intention of the Persian Government to reserve to themselves the lands as yet unoccupied and unreclaimed, but they ultimately consented to waive that point.

Before the issue of this Farmān the Shaikh's tenure of his ancestral domains was, at least in theory, precarious. The Bakhtiyāri Khāns had bought the Rāmuz district from the Persian Government about 1896, while the Nizām-us-Saltaneh had about the same time acquired large

Grant of the Muhammareh,
'Abbādān, Bahmanshīr,
and
Kārūn
districts
to the
Shaikh of
Muhammareh
and his
subjects,
1903.

^{*} The reference to the Shaikh's subjects was inserted on a suggestion by the British Legation: Hāji Raīs considered it unnecessary.

tracts of land in the Jarrāhi district and between the Kārūn and Karkheh rivers, and it was at least possible that the lands composing the Shaikh's territory might in a similar way be sold over his head to high Persian officials, or court favourities, or wealthy merchants like the Mu'īn-ut-Tujjār.

Grant of Fallahiyeh to the Shaikh of Muhammareh, 1903.

In the same manner, by a separate Farmān, "the place of Fallāhīyeh," as being "part of the jurisdiction of His Excellency Shaikh Khazal Khān" was bestowed on him, also "as perpetual property," subject to payment of "the usual annual revenue" and non-transfer of his proprietary rights to foreigners. He was expressly "permitted and empowered to exercise in those lands the possessory rights of ownership of every kind" and power of resuming this grant, also, was formally renounced by the Government.

Grant of Hindiyān, Dih Mulla, and lands east of the Kārūn to the Shaikh of M u h a m mareh, 1903.

By a third Farman of the same date "the whole of Hindiyan and Dih Mulla, which are a part of his jurisdiction, together with the lands on the east of the Karun which are the place of his cultivation," were granted to Shaikh Khaz'al on the same terms as Fallahīyeh, so that he might, "with the utmost hopefulness and extreme zeal, busy himself in augmenting the improvement of those two places."

The combined effect of the three grants was apparently to invest the Shaikh with a secure title to all Southern 'Arabistan except the Hawizeh district, of which the position was anomalous, and Ma'shūr and other tracts, which were owned by the Nizām-us-Saltaneh in partnership with the Mushīr-ud-Dauleh.

Persian titles conferred on S h a i k h Kaz'al and his family, 1898-1902.

In April 1898 the title (Laqab) of "Mu'izz-us-Saltaneh," borne by his predecessor in office, was renewed in Shaikh Khaz'al's favour; and in 1902 he was promoted to the rank (Mansab) of Sardār-i-Arfa' or Field Marshal, his Kāsib receiving at the same time the title of Nusrat-ul-Mulk.

British and Russian relations with the Shaikh of Muhammareh, 1896-1905.

In Shaikh Khaz'al the British Government found a strong and well disposed local ruler whose interests coincided with their own, and their policy towards him was consequently one of support. The principal object of British endeavour in Persia during the period was, as explained in the chapter on the history of the Persian coast and islands, to prevent the extension of Russian influence into the Southern provinces; and the

Shaikh's greatest desire was to maintain his hereditary autonomy against the Persian Central Government in the train of whose officials-this consideration, however, being of less importance to the Shaikh than to the British Government—Russian influence was likely to follow.

Immediately on his accession to power in 1897, Shaikh Khaz'al Khān 1897. referring to a conversation which had taken place between them two years earlier, informed Mr. McDouall, His Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul at Muhammareh, that he had promised to assist British trade, should he ever be in a position to do so, and that he was now prepared to make good his words; that, though it might not be prudent for him to give public expression to his feelings, he wished it to be known to the British Government that he was secretly their friend; that it was his desire to serve the British Government; and that, even if he were not "accepted as their servant," he would still render them service in the hope of one day profiting thereby. Questioned subsequently as to what he meant, the Shaikh explained that, if he were deposed by the Persian Government, he might seek a temporary asylum at Bombay, and that, if Persia were to break up, as seemed not improbable in view of the increasing weakness of its Government, the support of the British Government would be of inestimable value to him.

Shaikh Khaz'al, after despatching Hāji Raīs to Tehrān to obtain official recognition for him, promised to instruct that agent to place himself in close relations with the British Legation at Tehran with a view to mutual advantage. He also withdrew a steamer which had been run on the Kārūn by his late brother in opposition to the British firm of Messrs. Lynch.

In November 1898 the Shaikh, alarmed by an aggressive spirit 1898-99. which he detected in the dealings of the Persian Government with him, and by indications that they aimed at taking the customs of 'Arabistan out of his hands, expressed to His Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul at Muhammareh a wish to be taken secretly under British protection. said that he did not mean, at that stage, to press for a written assurance; all he wanted was a verbal intimation that the British Government accepted him as their servant and would support him by such means as the British Legation at Tehran thought desirable. He did not ask for an alliance against the Persian Government, whom he had faithfully served, though they might not appreciate the fact, and whom he would continue so to serve. The Persian Government had never interfered with the late Shaikh Miz'al, who always opposed British interests; and

it was incumbent on the British Government to support himself, so long as he assisted British trade, and not to allow his influence to be diminished by the Persians. He also informed Colonel Meade, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, who visited him a little later, that he apprehended an early downfall of the Persian monarchy, followed by a general scramble and partition of the kingdom, -eventualities in which he was anxious that his lot should be thrown in with the British Government. His request was referred to His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran, under whose instructions Colonel Meade caused the Shaikh to be informed, in May 1899, that His Majesty's Government could not promise to support him against his own Government, nor in case of the dissolution of Persia guarantee his independence or, indeed, say what would happen; but that, as the Shaikh was the most influential chief in that part of Persia, the British Government wished to see him strong, and the Arabs under his authority united; and that he might therefore rest assured that he would receive the support and advice of the British Minister at Tehran at all times, so far as they could be given consistently with honour towards the Persian Government, the British Government trusting that the Shaikh would in return do all he could to promote British commercial interests.

Meanwhile the Government of India, also, had held it to be impossible to give the Shaikh an assurance such as he desired, seeing that Muhammareh was a part of the Persian dominions.

In June 1899 a first indication of the interest that Russia took in 'Arabistān was afforded by a visit of Prince Dabija, the Russian Consul General at Isfahān, to Muhammareh, at which it was believed that efforts were made seriously to impress the Shaikh.

Sir M. Durand, the British Minister in Persia, visited Northern 'Arabistān in the autumn of 1899; but his stay at Nāsiri was short, and no meeting took place between him and Sheikh Khaz'al. The Sheikh was, however, presented through Colonel Meade with the Royal Victoria Badge, a medal* in the gift of the British representative in Persia, and accepted it after a reference to the Persian Government.

In 1900, the views of the Central Persian Government in regard to the 'Arabistān Customs having at length been plainly declared, and rumours having become prevalent that the Shaikh was about to be deprived of his large executive powers and absolute tribal authority as

1900.

^{*}Really the Queen's Jubilee Medal of 1887, distribution of which in Persia was initiated by Sir H. Drummond Wolff, and which for that reason is sometimes unfor tunately described in Persia as "the Wolff Medal."

well as of Customs control, His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehrān volunteered an offer of mediation, and the Persian Government availed themselves of it to a limited extent. A disquieting feature in the situation was the arrival of a Russian war vessel in the Persian Gulf in February 1900; and in March the Persian Minister of Customs, M. Naus, told Mr. Spring-Rice in strict confidence that the Shāh in fact wished to put an end to the semi-independence of the Arab tribes in the South of Persia. He added that the Persian Government would prefer "taking one bite at the Shaikh to taking two"; that if the Shaikh consented to the Customs arrangements proposed, he would deprive the Persian Government of an excellent pretext for altering his position; and that on the Shāh's return from Europe, until which it had been decided to postpone action, serious measures would be taken and a gunboat sent to Muhammareh.

Matters remained in suspense during 1901; but in 1902, as already explained, a peaceful transfer of the 'Arabistān Customs from the Shaikh to the Persian Government took place on terms by no means disadvantageous to the Shaikh, and a title to almost the whole of Southern 'Arabistān was conferred on him by the Shāh. The British Legation did not appear in the negotiations of which this general settlement was the outcome, but their advice was frequently sought by the Shaikh's representative in bringing it to pass.

Had there been no extraneous factor in the situation, matters might have rested here; but Hāji Raīs, the Shaikh's negotiator at Tehrān, who remained there from April 1902 to January 1903, was made the object of blandishments and threats directed to the establishment of a Russian protectorate over Muhammareh, or represented such to be the case; and he was urgent in his requests, which in the circumstances could not be neglected, that some additional assurance should be given to his master by the British Government. He referred to the Shaikh of Kuwait, to whose position he desired that of the Shaikh of Muhammareh should be assimilated; and he urged that Shaikh Khaz'al, though he had no fear of the Persian Government, wished to feel sure that the interests of himself and his subjects would be secure, even should a dissolution of Persia take place. In November 1902, it having in the meanwhile become known that a Russian consular representative would presently he stationed in 'Arabistan, where Russian trade was non-existent, Sir A. Hardinge, His Britannic Majesty's Minister in Persia, telegraphed to Lord Lansdowne, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, that, unless

1902.

real confidence in the strength and resolution of the British Government could be instilled into the Shaikh, Russian influence would shortly be found supreme and active at Muhammareh. His recommendations in favour of a less reserved policy with Shaikh Khaz'al were supported by Lord Curzon, Viceroy and Governor-General of India; and eventually under the authority of His Majesty's Government, the British Minister on the 7th December 1902 addressed the following letter to the Shaikh.

I was very glad to hear from Haji Rais-ut-Tujjar of the satisfactory arrangement concluded between you and the Department of Customs. On general grounds of policy it is very desirable that differences should as far as possible be avoided between the Persian authorities and the Arab tribes under your rule. The relations between the British and Persian Governments are of a friendly character, and the preservation of the integrity and independence of the Persian monarchy has for many years been one of the great objects of British policy in this part of the world. Disturbances of a nature to imperil that object would be a serious evil, and you would gain little and might endanger much by throwing off the sovereignty of the Shah. I am convinced that under the present circumstances the Arabs and yourself, as their ruler, have every interest in cultivating good and loyal relations with the Government of Tehran, and, that the latter has no desire to oppress you or curtail your authority. For this reason I think you acted wisely in giving up the idea of forcible resistance to the establishment of a Customs house and in seeking rather to come, as I have from the first urged you to, to a friendly understanding on this subject with the Customs administration.

Haji Rais-ut-Tujjar has asked me on your behalf to what extent you might rely on the protection of the British Government, and I told him that, so long as you behaved to us in a friendly manner, our influence would be exerted here to maintain you and your tribes in the enjoyment of your hereditary rights and customs, and to dissuade the Government of Tehran from any endeavour to diminish or interfere with them. Haji Rais-ut-Tujjar thereupon said that you were not afraid of the Persian Government itself or of attacks by neighbouring tribes acting or pretending to act under its orders, but that you wished to know whether we should protect you in the event of an attempt by a foreign Power to depose you or deprive your people of the rights which they at present possess. This might happen in two ways: either such a Power might be at war with Persia and might as an enemy of the Shah send ships to attack your district, or such a Power, pretending to be the friend of the Persian Government or to act in its behalf, might attempt also by means of its ships to conquer you and the Arabs. I replied that both contingencies were extremely unlikely, but, if either were to arise, we should, I believed, interfere, provided you had acted in accordance with our advice, and our fleet which is the strongest of any in the Persian Gulf would be employed to prevent any forcible measures against you. I added, however, that I would refer the question to the Foreign Minister of the British Government, and he has now authorised me to say that we shall protect Mohammareh against naval attack by a foreign power, whatever pretext for intervention may be alleged; and also, so long as you remain faithful to the Shah and act in accordance with our advice, we will continue to give you our good offices and support.

As I have however said above, I do not regard this danger, at any rate at present, as a real one. The Persian Government desires, I am sure, as earnestly as we do the preservation of peace in Arabistan; and the establishment of a Customs house at Mohammareh is, as I assured you last year, a fiscal, not a political, measure. It has already informed me in a friendly spirit of the conditions under which the new arrangement has been made, and the British Government has instructed me to intim ate its acquiescence in them.

We reserve of course our right to object to any further change which we may consider likely, as affecting peace and trade on the Karun, to be detrimental to our interests.

I hope that the new arrangement may work smoothly. There will very likely be some small difficulties and friction at first, but I trust to your wisdom and judgment to deal with them prudently and patiently. Our Consul has my orders to afford you all help and advice, and you may place every reliance on my friendship. You can write to me freely should you wish to do so as well as to the Resident at Bushire.

Meanwhile, on the 1st December 1902, His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran had a conversation with the head of the Persian Government concerning 'Arabistān affairs, which he reported in these terms:

I spoke to the Grand Vizier on the first instant about Mohammarch and referred to the two notes which Mr. des Graz had addressed on the subject to the Mushir-ed-Dowleh, and the last of which had not yet been answered.

His Highness then endeavoured to argue that our interests were not affected by any changes in the position of the Sheikh, who was a local Governor like any other. I said I hoped he would allow me to be frank with him on the subject. I had no wish to call in question the Shah's sovereignty over the Chief or people of Mohammareh, which His Majesty's Government had always recognised.

Our experience in Seistan had, however, been a lesson in the effects on our interests which a Russian Consul and Belgian Customs officials, who were not always judicious, could produce at the residence of a remote and ill-informed Persian Governor. On the Karun, as in Seistan, the Russians had no bonâ fide commercial interests, and their recent appointment of a Consul could have only political objects. We are determined not to have, if we could help it, another Seistan in Mohammareh, and to let Sheikh Khazal therefore understand that, if Russian agents attempted to intimidate him, or insinuate that they could bring pressure to bear on him owing to the influence which they exercised at Tehran, we on our side were ready to support him. It was because threats of this kind had been used by Prince Dabija, Russian Consul at Ispahan, when he visited Mohammareh, that I had felt obliged to intimate to the Sheikh that our naval forces in the Gulf were more powerful than those of Russia and that they might be employed in certain eventualities for the purpose of maintaining the status quo in which he and we were alike interested.

And on the 5th December Sir A. Hardinge had addressed the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs as follows:

I communicated the account of what had passed between His Highness and myself to Lord Lansdowne, who has now instructed me to make the following declaration to your Excellency for the information of the Persian Government and with a view of making our position in this matter perfectly clear:

- (1) The British Government has never doubted the absolute character of the Shah's sovereignty over the territory, ruler, and people of Mohammareh. Any suspicion which the Persian Government may have been led to entertain that we sought to establish any analogy between the position of the Sheikh of Mohammareh and that of the Sheikhs of Bahrein or Koweit or to distinguish between it and that of other Persian Governors, such for instance, to cite, Your Excellency's own illustration in conversation with Mr. des Graz, as the Chief of Kuchan, can only have been suggested by persons desirous of sowing distrust between the two friendly States. We recognise in the fullest manner that His Excellency the Sirdar Arfa is a Persian subject and a servant of His Imperial Majesty the Shah.
- (2) At the same time the important interests which Great Britain possesses in the south of Persia preclude us from viewing with indifference any changes in the system of Government in the province of Arabistan, which by causing trouble among the Arab tribes may endanger our trade and the security of foreign subjects, or afford occasion for interference by other powers and thus oblige us, on our side to take active steps for the protection of British rights.

* * * * * * :

But it must again reserve its right, in the event of further changes which it could not view with equal approbation, to make friendly representations with regard to them to the Persian Government, and if need be, take such other ulterior steps as it may deem requisite for the protection of British interests, both political and commercial, should these in its opinion be threatened. It is glad, however, to take the opportunity of expressing its confidence in the friendly assurances which His Highness the Atabeg has renewed to it, and which on its side it is happy to reciprocate,

These observations were not resented by the Mushīr-ud-Dauleh, who replied on the 13th January 1903 to the British Minister:

1903. I have had the pleasure of receiving your Excellency's letter of the 9th (and 6th) January last, and have with satisfaction made myself acquainted with the contents which signify the sincere friendship between the two Governments, and I would now express my own heartfelt satisfaction at the friendly assurances exchanged between the two Powers: and I trust that the harmony and sincerity which have for so long existed between the two Powers may be still further strengthened, and that the friendly feelings between the authorities of both powers may, as always, tend to an increased amity.

In December 1903 Sir A. Hardinge, who had then recently parted from Lord Curzon, the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, in the Persian Gulf, and who was returning to Tehrān vid Muhammareh and

Baghdad, telegraphed to the Foreign Office in London and to Lord Curzon that the Muhammareh question again seemed likely to become acute, at the same time mentioning the complaints which the Shaikh made at this time about breaches by the Persian Government of their understanding with him. The Shaikh wanted to know definitely whether the British Government would support him in resisting encroachment, if necessary, by forbidding the Persian Government to employ force against him, should he on his part repudiate the understanding because the Persians had not observed it. Sir A. Hardinge was in favour of some assurance being given, especially as Russia was still bidding for the Shaikh's good graces. Eventually, after receiving the instructions of His Majesty's Government, Sir A. Hardinge wrote to the Shaikh from Baghdad on the 24th December 1903:

Lord Lansdowne says that if, as he presumes is the case from my account of your Excellency's statement to me, the Persian Government is really attempting to repudiate the arrangement made with you last year, I am authorised to say that you are in his opinion justified in opposing such attempt. He instructs me to remind you of the message which he sent you last year, and to add that you may rest assured of the support of the British Government so long as you on your side observed the conditions of the arrangement made between the Persian Government and vourself.

He has authorised me to point out to that Government the necessity for respecting the conditions of the arrangement on their side, but I do not propose to do so until I hear further from you, as I think it will be better in the interests of good relations between the Persian authorities and yourself that our intervention should not be invoked until all other means of adjusting matters between them and you have been exhausted.

In the next year Russian activity in 'Arabistan rather increased 1904. than diminished. In January 1904 a party of three Russian travellers, who gave themselves out to be entomologists and one of whom was a well-known Russian emissary, M. Zaroudni, arrived at Nāsiri from Isfahān; and in February they voyaged down the Bahmanshīr, which they surveyed and sounded visiting Qubban and exploring 'Abbadan Island, and eventually returning northwards by way of Dizful. In March M. Passek, the Russian Consul-General at Bushehr, paid a visit to Muhammareh and invested the Shaikh with the Order of St. Stanislaus of the first class. A document which accompanied this decoration recited, as reasons for its being granted, the Shaik's enlightened policy and his wisdom in consenting to the establishment of the Imperial Persian Customs in his jurisdiction. M. Passek also made a tour to Ahwaz and Shushtar. About the same time the Muhammareh Agency of the Russian steamer line in the Persian Gulf was transferred from

Mr. ter Meulen, Russian Consular Agent in 'Arabistān, to a son of Hāji Raīs, the Shaikh's principal adviser; and the Shaikh himself had become, or feigned to have become, doubtful of the value of the assurances that he had received from the British Government. In August the soi disant Prince Anatouni, an Armenian Russian subject and Attaché in the Russian Ministry of Commerce, travelled up the Kārūn as far as Shūshtar; his mission was ostensibly commercial, but he was obviously ignorant of mercantile affairs.

1902-05.

The Russian Consular Agent appointed to 'Arbistān in 1902 was Mr. P. ter Meulen, a Dutch merchant. He arrived at Nāsiri in December of that year and, except for an absence on leave from January to June 1905, remained continuously in the province throughout the period. He did not, however, show himself a particularly efficient representative of Russian interests. Without energy or discretion, of doubtful honesty, and not very successful in private trade, his relations with the Shaikh of Muhammareh, with Hāji Raīs, with the Kārguzār, and even with the Imperial Persian Customs were unfiriendly, and at one time his disagreements with the first two reached such a point that the Russian Consul-General at Būshehr had to intervene as peacemaker.

Relations of other European powers with 'Arabistan, 1896-1905.

Almost the only Europeans of significance, not British or Russian whose presence was remarked in 'Arabistān were some French archæologists engaged, from 1897 onwards, in excavations at Shūsh under the direction of M. de Morgan. The country in their neighbourhood being much disturbed, they found it necessary to immure themselves in a kind of castle near the scene of their labours; and they took no active interest in political affairs. The activity of M. van Roggen, a Dutch engineer, is noticed further on in connection with irrigation projects in the province.

British political cases and interests in 'Arabistan, 1896-1905.

Political cases in 'Arabistan concerning the British Government

chiefly arose, during the period under consideration, from the insecurity which generally prevailed in Northern 'Arabistān.

The state of that sub-province in 1896-97 was, as we have already seen, one of chaos; and British subjects and firms were among the sufferers from the universal disorder, the impunity of the Persian soldiers who had attacked Messrs. Lynch's at Nasiri in 1895 affording, it would seem, special encouragement to outrages against them. In June 1896 a brutal and murderous midnight attack was made at Shushtar upon Mr. Tanfield, an employé of Messrs. Lynch, by a Persian subject in his service; he escaped with his life, but fearfully mutilated. Such an incident might have occurred under any Government; but this one was invested with an exceptional character by the conduct of a crowd who, on the following day, pursued with yells and stone-throwing a party conveying the wounded man to a steamer. Mr. Tanfield's assistant was arrested, but at first nothing further was done; and it was only after the outrage had become the subject of diplomatic representations that the offender was removed to Tehran and there imprisoned. The Nizām-us-Saltaneh, Governor-General of the province, and his brother and deputy, the Sa'ad-ul-Mulk, who had shown gross negligence if not prejudice in their treatment of the case, were removed from office.

In January 1897 a mob, after pillaging a caravan belonging to Messrs. Lynch on its way between Shüshtar and Shalaili, the anchorage for steamers, invaded and completely sacked the office of Messrs. Hotz, a Dutch firm under British protection, in the town.

Shortly afterwards order was in some measure restored by the A'laud-Douleh, who succeeded the Nizām-us-Saltaneh as Governor-General; but no compensation was obtained by Messrs. Lynch or Messrs. Hotz for their losses. In 1898 it was still impossible for any European to reside at Shūshtar.

On the night of the 5th September 1902 the "Shushan" *steamer, owned by His Majesty the Shāh but worked by Messrs. Lynch and commanded at the time by Captain King, was attacked by a gang of 40 Arabs of the Khasraj section of the Bani Lām tribe, who fired about 70 shots into the vessel, fatally wounding a deckman and killing a boy who were on board. The wood work of the cabins was riddled with shot

Murderous attack on Mr. Tanfield, pillage of a caravan of Messrs. Lynch, and sack of Messrs. Hotz's office at Shūshtar, 1896-97.

Attacks on the "Shus. han" and insecurity on the upper Kārūn,1902 -05.

^{*}The "Shushan" is known among the Arabs of the country as the "Slūgi-al-Kārūn" (Greyhound of the Kārūn), also by the more opprobrious names of "Abu-Az-al-Hamar" (Possessor of the Red Posterior) and "Khanzīr-al-Hamar" (Red Pig), these last appellations referring to the colour of her stern wheel.

holes and the funnel, too, was pierced. The robbers entered the vessel and remained about an hour on board her, pillaging the cargo and effects of the crew, after which they decamped with their booty. There was a guard of three Persian soldiers on board when the attack took place, but they fled at the approach of the marauders; one of them was wounded. After this the "Shushan" was supplied with a Persian military guard of ten men by the A'zam-us-Saltaneh, Governor of Northern 'Arabistān, who promised that troops would shortly arrive to restore security; but none came. The Persian authorities excused themselves for not taking measures against the Khasraj on the ground that they were Turkish subjects.

On the 17th May 1903 the "Shushan" was again fired on at Shalaili.

On the 15th April 1904 a third attack on the "Shushan" occurred, again at Shalaili, the vessel being moored to the bank and having 10,000 Qrans in specie on board at the time. The affair began at 8-30 p. m. with the discharge of 50 or 60 shots from some high ground, to which no reply could be made as there were intending passengers with mules and donkeys on the bank alongside. The raiders, numbering about 50, next rushed down from the high ground; and, while some of them turned their attention to the passengers on shore, the rest poured a hot fire into the body of the ship. Those of the passengers who could meanwhile began to escape across the river in cargo boats, and the Persian guard, to gain time, opened a parley with the leader of a group of about ten Arabs who had approached the gangway, dagger in hand. Captain Maclure, the Commander, and two deckmen, armed with rifles, posted themselves in the engine-room; and the Persian guard also made ready. On the leader of the Arabs shouting to his men to rush the ship, about 20 more came up; the Persian guard then fired a volley by Captain Maclure's order; the Arab leader fell dead; and the rest of the robbers beat a hasty retreat, leaving his body behind. Shots continued to be exchanged until 10-30 P.M.; but there was no further attempt at boarding. The vessel was undoubtedly saved by the good behaviour of the Persian guard, commanded by Muhammad Hassan, Vakīl-Bāshi.

On board two women passengers had been killed, and one wounded; on shore one mule and four donkeys had been carried off; and the damage done to the woodwork and funnel of the ship was estimated at £50.

The "Shushan" left for Nāsiri the next morning with the corpse of the Arab leader, which was handed over to the Shaikh of Muhammareh's representative there for identification. It appeared that the offenders on this occasion, as in 1902, were Khasraj, and that there was an understanding between them and the Arab inhabitants of the Miyānāb. The latter fact made the navigation of the Gargar, with its narrow and commanded channel, a dangerous undertaking for the future; and, Captain Maclure's contract with Messrs. Lynch having expired, and there being some risk of retaliation against him, his employers made no objection to his quitting their service.

Representations as to the insecurity of the upper Kārūn having been made by His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran, the Persian Government requested the Shaikh of Muhammareh, as there was for the moment no Persian Governor-General of 'Arabistan, to undertake temporarily the task of assuring order. He agreed and sent 400 Arab horsemen to serve at Shushtar and Dizful; of these 60 were stationed at Shalaili to supply mounted escorts on land for steamers on the upper Under these arrangements security quickly returned; and in June the "Shushan" resumed her voyages, which had been discon-On the arrival of the A'zam-us-Saltaneh as Governor-General, the Shaikh's men were withdrawn from Shushtar and Dizful, but he was prevailed on to leave a guard at Shalaili for some time longer. Shaikh estimated the cost of protecting the river between Ahwaz and Shalaili at 1,000 Tūmāns or R2,560 a month; and, though averse from employing men of his own permanently outsile his jurisdiction, he was willing to undertake the duty if his expenses were guaranteed; but, so far from this being done, he did not even receive payment for the services he had rendered. The thanks of the Shah, conveyed to him in a letter from a Minister, were his only reward.

There appeared little prospect of the A'zam-us-Saltaneh, whose whole military resources consisted of a bodyguard of 80 Shāhsavan horsemen, not to mention 50 armed road-guards whose services were required elsewhere, being able to police the upper Kārūn effectively; and long discussions followed among the British authorities in Persia as to the measures which the Persian Government or the Shaikh of Muhammareh should be induced to take. There was a general concensus of opinion that the Shaikh, whose influence—though his actual jurisdiction ended a short way above Band-i-Qīr—extended to the Arab tribes east of the Diz, would prove the most efficient agent in the matter; but, as it was

improbable that the Persian Government would consent to pay for his services, the question became one of a subsidy being granted him by the British Government. Sir A. Hardinge, the British Minister in Persia, pronounced in favour of such a grant; but meanwhile outrages had ceased to occur, and, with the arrival of the Sardār-i-Mu'azzam in the following spring, Northern 'Arabistān came under a strong and, from the British point of view, not altogether unsatisfactory régime.

British commercial and general interests, 1896-1905.

During this period, exception being made of the Anglo-Dutch firm of Messrs. Hotz, European trade was represented in 'Arabistân by the British firm of Messrs. Lynch only. In 1899 Messrs. Lynch were represented at Dizfül for some months by a British employé, but he was withdrawn, and in 1905 their sole European representative in the province was one at Nāsiri.

Embargoes on the export of produce, 1896-1905.

The system of embargoes on exportation of food stuffs continued in full vigour, and few seasons were entirely exempt from its application. It was frequently so worked as to enable Persian officials to buy grain cheap and then export it themselves. A noteworthy* instance of this occurred in 1900.

1896.

In June 1896 the embargo on grain which had been temporarily raised was imposed again by the Governor General, but almost immediately an intimation was received through the British Legation at Tehrān of its removal by the central Government.

1897.

The following harvest in 'Arabistān was a good one, but prices continued to rise, chiefly in consequence of a short crop in Mesopotamia; and in January 1897 a prohibition of the exportation of food grains, to come into effect two months later, was notified; but it was not enforced on the Kārūn till April. The ensuing harvest being poor, the embargo on grain continued, causing much inconvenience to British firms who had advanced money to cultivators; but ultimately sesame seed was excepted from the interdict.

1898-1900.

This embargo continued into 1898, notwithstanding that the coming crop was an excellent one; and at the beginning of 1900 the Resident in the Persian Gulf wrote that agricultural prospects in 'Arabistan were

^{*} See Mr. V. Chirol's Middle Eastern Question, pages 166-167.

extremely favourable, and that if only the embargo on wheat were removed the prosperity of the district should rapidly increase. The summer of 1900 was signalised, however, by a particularly vexatious embargo.

During the earlier years of the period at least, the operations of the Navigation Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company were carried on at a 1896-1905. loss, in spite of a subsidy paid them by the British and Indian Governments, to which reference will be made further on. Leaving the subsidy out of account, the deficit on their ordinary business in 'Arabistan amounted (by their own statement) to £35,460 for ten years from 1890 to 1899 inclusive, besides which they were unable to obtain payment from the Persian Treasury of £4,623, the amount of loss incurred by them in working the "Shushan" for the Shah from the beginning of 1891 to the end of 1898. Altogether they calulated their net losses in 'Arabistan from the 1st January 1890 to the 31st December 1899, after deducting the amount of the subsidy, at * £31,447.

of the Karun.

On the upper river between Ahwaz and Shalaili the Nasiri Company, in other words the Mu'in-ut-Tujjār, still continued in 1905 to run a steamer and declined, when approached, to transfer their rights to the British Company or to enter into partnership, unless on unacceptable terms.

The Persian Government also continued to be obstructive, and it was only at the end of 1905 that permission was with difficulty obtained to remove some supposed rocks, which proved to be masonry, from the bed of the lower Kārūn at Kūt 'Abdullah; the construction of sheds for cargo at Shalaili was not allowed; and the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company could not obtain a concession, for which they applied, to lay a tramway between Shalaili and Shustar.

In 1905, however, Messrs. Lynch were able to secure an extension for six years from 1907 of a lease which they had obtained from the Persian Government of suitable business premises at Muhammareh. known as the Bandar Sāhib-Qrānīyeh.

On assuming charge of the Customs of 'Arabistan in September 1902, the Imperial administration closed the river Customs houses at Nāsiri and Shūshtar, and insisted that all duty on upward and downward

Attempted abolition of the Customs houses at Nāsiri and Shushtar, 1902-1903.

^{*}This sum, however, included over £7,000 sunk in the Bakhtivari Road (vide post). a profitable investment; and Mesers. Lynch gave no indication of the results of their general trade, to which the navigation of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, controlled by them, was subservient.

cargoes on the Kārūn should be paid at Muhammareh. This innovation deranged all through traffic arrangements and was excessively inconvenient to up-country merchants who had not agents at Muhammareh. A protest was accordingly lodged by the British Legation at Tehrān founded on the assurances given by the Persian Government in 1890 when the "Shushan" was presented to His Majesty the Shāh; and the custom house at Nāsiri was provisionally re-opened in November 1902, and that at Shūshtar in February 1903. The Persian Government argued that the indulgence granted in 1890 was not intended to be permanent, and that it had only been made because the goods of European merchants then paid a higher duty on entry into the country than those of Persian subjects, which had ceased to be the case. In the end, however, they withdrew their objections and the custom houses at Nāsiri and Shūshtar were definitevely re-established in April 1903.

D'Arcy Oil Exploitation Company, 1901-1905. On the 28th May 1901 an oil exploitation concession was obtained by Mr. W. K. D'Arcy, a British capitalist, from the Persian Government; it conferred on him a monopoly of working mineral oil, natural gas, asphalt and ozokerit, and an exclusive right of laying pipe lines for the conveyance of oil, throughout Persia with the exception of a few of the northern provinces. A D'Arcy Oil Exploitation Company was then formed, between whom and the Bakhtiyāri Khāns an agreement was concluded on the 15th November 1905, providing for the facilitation and protection of operations by the Khāns in return for an annual payment of £2,000 rising to £3,000, besides which the Khāns might claim, on payment, 3 per cent. of the Company's ordinary shares after the production of oil had begun.

Road projects in 'Arabistan, 1896-1905.

Such progress as was made in land communications during the period was due entirely to British enterprise.

Ahwāz-Isfahān (or Bakhtiyāni) Road, 1897-1905. In 1897 a sixty years' *concession was grated by the Persian Government to some of the Khans of the Bakhhtyāri tribe for the construction, maintennce, and exploitation of a road through their country from Ahwāz to Isfahān, and of another from Shūshtar to Isfahān. It conveyed

^{*}For the text see Lieutenant A. T. Wilson's Précis of the Relations, etc., pages 93-94.

to the concessionnaires the right of levying tolls at certain specified rates; it authorised them to obtain the aid of capitalists for carrying out the necessary works; and it charged them with the responsibility for the safety of persons, animals, and goods travelling by the roads. Before the end of the year a subsidiary* agreement was concluded between the Khans and Messrs. Lynch, and guaranteed by the Persian Government, for the construction and maintenance of the (Ahwāz Isfahān) road by the British firm for the Bakhtiyari concessionnaires on certain financial and other conditions. The contract cost of the road was £5,500, but might be increased by mutual consent of the parties; and the actual expenditure incurred to about the middle of 1899 was £7,333. The length of the road as completed was 277 miles, reducing the journey to 15 or 18 marches; it passed through very difficult mountainous country; and one of its principal features was an iron suspension bridge over a remarkable gully at Godar-i-Balūtak. road was opened for traffic in December 1899. A toll-collecting station was established at Godār-i-Balūtak, and in 1903 the Bakhtiyāri Khāns were said to have leased it to a contractor at 8,000 Tumans for the year. An increasing trade upon the road was quickly established. Some trouble arose, however, between the Bakhtiyāri Khāns and Messrs. Lynch with reference to the amount of the firm's bills for maintenance of the road.

Under the Tehrān Ahwāz Boad Concession, held by the Imperial Bank of Persia, an unmetalled carriage road from Tehrān had been completed to Qum in 1899 at a cost of £80,000, and vehicles were run upon it by the Bank. In 1902, arrangements were made for the formation of a British Company to be styled the Persian Transport Company, which would take over the road concession held by the Imperial Bank of Persia as well as Messrs. Lynch's† interest in the navigation of the river and in the recently constructed Bakhtiyāri Road; and meanwhile the Tehrān-Ahwāz road was prolonged from Qum to Saltānābād. The promoters of the new Company represented that a Government subsidy was necessary to their success; and, on the Company's finally coming into existence in 1904, a grant of £2,000 a year for ten years was made

Tehrān-Ahwāz Road 1896-1902.

^{*}For the text see Lieutenant A. T. Wilson's Process of the Relations, etc., pages 94-96.

[†]There was reason to expect that Messrs. Lynch would control, if not virtually own, the new combination, as they already did the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company.

them, of which half was to be contributed by His Majesty's Government and half by the Government of India.

Attack on Colonel Douglas and Lieut. Lorimer, 1904.

A British representative had for the first time been posted to Nāsiri (Ahwāz) at the beginning of 1904 in the person of Lieutenant D. L. R. Lorimer of the Indian Political Department; and the most immediate and principal duty of this officer was to ascertain the measures required for carrying the Tehran-Ahwaz road through Luristan, and for assuring its safety in that section. He had orders to report on the feasibility of raising a corps of local road-guards, capable of being expanded into a tribal militia for political purposes. Lieutenant Lorimer travelled safely from Ahwaz to Khurramabad and back again in the spring of 1904, under tribal protection, and submitted a preliminary report; he had been well received by the tribes; and the prospects of success at this time appeared favourable. In autumn of the same year he again made his way without mishap to Khurramābād, where he met Colonel Douglas, the British Military Attaché at Tehran; but on the 25th October 1904, in marching from Khurramābād to Dizfūl, the two officers were treacherously attacked by their own escort of Dirakwand Lurs. were both severely wounded besides being robbed of all their property. and barely escaped with their lives to Burujird, where they received medical attention.

A substantial indemnity for this outrage was demanded on their behalf by His Majesty's Government, and the Persian Government declared their intention of organising a punitive expedition against the Dīrakwand, but took no effective action. In July 1905, with the help of certain chiefs of the Sagward Lurs, the Persian authorities enticed some of the men concerned in the attack into Khurramābād by promises of honours and gifts, arrested them and sent them to Kirmānshāh, where they were imprisoned.

The Bakhtiayāri Khāns expressed great concern at the outrage and offered to undertake, on terms which they specified, the punishment of the offenders, and even the pacification of the Lur country; but their offers, which were not entertained, probably outran their powers of performance.

On return to his post from leave, before the end of 1905, Captain Lorimer was able to resume negotiations with the Sagwand, but not with the Dirakwand Lurs.

British official matters in 'Arabistan, 1896-1905.

The period was one of much British official activity in 'Arabistan.

In the autumn of 1899, Sir M. Durand, His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehrān, made an extensive tour in Persia which reached to 'Arabistān; he was absent from the capital from the 26th September to the 14th December. On the 6th November he arrived at Nāsiri, where he was met by Colonel Meade, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and Mr. McDouall, His Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul at Muhammareh, and remained two or three days. He returned to Tehrān viá Shūshtar, Dizfūl, the Dīrakwand Lur country, and Khurramābād. As mentioned before, no meeting took place between him and the Shaikh of Muhammareh.

* Tour by Sir M. Durand, British Minister in Persia, in 'Arabistan, 1899.

At the end of 1903, as already stated in another connection, Sir A. Hardinge, His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehrān, in returning from a cruise with Lord Curzon, Viceroy and Governor-General of India, in the Persian Gulf, visited Muhammareh, where he met the Shaikh and discussed political affairs with him. He also ascended the Kārūn as far as Nāsiri.

Visit of Sir A. Hardinge, British Minister in Persia, to Muhammareh and Nāsiri, 1903.

In 1903, in connection chiefly with schemes for opening communication by road between 'Arabistān and Central and Northern Persia, it was decided to raise the status of the British representative at Muhammareh to that of Consul, and to appoint a British Vice-Consul for 'Arabistān; the Consul at Muhammareh was to remain in charge of British commercial interests throughout the province, while the new Vice-Consul was to be employed chiefly in establishing relations with the tribes of Northern 'Arabistān, and of Luristān, and in collecting political and geographical information. The Vice-Consul's head-quarters were fixed provisionally at Nāsiri.

Appointment of a British Vice-Consul for 'Arabistān and conversion of the British Vice-Consulate at Muhammarch into a Consulate, 1903-04.

When this reorganisation was sanctioned, in July 1903, Mr. McDouall, the permanent British representative at Muhammareh, was absent on leave; and his *locum tenens*, Major E. B. Burton of the Indian Army, carried on temporarily the work of both appointments. Major Burton toured energetically and collected much valuable inform-

^{*} This tour is described by Lady Duraud in her Autumn Tour in Western Persia, 1902.

ation, exploring more particularly the little known country about the head of Khor Mūsa and the valley of the Diz river. His Britannic Majesty's first Vice-Consul for 'Arabistān was Lieutenant D. L. R. Lorimer of the Indian Political Department, who assumed charge of his duties in January 1904.

Mr. McDouall became Consul at Muhammareh with effect from the 23rd February 1904.

Head-quarters of the British Vice-Consulate for 'Arabistan, 1904. One of the first questions which it was necessary to decide in connection with the establishment of a British Vice-Consulate for 'Arabistān was where to locate the new officer's permanent headquarters. Lieutenant Lorimer, on being consulted, recommended Ahwāz (Nāsiri) in preference to any other place, remarking:

Ahwāz is of no importance as a native community, but the Sheikh* spends the winter near it, and it is the last point which is in direct touch with the outer world. It is Lynch's head-quarters in South-Western Persia. It is the starting point of the Bakhtiari road, as well as of the route to Shushtar and Dizfūl. Whatever the alignment adopted for the Khurramābād road, Ahwāz will be its real terminus. The earliest reports of any occurrences affecting the safety of our traffic are naturally brought here to Messrs. Lynch's Agent, who also acts for the Persian Transport Company.

Ahwāz will necessarily remain the head-quarters of all British concerns, and it is unlikely that any companies will post European Agents to any other places such as Dizfūl. In any case, the head management will always be situated at Ahwāz, which is in fact the port of 'Arabistān, Luristān, and the Bakhtiari route.

Lieutenant Lorimer's opinion was accepted by the Government of India. He further proposed that native houses should be rented at Shūshtar, Dizfūl, Khurramābād, and Rāmuz for occupation by the Vice-Consul on tour. Some difficulty was experienced in obtaining a suitable site for the British Vice-Consulate at Nāsiri.

British medical officer for 'Arabistan, 1904-1905. It was decided in 1904 that an officer of the Indian Medical Service should be deputed to Persia as Consular Surgeon at Ahwāz and Kirmānshāh, and it was intended that he should, inter alia, afford medical assistance to the Bakhtiyāri Khāns, who had frequently expressed a wish for the services of a European doctor. The combination of duties thus arranged afterwards proved to be impracticable, in consequence of the great distance and difficulty of communication between the two places intended to be served; and the officer sent, being posted in the first instance to Kirmānshāh, was not seen in 'Arabistān.

It was ordered in 1904, under the general scheme for British consular guards in Persia, that a detachment of 12 sabres of Indian Cavalry should be sent to 'Arabistān as an escort for the Vice-Consul. This guard was despatched in due course, but it unfortunately arrived too late to accompany Lieutenant Lorimer on the journey on which he and Colonel Douglas were attacked by the Dīrakwand.

Military guard of the British Vice-Consulate in 'Arabistān, 1904.

In September 1899, the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company (Messrs. Lynch), whose financial difficulties in 'Arabistān have already been mentioned, applied for the continuation for another five years of the subsidy of £2,000 per annum granted to them in 1894 at the joint expense of His Majesty's Government and the Government of India. The Government of India consented to make one more contribution, viz., for the calender year 1900, but declined to do more, observing in a despatch to His Majesty's Secretary of State for India: "We cannot agree to prolong the contribution beyond the year 1900, and we would once more call Your Lordship's attention to the inequity of an arrangement whereby Indian revenues not only meet half the Kārūn subsidy, in which Indian interests, if they can be said to exist at all, are insignificant, but also bear the whole charge for the Euphrates Tigris subsidy, in whose object the Imperial Government is at least equally, and indeed in our opinion more vitally, concerned."

The Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company's Kārūn subsidy, 1899-1900.

Meanwhile the report of a Royal Commission on the expenditure of the Government of India, which had been sitting since 1897, was submitted. Their conclusion in regard to the Kārūn subsidy was that, if the Government of India maintained the Baghdād-Bāsrah service, the charge for the Kārūn service should be borne by Great Britain.

Irrigation projects in 'Arabistan, 1896-1905.

The question of the irrigation of 'Arabistan from the Karun, laid aside in 1882, was reconsidered during the period now under consideration.

It was raised, in the first case, by proposals on the part of M. van Roggen, a Dutch engineer in the service of the Persian Government, to bring a tract of country on the left bank of the Kārūn at Ahwāz under cultivation by means of irrigation from the river. M. van Roggen made

M. van Roggen's scheme, 1903-1904, a preliminary examination of the ground in the winter of 1903-04 and then returned to Tehrān, where his project was favourably received by the Persian Government; but the Shāh, while approving of it provided it could be carried out by Persian enterprise, was strongly averse from granting a concession for its execution by a foreign company. The Shaikh of Muhammareh was opposed to the scheme, unless it were executed by himself or by the British Government, and he professed to fear that it might injure date cultivation on the lower Kārūn and Bahmanshīr. The British Government were concerned at the prospect of any reduction in the volume of the Kārūn, which was already hardly sufficient to maintain navigability at certain seasons. In a minute, dated 1st August 1904, Lord Curzon, then Viceroy of India, remarked:

Any such scheme, if successfully carried out, will practically destroy the Karun as a navigable river, and will put an effectual stopper upon on the enterprise of Messrs. Lynch.

Even now the depth of water is only 3 feet in many places, and the steamers run aground constantly on their way up to Ahwāz. A reduction of even 6 inches in the depth would block navigation for the four months from August to December. Our Indian experience in the Punjab has shown that large navigable rivers, such as the Jumna, Ravi, Chenab, Sutlej and Jhelum, are drained quite dry for most of the year by big irrigation schemes, and I entertain little doubt that this also would be the fate of the Kārūn.

His Majesty's Government must, therefore, balance the advantages to be derived from irrigation against the damage that will be inflicted upon British commerce. It is obvious that, if Messrs. Lynch are pushed out, and if their place is taken by Belgian officials and Dutch engineers or concessionnaires working a big irrigation project in purely selfish or in anti-British interests, we should be very greatly the losers by the change.

On the other hand, if we had a substantial or preponderating voice in the control we might be able to replace one form of commercial activity by another; and might open up another route for navigation to the plains of 'Arabistān by utilising the Khor Musa, or one of the adjoining inlets which we have recently explored, and by making new roads from thence into the interior.

What I have said emphasises the supreme importance of British participation and joint control in any Karun irrigation scheme, if it is to be started, but conversely also the striking danger to British interest that would result if we were left out of sight in any such enterprise.

At the end of 1904 Mr. van Roggen, who thoroughly appreciated the desirability of obtaining British co-operation, and who during a visit to Europe had endeavoured to interest the British Foreign Office in his project, returned to Ahwaz with two European assistants, and proceeded to elaborate his plans.

In February 1905, under instructions from the Persian Government, who had meanwhile been approached by the British Legation, M. van Roggen explained his project in detail to Major W. R. Morton, R.E., an officer of the Punjab Irrigation Department who had been deputed from India. on behalf of the Government of India and His Majesty's Government to study the prospects of the scheme and its probable influence upon navigation. M. van Roggen's plans were found to be technically grotesque, and financially extravagant, if not impossible, They involved the excavation of reservoirs with a capacity of over 4,000,000,000 cubic feet for the sake of irrigating an area of not more than 85,000 acres,—a circumstance which, coupled with the fact that the operations were to be spread over a period of 24 years, sufficed to stamp the scheme as unremunerative.

Deputation of Major Morton, R.E., from India, 1904-05.

As it seemed probable, however, that an irrigable area of much more than 85,000 acres might be commanded from the Kārūn at Ahwāz, Major Morton, after he had exploded M. van Roggen's scheme, was ordered to collect data on which an alternative project might be framed, if required. He was instructed to consider the possibilities on both sides of the Kārūn, and to distinguish in his reports between plans compatible with the maintenance of navigation and others which were incompatible.

M. van Roggen left 'Arabistan for Europe in April 1905, but Major Morton remained on the spot until after the end of the period.

In May 1905 in the course of negotiations for a loan which the Persian Government were then desirous of raising the British Legation at Tehran endeavoured to stipulate that in the event of irrigation works being undertaken on the Kārūn, preference should be given to British Agency but the point was not carried.

A new project for the irrigation of part of 'Arabistān from the Karkheh river was mooted by the Shaikh of Muhammareh in 1905; but, though its potentialities were afterwards found to be considerable, it did not immediately receive attention.

Scheme for irrigation from the Karkheh, 1905.

CHAPTER XI

HISTORY OF THE PERSIAN COAST AND ISLANDS.

The history down to the year 1763 of what is styled throughout Gazetteer "the Persian Coast, and Islands" that is of the whole southern coast of Persia except so much as is included in 'Arabistān or Makrān, this has been given in the chapter on the general history of the Gulf; but from 1763 onwards, for reasons which are there explained, it is necessary to deal separately with the history of the Persian Coast; and the present chapter is added chiefly with that purpose. The general affairs of the Persian kingdom after 1763, however, in so far as they call for notice, will also be treated of in this chapter, as finding in it a more appropriate place than in the histories of the outlying Persian provinces of 'Arabistān and Makrān.

KARIM KHĀN.

1763-79.*

Internal administration of Karim Khān.

The earlier stages of Karīm Khān's rise to supreme power in Persia have been described elsewhere; and the rest of his career was,

For events in Persia generally the reader may refer to Malcolm's History of Persia, 1815.

^{*}The chief official source of information for the Zand period (1763-95) on the Persian Coast is Mr. J. A. Saldanha's Selections from State Papers, Bombay, regarding the East India Company's connection with the Persian Gulf, with a Summary of Events, 1600-1800, published in 1905, which covers the entire period. The other principal authorities are these: Niebuhr's Voyage en Arabie, 1776; Observations made on a Tour from Bengal to Persia, 1790, by Ensign W. Franckliu, who resided for some time at Shīrāz in 1787; Dynasty of the Kajars, 1833, and Account of the Transactions of His Majesty's Mission to the Court of Persia, 1834, by Sir H. J. Brydges, who, as Mr. H. Jones of the Basrah Residency visited Shīrāz in 1787, and again in 1791, and had close relations with a number of the leading men; Voyage dans l'Empire Othoman, l'Égypte et la Perse, 1801-07, by Mr. M. G. A. Olivier, who visited Tehrān in 1796 as a French political emissary; and A Tour to Sheeraz by Mr. E. S. Waring, who visited Shīrāz and passed some time there in 1802. M. Olivier and Mr. Waring both made a special study of the recent history of Persia.

in matters of internal government, somewhat uneventful. In 1763 his authority extended, though not in an absolute manner, to the whole or nearly the whole of the country; and from that year until the end of his reign, notwithstanding the jealousy of the Qajars of the north, it was never seriously disputed by any rival. Satisfied with the possession of royal power, Karim Khan prudently did not usurp the royal title, but continued to govern as Vakil or regent on behalf of the nominal Shah, whom he kept in confinement. His government was distinguished by moderation, combined with firmness and efficiency; the welfare of the subject was at all times his principal care; and he reaped a rich reward, both in the prosperity which the country enjoyed under his rule and in the respect which was felt for his memory after his death. In short. the reputation to which he attained among the sovereigns of Persia,for such, apart from a political fiction observed by himself, he must certainly be considered—was as admirable and as well deserved as it was uncommon and even unique. Shiraz, which throughout the reign of Karīm Khān was his capital and his almost constant residence, profited more than any other part of his dominions by his liberal expenditure on public works and by the general enlightenment of his ideas; and its inhabitants were the most attached to him of all his subjects.

Less is known of the private than of the public character of Karim Khān; but, while judgment and calculation were predominant traits and generally regulated his actions, he appears none the less to have been humane, even kindly, and sincere. Karim Khān made considerable use, as will appear from the sequel, of the services of his brothers * or half-brothers, Sādiq Khān and Zaki Khān. The former of these was in direct charge of the capital at the time of the establishment of a British Residency at Büshehr in 1763 and also of Niebuhr's visit to Shirāz in 1765, and he afterwards conducted operations against Lär in 1766 and against Basrah in 1775-76; while the latter, who was the Vakīl's half-brother and cousin only, had charge of an expedition to Kangun in 1767, of another to Ganaveh in 1769, and of a third to Bandar 'Abbās in 1773. Karīm Khān died in 1779 at the age, as was supposed, of seventy-five or eighty years.

The foreign policy of Karim Khan related chiefly to 'Oman and Foreign Turkish 'Iraq; and his endeavours between 1769 and 1779 to extort policy submission from the Imam of 'Oman, as also the invasion of 'Iraq by

Personal character and employment of relatives.

of Karim Khān.

^{*} Sādiq Khān was older than Karīm Khān, but would probably never have risen to distinction had it not been for his brother the Vakil. He learned to read and write, however, while the Vakil was content to remain illiterate.

his troops in 1775 and their occupation of Basrah beginning in 1776, are described in the separate histories of the countries concerned. It is possible that the Vakil's activity abroad had, for one of its objects, the employment of the armed forces of Persia at a distance from home, and the removal by that means of a standing danger to the peace of his dominions; indeed, without this explanation, his aggressions on the ruler of 'Omān would appear out of harmony with his generally pacific spirit.

Various circumstances brought Karīm Khān into contact with the British power, also, in the Persian Gulf; and of these circumstances, and of the relations to which they gave rise, we now proceed to supply a short account, touching lightly on matters which belong rather to the history of 'Irāq or of 'Arabistān than to that of the Persian Coast.

Relations between the British power and Persian central Government, with especial reference to affairs upon the Persian Coast, 1763-79.

At the beginning of the period on which we have entered, the intercourse of the East India Company with Persia had been completely, though temporarily, suspended. There was no correspondence on foot, on any subject, between the representatives of the Company and the de facto ruler of Persia; and the Company's last important settlement* in the country, their Agency at Bandar 'Abbās, had been closed and removed to Turkish territory. It appears, however, that the Government of Bombay—whether with or without the previous sanction of the Court of Directors at home—had resolved, even before the withdrawal of the Bandar 'Abbās Agency, to institute in its stead a Residency at Būshehr; and the period of the Company's total absence from Persia was, consequently, a very short one.

Mr. Price's mission to the Gulf and establishment of a Residency at Büshehr, March—April, 1763.

In January 1763 the authorities at Bombay selected Mr. William Andrew Price to proceed to the Gulf as "Provisional Agent of Persia," for the purpose of enquiring into serious defalcations that had come to light at Basrah; and, as the powers of the regular Agent, Mr. Douglas, were to be in abeyance during his visit, Mr. Price was also instructed to arrange for the establishment of the Residency at Büshehr, "in order

A Linguist, however, appears to have remained at Kirman, who was not withdrawn till afterwards,

more particularly to introduce the vend of Woollen Goods into the Kingdom of Persia."

Mr. Price arrived off Bandar 'Abbās on the evening of the 24th of March, when guns were fired and blue lights burned on board his vessel, the "Tartar"; but no answering signal was received from the shore. On the following morning, as up to ten o'clock no boat had come alongside, the roadstead also being empty of vessels and no British flag anywhere visible, Mr. Price, who rightly inferred that the Agency had been withdrawn after hostilities, caused a Dutch ensign to be hoisted and a gun fired. By this means communication with the land was quickly established, and full information of what had occurred was obtained from a servant of the late Agency. So far, however, were the local Persian authorities from wishing to carry on the quarrel between the Company and themselves that the Governor of Bandar 'Abbas invite Mr. Price to visit him on shore, - an invitation which, however, does not seem to have been accepted,-and Mulla 'Ali Shah of Qishm, on the usual signal being made, supplied a pilot for the Clarence Strait, and even sent a present of fowls and almonds on board the Agent's vessel.

A few days later the "Tartar" reached Büshehr; and on the 7th of April a son of Shaikh Sa'dūn, who was in charge of the town during the absence of his father and of his father's brother Shaikh Nāsir, visited Mr. Price on board ship, persuaded him to land, treated him on shore "with great politeness and civility," and discussed with him the conditions on which a British settlement might be formed at Bushehr. The negotiations thus begun were continued with Shaikh Sa'dun himself, to meet whom, as he was at a distance, Mr. Price deputed one Stephen Hermit, the Linguist of the late Bandar 'Abbās Agency; and the result was the conclusion of an Agreement* in the sense desired, on the 12th of April 1763. On the 22nd of April, Mr. Price appointed Mr. B. Jervis, whom he had brought with him in the "Tartar," to the office of Resident at Büshehr; after which he caused an artillery officer and a small military guard to be landed, "for protecting the Hon'ble Company's goods and giving a credit to their affairs", and himself sailed for Basrah. In the Provisional Agent's opinion, the fact of Büshehr being included with Shīrāz in the jurisdiction of Karīm Khān, whose reputation for justice and good government already stood high, together with the mercantile character of the town itself and the absence of any necessity

^{*}This Agreement is given in Aitchison's *Treaties*, 4th edition, Volume XII, pages 33—34; but it is of little importance as it was almost immediately superseded by a Grant from Karīm Khān himself, see pages 34—36 of the same.

for "pomp and parade" on the part of a British representative, indicated Büshehr as a very suitable location for a Residency; and he remarked that it would always be easy to obtain satisfaction for injuries sustained at Büshehr by seizing vessels belonging to the port.

Grant of Privileges to the British by Karim Khān, July 1763.

Not long after this, Mr. Price, who had meanwhile become aware that Shaikh Sa'dun was subordinate to Sadiq Khan, brother of Karīm Khān and Governor of Shīrāz, directed Mr. Jervis to apply to the latter tor confirmation of the agreement made with Shaikh Sa'dun; and on Sādiq Khān sending a present and expressing a wish that a European gentleman should visit him at Shīrāz, the Resident took advantage of the opportunity to send his Linguist, Stephen Hermit, accompanied by Lieutenant Durnford, to deliver a return present and make the required application. On the 1st of August 1763, these two returned to Büshehr bringing with them a Grant of Privileges of which a copy, duly authenticated by Karim Khan's own seal, was subsequently received. The principal provisions of this grant were the following: that the British should have liberty to erect a Factory at Büshehr or at any other port in the Gulf, to mount thereon as many guns as they chose, not larger than 6-pounders, and to build in connection therewith, in any part of the kingdom, any number of ordinary houses; that their trade should be free of import, export and internal duties both at Büshehr and at other ports, and that the Shaikh of Büshehr and other local governors should not charge more than 3 per cent. export duty on British goods purchased by Persian merchants; that the British should possess a monopoly, as against all other nationalities, of the importation of woollen goods into Persia; that the local governors should assist them in the recovery of their lawful debts in Persia, failing which they should be free to take their own measures against their debtors; that their trade should be free from all restrictions throughout Persia; that, without the knowledge and consent of the British official representative, native merchants should not purchase goods from any British ship arriving at a Persian port; that, British vessels in the Gulf, if driven on shore or otherwise lost, should not be plundered, but should be salved, free of charge, by the local authorities; that the British and those under their protection should enjoy religious freedom in all parts of the country; that British deserters, whether soldiers, sailors or slaves, should be delivered up by the Persian authorities, on condition of their not being punished for a first or a second offence; that Linguists, brokers and Factory servants should be exempt from Persian taxes and subject to British jurisdiction; that a spot of ground should be assigned to the British, wherever they might

settle, for a burying place; that if they wished ground for a garden, they should receive it, either free of cost from the property of the Persian crown, or on payment of a fair price out of private property: and that the house formerly owned by the East India Company at Shīrāz, together with the garden and water belonging to it, should be restored to them. The Vakil desired that it should be stipulated, in addition to the foregoing articles, that the British should take Persian produce in payment or part payment for their goods, and not export the whole value of their sales in specie; that they should not ill-treat Muhammadaus; that they should give preference, in the sale of their imports, to principal merchants and men of credit; that rebels against Persian authority should not be harboured by them, but should on the contrary be handed over subject to an understanding that they were not to be punished for a first or a second offence; and, finally, that the British should not, either directly or indirectly, assist the enemies of the ruler of Persia. It appears, from later correspondence, that the Government of Bombay did not approve of the article which aimed at subjecting all British trade in Persia to the control of the East India Company's servants, and that they decided that it should not be enforced; and similarly they seem to have rejected the articles, proposed by Karim. Khān, for restricting the export of specie and giving a preference, in all circumstances, to particular merchants. The whole cost of the deputation by means of which the Vakil's Grant was obtained amounted, inclusive of presents, to R3,059 only.

The discussions between the East India Company's representatives and the Government of Karīm Khān at this time were not restricted, however, to matters of trade. They extended to the question of British naval support of the authority of the Vakil in the Persian Gulf, principally with a view to the coercion of Mir Mahanna, the maritime chief of Rig, who was inclined to harass the trade passing between Bushehr and Shīrāz, and against whom the Persians, though some months previously they had assembled land forces and called on the Shaikh of Būshehr to co-operate, had as yet accomplished nothing. The matter having been raised during Mr. Price's visit to Bushehr, it was suggested by him, subject to the approval of his superiors at Bombay, that, in consideration of a subsidy of R22,000 a year to be paid by the Persian Government, a guardship should be stationed at Büshehr by the East India Company; and Sādiq Khān, on the occasion of Lieutenant Dornford's visit to Shīrāz, seems to have closed with this proposal and promised to give an assignment for the required amount on the customs or other revenues of

Negotiations on the part of the Persians for British naval assistance, 1763-94.

The idea was not well received, however, by the Government of Bombay, who apparently thought that the expenses of a guardship would be heavier than anticipated by Mr. Price and to whom, moreover. a scheme for stationing not one but three guardships in the Gulf appears to have been submitted. In September 1764, Karīm Khān, who was then encamped with a large force in the Bakhtiyari country, was believed to be contemplating the reduction of Mir Mahanna in the month of November or December following, for which purpose he was desirous of the help of one or two British vessels to prevent the escape of the rebel by sea; and it was reported that "he was willing to assign the Hon'ble "Company the annual sum of 40,000 Rupees for two cruizers, or 20,000 "for one, to be stationed in the Gulf for the protection of the trade, and " had also made an offer of delivering up to the Hon'ble Company the "Town and Government of Bunderick," i.e., of Rig, "if agreeable to us." The Bombay Government, however, took no steps in the matter further than to authorise the Resident, in December 1764, to lend the Vakil the services of a British vessel from time to time, provided that it were for the interest of the East India Company in Persia to do so, and that no inconverience should be caused by the detention of the ship.

Piratical outrage on the British Ship" Islam abad", 6th February 1765, and subsequent proceedings

Soon after this a serious case of piracy occurred, proving that the need for some kind of maritime police was not imaginary. The "Islamabad" a British vessel from Bengal, commanded by Captain H. Sutherland, was returning down the Gulf from Basrah to India, when she encountered off the island of Qishm a violent gale from the south-east, before which she was obliged to run to Mughu. The places of a number of her crew, lost on the outward voyage and at Basrah, had been supplied by the enlistment at the latter place of a dozen Arab sailors, the remainder of the original crew were, with one exception, Indians; and the only true Europeans on board were the Captain and his three officers. Among the passengers were some Armenian merchants. Mughu on the 6th of February, the ship being short of provisions and water, the Captain sent the long-boat ashore in charge of the third officer to fetch a quantity of both, upon which the Arab part of the crew rose against the officers remaining on board, surprised and killed them, and took possession of the "Islamabad". The next day, when the party in the long-boat, who were ignorant of what had occurred after their departure, came alongside in bad weather, several of them were allowed by the Arab mutineers, or rather pirates, to return on board; but on the Captain's servant attempting to follow, he was wounded with a lance and thrown back into the water, and, hardly had he been picked up by his

companions, when the officer in command of the boat was suddenly killed by a pistol bullet from the ship, which passed through his head. The others cast off and made for the nearest shore, landing again at "a little town about a league to the southward of Magoo", probably Duvvān, where the Shaikh seized the boat and stripped them of all their property. The pirates carried the "Islamabad" to Qais Island and disembarked there, first possessing themselves of all the valuables on board and murdering one of the Armenian merchants, of whose professional advice they had availed themselves; but they were at once taken prisoners and sent over to the mainland by the local Shaikh, who did not fail, at the same time, to convert the stolen property to his own use. The survivors of the long-boat party, namely "a servant, a helmsman and lascars", reached Büshehr on the 6th of March and reported the affair to Mr. Jervis, the Resident there, who on the same day despatched a boat-express with a letter to the Agent and Council at Basrah; but the information, apparently, did not reach Basrah until the 26th of March, when much valuable time had been lost.* As Mr. Jervis had suggested that vessels should be sent to demand the surrender by the Shaikh of Qais of the plunder in his possession, the Agent and Council placed the snow "Tartar" at his disposal and gave him discretion to make use of her as proposed, in case this could be done without endangering either ship or cargo; and along with the "Tartar" they sent from Basrah Mr. Hollamby, a Company's servant, who was to act as their representative in the matter, provided that Mr. Jervis thought the undertaking feasible. The total loss in the "Islamabad" case was roughly estimated at Rs. 4,00,000, of which half was expected to fall upon British and half upon Armenian and other merchants, but the ship herself was apparently saved, having been taken to Masqat by the crew and passengers, after the catastrophe, with the help of Qais pilots. Nothing resulted in this connection from the despatch of the "Tartar", which did not even, it would seem, proceed beyond Büshehr, perhaps because it was known that the Shaikh of Qais had already been obliged by Shaikh 'Abdullah of Hormūz, acting on behalf of Nāsir Khān of Lār, to disgorge the larger part of the booty. No application on the subject of the "Islamabad" was made, it would appear, to Karīm Khān, into whose

^{*} The above follows the official account; but, according to Niebuhr, whose ship passed the "Islamabad" near Sirri on the 25th of January, the tragedy took place only two days later, and the news of it reached Būshehr "a little after" his own arrival there on the 4th of February. Mr. Jervis, perhaps, had doubted or disbelieved the rumour of a catastrophe until convinced of its truth by the arrival of the survivors.

own possession Nasir Khan's share of the plunder was said soon after to have come on the fall of Lar; but the Company's servants did not lose sight of the case, and a few years later it became, as we shall see further on, the indirect cause of another and far more serious disaster.

Combined British and Persian attack on Mir Mahanna of Rig, May— July 1765.

In the spring of 1765, Karim Khan in person undertook an expedition against the refractory Ka'ab tribe of 'Arabistān; and at the same time he caused a force of about 1,100 mounted and 500 unmounted men to be assembled at Khurmij near Bushehr, under the orders of Amīr Kuhneh Khān, for the purpose of reducing Mīr Mahanna of Rīg to obedience. The Rig expedition, of which the proceedings at Khurmūj are noticed again further on, was delayed for three months or more by the inability of the commander to find a naval ally of sufficient strength to cope with Mir Mahanna and prevent his escape by sea; for the Shaikh of Büshehr's small fleet by itself was unequal to the task, and the other petty Shaikhs of the coast, whose position resembled that of Mir Mahanna in that they did not as yet pay tribute to the Persian Government, could not be relied on to act against him. Karīm Khān, in these difficult circumstances, turned to the Dutch Governor of Khārag and to the British Resident at Bushehr. From the former, Mynheer Buschman, he received no encouragement; but Mr. Jervis, considering the occasion to be one on which the services of a vessel might properly be lent to the Vakil under the orders given by the Government of Bombay in 1764, made an application on that footing to his superiors at Basrah, and asked that the snow "Tartar" might be sent. Agent at Basrah (Mr. P. E. Wrench) and his Council, who were evidently piqued by the Vakil's having written to the Resident at Bushehr on a subject of such importance, instead of to themselves, and by Mr. Jervis's having neglected to forward them the Vakil's letter, made difficulties about complying with this request; they represented that the "Tartar" was unfit for the duty, and that she might miss her passage to India and be detained in the Gulf during the whole monsoon to the Company's great inconvenience; and they urged that the attack on Rig was not likely to be a complete success, and that, if it even partially failed, Mir Mahanna might afterwards make a descent on Bushehr, besides attacking every British vessel bound up the Gulf. In the end however, they thought it best to leave the decision and the responsibility to Mr. Jervis, which they did by instructions dated the 25th of March; and a few days later they sent him the "Tartar" for employment, if required, both in the business of Mir Mahanna and in the "Islamabad" case. The views of the Agent and Council, as the event showed, were not

altogether incorrect; but we should rather, perhaps, deplore their apathy in regard to the suppression of Mir Mahanna, the desirability of which was better understood by the Resident at Büshehr, than regret their want of decision in not prohibiting an enterprise of which they disapproved.

May to 3rd June.

No actual movement took place until late in May, when the Persian land forces under Kuhneh Khan arrived before Rig and were joined there by some thousands of men from Karim Khān's camp at Qubbān in 'Arabistan. The allied fleet, however, was not yet ready; and a bomb which the Persians tried to throw from a mortar into the town of Rig fell among themselves and killed several persons. Though Mahanna had laid in abundant supplies at Rig, desertions from among his subjects warned him of the danger of attempting a long defence; and on the night of the 1st of June, after slaughtering such of his cattle as he could not remove, he embarked his people and their property on 17 vessels, of which 5 were Gallivats and the rest belonged to a smaller class. The next day he arrived at the Island of Khārgu, adjoining Khārag, where he landed and formed a settlement on a site that suffered from several disadvantages, being at once waterless, sandy, without shade, and destitute of forage; but he had brought plenty of provisions with him, and the Dutch, though they otherwise observed neutrality, allowed him to send his sheep to graze on the Island of Khārag. The circumstances of Mīr Mahanna at this time did not promise a prolonged resistance on his part; for, though Kuhneh Khān's forces could not reach him, a number of his people died of the extreme He himself, already blind of an eye, suffered from severe inflammation of the other and was obliged for a time to leave the arrangements for defence to subordinates, some of these being men whose ears he had previously cut off for disobedience of orders, or merely in drunken fury.

The Anglo-Persian fleet, consisting of the snow "Tartar", Captain Price, of a ship belonging to Shaikh Nāsir, of three Gallivats and of two Batīls, left Būshehr on the 4th of June to co-operate with Kuhneh Khān and anchored the same evening off Khārag: they were thus too late to prevent the escape of Mīr Mahanna from Rīg. The son of the Shaikh of Būshehr, who came in his father's ship, tried to pose as the admiral of the whole expedition; but Captain Price of the "Tartar" actually took charge of the operations. The argest of the Persian Gallivats was commanded by Mr. Natter, a writer of the Būshehr Residency, who had in his boyhood made several voyages as a naval

4th to 18th June.

cadet; and no useful service was done, in the hostilities that took place, except by the "Tartar" and by the Gallivat under Mr. Natter. During the night of the 4th of June, 5 Gallivats and a Batīl which Mîr Mahanna had caused to be drawn up on shore were set afloat again; and the next morning, when they were descried standing over towards the coast of the mainland, they were pursued by the Anglo-Persian fleet and a harmless exchange of shots took place at very long ranges; but at sunset, though still visible to the south-east, they had not been overtaken. Daybreak of the 6th of June found Mir Mahanna's vessels returned in safety and stationed between Khārag and Khārgu, while the British and Persian fleet was scattered in different directions; and the Shaikh's son had gone with two vessels to Bushehr, apparently to confer with his father and to attribute the failure of the allies to neglect of his own valuable advice by the British Commander. Captain Price and Mr. Natter, unsupported by the large Büshehr vessel, which kept carefully out of the way, then attempted a direct attack upon Mir Mahanna's craft; but these replied with so hot a fire and were so well seconded by shore batteries on Khārgu that the assailants found themselves obliged to retire, and in the afternoon they anchored again off Khārag. days of inaction followed, and on the 10th of June one of the Persian Gallivats was damaged and rendered useless by a violent storm from the north-east. On the 15th, three Gallivats and a Batil of Mir Mahanna were seen to have left Khargu, and it was conjectured that they had gone to encounter the Shaikh's son, who was believed to be on the point of returning from Büshehr. Much confusion was created during the next night by some blank firing from the Dutch guns on Khārag, which was ordered by the Governor, Mynheer Buschman, partly as a practical joke and partly to test the preparedness of his own garrison for an emergency, and was not understood by the belligerents. On the 16th an engagement between four vessels of Mir Mahanna's fleet and three belonging to that of Shaikh Nasir appeared to be imminent; but it was averted by the accidental appearance of a large British ship from Madras, which bore straight down upon the combatants in ignorance of what they were about, and so gave them an excuse-not unwelcome to either-for separating.

19th to 21st June.

On the 19th of June the Shaikh's son and the vessels that had gone to Büshehr returned to Khārag, and an endeavour was made, at Mr. Jervis' instance, to induce the Dutch to associate themselves with the British and Persians; but Mynheer Buschman would have nothing to do with the affair. On the 20th, learning that two fishing boats

belonging to Mir Mahanna's people were at Khārag, the son of the Būshehr Shaikh sent men to seize them, and this was done without difficulty, a fisherman who was in one of them being killed; but the Dutch would not allow the boats to be removed from the island, and, when the captors persisted in taking them away, opened fire with their heavy guns. One Būshehr crew succeeded in carrying off their prize; but the other brought theirs back to the beach, where, on landing, they were surrounded and mobbed by a crowd of Khārag Arabs, whom the sight of the dead fisherman had filled with indignation. The sailors on the Dutch Gallivats, however, put an end to the riot by firing indiscriminately with their muskets on the whole crowd; and Mynheer Buschman had the Būshehris arrested, and kept them in custody until the fishing boat that had been taken away was brought back.

in the Büshehr squadron, ran over to Rig with the whole fleet for the purpose of embarking Persian troops, according to a previous arrangement with Amīr Kuhneh Khān, for a descent in force on the island of Khārgu; but the Persian commander now said that he could do nothing until the 29th of June, when, the Muharram festival having passed over, 5,000 men would be available; so on the next day the allied vessels returned to Khārag. Meanwhile Mīr Mahanna, who paid a rupee to his subjects for every cannon shot of the enemy picked up and brought to him, and who had already thrown up ramparts of sand to protect his people from the frequent desultory bombardments from the sea to which they were exposed and to cover the carpenters employed in repairing his

Nothing more occurred until the 29th of June, when, after an absence lasting several days, three Gallivats and a Batīl belonging to Mīr Mahanna's fleet reappeared conducting a Gallivat that they had taken between Bahrain and Būshehr with specie and pearls on board. News of this capture had been brought to Khārag two days previously by a couple of Batīls which were with the Gallivat when she was attacked; but the smaller vessels of the Būshehr fleet at Khārag, though they were superior in strength to those of Mīr Mahanna and lay directly in their course, tamely allowed the prize to be carried past them to the northern shore of Khārgu. Captain Price immediately ordered an assault on the island of Khārgu, and himself proceeded, with the "Tartar" and

damaged vessels, made ready for the threatened descent by constructing new batteries near the most exposed points; and at the same time he even caused to be celebrated, with all the enthusiasm customary among

Shī'ahs, the anniversary of the martyrdom of Husain.

On the 22nd of June, Captain Price, who had now lost all confidence 22nd to 28th

29th June to 1st July.

the large Büshehr ship, to the help of his smaller craft; but, while his vessel and that of Mr. Natter engaged the enemy and both received damage, the Büshehris confined themselves to cruising up and down at a safe distance. From the first Captain Price had been displeased with the conduct of his allies, who systematically disregarded a code of signals that he had arranged and shunned even the appearance of danger, while the Shaikh's son even pretended that it was beneath his dignity to take orders from a European; and their behaviour on this last occasion was so unsatisfactory that on the next day Mr. Natter and some European gunners who had been distributed among the vessels of the Büshehr fleet were withdrawn, and returned partly on board the "Tartar" and partly on board a small yacht, belonging to the establishment of the British Agent at Basrah, which had taken part in the later operations.

2nd to 11th July. On the 2nd of July a small vessel of the Büshehr fleet was taken by the enemy, and another was cast on shore and lost. On the 9th of July the Agent's yacht left for Basrah in company of the "Fort William," a large English ship from Bengal which had called at Khārag; and on the 10th the fleet of Mīr Mahanna formed a junction, within sight of Khārag, with that of Salmān, the Shaikh of the Ka'ab, who like himself was at war with Karīm Khān, and who a few days later came to a rupture with the British also. On the 11th of July Captain Price announced his intention of returning to Büshehr on the following night; and, as the Shaikh's son who had neither money nor provisions left, decided to withdraw likewise, the operations came to an end. The failure was entirely due to the pusillanimous behaviour of the Büshehr *contingent; but Karīm Khān, nevertheless, seems to have considered that he had been badly treated in the matter by the British.

Relations with Karīm Khān arising out of Ka'ab affairs, 1766-67.

No sooner had this enterprise reached its unfortunate conclusion than a new train of circumstances began, of which the tendency was still further to lower the credit of the British in the eyes of the Vakīl, and at the same time to bring their interests and his into collision. Of these events, which are fully described in the history of 'Arabistān, the most important were the piratical seizure by the Ka'ab tribe in July 1765 of the "Sally" and "Fort William" and of the Agent's yacht, just mentioned; the subsequent despatch of a British armament from Bombay, at the beginning of 1766, to co-operate with a Turkish force

^{*} Such at least was the opinion of the traveller Niebuhr, who was an impartial eyewitness of the whole proceedings, and who has placed it on record that Mîr Mahanna "would inevitably have been defeated altogether, it only Captain Price and Mr. Natter had not been deserted in such a cowardly manner by the Büshehr Arabs." For his account of the operations, see his Voyage, Volume 11, pages 152—159.

in obtaining reparation from the Ka'ab; and the virtual defeat of the joint Anglo-Turkish expedition, of which the British portion sustained two serious reverses, in May and September 1766, in the neighbourhood of Dorag or the modern Fallahiyeh. Mir Mahanna had in the meanwhile, on the 1st of January 1766, expelled the Dutch from Khārag and possessed himself of that island; but after doing so, while he remained at war with the Shaikh of the Büshehr, to whom Karīm Khan about March 1766 promised further assistance, he showed no malice against the British; and the East India Company, though their employés at Büshehr wished, in the summer of 1766, to detain a cruiser for their protection against him, had not as yet to suffer from any of the embarrassments which it was in his power to create. As the Ka'ab, notwithstanding Karim Khān's expedition against them in the preceding year, were considered by the Basrah Agency to be subjects of the Turkish Government, the Vakil was not consulted before the operations against them were begun; but the Agent, Mr. Wrench, sent him a letter, to which he returned no answer, requesting him not to afford asylum in his dominions to the fugitive Ka'ab. An effort was made at the instance of the Turks, probably soon after the arrival of the British armament in March 1766, to secure the co-operation of the Shaikh of Būshehr against the Ka'ab; but, as the Shaikh made it a condition that he should again be assisted by the British against Mir Mahanna, - a condition which the Company's representatives, under instructions from Bombay, considered it impossible to grant, — nothing was arranged on these lines; nor is it probable that the Büshehr fleet would have rendered any more valuable service against the Ka'ab than it had done against Mīr Mahanna.

During the progress of the Anglo-Turkish operations in 'Arabistān, in the summer of 1766, Karīm Khān showed no signs of interest; till at length, a few days after the second British reverse on the 23rd of September, letters were received from him by both the British and the Turkish authorities. In these letters he insisted on the immediate withdrawal of the Anglo-Turkish forces from the country of the Ka'ab, whom he described as his subjects, and on whose chief he professed to have conferred the Government of Dōraq; but at the same time he promised that he would cause full satisfaction to be made to the British and to the Turks for the injuries that they had suffered at the hands of the tribes. As it was reported that Karīm Khān was greatly incensed against the British, chiefly on account of their not having enabled him to suppress Mīr Mahanna, and that he did not even

allow their name to be mentioned in his presence, the Agent and Council in October 1766 directed the Resident at Büshehr to inform him, if he asked any questions, that the British were merely the auxiliaries of the Turks in the war with the Ka'ab; and at the same time Mr. Wrench and his friends were evidently prepared, in case the Vakil's resentment should seek practical expression at Büshehr, to send vessels for the protection of the East India Company's interests there or even, if necessary, to remove the Residency altogether.

Visit of a Persian Envoy to Basrah, March— April 1767.

It is probable that the attitude of the Vakil towards the Company was by no means so hostile as their representatives at Basrah had been led to suppose, for, so far from any attempt being made to injure them, an envoy was sent by Karim Khān to Turkish 'Irāq in the person of a certain Aghasi Khan. This individual, on the 13th of March 1767, informed Messrs. Lyster and Skipp at the Turkish Government Sarāi at Basrah that he had come to insist on the restitution to the British of all the property plundered by the Ka'ab, failing which the Vakil would take suitable measures against the tribe and would hold himself responsible for the British losses, provided that an account of the same were supplied to him and one of the Company's European servants sent to explain it to him at Shīrāz, in which case other misunderstandings also would probably be removed. To this it was answered, no instructions applicable to the situation thus created having been received from Bombay, that the British had entered on the war with the Ka'ab as allies of the Turks, in whose territory the offences of the tribe had been committed, and not as principals; but that, if restitution should be brought about by the mediation of the Vakil, it would be regarded as a proof of his love of justice and of his regard for the British nation. A letter, probably to the same effect as the verbal message, was delivered by the Persian Envoy at a visit to the British Agency building on the 17th of March. After this, on the 23rd of March, the Envoy had an interview with the Ka'ab Shaikh, but his proposals for satisfaction of the British claims met with an insulting reception; and on the 8th of April, after making a final but ineffectual demand on the Ka'ab by letter, he took his departure from Basrah.

Mr. Skipp's first mission to Shīrāz, April—September 1767.

Three days after the first arrival of the Persian envoy at Basrah, a letter was received by the Agent there from the Government of Bombay, who, after carefully considering the steps to be taken in consequence of the failure of the Anglo-Turkish expedition against the Ka'ab, had come to the conclusion that the war should not be carried on by the British without allies, and that, if the Ka'ab remained obdurate and

there were no hope of a settlement being reached by the help of the Turks alone, arrangements should be made to obtain the co-operation of the Persian Vakīl. The Presidency were well aware of the disfavour with which the Court of Directors at this time regarded entangling alliances with native powers in the Gulf, but they could devise no other means of retrieving their political and commercial position in that quarter; and, though they were particularly unwilling to be drawn into operations against Mir Mahanna in the interest of Karim Khān, they thought that even these should be undertaken,-if the Vakil were to insist on them as an indispensable condition of his friendship,—on the best terms that might be obtainable from him. Their instructions to the Agent at Basrah were framed on these lines; and they recommended the immediate despatch to Shīrāz of Mr. George Skipp, one of the Council at Basrah, to conduct the negotiations. the same time they suggested the following as terms to be stipulated if assistance were promised against Mir Mahanna: that the Grant permitting a British settlement at Büshehr should be confirmed, with the addition that the Company should be at liberty to build a fort or Factory there, or at any other place in Persia, and to mount on it such guns as they might please; that a sum of R20,000 to R25,000 a year should be assigned to the Company from the Customs of Būshehr, or from some other item of public revenue, to defray the expense of their maintaining a cruiser constantly in the Gulf; that any island in the Gulf which the Company might select for the purpose should be granted to them, if they desired it, for the foundation of a settlement; that ample satisfaction should be made for the losses sustained by the British out of the booty that might hereafter be taken from the Ka'ab, the vessels of that tribe being at the same time destroyed or handed over, or full security being given that they should not again be employed against the British; that half the booty taken from Mīr Mahanna should be delivered up to the British, whatever its nature; and finally, in the event of a joint Anglo-Persian expedition against Khārag proving successful, that Mīr Mahanna should be allowed to retain possession of the island on undertaking not to cede it to any European power other than the British. It was added that, in any case, the return of British field-guns, etc., taken by the Ka'ab in war must be insisted on, and that an endeavour should be made to obtain commercial advantages in Persia, especially in regard to the trade in Gilan raw silk. According to the orders sent from Bombay, the application to Karīm Khān was not to be made until a last chance of coming to terms had been offered by the Agent and declined by

the Ka'ab; but the British authorities at Basrah considered that the proceedings of the Persian Envoy had been such as to render unnecessary, and even improper, any further correspondence with the tribe, and they therefore proceeded to act upon their instructions without delay.

Instructions of the Agent to Mr. Skipp.

The British Agent at Basrah was now a Mr. Henry Moore, whose personality was to exercise a peculiar and by no means influence upon the negotiations with Karīm Khān; and a first sign of his eccentricity appeared in the manner in which he modified the orders of the Presidency in conveying them to Mr. Skipp. In one sense Mr. Moore's interference was cautious, for he did not withhold any of the commands of the Government, and he even urged Mr. Skipp to pay due heed to them all; but at the same time he suggested that they were not of a binding nature and put forward in place of them a number of suggestions of his own, of which the principal were that the Vakīl should be pressed to co-operate for the "destruction" of the Ka'ab, or, failing that. to arrange "a firm and lasting peace between the Chaub on the one part, the Turks and us on the other," on a basis of payment of full compensation for English and Turkish losses, together with £1,00,000 on account of the expenses of the expedition equipped by the Company, and of the recognition by the Persians of the country dependent on Qubban though not of that dependent on Doraq - as subject to Turkish authority.

In short, it would appear that Mr. Skipp received virtual discretion to make the best terms that he could with Karīm Khān in respect of compensation and all other matters, and to pay as much or as little heed as he chose to the views of his superiors at Bombay. Mr. Skipp appears to have left Basrah for Būshehr, on his way to Shīrāz, about the middle of April 1767: he took with him an introduction from the Persian Envoy, special letters for Karīm Khān from the Governor of Bombay and the Agent at Basrah, and presents to the value of $\Re 10,000$. The valuation handed to him of the ships "Sally" and "Fort William" and their cargoes amounted to $\Re 3,90,930$.

Trade and other difficulties at Bushehr. It should be mentioned here that, perhaps in consequence of the enterprise against Mīr Mahanua in which Mr. Jervis had, engaged in 1765, the Court of Directors in May 1766 prohibited the Resident at Būshehr from corresponding with the Vakīl or ruler of Persia for the time being in any important matter, such as the obtaining of new settlements or grants, unless under the instructions of the Agent and Council at Basrah, and from deputing any person to represent him at Karīm Khān's court or at Shīrāz. Mr. Jervis, however, before the receipt of these orders,

had complained to the Persian Government against Shaikh Nasir of Bushehr and suggested his removal; and this step resulted, after the succession to the Residency of Mr. Bowyear, in Shaikh Nāsir's son attempting to enhance the rent of the Factory premises at Būshehr by R1,000 a year, while the Shaikh himself summoned the Residency broker to Shīrāz, merely for the purpose of inconveniencing the Resident. More serious, too, than these difficulties was the fact that British trade at Bushehr had been brought to a standstill by an embargo, imposed under Karīm Khān's orders, on the exportation of specie from Persia. were thus questions relating to Büshehr and to British trade to be adjusted by Mr. Skipp, apart from that of a settlement with the Ka'ab.

Mr. Skipp, notwithstanding that he had come to Shīrāz in a public Mr. Skipp's character and at the Vakil's own desire, was at first treated with indifference and could not obtain an interview with Karīm Khān; and at the beginning of August matters appeared to the Agent at Basrah to have reached such a pass that he had directed Mr. Skipp to leave Shīrāz at the end of that month, and had given orders that, on Mr. Skipp's arrival at Būshehr, the Resident there should remove with the Company's property to Basrah and seize, at his departure, as many vessels as possible belonging to the Vakīl, the Shaikh of Būshehr, and the Shaikh of Bahrain. The news of this contemplated rupture with the Vakil, regarding which Mr. Moore had not thought fit to consult them, reached the Bombay Government in September and filled them with consternation, for it was too late for them to take any steps to prevent it; but in the meantime affairs at Shīrāz, perhaps in consequence of Mr. Skipp's seeking to quit the place, which Karim Khan would not allow him to do, took a more favourable turn; and at length, about the middle of September, the Vakil agreed to pay R5,00,000 to the East India Company as soon as they should have equipped an expedition against Mir Mahanna, and to give them liberty to attack the Ka'ab-but without the assistance of the Turks-at such time or place as they chose. He could not be prevailed on, however, to promise that he would immediately hand over the Ka'ab fleet to the British, a condition which he professed to consider dishonourable to himself as protector of the tribe, and which, moreover, he might have found it difficult or impossible to fulfil, - and the Agent and Council at Basrah, who regarded the point as of extreme importance and refused to be satisfied with a stringent undertaking on his part that he would be answerable for the future conduct of the Ka'ab, accordingly sent him a temporising answer and referred his proposals to the Government of

negotiations and settlement at

Bombay. Mr. Moore, it would appear, had now contracted a strong prejudice against Karīm Khān, whom he described as "by far too wavering and capricious to have the least reliance on his promises;" and his own view, at this juncture, seems to have been that the British should prosecute their quarrel against the Ka'ab by main force, without recourse to alliances.

Unanthorised expedition against Hormuz and loss of the "Defiance," October—November 1767.

After the conclusion of their negotiations with Karim Khan and the reference of his proposals to higher authority in India, the Agent and Council at Basrah found themselves with a considerable and temporarily unemployed naval force at their disposal, and, looking round, they invented for it a remarkable and unauthorised application. Reverting to the "Islamabad" case of 1765, the details of which they hunted up in the records of the Agency, and to the instructions given by the Bombay Government early in 1766, in which operations for the recovery of the value of the "Islamabad's" cargo were contemplated if a favourable opportunity should present itself after the chastisement of the Ka'ab. quoting also an alleged request by Karim Khān to Mr. Skipp at Shīrāz, that the Company should undertake the reduction of Shaikh 'Abdullah of Hormuz to obedience to the Government of Persia. Mr. Moore and his colleagues decided on a showy but dangerous enterprise. It was to call upon Shaikh 'Abdullah, on account of his ex post facto connection with the "Islamabad" affair, to pay $\Re 4,00,000$ as compensation to the owners and freighters of the unfortunate vessel, R1,00,000 as damages to the East India Company, and R40,000 as a reward to the members of the expedition; to deliver up to the British, as the allies of Karīm Khān, a ship and all the Gallivats which were in his possession; and to renounce in favour of the British, or whomsoever the Vakil might nominate, his ancestral property, the island of Hormuz. plan were not likely in itself to be large enough to occupy the available vessels, satisfaction was to be demanded from the Shaikh of Chārak "for his taking our armed boat in the month of May last on her return from Masqat, for his cruelty to our people, and for his insolence in saying the English were not equal to his shoes," which satisfaction was to consist in the restoration of the boat and her cargo, valued at R10,000, in the seizure of the Shaikh's Gallivats, and in the capture of the Shaikh himself, who was to be handed over a prisoner to Kārīm Khān. The Shaikh of Qais, also, was to be called to account for his share in the "Islamabad" business; and, last but not least, Commodore Price was "ordered to take, burn, sink and destroy every fighting Gallivat he meets with during his cruise except those belonging to Meer

Mahanna." Messrs. Lyster and Bowyear (or Bawyear) were appointed to be joint managers in the expedition, and the cruiser "Defiance", bomb-vessel "Salamander", and Gallivat "Wolf" were detailed for the service.

An appalling catastrophe, the most serious that has ever befallen a British operation in the Persian Gulf, brought this ill-judged venture to a sudden end. The circumstances are fully described in the excerpt * which follows from the Basrah Agency Diary:—

Arrived the "Salamander," Bomb, commanded by Lieutenant Gage, who brings us the melancholy account of the loss of the "Defiance," Commodore Fountain Price, that ship having blown up, under the 15th November, on an expedition against Ormuse, in sight of the island of Kishmee. As the following extract from Lieutenant Gage's journal particularizes the event, it is here with melancholy transcribed.

Extract from Lieutenant Gage's Journal with respect to the blowing up of the Ship "Defiance."

Saturday, 14th. Pleasant land and sea breezes. At 4 P.M. observed the Commodore haul up with an intention of going between the island of Kishmee and the mainland; haul up after her; at 8 P.M. anchored in $\frac{1}{4}$ less (than) 4 fathom(s) by the "Defiance". At daylight the southernmost end of Kishmee south-east by east; off shore about 4 leagues.

Sunday, 15th. At 1 P.M. weighed in company with the "Defiance," launch and Trankey; steered east-north-east till 9 P.M.; then anchored by the "Defiance". At 11 P.M. the fleet weighed, wind north by east; at 1 past 1 a.m. the "Defiance" was taken aback and came to an anchor; at the same time the Commodore ordered me to stand on as long as the flood ran. At \frac{1}{2} past 2 A.M. observed something on shore of us; took it to be a large Trankey under sail; fired a shot at her to bring her to; soon after heard a great noise on board her. At 3 o'clock fired 3 shot more at her; discovered her to be a large ship at anchor; she fired several musquets at us out of her tops; we passed her about a musquet shot distance and anchored to the eastward of her within gunshot. Made the signal to the Commodore of seeing a strange ship and immediately despatched Lieutenant Kerr to the Commodore to acquaint him that we was at anchor by a strange ship. At this time the "Defiance" was at anchor, distance from us about 4 miles. Lieutenant Kerr acquainting the Commodore that we was at anchor by the ship (the Commodore) weighed and stood towards us; and we at times burned blue lights to let the Commodore see where we was. There being little wind and the tide of ebb against him, he could not get near us; and little after daylight the "Defiance" anchored, -distance from the ship about a mile and from us about 12 miles. Found with the ship 3 Gallivats and 4 armed Trankeys. At 7 o'clock Lieutenant Kerr returned, acquainting me the Commodore intended attacking the ship and board (ing) her as soon as possible, and to keep our boats manned and armed in case he should make the signal for her; all this time the ship and Gallivats making preparations. At 8 A.M. the launch with the Commodore's boats was alongside him, taking the military upon boarding the ship. At \$ past 8 saw a smoke from

^{*} For the sake of clearness the punctuation and spelling have been modified to some extent.

the "Defiance '; took it to be a gun fired from her; but to our great surprise she blew up in less than two minutes after. We were then about a mile and a half distance from her, but could not observe any men living about the wreck; indeed the explosion was so great that we could not think it was possible that there was any men saved from her. The enemy, immediately on seeing this, manued their ship and Gallivats with a number of men that was not seen before, which prevented us from getting under sail and making towards the wreck; [but,] if we had weighed, we should have dropped on board the ship, it being strong tide of ebb and no wind. At 9 P.M. observed the enemy's Trankeys under way and thought they were making for our Trankey, that had about forty sepoys in, on which the Trankey weighed and stood back again; but we soon saw the enemy's Trankey alongside the wreck getting what they could out of her. At 11 A.M. the enemy's Trankeys returned from the wreck and went on shore; soon after, the tide of flood making, and thinking it was impracticable for us to pretend to engage the enemy, they having so many vessels and such a number of men, thought it more prudent for us to make the best of our way to Gombroon road to join the "Wolf" Gallivat, who had parted company with us the 12th instant, and then to proceed to Kishmee to endeavour to water, having only one tank of water on board, and then to make the best of our way to Bussora or Bushire according as our water held out.

Monday, the 16th. Saw some Europeans on shore: sent our boat to see who they were, we being then to the eastward of the enemy about $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles. The boat soon after returned with 10 seamen, 1 solder, 10 lascars, 8 sepoys, 2 topasses, 2 servants belonging to Mr. Bowyear, 1 servant belonging to the Commodore, and a black carpenter, who informed us they were saved by being in the fore part of the ship and says the ship was blown up by the carelessness of the gunner and steward, who had a candle down in the after hold, drawing arrack off, which took fire.

The foregoing 35 men are all that were saved of 300 (or) more; there were eighty-six Europeans, military, on board; about as many European seamen; and the remainder consisted of sepoys and lascars. The gentlemen who unfortunately perished by this sad event are—

Commodore Fountain Price;
Dymoke Lyster, Soint managers on the Ormuse expedition;
Captain Lyton Leslie,
Lieutenant Wm. Robbins,
Lieutenant Melenburgh,
Richard Watkins,
James Dawling Watkins,
Michael Cummings, Surgeon;
(? Stephen) Hermit, the Bushire Linguist.

The scene of the occurrence appears to have been in the neighbour-hood of Laft, at the eastern end of Clarence Strait, but the indications of locality are far from clear.

The Government of Bombay, on learning of the accident to the "Defiance", immediately sent the "frigate "Revenge" of 28 guns, the East India Company's largest armed vessel, to replace her; but at

^{*}The "Revenge" was lost in a storm off Bombay in 1782.

the same time they expressed their surprise at what had occurred, as it was inconsistent with an assurance previously volunteered by the Agency, that they would remain "entirely inactive" until the receipt of orders from Bombay upon Karīm Khān's proposals. Another unfortunate fact in the case was that Karīm Khān, in whose name, as it were, the expedition had been undertaken, afterwards protested against it and expressed annoyance; while Mr. Skipp, in April 1768, wrote: "With respect to Shaik Abdullah the Vackeel from time of my first arrival till now has not requested our assistance against him, or indeed mentioned him to me." The Court of Directors in London, even before they became aware of the loss of the "Defiance", condemned the projected attack on Hormūz upon several grounds and ironically remarked in a letter to Mr. Moore and his associates, dated the 2nd of March 1768:

"In short, if you had met to consider of a mode to embroil our affairs it is very doubtful if you could have done it so completely as by the measures you have now taken."

In November 1767 the Bombay Government, in replying at the earliest opportunity to the communication from Basrah anent the settlement proposed by Karīm Khān, regretted that the Agent had not seen fit to close with the Vakil's offer on his own responsibility and ordered that, if the offer in question were still open, it should be immediately accepted. In that case Mr. Skipp should be sent back to Shīrāz "with the utmost expedition" to conclude a regular agreement on the subject, a letter from the Government of Bombay being in the meantime transmitted direct to the Vakil by the Resident at Bushehr. If, however, the Vakil were found to have changed his mind, the Agent might take any steps that appeared suitable for concluding the affair on a favourable footing, short only of making war on the Vakīl or forming a combination against him with Mir Mahanna or with any other person. A treaty with Karīm Khān, were such to be arranged, should fix an amount of woollens to be purchased by the Vakil from the East India Company every year and the rate at which they should be paid for; and similarly it should mention the value at which Gilan raw silk, Kirman wool, and copper would be accepted by the Company in exchange for their goods; while any offers that Karīm Khān might make in regard to Khārag should also be embodied in it.

Mr. Skipp did not, apparently, leave Basrah for Shirāz until the 7th of February 1768, or later; and in the meanwhile a fresh protest bad been entered by the Government of Bombay against a proposal by Mr. Moore to join with Mīr Mahanna against Karīm Khān, in regard

First part of Mr. Skipp's second mission to Shīrāz, February— April 1768.

7th February 1768.

to the latter of whom they remarked: "We do not recollect any one "instance of his having ever injured us, nor can we adopt the opinion "you seem to have entertained of his being an unsteady character, for "his strict adherence to his word passed the Chaub, his resolute refusal of "the present carried to him by Mr Skipp until affairs were settled, as "well as other instances of his conduct mentioned in different parts of "your advices, make him appear to us in a very different light." It was added, in the letter from the Presidency, that Khārag should be surveyed and occupied by the Company's forces, if it were captured, until the orders of the Court of Directors could be obtained; that no forcible action should be taken against the Ka'ab without the concurrence of the Vakīl; that an undertaking to keep a British guardship in the Gulf might be given, provided that the Vakīl were willing to pay the expenses of maintaining it, which according to a "calculate" would be R62,440 a year for a first rate, and R40,099 a year for a second-rate vessel; and that in any treaty concluded it should be laid down, but without direct reference to another European nation, that the British East India Company were to have an exclusive right of trading in the dominions of the Vakil.

At the time of Mr. Skipp's departure for Shirāz there were still impediments to British trade at Būshehr which, Karīm Khān intimated, could not be removed without negotiation.

14th April 1768.

On this occasion there was less delay on the part of Karim Khān in coming to terms with Mr. Skipp; and on the 14th of April 1768 the British representative was successful in obtaining from him a sealed agreement, in which, on condition of the island of Khārag being taken and Mir Mahanna being captured or killed or having his strength broken by the British, the Vakil undertook to recover 15,000 Tumans as compensation for British losses from "the Hon'ble Shaik Soleman, Chaub," to give half of the goods and the whole of the armament and vessels of Mir Mahanna to the British, and to cede to them for ever "the entire possession and dominion" of the island of Kharag. The Vakil also made himself financially responsible to the British for all depredations that might henceforth be committed on them by the Ka'ab Shaikh, whether on sea or on land; and, apart from the agreement, he promised that the field-guns taken by the Ka'ab should be returned on board the British fleet when it assembled before Khārag, gave orders for the immediate release of all prisoners by the Ka'ab, and issued a stringent injunction to the tribe with reference to their future conduct towards the British and the Turks. The removal of impediments to British trade

in Persia was deferred, however, on the plea that the Vakil had a number of points to settle with the Shaikh of Büshehr before opening the road from that place to Shīrāz, which he had closed; but it was promised in general terms that, as soon as the East India Company had given proof of being in earnest in the Khārag matter and so set at rest the doubts which Karim Khan openly avowed, their trade should have free course throughout the whole country. At one moment during the negotiations the Vakīl seemed inclined to accept the services of the Shaikhs of Būshehr and Hormūz against Mīr Mahanna, in preference to those of the British; but, after a little hesitation, he resolutely set their offers aside; and, before Mr. Skipp's departure, he accepted the presents of the East India Company, at the same time according the bearer a very favourable interview.

Steps were then taken, without further delay, to carry out the article relating to the reduction of Khārag. A considerable British armament was already present in the Gulf, the senior naval officer with the same being Commander C. Elphinstone, while the military were under the orders of Captain L. Nilson or Nelson; but so irresolute was the conduct of the leaders that the operations ended in an ignominious failure, which seemed to justify Karīm Khān's doubts of the willingness or ability of the British to execute what they had undertaken.

Unsuccessful British attack on Khārag, May 1768.

On the 19th of May 1768 a council of war was held on board the British squadron before Khārag, at which it was resolved to make a breach the next day in the north curtain of the fort, and to storm it with landing parties. On the 20th, however, there was an adverse wind, which prevented the ships from anchoring so near to the shore as had been intended; a three hours' bombardment produced no effect on the fort; the enemy stood to their guns with unexpected firmness; the grab "Bombay", the second largest vessel of the East India Company's marine, went on fire in her starboard quarter; and the attack was abandoned. In this engagement the "Revenge" and the "Bombay" suffered a good deal in their masts and rigging and received a number of shot in their hulls, while the "Revenge" had "three of her men's legs shot off," the "Bombay" had ten men wounded, some of them mortally, and the "Dolphin" schooner had one man killed. Mahanna's guns were said to be heavier than those of the squadron, which were 6 and 9 pounders only. The same evening a second council of war was held, and it was decided to postpone further operations until Karīm Khān's real intentions in regard to sending military assistance should have become known, for, if reinforcements were obtained, the

19th and 20th May. probability of success would be greatly increased, but in any case the attack was to be resumed later on. Meanwhile the "Bombay" was to carry the sick and wounded to Büshehr, "as soon as the Surgeons think the people with stumps can be moved with safety"; and a hospital was to be established there on shore under Mr. G. Birch.

29th May.

On the 29th of May, no help having yet arrived from the Vakil, active operations were again undertaken. Between 3 and 4 A.M. the boats of the squadron, manned and armed, proceeded ashore under the command of Lieutenants Dutton, Sheriff, Scott and Blair to seize and burn three of Mir Mahanna's Gallivats; but they grounded at a distance from the beach, and, as the Gallivats were seen to be hauled up high and dry, returned to the ships without making the attempt. A few hours later a party from the "Eagle," from the "Wolf" and from a store ship, which had all been lying off-Khargu since the 27th to take in water, was surprised on that island by 40 or 50 of Mir Mahanna's men and very severely handled; the island had been thoroughly reconnoitred on the previous day, but the enemy had crossed from Khārag during the night and hidden themselves in trenches in the sand. The watering party, which included four European sailors, was covered by a guard of 50 sepoys under a Sūbahdār; but these, on being attacked. mostly threw away their arms and rushed into the sea, while such of them as stood their ground were cut to pieces. A sort of panic seems to have seized the whole expedition, for, though military detachments were embarked in boats, they did not land; the bodies of the dead apparently remained where they had fallen, on shore; and the enemy on Khārgu were allowed to escape in small boats, unmolested, back to Khārag. The casualties sustained by the British in this affair were 30 in all, viz., 4 European seamen, 17 sepoys, 2 lascars and 1 Topass killed, 5 sepoys wounded, and 1 European seaman missing; and the enterprise was now altogether given up by those charged with it, on the ground that "we have by no manner of means a sufficient number to make the landing by ourselves, especially as the heats are now set in."

The Government of Bombay announced, though not until April 1769, their intention of causing an inquiry into the causes of this failure to be held; but it does not appear whether this was ever done, or, if so, with what result. The views of the Court of Directors, expressed in a letter of the 2nd March 1768, which has already been quoted above, probably reached the Agent and Council at Basrah earlier, not long after the fiasco itself: the Court reprobated the entire proceedings of the

Company's servants, so far as yet known to them, especially their tolerance of Karīm Khān's behaviour in the matter of trade; they censured the Agent and Council at Basrah for not having already withdrawn the Būshehr Residency,—a step which might have brought the Vakīl to his senses and would at least have rendered the East India Company independent of his favour in the Ka'ab and all other affairs; and they criticised and condemned the idea of attacking Mīr Mahanna, unless first attacked by bim, and of forming a settlement on Khārag, either with or without his consent.

The negotations with Karim Khān through Mr. Skipp, who was still at Shīrāz, continued for two or three months after the failure of the attack on Kharag; but there was now no longer any chance of their success, for, not only did Mr. Moore adhere to the "unaccountable antipathy" which he had conceived for Karīm Khān and even express his preference for an alliance with Mir Mahanna, but he also took a "strange personal pique and disgustto Mr. Skipp" which put an end to harmonious and effective working. On the 6th of September the Agent and Council at Basrah "came to the resolution of having nothing further to do with the Caun, his perfidious and injurious treatment of us (being) the cause of it," and sent orders to Mr. Skipp to annul all engagements and retire from Shīrāz; and this decision, notwithstanding the subsequent receipt of proposals transmitted by the Vakil before the end of August and the actual despatch by him of a force to Ganaveh opposite Kharag, which they treated as a mere blind, they absolutely refused to reconsider. Mr. Skipp, on his arrival at Basrah in October 1768, was suspended by his enemies there on a charge of breach of trust and breach of orders in commercial matters, as explained in another place, and found himself obliged to proceed to Bombay for the purpose of vindicating his character.

The failure of their representatives to arrive at an understanding with Karim Khan re-acted unfavourably, in more than one respect, upon the position of the East India Company in the Persian Gulf. On the 17th August 1768, while Mr. Skipp was still at Shīrāz, Mīr Mahanna ventured to show his anger at the recent attack on Khārag by capturing the British snow "Speedwell" at sea off Būshehr; and in October, after the recall of the mission, the Agent and Council at Basrah thought it necessary, as a precaution in case of a rupture with the Vakil, to reduce the "risque" or value of the Company's stock at Būshehr to R5,000; while at the same time they lodged a warning for upward-bound vessels at Masqat, and directed the squadron under their orders to cruise con-

Second part of Mr. Skipp's second mission to Shirāz, May — September, 1768.

Unsettled relations with the Vakil, 1768.

stantly in two divisions between Basrah and Bardistān as a check upon further piratical proceedings by Mīr Mahanna. The squadron itself was now so badly found, both in men and stores, that at one time the laying up of the smaller vessels was seriously considered as a means of providing the larger with proper complements; and eventually, a very few days before the arrival of a Persian army at Ganāveh, the bulk of the force returned to India under orders from the Basrah authorities.

British blockade of Khārag, 1769.

No serious disturbance of the status quo took place, however, until after the expulsion of Mir Mahanna from Kharag by his own subjects on the 26th of January 1769, - an event which only supplied the Company's employés in the Gulf with an opportunity of committing fresh errors of judgment. Mr. Moore and his associates seem to have supposed that Mir Mahanna had accumulated vast treasures on Khārag and that, by blockading the island and preventing the removal of the spoil to the Persian coast, they might be able to obtain compensation for recent losses from the successor of Mir Mahanna or possibly from Karim Khan, under whose authority, should there be no interference on their part, Khārag was likely to fall; but the event did not answer to their expectations. A demand made by them on the new chief of Khārag, that he should demolish his fortifications and surrender his ordnance, met with a refusal; and about the beginning of April, convinced at last of the impossibility of effectually blockading Khārag and made anxious by rumours of a possible junction of the Būshehr and Ka'ab fleets at Ganāveh under orders from Karīm Khān, they removed their vessels. Simultaneously, however, they sent vacillating orders to the naval commander "not to act offensively against the Caun, Chaub, or Meer, unless a favourable opportunity offers, whereby if he thinks he can get possession or destroy the Gallivats of both or either of the latter powers, if he can, he is by all means to attempt it ".

Withdrawal of the Bushehr Residency, 1769. The action of the Agent and Council in regard to Khārag so alarmed Mr. J. Morley, the Resident at Būshehr, who seems to have had an inkling of their intentions before they were carried out, and who foresaw a rupture with Karīm Khān as the probable consequence that early in February he took steps, on his own responsibility, for withdrawing the Residency from Būshehr; and later, notwithstanding some preliminary opposition by the local Shaikh, who had received orders from Zaki Khan commanding the Persian force sent to Ganāveh not to let the British go, and in spite of the fact that about 100 persons—some of whom were patients in hospital—had to be

embarked, the removal was successfully accomplished. The Vakil not having been able to prevent this movement, politely sent after the Resident some of his effects and of the East India Company's horses which had been left behind.

The conduct of both the Agent and Council and of the Resident in connection with these affairs, was highly disapproved by the Government of Bombay, who in April 1769 directed the Agent and Council at Basrah to assist Zaki Khan, if it were not too late, on the best terms that they could obtain from him, to take possession of Kharag. In case this should not be feasible, they must endeavour to come to a settlement with the islanders; but, at all events, they should do their utmost to prevent the restoration of Mīr Mahanna. It does not appear whether these instructions were obeyed. The Court of Directors in London, whose ear the Agent and Council at Basrah had gained by garbling—so at least the Government of Bombay believed—part of the official correspondence, held that the troubles in the Gulf were entirely due to the Presidency "having been deceived by Mr. Skipp into a confidence in Carem Caum", and themselves urged, in ignorance of what had already been done at Büshehr, the expediency of abandoning that station.

The remarks of the Court on this occasion and their policy of withdrawal from Persia were highly distasteful to the authorities at Bombay; and the Government of that Presidency were not slow to find, in a request of the Directors themselves that Gīlān raw silk should be procured, which could be done most conveniently at Büshehr, an excuse for re-opening the question of the Bushehr Residency. They were also annoyed, it would appear, by the persistent efforts of the Agent and Council to concentrate the whole of the Company's trade in the Gulf at Basrah; and their first step was to appoint a Committee consisting of Messrs. Wrench, Jervis and Martin, of whom the two first had served in the Gulf, to report whether the Basrah Agency should not be transferred to Büshehr and the establishment at Basrah reduced to the rank of a Residency. The Committee, after consulting Messrs. Morley and Skipp, who had apparently returned to Bombay, reported on the 3rd of November 1769 in favour of a fortified Factory at Büshehr. which, in their opinion, would be as secure as the existing settlement at Basrah and a great deal more advantageously placed for trade; for they believed the demand for woollens in Persia to be much larger than that in the countries served by Basrah, and they thought it not unreasonable to estimate that Karim Khan would take two or three lakhs of rupees worth of woollen goods from the Company every year, provided that

Orders of the Bombay Government and Court of Directors, 1769.

Efforts of the Bombay Government to re-establish the Büshehr Residency, 1769-1770. taw * silk were accepted from him in payment; whereas, under the existing system, Persian merchants were obliged to visit Turkish territory, which they disliked doing, in order to make their purchases at Basrah, and could not offer as high prices there, on account of the expenses of the journey, double customs, etc., as if the goods were delivered to them at Büshehr.

Meanwhile anxious enquiries were made from the Commanders of the "Expedition" and "Fancy" at Bushehr, on behalf of the Shaikh. whether the British intended to re-settle at that part, and the local merchants would gladly have bought cloth, had there been any on board the cruisers; but the Agent and Council adhered firmly to their plan of sending nothing to Bushehr and of so compelling the Persian trade to come to Basrah. In September 1769, in order to avoid giving offence to Karīm Khān, who was then at war with the Imām of Masqat, the Basrah Agency decided not to arrange a special convoy for the 'Omāni coffee fleet to enable it to reach Basrah: this decision, which was contrary to their own inclinations, was adopted in obedience to the spirit of orders which they had received from Bombay. In 1770 the Governor of Bombay in Council directed the Agent at Basrah to reply to Sheikh Nāsir, who had written inviting the British to return to Bushehr, that, if the Vakil wished to see the Residency re-established and would cause a letter to this effect to be sent to the Agent, a European gentleman would be deputed to discuss the matter with him. It was intended, in the event of this proposal being accepted, to send Mr. Morley to Shiraz with the same instructions — except those relating to Khārag-as Mr. Skipp had received on his last mission, and to demand the restoration of the "Speedwell" and her cargo, which had been taken by Mīr Mahanna in 1768.

Return to Bushehr prohibited by the Court of Directors, August 1770. The Agent and Council at Basrah, however, were able to delay compliance with these unpalatable orders by representing that they had no suitable present to send Karīm Khān and no trustworthy Linguist to accompany Mr. Morley, and that Shaikh Nāsir himself was really indifferent on the subject; and their dilatory tactics were crowned with success, for, in August 1770, a peremptorily worded despatch of the Court of Directors was transmitted overland from London to Basrah, with the utmost haste, conveying these orders: "We hereby prohibit "you in the strictest manner, not only from re-establishing Bushire, but "from forming any other settlement in the Persian dominions without our

^{*} Karim Khān was said to receive a part of the revenue of Gilan and other districts in raw silk.

"express permission. And if, contrary to our expectations, you should "have undertaken either the one or the other, we in this case require "and direct you forthwith to withdraw such settlement." The Directors considered that the expenses of maintaining a Residency in Persia — even apart from the risk, which, as the idea of a fortified Factory was in their opinion absurd, they thought must be considerable-were likely more than to counterbalance the better prices that might be obtained for woollens at Büshehr, besides which the competition of the new settlement would injure Basrah; and they remarked particularly on an admission made by the Bombay Committee, that one-third of the woollens sold at Basrah already found their way to Persia.

In the autumn of 1770 the general outlook was so peaceful that it Serious was reported from Basrah that two cruisers would be amply sufficient for the service of the Gulf; and friendly overtures for the settling of a British Factory at Rig were received from Husain Khan, the successor of Mīr Mahanna. But this favourable aspect of affairs was deceptive and of short duration. On the 22nd of June 1771 three Gallivats belonging to Kharag took possession, off Kangun, "of the Britannia, an English " Snow from Bombay, laden with Sugar, Iron, Spices, etc., belonging to "Mr. Shaw, and of a country Ketch from Gogo under English colours, "laden with Cotton and Gruff, besides a Botalla Ketch and Sundry boats "from Muscat." The news of this affair reached the Basrah Agency on the 9th of July; and, on the 12th, Commodore Ince was sent with the "Resolution," "Expedition" and "Dolphin" to obtain intelligence and to deliver to the chief of Khārag a letter from the Agent demanding restitution. If this letter failed of its effect, the Commodore was to recover the vessels taken and capture the piratical Gallivats, if possible; otherwise he was to arrange for convoying British upward-bound vessels from Masqat to Basrah, and, if his doing so would serve any useful purpose, to watch the island of Khārag. At the time of Commodore Ince's visits to Khārag and Rīg, the latter of which was paid on the 14th of July, the pirates had not yet returned home with their prizes; and, after sending a Linguist on shore at Rig with the letter for Husain Khān and receiving a satisfactory answer to the same, he returned to Basrah on the 26th or 27th of July with the "Expedition" and "Dolphin," having made no arrangements for the protection of British trade above Masqat. On the 27th of July the "Britannia" and the Gogo Ketch arrived at Rig from Bahrain, where they had been detained in the meanwhile by strong north-westers; but the "Britannia" grounded on a bank and was seriously damaged by rough weather before

piracy by Khārag and other boats on British and other vessels June 1771.

she floated again with the tide; and more than half of her cargo had already been disposed of by the pirates on the Arab side of the Gulf. The treatment of the captured crews was inhumane, and while at Rīg they could hardly obtain the least shelter from the sun or the commonest necessaries of life. On the 1st of August, under orders from Karīm Khān, Captain Shaw and Mr. Nicholson, the first officer of the "Britannia," left for Shīrāz, where they were to be examined concerning the ship's cargo; but the former, as it was afterwards stated, expired on the way. Mr. Rowe, the second officer, and part of the crew were sent by Husain Khān in boats direct to the Agency at Basrah; while the remainder, except a few lascars, arrived safely at the same place on the 16th of August, having made the journey viá Būshehr, where they were well treated by the Shaikh.

Punitive expedition proposed by the Agent and Council at Basrah.

Husain Khan had verbally assured the Linguist, during the stay of the latter at Rīg, that Karīm Khan and the Shaikh of Būshehr were the persons really responsible for the late piracies, and that he himself, though his vessels were involved, wished to be friends with the British and would even make over the island of Khārag to them on condition of receiving their protection; but in his letter to the Agent he asserted Karīm Khan's innocence as well as his own and laid the whole blame for the incident on the "Britannia", which he falsely accused of having attacked the Gallivats first, so compelling them to capture her in selfdefence. In the same missive he gave a formal promise, which he did not afterwards see fit to redeem, that he would deliver up "Britannia" immediately on her arrival at Rig. The Agent and Council at Basrah, partly relying on the verbal statement of this unreliable Khān, contradicted though it was by his own written communication, and interpreting in a unfavourable sense the presence of three agents of the Vakil at Rig, the summons which Captain Shaw and Mr. Nicholson received to appear at Shīrāz, and the failure of Karīm Khān to answer at once a letter which the Agent had written him enquiring whether the piracies were committed by his orders, informed the Court of Directors in London that there was not a doubt of Karīm Khān's complicity, and suggested to the Government of Bombay the despatch of a large mixed force to the Gulf for the purpose of punishing the Vakil and of extirpating the pirates by whom the Gulf had begun to be infested. These objects, they thought, could be effected by a squadron consisting of a large ship for battering, of one or more first and second rates, of a bomb vessel, and of ten or twelve small craft to pursue Gallivats in shoal water, the whole carrying a land force of 500 Europeans

at least, a train of artillery, and 1,500 to 2,000 sepoys. The modus operandi which they proposed was a sudden raid into the Gulf, either with or without the assistance of the Imām of 'Oman, in the course of which the Hormuz, Bushehr, Khārag and Ka'ab fleets should be destroyed in succession, to the estimated number of a dozen Gallivats, 7 or 8 Gallivats and 2 ships, 10 Gallivats, and 14 or 15 Gallivats respectively, exclusive of armed boats. They also contemplated the ravaging or seizing of islands, ports, and other places in the Gulf that either yielded revenue to Karīm Khān or afforded refuge to pirates.

When this scheme came to the knowledge of the Court of Directors in November 1771, they wrote at once to their servants at Basrah to prohibit its execution, for they considered that the cost of the operations would be altogether out of proportion to the advantages which the Company derived from their trade with the Persian Gulf; their orders were that recourse should be had to negotiation rather than to force of arms, and that, if pacific means in the end proved ineffectual, an application for protection and assistance should be made by the Bombay Government to the Officer Commanding His Majesty's Ships in the East Indies. In the meanwhile, if insecurity continued, a rendezvous should be established at Masqat and convoys arranged between that place and Basrah. So far as can be ascertained, no further steps were taken in the matter.

In the spring of 1773, in circumstances which are described in the history of Turkish Irāq, Mr. Moore and his Council decided on leaving Basrah because of an epidemic of plague then raging; and in the passage down the Shatt-al-'Arab, the "Tyger," one of their two vessels, having become separated from the other, was captured on the 26th of April by Gallivats from Rīg, Messrs. John Beaumont and George Green of the Basrah Agency, who were on board of her, being at the same time taken prisoners. During the following summer Mr. Moore and most of his staff were at Bombay; but a member of the Agency, Mr. Abraham, with Mr. Collings as assistant, was apparently left at Masqat with orders to proceed to Būshehr, where he was to keep himself informed of the sanitary state of Basrah. He was also to endeavour to obtain the restitution of the "Tyger" and the release of Messrs. Beaumont and Green, who had been sent at once to Shīrāz and were detained there by

the Vakil; but in consequence of recent strict orders from Bombay against forcible action in dealing with any of the powers in the Gulf, he was expressly warned not to let the commander of his cruiser take the offensive against Native Gallivats "unless they should approach

Punitive expedition vetoed by the Court of Directors, November 1771.

Continued misunders tanding with Karim Khān, capture of the "Tyger" and detention of Mesars. Beaumont and Green, 1773-1775.

nearer than prudence will allow, and he thinks their intention is to attack him." According to information which reached the Agent at Masqat on his return to the Gulf in November 1773, Karim Khān had taken a part of the valuables found on board the "Tyger" for himself and caused a part to be given to the captors a reward, had directed the commanders of the Gallivats to prosecute hostilities against the British, and had ordered the conversion of the "Tyger" into a Gallivat: but this report, which was not corroborated by Karīm Khān's subsequent attitude, may not have been entirely correct. Messrs. Beaumont and Green themselves wrote from Shīrāz that they had applied to the Vakīl for their liberty and had received a temporising reply; but they were silent in regard to the nature of their treatment. This, however, was afterwards ascertained to have been good after reaching Shīrāz, where they were allowed seven rupees (then worth seventeen shillings and sixpence) a day for their expenses, had a house of their own and full liberty to walk about as they pleased, and were treated with kindness and respect by the inhabitants. The only thing taken from them was Mr. Green's watch, which Karim Khan kept for himself.

Visit of the Basrah Agent to Bandar Abbās, December 1773.

The returning Agency Staff, on their way up the Gulf in December 1773, visited Bandar 'Abbās and Būshehr. Shaikh Mahmūd, the Governor of Bandar 'Abbās, was absent on a visit to Shīrāz; but an exchange of amenities took place between the Agent and the Shaikh's son, the latter even going so far as to offer the former Dutch Factory to the British in case they wished to settle again at Bandar 'Abbās. From this place a letter, written by Mr. Latouche under Mr. Moore's orders and containing a message for the Vakīl, was despatched to the address of Messrs. Beaumont and Green.

Visit of the Basrah Agent to Bushehr, December 1773. On arrival at Büshehr, a few days later, a letter from the Governor of Bombay to Karīm Khān was handed to Shaikh Nāsir for transmission; but, as no competent Persian writer could be obtained on the spot, it had to be sent without a covering communication from the Agent,—an omission for which the Shaikh was asked to make the proper apologies. While Mr. Abraham went on shore to arrange this business, a Persian merchant named *Āgha Kachīk, the factotum of the Shaikh Būshehr, remained on board the "Revenge," where he purchased a large quantity of sugar on behalf of his employer, himself, and others. At the time of this visit to Būshehr, the captured British vessel "Tyger," along with the Rīg fleet and three Gallivats and an old ship belonging to Būshehr, was lying near Kangūn in readiness to proceed on a cruise against the

Imām of Masqat; but the Ka'ab Shaikh could not be induced to send the naval contingent which was demanded of him; and the expedition never sailed.

The communication made to Karīm Khān had no immediate beneficial effect, for, after the arrival of the Agent and Council at Basrah. he still detained Messrs. Beaumont and Green at Shīrāz; but he apparently still gave them an allowance for their maintenance and made no objection to their corresponding with their friends. At the beginning of February 1774 they wrote that it was the intention of the Vakīl to demand naval aid from the British and the Turks against the Imam of Masgat and, in event of a refusal, to send a force to destroy Basrah, This report, as it agreed with information received from an independent source, caused some uneasiness to the Agent and Council; and the Turkish Mutasallim had some difficulty in persuading them, on the ground that their action might cause a panic at Basrah, not to place the Company's goods on board ship, even for the purpose of facilitating a speedy removal in case such should become necessary. At the beginning of March some correspondence was in progress between the Basrah Agency and the Vakīl; but, according to a letter from Messrs. Beaumont and Green, which was closed at Shīrāz on the 5th and received at Basrah on the 19th of that month, Karim Khan had no intention of releasing them, and was determined on the contrary to treat all British subjects and ships as those of a hostile power until his demand for naval assistance against Masqat should have been conceded. In their opinion, the pacific policy so far pursued towards the Vakil had only emboldened him to regard the East India Company as timid and of no account.

Only a few days later, however, it was reported that Shaikh Nāsir of Būshehr, who for the moment was in high favour with Karīm Khān, was on his way to Būshehr to negotiate, as a plenipotentiary from Karīm Khān, with the Imām of 'Omān; that he was bringing Messrs. Beaumont and Green with him; and that he had written to his brother, Shaikh Sa'dūn, to prepare the British Residency building at Būshehr for the reception of the two gentlemen: it was surmised that their release from detention at Shīrāz was due either to Shaikh Nāsir himself, who was anxious to see a British Factory re-established at Būshehr, or to "Coja Sarguise," an Armenian merchant of "most execrable character," but possessing an unaccountable influence at Shīrāz, to whom the Agent had promised a reward of £5,000 in case of his exerting himself successfully in the case. No further concession, however, could be obtained from

Continued detention of Messrs. Beaumont and Green at Shiraz, 1774.

Transfer of Messrs. Beaumont and Green to Bushehr, March 1774. Karīm Khān at this time; and fresh recruits, among whom the Shaikh* of Chārak was conspicuous, were constantly being added to the number of the piratical Arab chieftains in the Persian Gulf; while Shaikh Nāsir apparently, on his arrival at the coast, gave himself up entirely to the task of arranging a settlement with the ruler of Masqat. In these circumstances the Agent and Council, without obtaining the instructions of their superiors at Bombay, endeavoured to put pressure on Karīm Khān by arranging for a boycott of his ports by all British vessels; and it is clear that, but for strict injunctions by the Bombay Government against bringing about an unauthorised rupture, they would have proceeded to make seizure of a large quantity of Persian property carried by a British vessel, "The Four Friends."

Release of Mr. Green, September 1774.

On the 17th August 1774 Shaikh Nasir returned to Bushehr from a journey to the southward which he had undertaken in connection with the Perso-'Omāni difficulty, but which had not included as at first intended,—perhaps because it was known that the demand of the Vakil for tribute would be regarded as merely insulting, -an interview with a representative of the Imam at Khor Fakkan; and Messrs. Beaumont and Green then reminded him of a promise that he had made of sending them to Basrah immediately on his return. The Shaikh at first refused to treat them otherwise than as prisoners, alleging as the reason his fear of Karīm Khān's displeasure; but at length he decided to make them the medium of overtures to the Agency on his own behalf, and even to allow Mr. Green to be the bearer of his proposals, in which capacity that gentleman reached Basrah on the 19th of September following. The terms of settlement suggested by the Shaikh were that, on condition of a European gentleman or an Armenian merchant being posted provisionally to Büshchr as Resident and the trade with that place re-opened, the "Tyger" and her stores should be returned to the British, the Shaikh should undertake the responsibility for any piracies that might be committed on them in future by the Rīg or Ganāveh fleets, and Mr. Beaumont should be set at liberty. These conditions were declined by the Agency, who had received orders from Bombay not to enter into any arrangement "till the release of Messrs. Beaumont and Green was absolutely effected"; but they were confident that perseverance in that policy, to which and to the commercial boycott of Büshehr they attributed the advances now made by Nāsir Khān, was the means "most likely to procure with credit the enlargement of Mr. Beaumont likewise"; and it was not, apparently, considered necessary for Mr. Green to return into formal captivity at Büshehr.

^{*} The Shaikh of Chārak was hardly a new recruit, but there had been no complaints of his behaviour since 1767.

The Government of Bombay, who were heartily tired of the disagreement with Karim Khan and of its direct and indirect consequences,—in particular the frequent and prolonged detention in the 1775. Gulf, at a heavy cost, of the Company's armed vessels, the imprisonment of Mr. Beaumont, and the prevalence of piracy,-resolved in February 1775 to bring all these troubles to an end, if possible, by a change both of measures and of men. They accordingly authorised Mr. Robert Garden, who had previous experience of the Gulf and was now proceeding on private business to Basrah, to take up the question of Mr. Beaumont's release on his way at Büshehr, and, if he found that it could not be effected nor security restored in the Gulf by any other means, to re-establish the Büshehr Residency on a small scale, notwithstanding that this was in direct opposition to the orders of the Court of Directors. At the same time they strictly enjoined the Agent and Council at Basrah to give effect to any arrangement into which Mr. Garden might enter under these instructions.

Rupture of the Basrah Agency with the Ka'ab and

the Shaikh

of Bushehr, March-April

Mission of Mr. Garden.

February

Before Mr. Garden could arrive, however, and open relations with Karīm Khān through Būshehr, a crisis had occurred at Basrah, as more fully explained in the history of Turkish Iraq, which brought the Agency into direct conflict with some of the Vakīl's subjects or subordinate allies. A Persian invasion of 'Iraq which had long been threatened was now, in consequence of a defeat inflicted by the Turks on the Persians in Kurdistan, actually carried out; and on the 7th of April 1775, on the very day of Mr. Garden's reaching Büshehr, a large force that had recently crossed the Ottoman frontier under the command of Sadiq Khān, Karīm Khān's brother, commenced to besiege Basrah. three weeks earlier Mr. Moore and his Council, had imprudently allowed the Company's vessels under their orders to attack a fleet of Ka'ab Gallivats as it was pushing up the Shatt-al-'Arab to join the Persian army near Qurnah; this was done with considerable success; and the Agent then wrote to Mr. Beaumont at Büshehr to send any cruiser that might call there to his assistance with the utmost despatch. On the 11th of April, however, dismayed by the approach of a large Persian fleet of some 60 sail up the river towards the already invested town, the Agent and his Council changed their minds and hurriedly left Basrah with their vessels, abandoning the whole of the Company's property there to its fate. As if further to embroil matters, the British squadron in descending the Shatt-al-'Arab become partially engaged, near the mouth of the Kārūn, with the ascending Būshehr fleet, which was commanded by Shaikh Nasir; and firing continued for some hours, but without material damage to either side. . 124 A

Continued negotiations of Mr. Garden with the Persians, April 1775.

Mr. Garden, being informed of what had occurred at Basrah up to the time of the British attack on the Ka'ab Gallivats, very judiciously decided not to proceed any further on the way to Basrah with his cruiser and the three unarmed vessels that accompanied it, whereby he would have endangered property of the East India Company and of private merchants to the amount of about R20,00,000, but rather to avert the trouble which might otherwise spring from the rash proceedings of the Agent and Council by concluding, with the least possible delay, a general settlement with Karīm Khān. Accordingly, on the 11th of April, he despatched a letter to Karim Khan, explaining his mission: and Shaikh Sa'dun and the local Persian merchants did not hesitate to assure him of a favourable answer,-" as the Khan has nothing more at "heart than the establishment of an English Factory in his dominions; "and that he could think of no other means of effecting it than by the "detention of Mr. Beaumont, not chusing to make any further overtures "to Mr. Moore, against whom he was highly incensed; and Shaikh "Nassir, in a conversation he had with Mr. Beaumont the night before "his departure, assured him that Mr. Moore's obstinacy had been the "cause of the present war, for, had the English colours been hoisted "at Bushire, the present expedition would not have taken place." On the 15th of April, the fugitive Agent and his Council having arrived at Bushehr with news of all that had occurred up to the 11th, Mr. Garden wrote a second letter to Karim Khān, asking him to order his general at Basrah to take all possible care of British property there; and at the same time he addressed Shaikh Nasir of Bushehr, who was still with the Persian forces, in a similar sense.

Satisfactory settlement with Mr. Garden, 24th April 1775. On the 24th of the month a satisfactory reply was received from the Vakīl, laying the blame for the disagreement between the British and the Persians entirely on Mr. Moore, and promising the restoration of the "Tyger" on her return from Basrah, against which she had been sent; Messrs. Beaumont and Green were declared to be released; and on the 26th the Union Jack was hoisted once more over the British Factory at Büshehr, where Mr. Garden had taken up his residence. As Shaikh Nāsir, moreover, received with joy the news of Mr. Garden's arrival at Büshehr, protesting that his friendship for the British had not been diminished even by the fracas in the Shatt-al-'Arab, and as the question of the damage inflicted on the Ka'ab fleet by the British cruisers at Basrah never afterwards came into discussion, Mr. Garden's settlement may fairly be regarded as complete and satisfactory. It ushered in a short period of pleasant and harmonious relations with the central

Persian Government which was terminated only by the death of Karim Khān.

When Basrah, on the 16th of April 1776, at length surrendered to the Persians, Mr. Garden and Mr. Moore had apparently both returned to India; Mr. Beaumont was in charge of the Bushehr Residency, to which on his release he had been appointed by Mr. Garden; a Mr. Galley had gone to Basrah to look after the interests and property of the East India Company there, in an informal manner; and the rest of the Agency Staff, at the head of whom was now Mr. Digges Latouche, were watching events from Bushehr. Mr. Galley having been well received at Basrah by Sādiq Khān, who on the 20th of April placed him in possession of the British Factory building, Mr. Latouche decided to return to Basrah with as little delay as possible; and on the 5th of May, after being detained at Bushehr for some time by adverse winds, he and his party sailed for Basrah in a native vessel, taking with them handsome presents for Sādiq Khān and Skaikh Nāsir of Būshehr, the latter of whom was still at Basrah with his fleet and had shown a good disposition towards Mr. Galley.

Anglo-Persian relations during the occupation of Basrah by the Persians, 1776-1779.

Early in June 1776 the Agent and his Council were able to report that the Factory had been successfully re-established, that the Persians seemed very well disposed towards them, and that everything promised well for the future. About the same time the assembled Persian fleets were dispersed, and the commanders returned with their vessels to their own ports, Shaikh Nasir reaching Bushehr upon the 30th of June.

June 1.776.

The administration which the Persians had set up in Basrah was, however, as explained in the history of Turkish 'Iraq, far from satisfactory; in September 1776 the Agency found themselves subjected to severe restraint; and in February 1777 the behaviour of the Persian Governor, 'Ali Muhammad Khān, was such that it obliged them to shut themselves up in the Factory and to appeal by letter to Karīm Khān at Shīrāz. This protest on their part was eminently successful, for not only did the Governor at once make advances to them, which they thought it advisable to disregard until their letter should have been answered, but the Vakil, on becoming aware of the situation at Basrah, sent stringent orders to 'Ali Muhammad Khan to show the utmost respect for the British and wrote a cordial letter to Mr. Latouche, received by that gentleman on the 17th of March 1777. In June 1777 another advantageous Farman was granted to the Agent by Karim Khan.

September March 1777.

The Court of Directors in London, when in 1777 news, reached them Proposed of the difficulties by which the Company's servants at Basrah were carried

into

administrative position of the Bushehr Residency, 1777---79.

effect, in the surrounded, but not as yet of the success of the Agent's application to Karīm Khān, decided to abolish their establishment in Turkish 'Irāq altogether; and for this purpose they recommended that the Basrah Agency should first be transferred with Karīm Khān's consent to Büshehr, and after a suitable interval be reduced in strength until only one servant remained, the property in whose charge should never exceed R10,000 at one time; but, if Basrah were afterwards to revert to the Turkish Government, a Resident might be posted there again, not however without the previous sanction of the Court. These orders. dated 4th July 1777, did not reach Bombay until the 30th April in the following year, nor were steps taken by the Bombay Government to put them into effect before the 2nd of August 1778, when, in view of the probability of a war with France and the consequent necessity of maintaining a news-forwarding station at Basrah, as also of the desirability of having two servants in the Gulf, the one to replace the other in case of accident, they resolved on their own responsibility so far to modify the instructions of the Court as for the time being to maintain two separate and independent Residencies, consisting of one post each, at Basrah and Büshehr respectively. Mr. Latouche was to have the choice of the two, and the one which he did not take was to be offered in succession to Mr. Beaumont and to Mr. Green. delay occurred at Basrah, in the execution of those orders, and at some time in the winter of 1778-1779 a revolution took place there, bringing the town once more under the jurisdiction of the Ottoman Government. upon which Mr. Latouche considered himself justified in referring the matter back to Bombay for fresh orders. In the meantime he retained his status as Agent and kept Mr. Abraham with him as his Assistant.

Events at Rig and Khārag, 1763-79.

In the preceding sections we have dealt fully with the affairs of the Persian Coast in so far as they had a bearing on British policy and action, but it remains to notice some events of more exclusively Persian or local interest which occurred at certain important places.

The history of Rig and Khārag relates, during the first years of this period, principally to the doings of Mir Mahanna, the piratical chief of Rig who expelled Mr. Wood from Rig in 1756, as mentioned in the

Unsuccessful endeavours of the Vakil to reduce Mir

Chapter on the general history of the Persian Gulf, and to whom it has frequently been necessary to refer in the earlier sections of the present chapter also. On some occasion between 1756 and 1764, Mir Mahauna, who for a short time in 1755 or 1756 had been imprisoned at Shīrāz, fell again into the hands of Karim Khan; but owing to the good offices of the ruler of Tangistan, to whom one of his sisters was married, his second captivity also was of short duration. He persisted, however, in his opposition to Karim Khan, committed raids by which caravans passing between Büshehr and Shīrāz were seriously endangered; and he once defended his town of Rig with success, when it was attacked by the Vakil with a large force on the landward side. His relations with his neighbours, the Shaikh of Büshehr on the one side and the Ka'ab Shaikh on the other, were generally unfriendly. In 1764 Karim Khān made a formal demand for tribute, which Mir Mahanna rejected with contempt, causing the beard of the messenger to be shaved, whereupon the Vakil declared war against him and sent a force down to the coast to undertake land operations against Rig under the command of Amīr Kuhneh Khān. From February to May 1765 the Khān remained encamped at Khurmuj, endeavouring to obtain from the local maritime chiefs that naval assistance which he saw to be indispensable for the success of his campaign; but except from the Shaikh of Bushehr, whose relations with Mir Mahanna were hostile and the prosperity of whose town depended on its connections with Shīrāz, but whose fleet could not alone deal with that of Mir Mahanna, he was unable to secure any; and so distrustful of his intentions were the people of Kangun in particular, who like Mīr Mahanna paid no tribute to the Vakīl, that they were said at this time to sleep every night on board of their vessels. At the end of May 1765, when British naval aid had at last been promised, Kuhneh Khān marched against Rīg; but Mīr Mahanna almost immediately evacuated it and withdrew to Khargu, whereupon there ensued the abortive Anglo-Persian attempts at crushing him which have been described above in an earlier paragraph. After the break-up of the joint expedition, in July 1765, the Persian forces remained for some time in occupation of Rig. In the month of August following, Mir Mahanna caused two of his own sisters to be drowned in the sea, apparently because the Ka'ab Shaikh, whom he disliked, had demanded one of them in marriage for a son and he considered this the most convenient way of evading the request. Mīr Mahanna, who was at this time still under 30 years of age, had already destroyed his own first-born child by causing it to be exposed to the sun upon the sea beach, his only reason for doing so being that it was a daughter and not a son.

Mahanna of Rīg to obedience, 1764-65. The Dutch oettlement sn Khārag under Mynheer Buschman, 1768-65.

The Vakīl Karīm Khān, early in his reign, several times called on the Dutch to pay tribute on account of Khārag; but so uncompromising was the answer invariably returned that by 1765 he had ceased to refer to the subject. During the prolonged attack made by British and Bushehr vessels on Mîr Mahanna at Khārgu, in the early summer of 1765. Mynheer Buschman observed strict neutrality and kept the port of Kharag open to both sides. This was the period of the celebrated Niebuhr's visit to Khārag, where he remained as the guest of the Dutch from the 31st of May to the 31st July 1765; and an interesting account of the place as it then was, with its fort and garden, warehouses, caravansarai, bazaar, and town of stone-built houses and mat huts, as well as of its Dutch, Armenian, Hindu, Persian and Arab inhabitants and their mode of life, is given in his writings. The residences of the Dutch were provided with Sardabs, or cool cellars for summer use, which in some cases were fitted with Badgirs or ventilators; but there was no proper European church, either Protestant or Catholic, and the only minister of religion that ever visited Khārag was a Carmelite priest from Būshehr. Outside the town the Armenians had a pretty little church with a bell,—a rare feature in those countries.

Protest by the Dutch Governor of Khārag against British Proceedings at Bandar 'Abbās, 1764. A belated protest was made by the Dutch Governor of Khārag, in August 1764, against a part of the proceedings of the British in their retirement from Bandar 'Abbās in the previous year. It was addressed to the British Agent at Basrah and was couched in the following terms:—

SIE.

You will not take amiss by this present my giving you a detail of the irregular conduct and of the violence committed by the English gentlemen at Bunder Abassy against our Factory, under pretence of driving out the Persians who had retired there. You surely, Sir, are not ignorant that they did not fear breaking open the doors with hatchets, also the windows, as well as burning the platforms on which were formerly cannon; in a word their committing all manner of hostilities in the Factory, not even sparing the effects of the Inspector of said Factory, J. Jacob Christanus, and by which means he was deprived of all he possessed, and the Factory rendered entirely defenceless and that to the scandal of our Company. I come, therefore, Sir, by this present to protest to you, a Chief of the English Company in the Persian Gulph, and my (P me) representing the Dutch Company, against all those attempts and violences committed by your nation against the goods and honour of our Company, and pretend to an entire indemnity for all the wastes and losses our Company and the Inspector of the Factory have suffered on the occasion:

Sign'd without compliment,

CARRACK 29th August 1764.

W. BUSCHMAN.

To this letter the British Agent replied that he had no personal knowledge of the facts, and he returned the document, advising the

Dutch Governor that it should be submitted to the Government of Bombay. Nothing more was apparently heard of the matter, which had arisen through a complaint made by the Inspector Christanus mentioned in the protest, and in regard to which Mynheer Buschman was careful to explain, in a covering letter, that he only acted under instructions from the Supreme Council in Batavia.

At the end of July 1765 Mynheer Buschman, who had applied for leave of absence on the ground of health, was relieved by a Mynheer van Houting, a gentleman of ability, well connected in Holland, but altogether ignorant of the languages and the politics of the Gulf. Mynheer Buschman had recommended a German named Tamm or Temm 1765. who had come to Khārag as a private soldier and had risen by merit to a clerkship and finally to the position of Second, to act as his locum tenens; but the Council in Batavia, though prepared to grant Tamm some substantial advantages, would not give him the Chiefship; and he having become aware of this, but not of the special arrangements which it was intended to make in his favour, gave way to despair and blew his brains out before the arrival of Mynheer van Houting.

Disastrons defeat of the Dutch on

Khārgu by Mir Mahanna.

October

1765.

The Dutch settlement on Khērag

under Mynheer van

Houting,

In the month of September 1765, Mir Mahanna, who still occupied Khārgu and only a few of whose people had as yet returned to Rig, gained a victory over his enemy Shaikh Nāsir and proceeded to blockade Bushehr, insisting that the Dutch also should suspend their trade with that port. On the 9th of October Mynheer van Houting, who was unwilling to submit to the dictation of a savage, sent two large Indiamen and three Gallivats against Khārgu; and the Shaikh of Būshehr, delighted at the turn of events, hastened with his fleet and a considerable land force to join the Dutch. The Dutch burned one of Mīr Mahanna's Gallivats and destroyed two others, but after this they could do him no more damage from the sea, for he had carefully fortified his position "and, so to speak, almost buried himself in the ground." At length the allies decided on a landing; and, as their disembarkation was not opposed, they quickly reached the houses of the inhabitants, where they all, even the Dutch European troops, gave themselves up to plunder. Mir Mahanna, seeing the invaders scattered and disorganised, suddenly attacked them with a body of cavalry, of which the existence even had not been suspected, and drove them into the sea with heavy loss. On the part of the Dutch 70 Europeans were killed, while about a dozen escaped, wounded, by swimming off to the ships; and the Shaikh of Büshehr was said to have lost 200 men. The Dutch were so weakened by this disaster that they found themselves obliged to return to Khārag

and to prepare, by throwing up new batteries, for the defence of the place.

Capture of the Dutch settlement on Khārag by Mīr Mahauna, 1st January 1766.

Mir Mahanna was not slow to follow up his success by invading the The transportation of his troops from Khārgu Island of Khārag. across the intervening strait was so arranged that the larger Dutch vessels could not be used to prevent it; and ultimately the Dutch with a fighting force of about 200, including a considerable proportion of Europeans, found themselves besieged in the town of Khārag by 500 men under Mir Mahanna. About midnight on the 31st December 1765, after a thirteen days' siege, the Arabs escaladed the town wall and took possession of one of its bastions; "and the next morning, though there" "were above 60 or 70 Europeans in the Fort, they delivered it up on "condition of retiring in safety to what place they chose, not having had "above 8 or 9 men killed and wounded." This final surrender, otherwise inexplicable, seems to have been due to the treacherous seizure of Mynheer van Houting and his suite by Mir Mahanna at an interview in the Fort, to which, on the advice of a Persian confidential agent of the Governor, they had been admitted for the purpose of discussing terms; and the circumstance that the military commandant, an altogether inexperienced officer from Batavia, was taken prisoner along with the Chief makes this explanation appear in itself sufficient. Two of the Dutch Company's ships, which had been lying in the roadstead during these occurrences, set sail down the Gulf immediately upon the flag of truce being hoisted on the Fort; but the Governor sent a boat after them with orders for one to return and convey himself and his people to Bandar 'Abbas or Cochin. The Dutch then took their departure, leaving all their goods behind; and on the 4th January 1766 Mynheer van Houting and his party, including about 50 soldiers, arrived at Bushehr, where Mr. Jervis, the British Resident, supplied them with money and other necessaries in exchange for bills. Among the property which fell into the hands of Mīr Mahanna at the capture of Khārag was a man-of-war belonging to the Imam of Masqat, which had recently discharged a cargo of coffee there.

So ended the costly and unremunerative experiment of a fortified Dutch settlement on Khārag, and no attempt was made to renew it. Apart from the initial outlay on defensive works and armed vessels, the chief item of expenditure had been the pay of some 90 European soldiers and 50 European sailors who formed the ordinary garrison: this was a recurrent charge, and it was rendered heavier by the great annual mortality among the men, due less to the climate than to their manner of

life. About the time of Mynheer Buschman's becoming Governor, the Khārag settlement would probably have been abandoned, had it not been that the growing tranquillity of Persia gave hope of better commercial results in the future, and that Mynheer Buschman was able to remove the chief local difficulty by making peace with Mīr Mahanna.

It was expected that Mir Mahanna would shortly send an expedition from his new stronghold on Khārag against either Būshehr or Bahrain; and Mr. Jervis, the British Resident at Büshehr, while he admitted the existence of a report that Mir Mahanna intended to respect British property, was therefore inclined to recommend an attack on Kharag, which, he was assured, could be captured by two bomb-vessels. Government of Bombay, however, ordered him to abstain from interference between the Dutch or the Persians and Mir Mahanna, and not to employ for the reduction of Khārag any part of the expedition that had been sent to the Gulf to chastise the Ka'ab. At the beginning of April, perhaps on account of the judicious neutrality of the British, but possibly in consequence of a promise by Karim Khan to send a large force to the aid of the Shaikh of Bushehr, - an engagement which, it was thought, the Vakil might have some difficulty in fulfilling at that season of the year,—the situation was still perfectly quiet. In May 1766 it was reported by the Agent and Council at Basrah that Mir Mahanna had shown "the greatest proofs of his respect and regard "for the English, having behav'd in a most friendly manner towards the "gentlemen of the Berkshire and Four Friends, who called in at Carrack "to furnish themselves with proper pilots to conduct them into Bussora "River"; and Mr. Wrench and his associates expressed themselves as altogether averse to conceding a request by the Shaikh of Būshehr for the assistance of the Company's naval force in the Gulf against Mir Mahanna, adding: "besides, according to the opinion of the gentlemen "above mentioned, Meermanna has made such additions to the fortifications "of Carrack and preparations for his defence, having upwards of 3,000 "men, which they declare they saw when he muster'd his forces in their "presence, many of which are good horsemen, well train'd, all in coats of "mail, that we apprehend our force at present would be hardly sufficient "to dispossess him of that place, even had we orders to proceed against "him."

In 1767 Mir Mahanna despoiled the Masqat coffee fleet of 380 bales of coffee out of a total of 550; and this particular trade was brought to a standstill in consequence, at least until the autumn, when it seems to have been arranged that a British ship should convoy the stocks remaining at Masqat on their passage up the Gulf.

Mir Mahanna's Government of Khārag, 1766-69. As has already been mentioned, in the section on British relations above, the East India Company's officials at Basrah inclined after this, under the leadership of Mr. Moore, to an alliance with Mīr Mahanna against the Vakīl; but the Government of Bombay disapproved of their policy; and in 1768 Mr. Skipp was sent on a second mission to Shīrāz, which resulted—as before described—in a combination between the British and Karīm Khān against Mīr Mahanna, and in an unsuccessful attack by the British on Khārag in the month of May 1768, this attack leading in its turn to the retaliatory seizure by Mīr Mahanna, in August 1768, of the British vessel "Speedwell."

Expulsion of Mir Mahanna from Khārag, 26th January 1769, followed by his death.*

The blood-stained career of Mir Mahanna was at length brought to a close by an insurrection among his own subjects, to whom his tyranny had become intolerable. A certain Darbās, the principal man in his service having been confined under his orders and treated with great severity on account of some trifling offence, the leading Arab chiefs on Khārag entered into a conspiracy against the Mīr; and on the night of the 26th of January 1769, after taking possession of a small work, they made an unsuccessful attempt to seize his person, which drove him to take refuge with his immediate followers in a bastion of the main Fort. In this bastion Mīr Mahanna at first proposed to hold out; but, finding that he had no longer any party on the island, he changed his mind and managed to escape from Khārag in a small boat, accompanied by about 20 men who still adhered to him.

From Kuwait he seems to have made his way to Basrah, where, at midnight on the 21st of March 1769, he was put to death by strangling under the orders of the Turkish Mutasallim. It was said at the time that the object of the Turks in thus disposing of the fugitive chief was to forestall a demand, which it would have been equally dishonourable to grant and dangerous to refuse, on the part of Karīm Khān for his surrender, and it was believed that his head, after being seen by the Pāsha at Baghdād, would be sent to the Vakīl in Persia.

Khārag and Rīg under Husain Khān, 1769, and after.

On the flight of Mir Mahanna from Khārag, the administration of that place and of Rig devolved, in some manner, on an individual named Husain Khān. According to the information received by the Basrah Agency, Husain Khān at first seemed "to be wavering between "his fear of the Caun and his desire of keeping possession of Carrack and "its riches. Some reports say that his people are much disaffected to

^{*}The account given in the text differs so mewhat from that of Parson's (see his Travels, pages 195-198), but it is more reliable, as coming from a British official and not from a Persian non-official source.

"his Government and are daily leaving the island, that he intends delivering the effects to the Caun, and that they are to be equally divided between the Meer and the Caun and the Persian army; others that he is very desirous of our settling on the island, where he would give us a Factory, but not the Fort, as he first proposed; and others again say that the Meer has wrote to the Imaum of Muscat, requesting his friendship and promising to deliver over the effects and Gallivats of the island, if he will grant him his protection and admit of his followers' living unmolestedly at Muscat." It would appear, however, that two persons representing Zaki Khān, the brother of Karīm Khān, were allowed by the new chief to visit Khārag and to make an inventory of the property there.

The conduct of the Agent and Council at Basrah in opening negotiations with Husain Khan and attempting to blockade the island and that of the Resident at Bushehr in abandoning his post have been noticed, together with the views and orders of the Bombay Government and of the Court of Directors thereon, in the section referring to British relations with the Persian Government; and here it is enough to observe that the East India Company in the end derived no advantage, unless by the disappearance of Mir Mahanna personally from the scene, from the revolu-In 1770 Husain Khan invited the Company's servants tion at Khārag. to establish a Factory at Rig, no doubt as a substitute for the Residency that had been withdrawn from Bushehr; but his offer, for reasons which cannot but be obvious on considering the relations of the East India Company with the Persian Government at the time, was politely declined by the Agent at Basrah. A serious piracy in June 1771, committed by boats from Khārag upon the "Britannia" and another vessel under the British flag, brought the Company's representatives once more into correspondence with Husain Khan; but, as has been fully explained in an earlier paragraph, no decisive action against him was ever authorised, nor any satisfaction for the gross injury obtained.

Events at Büshehr and in its neighbourhood, 1763-79.

The affairs of Büshehr have already entered largely into our narrative, chiefly because Büshehr was the port of Shīrāz, through which the British maintained correspondence with Karīm Khān; and we do not propose to return here to events already described and dis-

cussed, such as the establishment of the British Residency at Būshehr in 1763, its withdrawal in 1769, and its re-institution in 1775. Similarly the relations of the Shaikh of Būshehr with the British, with the Mīr of Rīg, and with the Vakīl himself have already, in some degree, come under our notice; and the part played by him in the affairs of 'Omān, Bahrain and Turkish 'Irāq will appear from the separate chapters on the history of those countries.

Relations of the Shaikh of Būshehr with the Persian Central Government, 1763-69.

The attitude of Shaikh Näsir of Büshehr towards Karīm Khān was ordinarily that of an obedient and even loyal vassal, as is shown by his undertaking service against Mir Mahanna in 1765 and against Basrah in 1775-76; but there were occasional differences between him and his suzerain. In 1767 a difficulty in regard to the tribute payable by the Shaikh on account of Bahrain, the same that had occasioned his imprisonment at Shīrāz in 1755, arose; 4,000 Tūmāns a year were demanded of him by the Vakil for Büshehr and Bahrain together; and, on his hesitating to comply. Karim Khan apparently sent a force under Zaki Khān into Dashtistān, closed the passes between Būshehr and, Shīrāz, and incited the chief of Tangistān to take up arms against Shaikh Nāsir. At the beginning of 1768 Shaikh Nāsir's brother Sa'dūn, who had been sent to Shīrāz to negotiate, returned with a favourable answer; and friction ceased until about 1773. It was then renewed: but early in 1774 a fresh reconciliation was brought about by a voluntary visit of Shaikh Nāsir himself to Shīrāz, which so delighted the Vakīl that he immediately appointed the Shaikh his plenipotentiary for the purpose of arranging a settlement with the Imam of 'Oman.

Naval resources of the Shaikh of Bushehr, 1765-75. With the countenance of Karīm Khān, whose authority he represented in maritime matters in the upper Gulf, Shaikh Nāsir of Būshehr steadily increased his fleet during this period. In 1765, at the time of the attack on Khārag, it consisted of a ship, 3 Gallivats and 2 Batīls; in 1769, shortly after Mīr Mahanna's death, of a ship, 4 Gallivats and 30 armed boats; in 1771, of two ships and 7 or 8 Gallivats, besides boats; and in 1775, during the siege of Basrah, of some 20 war Gallivats, carrying from 8 to 10 guns each, and a number of merchant vessels of 40 to 80 tons which could be, and sometimes were, used for naval purposes. In 1775 a 40-gun ship lay in a deep hole in the Būshehr harbour, out of which it could not be moved: it was said to have been captured from the Imām of Masqat, but it may have been merely the 'Omani vessel which, as already related, accidentally fell into the power of Mīr Mahanna at Khārag in 1766.

Affairs in

Karīm Khān was accustomed, on pretext of requiring their advice or

military services, but really in order to prevent risings against his authority in the provinces, to keep most of the hereditary chiefs of districts in attendance on his court at Shīrāz or with the army; and among those whom he so dealt with was the Khan of Dashti, who had his capital at Khurmuj. The Khan had appointed an uncle to govern the district in his absence; but this substitute soon blinded and displaced by Ja'far, a brother of the Khan. Amir Kuhneh Khān, whom Karīm Khān sent to the coast with a force at the end of 1764 or beginning of 1765 to deal with Mir Mahanna, was commissioned to invest Ja'far Khān, by the way, with a robe of honour; but the usurper, no doubt correctly interpreting the real intention of the Vakīl, attempted, unsuccessfully, to destroy Kuhneh Khān's force in a narrow defile through which it had to pass. this failure Ja'far Khan took to the hills; but within a few days he was captured and sent to Shīrāz, where, as a punishment, he was condemned to remove a mound inside the town to a place without the gates. Amīr Kuhneh Khān, notwithstanding that Rīg was his real objective and that Dashti, after the capture of Ja'far, was perfectly submissive to the Vakil's authority, insisted in or before February 1765 on destroying the whole town of Khurmuj, with the exception of a mosque and an lmämzädeh. During his whole sojourn there he occupied an entrenched camp, as if in hostile country; and, when in May he at last marched against Rig, he left a detachment behind to collect the revenue of Ahram in Tangistan and of the adjoining villages. At this time there was a considerable fortified village at Tangistan proper, in the district of that name, consisting of mat huts and surrounded by a mud wall and a ditch; and the headman, before the arrival of the Persian troops in the

Dashti and Tangistān, about 1765.

Events on the coast of Shibkūh and below, 1763-1779.

neighbourhood, had been accustomed to make travellers passing that

way pay heavily for road guards.

The most important occurrences on the coast of Shibküh and below during this period were, from a British point of view, the piratical seizure of the "Islamabad" off Mughu in 1765 and the capture of an armed boat of the East India Company by the Shaikh of Charak in 1767, to which we might add, on account of its relation to these cases, the blowing up of the "Defiance" near Laft in 1767. These affairs, as well as

the connection between them, have already been dealt with in the section on British relations.

Destruction of Kangun by Zaki Khān, 1767. In 1765 the port of Kangūn appears to have been recalcitrant to the authority of Karīm Khān, for, on the arrīval of the Vakīl's commander Amīr Kuhneh Khān at Khurmūj about the beginning of that year, the inhabitants not only refused to help him by sea against Mīr Mahanna of Rīg, but prepared to fight and took precautions against surprise by sleeping at night on board of their vessels instead of on terra firma. It seems probable that what they feared was an attempt to subject them to tribute. In 1767, at the time that there was trouble between the Vakīl and the Shaikh of Būshebr, Karīm Khān's brother Zaki Khān, who had been sent with a force into Dashtistān, made a sudden raid on Kangūn with 6,000 men and totally destroyed the place.

Events in the vicinity of Bandar 'Abbās and Hormūz, 1763-1779.

After the withdrawal of the British Agency from Bandar 'Abbās in 1763, affairs in that quarter had no longer the same interest as before for the representatives of the East India Company, and little mention of them is to be found in the official records. Mr. Price, on establishing a British Residency at Būshehr in 1763, sent orders to the Linguist at Kirmān, who had formerly been dependent on the Agency at Bandar 'Abbās, to send whatever wool he had collected to Būshehr and not to incur any further expenses at Kirmān on account of the Company. The indirect connection of the Khān of Lār and the Shaikh of Hormūz with the "Islamabad" case has already been noticed in the proper place.

Capture of Lar by Karim Khān's forces and decline of Bandar 'Abbās, 1766—1773. Nāsir Khān of Lār having failed to pay with regularity the revenue agreed upon between himself and Karīm Khān in 1761, the Vakīl, early in 1766, sent a large force against him under Sādiq Khān. The result of the operations seems to have been the reduction of Lār and the seizure of the Khan's treasures by the Persian army; and thereafter nothing more is heard of a hereditary Khān of Lār.

In 1773, when the Basrah Agent and his staff, in returning from Bombay, touched at Bandar 'Abbās, they found that the place had fallen into utter ruin. In the absence of the Governor, Shaikh Mahmūd, who had gone to Shīrāz, the port was being administered by his son; and a rumour that Zaki Khan was at hand with a large army had caused it to be temporarily abandoned by most of its remaining inhabitants.

Proceedings of the Shaikh

'Abdullah, Shaikh of Hormūz, after the submission of Lar and Bandar' Abbas to the Vakīl's authority, was apparently recognised by

Karīm Khān as his naval representative in the lower part of the Gulf, just as Shaikh Nāsir of Būshehr was in the upper part; and under this encouragement his naval resources continued, like those of the Būshehr Shaikh, to expand. In September 1766 Captain Justice of the "Berkshire," who had lately spent three or four days at Hormūz to study, in connection with the "Islamabad" case, the means of defence possessed by the Shaikh, reported "that his fort was all in pieces, and not one of his gun-carriages but what was useless; that his Gallivats were all in very bad order; that our ships could go within hail of the fort, and that, if they were to go, the fort could not hold out two hours." In 1771, however, the Hormūz fleet consisted of about a dozen Gallivats, apparently quite efficient; and in November 1773 it was reported that the Hormūz Gallivats were out and were capturing every boat that they met in the Gulf.

of Hormuz and his relations with the Persian Central Government, etc., 1771-1778.

It is clear that there was not a continuously good understanding between Shaikh 'Abdullah and his master, for, in 1773, the former joined with the Wali of Masqat and the Shaikh of Ras-al-Khaimah in committing depredations upon the Persian Coast at Bandar 'Abbās and Lingeh; and in 1774 it was actually reported, but with what truth cannot now be determined, that he had decoyed Zaki Khān from Bandar 'Abbas to Hormuz on the pretence of giving him a daughter in marriage, and had detained him there, with 40 others, as security for the release of a son whom Karim Khān, according to his usual practice, had detained at Shīrāz as a hostage for 'Abdullah's fidelity. By 1778, however, the attitude of the Shaikh had changed; for in that year we find him first acting in opposition to the Imam of Masqat, and then kidnapped, as related in another place, by the agents of that ruler. At the same time a feud had arisen between the Shaikh's subjects and the people of Büshehr, and two or three vessels had been captured by the Hormuzis, and one by the Bushehris, respectively. It is said that, by about 1765, Shaikh 'Abdullah had been able to expel, from the part of the Persian Coast under his supervision, the Qawasim who had established themselves there during the troubles of the preceding years, and that during the rest of his life he was able to keep them at a distance.

The East India Company's trade in Persia, 1763-1779.

The import trade of Persia in 1765, so far as carried on by the Imports. British in the Persian Gulf, was described by Niebuh as consisting

chiefly in European manufactured cloths and in goods from Surat and Bengal.

Weollens.

The principal article imported by the East India Company into Persia continued to be, as in the period preceding 1763, woollen cloth of 1763, various kinds. In 1763 at the establishment of the Büshehr Residency. Mr. Price caused a stock of 384 bales of broadcloth, 184 bales of perpets. and 4 chests of "tabbies and sattins" to be landed, these being "the sortments proper for the Persia market," and gave the newly appointed Resident authority to dispose of them, in the first instance, at prices lower than had been customary at Bandar 'Abbās, in order that upcountry merchants might be attracted and the Dutch on Khārag discouraged from competition in the trade. Mr. Jervis was also to procure lists of all the kinds of woollens suitable for sale in the different parts of Persia, and he was to draw up estimates of the probable annual demand Afterwards, strict orders having been given to the Resident at Bushehr "not to sell perpets separate from cloth, as the profits on the cloth are far superior to those on the perpets," difficulty was from time 1764, to time experienced in making sales; and in March 1764 Mr. Jervis reported "that not having received any scarlet or aurora perpets by the "Drake and the coarse cloth by the Nancy being all of one colour had "proved very prejudicial to his sales, the purchasers in January having "declined taking coarse cloth and perpets to an equal amount of what "they then bought for want of those other sortments, and he had been "obliged to abate two rupees per piece on the blue and green perpets taken "by the * Corasooners, which made it absolutely necessary there should be "a proportion of 20 or 25 bales scarlet or aurora perpets to 100 of the other "colours, without which the popinjays would never sell, being a colour "much disliked by the Persians in general." Later in the same year he was obliged to refuse an offer from some Khurāsāni merchants, then visiting Büshehr, "to take all the green and blue perpets at 20 rupees per piece, provided he would sell them separately," and the merchants on learning that he had no scarlet perpets in stock announced their intention of waiting till some were received; meanwhile, however, the sales 1766. at the Residency were very trifling. On the 5th of April 1766 the cash balance at Büshehr was #37,021, recent sales, "for want of proper sortments of coarse cloth and perpets," having been small; but in the meanwhile, at the beginning of March, 151 bales of cloth and 200 of longells for the Persian market had been despatched in the "Tartar" from 1775. Bombay. In February 1775, notwithstanding the dangers impending

over Basrah from the side of Persia and the detention by the Agent and Council there for their own protection of the "Eagle" and "Success," the Bombay Government sent 300 bales of woollens to that place by the "Drake" and 230 more, including 30 bales of drabs, by a specially freighted native vessel. In the early summer of 1776, after a fresh stock of woollens had been laid in at Büshehr, an effort was made under the orders of the Presidency to enhance the selling prices; but the season was unfavourable for the attempt, as from June to August inclusive many of the merchants were accustomed to retire from Bushehr to Shīrāz to escape the heat at the coast, and there was no retail sale of woollens in the country before September; and a combination to resist enhancement had been formed among the merchants and was supported by the Shaikh of Bushehr, who was himself the principal buyer of the cloth goods imported by the Company. In the end the Resident decided to sell off the goods for the most they would fetch, before the end of the following season. In 1778 there was a strong demand at Būshehr for perpets, coarse medleys and coarse cloth.

A considerable trade in tin seems to have been carried on at Büshehr and Basrah about 1764, and a consignment from Bombay at the end of that year was equally divided between the two places. Earlier in the year the Resident at Bushehr, who had taken 14,107 caps of tin out of the passing vessel "Drake" and sold them to local merchants for 31 rupees per Tabrīz Man, estimated the annual Būshehr demand to be 10,000 Tabrīz Mans at about this price, and the action of the Residency in sending more was probably due to his advice; but they blamed him for having sold the tin caps apart from the tin in slabs, for which there was not so much demand.

Sugar was also an article of the trade with Persia at this time, and we find that in 1773 a leading merchant of Büshehr purchased 124 canisters at Rs. 8 per Tabriz Man from Commodore Nesbitt of the "Revenge."

The exports of Persia through Büshehr, as enumerated by Niebuhr Exports.

who visited the place in 1765 were silk fabrics from Yazd and Kāshān, red Gilan silk, carpets (of which the most valuable were from Isfahan), fine wool or goats' hair from Kirman, horses and mules, rhubarb and other drugs, cotton, fruits, rose-water, and a great quantity of Shīrāz The East India Company, however, did not deal in all these articles, but left the trade in some of them to their Resident at Bushehr in his capacity of private merchant.

That Kirman wool, notwithstanding the distance of the producing Raw wool. districts from Bushehr, still entered into the export trade of Persia is

confirmed by the following observations of the Bombay Government. which were made in September 1767 with reference to a letter from the Company's servants at Büshehr: "(They) advised us that they had con-" signed to us by the Success 66 bales of Carmenia wool on account and "risque of Mahmud Hussan, that it was of a fine sort but had been "touched by the worms, for which reason they had not fixed any price "for it, which the Linguist desired might be referred to us, and who "would abide by any price we might think it worth. They likewise sent "us two bales of new wool on the Hon'ble Company's risque, and had "contracted for 3,000 bales more at 6 rupees the maund, all charges in-"cluded; but they were afraid that the impediments laid on their trade "would discourage the contractors and occasion a disappointment in this " article, of which, altho. we were the only purchasers in Persia, they "could not perceive it under the above price, owing to the sheep being "almost totally destroyed by the length of the troubles that [they] had "ravaged the province of Carmenia." A little later, in giving orders for Mr. Skipp's second mission to Shīrāz, the Presidency directed that the price of Kirman wool should be fixed in the treaty which might be arranged with Karim Khan.

Raw silk.

A similar direction was given in regard to raw silk, chiefly of Gīlān origin, the trade in which was now evidently considered important by the Court of Directors in London, though considerations of the risk and difficulty in obtaining it sometimes led them to modify or cancel orders already given. In March 1768 they "laid aside any thought of it for the present," but a year later they again urged that it should be procured. A large quantity was expected to be collected at Basrah at the beginning of 1771; and again, at the end of 1771, orders were sent from London to discontinue purchasing raw silk.

Copper

There are also indications that copper was still exported from Persia by the East India Company.

Specie and barter.

The medium of exchange seems to have given rise, during this period, to questions of some difficulty. Karīm Khān had, apparently, theories of his own on the subject; and these eventually led him to prohibit the exportation of specie from Persia altogether, under pain of confiscation not only of money which it had been attempted to smuggle out of the country, but also of the whole of the delinquent's other estate; and in 1770 a caravan proceeding from Shīrāz to Būshehr, in which were 500 Tūmāns in cash, was stopped by his orders, the money seized, and the owner thrown into prison. There was at this time a great scarcity of specie in both Persia and Turkish 'Irāq, but the measures adopted by

Karim Khan seem to have had some effect in modifying the adverse balance of trade in the case of the former country. Occasionally, when the Company had large unsold stocks to dispose of, they were willing to permit sale by barter; witness the following instructions of the Court of Directors issued to the Agent and Council at Basrah in 1771: "Having taken into consideration what you write on the subject of "the Gīlān raw silk and the large quantity of the stock of woollens "which have remained so long in warehouse at your settlement and at "Bombay for your market, we are willing, and accordingly authorise "you, to dispose of those woollens in barter for silk entirely, without the "advance of cash for purpose thereof unless you shall find it utterly "impossible to procure the silk on those terms; and then we hope you "will be able to procure it, allowing the merchants a quarter part in "cash in payment for such raw silk": but as a rule they regarded restrictions on dealings in specie as oppressive, and they were highly indignant at the manner in which, to the detriment of foreign trade, those restrictions were enforced at Büshehr. In 1776 the merchants of Bushehr made an offer, which was not accepted, to buy all the perpets in the British Factory for ready money, "giving silk for the whole remains of cloth"; but in 1778 "forty-two (42) rolls of Gilan "raw silk arrived from Schiras and were deposited in the Factory by "Coja Ezar, in consequence of which he has received our remains of "woollens, and Rs. 9,666-1-9 are now due on that deposit."

It is interesting to notice that in 1764, a doubt having arisen as to the correct English equivalent of the Tabrīz Man, the Resident at Būshehr, Mr. Jervis, reported after experiment that it was 7.38 lbs. avoirdupois, but that the Bombay Government held from their own knowledge that it did not really exceed 63 lbs.,* and directed in consequence that he should either do business in English weights or treat the Tabrīz Man as equal to not more than 7 lbs.

Under the rule of Karim Khān commerce flourished; and it is stated that, in his day, the receipts from customs at Shīrāz, which were taken at the rate of 2 per cent. ad valorem only, sometimes amounted to 6,000 Tūmāns a month.

At the institution of the Büshehr Residency in 1763 it was arranged, apparently not without the knowledge of the Persian authorities, that a duty of 3 per cent. should be levied by the Resident on behalf of the Company upon all goods imported or exported by those trading under

The Tabrīz Man.

Trade generally.

Customs and consulage.

^{*} The Tabriz Man at the present day is 6.547 lbs. English, and it may be inferred that Mr. Jervis was misled by the local merchants, who perhaps showed him a Büshehr Man (now 72 lbs. English)

the Company's protection, and that, in addition thereto, consulage at the rate of 1 per cent. on all British trade should be collected and divided equally between the Resident at Büshehr and the Agent at Basrah. On the 3rd of April it was further resolved in Council at Bombay, "in order to put the customs and consulage at Bushire upon "the same footing as at the Agency, that one per cent. consulage be in "future collected there for the President," apparently in addition to the one per cent. already taken for the Agent and the Resident.

Establishments of the East India Company in Persia, 1763-1779.

The recognised establishments of the East India Company in Persia were confined, during this period, to one Residency at Büshehr.

Powers and duties of the Resident at Bushehr.

The Resident at Bushehr was from the first under the orders of the Agent and Council at Basrah, through whom the whole of the correspondence, in either direction, between him and Bombay was ordinarily to pass; but he was also authorised, and even ordered, to avail himself of the opportunities afforded by vessels bound direct to Bombay of speedier communication with the Presidency; and he was permitted, when none of the Company's cruisers were available, to send consignments of goods not exceeding #50,000 in value by native vessel to Surat or Bombay. In 1764, on Mr. Wrench's appointment to the Basrah Agency, the Resident at Bushehr was specially instructed to give him "the "necessary information in respect to all concerns under his management "and to obey him as Agent in future, agreeable to the established rules "in the service." Mr. Jervis, the first Resident at Bushehr, entertained the distinguished traveller Niebuhr there in 1765, passing him on, when he left for Persepolis, to a young English merchant whom he employed at Shīrāz; and Nīebuhr gives us an interesting glimpse of the life of his host at either place.

Mr. Jervis.

Mr. Jervis, who had received a good education in his youth, still devoted to study all the time that he could spare from business; he spoke, read, and wrote * Persian; and he had began to form a collection

[•] From the following extract of a letter written by the Agent and Council at Basrah to the Presidency at Bombay in 1770 it appears that a knowledge of the language was not universal among the Company's servants employed in the Gulf: "We submit also to Your Honour, etc., the propriety of sending Mr. Dow in order "to accompany Mr. Morley, as so much useful information may be procured from "his knowledge in the Persian language, and so much greater confidence can be placed "in his interpretation than in that of any of the country people."

of Persian manuscripts, among which was one of Muhammad Mehdi Khān's Life of Nadir Shah, afterwards translated from a different copy by Sir W. Jones. Mr. Jervis's only regular assistant at Būshehr was Mr. Natter, the son of a stone engraver of European reputation, who had apparently the rank of Writer in the Company's service; and except two monks, one of whom called himself Bishop of Isfahān, there was then no other European at Būshehr.

Mr. Hercules, who was Mr. Jervis's representative at Shīrāz, belonged to a good English family but had no official status, being merely Mr. Jervis's agent in private trade. The life of this gentleman at the Persian capital was monotonous and unpleasant in the extreme, for he was the only European settled there; an Armenian officer in Karīm Khān's artillery was the sole person with whom he could converse freely; and he could not, out of regard for his position in the eyes of the nobles and great merchants, appear in the streets otherwise than mounted on horseback and accompanied by a retinue of servants.

Restrictions imposed by the Directors on the Resident at Būshehr,

It seems probable that the anomalous position of Mr. Hercules at Shīrāz, where Mr. Jervis no doubt made use of him in public as well as in private business, in the end came to the knowledge of the Court of Directors in London and excited their disapproval, for the following words in their despatch of May 1766, already mentioned, by which they imposed restrictions on the political activity of the Resident and forbade him to appoint an agent at Shīrāz, seem to apply very closely to Mr. Hercules' case: "If it," i.e., the agent, "should be one of our "servants, it will be unnecessary expense, and much worse if an Armenian "or any country-born people, who will always act more for their private "interest than that of the Company. The servants in the factory who "are not covenant servants of the Company and understand English, "if any such there are at present, must be suffered to see the Company's " accounts or any letters or transactions regarding the Company's affairs, "in which are to be employed but our own servants. If there are not "sufficient at present, the Presidency, upon your application, will encrease "the number." In the same despatch, it may be observed, more stringent rules were laid down regarding the correspondence of the Resident at Bushehr, who was in future to write to the Agency regularly once a fortnight, and copies of whose direct communications with Bombay were to be sent to the Agent and Council at Basrah "by the very first conveyance that offers."

Assistant to Resident, Medical Officers, etc.

It does not appear that the Resident at Büshehr had a covenanted servant to assist him, unless * Mr. Natter were such, until after the re-institution of the Residency in 1775; but in 1778, Mr. Green was serving there under the orders of Mr. Beaumont, whose captivity at Shīrāz he had shared. A Sarrāf or money-changer formed part of the Bushehr establishment from the beginning, having been appointed originally under an order of Mr. Price, which ran thus: " As the money "for your sales will be paid in different species, both of gold and silver, "a Shroff will be necessary to prevent any imposition. You are accord-"ingly empowered to entertain one, and in order to encourage him to a "faithful discharge of his duty (? to allow him) a shroftage of ; per cent." In 1778, when Messrs. Beaumont and Green wrote as follows, there was still no Surgeon at Büshehr, and the want of carpenters was severely "We desire the favour of Your Honour, etc., to oblige us with "a Surgeon for the use of this Factory, and hope that the severity of "the hot seasons and sudden change of the air here, which frequently "subjects us to disorders, will plead in our excuse for this request. "We also entreat for two carpenters, which we have often occasion for, "as there is not one to be had in the place."

Miltary guard and boat at Būshehr

When the British Residency at Bushehr was opened in 1763, a small guard of about a dozen men was landed, under a European officer, to give the Factory consequence; and it was no doubt maintained there, though the officer (Lieutenant Thomas Durnford) was withdrawn after Price, in concluding his about a year. Mr.report opening of the Bushehr Residency remarked: "I have only to add "thereto that, the rains in this part of the world not being periodical "and no vessels to be procured for transporting goods but trankies. "which are not only open but wretchedly bad in any blowing weather, "a vessel of about 100 tons burthen, with a deck and pique sail, like "the Dutch luggage boats at Sūrat, appears to me very necessary; and, "as she may be made capable of defence by mounting 8 or 10 carriage "guns upon her, she will be very serviceable in many respects, especially "for removing our surplus cash at Büshire to Bussora as occasion requires. It was not however until 1766, or three years later, that the Agent and Council at Basrah sanctioned the purchase by the Resident at Būshehr of a boat for carrying packets to Basrah and occasionally to Masqat, whereby, they hoped, the Company would save considerably in the item of freight.

^{*} Mr. Natter has been described as a Writer above, but it is not clear that he was a covenanted servant.

In the treatment of their servants, especially in exceptional cases, the Company often showed a judicious liberality. Stephen Hermit, who was Linguist at Bander 'Abbās and afterwards at Būshehr and who accompanied Lieutenant Durnford to Shīrāz in 1763, having lost his life by the explosion on the "Defiance" in 1767, the Bombay authorities in 1769 acquiesced in the grant to his widow and children of an * allowance "sufficient to afford them a decent maintenance"; and Messrs. Beaumont and Green, after their release in 1775 from two years' confinement in Persia, were awarded a gratuity of Rs. 4,000 each by the Company, in consideration of their sufferings.

Treatment by the Company of their servants.


RULERS OF THE ZAND DYNASTY AFTER KARIM KHÅN, 1779—95.

The period following the death of Karīm Khān was one of confusion and unrest, during which the power of the Qājārs of Mazandarān steadily increased at the expense of that of the Zands of Shīrāz; and by 1795 the supremacy in Persia had been completely transferred from the southern to the northern tribe. We may deal with the events of the time under two aspects: first in their relation to Persia as a whole, and again in their bearing on the Persian Coast districts with which we are more immediately concerned.

In order to explain the relationship among themselves of the Zand princes, to whose dissensions more than to any other cause the ultimate triumph of the Qājārs must be attributed, we subjoin a table which contains their genealogy in outline. One of them, Ja'far Khān, it will be seen, appears in two places in the table.

^{*} This allowance was still being paid in 1788, at the rate of Rs. 30 a month.





General History of Persia, 1779-95.

The supreme power was usurped, on the death of Karīm Khān, by his half-brother Zaki Khān, a military leader distinguished by energy and even ferocity of character. The new ruler's first step was to destroy a number of influential Zands and others who had presumed to declare for Abul Fat-h Khān, a son of Karīm Khān, after which he pretended to govern on behalf of Abul Fat-h Khān and a brother named Muhammad 'Ali Khān, the latter being his own son-in-law. He was supported in his coup d'état by 'Ali Murād Khān, his sister's son, an able and ambitious man of whom more will be heard hereafter; but other members of the family were adverse to him, especially Sādiq Khān, who himself harboured a claim to the succession.

Reign of Zaki Khān, 2nd March to 14th June 1779.

Sādiq Khān, at the time of the Vakīl's decease, was Governor of the town of Basrah, then occupied by a Persian garrison; but, immediately on the news of the momentous event reaching him, he evacuated the place and set out for Shīrāz by forced marches, taking with him the whole of his troops. Having learned at Dōraq on the way that Zaki Khān was already established in power, he sent his son Ja'far Khān forward to negotiate on his behalf for a share in the administration; but, doubtless for want of confidence on either side, nothing was arranged. Sādiq Khān would then have attacked Shīrāz; but he was deterred by the action of Zaki Khān in arresting three of his sons, who happened to be in the town, in imprisoning Abul Fat-h Khān, who was suspected of favouring his cause, and in threatening to ill-treat the relatives at Shīrāz of some of the leaders of his army; and he had instead to retire, with a small following and not unpursued, to the remote district of Kirmān.

But rivalry on the part of his own relations was not the only difficulty with which Zaki Khān had to contend. The city of Ispahān, during the confusion following the death of Karīm Khān, had been seized by two Afshār chiefs, brothers, with the support of their own tribe and of the Bakhtiyāris and other Lurs; and some little time elapsed before the place was recovered by the perfidious diplomacy of Bastām Khān, whom Zaki Khān afterwards appointed Governor.

More dangerous, however, than any movement in the southern provinces was the growth in the districts near the Caspian Sea of the

hostile power of the Qājār tribe, whom the escape of Agha Muhammad Khān from Shīrāz, on the occasion of the death of the Vakil, had at length provided with a leader of first-rate capacity. Agha Muhammad Khān was a eunuch, and he had been detained for many years as a hostage by Karīm Khān; but in endurance, ability, and force of character he was at least the equal of any surviving member of the Zand family; and he signalised the recovery of his freedom by boldly laying claim to the throne of Persia and adopting the insignia of royalty.

Zaki Khān, when the revolt at Isfahān had been quelled, despatched 'Ali Murad Khan with the flower of his army against Agha Muhammad Khān; but his kinsman and early supporter, with whom Sādiq Khān had meanwhile opened a correspondence, took advantage of being thus placed in command of troops to throw off his allegiance, occupy Isfahan. and declare himself an adherent of Abul Fat-h Khān, the deposed son of Karim Khān. Zaki Khān, always prompt in action, and impelled in the present case by extreme indignation, at once placed his own son Akbar in charge of Shīrāz and set out for Isfahān at the head of all his available forces; but he was assassinated at Yazdikhāst, on the way thither, by some of his own followers. The date of this occurrence appears to have been the 14th of June 1779. His violent character had rendered Zaki Khān unpopular with many; but the immediate cause of his death was a series of atrocities committed by him at Yazdikhāst, in connection with the recovery of a sum of money for which he held the inhabitants to be responsible.

Reign of Abul Fat-h Khān and Sādiq Khān jointly, July to September 1779.

The assassination of Zaki Khān was followed by the elevation to the throne of his prisoner and nephew Abul Fat-h Khān, a youth of weak and dissipated character, but reputed just, mild, and unambitious. One of the first acts of the new ruler was to imprison Akbar Khān, the son of Zaki Khān, and Muhammad 'Ali Khān, his own brother, who had married Zaki Khān's daughter. At the beginning of July 1779 Sādio Khān, who was a man of handsome appearance, who had at one time held the position of Baiglarbaig or Viceroy of Fars under the Vakīl, and whom Karīm Khān had on his death-bed appointed guardian of his sons, appeared at Shīrāz and succeeded in obtaining a share in the administration; but the dual system of government thus established was unsatisfactory and lasted for about two months only. Abul Fat-h Khān, it was said, constantly rejected the advice of Sādiq Khān; and a serious disagreement at length occurred between them on the subject of Akbar Khān. whom Abul Fat-h Khān was desirous of blinding. At last, at the beginning of September 1779, Sādiq Khān lost patience and deposed and confined

Abul Fat-h Khān "for his intemperance, with the consent of the principal people"; and later, in opposition to the advice of Mīrza Muhammad Husain, his Vazīr, he caused him to be deprived of sight.

Sādiq Khān, after he had thus rid himself of his associate, enjoyed undivided power; but he failed, in exercising it, to sustain the reputation for soldierly efficiency and general good sense which he had gained during his government of Basrah; and he quickly found that he had to do with a formidable rival in the person of 'Ali Murād Khān. That prince had, it was said, been disappointed of marrying a daughter of the late Vakīl through Sādiq Khān's bestowal of the lady on one of his own sons; and now, on learning the fate of Abul Fat-h Khān, he proclaimed his independence of the usurper and came forward himself as a competitor for the throne. About January 1780 'Ali Murād Khān took possession of Isfahān, which Ja'far Khān, the son of Sādiq Khān, had evacuated on his approach; but his family and property at Shīrāz fell into the hands of Sādiq Khān. Both parties then remained inactive for several months. A campaign followed later, in which 'Ali Naqi Khan, son of Sādiq Khān, completely defeated 'Ali Murād Khān and compelled him to retire to Hamadan; but the victor did not follow up his advantage as he ought to have done; and presently 'Ali Murad Khan was able not only to recover Isfahān but also to confine Sādiq Khān and his supporters to the town of Shīrāz, which he proceeded to blockade. In February 1781 the town surrendered, after operations extending over more than eight months, in the course of which Akbar Khan had managed to escape from custody and join the camp of the besiegers, while Ja'far Khān, son of Sādiq Khān and half-brother at the same time of 'Ali Murād Khān. Governor also under his father of Behbehan and Shushtar, had in the meantime likewise made his submission. Three days after the fall of the town the citadel also opened its gates, and Sadiq Khan and three of his sons, who were in it, became the prisoners of 'Ali Murad Khan. The eyes of Sādiq Khān were immediately put out; and a little later he, and those of his sons who had been captured with him, suffered death by the hand of Akbar Khān, who actually solicited the privilege of becoming their executioner. Strict order was preserved by the conqueror in occupying Shīrāz, and the merchants were allowed to ransom their goods from pillage by the payment of a moderate contribution.

Akbur Khān, notwithstanding that he had been an early adherent of the new sovereign, did not long survive 'Ali Murād Khān's accession. On proof of his having been concerned in a conspiracy—or perhaps from pru-

Reign of Sadiq Khan. 1779-1781.

Reign of 'Ali Murad Khan, 1781 —85.

dential motives merely, as he was a man of conspicuous ability and ambition—'Ali Murād Khān decided that Akbar Khan must be removed; and Ja'far Khān, who had his father's death to avenge, readily undertook and performed the bloody task.

'Ali Murād Khān, after affairs at Shīrāz had been set in order, transferred his capital to Isfahān, where he thenceforward resided; at the same time he entrusted Shīrāz to a nephew, named Saiyid Murād Khān, and committed the charge of military operations which he thought it necessary to undertake against the Qājārs to his own eldest son, Shaikh Vais. The Qājār country was successfully invaded, and to some extent occupied; but Shaikh Vais's early victories were followed by a severe reverse, and by his hasty retirement on Tehrān. There 'Ali Murād Khān arrived to his assistance, and inflicted summary punishment on some tribal leaders to whose defection, at a critical moment, he attributed his son's defeat.

Notwithstanding the state of his health, which was precarious, the Zand ruler at once organised a fresh force, and was about to take the field in person against the Qājārs, when news reached him that Ja'far Khān, whom he had continued to trust and whom he had invested with a government, was in rebellion and was marching on Isfahān. It was the depth of winter, and his political and medical advisers would both have dissuaded him from exposing himself to the hardships of a snowy march; but the Khān was determined to reach Isfahān before the rebel, and he died by the way, when about 30 miles from his destination, a victim to the inflexibility of his own resolve. By the presence of mind of his ministers, his death, which occurred on the 11th of February 1785, was concealed from the army until the royal treasure had reached Isfahān and been deposited there in safety.

'Ali Murād Khān was a man of firm character, and he was the last of the Zands who showed himself able to confine the Qājārs within their ancestral bounds.

Reign of Ja'far Khān 1785--89 A few days after the decease of 'Ali Murād Khān, Ja'far Khān arrived at Isfahān. Bāqir Khān, the governor of the city, who had foolishly assumed royal state during the interregnum, fled at his approach, but was pursued, captured and imprisoned; and Ja'far Khān also found means to entrap Shaikh Vais. the son of 'Ali Murād Khān, and render him harmless by loss of sight. There was at first great confusion in the interior; the highroads became unsafe and even impassable; and Mr. Matcham, a servant of the East India Company who had undertaken to travel home from India by way of Isfahān and

to investigate the causes of the decline of the Persian trade, was obliged on arrival at Büshehr, in March 1785, to postpone if not to abandon his intended journey.

The reign of Ja'far Khān differed from that of his predecessor chiefly in this, that the Qājārs had become aggressive, and that the Zand ruler was now reduced to acting chiefly on the defensive, and had sometimes difficulty in maintaining his authority even in the south. Soon after the accession of Ja'far Khān, Āgha Muhammad Khān marched against Isfahān, and the new sovereign withdrew in such disorder from the town that his baggage was partially plundered by a mob; he found a safe retreat however at Shīrāz, where, under the influence of Hāji Ibrāhīm, a somewhat remarkable man whom Ja'far Khān afterwards appointed to the Kalāntarship of Fārs, Saiyid Murād Khān had remained faithful to his interests. Āgha Muhammad Khān not long afterwards came into collision with the Bakhtiyāri tribe and, having been discomfited by them in battle, retired to his own country, whereupon Ispahān was temporarily recovered for Ja'far Khān by a force under Saiyid Murād Khān.

Before the end of 1785 a difference occurred between Ja'far Khān and 1785. Hāji 'Ali Quli Khān of Kāzarān, one of his supporters, which in the end had a sinister effect upon the royal fortunes. It originated in the refusal of Ja'far Khān to ratify terms granted by 'Ali Quli Khān to a number of Khurāsāni soldiers who had surrendered to him while they were in arms against his master; and it led to an attack by royal troops upon the Kāzarān chief, followed in the first instance by his flight, later by his voluntary submission, and finally by his treacherous imprisonment at Shīrāz. Riza Quli Khān, the brother of 'Ali Quli Khān, fled to Būshehr and thence to Basrah; and Ja'far Khān appointed a kinsman of his own to the government of Kāzarān.

The difficulties of Ja'far Khān were added to, about this time, by the 1786. revolt of Ismā'il Khān, a cousin to whom he had entrusted the administration of a district; and in March 1786 the rebel even defeated him in a serious encounter. In the following autumn Ja'far Khān thought it necessary to proceed against Būshehr, of which place the hereditary ruler, Shaikh Nāsir, now more than 80 years of age, had been guilty of an unfriendly act in harbouring the fugitive Riza Quli Khān and had also neglected to pay the tribute due by himself to the central government; but on the Khān's advancing to Kāzarān, which he reached on the 22nd September, the Shaikh tendered his submission and purchased

peace by the payment, it was said, of a considerable sum. On the same visit arrears of revenue were collected also from other petty rulers in the neighbourhood of the coast, and Ja'far Khān apparently did not leave Kāzarān until the 17th of December 1786, nor return to Shīrāz until the beginning of March 1787.

1787. In the following year suspicions of the loyalty of Saiyid Murad Khān, which Ja'far Khān had entertained ever since the beginning of his reign, seemed to come to a head; and in April 1787 the unhappy nobleman was arrested along with his family, beaten, stripped of his possessions, and sent to join 'Ali Quli Khān in confinement.

In 1788 Ja'far Khān's eldest son Lutf 'Ali Khān, a youth about 18 years of age, who had lately been appointed Baiglarbaig or Viceroy of Fārs, was able to repair to some extent the prestige of his father's government,—then shaken by a late unfortunate engagement between Ja'far Khān and some rebellious subjects in the neighbourhood of Yazd,—by the reduction of Lār, the capital of which he took by storm, afterwards sending the chief of the district a prisoner to Shīrāz. The Khān himself also obtained a success over the Qājārs in a battle fought near Qūmisheh, with the result that Isfahān, which had been lost, fell once more into his possession; but, on Āgha Muhammad Khān advancing against him, he again evacuated that city on the pretext that disturbances in the region adjoining the Persian Gulf demanded his immediate presence.

of these troubles, when, in January 1789, the life and reign of Ja'far Khān were suddenly terminated by violence. The principal actors in his assassination were the political prisoners 'Ali Quli Khān and Saiyid Murād Khān, who, after poison had been administered to him by an accomplice in the royal household, found means to draw near and despatch him with their swords. His head, separated from his body, lay for a time exposed to the insults of the populace on a piece of open ground before the citadel.

Ja'far Khān was in 1787 a middle-aged, corpulent man. His character was unreliable and even treacherous, but not harsh or severe; and with those of his subjects who knew him best he was by no means unpopular. His principal adviser or Vazīr was the worthy Mīrza Muhammad Husain, who had acted in the same capacity under his father Sādiq Khān, and who afterwards figured among the most loyal adherents of his son Lutf 'Ali Khān. The general position in Persia at Ja'far Khān's death may be summed up by saying that the districts

of Shīrāz, Behbehān and Shūshtar were still subject to the jurisdiction of the Zands, while Yazd, Kirman, Bushehr and Lar continued to pay them tribute; but the northern and north-western districts, as also Isfahān, had passed under the control of the Qājārs.

The revolution at Shīrāz placed Saiyid Murād Khān at the head of affairs. Lutf'Ali Khan, on news of the transactions at the capital reaching his camp, was at first deserted by all his followers except five; but, being a military ruler of ability and even of experience, and having been well received by the aged Shaikh of Büshehr, he was able in three months to collect a new force.

Reign of Saiyid Murād Khān 1789.

On the 22nd April 1789 he marched from Büshehr, accompanied by the eldest son of Shaikh Nāsir of Būshehr, who a few days later succeeded to the Shaikhdom in consequence of his father's death. A force sent from Shīrāz to oppose his advance mutinied at Dāliki and handed over their commander, a brother of Saïyid Murād Khān, to Lutf 'Ali Khān, who immediately put him to death. The rest of the young prince's march to Shīrāz was a triumphal progress; and, on arrival there, he was fortunate enough to secure the persons of his most dangerous enemies, in particular that of Saiyid Murād Khān, whom he caused to be executed. Others of his opponents met with unexpected clemency, and among these was, in the first instance, an obscure person named Mehdi 'Ali, who was accused of having cut the ears from the lifeless head of Ja'far Khān; but, at a later period, Lutf 'Ali Khān was persuaded to reconsider his treatment of this individual and sentenced him to death by burning, - an act which alienated the clever and influential Hāji Ibrāhīm, one of the intercessors on behalf of Mehdi 'Ali, and so contributed, as we shall see, to the downfall of the Zand dynasty.

The events described in this paragraph occurred, for the most part, during the year 1789.

Lutf 'Ali Khān was the last of his family to occupy a throne, but in military prowess he was the most remarkable, as in personal character he was perhaps the most attractive, of the Zand monarchs. His misfortunes have won for him the sympathy of every historian of the period.

Reign of Lutî 'Ali Khan, 1789-95.

No sooner was Lutf 'Ali Khan established in the government 1789. than his Qājar rival, Āgha Muhammad Khān, appeared in the neighbourhood of Shīrāz. A spirited attack was immediately made upon

the invader, but it was not 'successful; and a siege of Shīrāz by the Qājārs followed, which, though it was maintained for three months, likewise failed.

1790.

In the following year 1790, Lutf 'Ali Khān, after appointing a younger brother to be his nominal representative at Shīrāz and entrusting the civil government of the country to Hāji Ibrāhim and the command of the garrison at the capital to one Barkhudār Khān, himself set out, with an army originally collected for service against the Qājārs, to compel the governor of Kirmān to submit to his authority. His utmost efforts, however, were unequal to the task of capturing the town; an unusually rigorous winter made havoc of his force, both men and animals; and eventually he returned home baffled, bringing with him the shattered remains of the expedition.

1791.

The next year a crisis occurred at Shīrāz, after which, though his fortitude and other mauly qualities did not fail him but rather shone out with a brigher lustre than before, Lutf 'Ali Khān must be regarded as a king in name rather than in fact.

During his absence at Kirman there had been friction between Haji Ibrāhīm on the one side and the brother of Lutf 'Ali Khān and Barkhudar Khan on the other, all of whom represented him in different capacities; but the prince, disregarding the advice of his Vazīr, Mīrza Muhammad Husain, who distrusted Hāji Ibrāhīm, renewed their appointments when, in the summer of 1791, he took the field against the Qājār leader Bābā Khān, afterwards Fat-h'Ali Shāh. The result was that a few days after Lutf 'Ali Khān's departure, in pursuance of a plot in which Riza Qulī Khān of Kāzarān, Shaikh Nāsir of Bushehr and others were said to have joined for the purpose of setting up a federation of independent principalities, Haji Ibrāhīm contrived to make a prisoner of Barkhudar Khan and establish a government of his own in the town; but his brother, 'Abdur Rahīm Khān, failed in the task which had been assigned him of making Lutf 'Ali Khān a prisoner in his own camp. The very attempt, however, caused Lutf 'Ali Khān's army to disperse; and he hurried back to Shīrāz, which he expected to find in friendly hands. gates were closed against him; but, on being rejoined by some of his most loyal adherents, he proceeded, nothing daunted, to lay siege to his own capital. The families of his officers, however, being within the walls, were in the power of Haji Ibrāhīm; and the latter, by threatening to take extreme measures with them, was able a second time to empty Lutf'Ali Khān's camp.

The prince, accompanied only by about a dozen grooms and other servants, then made for Būshehr, where he hoped to receive help from Shaikh Nāsir; but in the plain of Kāzarān his mortal foe, Riza Quli Khān, was waiting for him and barred the way. Lutf'Ali Khān escaped with difficulty from the plain into the south-eastern hills, abandoning a number of valuable horses, but saving his own favourite charger "Keraun", and so descended by an unusual and toilsome route into Dashtistan. Here he was promptly succoured by Zal Khan of Khisht. a faithful adherent whom he had dismissed to his home from before the walls of Shīrāz. * Mīr Mihr 'Ali, the chief of Rīg, another devoted follower and one who, had not failed to warn Lutf 'Ali Khan of the existence of the plot against him before it took effect, quickly joined him; while "the old † cow" Shaikh Nāsir, who now belonged—as we have seen — to the opposite side, who had recently visited Shīrāz, and who at this point came out of Büshehr to take him prisoner, was fain to beat a hasty retreat lest he should be captured himself. On the 2nd November Lutf'Ali Khān and his supporters broke up a hostile force of Dashtistanis which had collected to attack them, and the Chief of Rig in particular performed prodigies of skill and valour in " spitting, on his spear, those pigs of fellows."; but on the same day a retirement was made to Khisht and preparations were begun for an attempt on Riza Quli Khān, in the meanwhile, had occupied and made dispositions for holding the Tang-i-Turkan, a pass through which the royalists would probably endeavour to force their passage in returning northwards.

On the evening of the 4th November Mr. Harford Jones; of the Basrah Agency, who had had commercial relations with Lutf 'Ali Khān not long before at Shīrāz and was now returning to Basrah, had an interview with the prince in his simple tent at Khisht, and received from his

^{*} Called in correspondence "Meer Ally" and by Brydges "Mihr Aly"; probably he had both the title "Mīr" and the name "Mihr".

^{† &}quot;Old cow" was the epithet which Lutf 'Ali Khan himself applied to Shaikh Nāsir; but he also quoted with approval a saying by another, that too much must not be expected of Shaikh Nāsir, he being "one of those animals whom God Almighty has furnished with very long ears and very little brains".

[‡] The events of this year in Persia are very fully described by Mr. Harford Jones, afterwards Sir H. J. Brydges, who was an eye-witness of them in so far as they occurred at the capital, in the introduction to his *Dynasty of the Kajars*. Mr. Jones arrived at Shīrāz, where he was the guest of Mīrza Muhammad Husain, the chief adviser of Lutf'Ali Khān, early in 1791; the object of his journey was to arrange

lips a graphic account of his late adventures. In response to a request for his opinion Mr. Jones suggested that Lutf 'Ali Khān should seize Būshehr, establish himself there, and open communication with the Government of India; and he promised personally to accompany and assist any agent whom the prince might depute to India, to realise money by the sale of jewels and to obtain ammunition and military stores with the proceeds. The same evening Mr. Jones left for Rīg; and, though for some months afterwards he maintained a correspondence with Lutf 'Ali Khān, he never again saw him.

A few days after this interview Lutf 'Ali Khān, who was always in favour of immediate action and apparently rejected the scheme proposed by Mr. Jones as involving too much delay, marched for Shīrāz with such a force as his local supporters had in a few days been able to raise; and on his way he inflicted one, if not two, crushing defeats upon Riza Quli Khān of Kāzarān, whom he captured and deprived of sight, recovering at the same time the horses that he had lost in his flight. Meanwhile Hāji Ibrāhīm, conscious of the insecurity of his position at Shīrāz, had opened communication with Agha Muhammad Khan, the Qajar chief, who at once appointed him Governor on his behalf of Fars, the Kühgalu country, Lāristān and the coast of the Persian Gulf, and ordered Mustafa Khān, one of the Qājār leaders, to comply with all his requisitions. Lutf'Ali Khān, as he approached Shīrāz, repelled with loss to the enemy a night attack upon his camp, and, after capturing a convoy of grain intended for the city, frustrated a determined effort by Mustafa Khān to recover it. He then settled down to a blockade of the town and

for the purchase of two valuable diamonds which Lutf 'Ali Khan, it was believed, wished to sell; but, though negotiations continued into the summer, the business was not carried through. The values of the two principal gems, the "Darya-i-Nur" and the "Taj-1-Mah", were estimated by Mr. Jones at about £300,000 and £100,000 respectively; and twelve other diamonds which were set along with them appeared to him to be worth about £500,000 in the aggregate. After the revolution Mr. Jones had some difficulty in obtaining permission to leave Shīrāz, as it was feared by Hāji Ibrahim that he might assist Lutf 'Ali Khan, who was still at large, to raise funds for continuing the struggle by the sale of jewels. At his departure Mr. Jones undertook to remove with him, for sale in India, a valuable library belonging to his host Mirza Muhammad Husain; but the owner, fortunately for himself, changed his mind, and was able afterwards to escape loss of life or of sight by delivering up the books when they were demanded of him by Agha Muhammad Khan. Mr. Jones eventually left Shīrāz for Rīg on the 1st November 1791; and on his way to the coast he waited at Khisht upon Lutf 'Ali Khan, for whom he entertained respect and even personal friendship: 'this was the occasion of the interview mentioned in the text.

opened a secret correspondence with friends, or supposed friends, within the walls; but the blockade was not strict enough to be quickly effectual, and the correspondence failed of its object through being detected and read.

The position of Haji Ibrahim, however, was so obviously critical,especially after a defeat sustained by his troops in an attack made jointly with a Qājār detachment upon those of Lutf 'Ali Khān,-that he was at last able to induce Agha Muhammed Khan, who had hitherto contented himself with sending re-inforcements, to move in person to his assistance. Lutf 'Ali Khan at once proceeded beyond Persepolis to encounter the approaching Qājārs; and he so arranged matters as to fall by night upon their advanced guard, which he drove back pell-mell upon the main body. In the darkness he then overran, with an absurdly small force, the camp of the huge Qājār army; but he was unfortunately persuaded by one of his adherents, whose motives may possibly have been treacherous, to do nothing more until the morning; and when day dawned, it was seen that Agha Muhammad Khan with great firmness of mind, had refrained even from quitting his tent. Between the disproportionate forces now intermingled on the same ground, and both commanded by able leaders, there could by daylight be no question of a contest; and Lutf 'Ali Khan was obliged to seek safety in flight.

After this decisive affair, which is variously described from the names of two adjacent villages as the battle of Mayin or Giraj, and which apparently took place in 1792 at some time before the end of May, the conqueror marched to Shīrāz, where he celebrated his success by a number of extreme measures, among these being the desecration of the tomb of Karim Khān and the deportation to Mazandarān of all the remaining members of the Zand tribe. Misfortunes, as we shall see further on, also befell the supporters of the Zand cause in the coast districts.

Lutf'Ali Khān was from this time onwards a homeless wanderer; 1792-94, but he was constitutionally incapable of despair; and during the next two years he continued to prosecute, with the assistance of an uncle ('Abdullah Khān) and other faithful friends, a desultory but untiring opposition to the Qājār chief.

He first found an asylum at Tabas and there organised an invasion of Fars; but a defeat by superior numbers at Rūnīz obliged him to withdraw again to the eastward; and, as he found himself no longer a welcome guest at Tabas, he withdrew from that place to Bam.

From Bam, having been joined by Afghan and other partisans, he advanced against the town of Kirman, captured it by storm after con-

siderable resistance, and assumed once more the prerogatives and state of an independent ruler; but this was the last gleam of his prosperity.

In 1794 Āgha Muhammad Khān himself appeared before Kirmān: and, after an investment extending to months, his troops were admitted into some of the defences by the treachery of a part of the garrison. Lutf 'Ali Khan held out for a time in one of the gateways of the town, after which, breaking through the masses of the enemy by a desperate effort, he regained Bam in safety. A few days after his arrival, however, not without a desperate struggle in which he defended himself single-handed against a whole body of the enemy, nor until he had been disabled by wounds, Lutf 'Ali Khān was made a prisoner by the acting Governor of Bam, whose intention it was to sacrifice him to the safety of a brother captured by Agha Muhammad Khān at the fall of Kirman; and a little later, having been handed over to the Qājārs, he was blinded, subjected to nameless indignities, and finally put to death. So ended, in 1795, the rule of the Zands in Persia. Khusrau Khān, the infant son of Lutf 'Ali Khān, was emasculated by order of Agha Muhammad Khan, himself a eunuch; and the conqueror's treatment of the citizens of Kirman recalled the worst excesses of Nadir Shāh.

Lutf 'Ali Khan is one of the most striking figures in Persian history, and his military skill and the extraordinary courage with which he contended against fate command admiration; but it may be doubted whether his reputation would have been served so well by success as it was by adversity, for in his conduct few traces are discoverable of foresight or moderation, — in a word, of statesmanship. It should be remembered, however, that his career ended at the early age of 25.

History of the Persian Coast districts, 1779-95.

Occupation of Bushehr by Baqir Khān, Chief of Taugistan, 30th June to 11th July 1779.

The assassination of Zaki Khān at the middle of June 1779 was the indirect cause of a series of remarkable occurrences at Būshehr and in its neighbourhood. In the confusion following his death Bāqir Khān, Rais or Chief of Tangistān, Zaki Khān's "instrument in ill-treating Sadoo "Caun's women, which power he exercised with cruelty," escaped from the clutches of the new rulers; and on the 28th of June it became known at Būshehr that he had reached the port of Rīg. Shaikh Nāsir, the hereditary governor of Būshehr, was at this time absent on some long

journey; but his return by sea from the direction of Masqat was expected within a few days, and two vessels had actually been got ready to meet his ship and convoy it up the Gulf.

On the evening of the 29th June, Hamad, the blind commander of 29th June. Bāqir Khān's troops in Tangistān, set out from home at the head of two or three hundred men in the direction of Rig; but his real objective. under orders received from his master, was Büshehr.

On the same night, or very early the next morning, finding the wall 29th-30th across the isthmus left, by unusual negligence, unwatched and even un- June. guarded, he entered Bushehr, A conflagration was immediately kindled, by which before daylight a thousand huts had been reduced to ashes; and, partly through the alarm and confusion caused by this fire and partly through the supineness of the ruling family, the Tangistanis obtained complete possession of Büshehr, with a loss of not more than fifteen men killed upon either side. Shaikh 'Ali and most of Shaikh Nasir's near relations busied themselves in saving their families and property, with which they embarked on vessels in the harbour, taking away some 300 men who might otherwise have been employed in defending the town; and Shaikh Sa'dun, the brother of Shaikh Nasir, "kept "close in his house, not daring to stir out though supported by near 200 "men armed with musquets, when 50 brave fellows led on by a man of "courage might have recovered the place." The weakness of the enemy was not discovered until it was too late, and then it was "impossible to describe the consternation of everybody on finding their conquerors so few."

30th June.

Contrary to the general expectation, no outrages against person or property were committed by the Tangistani force; but at midday on the 30th of June Shaikh Sa'dun left his house, under intimidation, and placed himself in the power of Hamad, with whom he agreed that a truce should be observed by both sides until Baqir Khan arrived. "This shameful treaty was no sooner concluded and Shaik Sadoon's "person secured than a party of Arabs appeared to the assistance of "Bushire, who killed 4 or 5 Tankseer * people they met with at the "watering place giving their horses water, which making free with, and "learning that the town was eventually lost, they departed, not however "without execrating Shaik Sadoon for his pusillanimity."

On the 1st of July Baqir Khan arrived on the scene from Rig with 1st July. a following of about 200 men and assumed the government of Büshehr

in a manner that was almost apologetic, for he explained that only the necessity of providing himself with a stronghold in which he might be safe from the enmity of Sādiq Khān had compelled him to act as he had done, and he promised to rule with strict moderation and justice. His later policy, equally, was a mixture of conciliation and force: on the one hand he persuaded the Muhammadan, the Armenian, and even the Hindu mercantile communities to petition separately for his recognition by Abul Fat-h Khān, the titular sovereign of Persia; and, on the other, he proceeded to improve the defences of the town against external attack, and to guard against insurrection within the walls by depriving the citizens of their weapons. The conduct of Bāqir Khān in seizing Būshehr, it may be remarked, was the more reprehensible in that he had, before the death of Karīm Khān, undertaken to provide for the safety of the place during the absence of Shaikh Nāsir.

2nd July.

On the 2nd of July the two Gallivats which had been prepared left for the southward in search of Shaikh Nāsir; and on the next day a number of poor families were expelled from the town to make room for a number of Tangistani immigrants, some of the better class among whom were armed. On the 5th of the month an officer of the Mir of Rig, who had come to request that the family of a deceased relation of the Shaikh of Büshehr should be handed over to his master, left for Rig after successfully discharging his commission; but before his departure he visited Mr. Beaumont, the British Resident, and assured him that the Mir, so far from having instigated the seizure of Büshehr by Bāqir Khān, his late guest, highly disapproved of the usurpation and would probably arrive before long with his own people and those of Ganaveh to help in bringing it to an end. By this officer Mr. Beaumont despatched a letter to the British Factory at Basrah, in which he informed them of the crisis at Bushehr and of his own disagreeable situation. During the next three days nothing of importance happened.

Difficulties of Baqir Khan and evacuation by him of Bushehr, 9th to 11th July 1779.

On the 9th of July Bāqir Khān received, with reference to his overtures, an unfavourable reply from Abul Fat-h Khān, by whose Farmān he was directed to restore to the inhabitants of Būshehr everything that he had taken from them, to deliver up the town to Shaikh Sa'dūn, and to repair at once in person to Shīrāz to answer for his late conduct. As preparations were already being made by neighbouring chiefs for an attack on him by sea and land, as it now seemed not unlikely that their efforts might be seconded by the Government of Shīrāz, and as, moreover, it was probable that he would be deserted by his own followers, whose families in Tangistān had begun to suffer by the attacks of Arab sympathisers

with the Shaikh of Būshehr, Bāqir Khān, at this point, decided to evacuate his conquest. As a preliminary to doing so, he seized upon some boats and despatched in them, to a place upon the coast of his own district, the plunder of the Shaikhs of Būshehr, of which the value was estimated at 3 to 4 lakhs of rupees: from the other principal residents, it is said, he had taken nothing. At length, at sunrise on the 11th of July, "to the inexpressible joy of the inhabitants" he quietly left for Tangistān with all his people.

The injury caused by this invasion was less than might have been supposed. Arrears of customs to the amount of 30,000 or 40,000 rupees had, indeed, been collected from the merchants of the town, who had also found it expedient to propitiate Bāqir Khān with gifts; and presents to the value of Rs. 3,789, which appeared to be expected, had been provided for him and for his principal men by the British Resident; but apart from these, from the spoliation of the Shaikhs and of some other Arabs, from the burning of a number of huts at the beginning of the occupation, and from the looting of a few shops on the day of the retirement, there were no losses.

The evacuation of Bushehr by the Tangistanis did not, however, bring the disturbances to an end; for the people of the adjacent districts, especially those of Arab race, and chiefs whose own position resembled that of the Shaikh of Bushehr, were resolved on punishing Bagir Khan and his tribesmen for their wanton attempt to upset the established order of things. Before Bagir Khan had left Bushehr even, Arab bands were over-running his district of Tangistan, where they pillaged and laid waste villages and committed all sorts of atrocities upon his subjects, "sparing neither sex nor age." On the 12th of July two Gallivats from Rig, and on the 15th one from Ganaveh, arrived at Bushehr to take part in the intended operations against Bāqir Khān; and on the latter date, Shaikh Nāsir not having as yet returned home, his brother Shaikh Sa'dūn was persuaded to place himself at the head of the retaliatory expedition. This body, which was composed chiefly of the warriors of Dashtistan, but which included also contingents from Ganaveh and Rig, was already encamped near the village of Tangistan in the district of the same name; and by the middle of July it had attained a strength of about 3,000 men. On the 31st of July Shaikh Nāsir arrived at Būshehr, accompanied by the two Gallivats that had sailed on the 2nd to meet him, and by the two Rig Gallivats and the Ganaveh Gallivat, which had followed for the same purpose upon the 26th; with him came also the

Counterinvasion of Tangistān by a confederation, July, August 1779. Harami Shaikh of 'Asalu, bringing two Gallivats, and Shaikh Nāsir of Bahrain, bringing one, so that there were in all 9 Gallivats besides 5 or 6 other vessels. Two vessels containing Būshehr property, which incautiously separated from the rest of the fleet near Bandar 'Abbās to obtain water, had been captured off Qishm by Shaikh 'Abdullah of Hormūz, who was at war with the Shaikh of Būshehr; but a ship belonging to the Imām of Masqat, with whom also Shaikh 'Abdullah had lately been on bad terms, had accompanied Shaikh Nāsir as far as 'Asalu and thence sailed for Zubārah. Shaikh Nāsir, on arrival at Būshehr, invited the Khān of Bardistān to join the combination against Bāqir Khān; at the beginning of August the invitation was accepted; and on the 7th of that month the Shaikhs of Būshehr, 'Asalu and Bahrain proceeded in person to the front. Close siege was laid to Bāqir Khān in his principal fort by a force that now amounted to 4,000 men with five or six heavy guns.

Bāqir Khān, on his part, was not altogether without allies. On the 12th of August, 7 boats from Tāhiri disembarked a reinforcement of 200 men for him at a convenient point on the coast; but 3 Gallivats were immediately sent from Būshehr to prevent the landing of any more similar contingents and, if possible, to capture the Tāhiri boats before their return home. The Ka'ab Shaikh also was disposed to help Bāqir Khān, who had solicited his aid immediately after taking possession of Būshehr; but difficulties with neighbours limited his efforts on behalf of his friend to the despatch of a single Tranki with 50 men. This vessel, moreover, merely touched at Dīlam at the end of July, and thence, in consequence of news of Bāqir Khān's evacuation of Būshehr, returned direct to Dōraq.

Negotiations, murder of Baqir Khau, and end of the war, 24th to 29th August 1779.

On the 24th of August, having previously come out of his fort and consulted with the Mīr of Rīg, the Khān of Ganāveh, and other intermediaries, Bāqir Khān visited Shaikh Nāsir on a safe conduct and promised to surrender the next day, and to give up his forts and all his property; but on the 25th he did not appear, and it was observed that he had utilised the armistice, as on a former occasion, to re-provision his fort. On the 26th of August, however, he came again to Mīr Mihr 'Ali of Rīg, at the same time submitting to Shaikh Nāsir "a very false account of the effects taken from Būshehr;" but, while he was actually sitting with Mihr 'Ali, a number of Ganāveh people who had a blood feud against him, having first obtained permission from Shaikh Nāsir, fell upon him and killed him along with fifteen of his followers. Twenty-five others who accompanied him, and who were among his principal men, were taken

prisoners on this occasion, but were saved from death by the intervention of the Büshehr Shaikh. On the 27th a partial surrender of the late Khān's followers took place; and on the 29th the whole proceedings concluded with the submission of his lieutenant Hamad, who delivered up the principal fort in Tangistān to Shaikh Nāsir. The allied forces then dispersed to their homes, and* Tangistān was left, for the time being, in the possession of the Büshehr Shaikh. The chief credit for the overthrow of Bāqir Khān was considered to be due to the Arabs whose prompt invasion of Tangistān had deranged his original schemes.

The conduct of Bāqir Khān was strongly resented, as we have already seen, by the Persian Government; they immediately despatched messengers to every district between Kangūn and Bandar Abbās to procure help for the allies; and troops from Shīrāz would also have been sent to the spot, had not the leaders of the expedition to Tangistān, anticipating misbehaviour on their part, declined to receive any such reinforcement.

Attitude of the Shīrāz Government and action of the British Residency at Basrah.

During the crisis the British Factory at Basrah did everything in their power to assist Mr. Beaumont, the Resident at Büshehr; they wrote letters on his behalf to the Mīr of Rīg, to the Khān of Ganāveh, and to Bāqir Khān himself; and they sent an Armenian merchant to Khārag, and a subordinate from their own staff to Büshehr, to render such further services as might be feasible.

During the summer of 1780, Sādiq Khān's sovereignty of Persia being then disputed by Ali Murād Khān, the districts of the Persian Coast escaped from all control, and general confusion prevailed. In July Shaikh Abdullah of Hormūz was at war with the people of Chārak; Shaikh Saqar of Asalu had lately burned a place, probably Tāhirī, which belonged to his enemies; and the Qawāsim of Rās-al-Khaimah, between whom and the Imām of 'Omān hostilities prevailed, seem to have committed depredations on the Būshehr fleet also, as there is mention in the records of the time of a vessel, named the "Expedition,' which they declined to restore to the Shaikh. During this season the town of Rīg was accidentally destroyed by fire.

Coastal and maritime disturbances, 1780.

The visit of Lutf Ali Khān, the Zand prince, to Būshehr in the spring of 1789, and his reception and the support which he obtained there, have already been noticed in the foregoing section which deals with the general history of Persia. Of greater local importance were

Death of Shaikh Nāsir I of Bushehr and succession of Shaikh Nāsir II, 1789.

^{*}Shaikh Nāsir apparently built a fort at Chaghādak in Tangistān and retained it until 1791, when, on the defeat of the Dashtistānis by Luft Ali Khān (see page 1843, ante), it was destroyed by the Tangistānis.

the death, at the end of April or beginning of May 1789, of the aged Shaikh Nāsir (I) of Būshehr, who had then ruled the principality for some 40 years and had attained an age of over 80, and the succession of his son, whose name also was Nāsir (II).*

Affairs at the coast, 1791-92.

In the winter of 1791-92, as we have already seen, the country about Kāzarān, Khisht and Būshehr became for a short time, after his loss of Shīrāz, the theatre of Lutf 'Ali Khān's activity; and it is unnecessary to return here to the incidents of his sojourn in the neighbourhood. By the beginning of June 1792, in consequence of the defeat of Lutf Ali Khān by Agha Muhammad Khān at Māyin or Giraj, events at the coast had taken a turn unfavourable to the supporters of the Zand cause, but advantageous to the Shaikh of Büshehr. who had in the beginning espoused the side of the rebel Haji Ibrahim. Mihr Ali Khan of Rig, being unable to take the field in consequence of a severe wound which he had received in battle with Lutf Ali Khan's enemies, submitted to a demand by Shaikh Nāsir II that he should retire to Ganaveh and hand over Rig to a former governor whom Lutf Ali Khān had deposed. A little later the Shaikh of Būshehr endeavoured to take the island of Khārag, which belonged to Mihr Ali Khān, by means of a force of two or three hundred men supported by several armed boats; but the Dutch fort by which Khārag was defended was still strong, the commandant was a man of courage, and Mihr Ali Khan found means to reinforce the garrison; and for these reasons the attack failed. Simultaneously an expedition was led by Shaikh Nāsir in person against Khisht, the residence and domain of Zal Khan, another staunch partisan of Lutf Ali Khan, which was defended by a small fort. This was the position of affairs at the end of May 1792; and Nasir Khan seems to have remained at Khisht until the end of June, and then to have gone home unsuccessful; but within a month after his return to Būshehr, in consequence of the death of Mihr Ali Khān, Khārag passed quietly into his possession. Shaikh Nāsir had ere this time received several summonses to attend the court of Agha Muhammad Khan at Shīrāz; but he did not desire a closer acquaintance with the Qājār, and he was able, for a time at least, to evade compliance.

Lease of Bandar 'Abbās and dependencies to the Sultān of 'Omān,

1794.

About this time Saiyid Sultān, the ruler of 'Omān, obtained a footing on the Persian Coast in virtue of a revenue lease of Bandar 'Abbās,

^{*} In the official letter announcing the change, the names of the old and new Shaikhs seem to be given as "Nausir" and "Nassir" respectively, meaning perhaps Nasir and Nasr (Ullah); but before this the name of the old Shaikh also had generally been spelt "Nassir" or "Nassur," and it may be doubted whether there was really any difference between the names.

Minab, and the adjacent islands, which seems to have been granted to him in 1794, probably because it could not be refused, either by Agha Muhammad Khān or Lutf 'Ali Khān.

British relations with the southern districts of Persia, 1779-1795.

The East India Company, the sole custodian as yet of British interests in the Persian Gulf, maintained a Residency at Bushehr during the whole of the period now in question; but their political dealings with the Government of Persia, perhaps on account of its instability in the time of the Zand rulers after Karīm Khān, were few and unimportant.

Of the later Zands, Ja'far Khān at least was well disposed towards the British: and in 1786 his minister Mīrza Muhammad Husain, who had been favourably known to the Company's representatives at Basrah as the adviser of Sādiq Khān during the Persian occupation, was presented by Mr. Galley, the British Resident at Büshehr, with "an elegant "achromatic telescope and a Fahrenheit's thermometer, two articles of "which Persians are extremely desirous," avowedly as an incentive towards "the continuance of his friendship to the English nation".

In 1787 Mr. H. Jones of the Basrah Factory, afterwards Sir H. J. Brydges, and Ensign Francklin of the East India Company's service spent a pleasant summer at Shīrāz under the protection of Ja'far Khān, and were enabled to make an excursion to the ruins of Persepolis.

On the 18th of January 1788 Ja'far Khān issued an effusive Farmān 1788. to the address of the British Resident at Bushehr, promising full protection and absolute freedom of trade to British subjects in Persia, and undertaking to abolish road dues and other vexatious impositions, to which they had apparently been subjected; and in September of the same year another document of similar purport was granted, accompanied by a robe of honour for the grantee.

In June 1790 Lutf 'Ali Khān, referring to his late father's disposition 1790-1791. in the matter, strongly urged the British to push their trade at Shīrāz and promised to grant them every facility that they enjoyed in Turkish 'Iraq. Mr. Harford Jones's relations with Lutf 'Ali Khan in 1791 were of an altogether unofficial nature.

The unsettled state of the country was as unfavourable to commercial as it was to political activity. In February 1780, the official disbursements of the Resident at Büshehr having been largely in excess

1787.

East India Company's trade and consulage.

and trade generally. of the receipts from the Company's trade, Mr. Beaumont was obliged to draw a bill for Rs. 10,000 upon the Government of Bombay at 30 days' sight, by which means interest at 18 per cent. a month upon cash borrowed locally and a loss of 5 per cent. in exchang upon money obtained from Basrah were both avoided. The native merchants at Büshehr, notwithstanding the prospect of further civil wars, were at this time ready to take off a supply of woollens; but the stock in the factory had been allowed, perhaps out of prudence in view of risk, to become depleted. The annual accounts of the Residency, closing on the 30th of April 1780, showed a loss to the Company in the year just ended, through the existence of the Büshehr station, of Rs. 9,124. The total expenditure had been Rs. 14,585, and the total income consequently less than Rs. 5,500; and, while Rs. 3,789 paid in blackmail to Bagir Khan and Rs. 2,000 expended in repairs to the factory were exceptional items of debit, the deficit apart from these was considerable. The Company's customs yielded Rs. 4,385, but only Rs. 700 was obtained as freight on pearls and treasure consigned to India, the reason being that only one cruiser sailed from Büshehr for the Presidency during the whole twelve months.

1784.

In 1784 a two per cent. consulage at Büshehr, hitherto divided equally between the local Resident and the Governor of Bombay, was ordered to be otherwise treated, half the receipts being in future passed to the credit of the East India Company.

1785.

In 1785, the Persian trade being still at a low ebb, Mr. G. Matcham, a servant of the Company who was returning to Europe, received a passage on H.M.S. "Active" and a commission from the Government of Bombay to travel home by way of Isfahān and investigate upon the spot the causes of its decline; but at the time of his arrival at Būshehr, in March 1785, the interior of Persia was so much disturbed that he was obliged to renounce, for the time at least, all thought of carrying out his instructions, and continued his journey by Basrah.

1788.

Under Ja'far Khān commercial confidence began to revive in Persia, as both that prince and his enemy Āgha Muhammad Khān tacitly made it a rule not to attack caravans or otherwise disturb trade; and in 1788 the imports into Persia were larger than in any year since the death of Karīm Khān.

1790.

In 1790, under the orders of Government, a report on the trade of the Persian Gulf was drawn up by Messrs. Manesty and Jones of the Basrah Factory, dealing very fully with the state of trade in Persia at the time, which was still less flourishing than it had been under Karīm Khān.

Büshehr.

The principal port was Büshehr, where customs duties were light, though variable, and where the administration was of an easy-going Arab kind, very favourable to trade. Since the loss of Bahrain in 1783 there had been little intercourse between Büshehr and the opposite coast of the Gulf; but there was a considerable trade, by native boats, with Masqat. The chief article imported direct from India at Büshehr was chintz from the coast of Coromandel. There were also cloth goods from Bengal, but these were not suited to the Persian market and were brought to Büshehr only for the purpose of smuggling them into Turkish 'Irāq. Bengal merchants sent also some sugar candy, iron, and wooden planks; indigo was supplied by Masulipatam; and china and glassware often arrived from Bombay in the vessels of the East India Company. The importations by native boat from Masgat were chiefly sugar, sugar candy, spices, coffee, metals and a variety of petty articles: of these the sugar, sugar candy, spices and metals mostly came to Mascat in French or Dutch vessels. The principal obstacle at one time in the way of a profitable trade at Bushehr was the abuse of his power by the Shaikh, himself a merchant, to control the local market. The state of trade at Büshehr always depended closely on the general and political situation at Shīrāz; and, under ordinary conditions, there was hardly a week in which one or more commercial caravans did not pass between the two places. When disturbances prevailed upon the direct road, goods for Isfahān were forwarded to their destination by Shūshtar or Yazd instead of Shīrāz. The cost of carriage from Būshehr to Shīrāz was at this time 221 to 231 Būshehr rupees per mule load, and 25½ to 26½ Büshehr rupees per camel load. The best Persian opium was produced, in these days, in the neighbourhood of Kāzarān; and Shīrāz supplied the whole Gulf with glass, sword-blades, spear-heads, and gun-barrels.

Bandar'Abbās had now ceased to be a port of general consequence; and the trade route connecting it with Isfahān had fallen into total disuse. There was, however, some exportation of sulphur and rock-salt from Hormūz. Kirmān wool was still a commodity of considerable value; but about 1788, in consequence of a prohibition on export by Ja'far Khān, only about 3,000 Tabrīz Mans were obtainable annually.

The foreign trade of Western Persia, if a trade between Basrah and Shūshtar be excluded, was entirely with Baghdād; and it was observed that the parts of the country served by Baghdād took, as compared

Bandar 'Abbās.

Western Persia. with others, a larger proportion of European and a smaller of Indian goods. The caravan road from Persia to Baghdād by Kirmānshān was, as a rule, unsafe. Chintz and coarse cotton cloth manufactured at Shūshtar were among the exports from Persīa to Turkish 'Irāq. The duties at Shūshtar were very moderate.

Eastern Persia. The regions of Makrān and Sīstān were as yet commercially of no account; but southern Khurāsān and at times northern Khurāsān, as well as Qandahār and Kābul, were supplied with foreign goods from Masqat by way of Sind and Multān. The trade from Masqat to Afghānistān and Khurāsān by the Indus route had at this time only begun to attract notice, but it was regarded as highly promising, and it had been initiated by merchants of Būshehr. The goods sent for disposal in Afghānistān were woollens, Bengal piece-goods, Masulipatam chintz, and European fire-arms; and the "returns" consisted partly in shawls, jewels and drugs.

Matters apparently went from bad to worse; and at the beginning of June 1792, in consequence of the overthrow of Lutf'Ali Khān, they reached such a point that Mr. Watkins, the Resident at Būshehr, reported as follows,—"Ever since the revolution took place, all mercan-"tile communication between Sherauz and Bushire has ceased, and it is "easy to conceive the vast detriment commerce must consequently have "sustained. Although many revolutions have happened of late years "in this country, not one had been attended with such injurious con-"sequences to its trade. Owing to stagnation of trade money is "extremely scarce, and, to add to the list of evils, every kind of grain "and provisions are (sic) uncommonly scarce and dear."

Establishments of the East India Company on the Persian Coast,

The Residency at Büshehr, the only settlement at this time maintained by the East India Company in Persia, was no longer dependent on, or even connected with, the Factory at Basrah, which in 1778 had been reduced from the status of an Agency, with powers of control over Residencies, to that of a Residency itself.

The Residency building at Büshehr was repaired in 1779-1780 at a cost of Rs. 2,000; but unusually violent rains, which set in before the work could be properly completed, again "destroyed a fourth part of this rotten factory"; and Mr. Beaumont, who at the same time applied for a transfer to India on the ground of indifferent health and a twelve years' residence in the Gulf, reported that the rest was in danger of falling from every shower. These are trivial facts, but they cast a light on the conditions of life at Büshehr in the early days of the British Residency there.

AGHA MUHAMMAD KHAN, 1795—1797.

The reign of Āgha Muhammad Khān, the founder of the Qājār dynasty in Persia, lasted only two years, from 1795 to 1797; but, short though it was it was signalised by the first establishment of contact between the politics of Europe and those of the Middle East. In the present place, however, we are not concerned with such far-reaching questions; and, for an account of the developments of Russian, French and British policy in regard to Persia at this time, the reader is referred to the chapter on the history of the Persian Gulf as a whole.

General history of Persia, 1795-1797.

Āgha Muhammad Khān, while still a child, had been emasculated by order of 'Ādil Shāh, the nephew and successor of Nādir Shāh, into whose power, about the year 1748, he had the misfortune to fall; and it was, perhaps, in consequence of this accident that his whole life, from the time he grew up, was dedicated to political ambitions, and that his pursuit of them was characterised by systematic cruelties such as only ruthless calculation, combined with a wish to revenge his wrongs upon mankind at large, could have inspired.

His father, Muhammad Husain Khān, was defeated and killed in 1758 by other chiefs of the same Qājār tribe, who had combined with Karīm Khān, Zand, the ruler of Shīrāz, to overthrow him; and from that year until 1779 Āgha Muhammad Khān remained as a political prisoner at the southern capital.

On the death of the Vakīl he escaped from Shīrāz with only 17 followers and reached northern Persia in safety; but after that some years passed in contests with members of his own family before he attained to undisputed headship over the Qājārs. His only full brother, Husain Quli Khān, was dead, having been slain by Turkmans, but had left two young sons named Fat-h 'Ali Shāh and Husain Quli Khān. His half-brothers were five in number, of whom he was able to drive

three from the country, to blind another, and to remove the last by peculiarly treacherous assassination. About 1786, while still competing with the Zands for the supremacy in Persia, Agha Muhammad Khān made Tehrān his capital instead of Isfahān, which he had occupied in the previous year but had not been able to retain.

In 1791, assisted by an internal revolution, he obtained possession of Shīrāz, the seat of the Zand power; and by 1795 the whole of Persia was in his hands. He then set himself to intimidate, by a course of merciless severity, all tribal chiefs and others, who, with the examples of Nādir Shāh and Karīm Khān before their eyes, might venture to aspire to the crown, or from any other motive to trouble the peace of the country; and by acts intended to vilify and degrade the memories of Nādir Shāh and Karīm Khān, whose remains he even exhumed and caused to be reburied at the threshold of his palace, he did his utmost to efface such traditions of the past as seemed to detract from his own greatness. After the extension of his power to Southern Persia he appointed Hāji Ibrāhīm, whose of the Zands had given him Shīrāz, to be his chief adviser: and his nephew Fat-h'Ali Shāh, whom he had chosen to succeed him at his death, was made Governor of the whole province of Fars.

Agha Muhammad Khān's military exploits, after he had acquired undivided sovereignty over Persia, were confined to the north. In 1795 he invaded Georgia, a province of which the ruler, Heraclius, had in 1783 placed himself under the protection of Catherine of Russia; and, as Russian aid was not instantly available, Tiflīs, the capital, underwent sack and other dire atrocities at the hands of the Persians. During the winter of 1795-96 the Persian ruler remained in occupation of Georgia. He now, at length, consented to be crowned after a fashion; but he refused the four-plumed diadem of Nādir Shāh on the plea that the extent of the territories as yet in his possession was not sufficient to warrant his assuming it.

From Georgia Āgha Muhammad Khān marched to Khurāsān, punishing some Turkoman tribes by the way; and at Mashhad, by tortures so severe as in the end to cause death, he wrung from Shāh Rukh, the blind grandson of Nādir Shāh, the treasures, chiefly gems, remaining in possession of his family. He next threatened the principality of Bukhāra with invasion, unless all Persians kidnapped and enslaved by the Azbaks were set at liberty; and hostilities with Baigi Jān, the virtual ruler and a man of no less unusual character than himself, might have followed, if his attention had not been distracted by events in a different quarter.

The mission of MM. Bruguière and Olivier, who were sent by the French Government to the Persian Court in 1796, is fully noticed in the chapter on the general history of the Gulf.

The Russians had now begun to advance, in considerable strength, upon the northern frontier of Persia; and on the 20th September 1796 Agha Muhammad Khān arrived at Tehrān from Mashhad to make dispositions for meeting their threatened attack. The danger of invasion was removed for the time, however, by the death of Catherine of Russia on the 9th of November 1796; and in the early spring of 1797, encouraged by the Russian retirement Agha Muhammad Khān undertook a second invasion of Georgia. But his mind was now deranged, or in a state bordering on derangement; and in the course in the campaign he was murdered by two domestic servants whom he had sentenced to death for a paltry offence, and had allowed to remain, while awaiting their doom in attendance upon his person.

History of the Persian Coast, 1795-97.

During the reign of Agha Muhammad Khān over Persia, the districts of the Persian Coast were not the scene of any incident worthy of remark in connection either with foreign policy or with internal affairs.

FAT-H 'ALI SHAH, 1797—1884.*

Under Fat-h 'Ali Shāh, the successor of Āgha Muhammad Khan, Persia entered a wider political circle than that in which she had been

^{*} The principal authorities for the general history of Persia under Fat-h'All Shāh are History of Persia, by Sir J. Malcolm, 1815; Dynasty of the Kajars, by Sir H. J. Brydges, 1833; History of Persia, by Mr.R. G. Watson, 1866; General Sketch of the History of Persia, by Mr. C. R. Markham, 1874, and Lord Curzon's Persia, 1892. The following are useful chiefly with reference to the political relations between Britain and Persia, involving to some extent those of the latter country with Russia and Afghānistān: Journey through Persia and Second Journey through Persia, 1812 and 1818, by Mr. J. Morier; Mission to the Court of Persia, by Sir H. J. Brydges, 1834; and History of the War in Afghanistan and Life and Correspondence of Lieutenant-General Sir John Malcolm, 1851 and 1856, by Mr. J. W. Kaye. Mr. J. Talboys Wheeler's Memorandum on Persian Affairs, 1871,

accustomed to move, and her external politics became more complicated than they had hitherto been. As it is impossible to separate the history of Persia in the Persian Gulf from the history of Persia at large, we may here review the latter in some of its principal aspects.

Internal history of Persia, 1797-1834.

The internal history of Persia during the reign of Fat-h'Ali Shāh is roughly divided into periods by two wars with Russia, to be noticed hereafter, which ended respectively with the treaty of Gulistān in 1813 and the Treaty of Turkmanchai in 1828.

Early period, 1797—1813.

In spite of various precautions which Agha Muhammad Khān had taken for securing the succession of his nephew and heir, Fat-h 'Ali Shāh was engaged for some time after he ascended the throne in contests with pretenders to the crown and other rebels against his authority. During the lifetime of Agha Muhammad Khān he had been generally spoken of as Bāba Khān or Bāba 'Ali Khān; but, after his coronation on the 21st of March 1793, the earlier appellation was dropped for that of Fat-h 'Ali Shāh, by which he is known to history.

1797-98.

Almost the first act of the new sovereign was to blind his uncle 'Ali Quli Khān, a brother of Āgha Muhammad Khān not before mentioned by name, who had unduly delayed to testify his respect by waiting on him; and immediately afterwards he marched in person against Sādiq Khān, a military commander who had been implicated in the murder of Āgha Muhammad Khān, and who now clearly aspired on his own account to the supreme power. Sādiq Khān was defeated in the neighbourhood of Qazvīn; but he made his peace with the Shāh by delivering up the crown* jewels of Persia, of which he had possessed himself at the death of the late ruler, and was then pardoned and even invested with a

Appendix II, contains the text of two French Treaties with Persia. Aitchison's Treaties (Vol. XII, 4th edition) contains the Anglo-Persian engagements of the period. The chief sources of information in regard to the local affairs of the Persian Coast are Mr. J. A. Saldanha's Selections from State Papers, Bombay, regarding the East India Company's Connection with the Persian Gulf, with a Summary of Events, 1600—1800, printed in 1905, and his Précis of Correspondence regarding the Affairs of the Persian Gulf, 1801—1853, printed in 1906. A few additional facts are contained in E. S. Waring's Tour to Sheeraz, 1807; Bombay Selections, XXIV, 1856; and Lieutenant C. R. Low's History of the Indian Navy, 1877.

^{*} Among these were the Darya-i-Nūr and the Tāj-i-Māh, which we have seen in the possession of Lutf 'Ali Khān.

government. Meanwhile the actual assassins of Agha Muhammad Khan were captured, one by one, and put to death; and the body of that prince was sent to Najaf for interment. A member of the Zand family, named Muhammad Khān,—who is described as a son of Zaki Khān but is not, apparently, mentioned as such at any earlier date, -next seized Isfahān; but he was promptly driven out by the troops of the Qajars and took refuge in the Bakhtiyāri mountains. After this Sādiq Khān with the help of several other chiefs again made war upon the Shah, and, having been overthrown by a Qājār general, Sulaimān Khan, was pardoned a second time; but one, at least, of his principal associates was less fortunate and paid the penalty of rebellion with his life. interim Muhammad Khan, the Zand prince, had succeeded in forming a party of his own among the Kurds: he was defeated, however, by Muhammad Vali Khān, a commander sent against him by Fat-h'Ali Shah, was captured while endeavouring to escape to Basrah, and was incapacitated for future mischief by being deprived of sight. rising against the Shah was one headed by his own full brother, Husain Quli Khan, whom he had originally appointed to the Government of Fars,—at the time, perhaps, the most important province of Persia, and whom he now saw fit to supersede, apparently for incompetence rather than for untrustworthiness. Muhammad Vali Khān, the commander who had defeated Muhammad Khan, Zand, deserted his master and joined Husain Quli Khān, as did also that Sulaimān Khān whom Fat-h 'Ali Shāh had employed against Sādiq Khān; and armed strife between the royal brothers was with difficulty averted by the entreaties of their mother. In the settlement of this case Fat-h 'Ali Shah showed great magnanimity, for he appointed his brother to the Government of Kāshān to console him for the loss of Shīrāz, and he spared the lives of Muhammad Vali Khān and Sulaimān Khān, and even restored the latter to favour. This rebellion involved, as we shall see further on, a temporary change of Government at Büshehr. Is-hāq Mīrza, a reputed descendant of the ancient Safavi kings of Persia, after this attempted to assert a claim to the throne; but he was worsted, and the Shah took advantage of the occasion to give fresh proofs of the clemency of his disposition. The next scene of trouble was in Khurāsān, where Nādir Mīrza, son of Shāh Rukh and great-grandson of Nādir Shāh, re-entering the country from Afghanistan on the death of Agha Muhammad Khan, had established himself with an armed following. The Shah, on his march to Mashhad, reduced the towns of Turbat and Nishapūr, which were in revolt against him; and, on his arrival at his destination, the usurping Mīrza duly made his submission and was permitted to retain the government. Fat-h 'Ali Shāh's return to Tehrān from this expedition appears to have taken place after the middle of 1798; and, in that case, the first year of his reign must have been an arduous one.

1799-1800.

Some time afterwards, probably in the summer of 1799, Fat-h 'Ali Shāh assembled an army, intending to make war on Zamān Shāh, the ruler of Kābul, who had demanded the cession of Khurāsān; but in the end, Zamān Shāh having withdrawn his pretensions, the force was employed instead to chastise the rulers of Sabzavār and Nīshapūr, who had shown signs of insu bordination. The destruction of that incorrigible rebel Sādiq Khān resulted indirectly from the call to arms; for, on his neglecting to obey a summons to join the army, he was taxed with treachery, arrested, and walled up in a room at Tehrān, where he perished by starvation.

Early in 1800 the Shāh again visited Khurāsān, but returned to his capital before the end of the year.

1801-02.

After this, perhaps in the next year, Husain Quli Khān, the brother of the Shah, wer' into rebellion once more and temporarily obtained possession of Isfahan by means of a forged patent of appointment as Governor. On the approach of a royal force, however, he fled; and, finding himself cut off from the Turkish frontier, across which he had intended to retire, he threw himself upon the mercy of the Shāh at Qum. He was again forgiven, and soon afterwards he died a natural death in the vicinity of Tehran. No sooner had his brother's revolt been quelled than Fat-h 'Ali Shah was obliged to proceed to Khurasan, where complaints against the administration of Nadir Mirza were rife; but, before matters had been fully settled there, he returned to Tehran. The date of this journey appears to have been 1802. The Shah subsequently reinforced some troops left before the walls of Mashhad to receive charge of Nādir Mīrza, whose surrender had been guaranteed by Saiyid Mehdi, the chief Mujtahid of the town; and ere long, in consequence of excesses to which Nadir Mīrza proceeded, such as plundering the shrine of Imam Riza and putting to death Saiyid Mehdi, the citizens admitted the royalists within the walls. The Mīrza attempted to escape, but he was pursued, captured, and taken to Tehran, where, by order of the Shah and with the full approval of the public, he suffered the loss of his tongue, hands, and eyes.

The Shāh inherited his first prime minister, Hāji Ibrāhīm, from his uncle, who had been originally placed in possession of Shīrāz by that able and probably unscrupulous individual. Fat-h 'Ali Shāh, however,

seems to have feared that a statesman who had failed in loyalty to a Zand might prove equally untrustworthy towards a Qājār; he early associated two colleagues with the Haji, as a check upon his actions; and in 1801 * or 1802, in consequence of sinister reports that had begun to circulate regarding the minister's intentions, he caused him to be put to death. A number of Hāji Ibrāhīm's relations, by whom a large part of Persia was governed, perished simultaneously with him upon an appointed day.

From 1804 to 1813, or during the remainder of this first period, war 1804-13. continued intermittently between Russia and Persia, overshadowing all domestic occurrences in the latter kingdom. We may mention, however, that in 1812-1813, after a severe defeat of the Persian army by the Russians, the chiefs of Khurāsān rose against Muhammad Vali Mīrza, the Shah's son, by whom the province was governed. The rulers of Bukhāra and Khīva sent aid to the insurgents, but this movement on their part was premature, for the head of an ecclesiastical family of Mashhad, acting in the interest of the Shah, was able temporarily to break up the combination of domestic rebels; and then, while the Central Asian forces retired with ignominy, a royal army inflicted punishment on the Khurāsānis. Some Turkmans who had risen under the leadership of a Qajar were also chastised, about the same time, by order of the Shah.

Fat-h'Ali Shāh had an enormous family†; but only four of his sons attained to any prominence in public affairs during his life-time. These were Muhammad 'Ali Mirza, the eldest, fierce and truculent, who was governor of Kirmanshah and superintended the affairs of Persian Kurdīstān, but who from the first, perhaps as the offspring of a Georgian slave, was treated as ineligible for the succession; 'Abbas Mirza, the second, energetic but capricious, who was recognised as heir apparent, ruled over Āzarbāijān, and generally commanded in the war against the Russians: I Hasan (or Husain) 'Ali Mīrza, who filled the government of Shīrāz after the removal therefrom of Husain Quli Khān and was consequently the adviser of the Shāh in Persian Gulf affairs; and

^{*}The time must apparently have been after the departure of General Malcolm from Persia in March 1801 and before the arrival of Mr. Waring in the country in May 1802.

[†] According to Mr. Watson (History of Persia, page 269) his own sons and daughters numbered 159. For other estimates see Lord Curzon (Persia, vol. I, pages 410-411).

[‡] In the Persian Gulf records his name is generally given as Husain, not Hasan.

Muhammad Vali Mīrza, who at one time, as we have seen, was in charge of Khurāsān.

Middle period, 1813—28. Not long after the close of the first Russian war, Muhammad Vali Mirza, who had treacherously murdered Is-hāq Khān of Turbat, the most influential chief of Khurāsān, possibly under instructions from the Shāh, was recalled from Mashhad, where his place was taken for a time by his brother Hasan 'Ali Mīrza, formerly of Shīrāz.

1817.

In 1817 the head of the Ismā'īli sect, a progenitor of the present Agha Khān of Bombay, who resided at Yazd, was killed in a riot between shop-keepers of the town and some of his own servants. Fat-h 'Ali Shāh, who feared the vengeance of the Ismā'īli sect, was careful to conciliate them by punishing one of the principal offenders and by adopting a son of the deceased, on whom he conferred much property in addition to that which he inherited. The actual murderers of the sacred chief did not escape retribution at the hands of Ismā'īlis.

1821-22.

Persia was visited in 1821-1822 by a severe epidemic of cholera: it * carried off the Shah's eldest son, Muhammad 'Ali Mīrza, who was then engaged in a war with the Turks. The disease also caused the death at Shīrāz of Mr. Rich, British Political Agent at Baghdād, and that of Dr. Jukes, a Special Commissioner from the Government of India to Persia. Another victim was Mīrza Buzurg, a worthy man and one of the principal officials of the Shah, who died on the 14th of August 1822. Mīrza Buzurg was a nephew of Mīrza Muhammad Husain Khān, the minister of Sādiq Khān, Ja'far Khān and Lutf 'Ali Khān, and he thus belonged to a family that had lost its place at court through the fall of the Zand dynasty and the enmity of Hāji Ibrāhīm. After a time, however, he had become adviser to 'Abbas Mīrza, the heir apparent, and received the title of Qāim-Magām; and finally he rose to such favour that about 1811, on the death of his eldest son in the Crown Prince's service, a daughter of the Shah was bestowed in marriage upon his youngest son as a mark of sympathy.

Final period, 1828—34.

During the Russian war of 1826-1828 disorganisation spread far and wide through Persia. The Shāh's son Muhammad Vali Mīrza, who had been sent to govern Yazd, was expelled and insulted by the inhabitants of the town; the people of Isfahān withheld the revenue due from them; and the province of Kirmān broke into open rebellion. On the conclusion of peace with the Russians Hasan 'Ali Mīrza, lately governor

^{*} According to another account, however, Muhammad 'Ali Mirza died before the commencement of the epidemic, and the course of the illness which carried him offwas less rapid than that of cholera.

of Khurāsān and formerly of Fars, was sent with troops to restore order in the south; but he failed to do so, at least at Yazd. Simultaneously the provinces of Kirmanshah and Hamadan were entrusted to 'Abbas Mīrza in addition to that of Azarbāijān, which he already held. The chiefs of Khurāsān had revolted in the meanwhile; and in August 1828 Mashhad was seized by a leader of local influence, nor could it immediately be recovered.

In 1830, in which year the Shah paid a personal visit to Isfahan, 1830-33. Khurāsān was added to the already unwieldy charge of the Crown Prince: but he was ordered to settle the affairs of the south before entering on those of the north-eastern province. 'Abbas Mīrza was successful not only in reducing Yazd, but also in capturing the chief of the malcontents there, who was afterwards done to death by Muhammad Vali Mīrza at Tehrān; and the people of Kirmān, whence Hasan 'Ali Mīrza was sent back to the presence of the Shāh under an escort, received 'Abbās Mîrza with open arms. Arriving in Khurāsān, the frontiers of which he had been directed by his father to extend to the Oxus,—the true boundary of Persia, as laid down in the time of Nādir Shāh,-he adopted measures against the roving tribes of the neighbourhood; and he even captured with great slaughter the Turkman town of Sarakhs, which depended to a large extent on a traffic in Persian slaves. He next prepared to attack Herat and its districts, upon his eastern border; but at this point he was recalled by his father to Tehran, and his place on the north-eastern frontier was taken by his son Muhammad Mīrza. The Crown Prince's health was now failing, but the Shah could not persuade him to remain at Tehran, and he soon left again for Mushhad, where he died in 1833, in the forty-sixth year of his age. Muhammad Mīrza was then stummoned to Tehran, designated heir to the throne; and appointed governor of Azarbāijān.

Meanwhile Hasan 'Ali Mirza, who had once more become ruler of 1834. Fars under the title of Farman-Farma, began to withhold the revenue of his province; and in the autumn of 1834 the Shah, whose ruling passion was avarice, and who had lately suffered in pocket through the capture of some royal treasure by Bakhtiyāri robbers between Isfahān and Tehrān; set off for the south to investigate the matter himself. He arrived safely at Isfahan, where Hasan 'Ali Mīrza shortly appeared, but the latter brought only 13,000 Tumans out of 600,000 for which he was accountable, and his father accordingly superseded him in his government and sent a minister with troops to recover the balance due from the province. A few days later the Shah was attacked by fever; and on the 23rd of

October 1834, after a very short illness, he died at Isfahān, aged sixty-eight years.

Character of Fat-h'Ali Shāh. The personality of Fat-h 'Ali Shāh was remarkable for its inconsistencies. He was dignified in person and maintained truly royal state,
yet in money matters he showed a sordid meanness which was as unbecoming to his rank as it was often injurious to his political interests.
His attitude in foreign affairs was characterised by personal pride and
national conceit; but whether he possessed courage is a debated question,
and he was at least more of a diplomat than of a soldier. Merciful as
a rule to his opponents, and uniformly affectionate towards his own
family, he was nevertheless capable, in particular circumstances, of
acting with great severity and even with barbarity. His common sense
was remarkable, but it was liable to be perverted at all times by avarice,
and occasionally by vanity.

Relations of Persia with Afghanistan,* 1797-1834.

We cannot pass over altogether in silence the relations of Persia with Afghānistān during the reign of Fat-h 'Ali Shāh, for designs upon the territory of his eastern neighbour, albeit they could not to any great extent be realised, bulked largely in the foreign policy of the Shāh.

Reign of Zamān Shāh, 1797— 1801. From the time of his accession Fat-h 'Ali Shāh countenanced and even supported Mahmūd and Feroz-ud-Dīn, two rebellious brothers of Zamān Shāh, the Sadozai ruler of Afghānistān. His object was, doubtless, to weaken the royal house of Afghānistān by internal distensions, and to attach one or two of its members to his own interests. As we shall see further on, he was encouraged in this scheme by an emissary from the British Government in India, which then feared a raid by Zamān Shāh in the direction of its own dominions; and a Persian expedition into Afghānistān actually took place before the end of 1798, but met with no success. In the summer of 1799 a more serious crisis occurred. To a demand by Zamān Shāh for the surrender to him of Khurāsān, Zamān Shāh retorted by claiming the whole of Λfghānistān as a dependency of Persia; and thereafter, as a proof of the seriousness of his intentions, he collected a large force and himself proceeded from

^{*|}The information contained in this section is largely taken from Watson's History of Persia, which, depending in Afghan questions upon native Persian sources, probably magnifies Persian successes and minimises Persian failures.

Tehrān to Mashhad. Zamān Shāh, however, alarmed by these preparations, despatched an ambassador with presents to Fat-h 'Ali Shāh, who was easily induced by this means to return to Tehrān. The Afghān rebels Mahmūd and Feroz-ud-Dīn, already mentioned, were at this time domiciled in Persia, or had lately visited it to solicit help of the Shāh; and the latter accordingly, in withdrawing from the frontier, stipulated that they should be received by Zamān Shāh and treated by him in future in a manner befitting their rank as princes. The Ghorian district situated to the westward of Herat, remained in the hands of the Persians, by whom it had been occupied. Not long after this, Mahmūd and Feroz-ud-Dīn, having been joined by Fateh Khān, Bārakzai, obtained possession of Herat; and from that place as a base Mahmūd subsequently advanced to Qandahār, which he captured, Feroz-ud-Dīn remaining behind in charge of Herat.

In 1801 Zamān Shāh was blinded and deposed. Mahmūd took his place and ruled over all Afghānistān until 1803, when he was expelled from the greater part of the country by Shāh Shujā' and probably returned to Herat.

First reign of Mahmūd, 1801—03.

After the accession of Shāh Shujā', an invasion of the Qandahār district was undertaken by Kāmrān, son of Mahmūd, with the assistance of Fateh Khān, Bārakzai; but a movement of the Persians against Herat obliged him to retrace his steps. Feroz-ud-Dīn, after corrupting the Persian official in charge of Ghorian, had sent a force into that district with a view of annexing it to his own government; but the Afghāns had been defeated in their attempt with heavy slaughter; and thus it came about that the Persian Governor of Khurāsān was now at the gates of Herat. The operations resulted, according to Persian accounts, in the complete humiliation of Feroz-ud-Dīn, who was obliged to promise to pay tribute to Persia in future, to furnish two annual instalments at once under the name of arrears, to deliver up his own son as a hostage, and to surrender the Persian official with whom he had intrigued in regard to Ghorian. These events occurred in 1805.

Reign of Shah Shuja' 1803—09.

In 1809 or 1810 Mahmūd, supported by Fateh Khān, Bārakzai, again came to the head of affairs in Afghānistān, and Shāh Shujā' was driven from the country. In 1816 or 1817 Hasan 'Ali Mīrza, who had lately been appointed by his father, the Shāh, to the governorship of Khurāsān, advanced upon Herat, capturing the Hazārah stronghold of Mahmūdābād by the way. The reason of this incursion was the appropriation, once more, by the Afghāns of the debatable district of Ghorian; and Ferōz-ud-Dīn, struck with terror at the example of

Second reign of Mahmud, 1810—17.

Mahmudabad, where the Persians had behaved with great cruelty, hastened to relinquish his conquest. Hasan 'Ali Mirza, however, would not be appeased, but proceeded to lay siege to Herat in regular form: and Feroz-ud-Din thought it prudent to make full submission, to pay a fine of 50,000 Tumans, and to engage that at Herat thenceforth the public prayers should be recited, and the coinage struck, in the name of the Shah of Persia. The Persians afterwards made an expedition into mountainous country against a Firūz Kūh tribe who were harbouring the late ruler of Ghorian, but it ended in a serious disaster and in the retirement of their forces to Mashhad. Meanwhile Feroz-ud-Din had appealed to his brother Mahmud at Kabul for assistance against the invaders. The result was the despatch of a large Afghan force westwards under Fateh Khan, now Mahmud's chief minister, who, with the rest of the Barakzai family, was already secretly preparing to dispute the sovereignty of Afghanistan with the ruling Sadozais. Fatch Khan invited the Khan of Khiva to co-operate with him against the Persians and was not disappointed of his aid; but, when this ally had advanced as far as Sarakhs, the unwieldy and disunited Afghan army was attacked and scattered in Ghorian by a compact Persian force under Hasan 'Ali During these transactions the palace of Feroz-ud-Din at Herat had been plundered and its Sadozai inmates insulted by Dost Muhammad, afterwards ruler of Afghanistan, a younger brother of Fateh Khan; and the Barakzai minister, on his return from his unsuccessful campaign against the Persians, whether in expiation of this outrage committed by his near relation or with a view to appeasing the Shah of Persia, was first blinded by the hand of Kamran and then hacked to pieces under the orders of Kamran's father, Mahmud.

Anarchy, 1818—26. A period of several years of turmoil succeeded, during which the Bārakzai Sardārs, of whom Dōst Muhammad was now the most prominent, made themselves masters of the greater part of Afghānistān; but Herat still remained in the possession of Mahmūd and Kāmrān, the heads of the Sadozai family, and had become their place of residence. During this troublous time the assistance of the Shāh of Persia, for recovering Kābul, was more than once requested by Kāmrān.

Reign of Dost Muhammad, after 1826. By 1826 the authority of Dost Muhammad had become established throughout most of Afghānistān except the Herat and Qandahār provinces, of which the latter, not being under his powerful protection; was liable to encroachments by the Persians. In 1833 'Abbās Mīrza, the Crown Prince of Persia, who had recently been appointed his father's representative in Khurāsān, resolved on an effort for the annexation

of Herat* to Persia and applied to the Shah for additional troops, which were immediately sent him. Fat-h 'Ali Shāh, however, became anxious at this time to see his favourite son once more, and summoned him to Tehran; and the charge of the troops and of the military operations devolved in his absence, along with the governorship of Khurasan, upon the Crown Prince's son Muhammad Mirza. The young prince advanced upon Ghorian, which was now again in possession of the Afghans, but failed to take it, and passed on to Herat. Advised by M. Baroffsky, a Polish officer, he began a siege of the town; but it was defended with spirit by Kāmrān, whose troops made at least one successful sally against the Persians; and in the autumn of 1833, in consequence of the death of the Crown Prince, who had meanwhile returned to Mashhad, the operations were suspended before any definite result had been attained. On receiving a bare promise that tribute would in future be rendered to the Shah for Herat,—an undertaking already repeatedly given, but indifferently or never observed, - Muhammad Mīrza withdrew his troops and returned to Persia.

Relations of Persia with Turkey, † 1797-1834.

During the reign of Fat-h'Ali Shah there was from time to time friction, and even open war, between Persia and Turkey.

In 1801, when the Wahhābis from Najd fell without warning upon the sacred Shi'ah town of Karbala, plundered it, massacred the inhabitants-many of whom were Persians, and desecrated shrine of Husain, a profound and painful sensation ran through bis, 1801, Persia. The Shah returned to his capital from an expedition in the provinces, and at first proposed to treat Sulaiman Pasha of Baghdad as responsible for the catastrophe; but on second thoughts, and after being well bribed by the Turkish governor in question, he allowed himself to be pacified by an assurance that the Wahhābis would be punished by the Turks.

In or about 1806 war broke out between Persia and Turkey on their common frontier north of Kirmanshah. The subject of dispute

Indignation in Persia at the sack of the Karbala by the Wahha-

Trouble Persia and Turkey

^{*}Au expedition to Herat had been planned by the Persians in 1832, or even the Kurdisearlier. The idea was now encouraged by Russia, as it had been by Britain in the tan frontier, time of Zamān Shāh; but Mr. McNeill, the British representative at Tehrān, was 1806. able for a time to prevent its being carried into execution.

[†] The Persian authorities followed by Watson have probably shown some partiality for their own country in describing the national relations with Turkey, especially the course of the wars, Vide the remark on page 1866 in regard to Afghan relations

seems to have been the Kurdish district of Shehrizor adjoining Sulaimānīyah, then governed by a certain 'Abdur Rahmān Pāsha, a Turkish vassal. 'Abdur Rahmān, in consequence of a difficulty with 'Ali Pāsha, Wāli of Baghdād, retired to Persia; and his cause was espoused by Muhammad 'Ali Mīrza, the eldest son of Fat-h 'Ali Shāh, who had lately been appointed governor of Kirmānshāh. An armed conflict followed between the Persian prince and Sulaimān Pāsha, the son-in-law of 'Ali Pāsha, of which the result—according to the Persian chroniclers—was that the Turks suffered defeat and were pursued by the Persians into the neighbourhood of Baghdād, that their commander was carried a prisoner to Tehrān but afterwards released, and that 'Abdur Rahmān was reinstated in the government of his districts. He agreed to hold them in future as a dependent of Persia; and, as a guarantee of good faith, he placed his son as a hostage in the hands of the Persian Government.

Rapprochement between Persia and Turkey, 1810-11.

Early in the spring of 1810 there was a movement, under British auspices, for a close understanding between Turkey and Persia, and the Porte were persuaded by the British Ambassador at Constantinople to despatch a representative to the Persian Court. In the following autumn the Turkish Envoy duly arrived in Persia; and, his work there being completed, he returned to Constantinople at some time in 1811.

Renewed trouble between Persia and Turkey on the Kurdistan frontier, 1811.

In 1811 a disagreement occurred between the Prince Governor of Kirmānshāh and the Kurdish chief 'Abdur Rahmān Pāsha, who had lately been instrumental in setting up a new Pāsha at Baghdād, and who now seemed anxious to repudiate his allegiance to Persia. result was a forward movement by Muhammad'Ali Mīrza, who took temporary possession of Sulaimānīyah; and 'Abdur Rahmān Pāsha made his submission,—not, however, in time to save the life of the son whom he had given as a hostage to the Persians. A little later 'Abdullah, the new Pasha of Baghdad, moved out against 'Abdur Rahmān and took Sulaimānīyah; but the Persian Government were induced by the British Ambassador at Tehran to stand neutral upon this occasion. In the end the Pāsha of Baghdād was persuaded to pay a sum of money to the Shah under the name of compensation for the expenses which Persia had incurred through intervention, or preparations for intervention, in Kurdistan; and the Turkish troops were apparently withdrawn from the country.

Perso-Turkish war, 1821—1823. In 1821 fresh trouble arose from the protection by the Turkish authorities at Erzeroum of two tribes which the governor of Āzarbāijān, then 'Abbās Mīrza, the Crown Prince of Persia, claimed

as belonging to his jurisdiction. It ended in a successful invasion of Turkish territory by the Persian forces, which penetrated as far as Bitlis and occupied various points in the districts that they overran. The Turks attempted a counter-attack in the frontier tract of Shehrizor; but they were worsted by Muhammad 'Ali Mirza, who followed up his advantage over them and threatened Baghdad. August there was a Turkish force at Mandali, under the Kehiyah, to cover the capital, where the Pasha remained. At this juncture, however, the Persian prince became dangerously ill and retired with his troops to the Persian hills, where he died at Kirind. the north the war continued under the auspices, upon the Persian side, of 'Abbas Mīrza. In marching to the relief of one of the garrisons established by the Persians upon Turkish soil the Mīrza achieved a fresh and striking triumph over the Turks, but he then withdrew, as the enemy had signified their willingness to treat upon that condition, to the Persian side of the border. Meanwhile hostilities had been renewed on the side of Shehrizor; the Shah himself arrived at Hamadan with a large force, with the supposed intention of making under its protection a pilgrimage to Karbala and Najaf; and another victory was gained over the Turks by the son of the late Muhammad 'Ali Mīrza. When matters had reached this stage. however, cholera appeared upon the scene and put an end to the military operations. Before peace was actually concluded, a fresh rupture with the Pasha of Baghdad took place; but he was obliged to pay an indemnity and to consent, for the future, to the passage through his dominions, without payment of tolls, of Persian pilgrims on their way to the holy cities of the Shī'ahs. Amity was formally restored on the 28th of July 1823, some time after the cessation of actual hostilities, by the first Treaty of Erzeroum. This compact re-established the frontier which had existed before the war; and from this simple fact it may perhaps be inferred that the course of the fighting had not been entirely unfavourable to the Turks.

Relations of Persia with other states of the Persian Gulf, especially 'Omān, 1797—1834.

'Oman was the state in the Persian Gulf with which, next to the Turkish Empire, Persia had most connection during the period under

review. The transactions between the two Governments related largely to Bahrain affairs; and, in so far as they did, they are described in the chapter on the history of that principality. Others are mentioned in the history of the 'Oman Sultanate; others again, as affecting the Persian Coast, are dealt with in a later section of the present chapter; and here it will be sufficient merely to enumerate, in chronological order, the leading features of the intercourse between the states.

1799-1800.

In 1799, encouraged by the Persian Governor of Fars, the Sultan of 'Oman declared war upon the 'Utūb of Bahrain; but the only gainer by his naval successes was Persia, under whose protection the 'Utūb at once placed themselves, and to whom they even paid a year's tribute. The Sultan, annoyed at the duplicity of the Shaikh of Büshehr, by whom this unexpected turn had been given to the affair, then seized Khārag Island; but he was not able to retain it long.

1802.

In 1802, the Persians actually lent some military assistance to the Sultan of 'Oman for his invasion of Bahrain in that year; but the success of the allies, in consequence of the growth of the Wahhābi danger upon the home frontier of 'Oman, had no permanent results.

1805.

In 1805 Saiyid Badar, a usurping ruler of 'Omān, forcibly recovered with British aid, as will be related hereafter, the fief of Bandar 'Abbās and its dependencies, which had been seized by Persian subjects.

1811-12.

The next Sultān, Saiyid Sa'īd, sent an embassy to Shīrāz in 1811 to solicit help against a Wahhābi invasion of his dominions; and in the following year a Persian contingent was sent to his assistance, but it met with disaster in the uplands of 'Omān. In the meantime a Wahhābi envoy, Ibrāhīm-bin 'Abdul Karīm, had waited on the Persian Governor of Fārs at Shīrāz to dissuade him from hostile action against the Wahhābi power, and had been received with fair words.

1816.

When the Sultān of 'Omān next attacked the Bahrain Islands, in the summer of 1816, he was supported, under the orders of the Persian Government, by vessels from Būshehr and drafts of fighting men from Kangūn and 'Asalu; but, when after the disastrous failure of his landing on Muharraq he repaired to Kangūn to take on board reinforcements promised by the Governor of Fārs, he found that the Persians meant to seize him by treachery, and accordingly abandoned the enterprise. On this occasion a regular agreement had been drawn up, defining the financial conditions on which the Persians gave their assistance, and practically assigning to the Sultān the position of a Persian fief-holder in Bahrain, should he succeed in taking the islands by means of the expedition.

In 1820, there was intense jealousy and secret rivalry between Persia 1820. and 'Oman in regard to the possession of Bahrain, which came to the notice of the commander of the British expedition in that year against Rās-al-Khaimah; but no overt step was taken by either Government. This matter is dealt with in a later paragraph.

An attempt by the Persians to oust the Sultan of 'Oman from his 1823-26. Bandar 'Abbās fief, in 1823, and hostilities which took place between Saivid Sa'id of 'Oman and Shaikh 'Abdur Rasul of Bushehr, in 1826-1827, are noticed in a later section of the present chapter.

Persia took no part in the final and unsuccessful attempt of the 1928-29. Saivid, in 1828, to annex Bahrain to his dominions; and a settlement arranged in the following year between him and the 'Utūb was the work of Muhammad-bin-Näsir of the Büshehr family of Shaikhs.

In 1829, and again in 1830-31, as will be explained further on, 1829-31. Saiyid Sa'id nearly became involved in disturbances which took place at Bushehr, the reason of his interest being a marriage which he had contracted in 1827 with a daughter of the Prince Governor of Shīrāz.

Relations of native powers in India with the Persian Government, 1797—1834.

At the beginning of this period a diplomatic connection still existed between the Government of Tipu Sultan in India and that of Fat-h 'Ali Shah. The last envoy sent by the doomed ruler of Mysore to Persia arrived in the Gulf in the summer of 1799, was sent by the Sultan of 'Oman in one of his own vessels from Masqat to Bushehr, and probably landed in Persia about the end of August. This mission, which brought three elephants and other gifts for the Shah, was rendered futile by the overthrow and death of the sender.

Again, about 1805, the Shah received envoys from the Amirs of Sind, who had taken alarm at the progress of the British power in India.

Relations of Russia with Persia, 1797—1834.

During the reign of Fat-h 'Ali Shāh, Persia was brought into serious conflict with Russia; and in the course of the struggle she lost, in two campaigns, some districts that she had until then possessed of the modern Transcaucasia. When peace was at length firmly established the attitude of Persia towards Russia was found to have undergone a change and to have become one of deference and almost submission.

Perso-Russian War of 1804-13. We have seen that Agha Muhammad Khān had, in 1795-96, invaded and occupied Georgia with striking if somewhat barbarous success; and it is probable that until about 1800 Persian prestige in Transcaucasia stood as high as Russian. Soon after the accession of Fat-h 'Ali Shāh, Gurgīn Khān of Georgia, the son and successor of Heraclius, voluntarily professed allegiance to Persia; but on the 28th of September 1800, with equal or even greater weakness, he signed away his crown in favour of the Tsar. The Russians then proceeded to take possession of the country, overthrowing a patriotic party headed by Alexander, a younger brother of Gurgīn Khān, and captured Ganjeh, the modern Elizabetpol; but it was not until they advanced to besiege Erivan that war with Persia began.

1804.

In the spring of 1804 'Abbās Mīrza, the Crown Prince of Persia, crossed the Aras River to oppose the Russians; and in July he was defeated by Zizianoff, a Russian Commander of Georgian extraction, in two pitched battles, of which the first was fought near Echmiazin and the second close to Erivan. The declared intention of the Russians was now to take possession of the whole country up to the line of the Aras. The Persians, after some experience of the war, resorted to raids by mounted forces upon the Russian lines of communication; and in the end the besiegers of Erivan were obliged to retire upon Tiflis. The chief of Erivan, however, by whom the place had been defended, showed much unwillingness to admit Persian troops to his citadel after the departure of the Russian forces.

1805.

In the next year, 1805, the principal scene of operations was the district of Karabagh, further to the eastward than Erivan; and from it the Persians seem to have succeeded in expelling the Russians for a time. A Russian expeditionary force was landed at Enzeli; but, failing on account of various obstacles to attain Rasht, which was its first objective, it was embarked again at the same port. The Persian Crown Prince occupied Ganjeh, which had been evacuated by the Russians; but the Muscovites on their part obtained possession of Shisheh, the chief place in the Karabagh district, which was nearer than Ganjeh to Persia proper. This phase of the war ended with the treacherous assassination of Zizianoff at Bāku, which the Russians were at the time besieging, by the native chief of that place.

The Russians, after this event, recovered Ganjeh and gradually 1805-12. strengthened their hold upon the greater part of the country in dispute. At one time they seem to have suggested, as the basis of a treaty, the cession to themselves of all the districts north of the Aras except Erivan; but the proposal was rejected by the Persian monarch, who had not vet reconciled his mind to the loss of any district hitherto held by Persia. In 1808-09, the Russians again besieged Erivan, under the command of Godovitch, and again were obliged to relinquish the siege; this time they fell back upon Ganjeh. In the summer of 1809 the Shah remained encamped at Chaman Ujān, 30 miles south-east of Tabrīz, in somewhat dangerous proximity to the frontier, for the Persians never had any reliable information of the movements of the Russians. Persians after this pressed the war somewhat energetically for a time. the Shah's eldest son, Muhammed 'Ali Mīrza, ravaging the country from Erivan to the Gokcheh Lake, while his brother 'Abbas Mirza, the Crown Prince, almost succeeded in retaking Ganjeh with the help of some of the Armenian inhabitants. The army of the former prince was organised, trained and equipped on Persian, that of the latter, so far as possible, on European principles. In the early spring of 1810 Baron Wrede visited the Crown Prince of Persia at Tabrīz, to discuss terms of peace with him, on the part of General Tormasoff, then commanding in Georgia; but nothing was arranged. At the beginning of 1812 a Persian force commanded by Colonel D'Arcy, a British officer in the Persian service, defeated a Russian force near Shisheh. killing 300 of the enemy, taking 500 prisoners, and capturing 2 guns In the autumn of the same year, however, a terrible disaster befell the army of the Crown Prince, who, after some abortive negotiations with the Russians in which the British Ambassador to Persia had taken part as an intermediary, was encamped in fancied security at Aslanduz on the Persian bank of the Aras. On the 31st of October the Persians were surprised in a disadvantageous position; and on the 1st of Novem ber, notwithstanding gallant efforts by Captain Christie and Lieutenant Lindsay, two British officers employed with the Persian army, to retrieve the day, 'Abbas Mīrza's force was broken up and scattered. The Prince then made the best of his way to Tabrīz, saving only 2 out of 13 guns. Captain Christie was left wounded on the field and was there put to death under the orders of the Russian commander (who had been erroneously informed that no British officer would take part in the war on the side of the Persians), perhaps because he refused to surrender, but possibly with even slighter justification.

1813.

Both sides remained in arms for a year after the battle of Aslandūz, and Lankurān was taken by the Russians at the beginning of 1813, but upon the Aras the Russian arms made no progress. It must be remembered that during a part of these campaigns Russia was weighed down by serious difficulties in Europe, and especially by Napoleon's invasion in 1812-13, but for which the Russian advance in Transcaucasia would doubtless have been more rapid and more decisive.

Treaty of Gulistān, 24th (12th) October, 1813.

At length, on the 24th (12th) of October 1813, peace was concluded between Russia and Persia at Gulistan, a place in Karabagh. declined to agree to the appearance of the British Ambassador in Persia as a mediator between the parties, but his good offices were accepted and utilised. The Treaty of Gulistan established a frontier, on a basis described as the status quo ad praesentem, by which the bulk of Georgia, -including Karabagh, but excluding Erivan and Nakhshivan,-was provisionally assigned to Russia; but the final adjustment of the boundary was left to be made by a joint Commission, to whom power was even reserved of altering the proposed division of the country in case it should be found not to correspond with the facts of previous possession. No attempt at all was made to define the course of the new frontier in the district of Talish, adjoining the Caspian Sea; and the difficulty there was thrown entirely on the future Commissioners. An exclusive right of keeping ships of war in the Caspian Sea was conferred on Russia; and Russia on her part undertook to support the prince whom the Shah might nominate, as heir to the Persian throne, against any faction that might dispute his right. intention of interchanging Ambassadors was expressed; the appointment of Consuls or trade agents by the one power at places in the territory of the other was authorised; and the import and export duties leviable in Persia upon Russian merchandise were limited to a simple 5 per cent., only once chargeable.

Perso-Russian War of 1826—28. The Treaty of Gulistān was probably not regarded by either of the parties as a final settlement between them; and the Shāh, after an interval, sent an Envoy to St. Petersburg to request Russia to give up a part of the territories which she had obtained under it. In return General Yermoloff, the Russian Governor-General of Georgia and Ambassador to Persia, visited Tehrān; but, so far from his being authorised to make any concessions, he had instructions to press a variety of new demands of an alarming character upon the Persian Court. Nothing, consequently, followed from this exchange of missions; and when the Commissioners for demarcation of the frontier at length met,

the result, as might have been foreseen from the provisional and indefinite nature of the Treaty of Gulistan, was to open a boundary dispute. Three or four tracts were claimed by both parties, the principal of these being the Gokcheh district situated between the lake of the same name and Erivan. In the summer of 1825 an effort was made to dispose of the Gokcheh question by agreement; and, when this failed, the Russians settled the doubt in their own favour by occupying the district with troops. In consequence of this act, and of the unfavourable treatment of Muhammadans in the Transcaucasian districts obtained by Russia in the last war, an extraordinary frenzy, which under ecclesiastical guidance assumed a religious character, suddenly took possession of the Persian nation; and the Shah found himself obliged by the unanimous demand of his subjects to insist, contrary to his own better judgment, upon the evacuation of Gokcheh by the Russians. At this point the Tsar Alexander died and was succeeded by his brother Nicholas, who sent Prince Menschikoff to discuss the situation at Tehran: but in the matter of Gokcheh neither side would yield, and on the departure of the Russian Envoy hostilities began.

Great enthusiasm for the war against "the infidels" prevailed through- 1826. out Persia, and volunteers from all parts of the country poured by thousands into the camp of 'Abbas Mīrza, Crown Prince of Persia, who had been appointed to conduct the campaign. The Russians seem to have been unprepared for the storm which thus suddenly broke upon them; and in about three weeks the Persians had expelled them from Talish and recovered Gokcheh and the other disputed tracts. Everywhere the Muhammadan inhabitants of the country rose against the Russians: and at Ganjeh, besides massacring the Russian garrison, they exterminated their Armenian fellow-citizens. A Persian raiding column penetrated almost to Tiflis; and at the end of this first stage of the war Shisheh was the only advanced Russian post which had not been either evacuated or overpowered.

Soon, however, the Russians resumed the offensive. Muhammad Mīrza, son of 'Abbās Mīrza and afterwards Shāh of Persia, was defeated near Ganjeh and narrowly escaped being taken prisoner; Ganjeh itself was recovered by the Russians; and in September 1826 a crushing calamity overtook the arms of the Crown Prince in the vicinity of Ganjeh. An envoy was then despatched by the Shah to Tiffis to propose a pacific settlement; but the Russians did not desire peace, and they now began to demand the cession of Erivan and Nakhshivan, hitherto recognised by them as Persian.

1827.

In the spring of 1827 the military operations, which had been suspended for a time, were renewed; but the efforts of the Persians, from this time onwards, were crippled by the extraordinary and short-sighted parsimony of Fat-h 'Ali Shāh. General Paskevitch, who had now replaced General Yermoloff, took the field in person, and in April his troops had secured Echmiazin. Erivan was invested by the Russians from the 8th of May to the 1st of July, but without success. On the 31st of July the important Persian stronghold of Mahmūdābād on the Aras fell by treachery; but a part of the garrison, consisting of Bakhtiyāris, escaped from the place without surrendering. On the 29th of August the Russians sustained a defeat near Echmiazin; but, quickly recovering themselves, they advanced again and drove the Persians across the Aras. At the end of September the Persian post of Sardārābād was abandoned; and Erivan, left isolated by the loss of this place and of 'Abbāsābād, was again besieged by the Russians.

The Shāh now completely withdrew his financial support from the Crown Prince, and two great catastrophes to Persia almost immediately terminated the war. Erivan surrendered on the 13th of October 1827; and almost simultaneously Tabrīz, the capital of Āzarbāijān, situated at a considerable distance within the Persian frontier, was occupied by the Russians. The submission of Persia had now become inevitable; but the negotiations for peace were protracted from November 1827 to February 1828 by the obstinacy with which the Shāh resisted the demand of the victors for a pecuniary indemnity.

Treaty of Turkmanchai, 21st February 1828. At last, on the 21st of February 1828, peace was concluded at the village of Turkmanchai between General Paskevitch and 'Abbās Mīrza, acting as plenipotentiaries for their respective sovereigns. Under the Treaty which they arranged, all the country to the north of the Aras River, as well as the fortress of 'Abbāsābād and the districts of Talish and Mughān to the south of it, became Russian territory, Persia being thus finally deprived of Erivan and Nakhshivān. The war indemnity payable by Persia to Russia was fixed at five million Tūmāns or * thirty million silver roubles. The condition regarding the exclusive right of Russia to maintain war vessels in the Caspian Sea, embodied in the Treaty of Gulistān, was re-affirmed; and an undertaking was given by Russia to recognise, both immediately and in the future, the right of Abbās Mīrza to succeed Fat-h 'Ali Shāh. In one clause of the Treaty the permanent residence of an Ambassador from either sovereign at the

[•] According to Watson (*History*, page 240) the Russian equivalent was twenty million roubles. Five million Tumans was equal at this time to about £3,500,000.

Court of the other was distinctly contemplated; and a stipulation was likewise inserted for the mutual reception of Consuls. A commercial Treaty, attached to the political Treaty, limited the duties on Russian trade as before to five per cent., besides which it conferred on Russian subjects the right to acquire house property and business premises in Persia, along with inviolability of domicile. The instalments by which the war indemnity should be discharged were regulated, and the ceremonies to be observed in the reception of Russian Ambassadors and other diplomatic officials in Persia were fixed, by separate protocols in connection with the main Treaty.

The Treaty of Turkmanchai did not at once remove all difficulties between Persia and Russia. In August 1828, in consequence of a provision of the Treaty by which, if an instalment of the war indemnity remained unpaid after a certain date, Azarbāijān was to be detached from Persia and either handed over to Russia or constituted a separate Khanate, Persia, through the improvidence of the Shah and his ministers all but forfeited that valuable province. Again in February 1829, through the murder of M. Grebaiodoff, the Russian Minister at Tehran, and his suite by an infuriated mob which some of his demands, founded upon the Treaty, had roused to action, a very dangerous crisis was produced; but Khusrau Mīrza, a son of the heir apparent, who was deputed to St. Petersburg as the Shah's representative, was able not only to secure the condonement of this outrage on very moderate terms as to reparation, but even to obtain the remission of one-tenth of the whole war indemnity. After this event the ascendency of Russia at the Persian Court was for a time almost undisputed, and the foreign policy of Persia, especially upon her north-eastern frontier, began to be influenced by the designs and interests of Russia.

Perso-Russian relations, 1828 – 34.

Relations of France with Persia, 1797—1834.

It was however by France, rather than by Russia, that Persia was first brought upon the stage of European international politics; and to the diplomacy of that country, as directed by Napoleon, we must now turn our attention.

Early Communications of Napoleon with Persia 1801—04.

The Bruguière-Olivier mission from the French Directory, which visited Tehran in 1796 and marked the commencement of French interest in Persian affairs, had no practical outcome; and the first advances of

Napoleon to Persia were similarly resultless. The time, the medium, and the nature of these first advances are subject to some doubt, owing to discrepancy between the accounts given by various * authorities; and this much only appears certain, that they were made through an Asiatic who had some difficulty, if he did not altogether fail, in establishing his character as a French emissary to the satisfaction of the Persian Government. Further communications were made to the Persian Court by French political agents in Syria and Turkish 'Irāq; and in the autumn of 1804 a properly authenticated proposal for joint action against the Russians was transmitted by the Government of France to that of Persia. It was, however, virtually ignored by the Shāh, who was at the time in expectation of receiving substantial help against Russia from Great Britain, and who, as France and Russia were then at peace, probably doubted the good faith of the offer.

Mission of Colonel Romieu to Persia, 1805.

The next step taken by Napoleon, war having in the meanwhile begun between France and Russia, was of a more decided character: it consisted in the deputation to Tehrān of Colonel Romieu, who was furnished with proper credentials, and the accompaniments of whose mission were such as to ensure for him a proper degree of attention. His instructions were to suggest that Persia should relinquish her alliance with Britain and substitute for it one with France, who would in return send a minister to reside at Tehrān, grant a subsidy for the military operations against Russia, and even send troops to assist the Persian army in Georgia. Colonel Romieu arrived at the Persian capital in the summer of 1805, met with a somewhat frigid reception, and shortly afterwards died at the Persian capital; but his single interview with the Shāh seems

^{*} The author of the manuscript from which Brydges' Dynasty of the Kajars is translated says (pages 274-5) that a French letter, which the Persians could not understand, was delivered to a Persian emissary at Baghdad, apparently in 1801, by an individual who represented himself to be an Ambassador from the French Government, but whom the Persian Government decided to treat as an impostor. According to Watson (History of Persia, page 152) the first declared French emissary was an Armenian merchant who came from Baghdad to Tehran in 1801, but who, on account of the unintelligibility of his credentials, of his own appearance, and of that of his following, failed to obtain the confidence of the Persian Court. Rawlinson (England and Russia in the East, page 15, footnote) makes the bearer of the earliest letters "a certain Shahrokh Khan, who had travelled to Paris on his private affairs, and had met with much attention from the French authorities"; he gives the date as 1802, and he seems to indicate, as does also Kaye (History of the War in Afghanistan, Volume I, page 45) that the overtures of which he was the medium were regarded as genuine, but were repelled. Rawlinson adds, however, that reason was afterwards found for suspecting that these letters to the Persian Government emanated from irresponsible French intriguers in Syria, etc.

to have had some effect upon the royal mind, in which a doubt as to the availability of British support against Russia had by this time arisen.

The negotiations begun by Colonel Romieu were continued by M. Jaubert, who reached Tehrān in May 1806, having been seized on his way and for some time imprisoned by the Pāsha of Bayazid, whose Government, the Porte, were at this time in alliance with Russia against France. The new French Envoy found Fat-h 'Ali Shāh, who had renounced all hope of active assistance by the British, fully disposed to accede to his proposals. Indeed that monarch had lately, since the death of Colonel Romieu, caused an application for help to be made to France on his behalf through the French Ambassador at Constantinople, and had even despatched a letter to Napoleon by the medium of * M. Outrey, a Frenchman. The result of M. Jaubert's mission to Persia, which was of short duration, was the despatch of a return mission to France.

M. Jaubert to Persia, 1806.

Mission of

The individual selected to accompany M. Jaubert to Europe was Mirza Muhammad Riza, the principal adviser of the Shāh's eldest son Muhammad 'Ali Mīrza; and, his movements being more rapid than R those of M. Outrey, who had preceded him, he overtook that gentleman of at Constantinople. By his instructions he was empowered to conclude an alliance on equal terms between Persia and France, directed against Russia; and he was authorised to hold out a hope that the Shāh would join with Napoleon in operations on the side of Afghānistān, and that he might eventually cede him a port or some other place in the province of Fārs from which the French could act against British India. The result was a treaty of alliance, in the sense desired by the Persians, which was ratified by Napoleon at Finkinstein on the 10th May 1807; and M. Jaubert was at once sent back to Persia to announce its terms.

Mission of Mirza Muhammad Riza to Europe, 1806-

Hardly had these arrangements been completed, when Napoleon found himself obliged to reconsider and revise them; for, with the establishment of complete amity between himself and the Tsar Alexander at Tilsit in July 1807, action by France against Russia in the interests of Persia ceased to be possible. But the Emperor, for the sake of the designs, that

Mission of General Gardanne to Persia, 1807—09.

^{*} The name is the same as that of a French physician and merchant at Baghdad who co-operated with the Bruguière-Olivier mission there in 1796-97. See page .

[†] The text of this Treaty will be found in Mr. J. Talboys Wheeler's Memorandum on Persain Affairs, 1871; Appendix II, Napoleon guarateed the integrity of Persia; recognised the title of Persia to Georgia, then in Russian possession; undertook to establish a Minister Plenipotentiary at Tehrān; and engaged to supply the Shāh with arms (on payment) and with military instructors. The Shāh on his part was pledged to break with Britain, to expel the British from Persia, to induce Afghans to join him in an attack on British India, and to assist a French expedition against the British in India, if undertaken. But the treaty was never, apparently, ratified by the Shāh.

he entertained in the East, to a partnership in which he had now admitted the Tsar, was anxious to preserve an understanding with Persia; and he * therefore sent General Gardanne to the Shah to endeavour to readjust matters on a basis of mediation—instead of armed intervention by France in the Georgian question. With General Gardanne there returned to Persia Mirza Muhammad Riza, bringing the treaty, already as good as superseded, which had been arranged through himself. The suite of the French Envoy consisted of 24 persons. He was received with much distinction by the Shah, who conferred on him a new Persian order and the honorary title of Khan; and soon afterwards a Persian representative in the person of one Askar Khān, Afshār, took his departure for Europe as bearer of letters and presents for Napoleon. The exact time of the arrival of the Gardanne mission in Persia cannot be ascertained. nor do we know the nature of the work † with which it was at first occupied there. According to one authority a Franco-Persian treaty was arranged by which, among other matters, the island of Khārag I was ceded to France; and there is reason to believe that efforts were made to induce the Shah to prepare for joining in a French demonstration

^{*} So Rawlinson (England and Russia in the East, page 17), who seems to have made the most thorough study of the question; but from Watson's account (History of Persia, pages 158—159), in which he possibly follows native Persian authorities (see for example Brydges' Dynasty of the Kajars, pages 332—379), it would appear that General Gardanne arrived in Persia before the pacification of Tilsit and that he did not distinctly announce any desire on the part of his master to depart from the Finkinstein conditions.

[†]Kaye (History of the War in Afghānistān, Volume I, page 50) who places the strength of General Gardanne's European staff at about 70 persons, states that some of them visited Būshehr, Bandar 'Abbās, and other places in the Gulf and made surveys of harbours; but the present writer has met with nothing in the Persian Gulf records corroborative of this assertion, and the authority of Morier (Journey, page 30) seems opposed to it, as he indicates that the Shah prevented the French from visiting Būshehr and even Shīrāz.

[‡] Morier in his Journey, page 394. The same author makes the following remark, referring to an earlier period, which is not confirmed, so far as the present writer is aware, by information from any other source: "By a treaty signed at Paris, and negotiated by M. Pyrault at Bassora, Kerim Khān, the Regent of Persia, engaged to cede Kharrack; but the suppression of the French East India Company intervened, and the object was neglected." A Commercial Treaty, to be negotiated at Tehran, was mentioned in the Treaty of Finkinstein; and the text of such a Treaty, purporting to have been drawn up in December 1807 and to be signed by General Gardanne and two Persian Ministers, is given by Mr. J. Talboys Wheeler in his Memorandum on Persian Affairs, 1871, Appendix II. Under it Khārag was to have been made over to the French on the rendition of Georgia and other provinces to Persia by Russia. This fact goes far to explain the extraordinary solicitude about Khārag shown by General Malcolm and the Government of India in 1808.

against India in the following year. But the war between Persia and Russia forced the question of Georgia into prominence, and in that connection the French Envoy was unable to afford the Shah any real satisfaction. When General Godovitch, in 1808, advanced to besiege Erivan, General Gardanne gave the Shah a guarantee that the Russians would not commence hostilities unprovoked, proceeded himself to the head-quarters of the Crown Prince at Khoi, and despatched his assistant M. Lajarre to remonstrate with the Russian Commander; but these measures did not avert the attack threatened by the Russians, and the credit of the French at Tehran declined thereafter in a marked degree. British mission under Sir Harford Jones, of which the function was to counteract the proceedings of General Gardanne, arrived at Isfahān at the beginning of February 1809 on its way to the capital, the French Envoy entered a protest against its reception; but the reaction of the Persian Government against French influence was now far advanced, the French protest was disregarded, and after the middle of March General Gardanne retired from Persia by way of Tabrīz. assistant, M. Lajarre, lingered for a time at Tiffis; and M. Jouannin, the Secretary of the Mission, clung pertinaciously to Tehran until Sir H. Jones was able to procure his dismissal to Azarbāijān, whence, seeing no advantage in remaining there, he proceeded to Constantinople. General Gardanne's failure may have been due in part to the "precipitancy, parsimony and hauteur" with which he is charged by his British opponent; but the principal reason was, no doubt, the impracticability of the French policy in Persia, which, while it threatened to embroil the Shah with the Government of India, afforded him no effectual protection against the encroachments of Russia. This did not however save General Gardanne, if a Persian narrative may be trusted, from the displeasure of Napoleon, on his unexpected reappearance in Europe. Askar Khān, the Persian Envoy to Paris, from whom no news had been received by his own Government during his sojourn at the French capital, then returned, or was recalled, to Persia; but he brought with him nothing beyond vague assurances of friendship and satisfaction on the part of the Emperor. The era of French influence in Persia was at an end; and few traces of it remained, unless in some * military improvements initiated by members of the Gardanne mission, in the fortification of the

^{*}One of General Gardanne's staff, a M. Verdier, had devoted himself with much success to training a part of the Persian army on European principles. In 1821 Muhammad 'Ali Mīrza, though not an admirer of European methods like his brother 'Abbas, had still some French officers with him, who, on his death, mostly transferred their services to Ranjit Singh in the Panjāb.

frontier post of 'Abbāsābād, and possibly in the presence for a time of some French officers with the Persian army.

General political relations of Britain with Persia, 1797-1834.

We are now in a position to trace, with some appreciation of its meaning, the general policy of Britain in Persia during the reign of Fat-h 'Ali Shāh. The leading motive of that policy was, at first, fear of an invasion of Upper India by the Afghāns under Zamān Shāh, with whose proceedings, it was thought, some of the Muhammadan states of India might associate themselves. These apprehensions soon gave place to a dread of Napoleon's designs in the East by which British diplomacy was aroused to put forth some considerable efforts in Persia. Later, when the danger from France had also passed away, it became the principal task of the British representative at Tehrān to counteract, so far as possible, the growing activity and influence of Russia.

Anglo-Persian questions arising specifically out of affairs in the Persian Gulf were in no case of first-rate importance: they will be dealt with separately in a later section of this Chapter.

Mission of Mehdi 'Ali Khān to Persia and his appointment as British Resident at Būshehr, 1798.

At the beginning of September 1798 the first British emissary to the court of Fat-h 'Ali Shāh left Bombay; this was * Mehdi 'Ali Khān, a Persian gentleman of Khurasani extraction, but domiciled in India, who had been selected for the duty by Mr. Jonathan Duncan, Governor of Bombay. The mission was afterwards described as "a temporary deputation to the Court of Persia under the instructions of the Governor-General"; but the Envoy, at his departure from India, was appointed substantive British Resident at Büshehr. The chief political objects of Mehdi 'Ali Khan's journey were, first, to induce the ruler of Persia to keep Zamān Shāh in play upon the western border of Afghānistān, by which means he would be prevented from descending upon the plains of India; and, second, to make arrangements for the exclusion of French influence from Persia. In connection with the former of these purposes an expenditure of two to three lakhs of rupees annually at the discretion of Mehdi 'Ali Khān seems to have been sanctioned, or at least contemplated, by the Government of India. In his capacity as British Resident

^{*} Mehdi 'Ali Khān enjoyed the full confidence of Mr. Duncan, under whom he had served in some capacity at Ghāzipūr; but in the Deccan scandalous stories to his disadvantage were current. See Kaye's Life of Sir J. Malcolm, Volume I., pages 114—5, footnote.

at Büshehr, the Envoy was further expected to increase the East India Company's sale of European goods in Persia, and to obtain better prices for their imports than had of late prevailed.

Mehdi 'Ali Khān began his work at Masqat, where, as is related in another place, he obtained from the Sultān of 'Omān a concession for the establishment of a British Factory at Bandar 'Abbās; but the Government of Bombay did not advise the Government of India to take immediate advantage of the grant, unless for the purpose of forestalling the French, who were suspected of desiring to set up a station there. Mehdi 'Ali Khān also mentioned the possibility of establishing a British settlement on Khārag: but, on account of the constant disturbances between the Shaikh of Būshehr and other claimants, he did not recommend the project.

Mehdi 'Ali Khān's suggestions in regard to Bandar 'Abbās and Khārag.

On the 3rd of October 1798 Mehdi 'Ali Khān received charge of the Būshehr Residency from Mr. Hankey Smith, by whom it was held at his arrival; but that gentleman absolutely declined "to deliver the British flag to the will of a Musulman" unless under a positive command from the Government of Bombay; and he advanced a number of reasons for his refusal, some of which were not wanting in cogency. The Government of Bombay, however, took a severe view of Mr. Smith's behaviour, cast some reflections upon his sanity, and ordered him to make the flag over at once to Mehdi 'Ali Khān, who was to hoist it with some degree of ceremony in the presence of as many British officers as could be assembled, but not of Mr. Hankey Smith.

Hitch at Bushehr, October-November, 1798.

Mehdi 'Ali Khan, after this, opened a correspondence with the Shah's ministers; but he thought it well to disguise the chief objects of his mission, and he therefore substituted a letter of his own for that from the Governor of Bombay which he had brought with him, and gave out that he had been sent merely to convey to Fat-h 'Ali Shāh the condolences of the British upon his uncle's death and their congratulations upon his own accession. The Shah had already determined upon undertaking hostilities against his neighbour, the ruler of Afghanistan; and the British representative accordingly, though he expressed his personal approval as a pious Shī'ah, and even suggested that the claims of Mahmud to Herat would provide a specious ground of action, avoided all mention of his employers' anxiety for something to be done against Zaman Shah; -- an anxiety which, if it had been allowed to appear, would certainly have involved them in expense. In July 1799 Fat-h 'Ali Shāh was at Mashhad, actively threatening the Afghan border, and Mehdi 'Ali Khan had reached Shīrāz, where he met with a highly honorific

Proceedings of Mehdi 'Ali Khān in Persia with reference to the Afghāns and the French, 1798-99.

reception, and was in constant correspondence with His Persian Majesty. On the 4th of December 1799 Mehdi 'Ali Khān arrived at Tehran. whither the Shah had meanwhile returned from Khurasan, and became the guest of Hāji Ibrāhīm, at this time still the principal minister. three audiences which he had of the Shah, within as many weeks of his arrival, the Khan was successful in despatching the political business of his mission entirely to his own satisfaction. In particular he secured that orders should be issued "to all the seaports of Persia to be watchful and to seize on whoseover of the depraved French may make their appearance by sea or land, under whatever disguise, that they may not escape with life." The cost of the Envoy's proceedings at Tehran has been estimated at two and-a-half lakhs of rupees. One item of Ps. 17,000 for the equipment of the Afghan claimants Mahmud and Ferōz-ud-Dīn seems to have been regarded with suspicion or disapproval by the Government of India, by whom it was not passed until several years after.

Supersession of Mehdi 'Ali Khān as Envoy to Persia by Captain Malcolm, 1799.

About this time Mehdi 'Ali Khān must have become aware of his own approaching supersession as British Envoy to the Persian Court by Captain John Malcolm, whose mission will shortly claim our attention; for letters informing him of the intentions of the Government of India had been despatched from Bombay in the preceding September. In these he was ordered by the Government of Bombay to place himself, in his capacity as Resident, entirely at his successor's disposal; and various services which he might render Captain Malcolm were explained. Mehdi 'Ali Khān would not have been human had he not represented to his superiors the hardship of being thus superseded in the height of his success; but he bowed with a good grace to their decision. He seems to have returned to the Gulf viá Baghdād and Basrah, and his first meeting with Captain Malcolm took place at Būshehr on the 3rd of May 1800.

Continuance of Mehdi'Ali Khān as British Pesident at Būshehr, 1799—1803.

The last political matter of importance in which Mehdi 'Ali Khān figured as a principal was a scheme, suggested by him at the beginning of August 1800, for the seizure of Masqat by the British under cover of a lease granted by the Shāh of Persia, such as he reported himself able at any time to obtain. This proposal, which was professedly aimed at the French, was apparently not taken into serious consideration by the British authorities. Mehdi 'Ali Khān continued to hold the Residency of Būshehr until his retirement from the Fast Indian Company's service in April 1803,

The Mission to Persia of Captain John Malcolm, Assistant British Resident at Haidarābād in the Deccan, appears to have been resolved on by Lord Mornington, Governor-General of India, about the beginning of August 1799. Its scope, as understood by Captain Malcolm himself, was "to relieve India from the annual alarm of Zamaun "invasion, which is always attended with serious expense to the Company, "by occasioning a diversion upon his Persian provinces; to counteract "the possible attempts of those villainous but active democrats, the "French"; and "to restore to some part of its former prosperity a trade which has been in a great degree lost." There was therefore no essential difference between the objects of this Mission and those which Mehdi 'Ali Khan had been sent to achieve in the previous year; but it enjoyed a higher prestige, as proceeding from the Governor-General of India instead of the Government of Bombay, and it was equipped on a more magnificent scale. Captain Malcolm's staff included six *European officers, of whom three were Political Assistants; the military escort consisted of nearly a hundred native Indian troops, partly cavalry and partly infantry; and there were, in addition to these, a host of Indian servants and followers. On arrival in Persia a large number of Persian attendants were added to the strength of the Mission, which came in the end to amount to not less than 500 persons.

First Mission of (Captain) Malcolm to Persia, 1799—1801.

Captain Malcolm, with his party, left India in the "Bombay" and "Harrington" on the 29th of December 1799, and on the 1st of February 1800 he arrived at Büshehr, whence he at once addressed letters to the Persian Court. Ceremonial and other difficulties retarded his progress towards the capital, and he did not reach Shīrāz till the middle of June, nor Isfahan until late in October. Captain Malcolm had his first audience of the Shāh at Tehrān on the 16th of November 1800; and from that date until his departure, at the end of January 1801, negotiations were in active progress. Captain Malcolm left Persia by the route of Hamadān; he crossed into Turkish territory on the 15th of March 1801; he halted again at Büshehr on his way to India from the 22nd to the 24th of April; and he finally arrived at Bombay on the 13th of May, having encountered a dangerous gale after leaving Masqat.

Movements of Captain Malcolm's Mission in the Persian Gulf and Persia, 1799—1801.

At the time of Captain Malcolm's entry into Tehran the power of Zaman Shah for mischief on the side of India was already, through the operation of various causes, practically at an end; and there were

Captain
Malcolm's
negotiations
at Tehran,
November
1800 to
January
1801.

^{*}Namely Captain W. Campbell, First Assistant; Lieutenant C. Pasley and Mr. R. Strachey, Assistants; Lieutenant J. Colebrooke, commanding the escort; Mr. G. Briggs, Surgeon; and Mr. W. Hollingberry, Writer.

as yet no tangible evidences of French activity in Persia. The British nvoy therefore at first devoted, or appeared to devote, most of his attention to the conclusion of a Commercial Treaty, and left it to the Persians to press,—which they did not fail to do,—for the formation of political engagements. In the commercial Treaty, however, Captain Malcolm would have inserted a clause conferring possession of the islands of Qishm, Hanjām and Khārag upon the British, with rights of occupation and fortification; but this condition was strenuously opposed by the Shāh and his ministers from a belief that the British power in India had sprung from similar grants, and ultimately it was eliminated from the discussions.

Anglo-Persian Political Treaty, 28th January 1801. The Political Treaty, as finally signed on the 28th of January 1801, bore that amity should be maintained between Britain and Persia; that, if the ruler of Afghānistān were ever to show an intention of invading India, the Shāh should lay waste his dominions, and that, in any treaty of peace which the Shāh might make with him, a stipulation should be inserted for the abandonment by the Afghāns of all designs upon British territory; that, in event of the Afghāns or the French making war upon Persia, the British should supply the Persians with guns and military stores; that, if a French force should attempt to effect a lodgment upon any Persian coast or island, a joint Anglo-Persian expedition should be organised to expel them; and finally that, if the French were to apply for leave to establish a settlement in any such position, their request should be refused by Persia.

Anglo-Persian Commercial Treaty, 28th January 1801.

The provisions of the Commercial Treaty, signed on the same date, were that the merchants of each of the contracting powers were to enjoy security and official protection in the territories of the other; that British and Indian merchants "in the service of the English Government" (i.e., probably, in the employment of the East India Company) should be free to settle at all places in Persia; that no duties should be levied upon goods which were bona fide the property of either Government, but that the usual duties might, if such goods were sold, be realised from the purchasers; that in either country the merchants of the other should be entitled, on certain conditions, to official assistance in obtaining payment of debts and redress of injuries; that the British representatives in Persia should be at liberty to employ as many Persian subjects as their affairs might require, and to punish them in event of misconduct, but without injury to life or limb; that the British should be free to build residences for themselves in all the ports and cities of Persia, and to sell or rent the same at their pleasure; that aid should be

given, in the territory of either power, to vessels under the flag of the other entering its harbours in a damaged condition, and that, in case of shipwreck, property lost should be restored—so far as possible—to the owners, who should be bound to pay proper salvage; that European and Indian employés of the British Government, if desirous of leaving Persia, should be allowed to do so at any time and to remove their property with them; and that the duty to be recovered by the Persian Government from purchasers of the East India Company's iron, steel, lead, broad-cloth and perpets should not exceed one per cent. ad valorem, while the customs tariffs of both countries were to remain otherwise unaltered, and other questions relating to commerce were to be settled at another opportunity.

These were the tangible results of the employment of seven European officers during a period of nearly a year and-a-half, and of an enormous expenditure, forming an inconvenient precedent for the future, in presents to the ministers and leading men of Persia. In view of the fact that the treaty provisions relating to Afghānistān were from the first unnecessary and that those referring to France did not avail to prevent French intrigues in Persia, while those bearing on commerce were mostly of a commonplace and non-controversial character, the outcome must be accounted meagre; but a favourable opinion of the wealth, if not of the power, of Britain, and of the intelligence and character of British officers, had been diffused throughout Persia, in its length and breadth, by the proceedings of the Mission.

The two Treaties arranged by Captain Malcolm had been signed by him and by Hāji Ibrāhīm, the Prime Minister of Persia; and the Shāh, as a token of his acceptance, had caused a Farmān requiring his officials to observe its terms to be attached to each. It remained to arrange for a corresponding ratification by the Governor-General of India; and for this purpose, and for that of disposing of the points connected with trade which remained unsettled, Fat-h 'Ali Shāh undertook to send a return mission to India. In selecting a representative his choice fell upon one of the principal merchants of Būshehr, Hāji Khalīl* by name, who was ambitious of figuring as an envoy, who had taken some part in the negotiations at Tehrān, and against whose nomination Captain Malcolm had nothing to say. The terms of Hāji Khalīl's employment seem to have been, simply, that his deputation to India

Results of (Captain)
Malcolm's first Mission to Persia.

Mission of Hāji Khalil to India, 1801-02.

^{*} This Hāji Khalīl was partner in a large shipping concern with Messrs. S. Manesty and H. Jones of Basrah and a Portuguene merchant of Calcutta.

should involve his royal master in no expense, beyond that of providing him with a court dress and some articles of horse furniture, together with the title of Khān and permission to wear a particular kind of ornament in his cap. A frigate-of-war was detailed by the Government of Bombay to convey the Persian Envoy from Büshehr to India: but before its arrival he had chartered on his own account, for Rs. 3,300. a native vessel of which Mehdi 'Ali Khān, the British Resident, was partowner. This vessel Hāji Khalīl detained for about seven months without paying demurrage to the proprietors, who had expected him to discharge it in about 40 days; and the East India Company's ship also was kept by him idle at Büshehr for nearly four months. In the end he made the voyage in the chartered vessel, escorted by the Company's frigate. From the 3rd to the 7th of May 1802, the Tersian Envoy was at Masqat, where he was received by Captain Seton, and on the 21st of that month he arrived at Bombay. Mr. Duncan, the Governor, was then absent in the interior, and Haji Khalil was received in his absence by Mr. Carnac, the member of the Government next in seniority. Mihmāndār, or official entertainer appointed on the part of the Governor-General, seems to have been Mr. Hankey Smith, formerly Resident at Büshehr.

Accidental death of Hāji Khalīl, 20th July 1802. While arrangements were being made for the Envoy's onward journey to Calcutta, he tarried at Bombay. On the 20th of July, a few days after the death of Mr. Carnac and before the return of Mr. Duncan, an unfortunate disturbance arose between some Persians of the Envoy's suite and a guard of honour, composed of Hindu sepoys, which had been furnished by the Government of Bombay. Shots were exchanged; and Hāji Khalil Khān, on going out of his house to put a stop to the fray, was struck by a stray bullet in the neck and fell dead. Three or four other persons also received gunshot wounds.

Treatment of the incident in India and Persia. This untoward event caused unusual sensation in India, both on the spot and at Calcutta; and Captain Malcolm, who was now Private Secretary to the Governor-General, was sent in haste to Rombay to take suitable measures. In the discharge of this task he seems to have written letters of regret and explanation to the Shah and his Ministers, to have made an inventory of the deceased Envoy's public and private effects, to have advised the immediate payment of gratuities and alms by the Government of India to the amount of about a lakh of rupees, and to have recommended the grant of family pensions aggregating Rs. 46,000 a year. The Haji's body was sent to Najaf for interment, attended as

far as Baghdād by Mr. Day, a civil servant of the Bombay establishment; but by some the escort of a Christian seems to have been regarded as an insult,* rather than as an honour, to the corpse upon its last journey.

When the news of the tragedy first reached Büshehr, a version of it by which the whole of the blame was made to rest upon the ill-fated Hāji himself was invented and communicated to the Persian Court by Mehdi 'Ali Khān, the British Resident; but the chief consequence of this fiction seems to have been the compulsory retirement of its author upon a pension at the recommendation of Captain Malcolm. So unusual an incident as the violent death of an ambassador naturally caused astonishment at Tehrān, and extreme advice is said to have been offered to the Shāh by a youthful member of his family, but in the end the matter was passed over by the Persian Government with complete indifference.

Mr. Lovett, the successor of Mehdi 'Ali Khān in the Būshehr Residency, fell ill not long after his arrival in Persia; and in February 1804, without obtaining the orders of Government, he made over charge of his appointment to Mr. Manesty, the British Resident at Basrah. Manesty, who had reasons of his own for entering into this arrangement, almost immediately set out for Tehran, representing himself as an Envoy from the Governor-General of India to the Shah. On arrival at the Persian Court he met with a cordial reception; and he was able to obtain a Farman for the settlement of two cases of the plunder of wrecked British ships which had occurred in the Persian Gulf; but, the first Perso-Russian war having now actually begun or being upon the point of breaking out. he soon found himself pressed by the Persians with questions and demands to which he was not in a position to return any answer. Meanwhile the Governor-General, who had become aware of Mr. Manesty's proceedings, peremptorily ordered him to return to Basrah; and so ended his unauthorised venture. The Governor-General in the first instance directed that payment of some bills which Mr. Manesty had presumed to draw upon the Government of India in the character of envoy should be refused; but afterwards, partly out of consideration for Mr. Manesty's

Self-assumed mission of Mr. Manesty to Persia, 1804,

^{*}See an amusing note in Brydges' Mission (No. VII, pages ix—x) regarding the opinion of Sulaimān Pāsha of Baghdād, from which the following is an extract — "Hajee Kheleel lived an infidel, and with infidels, and therefore, was destined to hell: he was, however, murdered by infidels and so became a shahyde (martyr), this gave him a chance of paradise; but his former friends have robbed him of this chance by deputing an infidel to attend his corpse to the grave; his fate therefore is now fixed, and you may carry him to the devil in any manner you like best."

personal safety and partly lest the public credit should be affected, this order was rescinded, and it was arranged instead to hold Mr Manesty personally responsible for the expenditure that he had improperly incurred.

Muhammad Nabi Khān's Mission to India, 1805-07.

The negotiations interrupted by the untimely death of Haji Khalil Khān in 1802 were not resumed until 1805, when* Agha Muhammad Nabi a wealthy and respectable merchant and a close connection in various ways of the deceased Envoy, was appointed by the Shah to be his successor. The principal motive of the Persian monarch in taking this step was to obtain protection against the Russians, of whose vengeance. in consequence of the treacherous murder of General Zizianoff by the Persian commandant of Baku he now stood in dread; but he may also have been moved by the solicitations and bribes of the Agha himself who for personal reasons was anxious to obtain the appointment, and who, being a man of substance, was willing to take it on the same easy terms to the Persian Government as Hājī Khalīl had previously accepted. Muhammad Nabi, it appears, hoped to be able to cover the expenses of his mission, and even to obtain a profit, through the liberality t of the British Government,—an inordinate idea of which had been implanted in the Persian mind by the profuseness of Captain Malcolm,-and through the privilege of free export and import or goods which, as an Envoy, he was entitled by precedent to enjoy in India. It would seem that he also intended to press a supplementary claim for blood money,

^{*}Muhammad Nabi was the son by Agha Kuchik, once a leading merchant at Būshehr, of a Persian lady, originally a Parsee by religion, who had been the mistress of Mr. Douglas, formerly British Agent at Bandar 'Abbās. A daughter of Mr. Douglas by the same lady was educated in England, made a good marriage there, and, having succeeded to her father's property, partly supported for a time the widow and family of Agha Küchik, whom he had left at his death in poor circumstances. A full sister of Muhammad Nabi was married to Hāji Khalīl, the first Persian Envoy to India; and after Hāji Khalīl Khān's death, a Turkish widow of his at Basrah beccame the wife of Agha Muhammad Nabi. Muhammad Nabi's start in life was made in 1787, when he became Persian instructor to Mr. H. Jones at Basrah on a salary of Rs. 30 a month, Hāji Khalīl, by whom this was arranged, at the same time appointing him his commercial agent there; and by 1795 Agha Muhammad Nabi had become one of the chief merchants of the place. In 1799 he was described as attached to (i.e., probably, devoted to the interests of) the British Factory at Basrah, and assisted Mr. Manesty in turning back a mission which Tipu Sultan of Mysore had sent to the Porte.

[†] He once suggested that his horses at Bombay should be shod with gold and silver at the expense of Government and that the shoes should be loosely attached so as to fall off and be scrambed for by the crowd (Brydges' Mission, page 38).

amounting to twenty lakhs of rupees, on account of the death of the late Hāji Khalīl Khān.

Dr. Jukes, a good Persian scholar, was apppointed to accompany Muhammad Nabi Khān on his mission to India. It had been intended that the Envoy should travel by sea the whole way to Calcutta; but, bad weather having obliged his vessel to seek shelter at Bombay, he landed there on the 18th October 1805. He was received with much ceremony and handsomely fêted by the Bombay Government, whose guest he remained for more than a month, afterwards proceeding by land to his destination at Calcutta.

Movements of Muhammad Nabi Khān, 1805-07.

The Government of India, however, presided over by Sir George Barlow, were at this time occupied with internal affairs and retrenchment of expenditure, and they were accordingly content to refer all questions of British policy in Persia to His Majesty's Government at home. His Majesty's Government could come to no decision on the subject of Persia and Russia, and the consequence was that in January 1807 Muhammad Nabi Khān returned to Persia without having achieved a single political result. Even the Treaties arranged by Captain Malcolm in Persia remained unratified by the Governor-General of India. The outcome of the Envoy's private speculations was probably *fortunate; but his pecuniary claims on the Indian Government were scouted by the British authorities, whose per contra calculations even brought out a debit balance against him of more than a lakh of rupees.

Failure of Muhammad Nabi Khān's Mission.

The unfavourable issue of Muhammad Nabi Khān's negotiations in India was quickly reflected in the attitude of the Shāh, whose first attempted overtures to Napoleon through M. Outrey were made about the time that he must have become aware of the ill-success of his representative at Calcutta. Fat-h'Ali Shāh, in deputing Muhammad Nabi Khān to India, had simultaneously opened a correspondence with His Majesty's ministers in London; but from these also he failed to obtain a satisfactory reply, or possibly any reply at all.

At the beginning of 1807 the intimacy between Persia and France, exemplified in the missions of Colonel Romieu, Mīrza Muhammad Riza, and M. Jaubert, had become so close that the British Government at home felt it incumbent on them to take counteractive measures.

Mission of Sir H. Jones to Persia, 1807.

^{*}Morier (see his Journey, Volume I, page 23, foot note) says: "Having enriched himself enormously by his mission, he has yet never failed to complain before the King of the evil stars which by leading him to accept such a situation, had reduced him to beggary." According to Brydges (Mission, page 48) the Envoy made seven lakhs of rupees by his journey.

The means which they decided to adopt was a mission from the British sovereign to the Shah of Persia, the expense of which, however, was to be borne by the East India Company; and the person chosen to conduct it, in the capacity of Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary, was Mr. Harford Jones, a civil servant of the Company, who had been attached to the Basrah Factory from 1784 to 1795, had visited Shīrāz in a private capacity in 1787 and 1791, had held the post of Resident at Baghdad from 1798 to 1806, and, on his way to Europe in 1806, had placed his services at the disposal of the British Ambassador at Constantinople in connection with the passage through the Turkish capital of a Persian embassy to France, presumably that of Mirza Muhammad Riza. It was at first intended that Mr. Jones should proceed to Persia viá St. Petersburg, where he would endeavour to procure the acceptance of British mediation by Russia in her frontier difficulties with Persia; but the pacification of Tilsit, by bringing France and Russia together, frustrated this part of the scheme. In August 1807 a baronetcy * was conferred on the Envoy elect: and on the 27th of October he left Portsmouth for Bombay in H.M.S. "Sapphire." The principal members of his staff were Major Lewis Smith, Public Secretary, and Mr. James Morier, Private Secretary. Sir Harford Jones's voyage round the Cape was a prolonged one, and he did not reach Bombay until the 26th April 1808.

Second Mission of (General)
Malcolm to
Persia, April
to August
1808.

The Government of India, no less than His Majesty's Government, were convinced of the necessity of asserting British influence in Persia in opposition to that of France; and Lord Minto, who was aware of the intended deputation of Sir Harford Jones to Persia, but who could not tell when or by what route that gentleman might be expected to arrive on the scene, thought it advisable to send Malcolm once more to the Gulf, with the rank of Brigadier-General, to report on the situation in Persia, to devise measures for the exclusion of the French from that country, and even to make a reconnaissance for the despatch of "an expedition on a small scale", which might subsequently be required to prevent the French from establishing themselves upon the Persian coast. The Envoy was invested with "general powers of control over all

^{*}According to Sir Harford Jones himself this honour was a reward for his past services: according to the historian Kaye it was bestowed in order to increase his dignity as British Envoy.

[†] His full style was, it would seem, Plenipotentiary and Political Agent in the "Persian Gulf on the part of the Right Hon'ble the Governor-General of India, and "Envoy Extraordinary from His Lordship to the King of Persia and the Pacha of "Bagdad."

the British interests and concerns in Persia and Turkish Arabia", the local servants of the Company being thus placed under his orders; and he was furnished with credentials for presentation, in case they should be required, to the Shah of Persia and the Pasha of Baghdad. He was specially instructed to refute, should an opportunity of so doing present itself, an argument which had been adopted by the Government of Persia, that the Anglo-Persian treaty of 1801 was in effect one of offensive-defensive alliance against all other powers, and that it had been violated by Britain when she failed to afford support to Persia against Elaborate directions were added as to the manner in which Russia. General Malcolm should comport himself towards Sir H. Jones, if they should chance to encounter one another in the Persian field. The gist of these was that the representative of the Governor-General must, as Envoy to the Persian Court, give place to the representative of the King; but that, in his general capacity as an agent of the Government of India, he might take part in the proceedings, especially by affording advice.

General Malcolm sailed from Bombay in the "Psyché", a French prize, on the 17th of April 1808, only a few days before the arrival there of Sir H. Jones. The other vessels employed on the Mission were the "Doris", frigate, and the East India Company's ship "Wexford" and it was intended that some line-of-battle ships should follow at an interval of about a month. The Envoy's principal assistant was Captain C. Pasley, a relative of his own, who had accompanied him on his First Mission and had passed, since then, about four years in Persia. The escort, properly so called, consisted of 100 native Indian cavalry and 50 sepoys; but 300 men of H. M.'s 84th Regiment were embarked as marines, and a detail of European artillery with two light guns was to be sent with the ships of the Royal Navy. General Malcolm arrived at Bushehr on the 10th of May, and on the 12th he landed and was met at the beach by the Shaikh, who conducted him to a house and there entertained him. The Envoy was accompanied on this ceremonial occasion by a guard of 50 men of the 84th Regiment, these being the first European troops ever landed at Büshehr. A few days later Captain Pasley left for Tehran with a letter containing, it would seem, strong remonstrances on the subject of the relations of the Persian Court with France; but the bearer was prevented from proceeding beyond Shīrāz, and it was intimated to General Malcolm that he must transact his business with the Prince-Governor of Fars. Surprised and indignant at

such treatment, the British Envoy haughtily re-embarked on the 12th of June and declined to land again until this order was withdrawn; but it was not withdrawn, and on the 12th of July he sailed for Calcutta. Immediately before his departure he visited the island of Khärag and formed an estimate of its resources and value. Captain Pasley remained behind at Büshehr as Acting Envoy, with Lieutenant W. Bruce as his assistant; but at the middle of August, apparently from fear of an attempt by the Persians to seize him and his staff, he withdrew to Basrah, leaving Mr. Bruce in charge at Büshehr as Acting Resident.

The explanation of the rebuff sustained by General Malcolm on his Second Mission to Persia is not far to seek; for General Gardanne was by this time with the Shāh, and had for the moment persuaded him that his only safety from Russia lay in a close union with France. The failure may have been due, in part also, to the impatience and abruptness of the British Envoy when he found himself confronted by difficulties.

Voyage of Sir H. Jones to Persia and his early proceedings there, September 1808 to January 1809.

On receiving news of General Malcolm's intention of returning to India, the Governor-General * authorised or requested Sir Harford Jones, who had meanwhile been waiting at Bombay, to proceed on his mission to Persia; and on the 12th September the King's Envoy sailed in H. M.'s 36-gun frigate "Néréide", accompanied by H.M.S. "Sapphire" and the East India Company's tiny schooner "Sylph" of 78 tons. The "Néréide" reached Büshehr on the 14th of October, and on the next day 'Abdur Rasūl, the local Shaikh, came on board to pay his respects, and Sir H. Jones and his staff landed. "Sylph" had parted company with the "Néréide" at the beginning of the voyage; and on the arrival at Büshehr on the 29th of October of the Company's cruiser "Nautilus," which had been attacked on her way up the Gulf by some Qasimi pirates, serious fears for her safety began to be entertained. As related in another place, the "Sylph" had in fact been temporarily captured by the Qawasim, but had been immediately recovered and carried to Masqat by the "Néréide," which came upon the scene most opportunely in the course of her return voyage to India. The Persian secretary, who was the only member of the Mission staff on board the "Sylph," had escaped with his life; and on the 26th October he rejoined the Envoy at Büshehr.

^{*}Sir H. Jones had voluntarily consented to await in India the result of General Malcolm's Mission. Whether he was subject to the authority of the Governor-General or not is doubtful; see on the one hand his own statement in Brydges' Mission, pages 113 and 201, and on the other a remark by Rawlinson in England and Russia in the East, page 23.

The staff of the Mission, as reconstituted after the landing at Büshehr, consisted of Mr. Morier, in whom the appointments of Public and Private Secretary were now combined, Major Smith having been left behind in India; Mr. T. H. Sheridan, of the Bombay civil establishment; Lieutenant W. Bruce, who had remained at Büshehr after the departure of Captain Pasley, and as Acting Resident had received Sir H. Jones on his arrival; Captain J. Sutherland, of the Bombay military establishment, Surveyor to the Mission; Cornet H. Willock, of the Madras Cavalry, commanding the escort,* which consisted of the Indian detachments provided for General Malcolm; and Dr. Jukes, Surgeon.

Circumstances, at the time of Sir H. Jones's landing in Persia, were partly propitious and partly unpropitious. On the one hand the Persian Court had begun to distrust the French, their connection with whom had brought them no advantage in the shape of a settlement with Russia, and to hope for better results from a friendship with Britain; but on the other hand they were under apprehension of hostilities by the Government of India, whose representative had recently quitted Persia in displeasure. The attitude assumed towards Sir H. Jones by various local officials was at first unsatisfactory, but the Envoy was not without influential personal friends in the country, and with the lapse of time the prospect gradually improved. On the 17th of December, Sir Harford started from Bushehr on his journey to the interior; and on the 30th of the same month he entered Shīrāz. On the way he had accidentally met with Muhammad Nabi Khan, formerly Persian Envoy to India, an old acquaintance of his own; but this individual, instead of helping him, attempted to pry into the nature of his instructions and even pressed on him a corrupt bargain for providing additional presents to distribute at Tehrān. the 1st of January 1809, Sir H. Jones was well received by Hasan 'Ali Mīrza, the Prince-Governor of Fars; and though an endeavour was made to induce him to open his negotiations at Shīrāz, as General Malcolm had been required to do, it was not persisted in.

On the 5th of January, however, while still halted at Shīrāz, the British Envoy suddenly found himself placed in a very difficult predicament by a despatch from Lord Minto, in which he was informed that the occupation of the Persian island of Khārag by a force from India had been resolved on, as a measure of precaution, and in which he was himself directed to withdraw from Persia.

^{*} A Lieutenant Blacker of the Madras cavalry was with the Mission afterwards in Tehran.

Scheme of the Government of India for the occupation of Khārag, August 1808 to February 1809.

The origin of these orders may be explained in a few words. General Malcolm reached Calcutta about the 20th of August 1808, and the result of his meeting with Lord Minto was that the latter wrote to Sir H. Jones at Bombay on the 22nd, desiring him to suspend his departure for Persia. During the week that followed, a scheme for the occupation of the island of Kharag in the Persian Gulf was propounded by the returned Envoy; and on the 29th of October it was adopted by the Governor-General in Council, who decided that General Malcolm should be sent at once to carry it into effect, Sir Harford Jones being meanwhile detained for a further period at Bombay. The object of the proposed seizure, for it cannot be otherwise described, was to obtain a conveniently situated and secure base for military, political, and commercial purposes. the possession of which would secure the supremacy of British influence over that of other European countries in the Middle East and, by the constant menace which it held out to the Governments of Persia and Turkish 'Iraq, would deter the Shah and the Pasha of Baghdad from dalliance with the European enemies of Britain.

On the 30th of September, however, it became known at the headquarters of the Indian Government that Sir H. Jones had left Bombay one day before the arrival there of Lord Minto's letter of the 22nd August; and General Malcolm, who had just embarked for Bombay, was temporarily recalled to Calcutta. Deliberations then took place which ended in a decision by the Governor-General in Council to proceed with the Kharag scheme, and to inform Sir H. Jones that he must forthwith retire from Persia, else the whole of his proceedings in that country would be repudiated by the Government of India. The result was the despatch opened by Sir Harford at Shīrāz, which reached happened, only two days after his departure Büshehr, as it from that place. General Malcolm, in whose hands the political control and the military command of the Khārag expedition were to be combined, arrived at Bombay on the 30th November 1808; and on the 3rd of January 1809 he contemplated being ready to leave for Khārag in ten days' time "with an admirably well-appointed little force of about 2,000 men ..., to be followed, if it is found necessary, by three or four thousand more."

But meanwhile news was received from Europe of the difficulties which Napoleon was encountering in Spain; and this led Lord Minto to regard the danger from the French in Persia as less immediate, and consequently the necessity for the occupation of Khārag as less urgent,

than they had hitherto been considered by himself and his advisers. In consequence, at the end of January or beginning of February 1809, General Malcolm was informed that the idea of a military expedition to Khārag had been abandoned, partly on the ground of expense; and that, if any steps should afterwards be taken for acquiring the island, they would most probably be of a purely pacific and political kind.

Sir Harford Jones, on becoming aware of the intention of the Government of India to take possession of Khārag, made it his object to persuade the Persians, who had also received intelligence of the project from some quarter or another, not to oppose the British expedition by force; and, by undertaking full * personal responsibility for any unprovoked aggressions which General Malcolm might commit in defiance of his objections, he induced the Prince-Governor of Shīrāz to promise that that officer and the troops which he brought with him should be well received on arrival in Persia, while the questions to which their advent gave rise were reserved for diplomatic settlement.

Further proceedings of Sir H. Jores in Persia, January to March 1809.

On the 12th of January the Envoy refused to purchase India goods to the value of £14,000 which the shameless and indefatigable Persian ex-Envoy, Muhammad Nabi Khān, at this point again endeavoured to force on him, through an agent, as presents for the Persian Court; and on the following day he left for Isfahān. Dr. Jukes, whose place as surgeon with the Mission was taken a few days later by Dr. W. Campbell, was apparently sent back from Shīrāz; indeed it would seem that he and Mr. Bruce, though the latter eventually accompanied the Mission to Tehrān, were sympathisers with General Malcolm and did not work cordially with Sir Harford Jones.

On the 1st February the Mission entered Isfahān; and on the 6th, while they were halted at that place, a letter arrived from General Malcolm, dated the 29th December, in which he announced his intention of sailing for Khārag in about twenty days. To this communication Sir H. Jones replied announcing the favourable progress of his affairs, requiring General Malcolm to abstain from hostilities against Persia and from intrigues with the Chiefs of Dashtistān, to which the Shāh was particularly sensitive, and informing him that he would meet with a friendly reception at Khārag. About the same time it came to the knowledge of the Envoy that many families of the Lak tribe, which was connected with the Zands, had been expelled from Shīrāz for no other reason than that General Malcolm was expected to bring with him from Bombay a Zand

^{*} He even went through the form of signing a bond by which he made himself answerable with life and fortune.

pretender to the crown of Persia, apparently a son of Ja'far Khān. With the help of the Persian authorities, whom the fear of operations in the Gulf may possibly have rendered more complaisant, Sir Harford now expedited his journey towards Tehrān to the utmost. He arrived there on the 14th of February, a week after leaving Isfahān and two days after the departure of General Gardanne. On the 17th of February he had an audience of the Shāh, and on the 12th of March a Preliminary Treaty between Britain and Persia was signed. The principal representative of the Shāh in the negotiations was his Prime Minister, Mīrza Muhammad Shafī'.

Angle-Persian Preliminary Treaty, 12th March 1809.

The new Treaty was expressly described as Preliminary; and the contracting parties, in its first and second articles, bound themselves to substitute for it at a later time a Definitive Treaty, on the same principles, to regulate matters in detail. The chief provisions of the Preliminary Treaty had reference to European relations. The Shah, on his part, declared invalid all the treaties which he had hitherto formed with European powers, and engaged not to permit the passage of any European force through his dominions in the direction of India. On the part of His Britannic Majesty it was undertaken that, in case Persia should be invaded by a European force, Britain should assist the Shah's Government with troops, or in lieu thereof with a subsidy, warlike stores, and individual officers, the amounts and numbers of these to be determined in the Definitive Treaty. If Britain were at peace with the invading power she should use her good offices to arrange matters between that power and Persia; but, if she failed in this, her obligation to render active assistance to Persia should come into force. These European clauses though expressed in a general form, were aimed at French interference in Persia, and by their acceptance the principal object of Sir H. Jones's mission was undeniably realised.

The Treaty, however, also referred to Afghān affairs. In regard to these it was arranged that Britain should not intervene in a war between Persia and Afghānistān, unless by way of mediation at the request of both parties; but that, if the Afghāns should attack the British dominions in India, the Shāh should take military action against them in a manner to be determined by the Definitive Treaty.

With reference to the Khārag scheme it was agreed that, if British troops from India had been landed at any Persian port, their presence there should be regarded as provisional, subject to the good pleasure of the Shāh, and not as establishing rights of possession; and that, if the

Persian Government should afterwards assent to their remaining at the place where they were, they should be treated in a friendly manner and enabled by the local Persian officials to obtain supplies.

In conclusion it was explicitly laid down that the objects of the Preliminary Treaty were defensive, and that, during its continuance, the Shāh should not enter into any engagement prejudicial to the British Government or to the British Government in India.

Sir H. Jones lost no time in informing the Government of India of his success, which was completed by the departure of MM. Jouannin and Nerciat, the last of the French agents, from Persia about the end of April 1809. That he carried all his points with little difficulty was due to the urgent need in which Persia stood of help against Russia, to the ascertained worthlessness for this purpose of the French alliance, to the indefatigable and sanguine temperament of the Envoy himself, and possibly, to some extent, to the fear* of a British occupation of Kharag.

Great embarrassment was caused to Sir H. Jones by the action of the † Government of India, who ordered bills on Bengal to the amount of £65,000, drawn by him in the public service, to be protested,—a proceeding which only came to his knowledge on the 23rd of April; but, through the confidence reposed in him by native Persian financiers, he was enabled to surmount the difficulty thus created, which at an earlier stage of the proceedings whould certainly have been fatal to his success.

On the 7th of May 1809 the Preliminary Treaty was sent to London for ratification under the care of Mr. Morier, Secretary of the Mission, who was accompanied on his journey by Mīrzā Abul Hasan, a Persian

^{*} It seems to the present writer probable, though it is not suggested by any of the authorities, that the G overnment of India unconsciously strengthened the hands of I Sir H. Jones, by their military preparations at Bombay, of which the Persians somehow became aware. In view especially of the bond for restraining Malcolm, executed by Jones, the Persians may not unnaturally have supposed that the two, through apparently rivals, were really acting in collusion.

[†] Sir H. Jones's disregard of the authority which they claimed to exercise over him was no doubt the cause of this final act of repudiation by the Government of India; but the Envoy had also been represented to them, probably by Dr. Jukes and Lieutenant Bruce, if not by General Malcolm himself, as an undignified and even unprincipled person. Some of Sir Harford's expedients were eccentric, but they appear to have been not unsuited to the circumstances. Among such was his idea of causing the King's letter to the Shāh to be conveyed in a magnificently draped and escorted litter, which probably served a useful purpose so long as there was a doubt of the authority under which he was acting. But the effect was rather marred by the necessity which Sir Harford was under, during a several days' illness, of himself sharing the litter with the sacred missive.

Envoy to the British Court, charged with the duty of ascertaining through whom the subsidy guaranteed to Persia in certain circumstances would be paid. The Persian Envoy was a nephew, on his mother's side, of the late Prime Minister Hāji Ibrāhim, whose son-in-law also he was; he had been governor of Shūshtar during his relative's tenure of power; he had visited Makkah; and he had resided for more than two years in India, at Calcutta and elsewhere.

Third Mission of (General)
Malcolm to
Persia, 1810.

The Government of India, on becoming aware of the facts, decided that the Treaty negotiated by Sir H. Jones at Trhran must be accepted and executed, in so far as this depended on themselves, without regard to the agency—unworthy in their opinion—by which it had been obtained. Among the considerations that weighed most strongly with Lord Minto were the virtual expulsion of the French representative and his suite from Persia, the recall of the Persian Envoy (Askar Khān) from Paris, and other circumstances tending to a rupture between France and Persia.a danger to which the Shah, but for his reliance upon British aid. would probably not have exposed himself. It was also the opinion of the Governor-General that a British representative must in future be stationed at the Persian Court to pay the subsidy promised, if it should become exigible, and to see that the obligations imposed on Persia by the Preliminary Treaty were properly fulfilled; and, in his correspondence with the authorities at home, he recommended that this representative should be an officer appointed by the Government of India. For the double purpose, in the first instance, of demonstrating his acceptance of the treaty and rehabilitating the prestige of the Government of India in Persia, which he conceived to have been lowered by the conduct of Sir H. Jones, but probably also with an eye to future permanent arrangements, Lord Minto now despatched General Malcolm on a third mission to Porsia.

A collateral object of the Mission was to collect topographical and other information regarding Persia and certain of the countries adjoining it,—a field formerly neglected, but one to which Captain Sutherland of Sir H. Jones's mission had begun to devote attention; and, partly to facilitate this work of exploration and enquiry, but partly also to enhance the dignity of the Governor-General's representative, a considerable number of young and energetic officers were attached to General Malcolm's staff. Two of these, Captain Christie and Ensign H. Pottinger, started before the rest of the Mission and, travelling by land from India across the intervening countries, did not join it in Persia until it was on the eve of its return. The other members of

the *staff were Captain Pasley, the Secretary, who had accompanied General Malcolm on both former occasions; Lieutenant Stewart, First Assistant; Mr. H. Ellis, Second Assistant; Dr. A. Jukes, Third Assistant; Lieutenants Briggs, J. Macdonald of the Madras Infantry, and Little, Supernumerary Assistants; Surgeons Colhoun (? Colquboun) and Cormick; Captain N. P. Grant, commanding the escort; Lieutenants Frederick, Martin, H. Lindsay of the Madras Artillery, Johnson and Fotheringham, attached to the same; and Ensign W. Monteith of the Madras Engineers. The military escort consisted this time of two native officers and 24 non-commissioned officers and men of the Madras Horse Artillery; of three non-commissioned officers, one trumpeter and ten privates of H. M. 17th Light Dragoons; and of two non-commissioned officers, two musicians, and 40 sepoys of the Bombay establishment.

At the end of the winter of 1809-10 a despatch was received by Sir H. Jones from the Government of India, in which he was requested to relinquish his functions in Persia in favour of Dr. Jukes, who had been placed by them in provisional charge of British interests at Tehran, pending the arrival there of General Malcolm; but Sir Harford did not consider it necessary or proper to comply with the desire of the Governor-General, especially as he had already submitted his resignation to His Majesty's ministers by the medium of Mr. Morier and was in expectation of their orders.

General Malcolm left Bombay on the 10th January 1810 in the "Psyché," with which sailed the "James Sibbald" and other vessels; and on the 14th of February he landed at Būshehr. Here he remained until a letter from the Shāh should arrive, making a favourable reception at Tehrān certain, and not until this condition had been fulfilled did he start on the journey up country. Leaving Būshehr on the 15th of April, he arrived at Shīrāz on the 27th, where he paused until the 16th of May. During this halt he received news of the murder, on the confines of Turkish 'Irāq, of Captain Grant and Lieutenant Fotheringham, whom he had sent round by Baghdād. Lieutenant Macdonald and Ensign Monteith, whom he had ordered to travel

^{*}Christie, as we have seen elsewhere, was afterwards killed with the Persian army fighting against the Russians, while Grant and Fotheringham lost their lives early in the course of the Mission, as will be related further on; but, of the remainder, Pottinger (1789-1856) and Ellis (1777-1855) attained to distinction in distant lands, and Macdonald and Lindsay to prominence in Persia, while several of the others rose to posts of some importance in India. These facts testify to the judgment with which Malcolm selected his "family".

towards him from Basrah, rejoined him in safety at Shīrāz. General Malcolm reached the Shāh's summer camp at Sultānīyeh, 50 miles to the west of Qazvīn, on the 21st of June; and two days later he had his first audience of the Shāh. As he and Sir Harford Jones, though they exchanged visits and otherwise treated each other with becoming courtesy, could not agree as to the manner * in which they should appear together in the royal presence, the King's Envoy absented himself upon this occasion.

The duty of General Malcolm at the Persian Court seems to have consisted in the delivery of gifts and complimentary messages, and he was treated by Fat-h 'Ali Shāh with much cordiality. Among the gifts † seems to have been included, in harmony with the spirit of the Preliminary Treaty not as yet ratified by Britain, two batteries of horse artillery guns, with harness complete, and 35,000 stand of small arms. But at the beginning of July, during a movement of the Shāh's camp from Sultānīyeh to the plain of Ujān near Tabrīz, Sir Harford Jones was able to inform General Malcolm of a decision by His Majesty's Government to keep the appointment of the British representative at Tehrān in their own hands, and of their choice of Sir Gore Ouseley to succeed Sir Harford himself, whose resignation they had accepted.

This decision, reached after full consideration of Lord Minto's views, was a death-blow to General Malcolm's prospects of permanent employment in Persia, and he at once made dispositions for returning to India. Before his departure he received from the Shāh the titles of Khān and Sipāhdār and was invested with the order of the Lion and the Sun, instituted in his honour. At the instance of Sir H. Jones, his relations with whom became more friendly towards the end of their association in Persia, he left Captain Christie, ‡ Lieutenant Lindsay, Ensign

^{*}The evidence as to the nature of the disagreement is conflicting. One awkward circumstance was that Sir H. Jones had been accustomed to stand in the presence of the Shāh, while General Malcolm at his former visit to the Persian Court had received a seat. The contrast in ceremonial matters between the two British Envoys was certainly to the disadvantage of Sir H. Jones, who had instituted a practice of making his presents in hard cash,—a system perfectly effectual but somewhat indecent.

[†] See Brydges' Mission, page 364, and notes to the same, page xxviii. Rawlinson, however,—see his England and Russia in the East, page 26,—speaks of "a limited supply of military stores".

[‡] These were the first British officers lent to Persia; and the idea may have been suggested, along with the clause in the Treaty referring to officers, by the action of General Gardanne's French Mission in Persia. But there is reason to think that, perhaps in imitation of Turkey, Persia had turned her attention to European military arrangements and tactics even before 1807 (see *Dynasty of the Kajars*, page 308)

Monteith and Mr. Surgeon Cormick to be employed in Persia on the public service. On the 15th July General Malcolm had his final interview with the Shah, after which he made his way vid Tabriz to Baghdad, arriving there on the 20th September. At the end of October he left Basrah for India.

The cost of this third and last Mission of General Malcolm to India was extravagant; and its political results, partly no doubt in consequence of its terminating otherwise than the authors had intended, were incommensurate with the expense, and even negligible. In fact General Malcolm's History of Persia, on which he was employed at Bombay during 1811, remains the most substantial of his later achievements in the Persian field; and next, in order of importance, should perhaps be ranked the detailed information regarding parts of Persia, Afghanistan, Balüchistan, etc., which was acquired through the labours of his official staff.

We have been obliged, on account of the special interest of India in these affairs, to give a somewhat full account of them; but, apart from one more Treaty, the further proceedings of British representatives at the Persian Court during the reign of Fat-h 'Ali Shah need not detain us long. After the signature of the Preliminary Treaty Sir H. Jones was confidentially consulted by the Shah on various matters of foreign policy, especially in regard to Russian affairs; and a strong but naturally unsuccessful effort was made by the Persian Government to obtain, through him, the personal services of General Malcolm in the war against Russia. Sir H. Jones finally made over charge of his Mission archives to Mr. Sheridan and returned to Europe by way of Constantinople, travelling as far as that city in the company of a Turkish Ambassador whose visit to Persia he had been partially instrumental in bringing about. He was shipwrecked on the English coast in H.M.S. "Pomone" on the 11th October 1811; and this unfortunate incident, though he survived until 1846, marked the close of his strenuous public career.

Sir Gore Ouseley, Ambassador Extraordinary, to whom was confided the completion of the task begun by Sir Harford Jones, arrived at Tabrīz on the 9th* November 1811. With him there returned from England

a Morier of her own, what a subject was here for a caricaturist of British methods!

Conclusion of Sir H. Jones's Mission to Persia, 1810-11.

Mission of Sir Gore Ouseley to Persia, 1810-

^{*} The mission of Sir G. Ouseley had some peculiar features. The Ambassador was accompanied by his wife, and his Private Secretary was his brother, Sir W. Ouseley. The voyage from Spithead to Bombay, which included a fortnight at Rio di Janeiro, occupied from the 18th July 1810 to the 12th January 1811; and after landing in Persia a further delay of three months took place at Shīrāz, from 7th April to 10th July 1811, for purely domestic reasons. At this time, be it remembered, the Russians were pressing Persia hard, and the Shāh was waiting with impatience to know whether he might expect active aid from the British. Had Persia possessed a Morier of her own, what a subject was here for a carriesturist of British methods!

Mr. Morier, the Secretary of Sir H. Jones's Mission, and Mīrza Abul Hasan, the Persian Envoy to London; and he was accompanied by Majors D'Arcy and Stone of the Royal Artillery, who were destined for employment with the Persian army. The Ambassador's escort, consisting of 30 Indian cavalry under Lieutenant G. Willock, was taken on board at Bombay; and at that port were also embarked some non-commissioned officers of His Majesty's 47th Regiment who had been chosen as drill-instructors for the Persian infantry. At the time of the voyage of the Mission up the Persian Gulf, piracy by the Qāsimi tribe was still rife; and some craft, evidently piratical, were pursued and fired on by the vessel in which the Ambassador travelled—H.M.S. "Lion" of 64 guns,—near Shaikh Shu'aib Island.

The Definitive Treaty which the Ambassador was sent to conclude was signed on the 14th of March 1812; but, as it was never ratified by the British sovereign and was shortly superseded by another, it is unnecessary here to quote its provisions.

In the summer of 1812 there was correspondence between General de Russian Governor-General of Georgia, and the British Ambassador; and the latter, in consequence of his good offices having been requested by the former, visited the camp of the Persian Crown Prince; but, though a meeting of Russian and Persian plenipotentiaries took place at Aslanduz on the Aras River, no basis for an accommodation could be found. At the end of October 1812, as we have already seen, the Russians inflicted a crushing defeat upon the Persian army, which Sir G. Ouseley had considered himself obliged by the friendly relations in Europe of Britain and Russia to deprive of its* British officers; and the informal mediation of the British Ambassador was then resumed. ultimate result was the Treaty of Gulistan, arranged in 1813, between General de Rtischeff and Mirza Abul Hasan. The matter of the Anglo-Persian intended Treaty had been so greatly protracted that Persia derived no benefit in her first great war with Russia. In the summer of 1814, Sir G. Ouseley returned to England via Russia, leaving Mr. Morier to carry on the duties of British representative in Persia.

Anglo-Persian Definitive Treaty, 25th November 1814. Meanwhile the treaty arranged by Sir G. Ouseley had been under examination in London; and, as it was found to be unsatisfactory in certain respects, Mr. H. Ellis, who had accompanied General Malcolm on

^{*} Except Captain Christic and Lieutenant Lindsay, neither of whom had come to Persia with him, and whom he virtually authorised, along with 13 British drill instructors, to follow their own inclinations.

his third mission to Persia, was sent out from England, as a Minister Plenipotentiary, with fresh instructions. Mr. Ellis arrived near Erivan in August 1814 and proceeded with Mr. Morier, the Minister Plenipotentiary ad interim, to Tehrān, where, on the 25th of November, the Definitive Treaty with Persia, sometimes styled the Treaty of Tehrān, was adjusted by their joint exertions.

This important engagement, which with one important modification continued to regulate Anglo-Persian political relations for more than 40 years afterwards, consisted of eleven articles. By the first article the Persian Government declared all their alliances contracted with European nations in a state of hostility with Great Britain to be null and void; bound themselves not to allow any European army to enter Persian territory or to proceed thence, by land or sea, in the direction of India; and engaged not to suffer individuals belonging to European nations entertaining designs on India or at enmity with Britain to frequent Persia. By the same article the Shah of Persia undertook to use all the means at his disposal to induce the powers of Central Asia to prevent a European invasion of India by routes though their dominions. The second article established perpetual friendship between Britain and Persia, and bound the British sovereign to refrain from interference in domestic strife in Persia and to request the territorial integrity of the Persian kingdom. The third article defined the treaty as purely defensive in its nature, and preseribed as the boundary between Persia and Russia that which should be * accepted by the two countries and by Great Britain. fourth article referred to the obligations imposed on Britain by the Preliminary Treaty of 1809 in case of an invasion of Persia by a European power, and fixed the amount of the subsidy to be paid by Britain to Persia, should the assistance rendered take the form of a subsidy, at 200,000 Tūmāns annually; it was added that the subsidy should not be payable if the war which led to the invasion of Persia had been provoked by aggressive action on the part of Persia herself, also that proof must be afforded of the subsidy being applied solely to the military purposes for which it was intended. The fifth article permitted the employment by the Persian Government of European officers for the training of their troops, provided that such officers did not belong to nations at war or at enmity with Britain. In event of a European power at peace with Britain making war on Persia, the British Government were to mediate; but, if mediation

^{*}The Treaty of Gulistan, 1813, between Persia and Russia virtually left the frontier for fature determination by Commissioners.

failed, the obligation by which they were bound to assist Persia either with a military force or with a subsidy was to remain binding on them. By the seventh article the British subsidy, when payable, was to be paid "in as early instalments as may be convenient." Under the eighth and ninth articles, if war were to break out betweeen Britain and Afghanistan. the Shah was to take action against the Afghans and receive a grant for his expenses from the British Government; whereas, in the event of war between Persia and Afghanistan, Britain was not to interfere, unless as a mediator at the request of both parties. The tenth article related to the expulsion and extradition of political offenders. Finally, by the eleventh article the British Government undertook, in very general terms, to assist the Shah in the Persian Gulf, "if convenient and practicable," with ships of war and troops; but their expenditure, in such a case, was to be reimbursed by the Persian Government; and it was added that their ships must anchor at such ports as were appointed by the Persian authorities and not, unless from absolute necessity, at any others. The bearing of the eleventh article, which was doubtless inserted at the request of the Persians, is not explained: it may have had reference to the general prevalence of piracy, to apprehended danger from the Wahhābis, to Persian designs on Bahrain, or to the difficulties which occasionally arose between the Shīrāz Government and the semi-independent chiefs of the Persian littoral.

The wording of the Definitive Treaty was general, resembling in this respect that of the Preliminary Treaty; but, in consequence of the change in the political situation, the new Treaty was as clearly directed against Russia as the older one had been against France. The ratification of this Treaty by the Prince Regent was brought from Europe by Mr. H. Willock, who arrived in Persia in September 1815; and Mr. Morier finally left Persia in the following month.

British relations with Persia, 1815-28. After the arrival of Sir Harford Jones in Persia in 1808 the interests of Britain at the Persian Court were continuously watched by special representatives of varying rank, who were generally appointed by His Majesty's Government and not by the Government of India. From 1815 to 1826 this function was discharged alternately by Mr. H. Willock and Major G. Willock, who had first come to Persia in command of the escorts respectively of Sir H. Jones and Sir G. Ouseley, with the title of Chargé d'Affaires; and in 1826 Colonel J. Macdonald (Sir J. M. Kinneir), who had been introduced to the country by General Malcolm on his third mission, was appointed Envoy Extraordinary by the Indian Government, to which the responsibility for supervising British interests in Persia had

reverted in 1823. During the period from 1815 to 1826 much attention was given by the British diplomatic representatives to the improvement of the regular Persian army, and numerous British officers were lent to the Shāh for the purpose; but their endeavours, on account of the unsuitability of the material, did not result in the creation of any efficient fighting force.

The circumstances of Persia's unsuccessful war with Russia in 1826-28 led to an important modification of the Anglo-Persian Definitive Treaty of 1814. When hostilities began, the Persians claimed, under that Treaty, the benefit of British assistance; but it was withheld on the ground that the war had been begun, not by the Russian occupation of the disputed Gokcheh district, but by the attack made thereafter by the Persians upon the Russians. It was now recognised, however, that the Treaty, as it stood, was a dangerous entanglement for Great Britain; and, soon after the peace of Turkmanchai, advantage was taken of the difficulty which Persia found in raising the war indemnity payable to Russia to procure her assent, in return for a single payment of 200,000 Tumans, to the cancellation of the third and fourth articles,—those, namely, which obliged Great Britain to take cognisance of the boundary between Persia and Russia and to help the former country with men or money in case of a war of aggression upon her commenced by a European power. The two obnoxious articles were formally annulled upon the 24th August 1828.

Final modification of the Anglo-Persian Definitive Treaty, 24th August 1828.

British Officers in the Persian army, 1828-1834.

In 1828 Major Lindsay, afterwards Sir H. L. Bethune, and Major Hart, who commanded the Persian infantry and in whom the Shāh reposed unlimited confidence, were still serving with the Persian army. In 1832-33, as a matter of favour, a large quantity of arms and accoutrements was supplied by the Government of India to the Shah without payment. In 1834 a complete staff of British officers and noncommissioned officers was sent to Persia to reform the Persian army in all its branches: it included Colonel Passmore; Colonel Sheil, afterwards Sir J. Sheil, and Colonel Rawlinson, afterwards Sir H. Rawlinson, both of whom later represented Britain at the Court of Persia; Colonel F. Farrant, who was sent as a Special Commissioner to Karbala in 1843 and afterwards became British Chargé d'Affaires at Tehrān; Colonel Stoddart,

who was murdered at Bukhara in 1842; and Colonel D'Arcy Todd, who took charge of the Persian artillery.

Affairs of the Persian Coast and Islands, 1797-1834.

Our narrative of events under the rule of Fat-h 'Ali Shāh has borne, up to this point, little reference to the local affairs of the Persian Coast; but a detached account of the latter, apart from the history of Persia as a whole, would have been unintelligible and might have been misleading. The general view which we have taken enables us to treat the occurrences of the Persian Coast with a proper appreciation of their importance or unimportance.

Revolution at Bushehr, 1798. Two revolutions, of which the nature is obscure, took place at Būshehr during the year 1798. In April a force commanded by Husain Quli Khān, Governor of Fārs, who was then in rebellion against his brother the Shāh, advanced against the town; and Shaikh Nāsir, after some feeble dispositions for resistance, fled and was supplanted in the chiefship by his nephew Shaikh Ghānim, who seems to have been a partisan of Husain Quli Khān.

About the middle of September Shaikh Nāsir suddenly reappeared at Bushehr with an 'Athi fleet, probably that of Bahrain, and blockaded the port: on the way there he had re-established, with the help of the 'Utūb, his authority over the island of Khārag. He was preceded at Bushehr by a land force, under a Persian officer and his own brother Muhammad, which had been sent to co-operate with him. A five days' siege of Büshehr ensued during which the inhabitants were reduced to drinking " water little better than the sea." On the evening of the 20th September a sortie was attempted by Shaikh Ghanim, who had shown considerable spirit in the defence of the place; but it failed, and the party making it were pursued up to the gates by the enemy, who entered the town along with them. Panic then seized the garrison, and Shaikh Ghanim, after a vain effort to rally his men, took flight. The successful party continued plundering the town until daylight. naval part of Shaikh Nāsir's force in this affair was commanded by a Shaikh named Salim, but whether this Shaikh belonged to the Bushelir family or was one of the chiefs of Bahrain is not clear. The success of Shaikh Nāsir was ascribed to his "paternal influence."

In 1799, as explained in the history of Bahrain, preparations were Occupation made for the reduction of those islands by the Government of Shīrāz and the Sultan of 'Oman conjointly; and the Shaikh of Bushehr took advantage of the alarm of the people of Bahrain to extort from them an admission of dependence upon Persia, together with an instalment of tribute on account of the year 1798. A Persian military force under the command of a brother of the Baiglarbaig of Fars was at this time encamped outside the walls of Büshehr, in readiness to proceed on service to Bahrain. The Sultan of 'Oman, who considered himself to have been tricked by the Persians, then visited Khārag, where, by giving out that Shaikh Nāsir had again been superseded in his government by Shaikh Ghanim, he induced the inhabitants to make over the fort to him; having thus established a footing, he represented to the Baiglarbaig of Fars that he had found Kharag derelict and had occupied it to prevent its falling into the hands of the 'Utūb; and he offered to pay five years' revenue in advance for the island, if it were made over to him. matters were settled with the Baiglarbaig is not stated, but the Sultan shortly returned to Masqat; and exactly a year later, in July 1799, Shaikh Nāsir, under orders from the Government of Shīrāz, crossed over from Büshehr with 10 vessels and 1,500 men and repossessed himself of Khārag.

of Kharag by the Sultan of 'Oman 1797-1800.

In 1802 Khārag was still subject to the Shaikh of Būshehr; but Daliki, which he had at one time held in farm, had been transferred to the jurisdiction of another authority. The revenue for which the Shaikh was responsible to the Government of Fars amounted to 4,000 Tumans a year (or rather more than the same number of pounds sterling), but he was obliged to pay in addition a still larger sum under the name of presents to the Prince-Governor

Position of the Shaikh of Büshehr in 1802.

Operations by which in 1805 Saivid Badar of 'Oman recovered Bandar 'Abbās with the assistance of the British Resident at Masqat are described in a later section dealing with British relations.

Proceedings of the Sultan of 'Omān at Bandar 'Abbās, 1805.

On the 2nd January 1807 Shaikh Nāsir II left Būshehr on a pilgrimage to Makkah, from which it does not appear that he ever returned. At his departure he entrusted the administration to his son, Shaikh 'Abdur Rasul, of whom in the next year it was recorded that "his face was inanimate and his body bent double with excessive debauch"; but the

Succession of 'Abdur Rasul to the Shaikhship of Bushehr. 1807.

physical weakness of the new Shaikh did not prevent his taking an active part in politics for the next twenty-five years.

Government of Bushehr by Muhammad Nati Khān, 1808-11.

Meanwhile Muhammad Nabi Khān, who had been the Shāh's Envov to India in 1805-07, had been intriguing to obtain the Büshehr government for himself; and it was at length conferred on him in consideration of a payment of 40,000 Tumans. The pretext for the removal of Shaikh 'Abdur Rasūl was his inability to discharge a debt of 28,000 Tumans, including interest, which he had incurred for the purpose of meeting a demand formerly made on him by the Prince-Governor of Fars: the person, even, from whom he was to borrow the money required had been indicated to him by the same authority. On the 26th October 1808 the Shaikh was treacherously arrested, or rather kidnapped, by Muhammad Khān an emissary sent from Shīrāz, while both of them were on their way to visit Sir Harford Jones, the British Envoy, during his stay at Büshehr. These proceedings were covered by a Farman from the Prince-Governor of Fars, in which the emissary was strictly enjoined not to molest the British at Büshehr nor any of the native inhabitants of the place; and a re-assuring Farman was also addressed to Sir H. Jones personally, which Muhammad Khān was directed to read aloud in his presence. Indeed the Persians went so far as to attribute the trouble in which Shaikh 'Abdur Rasūl now found himself to some act of disrespect committed by him towards the recent Mission, headed by General Malcolm, from the Government of India. Great alarm and confusion, prevailed in the town and surrounding country; and numbers of villagers, with all their property, took asylum at the British Residency. Pending the arrival of Muhammad Nabi Khan the town was governed at first by Muhammad Khān, the Shīrāz emissary, and then by Muhammad Ja'far a brother of Muhammad Nabi Khān; but so arbitrary was the mood of the Shīrāz authorities, as represented by their emissary, that even Muhammad Ja'far himself was thrown into jail for a few days for no other reason than that he had failed to prevent the escape by sea of the Wazīr of the late Shaikh.

Muhammad Nabi Khān, alarmed by the antipathy of the local population to the change, which was looked upon as the end of Arab and the beginning of Persian rule, would now willingly have resigned the Būshehr government, and was said to have offered 2,000 Tūmāns in vain for permission to do so. His public entry into Būshehr took place on the 19th December 1808, and his rule seems to have been inaugurated without opposition, and even with a good deal of flattery, on the part of his

new subjects. To his credit it should be mentioned that by personal intercession he saved the life, and even the sight, of his predecessor Shaikh 'Abdur Rasūl.

In 1809, after the middle of November, Muhammad Nabi Khān was suddenly called to Shīrāz and made chief adviser to the Prince-Governor in place of Nasr Ullah Khān, whose disgrace on a charge of embezzlement he himself had probably been instrumental in procuring; and thereafter Āgha Muhammad Ja'far seems to have acted as permanent Deputy-Governor of Būshehr. Under the rule of the Persian brothers the Dumūkh Arab tribe, who had been the principal supporters of Shaikh Nāsir's family, were almost extirpated; and the Arabs of the Būshehr neighbourhood generally were reduced to desperation by Persian tyranny.

At length, apparently in 1811, Muhammad Nabi Khān was summoned to Tehrān, where his son Muhammad Rahīm Khān held an appointment at court. On arrival he was informed that the revenue of Fārs was 70,000 Tūmāns in arrears. He was then violently bastinadoed along with another official, who was regarded as his accomplice in withholding payment, and had a narrow escape of being thrown from a high window under the personal directions of the Shāh. His end is uncertain, * but he does not appear ever to have regained the royal favour. He had the misfortune to be an enemy of the Qāim-Maqām, Mīrza Buzurg, who was Arab in sympathy.

We learn that in 1815, on a Farmān of indemnity from the Shāh, Shaikh Muhammad, a brother of Shaikh Nāsir II, returned to Būshehr from Khārag, where he had been living with his dependents in voluntary exile. The records do not show the reason of Shaikh Muhammad's previous exodus from Būshehr, now when it occurred, nor how it was regarded by Shaikh 'Abdur Rasūl.

Connection of the Shaikh of Būshehr's family with Khārag, 1815.

In the summer and autumn of 1821 Büshehr and other places were visited by a severe epidemic of cholera; the road between Büshehr and Burāzjān was strewn with corpses; and the British war frigate "Liverpool" lost 2 officers in 15 hours, beside the Surgeon and a great part of the crew. At Shīraz the disease carried off Mr. Rich and Dr. Jukes, as mentioned elsewhere.

Cholera on the Persian Coast, 1821.

Early in 1823 one Zaki Khan from Shīrāz arrived at Bandar 'Abbās with instructions relating to the lease of that port and its dependencies,

Attempt to oust the Sultan of Masqat from Bandar "Abbas, 1823.

^{*} After his beating he was again invested with a robe of honour (see Morier's Second Journey, page 95); but according to Brydges (see his Mission, page 46) he eventually suffered "the complete ruin of his fortune, and the loss of his life in a very cruel and terrible manner."

held by the Sultan of Masgat: an idea even prevailed that he had been sent to find a means of terminating the grant. Saivid Sa'id, on receiving news of the presence of this official at Bandar 'Abbas, proceeded with two ships to meet him there; and the upshot of their discussions was that the Sultan promised to pay 1,000 Tumans extra per annum for the two next years and made Zaki Khān a personal present of 500 Tūmāns. Saivid Sa'id set sail for Masqat on his return journey, he was visited on board his ship by a certain Mīrza Bāqir, who brought with him Husain 'Ali Khān, Hākim of Bandar 'Abbās, and 'Ali Khān, Hākim of Mīnāb. both of whom had lately expressed a preference for Persian rule, but who were now desirous of being reconciled to His Highness. In the event these two persons and their conductor, for a while at least, mysteriously disapreared; and it was stated that the boat carrying them had foundered in returning to the shore; but it was generally believed at the time that they had been carried off and consigned to a living death in the dungeons of Masgat.

Hostilities between the Sultān of 'Omān and Shaikh 'Abdur Rasūl of Būshehr, 1826-27.

Bad feeling had for some time been growing up between the Sultān of 'Omān and Shaikh 'Abdur Rasūl, who seems to have resumed his position as hereditary Governor of Būshehr on the fall of Mumammad Nabi Khān; and in 1826, on the apparture of the Shaikh upon a pilgrimage to Makkah, the Sultān commenced hostilities against him. The cause of quarrel was some disservice which Shaikh 'Abdur Rasūl had done Saiyid Sa'īd at Shīrāz, and efforts which he was suspected of making to supplant the Sultān in a proposed match with a daughter of the Prince-Governor of Shīrāz. The Arabs of the Persian Coast from Qishm to Kangūn were believed to be on the side of the Sultān, while the friendship of the Qawāsim had been studiously cultivated for many years past by the Shaikh of Būshehr, and there was therefore a risk of the whole Gulf being plunged into war by a collision between the two.

The first incident of the war was the capture by the 'Omānis, on her return from Bengal, of the Shaikh's ship "Nasrat Shāh," which was carried to Masqat, cleared of all articles belonging to the Shaikh personally, and refitted as a man-of-war. On the 27th of July 1826 two ships and a brig from Masqat, accompanied by the "Nasrat Shāh," entered Būshehr roadstead; and the commander of the squadron, Muhammadbin-Sulaimān, informed the British Resident that he had orders to hand over, on payment of the Būshehr customs to him, the goods on board the "Nasrat Shāh" consigned to merchants of the place, and to seize all vessels belonging to Shaikh 'Abdur Rasūl, but not otherwise to threaten the town or molest its trade. At the request of the British Resident,

however, he relinquished the demand for customs, which the merchants would otherwise certainly have had to pay twice over; and the squadron in the end left quietly for Basrah, where also there were demands of their master to be enforced.

Shaikh 'Abdur Rasūl was at one time expected by the British authorities to travel home by way of Central Arabia, but Saiyid Sa'īd had better information, and on the 13th September 1826, after a short action, he captured the Shaikh and two of his vessels at sea in the neighbourhood of Qishm. The government of Būshehr, on news of this occurrence being received, was seized by Shaikh Ahmad, an uncle of Shaikh 'Abdur Rasūl, who was readily confirmed in his usurped authority by the Prince-Governor of Fārs. The captive Shaikh was not liberated until May 1827, when a bond for 80,000 German crowns was executed by him in favour of his captor.

During the detention of Shaikh 'Abdur Rasūl at Masqat serious disturbances occurred at Būshehr, due to rivalries among the members of his family. When the administration of the port was assumed by the Shaikh's uncle Ahmad, as already mentioned, the Shaikh's brother Husain and his son Nāsir took refuge in the British Residency; and from that point of vantage, very improperly disregarding the obligations imposed on them by their privileged position as refugees, they began to intrigue secretly for the subversion of Shaikh Ahmad.

At the end of January 1827 the Farman-Farma or Prince-Governor of Fars approached Büshehr; and Shaikh Ahmad, with a view to strengthening his position before the arrival of the royal visitor, required hostages, whom he proposed to send to the island from Khārag, from every tribe under his jurisdiction. This unpopular demand supplied his competitors with the opportunity that they needed. On the night of the 1st February the Shaikhs Husain and Nasir surprised and captured two towers of the fort which were held by Ahmad's most reliable adherents; and on the following day, assisted by the inhabitants of Büshehr generally and by a contingent of the "Benifladgi" tribe from a neighbouring village, they besieged him in his house and compelled him to surrender. An agreement was then concluded between the parties through the mediation of Colonel Stannus, the British Resident, under which Shaikh Ahmad abdicated the government and bound himself to remain at the British Residency until news should have been received of the surrender of Khārag to the opposite party, after which he was to be supplied with the means of quitting Būshehr by sea.

Revolution at Bushehr and insult to the British Residency, 1827.

On February 3rd, after Ahmad had taken up his abode at the Residency, a further discussion among the principals was held at the house of Shaikh Muhammad, another uncle of 'Abdur Rasūl, Colonel Stannus being present. A remark which fell from the Resident was badly received by Shaikh Husain, who rushed out of the house and began to raise his followers, by voice and gesture, "to a proper pitch for executing any act of violence." Colonel Stannus seems then to have returned to the Residency, against which a formidable demonstration was presently made by an armed rabble from the town. The place was surrounded by groups of men who hid themselves behind huts in the neighbourhood. parties were seen creeping along the roofs of houses to occupy commanding positions, and a large gun was brought up and planted within a Patrols were stationed in the streets hundred yards of the door. leading to the Residency, professedly for the purpose of preventing ammunition from being brought into it from the town; and by these patrols water-jars were emptied, bundles opened, and the persons of Armenians and others who came near were searched. A Residency servant going out was stopped and robbed of some articles that he was carrying. Colonel Stannus, however, by writing twice to Shaikh Nāsir, at length obtained a cessation of these threats and annoyances; and the next morning Shaikhs Nāsir and Husain, who had meanwhile had leisure to reflect on the consequences possible of their behaviour, began to deny that violence had ever been contemplated, and to assert that their only object had been to prevent the escape of Shaikh Ahmad. They also had recourse to effusive protestations of respect for the British and of gratitude for the kind treatment which they had formerly experienced at the hands of the Resident.

Soon after this the Farmān-Farmā arrived in person at Būshehr, but his presence did not improve matters, for he replied in offensive language to a representation made by Colonel Stannus in regard to the recent events and sought to throw the whole blame for what had occurred upon the Resident. At length, the Residency servants having been prevented from carrying water and otherwise insulted on the public roads, the Resident retired from Būshehr to a village in the vicinity.

At this juncture Colonel Stannus was relieved by Captain Wilson, and the Prince-Governor wrote to the new Resident, promising satisfaction for the late insults to the British and the removal of Shaikh Husain from the administration; the Residency then appears to have been reestablished in the town; and Ahmad, at his own request, was handed over by the Resident to the Farman-Farma. The Government of

Bombay commended the "decision, temper and firmness" shown by Colonel Stannus during the crisis, as also the judgment show by Captain Wilson in returning with the Residency to Būshehr, and in ignoring the improper language used by the Prince-Governor, accompanied as that had been by substantial concessions; and they did not even think it necessary to insist on the permanent exclusion of Shaikh Husain from the government, if he was the member of the family most capable of carrying on the administration in the absence of Shaikh 'Abdur Rasūl, and if there was no risk of the outrages against the Residency being renewed on his return to power.

The pre-occupation of the Persian Government with the Russian war in the north will account for their indifference to the conduct of the Sultan of 'Oman and the disturbed state of Rushehr in 1826-27.

On his release in 1827 Shaikh 'Abdur Rasūl returned to power at Būshehr, but about the end of the next year he was displaced by Tīmūr Mīrza, a son of the Prince-Governor of Shīrāz. Tīmūr Mīrza at once called upon Saiyid Sa'īd, the Sultān of 'Omān, whom his sister had married in the previous year, to help him with one or two vessels; and he suggested that an immediate effort should be made to capture the "Harriet", a ship belonging to the Shaikh. The "Muzaffar," frigate, which was sent by Sa'īd in response to these requests, fell in with the "Harriet" off Kangūn, but instead of attacking her accompanied her peaceably into Būshehr harbour. This was at the beginning of January 1829. The commander of the Masqat vessel, on landing in Būshehr, found the Farmān-Farmā there and 'Abdul Rasūl apparently in high favour with him; so, after remaining for a few days as guest of the Prince-Governor's Vazīr, he sailed again for home without committing any hostile act.

In May 1830, the Shīrāz Government having meanwhile reinstated the Shaikh of Būshehr and assigned to him Kāzarān and all the districts between it and the sea, tension was renewed, and the naval assistance of the Sultān of 'Omān was again invited by Tīmūr Mīrza against 'Abdur Rasūl; but the British Resident was successful in persuading Saiyid Sa'īd to abstain from interference.

In the following year the Sultan was in correspondence with the Prince-Governor of Shīrāz with a view to the removal of the Shaikh of Būshehr, partly by means of a naval force to be sent from Masqat; but effectual remonstrances were addressed to him by the Resident in the Persian Gulf and also by the Governor of Bombay, now Sir John Malcolm, with whom he was personally acquainted. Some claims of Saiy id Sa'īd against the Shaikh of Būshehr had only recently been settled by a payment

Strained relations between Timur Mirza and Shaikh 'Abdur Rasul, 1828-31.

of 20,000 Qrans, and, had he attacked him when he intended, he would have done so without moral justification.

Expulsion of Shaikh Nāsir III from Būshehr by the Persian Government and interference of Shaikh Sultān bin-Saqar, Qāsimi, 1832. Towards the end of 1832 Shaikh Nāsir III, who had lately succeeded his father* Shaikh 'Abdur Rasūl, was expelled from Būshehr by the Persian Government and took to his boats, with which he commenced a blockade of the town making Khārag the base of his operations. In November, only a few days after he had discontinued his blockade, and fled from Khārag to Kuwait, Shaikh Sultān-bin-Saqar, chief of the Qawāsim, arrived to his assistance, by previous arrangement, with a fleet carrying 1,000 to 1,500 men of the piratical Qāsimi tribe; and it was evident that, as there was no longer any hope of the Shaikh recovering his hereditary government, a mere vindictive attack upon Būshehr town and the plunder of its mercantile inhabitants must be intended. In these circumstances Mr. Blane, the British Resident, thought himself justified in interfering and in obliging the Qawāsim, under threats of force, to take their departure from the port.

Revolution at Būshehr and expulsion of Riza Quli Mīrza, 1833. After the fracas described in the preceding paragraph, resulting in the expulsion of the hereditary Shaikh, Riza Quli Mīrza, a brother of Tīmūr Mīrza, was appointed by his father, the Farmān-Farma of Fars, to the Governorship of Būshehr.

The establishment of direct Qājār rule over the town does not appear to have been relished by the inhabitants; and the conduct of the new Governor's mother, who visited Būshehr in person and took measures—including the arrest of the chief of Burāzjān—for increasing the revenues of the government, at length provoked an open rebellion. On the evening of the 14th April the residence of Riza Quli Khān was surrounded by an armed force under one Jamāl Khān of Būshehr, who was countenanced by the chiefs of Tangistān and Dashti; and His Royal Highness found himself obliged to release the chief of Burāzjān and to consent to his own departure from Būshehr early the next morning. On the following day, in accordance with his promise, he left accompanied by a few servants only; and the ladies of his household were sent after him as soon as mules could be obtained to carry their travelling litters and luggage.

In May 1833 the Prince-Governor of Shīrāz informed Mr. Blane, the British Resident at Būshehr, that at the request of the late rebels, who had "expressed their sincere sorrow for their fault," he had

^{*}Shaikh 'Abdur Rasul was killed at Furāzjān, by the inhabitants of that place, while on a return journey from Shīrāz to Būshehr. Deserted by his followers, he sold his life dearly. See Binning's Journal, Vol. I, pages 162-163.

appointed his son Tīmūr Mīrza to take charge of Būshehr instead of Rīza Qūli Mīrza; and he asked the Resident to meet the wishes of the new Governor in all respects,—a request to which that officer returned a guarded but courteous reply. The popular party had made it a condition of Tīmūr Mīrza's appointment that he should not remain long at Būshehr himself, nor bring many attendants with him; and on the 29th of June, after a short stay, he took his departure. Two persons of rank were appointed by him to act as his deputies in his absence, but this was a purely nominal arrangement, and the real control of affairs continued to be exercised by Jamāl Khān and his supporters.

On the 1st August, however, the local combination formed to resist the encroachment of the Shīrāz Government broke up, the chief of Tangistān being murdered in a place of public assembly by the chief of Dashti, who was jealous of his power. Husain Quli Khān of Angāli one of the Tangistāni chief's adherents was killed; another of his leading supporters was severely wounded; and the rank and file of his followers took refuge in the British Residency, whence with the consent of the opposite party they were despatched by the Resident, partly by land and partly by sea, to their own homes. British protection was next sought by Mīrza 'Ali Khān, one of the nominal representatives of Tīmūr Mīrza; he fled to the Residency on the 19th of August from the house of the Qāzi, where he did not feel secure, and, was safely put on board the East India Company's sloop-of-war "Ternate" before any objection could be raised.

On the morning of the 20th August Rīza Quli Mīrza, Tīmūr Mīrza and Nasr Ullah Mīrza appeared before the town with a large force; and the party inside, their overtures for a settlement having been rejected. prepared to leave by sea. A few of them kept up a show of resistance upon the walls so long as daylight lasted; and the royalist forces, on entering the town after dusk and rushing down to the beach to cut the fugitives off, found that the last of their boats was already beyond reach. By the exertion of the royal princes the town, except the houses that had been occupied by the rebel leaders, was saved from being plun-The only loss of life that occurred was among a party of Tangistanis who were occupied in searching tha abode of Jamal Khan; one of them inadvertently thrust a light into some jars of gunpowder, causing an explosion by which eight persons were killed. Jamal Khan seems to have escaped to the "Faiz Rabbanah", a Masqat ship on board of which he had already embarked his family and property; he narrowly escaped seizure by his own associate, the chief of Dashti, who had resolved to

hand him over to the victors as a propitiatory offering. A few Dashtis took refuge at the British Residency and others were at first believed to be hiding in the town, but none could be found by the Tangistānis, who were seeking for them to kill them in satisfaction of the general blood-feud to which the murder of the Tangistāni chief had given rise. Jamāl Khān seems to have taken up his residence in the territories of the Sultān of 'Omān, to reappear six years later, under the auspices of his protector, as a competitor for the Governorship of Būshehr.

British relations with the Persian Coast and Islands, 1797-1834.

Troubles of the British Residency at Büshehr in 1798.

The rebellion of Husain Quli Khan was a cause, through the local disturbances which it occasioned, of considerable inconvenience to the British Factory at Büshehr. The circumstances have already been described. On the day before the arrival of the 'Atbi fleet Mr. Hankev Smith, the British Resident, shipped his own property and that of the East India Company on a large native vessel, hired for the purpose, intending to remove it to the island of Khārag, where he hoped to escape the exactions to which he would probably be exposed at Būshehr, if the place were taken. The foremost 'Atbi boat, however, on entering the harbour, made straight for the Resident's chartered vessel, hauled down the British flag which was flying on board of her, and plundered her of several articles. Shaikh Sālim, the Arab admiral, when the matter was represented to him, at once ordered restitution to be made; and in the end only two bags of tin belonging to the Company and four or five bags of rice belonging to Mr. Smith, which had been accidentally dropped into the sea, remained unrecovered. Shaikh Nāsir II, however, whose "illiberal and pusillanimous jealousy made him adverse to the plan," declined to let the Resident remove to Khārag; and Mr. Smith was obliged to re-land everything at Bushehr except the tin and the rice, which he consigned to Basrah. When the town fell, "searcely a house escaped being stripped, and it was with the greatest difficulty with the Residency sepoys and my own threats"— so wrote Mr. Smith--" that I frustrated the general attempts made upon this* old ruin, inviting on every side an easy access."

^{*}It is not certain where the British Residency was situated at this time. It was originally outside Bushehr altogether, but was afterwards moved into the centre of the town, where it remained for a short time only. Its transfer to its present site seems to have taken place early in the 19th century, if not before then, a rent of Rs. 100 per mensem being paid for the ground occupied at first to the Shaikh of Bushehr and after his abolition to private proprietors.

The Factory servants were robbed of even the shirts on their backs, and the Resident found it necessary to supply them with clothes and provisions, besides which Shaikh Ghānim, who was expelled, left Būshehr owing him 300 piastres.* Mr. Smith requested that in the circumstances his losses might be made good to him by his employers; and he took the opportunity to repeat a request, which he had made before, for a reinforcement of his sepoy guard.

The relations of Mehdi 'Ali Khān, the British Resident, with Shaikh Nāsir II, of Būshehr were of a very friendly character. So much so was this the case that in March 1801 Shaikh Nāsir, who was then in India, wrote a letter to Mehdi 'Ali Khān, begging him to superintend the government of Būshehr and to regard Nāsir's brother Muhammad as his son, and Nāsir's son Hāji Sulaimān as his servant.

Two troublesome cases arose through the shipwreck of British vessels in the summer of 1803 upon the coast of Persia.

The first mishap befell the "Hector," which, while on her way from Bombay to Büshehr and Basrah carrying 850 bales of the East India Company's goods, ran aground in the month of May off the port of Nakhīlu. The captain having signalled for assistance by firing guns, Shaikh Rahmah, the chief of Nakhīlu, came off with a large number of boats, ejected the officers and crew, and himself took possession of the vessel with all that she contained. The officers and crew subsequently reached Masqat in safety, and thence returned to India.

In August of the same year the East India Company's packet vessel "Alert" was driven ashore in bad weather upon the island of Shaikh Shu'aib near Nakhīlu, whereupon about 500 of the islanders came down to the shore and plundered her of treasure which she was conveying on freight from Basrah and Būshehr to Bombay. The remonstrances of the captain, who referred to the friendship existing between the Governments of Britain and Persia, were altogether unheeded. On the third day Shaikh Rahmah himself visited the wreck and took away whatever of value remained on board, leaving only two bags of rice as a provision for 30 or 40 people. Some despatches also were carried away, but of these a "Europe packet" was afterwards returned open.

The total amount of the loss in the two cases is not stated, nor is the fate of the vessels themselves clear; but it seems probable that, of the latter, one was destroyed by the sea and the other appropriated by Shaikh Rahmah. The plundered merchandise was quickly distributed in various directions. Shaikh Rahmah soon afterwards visited Masqat in

Relations of Mehdi'Ali Khān with Shaikh Nāsir, 1801.

Cases of "Hector" and "Alert" at Nakhilu, 1803-07.

the ostensible character of an emissary to the Sultan from the 'Utub of Bahrain, and he seized the opportunity to dispose of a part of his spoil in Masqat harbour to an 'Omāni subject, by whom it was sent to Jiddah for sale. A person named Mīrza Bāqir of Bandar 'Abbās purchased 800 Tūmāns' worth of the stolen property and took a further quantity to the value of 5,200 Tūmāns provisionally on long credit, but the latter he subsequently returned to the Shaikh. Persian merchants of Yazd and Khōjahs from Sind also helped to relieve Shaikh Rahmah of part of his stock; and afterwards strong reason was found for suspecting that Shaikh Saif, Harami, of 'Asalu and Shaikh 'Abdur Rahmān of Nāband had acquired a joint interest to the extent of Rs. 33,750 in the goods taken out of the "Hector." A considerable proportion of the stuff, however, remained in the possession of Shaikh Rahmah, and was deposited by him on the islands of Hormūz and Qishm.

1803.

Representations were at once made to the Government of Fārs by Mr. Lovett, the British Resident in the Persian Gulf; and Shaikh Nāsir II of Būshehr, who had incurred the dipleasure of the Prince-Governor and was actually in confinement at Shīrāz at the time, was liberated for the purpose of conducting an expedition against Nakhīlu. The Shaikh, however, having obtained his liberty, took no steps to carry out his instructions; and at the end of the year the outrages were still unredressed.

1804.

The broker of the British Factory at Büshehr was next sent to the Shaikh of Nakhīlu with a letter from the Resident, demanding reparation. On the 12th June 1804 he returned with an evasive reply by the Shaikh, who offered to restore half of the missing goods; but the proposal was rejected by the Resident, who considered it inadequate, and who suspected besides that it was made without any intention of fulfilment.

On the next day, the 13th June, there arrived at Büshehr one Agha Riza, who had now been appointed by the Shīrāz Government to enquire into both affairs, and to exact reparation from Shaikh Rahmah with the help of Shaikh Nāsir of Büshehr and other chiefs of the coast. This Commissioner was handsomely received and entertained by the British Resident, who expended about Rs. 5,000 on presents for him and strove to fortify his mind with moral principles against the corrupt approaches of Shaikh Rahmah, for that rascally chieftain, as was well known, "relied much for the secure enjoyment of his plunder upon the venality of the person who might be deputed to enforce its restitution."

Mr. Lovett intended that the cost of the presents of Āgha Riza should be defrayed from a charge of 10 or 15 per cent. on the value of the goods recovered, which he proposed to allow as salvage. Shaikh Rahmah, on being thus called to account by the Shīrāz Government, asserted "the right of every country to the property which might be shipwrecked on its coasts," and Āgha Riza unfortunately seemed inclined to agree with him, but suggested that an exception should be made in the present instance on account of the political alliance between Britain and Persia.

In July 1804 Mr. Manesty, who, as we have seen before, took charge of Büshehr on the departure of Mr. Lovett and then proceeded to Tehrān on a pretended mission from the Government of India, obtained a Farman from the Shah to the Prince-Governor of Shīrāz, ordering a speedy settlement of the Nakhīlu cases; and soon afterwards it was stated that one Zaki Khān had been ordered to take action against Shaikh Rahmah, with the help of a tribe of Arabs who were at enmity with the people of Nakhilu. Perhaps in consequence of this report Shaikh Rahmah, about the middle of 1804, abandoned Nakhīlu altogether and withdrew, accompanied by his family and about 700 dependents, to the island of Shaikh Shu'aib. Here he proceeded to form a permanent settlement, built two towers for defence, and established intimate relations with the Wahhābis; and, as he was supposed to command the services of about 1,000 musketeers and was connected with the Shaikhs of Charak, 'Asalu and Kangun upon the Persian side of the Gulf and with those of Ras-al-Khaimah and Zubarah in position appeared to be a strong one. A proposal was made by Captain Seton, the British Resident at Masqat, for an attack on him by the British, with two ships, and the Sultan of 'Oman conjointly; but it was negatived by the Bombay Government, who were unwilling to make war on their own account upon a Shaikh who was a subject of the Shah of Persia.

At length the persistent representations of Lieutenant Bruce, the Acting Resident at Būshehr, took effect, and Shaikh Nāsir sailed with a fleet for the island of Shaikh Shu'aib. The assistance of the British cruiser "Mornington" was offered to the Shaikh by Captain Seton, the Resident at Masqat, who was then engaged with Saiyid Badar of 'Omān in an expedition to Bandar 'Abbās and Qishm, noticed later on, but it was refused; and Shaikh Nāsir's proceedings from June to August 1805 were not such as to inspire any confidence in those on whose behalf he was employed, for it was reported that he only fired a few guns every day as a matter of form and went on shore at night to

1805.

dine with Shaikh Rahmah. He succeeded, however, in obtaining the surrender of a part of the plunder; and afterwards, when Mr. Bruce continued to press for full satisfaction, he seized Shaikh Rahmah's son by a stratagem and carried him off as a hostage to Masqat, with the result that in the end substantial reparation was obtained in the case of the "Hector." A small quantity of the Shaikh's booty was recovered by Saiyid Badar at Hormūz and handed over by him to Captain Seton in the course of their joint expedition above mentioned.

1806.

In 1806, in consequence of information that had reached them regarding the complicity of Shaikh Saif and Shaikh 'Abdur Rahmān, already referred to, the Government of Bombay laid an embargo on some vessels belonging to their ports which happened to visit India, and before releasing them obtained guarantees from third parties, valid for nine months, for the submission of the Shaikhs to an enquiry. A protest was afterwards made against the Bombay seizure by the Prince-Governor of Shīrāz, who stated that Shaikh Saif was one of the respectable chiefs who had been employed by the Persian Government to coerce Shaikh Rahmah and requested that he should not be proceeded against; and, as Mr. Bruce also reported the evidence connecting the two Shaikhs with the outrages to be insufficient, the claim against them was eventually dropped.

Case of the "Fly," 1803-05. A peculiar case of a different character was that of the "Fly," a 14-gun brig belonging to the East India Company, which was captured near Qais Island in 1803 by the French privateer "La Fortune" of 38 guns, commanded by Captain Surcouff. Before the "Fly" was boarded, her commander ran her aground and sank some Government despatches and treasure, of which he was in charge, in 2½ fathoms of water, taking marks for their future recovery. The officers, crew and passengers of the "Fly" were conveyed by the French to Būshehr, where several prizes taken by the French had been collected; and they were there discharged with the exception of three officers who were sent to Mauritius to be exchanged.

The party released at Büshehr, after buying a native vessel among them, embarked for Bombay, touched at Qais, and recovered the Government despatches; but in 1804, in the course of their onward voyage, they were captured between Tunb and Musandam near the entrance of the Gulf by Qāsimi pirates, who carried them to Rās-al-Khaimah, as is related in another chapter of this book. By undertaking to show their captors where the treasure of the "Fly" lay, they at length obtained a conditional promise of freedom and were taken back to Qais, where, by

means of pearl divers, the genuineness of their offer was quickly ascertained. After performing their part of the contract they were landed by the Arabs on the island; and there they hid themselves, and subsisted with difficulty, during a massacre of the inhabitants by the Qawāsim.

When the pirates at length went away, they prepared a boat and a raft, on which they set out to cross to the mainland; but the boat was lost on the passage with all on board of her, and only the raft reached the Persian shore. The survivors made their way along the coast as far as the island of Shaikh Shu'aib, suffering extraordinary privations and abandoning, as they proceeded, one after another of their number, until at length none of the Indian sailors, sepoys or servants, belonging to the party remained, and only a few of the Europeans. The chief of Shaikh Shu'aib received them most inhospitably, but he was at length prevailed on by threats to send them in a boat to Büshehr.

One of the party died while being carried on board the boat, others on the voyage, and another on arrival at Büshehr; and in the end, out of a numerous company only Mr. Jowl or Yowl, a ship's officer, and Pennel, a seaman, survived. These eventually reached Bombay with the "Fly's" despatches, which they had carefully preserved.

In 1805 Captain Seton, the Resident at Masqat, was* instructed to make on effort to trace some native members of the party who had been left at Shaikh Shu'aib on board a native boat bound for Masqat, but it is not known whether or not he was successful in his quest.

In 1805, as related elsewhere, Captain Seton, the British Resident at Masqat, accompanied Saiyid Badar, the ruler of 'Omān, on an expedition to the Persian Gulf. The object of the Resident, under the orders of Government, was the suppression of the Qāsimi pirates of Rās-al-Khaimah, whose depredations had now become excessive, with the help of the Saiyid; whereas the motive of the Saiyid seems to have been chiefly the recovery of the leased territory of Bandar 'Abbās and its dependencies from the Bani Ma'īn, a local tribe, by whom it had been usurped on the death of his predecessor. Captain Seton's reason for complying with a request by Saiyid Badar for his company in the "Mornington" at Bandar 'Abbās seems to have been a fear lest the Sultān, if he were alone, might be induced to make common cause with

Expedition of the Sultan of 'Oman and the British Resident at Masqat to Bandar 'Abbās, 1805.

^{*} The inaction of the Büshehr Residency in this case seems peculiar. But 1804 was the year in which Mr. Lovett fell sick, in which Mr. Manesty improperly stepped into his place and went to masquerade as an Envoy at Shirāz, and in which Lieutenant Bruce, whose want of judgment afterwards made him notorious, was appointed Acting Resident.

the Qawāsim and the 'Utūb under Wahhābi influence, and with them to fall upon and destroy the fleet of Shaikh Nāsir of Būshehr, then engaged at Shaikh Shu'aib in coercing the Shaikh of Nakhīlu; and he considered that his own presence would be a check upon action by the Sultān offensive to the Governments of Persia and Turkey, such as it was desired by the British authorities in India to avoid in the joint campaign against the pirates. Captain Seton seems also to have hoped that by humouring his ally he might obtain from him a grant of Bandar 'Abbās, which, in total disregard or ignorance of its previous history, he represented as a secure and convenient place where a lucrative trade might be carried on.

Saiyid Badar, arriving on the spot ahead of Captain Seton, found that the siege of Mīnāb by Mulla Husain of the Bani Ma'īn, to raise which was one object of his expedition, had already been abandoned. He then commenced negotiations through the 'Utūb, by whom he was accompanied, for the surrender of Bandar 'Abbās, which was still in the possession of Bani Ma'īn. The 'Utūb, who did not wish to see peace established, made no real effort to adjust matters between the parties, brought back an insulting message from the Bani Ma'īn to the Saiyid, excused themselves from remaining longer on the plea that their vessels were overloaded, and so sailed for home leaving their ally in the lurch. The strength of the 'Atbi contingent was about 1,500 men, and Saiyid Badar's force was reduced by its departure to less than 1,000 'Omānis, his own subjects, whom he had brought with him.

Captain Seton joined him off Qishm town on the 5th June 1805, and the same evening Saiyid Badar stood over to Bandar 'Abbas, landed his troops, and invested the town. The British Resident, it should be observed, was now impressed with an idea that the recovery by the Saiyid of Bandar 'Abbās and Mīnāb, from which the piratical tribes drew a large part of their necessary supplies, would be a useful step towards the prevention of piracy; and he was clearly inclined to ignore the probable effect of forcible action in that quarter upon the susceptibilities of the Persian Government. On the morning of the 6th June, after Saiyid Badar's men had driven the enemy into Bandar 'Abbas, had taken possession of a house near the walls, and were about to erect a battery, an interview took place between the Saiyid and the Resident. The management of the operations from the sea, which had hitherto been clumsily conducted from inconvenient positions, was then undertaken by Captain Seton and Lieutenant N. Gilmour of the "Mornington," who betook themselves on board the Sultan's ship "Gunjava" along with a naval

officer, 25 Europeans and four guns; and on the morning of the 7th fire was opened on the Bandar 'Abbās fort with telling effect from the "Gunjava" and from another 'Omāni vessel anchored closer inshore. The garrison soon offered to surrender in case they were not succoured within two days, but this proposal was rejected; and on the evening of the 8th of June, Lieutenant Gilmour having stationed the "Gunjava" and the other 'Omāni vessel at opposite angles in order to obtain a cross fire, the defenders realised the hopelessness of their position and surrendered at discretion. The Saiyid thus recovered the rented possessions of his family in Persia; and he at once passed on, as related in another place, to combined operations with Captain Seton against a Qāsimi fleet at Qishm.

The proceedings of Captain Seton at Bandar 'Abbas were not treated. however, as a matter of indifference by the Prince-Governor of Shīrāz when he came to learn of them. Lieutenant Bruce, the Acting British Resident at Büshehr, to whom Captain Seton had referred in advance, consulted Muhammad Nabi Khān, the Persian Envoy to India, as to the propriety of the operations, and was informed in reply that the allegiance of the Bani Ma'īn and the Shaikhs of Lingeh and Shanās to the Persian Government was in general precarious, and that there would probably be no objection to their being punished by the British if they had deserved it; but this answer was given on the supposition that it was only meant to deal with pirates and not to interfere in other affairs. The matter was not mentioned by Mr. Bruce to the Government of Shīrāz at all, for it was urgent, and he knew that an application to them would entail references to Tehran and so probably occasion three or four months' delay. Mr. Bruce's opinion-after the event-was that the British should not take part in any hostile operations at places on the Persian coast, unless at Nakhīlu or Shaikh Shu'aib in connection with the "Hector" and "Alert" cases, and there only at the request of Shaikh Nāsir, lest the impending mission of Muhammad Nabi Khān to India should be prevented; but Captain Seton though he had asked for it, did not wait for Mr. Bruce's opinion. Captain Seton's justification of his own measures was that Mulla Husain, whom he had helped to eject from Bandar 'Abbās, was father-in-law and cousin to Sultan-bin-Saqar, the chief of the piratical Qasimi tribe of the Arabian coast opposite, and that his vessels engaged in piracy along with those of the Qawasim. result, Lieutenant Bruce was instructed by the Government of Bombay to assure the Shīrāz Government that Captain Seton had been distinctly ordered to avoid any act of which Persia could complain, an

that, if he had assisted Saiyid Badar in recovering Bandar 'Abbās, it must have been from an impression that his doing so would be agreeable to the Shāh. There is nothing to show how this hypothetical explanation was received by the Persian authorities, but they do not seem to have done more than express to Mr. Bruce their astonishment at the action of the Masqat Resident; and Muhammad Nabi Khān in due time proceeded on his mission to India. The apparent apathy of the Shāh's Government may be explained by the difficulties with Russia in which Persia was at the time involved.

Financial relations between the Bombay Government and the Snaikhs of Büshelir, 1807-15.

The Shaikhs of Büshehr seem to have been treated with considerable liberality, in financial matters, by the Government of Bombay. a grant of Rs. 3,000 was made to Shaikh Nasir as a reward for help rendered by him in connection with a piracy upon a British boat, and in compensation for the loss of one of his own "in an attack made by Lieutenant Cox." On the departure of the Shaikh for Makkah in 1807, a ship named the "Sulaimān Shāhi" was sent by 'Abdur Rasūl, his son and acting deputy, to Bombay with the modest request that she might be "very nicely repaired" at the Government dockyard and returned as early as possible to Büshehr; and the Governor in Council not only directed this to be done, but gave the "Sulaiman Shahi" precedence over all other vessels in the yard except those of the Royal Navy. Encouraged by this liberality, Shaikh 'Abdur Rasūl next demanded that the work should be paid for, as well as executed, by the Bombay Government; and they eventually agreed to defray one-fourth of the cost. When Shaikh 'Abdur Rasul was kidnapped by order of the Shīrāz Government in 1808, the British account against him was made up and was found to amount to Rs. 25,787, of which Rs. 17,940 was on account of re-coppering and other repairs to his ship, and Rs. 2,954 was due to private creditors under British protection. The question of the recovery of these debts was revived on the return of 'Abdur Rasūl to power in 1811; and in 1815 it was still, apparently, under discussion.

Assurances to the British Resident at Bushehr in regard to the presence of the French in Persia, 1807-08.

In 1807, when Lieutenant Bruce was on the point of vacating the Persian Gulf Residency in favour of Mr. Hankey Smith, a Farmān and robes of honour for him were sent by the Prince-Governor of Fārs to Būshehr. Mr. Bruce, attended by his guard and the principal inhabitants of Būshehr, met the bearer, Toral Baig, Gurgi, a personal attendant of the Prince-Governor, on the road at some distance from the walls; was invested with the dress in a tent which he had caused to be pitched by the wayside, the Farmān being at the same time publicly read aloud by

a Mīrza; and then returned in state to the town. Toral Baig was accompanied by Muhammad Husain Khān of Khisht, who was charged with special messages for Mr. Bruce, showing that the presentation had been made by order of the Shāh himself and that its object was to emphasize the good relations of Britain and Persia, which it was hoped that the recent visits of French agents to the country would not be allowed to disturb.

Some anxiety having been expressed by Mr. Hankey Smith, the successor of Mr. Bruce, in regard to the arrival of General Gardanne in Persia, steps were taken by Nasr Ullah Khān, the chief minister of the Prince-Governor of Fārs, to reassure him also. The agents employed for the purpose were 'Abdur Rasūl, Shaikh of Būshehr, to whom a special letter was written, and Muhammad Husain Khān of Khisht, who was again sent to Būshehr with a verbal commission. This latter incident occurred in 1808.

General Malcolm, during his second mission to Persia in 1808, had several times occasion to be satisfied with the conduct of Shaikh Jabarah of Kangūn, and he ultimately ordered Mr. Bruce to send him a present. A revolution, however, soon afterwards took place at Kangūn which resulted in the displacement of Shaikh Jabarah by his father, Shaikh Muhammad, and the despatch of the present was suspended; but in February 1809, Shaikh Jabarah having escaped from prison and arrived at Rūshehr viā Bahrain, a sum of 400 * piastres in cash and other articles to the value of 100 piastres were given him by the Resident, which came opportunely to alleviate his distress. In February 1809 it was reported by Muhammad Nabi Khān, Governor of Būshehr, that, should General Malcolm return from Bombay as an enemy, all the Arab tribes of the coast to the southward of Kangūn would join him, in the hope of shaking off the yoke of Persia.

Several ports of the Persian Coast fell within the purview of the expedition despatched by the Government of India in 1809 for the suppression of piracy in the Gulf; for the Qawāsim, who were the principal offenders and whose own head-quarters were at Rās-al-Khaimah upon the Arabian side, had numerous accomplices and sympathisers upon the Persian side. Before the arrival of the British armament the concurrence, even the co-operation, of the Persian Government in the

Relations of General Malcolm's Second Mission to Persia with the Shaikh of Kangun, 1808.

Connection of Persia with the second British expedition against the Qawasim, 1809-10.

^{*} The Turkish piastre or Qursh was at this time genarelly current in Persia, where it was worth one-tenth of a Tūmān, thus corresponding to the Qran of the present day. But the Tūmān was then worth at least £1 sterling.

proceedings contemplated upon their littoral was requested; but, lest a reply should not be received from them in time, the following instructions were also given to the British naval and military commanders:—

In any case you need not hesitate to proceed to destroy the maritime equipment of the pirates on that side of the Gulph, wherever you may ascertain them to exist, taking care to proceed in all such cases with the utmost practicable respect towards the undisputed right of His Majesty the King of Persia, the present ally of our Sovereign, and to cause it to be well explained to such of his officers as the course of events may lead you into communication with that the British Government have no other object than to free (trade from) the obstructions and heavy losses to which it is now, and has so long continued, exposed from the predatory attacks of the Joasmee and other pirates, without the slightest intention to occupy any part of the territory or to molest or annoy so much as one of His Majesty's loyal subjects, [and] whom, in pursuance of the happily cemented friendship between the two states, it is on the contrary the desire of the English nation to cherish and protect and promote the interest of to the greatest practicable extent.

The notice received by the Persians appears, however, to have been sufficient. In September 1809 it was intimated to Lieutenant Bruce, the Resident at Büshehr, that the Prince-Governor of Shīrāz intended, as soon as the weather was cool enough, to send troops under the command of his minister Nasr Ullah Khān against the Qawāsim, which would deal with the piratical settlements upon the Persian Coast, and in certain circumstances might even cross over to Rās-al-Khaimah; but no signs were ever perceived of so much as an attempt to carry this laudable intention into effect. Somewhat earlier in the year, it is true, a Persian force from Lār had visited Lingeh and Chārak and driven some Qawāsim whom they found there to Bāsīdu on the island of Qishm.

As is related fully in the history of Trucial 'Omān, the British armament destroyed the port of Lingeh and some vessels found there, and also did considerable execution at Lāft, which was stoutly defended by the same Mulla Husain that Captain Seton, in 1805, had evicted from Bandar 'Abbas. At Lāft, however, the British acted under an authority granted by the Sultān of 'Omān, to whom—and not to the Shāh—the Government of Bombay understood the whole island of Qishm to pertain.

The Persian ports of Kangun, Nakhilu, Chārak, Mughu, Kung, Hamīrān and Band Mu'allim were visited and searched by vessels of the British fleet, chiefly in November 1809 and January 1810; but no piratical craft were found at any of these places unless at Mughu, where four vessels belonging to Shārjah were destroyed. Mughu, Chārak, and the small coast village of Shanās near Lingeh had merely, it was stated

placed themselves under the protection of the Qawāsim. The case of Nakhīlu was peculiar. On the death of Shaikh Rahmah, who was their ruler at the time of the "Hector" and "Alert" cases in 1803-1805, the inhabitants became dependent on Shaikh' Abdur Rahmān of Nāband, a harbourer of pirates and himself a pirate; but, shortly before the British expedition of 1809, he too died. The son of the late Shaikh Rahmah, into whose hands Nakhīlu proper had passed, then connected himself for the sake of security with a surviving brother of Shaikh'Abdur Rahmān, who had no dealings with the Qawāsim, and with Shaikh Jabarah of Kangūn, who was on good terms with the Sultān of 'Omān; but at the time of the British expedition, strangely enough, it was reported that Shaikh Jabarah had been taken prisoner by the Shaikh of Nakhīlu and that efforts were being made, at the instance of the Sultān of 'Omān, to procure his release.

In 1816 a serious and fortunately very unusual case occurred at Shīrāz, where Mr. J. Williams of the Bombay Civil Service was subjected to gross indignities. Mr. Williams, who was in bad health, had gone to Shīrāz in May 1816 for change of climate; he took with him a letter of introduction from Mr. Bruce, the Resident at Büshehr: and he was provided at Shīrāz with a residence in one of the Farman-Farma's gardens. On the 30th of August his room was invaded by some hangers-on of the Shīrāz Court, whose conduct became so brutal that he was obliged to make his escape from a window by means of a rope, not without danger to his life. On his complaining to the Prince against the three chief offenders, a pretence was made of disgracing two of them, and Mr. Williams was induced to declare himself satisfied. But Mr. Bruce did not allow the matter to rest here; and eventually the three individuals in question were severely bastinadoed in the presence of Mr. R. Sharpe, Assistant-Surgeon of the Büshehr Residency, who had been specially deputed to Shīrāz to witness their punishment.

In 1814 a most discreditable act was committed by 'Abdullah-bin-Ahmad, Shaikh of Chārak. Instead of assisting the British ship "Ahmad Shāh," which had grounded on an island * near his port and

Insult to Mr. J. Williams at Shīrāz, 1816.

Outrage committed on the British ship "Ahmad Shāh" by the Shaikh of Chārak, 1814.

^{*} In the records Chārak itself is spoken of as if it were an island. It seems just possible that the whole story may refer to the island of Khārag, especially as in 1819 there were complaints of the conduct of the Shaikh of Khārag, and his removal by the Persians and the British expedition jointly was contemplated. But if not the island in question must have been Qais.

could easily have been got afloat again, he seized, plundered and burned her. A gentleman who was sent to the spot from Būshehr succeeded in recovering some treasure, the property of Būshehr merchants, and a few mares belonging to the Government of India; but this was the limit of the satisfaction obtained. Mr. Morier, Acting British Minister at Tehrān, applied to the Shāh for a Farmān for the settlement of the case, but, if granted, it remained a dead letter. Some boats were burned at Chārak, as we shall see later on, by the British expedition of 1819-20; and in 1820 a promise was obtained from the Persian authorities that the Shaikh should be removed from his government.

Connection of Persia with the third British expedition against the Qawāsim, 1819-20.

When in 1819 another naval and military expedition was despatched from India against the piratical Qawasim of the Persian Gulf, the Persian Government, who were now enjoying a respite from trouble with Russia, took a somewhat closer interest in the proceedings than on the last occasion. The British authorities, on their part, were anxious to avoid all cause of offence to Persia, but they were inexorably resolved to suppress piracy; and, as the Persian ports of Lingeh, Mughu, Chārak and Chīru were believed to be piratical, it was considered desirable to provide for the contingency of action being taken upon the Persian Coast. Dr. Jukes was, therefore, sent ahead of the expedition with letters from the Governor of Bombay to the Prince-Governor of Fars and the Governor of Bushehr, requesting the co-operation of those authorities by land, and assuring them that there was nothing in the intentions of the British inconsistent with the friendship between their Government and that of Persia. On the arrival of the expedition in the Gulf, Dr. Jukes became subordinate to the commander, Sir W. G. Keir, whose own instructions with reference to operations upon the Persian Coast were almost exactly the same in their wording as those of 1809, already quoted. In short, while every consideration was shown for the feelings of the Persian Government, it was not intended that measures against piracy on the Persian side should be neglected, or even delayed, by the attitude which they might assume; but it was added that any places upon the Persian Coast which might be taken by, or submit to, the British armament should, if they had belonged to Persia before the extension of Wahhābi influence to the Gulf, he made over to the Shaikh of Bushehr as the local representative of the Shah in those regions. Government of Bombay also communicated with Mr. H. Willock, the the British Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran, and begged him to justify the British expedition to the Persian Government by dwelling on the monstrous evils which had resulted from the impunity of pirates, on the proved inability of Persia to control her maritime tribes, on the consequent right of the British to take measures for the protection of their own trade, and on the reassuring precedent of the expedition of 1809-10, which showed that the British Government were only concerned to eradicate piracy and had no ulterior designs.

On the 9th January 1820 a letter from the Prince-Governor of Shīrāz reached Sir W. G. Keir, who had by that time effected the main part of his task upon the Arabian side; it ignored the question of the intended British operations upon the Persian Coast; but the bearer, Mīrza Muhammad Bāqir, made many enquiries as to the form that they might be expected to take. Eventually some boats were destroyed at the Persian ports of Lingeh, Mughu, Chārak, 'Asalu and Kangun, evidently without the assistance of Persian authorities or further reference to them; and it is indicated by one authority that a claim for damages on account of these proceedings was subsequently presented by the Persian Government and satisfied by the Government of Bombav, but exact * information on this point is wanting. In 1820 the Shah, who was averse to the periodical inspection of Persian ports by British vessels as a check upon the fitting out of piratical craft, undertook to appoint a Persian officer for the performance of that duty, to enforce upon the Persian Coast regulations similar to those imposed by Sir W. G. Keir's treaty upon the Arab tribes of Trucial 'Omān, and to oblige Persian subjects to use a distinctive flag at sea; but, needless to say, neither of the two latter engagements was ever fulfilled. The Shah's ministers did not shrink from assuming full responsibility for the behaviour of their maritime subjects, but remarked in a note, dated 9th December, to the British Chargé d'Affaires: "If any further steps are necessary to check piracy in the Persian Gulf, these can effectually be taken by the Prince of Fars, and no foreign aid is requisite."

The question of the treatment of Bahrain had been discussed in India in connection with the expedition of 1819-20, no doubt because the designs and constant attempts of Persia and 'Omān upon those islands had a disturbing effect upon the general peace of the Gulf. The Persian Government, since their loss of Bahrain to the 'Utūb in 1783, had never ceased to scheme for its recovery, and in 1802 and 1816 they had abetted unsuccessful efforts by the Sultān of 'Omān to establish himself in

Proposed mediation of Britain between the Persian Government and the Shaikh of Bahrain, 1819-20.

^{*}Compensation was paid, in 1822 or 1823, for some Lingeh and Chārak boats, the destruction of which was made a subject of complaint against Mr. Bruce (see next paragraph but one of the text), but these were perhaps two special cases.

possession; but their relations with him had been characterised by mutual distrust, and the Shīrāz Government had been guilty of actual bad faith in making him promises of military assistance, in 1817 and 1818, which they did not attempt to fulfil.

In 1819, shortly before the arrival of the British expedition in the Gulf, the Prince-Governor of Fars had again opened negotiations with Saivid Sa'id in regard to Bahrain; and the appearance of Sir W. G. Keir's forces on the scene brought matters to a head. A fear that the British might place the Sultan in possession of the coveted islands brought the Prince-Governor of Shīrāz, with an army, down in trepidation to the coast; and he applied indifferently, and at first with equal want of success, to the British Commander and to the Sultan of 'Oman for marine transports to carry his troops to Bahrain. Saiyid Sa'īd, from an inclination to make the attempt on Bahrain alone and so reserve for himself the whole fruits of possible success, did not immediately agree to the proposals of the Farman-Farma; but at length, doubting the sufficiency of his own resources and having failed to obtain the assistance of Sir W. G. Keir, who declined to help either competitor, he collected his fleet at Qishm for an expedition against Bahrain in partnership with the Persians. But the Prince-Governor, by this time, had changed his mind; and, apparently in March 1810, he left the coast and returned to Shīrāz. The preparations of the Fārs Government against Bahrain were the bane of the whole Persian Coast where, almost annually. they were made a pretext for overwhelming the local chiefs with vexatious exactions; and the Prince-Governor of Shīrāz found in them a convenient excuse for postponing the visits to Tehran which he was sometimes invited to pay for the purpose of adjusting his several accounts with the royal treasury.

The Government of Bombay, as early as December 1819, had suggested British mediation between the Government of Persia and the Shaikh of Bahrain, with a view to an arrangement by which the Shaikh should pay tribute to Persia and the Shāh should undertake not to interfere in Bahrain affairs; but they wished it to be distinctly understood that no responsibility could be assumed by themselves as mediators for the observance of the settlement that might be reached. Their suggestions were communicated to the Persian Government by Sir H. Willock, the British Chargé d'Affaires at Tehrān; but the Persian reply, delivered in May 1820, was to the effect that the Shāh must consult the Prince-Governor of Shīrāz, who was responsible for the affairs of Persia in the

Gulf, before giving an answer; and in October 1820 the Bombay Government thought it expedient to withdraw their offer. The hesitation of the Shāh seems to have proceeded from an unfounded suspicion on his part that the cession of an island in the Gulf would be demanded by the British as the price of their good offices.

In the early morning of the 18th March 1820 the "Ariel,"—an armed brig of 160 tons, belonging to the East India Company, which had taken part in the operations against Rās-al-Khaimah,—suddenly foundered in a squall about 13 miles to the south-east of Khārag Island. Of 83 persons on board at the time of the catastrophe, only five or six succeeded in reaching Khārag on a canoe which was kept by the officers for duck-shooting, the principal of these being Mr. J. Glen, the Surgeon. The few survivors were kindly received, entertained, and forwarded to Būshehr by the Shaikh of Khārag, who afterwards received a gratuity of Rs. 500 from the British Resident in acknowledgment of his humane conduct.

Good treatment of the survivors of the "Ariel" by the Shaikh of Kharag, 1820.

After the conclusion of the British expedition of 1819-20, the Government of Fars and the Persian Government made repeated complaints to the Bombay Government and to the British Chargé d'Aaffairs at Tehrān against Mr. Bruce, the Resident at Büshehr, and pressed strongly for his recall. The most important charge against him was one of having interfered in Bahrain to effect a reconciliation between the Shaikh and the Sultan of 'Oman, and of having thus frustrated the policy of the Prince-Governor of Fars at the very moment when the Sultan of 'Oman was about to take part with him in a joint invasion of Bahrain. It was added, in one of the quaintly worded accusations, that Mr. Bruce had also "stipulated for the motion of a standard on that island," by which the hoisting of the British flag seemed to be meant. To these allegations Mr. Bruce was able to reply that the Sultan of 'Oman had indeed come to a settlement with the Shaikh of Bahrain prior to the departure of the British armament from the Gulf, but that he personally had had nothing to do with it, being fully occupied on his single visit to Bahrain during the expedition in obtaining the surrender of some piratical vessels; and that the British flag, as was well known, had never been hoisted there. A second charge referred to the alleged loss, in a storm, of 14 Lingeh boats which had been seized by Captain Loch of H.M.S. "Eden" on suspicion of piracy shortly before the expedition, and a third to the destruction by the British of some native vessels at Chārak, possibly in connection with the "Ahmad Shāh" case: in both of these instances, it was apparently contended, the proceedings

Complaints by the Persian authorities against Mr. Bruce, the British Resident at Büshehr, 1820-21. were wrongful and had been instigated by Mr. Bruce, though he was not himself present on either occasion. The gravamen of the complaint, however, evidently lay in the article relating to Bahrain.

The opinion of the Government of India in the matter, when it eventually came before them, was that Mr. Bruce's conduct had been perfectly correct throughout, and that his removal from Būshehr on the complaint of the Persian Government could only be regarded as an unworthy compliance with a most unreasonable requisition; but they remarked that his transfer elsewhere, if it were desired for other reasons or would be agreeable to Mr. Bruce himself, should not be treated as barred by the consideration mentioned. In 1822 the Government of Bombay directed payment of compensation to the owners of the Lingeh and Chārak boats mentioned in this paragraph.

Scheme of the Bombay Government or establishing a British station in a central position in the Gulf, 1819-20.

Even before the sailing of the expedition of 1819 from India, the Government of Bombay had in view the establishment, subsequently to the operations against Ras-al-Khaimah, of a British naval and military base in the Persian Gulf, in a situation more central and commanding than either Bushehr or Basrah. Such a station, it was thought, would facilitate the repression of piracy in the future; and Sir W. G. Keir was instructed to recommend a suitable spot, after special consideration of the facilities afforded by Qishm and Hanjam, and to report whether the British Political Residency in the Persian Gulf might not with advantage be transferred from Büshehr to the place selected. The experience obtained in the course of the expedition corroborated the impression of the Bombay Government as to the advantages of an island base in the vicinity of the piratical ports; and it seems to have been the unanimous opinion of all the political, naval and military officers employed in the Gulf that without some such station the complete eradication of piracy would be impossible. W. G. Keir, however, while he approved of the scheme generally, deprecated the immediate removal of the British Residency from Büshehr, and suggested that it should be allowed to remain where it was until trade, in consequence of the creation of the new settlement, had fallen naturally into other channels.

At the request of the Government of Bombay the project for a British naval and military base was unfolded to the Shāh by Sir H. Willock, the British Chargé d'Affaires at Tehrān; but it was evidently most unpalatable to His Persian Majesty, who refused a personal interview on the subject and caused his reply to be communicated to the British representative by his ministers. His answer was, in effect, that

the request of the British for an island was no new thing, and that it had been refused many years before; that it was a matter too weighty for settlement through a Chargé d'Affaires and ought to have been raised by His Britannic Majesty, by the Hon'ble East India Company, or by His Excellency the Governor-General of India in another manner; and that its discussion had better be postponed until the arrival of a British Ambassador who, according to a report received from the Persian Minister in London, was about to be deputed to Persia on the part of the Prince Regent.

The later developments of the scheme for a central base will appear from the next paragraph.

From the first it had been assumed by the Government of Bombay apparently on the strength of a claim by their ally Saiyid Sa'id, that Qishm was a dependency of the 'Omān Sultanate; and that island was appointed as the rendezvous of the expedition against Ras-al-Khaimah in 1819. It was anticipated, however, that Persia might entertain a competing claim to the sovereignty of Qishm, and that she would in any case object to the establishment of a permanent British garrison on the island, should it be selected as the site of the proposed station. Sir H. Willock was accordingly consulted as to the attitude of the Persian Government, and as to the extent to which it would be advisable to defer to their wishes in the matter of Qishm; and the result was an application by him which ended, as already described, in a refusal by the Shāh to discuss the question of the occupation of a Persian island by a British force until the arrival of an Ambassador expected from England. The Shāh, it should be added, claimed Qishm as a Persian dependency and expressed much surprise at the pretensions advanced by the Sultan of 'Oman. The British Chargé d'Affaires was informed of the answer to his reference by the Persian ministers on the 5th May 1820.

Meanwhile, however, it was decided that the captured town of Rās-al-Khaimah was unsuitable, chiefly on account of difficulties in regard to drinking water, as a permanent post for the garrison of one native battalion or more which it had been resolved to keep in the Gulf, to control piracy, after the return of the expeditionary force to India; and the immediate transfer of the Rās-al-Khaimah garrison to Qishm was strongly recommended by Sir W. G. Keir. The Government of Bombay accordingly, ordered Captain Thompson, the political and military officer in charge of the permanent garrison, to remove to Qishm after making the required arrangements with the Sultān of 'Cmān, whom, on the strength

Negotiations with Persia and 'Omān and location of a British garrison at Qishm town, 1820.

of his own assertions, they had decided to treat as the owner. On the 29th May 1820, or a few days after the Shāh's refusal at Tehrān, the "Mercury" arrived at Rās-al-Khaimah from Masqat bringing the written permission of Saiyid Sa'īd for the location of the British troops on Qishm, and an open letter from him to the Shaikh or Governor of the island in which that authority was directed to assist them with boat transport and supplies. In a letter addressed to the Governor of Bombay the Saiyid remarked:—

With regard to the observations made by you, connected with the removal of the troops from Ras-ul-Khima to Kishm, God knows that the island in question and all other territories appertaining to me, and subject to my authority, appertain also to the Hon'ble Company, and that I do not reckon these dominions as appertaining to me, but as appertaining to the Hon'ble Company.

The British "detachment", as after this (notwithstanding its strength) it was generally styled, disembarked at Qishm town on the 20th July 1820.

Removal of the British detachment from Qishm town to Dairistan, 1820.

Only a few days after the landing at Qishm, Captain Thompson recommended the removal of the detachment to Dairistān on the southern coast of the island opposite to Hanjām, a place which he depicted as a healthier than Qishm town and more conveniently situated for watching the Pirate Coast on the other side of the Gulf; and he at once took steps, in anticipation of sanction, to provide hospital and other accommodation at Dairistān. His recommendations were accepted by the Bombay Government without hesitation, and were carried into effect. In October 1820 preparations were already in progress for the relief of the Indian battalion on Qishm by another, 800 strong, from Bombay. The facts seem to point to the prevalence of sickness among the troops in garrison.

Difficulties with the Persian Government in regard to the British occupation of Qishm, 1823-21.

Two or three months after the transfer of the Rās-al-Khaimah garrison to Qishm had been actually carried out, the Governor of Bombay wrote to Sir H. Willock at Tehrān suggesting that he should not renew the discussion with the Persians regarding the status of Qishm, and that, if the Persians on their part should come forward with proofs of ownership, he should endeavour to gain time by referring their arguments to Bombay. A short interval, he thought, would be enough to convince the Shāh of the good effects of the British occupation and bring him to consent to its continuance, even in the event of his sovereignty being satisfactorily established. In December 1820, however, some of the principal officers of the Government of Fārs reached Tehrān, having been sent there by the Farmān-Fārma for the purpose of reporting the British occupation

of Qishm and of representing it in a dangerous light. The machinations of the Prince-Governor were so successful that the Shah was persuaded to remit, by way of conciliating the dwellers near the Gulf coast, a considerable part of the ordinary revenue of Dashtistan, -in other words to reduce his financial demands upon the Government over which the Prince presided. Sir H. Willock, with some difficulty, restrained the Persian Government from * sending an agent of their own to Qishm to order the British detachment away, and from deputing another to Bombay to remonstrate with the Governor against the military occupation; and the objections of the Persian Government to the action of the British authorities were communicated to him in a formal note, dated 9th December 1820. The principal arguments contained in the note were that the Sultan of 'Oman, being a vassal of Persia, had no authority of himself to permit foreign troops to land at Masqat, still less on Qishm; and that the presence of a British garrison on Qishm was unnecessary, because the Persian officials could and would do everything that was required to prevent piracy. The note also interpreted the eleventh article of the Anglo-Persian treaty of 1814 as prohibiting the entry of British ships of war into Persian ports without express permission. It would seem that the Government of Bombay, with reference to this note, merely requested Sir H. Willock "to seize every opportunity of impressing on the Court of Tehran the absolute necessity of a station such as Kishm to keep down piracy, and its perfect harmlessness with reference to the dominions of Persia."

After this a Vakil from the Prince-Governor of Fars appeared on Qishm and informed Captain Deschamps, the officer commanding there, that he had been sent to prohibit the building of forts by the British,—an operation which at Shîrāz was stated to be in progress. The Vakīl was enabled to satisfy himself that the report regarding the construction of forts was erroneous, and he promised to assure his master that the British detachment had evidently no other duty than that of checking piracy. He explained that he had been sent to the spot on account of insinuations made by the Shaikh of Shārjah, which had reached Shīrāz, to the effect that the British aimed at subjecting all the smaller chiefs of the Persian Gulf to their own authority, whereby the influence of the Persian Government would be weakened.

Visit of a Vakil of the Prince-Governor of Shîrāz to Qishm.

^{*} The Prince-Governor of Fars did, however, send a representative both to Qishm and to Bembay (see the next two paragraphs of the text), but their instructions were probably more moderate than they would have been in default of Sir H. Willock's intervention.

A rumour was also current at this time that the Farmān-Fārma had ordered forces amounting in all to 16,000 men to be collected at various points upon the coast, perhaps for an attack upon the British on Qishm, but not very much weight was attached to it by the British authorities.

Mission of Dr. Jukes to Persia with reference to the British occupation of Qishm and his report on the title of the Sultan of Uman to that island, 1821.

With a view to allaying the agitation which the presence of the British detachment on Qishm continued to excite, Dr. A. Jukes, who had considerable previous experience of political work in Persia, was despatched by the Government of Bombay to Qishm in May 1821 with authority to visit Shīrāz, and even, if Sir H. Willock approved, to prolong his journey to Tehrān. The principal object of Dr. Jukes's mission was to reassure the Prince-Governor of Shīrāz with regard to the objects of the British on Qishm; but he was secretly authorised, in case he found that the Governor could not be diverted from the intentions which rumour attributed to him of attacking Q ishm, to withdraw the detachment to Masqat or to any other place in the territory of the Sultān of 'Omān of which His Highness might approve. He was also instructed to answer the Persian complaints against Mr. Bruce.

Dr. Jukes proceeded by Masqat to Qishm, where he learned that a mission from Shīrāz to Bombay on the same subject had crossed his own, the Persian commissioner who had just left for India being Mīrza Muhammad Bāqir. During a short stay on Qishm, where, as also in other parts of Persia and Arabia, cholera was at this time raging, Dr. Jukes made careful enquiries regarding the history of the island and the validity of the title asserted by the Sultān of 'Omān. He then left for Shīrāz.

As his investigations were conducted chiefly under the auspices of 'Omāni officials, whose statements he would naturally be inclined to accept, his report, dated 14th August 1821, can hardly be regarded otherwise than as an ex parte document, but as such it is of interest. It stated *that the island of Qishm had been wrested about 70 or 80 years previously from Mulla 'Ali Shāh, the representative of the Shāh of Persia, by Shaikh 'Abdullah of the Bani Ma'īn, a tribe formerly settled at Kung near Lingeh, and that Shaikh 'Abdullah had thereafter farmed Bandar 'Abbās and its dependencies from Nādir Shāh, a privilege which was continued

^{*}See however Chapter I, pages 96, 100 and 110, from which it does not appear that Shaikh 'Abdullah (doubtless identical with 'Abdul Shaikh) or the Bani M'ain chiefs who came after him ever held Bandar 'Abbās in farm. Shaikh 'Abdullah died in 1755, and Qishm was then lost to the Bani M'ain until 1763, when they recovered Laft. What happened in Qishm after the withdrawal of the British Agency from Bandar 'Abbās in 1763 cannot be ascertained.

to his successors by later rulers of Persia. About 1794 or 1795 the people of Qishm, being dissatisfied with the tyrannical government of Mulla Husain, chief of the Bani Ma'īn, invited Saiyid Sultān to annex their island with the others near it to his own dominions, whereupon that ruler came with a military force and seized Qishm, Hormuz and Bandar 'Abbas, over the first of which at least he and his successors had ever since exercised a general control. The Sultan of 'Oman, though he had taken Bandar 'Abbās by force of arms, consented to farm it and its dependencies from the Persian Government, as the Bani Ma'in had done before him; but he paid nothing to Persia for Qishm, Hormuz or Larak, all of which he claimed as his own absolute property. Persian Farmans relating to the lease of Bandar 'Abbas and its dependencies to the Sultan of 'Oman were said to exist, but Dr. Jukes was unable to obtain a view of them. At the time when he wrote, the annual rent paid by the Sultan for the Bandar 'Abbas fief was 4,000 Tumans a year, and the lease certainly included Shamil, Minab, and Khamir. Saif-bin-Nabhān, an Arab, was Governor of Bandar 'Abbās on behalf of Saivid Sa'id; and Saif's younger brother was in charge of Hormuz. The Governor of Qishm under the Sultan was Shaikh 'Abdur Rahman. Ma'īni, who was connected with Saiyid Sa'īd himself by marriage. Upon the whole Dr. Jukes seems to have considered that the Sultan of 'Oman had a good right, founded on conquest, to the sovereignty of Qishm; but at the same time he was not prepared to deny that both it and the other islands might be dependencies of Bandar 'Abbas. The claim of Persia to a general suzerainty of 'Oman he scouted as ridiculous, suggesting that the Shah might as well lay claim to Delhi as to Masqat.

On arrival at Shīrāz Dr. Jukes had several interviews with the Prince-Governor; and in a letter, dated 25th October, he wrote that His Royal Highness had claimed Qishm as belonging to Fārs, and the Sultān of 'Omān as a vassal of the Shāh. The Prince, however, had added that, as the presence of a British detachment on Qishm appeared from Dr. Jukes's explanations to have the peace and tranquillity of the Gulf for its only motive, he had personally not the slightest objection to its remaining there, and that he would inform the Shāh and his ministers of his sentiments in this respect.

On the 10th November 1821 Dr. Jukes died of cholera at Shīrāz. The Government of Bombay did not think it necessary to appoint a successor to him, but asked Sir H. Willock to undertake what remained unexecuted of his instructions and to solicit the permission of the Persian Government, on account of the prevailing cholera, to remove the British

detachment on Qishm to the island of Qais. It is not stated what steps* were taken in these matters by the British Chargé d'Affaires.

Transfer of the British detachment from Dairistan to Qishm town, Salagh, and finally Basidu, 1821-22. The transfer of the British detachment to Dairistan had cost Rs. 35,000 in marine transport alone; but the failure of the water-supply of the new cantonment, which was dependent on wells, soon made a return to Qishm town necessary. The exact date of this second movement of the troops is not ascertainable.

At the end of 1821, the troops being then back at Qishm town, where they presented "a melancholy picture" of sickness † and consequent inefficiency, the commanding officer Captain Kennett, made a fresh endeavour to find a healthier situation. At the beginning of January 1822, accompanied by a Master Attendant and by Assistant Surgeon Reach, whose duties were to report on the marine and sanitary aspects respectively of each site examined, he made a tour round the island, visiting every place which was said to possess good water. The former cantonment of Dairistan, the village of Salagh, 15 miles to the westward of it, and Basīdu at the extreme western end of the island were the places principally considered; but Captain Kennett also made a voyage to the island of Tunb, which he found to be ineligible for occupation on account of the scantiness and badness of the water-supply. In the end he selected Salagh, though the position there was not a good one from a military standpoint; and in February 1822 he carried out the transfer on his own responsibility by means of two vessels hired at a favourable rate. Some movement seems to have been already under contemplation by the Government of Bombay, who readily approved of Captain Kennett's action. Even the materials of the barracks and hospital were transported along with the troops from Qishm town to the new station. The consent of the Sultan of 'Oman was duly requested for the migration.

A few days' experience of Salagh showed, however, that the anchorage there was too exposed for shipping; and the movement of the force was continued to Bāsīdu, which thus became, as it still remains, a British

^{*} But we know that in October 1922 Lieutenant J. H. Grubb of the Company's Marine and Captain Remon of the Bombay Engineers reported on the suitability of Qais for a British station (see *Bombay Selections XXIV*, pp. 46 - 48); and Lord Curzon (*Persia*, Volume II, page 406), states that there was for a time a British military settlement on Qais.

[†]Dr. Jukes had already remarked on this in August 1821 and expressed grave doubts as to the advisability of maintaining a garrison on Qishm. The summer heat was intolerable, and during four months of the year the men were so prostrated by it as to be unfit for duty.

station. In October 1822 a report on Basidu was furnished by Captain T. Remon of the Bombay Engineers, probably under instructions from Government.

The Shah unfortunately proved less accommodating in regard to Further disthe occupation of Qishm Island by British troops than the Prince-Governor of Shīrāz had shown himself in his conversations with Dr. Jukes. He even insisted positively on the withdrawal of the detachment, and the utmost concession to which he would agree was that the result of a mission which he proposed to send to the British Court should be awaited. In these circumstances the advisability of maintaining the Qishm garrison was elaborately discussed by the Government of Bombay; and, though they feared that a retirement would cause a revival of piracy in the Gulf, they eventually advised withdrawal. The reason for their recommendation was that the good relations of the British and Persian Governments, which were of greater general importance than the quietness of the Persian Gulf, appeared to be endangered by the feelings with which the Shah regarded the presence of the British on Qishm. They advised that care should be taken, in removing the troops, not to say anything by which the claim of the Sultan of 'Oman to the island could be adversely affected; and they urged that the garrison, on leaving Qishm, should be withdrawn from the Gulf altogether, as its continuance at any place upon either coast would sooner or later involve the British Government in the politics of the adjoining countries.

withdrawal of the British detachment from Bāsīdu, 1822-28.

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These views were approved by the Government of India and were about to be carried into effect when information was suddenly received vid Büshehr of an apparently serious disagreement between the Shāh and the British Chargé d'Affaires, in consequence of which the latter had thought it necessary to quit the Persian Court. The causes of this unpleasantness are indicated as having been partly the discouragement by Lord Londonderry of the Shah's proposed mission to the King, till the accomplishment of which the Shah had agreed to suspend his demand for the evacuation of Qishm, and the attitude assumed by Persia towards the Porte; but it is probable that there were also * personal elements in

* The following passage in Rawlinson's England and Russia in the East (page 38, footnote) appears to refer to this incident :-

[&]quot;We have not forgotten that a personal misunderstanding between Sir H. Willock "we have not forgotten that a personal misunderstanding between Sir H. Willock and the Shah led to the temporary withdrawal of our Mission from the Court; but the occasion of the rupture was so entirely accidental, and the effects of it were so transient that it cannot be considered to affect the general character of our relations during the period in question. When our truant Minister, indeed, reported himself at the Foreign Office, Canning is said to have observed "Henry Willock?" I know a man of that name at Teheran, but certainly not in London." a remark which sufficiently expressed his opinion of the quarrel, and censured the undue importance that had been strached to it." attached to it.

the quarrel. It was rumoured at the same time that the Shāh had demanded 12,000 Tūmāns of annual rent from the Sultān of 'Omān for Bandar 'Abbās and its dependencies (along with Qishm) in place of the 4,000 hitherto paid, that Persian troops were being assembled at Bandar 'Abbās, and that the Sultān of 'Omān was daily expected at Qishm. The whole crisis was somewhat sudden, for Sir H. Willcock, who up to the 21st of March had expected no serious difficulty, demanded his passports upon the 29th; and the situation, as viewed from India, appeared so grave that the Bombay Government, who considered that Qishm could not for the present be abandoned without loss of credit, authorised a number of naval and military precautions. These included the despatch of 400 Europeans and an officer of Engineers for the purpose of rendering Lieutenant-Colonel Kennett's position at Bāsīdu more secure.

In June, however, before the steps ordered had actually been taken, news of the amicable adjustment of the differences between the Shah and the British representative reached Bombay, whereupon the orders for strengthening Basidu were cancelled and the preparations for evacuating it were resumed. It was too late to recall the despatches informing the British Chargé d'Affaires in Persia of the intended reinforcement of the Basidu garrison and other measures; but a candid explanation of the circumstances by Major G. Willock, the Secretary in Charge of the British Mission at Tehran, after receipt of the despatches, was accepted by the Persian ministers in the spirit in which it was given. No actual steps were taken at Basidu, and no further reference to the subject became necessary.

The exact date of the ultimate evacuation of Bāsīdu does not appear, but references in official correspondence show that it must have taken place between the 20th November 1822 and the 12th January 1823. It seems to have been carried out by Lieutenant-Colonel Kennett, who had commanded there for some time, with the assistance of Lieutenant Macleod, the officer who had just been appointed, in circumstances presently to be described, to succeed Lieutenant Bruce as Resident at Būshehr. Rahmahbin-Jābir, the celebrated pirate of Qatar, was said to have given lively expression to his joy on hearing of the removal of the British detachment; but the new Resident was hopeful that a squadron of cruisers, which the Bombay Government had arranged to substitute for the military post on Qishm, would prove no less efficacious for maintaining the tranquillity of the Gulf. The retirement from Qishm was made in communication with the Sultān of 'Omān, under whose authority the island had

been occupied, and who was most anxious that the British should not abandon it. From the fact that there was never any demand for the services of the garrison against pirates during its presence in Qishm, and that its departure was not followed by any recrudescence of piracy, we may perhaps conclude that it was in fact superfluous.

We must now refer to a vagary, so preposterous as to be almost incredible, committed by the British Resident at Büshehr; and the light in which it exhibits the character of Lieutenant Bruce is such as to make us wonder in what manner the general business of the Residency was conducted by that gentleman during his substantive tenure of office from 1811 to 1822.

Apparently in 1822, an Envoy named * Mīrza Bangar or Bunghir was sent by the Prince-Governor of Shīrāz to the Governor of Bombay for the purpose of clearing up all misunderstandings which existed between the Governments of India and Persia: he was received at Bombay "with every mark of respect and consideration." Mr. Bruce was then at Bombay, having possibly been summoned to head-quarters in connection with the charges made by the Persians against him, and these seem to have been discussed in his presence and that of the Persian Envoy, and to have been disproved or explained to the satisfaction of all parties.

Mr. Bruce after this returned to Büshehr as Resident; and thence, at the request of Hasan 'Ali Mīrza, the Prince-Governor of Fārs, he travelled to Shīrāz. The Government of Bombay, when they became aware of the invitation that Mr. Bruce had received and of his intention of accepting it, expressed disapprobation; but their letters reached him too late to prevent the mischief which followed. Mr. Bruce, on his arrival at Shīrāz, was induced to discuss with Zaki Khān, the chief minister of the Farmān-Farmā, an Agreement which the Fārs Government were anxious to conclude with the British Government. On the 8th August 1822 he was weak enough to accept the terms which were pressed on him by Zaki Khān and others; and on the 30th of the same month he went so far as to execute on behalf of the Government of Bombay, though he had no † authority to do so, a formal document

Unauthorised Agreement concluded by Lieutenant Bruce, Resident at Büshehr, with the Prince-Governor of Shīrāz, 30th August 1822.

^{*} Unless, which seems hardly probable, this Envoy was the Mīrza Muhammad Bāqir who just missed Dr. Jukes at Qishm in 1821. "Bunghir" might be a mistake for Baughir, which again, in Persia, is a possible corruption of Bāqir.

[†] The Government of Bombay were themselves, perhaps, partly to blame for Mr. Bruce's mistake. It will be within the recollection of the reader that Mr. Bruce concluded an unauthorised agreement with the Shaikh of Bahrain in 1816 which the Government, far from condemning, apparently quoted as a model in 1819.

which disposed of a number of delicate and important matters. Mr. Bruce then announced his intention of leaving Shīrāz with Lieutenant Hart of the Pioneers about the 15th September, and of marching by a direct route to the coast in the neighbourhood of Bāsīdu.

The Agreement related chiefly to Bāhrain, and its effect in connection with that principality is described in the history of Bahrain. Here we have to do with its general character and with such of its provisions as bore upon the affairs of the Persian Coast. Even the preamble of the document was objectionable, and it is difficult to understand how any British representative could have assented to its terms, for it laid the blame of the trouble that had occurred upon the British authorities, in the following words:—

Two years previous to this it became necessary to suppress the piratical acts committed by the Joasmis, for which purpose troops arrived from India in the Gulf of Persia, and a few acts were committed by them erroneously, which did not accord with the good understanding existing with this state; in consequence of which His Royal Highness Hussein Ali Mirza deemed it advisable for the good of his Government to make known these acts of misunderstanding to the Government appertaining, nearest to his own, that they might be aware of what had occurred (and) that some explanation might be offered for His Royal Highness to act upon."

The articles of the Agreement with which we are now concerned were the third, the fourth, and the fifth. The third article laid down that such losses as the people of Lingeh and Charak had sustained through the destruction, "by mistake," of their vessels by the British authorities should be made good to them. The fourth referred to the Persian complaints against Mr. Bruce, stating that they were withdrawn, and that the Prince-Governor would now prefer his continuance as Resident at Büshehr to the appointment of any other officer. The fifth, which after the Bahrain articles was the most important, ran as follows:—

5th. The British forces who had taken a position in an island on the coast of Persia and who had been requested to withdraw.

As the Hon'ble the Governor of Bombay has expressed a wish for their being allowed to remain for a time for the sake of appearances and benefit derived thereby, in consequence His Royal Highness deemed it advisable for the safety and tranquility of the Gult, and, to preserve the intercourse free and uninterrupted, has complied for the term of five years and until a naval equipment sufficient for the purpose can be gradually collected, on the following conditions:—

That, if previous to the five years His Royal Highness should have collected a naval force sufficient to ensure the tranquillity of the Gulf and will pladge himself to that effect, the British forces [to] withdraw on the assurance and pledge being given.

- That, if the British forces should be considered too great with a view to economy, they are to be reduced, and an equivalent force to be furnished by His Royal Highness under the orders of an officer, to encamp on the island and to attend to their wishes and desires.
- The British and Persian forces to take positions on any island on the coast of Persia, the climate of which may be found to be the best, and which His Royal Highness may nominate and deem advisable.
- Should His Royal Highness, during the period the British troops are stationed in the Gulf, require the services of one or two cruisers from the station to proceed to any of the islands or ports of Persia, they are to be furnished, and particularly so on the present occasions when an expedition as in contemplation against Bahrain to reduce it to obedience, His Royal Highness promising, after the service may be over, to dismiss the vessels with proper honour and respect. Should the vessels be required beyond the period of forty days, provisions and necessaries to be supplied by His Royal Highness, in failure of which the vessels are at liberty to return.
- Such vessels and stores as His Royal Highness may require, to be at liberty to purchase them in any of the ports of India without molestation from the Government.

No analysis of these articles, which with the rest of the treaty were immediately repudiated by the Government of Bombay, is necessary. It will be enough to quote the severe but not undeserved strictures on Mr. Bruce's conduct that were conveyed to him by the Secretary to the Government of Bombay, in a letter, dated 1st November 1822:—

The Governor in Council directs me to express his surprise that you should have entered on a negotiation with the Prince of Shiraz which was never contemplated by Government, and for which you were neither furnished with instructions nor with powers. He observes that the treaty which has been the result of those negotiations is not only unauthorised, but entirely inconsistent with the views of Government and with the obligations of the public faith.

The treaty grounds your supposed mission on errors of the British Government which have never been admitted, and of which the Governor in Council is still unconscious.

It admits the claim of the King of Persia to Kishm, contrary to all history, to the protestations of His Highness the Imaum of Maskat, and to the repeated declarations of this Government. It thereby admits the occupation of that island without the King of Persia's consent to have been an unjust aggression, and it agrees to admit a Persian force into Kishm, and to make over to the Persians the island which we received from the Imaum.

It places our voluntary payment to the sufferers at Lingahon the footing of a concession to Persia; and it makes the appointment of a Resident at Büshehr a point of negotiation with the Prince of Shiraz.

The effect of this treaty would be to compromise the dignity of the British Government, and to overturn every part of the policy which it has adopted in relation to the powers of the Persian Gulf.

In conclusion, Captain Bruce was informed that the Governor in Council found himself obliged to disavow the treaty in the most explicit terms, and—the more clearly to mark his disapproval of the whole proceedings—to remove Captain Bruce from his appointment as Resident at Büshehr and recall him to Bombay. He was directed to make over the Factory at Büshehr to the Residency Surgeon, and all instructions relating to the general politics of the Gulf to Lieutenant-Colonel Kennett, who at this time commanded the detachment at Bāsīdu.

To the Prince-Governor of Shīrāz the Governor of Bombay wrote expressing his regret at Captain Bruce's error; but at the same time he made the invalidity of the Agreement very plain in the following words:—

It is proper to explain clearly to Your Royal Highness that Captain Bruce had been merely directed to return to his duty at Bushire, and had received no authority to proceed to Shīrāz. and no powers or credentials to enter on any negotiation whatever with Your Royal Highness; the treaty which he has concluded is, therefore, his own act and not that of this Government. I accordingly disavow it, and desire it to be considered exactly as if it had never been written.

Appointment of Lieutenant McLeod to the Bushebr Residency, 1822. Captain Bruce was succeeded in the Büshehr Residency by Lieutenant John McLeod of the Bombay Engineers, an officer of much promise who had been employed in the Gulf in various capacities during the British operations there. In his first instructions, dated 12th November 1822, the new Resident was directed to do all that lay in his power to efface from the minds of the Sultān of 'Omān and the Shaikh of Bahrain the unfortunate impressions which Captain Bruce's Agreement had probably produced, and to moderate the resentment which the Prince-Governor of Shīrāz might be expected to feel at its repudiation; but his principal duty was to inaugurate a system of purely naval precautions against piracy, which was now introduced in a manner and with results which are described in the history of Trucial 'Omān. The "permanent local functions" of the Resident at Būshehr were defined as exclusively commercial, and as consisting in the protection of British trade and shipping and of British subjects engaged in either.

Arrangements on the Persian Coast for the repression of piracy, temporary In the case of piracies committed by subjects of Persia inhabiting the Persian Coast, the Resident was instructed in future, in consequence of the responsibility lately assumed by the Shāh's Government, to confine himself in the first instance to representations to the Farmān-Farmā of Fārs, and, should these fail, to refer to the British Chargé

d'Affaires at Tehran; but the Bombay Government approved of a suggestion by Captain Faithfull, the Senior Marine Officer in the Persian Gulf, that Mughu should be made a place of call for all ships sent from India to the Persian Gulf and a rendezvous for the cruisers employed in the Gulf in the work of supervising the maritime peace, and that a Native Agent on the part of the Political Resident at Büshehr should be established 1822-23. This arrangement was apparently brought into force and a house obtained at Mughu as a stores dépôt; but Sir H. Willock, the Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran, soon pointed out that objections would probably be raised by the Shāh's Government, founded on their interpretation of the eleventh article of the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1814. Accordingly in the autumn of 1823 the British naval station, for such in effect it was, underwent a transfer by order of the Government of Bombay from Mughu to Bāsīdu. Why the latter place should have been regarded as less open than the former to objection by the Persian Government is, in view of their protests against the British military occupation of Qishm, not very apparent.

ment of a British naval rendezvous at Mughu. and re-occupation of Bāsīdu,

In the spring of 1823, when a joint expedition by the Government of Shīrāz, the Sultān of 'Omān and the Shaikh of Qawāsim against Bahrain was apprehended, Major Willock was requested by the Government of Bombay to use him influence with the Shah, if he found a favourable opportunity for doing so, in order to prevent it. suggested to him, as a line of argument, that, should a disturbance of the peace of the Gulf lead to a revival of piracy, the British Government might be obliged to re-establish a military station in that region.

Discouragement of projected Persian expedition against Bahrain, 1823.

We have already noticed the local revolutions which occurred at Büshehr in 1826-27 on the capture of the hereditary governor, Shaikh 'Abdur Rāsūl, by the Sultān of 'Omān, and the inconveniences to which the British Residency was exposed in consequence have also been mentioned. The Shah, at an early stage of these affairs, urged the British Envoy at his Court to mediate in the dispute between the Governments of Färs and 'Omän ; but Colonel Macdonald felt that he could not do more than communicate to the Government of India a request by His Persian Majesty that the Governor-General would be pleased to intercede with Sayid Sa'īd for the release of the imprisoned Shaikh; and it does not even appear whether this message was productive of any result. Nevertheless, the sudden improvement in the attitude of the Shīrāz Government towards the British Residency at Büshehr, about the time of Colonel Stannus's departure and Captain Wilson's arrival, seems to have

Mission of 'Ali Murād Khān to Büshehr in connection with insults to the British Residency, 1827.

been due to stringent orders which the Shāh addressed to his son, the Farmān-Farmā. Zaki Khān, the chief adviser of the Prince-Governor. was stated to have been fined 40,000 Tumans for complicity in the disrespect lately shown to the Resident; and every possible kind of amends for the insults of which the British had to complain was promised by the Shāh's ministers. In connection with the last mentioned offer, a functionary of the Shāh's household named 'Ali Murād Khān was specially deputed to Büshehr, where he had an interview with the Resident on the 1st August 1827. He stated that he came armed with full powers to enforce execution of all the Resident's desires; but Captain Wilson discreetly limited himself to asking that the Shaikh of Büshehr might be informed of the Shah's wish that the British should be treated with respect, and that orders might be issued to prevent the molestation and detention of British agents and messengers and a tampering with the British mails which had recently become common in various parts of Fars.

Proceedings in the case of a Johanna boat weeked on the coast of Dashti, 1827. Another matter discussed with 'Ali Murād Khān during his visit to Būshehr was the misbehaviour of Jamāl Khān, Chief of Dashti, in the case of a Baghlah from Johanna, one of the Comoro Islands, which had been wrecked upon the coast of his district and plundered by his subjects, two of the crew being moreover, detained as slaves. An officer sent to Dashti by the Prince-Governor of Fārs had returned without effecting anything; and Saiyid Hamzah, the owner of the Baghlah, and a servant of the British Resident, both of whom had gone with him, had narrowly escaped being poisoned. 'Ali Murād Khān, on learning that the vessel had contained some British-owned goods, that the people of Johanna were in amity with the British and that it was not the custom in the British dominions to plunder wrecked ships, stated that he had already sent for Jamāl Khān and promised to do his utmost to bring about a satisfactory settlement.

Question of British commercial privileges in Fersia, 1827. Before the arrival of 'Ali Murād Khān at Būshehr, some difficulties in regard to British trade there had evidently arisen, leading to a discussion among the British authorities themselves as to the rights under treaty of British traders in Persia. The British Envoy in Persia stated that in his correspondence with the Persian Government he had invariably assumed the Commercial Treaty arranged by Sir John Malcolm to be still in force, but that he was aware that such was not the view of the Persian Government, who contended that it had been annulled by the Morier-Ellis Treaty of 1814, which, itself containing no commercial

provisions, contemplated the conclusion of a fresh Commercial Treaty. The points in regard to which difficulty had been experienced seem to have been first, the occasional levy of Rahdari or road tolls upon British goods in addition to import duty at the port of entry, and, second, undue influence used by the Shaikh of Büshehr to deter native merchants from shipping their goods on British vessels and to compel them to employ his ships. With reference to these matters the Persian Commissioner undertook, without reference to any treaty, to obtain written papers from the superiors of all Rahdars and from the Shaikh of Büshehr by which the grievances complained of would be removed.

A question raised, but fortunately not brought into discussion with the Persian Government, by the events of 1826-27 at Büshehr was that of the practice of granting asylum to Persian refugees in British official buildings in Persia. The only conclusions reached were, apparently, that such protection could not, in view of existing native customs, be altogether refused; but that it was desirable, so far as might be consistent with the good name of the British Government, to exercise it with the utmost moderation and so avoid serious political embarrassments. In the case of Shaikhs Husain and Nāsir of Būshehr, who took refuge in the British Residency towards the close of 1826, it was ordered by the Government of Bombay that protection should be continued to them only upon condition of their abstaining from intrigues and from attempts to upset the existing government of Bushehr,-a condition which, as we have seen, they did not fail to violate.

Scheme

Question of affording

asylum to

Persian refugees in

British

Persia, 1827.

official buildings in

It had been suggested at one time, with reference to the recent troubles, that the British Residency at Büshehr should be made defensible and located outside the walls of the town; but the British Envoy at the Shāh's Court stated that no such proposal would ever be entertained by the Persian Government, and he referred to their reasons as being the same "which led to the total destruction of the mansion erected by Captain Bruce, the walls of which were razed to the ground." steps, therefore, were taken in the matter.

for a defensible British Residency outside the town, 1827.

On the 28th August 1827, in the absence from Büshehr of the British Resident, an affair took place in the harbour which from the violence and haste with which it was conducted on both sides, might have "Amherst" had regrettable consequences. Captain Betham of the "Amherst," an East India Company's cruiser, having learned that a deserter from his ship was hiding on board a Baghlah in the port, sent a midshipman in a cutter to bring him back; but the party were repulsed by the crew

Case of a deserter from the at Büshehr.

Captain Betham then went himself in a of the Baghlah with force. boat to the Baghlah, took a man from on board her whom he meant to use as a witness, and sent his own interpreter Muhammad 'Alī to Shaikh Nāsir with his compliments and a request that the deserter might be Shaikh Nāsir, however, instead of complying, caused surrendered. Muhammad 'Ali to be severely assaulted and detained him and some lascars belonging to British ships. Captain Betham upon this sent his intended witness on board the "Clive," another Company's vessel which, with the "Nautilus," was present in harbour, and informed the Shaikh that he would keep the man as a hostage for the deserter. He then went ashore with armed boats and caused Shaikh Nāsir to be informed that, unless he released Muhammad 'Ali and made reparation for his insulting conduct within two hours, measures would be taken for destroving the "Rahmāni," a Persian ship, and all of the Shaikh's own vessels. Shaikh Nasir, after some delay, sent Muhammad 'Ali and the other prisoners down to the beach; but the former, who had served the British for twenty years, had had both eyes seriously damaged,—an injury for which the Shaikh promised to compensate him.

The matter then passed into the hands of the Resident, who had apparently received a complaint from Shaikh Nāsir of Captain Betham's behaviour, but it is not known how it terminated.

Scheme for the removal of the British Residency to Khārag, 1827-28.

In December 1827 Major Wilson, the Resident at Büshehr, was ordered to visit several stations in the Gulf with a view to ascertaining which of them would be the most suitable for the reception of the Residency in case of its removal from Büshehr. Major Wilson recommended Khārag; and in 1828 Sir John Malcolm, Governor of Bombay, whose former opinions in regard to Kharag were well known, expressed himself in favour of the project of a removal thither. Basidu, which since 1823 had been the principal station for British cruisers in the Gulf, was reported by Major Wilson not to be well situated for a commercial port and to be unsuitable for the site of the Gulf Residency. The principal advantage anticipated at this time from a migration to Khārag was relief from friction with the Persian authorities, arising from petty local matters; but the question of the proposed removal soon became involved with others relating to the retrenchment of expenditure in the Gulf and the consolidation of the Basrah and Büshehr Residencies into one. In this complicated form the scheme lingered on until 1834, when it finally ended in nothing. It should be observed that the question of a transfer to Khārag was not raised by Sir J. Malcolm, as might have been supposed, but by his predecessor; and that it probably had its origin in the troubles to which the Residency was exposed in 1827.

Early in January 1828 indirect overtures for a secret understanding with the British Government were made by Shaikh 'Abdur Rasūl of Bushehr to Captain Wilson, the British Resident; the medium of communication chosen by the Shaikh was the Mīrza of the British Residency. The substance of the Shaikh's message to the Resident was that he was anxious to connect himself in a very close and special manner with the British Government, in fact to be regraded by them as a dependent: that he would enter into any engagements which the Resident might consider expedient; and that he would write a letter to the Governor of Bombay,—at this time Sir J. Malcolm,—to say that whatever the Resident might report should be taken as coming from himself ('Abdur Rasul), and that he would be content to receive the Governor's reply verbally from the Resident. The object of these last precautions was clearly to obviate the necessity of committing his sentiments to paper. Captain Wilson had no doubt that the Shaikh's action was due to the progress of Russian influence in Persia, which he evidently expected to go on increasing, and that he "probably considered it safe policy at all events "to be recognised as on a friendly footing with the British Government, "towards which many in that part of Persia then looked, conceiving "it deeply interested in the war carried on with Russia and by no means "unlikely to take an active part in the contest;" but at the same time he thought that the Shaikh would not hold himself bound by anything that he might say, and that afterwards, if convenient, he would even deny having said it. The Resident accordingly endeavoured to dissuade the Shaikh from his purpose by assuring him that his friendly feelings towards the British Government were well known, and by reminding him of the political alliance between Britain and Persia. The Shaikh in reply professed entire loyalty to the Shah, but he continued to press the matter and even alluded to it in a personal conversation with the Resident, so that in the end Captain Wilson was persuaded to forward to Bombay a closed letter from the Shaikh to the Governor, of the contents of which he was himself unaware. On the 1st February 1828 the Governor in

^{*} Application by Shaikh Abdur Rasul of Bushehr for British protection, 1828.

^{*} There is a remarkable parallelism between the conduct of the Shaikh of Bushehr at this time and that of the Shaikh of Muhammareh in more recent days. See Chapter X, page 1755.

Council returned the Shaikh's letter unopened to Büshehr, with an intimation that Sir J. Malcolm, as one long acquainted with the Shaikh's family, would always be delighted to receive open marks of his friendship for the British Government, but that no communication could be accepted from him in circumstances which indicated that it was in any way inconsistent with his allegiance to his lawful sovereign, the ally of the British Government. The Shaikh was further assured that the refusal to entertain his proposals did not proceed in the slightest degree from displeasure with him. A remark was also added as to the dangers of a correspondence such as that on which he had entered, against the consequence of which, if it should be discovered by the Persian Government, the Governor of Bombay would be unable to shield him without incurring suspicion of having countenanced his proceedings.

Temporary removal of the British Residency from Būshehr to Khārgu, 1832. In the spring of 1832 plague prevailed at Büshehr; and the British Resident, to avoid infection, removed with his whole establishment to Khārgu Island, where he remained from the 12th March to the 29th of June. In the Resident's absence the Factory building at Büshehr was entered and stripped of the few articles of any value that had been left behind; and in 1833, after his return to Büshehr, a theft was committed by Qawāsim in a stone house lined with tent-cloth which he had built for himself at Khārgu, with the sanction of Government, during his residence on the island. The proceedings in the latter case are noticed in the history of Trucial 'Omān.

Claim of the Shīrāz Government to British protection against maritime aggression, 1832. We have seen, in the previous section dealing with events upon the Persian Coast, that in November 1832 the Qāsimi Shaikh appeared off Būshehr in a hostile manner with a large marine force, and that he was only induced to leave without attacking the town by the determined attitude of the British Resident. In the following month the Prince-Governor of Fārs, no doubt dreading further naval descents or menaces, wrote to Mr. Blane, the British Resident at Būshehr, insisting that it was the duty of the British under their treaties with Persia to prevent maritime aggressions upon the Persian Coast, and even, it would seem, blaming him for having allowed the demonstration by Shaikh Sultānbin-Saqar's fleet against Būshehr. To this communication Mr. Blane judiciously replied that he could not act in foreign affairs except by the orders of the Bombay Government, and that the British Envoy at Tehrān was the only authority in the country authorised to enter into discussions with Persian officials on the subject of treaties.

British trade with Persia by the Persian Gulf, 1797-1834.

Under the Zand rulers who followed Karīm Khān the foreign trade of Persia by sea declined, as we have seen, to a low level; but in the reign of Fat-h'Ali Shāh, Qājār, partly in consequence of the re-establishment of order by his predecessor and himself, and partly perhaps on account of the attention devoted by the Government of India to British commercial interests in Persia, a great and rapid revival took place. In 1813 the East India Company, on the occasion of a renewal of their charter, were deprived of their trade monopoly over the greater part of the East, after which there are few references to mercantile business conducted in the Persian Gulf on their behalf; and in 1822 their political officers in Persia were finally prohibited from engaging in trade.

The Mission of Mehdi 'Ali Khān to Persia and his appointment as British Resident at Büshehr, which have been described already in their relation to politics, had a commercial side also which at the time was considered important: indeed it was explicitly stated in Mehdi 'Ali Khan's instructions that "the great object" of his appointment was "the extension of the Company's European imports into Persia and the improvement to the highest possible degree of their selling prices." It appears that, in order to save the Company from loss, it was necessary to dispose of such goods in Persia at 20 to 25 per cent. above the invoice prices, whereas in recent years they had sometimes been sold even below those prices to the great detriment of the Company's financial interests. Commission at the rate of 10 per cent. seems to have been allowed to Mehdi 'Ali Khan upon the "additional profits" which his employers might derive from his exertions. He was specially directed to purchase Kirman wool at Rs. 6 per bale of 20 Tabriz Mans, and, as he feared that he could not procure so small a quantity as 50 bales (which was the amount desired) at that rate, he was authorised in the first year to remit 100 bales. Mehdi 'Ali Khān was also to prepare lists with full details of amounts and prices, of the European goods vendible in Persia, to serve as a guide to the Company in their operations; and he was to report on the particulars of the trade carried on by the Russians from the Caspian, with a view to the underselling of their goods, if possible, in the Persian market.

Considerable success was obtained by Mehdi 'Ali Khān, during the short period which intervened between his own arrival and that of

Commercial aspect of Mehdi 'Ali Khān's Mission to Persia, 1798-99.

Captain Malcolm in Persia, in finding a sale for the Company's goods, especially for their woollens; and at the end of 1799 it was reported by the Bombay Government that he had disposed "of all the Company's staples at a price in general as much above the invoice rate as for several years before they had sold below it." This happy result was probably due in part to improving economic conditions in Persia and in part to the personal influence of the Envoy-Resident

Commercial aspect of Captain Malcolm's first Mission to Persia, 1799-1801.

Captain Malcolm's First Mission to Persia had also considerable reference to trade; and he was furnished by the Bombay Government. at his departure from India, with a quantity of useful information on the subject, and with some suggestions as to the objects chiefly to be kept in view in arranging a commercial treaty. Among the documents handed to him was a historical and statistical report by Mr. Maister, Custom Master, and Mr. Fawcett. Accountant-General, dated 17th December 1799; and it was observed by the Government of Bombay that "not "much of positive institution is necessary, it being perhaps only requisite "to procure, in behalf of the Company, a confirmation of their several "privileges as far as they shall now be recoverable, as specified in the "said* report; and, in behalf of private merchants, to fix the rates of "duty they shall pay at the different seaports, and to prescribe, with as "much clearness and certainty as possible, the channel in which com-"mercial transactions are to be judged and decided on in case of differences, "and particularly how debts (are) to be recovered." They added that the Persian trade should be thrown open, so far as possible, to all British and Indian merchants dependent on the Company, the trade in certain staple articles such as woollens and metals being reserved, however, under the Company's monopoly, from public competition; but they thought that this last restriction could probably be enforced in India by the various Presidencies, and that it need not therefore he embodied in a British treaty with Persia. Captain Malcolm's commercial report, which was drawn up soon after his arrival in Persia, being dated 26th February 1800, has been examined by anticipation in another place; and the extent to which he was successful in meeting the requirements to which the Bombay Government had drawn his attention appears from the terms of his Commercial Treaty, which we have already analysed.

^{*} Namely Messrs. Maister and Fawcett's report.

^{\$} See the present Chapter, page 1888.

From the remarks of Mr. Waring, who visited Persia in 1802, we Persian trade oather* that the imports of the country at that time were chiefly articles of dress and luxury, and that the principal exports were gums, drugs, assafætida, pearls, rose-water, horses, and a small quantity of wine. The broadcloth in the Persian markets was now of French manufacture, imported through Russia. Many enterprising Persian merchants paid visits to India, where some of them maintained permanent agents, and they even made journeys to Kashmir to purchase shawls; but their annual turnover was small on account of the slowness of their operations. A number of them preferred to invest their capital in shipping rather than in trade.

The question of the Persian currency was studied by Mr. Waring in 1802 and by Sir H. Jones during a number of years prior to 1811. It appears from the observations of the former that the medium was extremely mixed and consisted to a very large extent of foreign money. Almost the only coins that did not fluctuate in value were the Qursh or Turkish piastre and the Persian gold Tuman, and those in most general circulation were the Qursh and the "Dutch ducat." There was a considerable influx of specie from Turkey and Russia; but it was probably more than counterbalanced, as in the time of the Zands, by a steady drain of cash from Persia to India. The gold and silver coins minted in Persia maintained, however, at least until 1811, a remarkable standard of purity, the policy of the Shah's Government in this respect being much more enlightened than that of the Porte.

The Persian currency, 1802-11.

It was noticed by Sir H. Jones that the foreign trade of Persia, with which he had been conversant since 1784, increased with extraordinary rapidity during the early part of the reign of Fat-h 'Ali Shāh. Taking one article of importation at Büshehr as an instance, he remarked that the annual demand there for Indian chintz, which at the beginning of his acquaintance with the place only amounted to 60 or 70 bales a year, had risen by the year 1811, when he finally left the country, to 500 or 600 bales annually.

Increase in the foreign trade of Persia.

In 1819, though the East India Company's trade monopoly had The East been abolished, they still sent goods to Bushehr for disposal on their own account; but for some years past the sales there had been made periodical, a change attended by successful results, and it was believed that "the necessity for continuing a commercial factory at

India Company's trade at Bûshehr in

^{*} See his Tour to Sheeraz, pages 2 and 76 - 77.

[†] See Waring's Tour to Sheeroz, pages 128-129, and Brydges' Mission, pages 432-

Bushire" had thus been done away with, and that there would no longer be any difficulty in transferring the Residency, if a transfer were desirable for political reasons, to some other place. This appears to be one of the last references, if not the very latest, to the trade carried on for two hundred years by the East India Company in Persia.

Position under treaty of British trade, 1797-1834.

We have seen that a Treaty of Commerce between Britain in Persia was successfully arranged by Captain Malcolm in 1801; but it was not re-affirmed at any later date, and after the conclusion of the Political Treaty of 1814, in the preamble of which it was stated that a separate commercial treaty, would be drawn up the Persian Government contended that the Treaty of Commerce of 1801 had ceased to be in force. In 1823 a Farman was obtained from the Shah, with reference to a new duty on the export of horses from the Gulf ports, that no duties should in future be levied on horses or other property or goods belonging to British subjects excepting such as were authorised by long established usage; but this was an insufficient substitute for a Commercial Treaty, and in 1827 inconveniences which arose at Büshehr in consequence could only be removed, as has already been mentioned, by special temporary arrangements. Towards the end of the reign of Fat-h-'Ali Shāh it was desired to establish a line for British trade with Persia across Turkey, which made the appointment of British Consuls at certain places in Persia almost necessary; but the Shāh was firmly opposed to the scheme, and his objections proved an insuperable bar to the conclusion of a Commercial Treaty.

The East India Company's establishments in Persia, 1797-1834.

The East India Company's official arrangements in Persia during the reign of Fat-h 'Ali Shāh, in other words the constitution of the Būshehr Residency and its place in the political organisation of the Persian Gulf from 1797 to 1834, form part of a large question and cannot well be discussed separately. The facts relating to the Company's Gulf establishments as a whole will be found in the chapter on the general history of the Gulf. The missions of Mehdi 'Ali Khān and General Malcolm to Persia, the varying importance of Masqat, the British expeditions against the Qawāsim, and the measures taken after the third Qāsimi expedition to prevent a revival of piracy all affected the Būshehr Residency and made its status, until 1833, somewhat fluctuating and uncertain.

MUHAMMAD SHAH,

1834-1848.*

Fat-h'Ali Shāh was succeeded by his grandson Muhammad Mīrza; the son of 'Abbās Mīrza, under the style of Muhammad Shāh.

The earlier years of the new monarch's reign were disturbed by a conflict between British and Russian policy in regard to Afghanistan. This conflict led in time, to a secret collision of British and Russian influence in Persia, of which an unsuccessful Persian expedition against Herat in 1837-38 and a crisis in Anglo-Persian relations resulting therefrom were the chief outward indications. The termination of the Anglo-Persian crisis was followed by a period of general quiescence in Persian affairs.

Under Muhammad Shāh, up to the time of the failure of the Persian attempt on Herat British, Russian and Afghān relations with Persia are so closely interlaced that to separate them is impossible. We are therefore obliged to abandon temporarily our usual division of the subject and to deal with external and internal affairs as a whole under the head of the general history of Persia.

General history of Persia from the accession of Muhammad Shah to the Persian expedition against Herat, 1834-1837.

Britain and Russia were agreed in supporting the claims of Muhammad Mīrza, whom his grandfather had nominated to the throne, and who

*For the general Persian history of the period the following are the principal authorities: Lady Sheil's Glimpses of Life and Manners in Persia, 1856; Mr. R. G. Watson's History of Persia, 1866; Mr. J. Talboys Wheeler's Memorandum on Persian Affairs, 1871; Sir H. C. Rawlinson's England and Russia in the East, 2nd edition, 1875; Mr. J. W. Kaye's History of the War in Afghanistan, 4th edition, 1878; Mr. E. L. Mitford's Land March from England to Ceylon, 1884; Sir A. H. Layard's Early Adventures in Persia, etc., 1887; and Lord Curzon's Persia and the Persian Question, 1892. Lieutenant C. R. Low's History of the Indian Navy, 1877, contains an account of all matters in which the service of which he is the historian were concerned; and Aitchison's Treaties, Engagements and Sanads, volume XII, 4th edition, 1909, includes most of the Persian agreements of the period with foreign States. The important sources of information for the Persian Gulf region are Bombay Government Records, Selection No. XXIV, 1856, and Mr. J. A. Saldanha's Précis of correspondence regarding the Affairs of the Persian Gulf. 1801-53, printed in 1906.

Defeat of rival competitors and establishment of Muhammad Shāh on the throne; 1834-36.

at the time of its becoming vacant happened to be at Tabriz. An understanding between the two powers having for its object the maintenance of the integrity and independence of Persia, even, came into existence in 1834 and was renewed in 1838; but it did not, either then or later, assume the shape of a formal agreement.

The funds which Muhammad Mīrza required for overthrowing two rival competitors,-namely, his uncle 'Ali Mīrza, known as the Zill-us-Sultān, and his uncle Hasan 'Ali Mīrza, Governor-General of Fārs, known as the Farman-Farma,—were supplied by the British Minister at Tehran. Sir J. Campbell, in anticipation of the sanction of Government; and the rapid success of the royal troops was mainly due to the leadership of British officers in the Persian service. Colonel* Lindsay-Bethune, who commanded the forces of Muhammad Mīrza in the ensuing operations. left Tabrīz for Tehrān on the 10th November 1834; at Qazvīn wheret Manuchehr Khān, a Muhammadanised Georgian or Armenian, who afterwards became notorious as Persian Governor of 'Arabīstān, joined him with a tribal force, all that remained of the Zill-us-Sultān's army surrendered; and on the 2nd January 1835 Muhammad Shah entered the Persian capital in State. In February 1835 Colonel Lindsay-Bethune moved against the Governor of Fars and completely overthrew in the field, between Isfahān and Shīrāz, his numerous army commanded by his brother, the Shujā'-us-Saltaneh: the royal force, though small, had the advantage in artillery. The Zill-us-Sultan, the Farman-Farma and the Shuja'-us-Saltaneh, all of whom had been captured, were despatched as prisoners to Ardabīl, the Shujā'-us-Saltaneh being first blinded; but the Farmān-Farmā died on the way. The Farmān-Farmā's sons Riza Quli Mīrza, Najaf Quli Mīrza, and Tīmūr Mīrza, the names of two of whom have been mentioned before in connection with Büshher affairs, made their way to England, where they spent a summer in English society under the guidance of Mr. Baillie-Fraser, the traveller, and were received by His Majesty King William. Their claims to Fars were not, apparently, encouraged by the British Government; but pensions seem to have been granted them. At Constantinople, where they were found a few months later, they met with a bad reception; and it was only through

^{*} This was the Lieutenant Lindsay whom Malcolm brought with him to Persia in 1810. He returned to England in 1821, but came back to Persia in 1834 and died there in 1851 at the age of 64. He was made a Baronet for his services in Persia.

[†] Can this Manuchehr Khān, later known as the Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh, be identical with the "Manutchehr" whom Rich met at Shīrāz in 1821? (Narrative of a Residence in Koordistān, Volume II, page 212.

the good offices of the British Ambassador that the Porte eventually agreed to their settling at Baghdād, through which they had passed on their journey to Europe, and where other members of the Persian royal family were already residing as exiles.*

Soon afterwards disaffection in Khurāsān was quelled by Kahrimān Mīrza, a brother of the Shāh; further disturbances in the south were suppressed; and with the help of Colonel Rawlinson, the Gurān regiment under whose command marched from Zohāb through Luristān to Dizfūl, Bahrām Mīrza, the Shāh's Governor of Kirmānshāh, succeeded in pacifying the south-west. Thus was Muhammad Shāh firmly seated on the throne of Persia without the aid of Russia, which had been proffred.

Among Muhammad Shāh's principal native supporters was his maternal uncle Allah Yār Khān, styled the Asaf-ud-Dauleh, the head of the senior branch of the Qājār royal family. This nobleman would fain have become Prime Minister; but the Shāh preferred Hāji Mīrza Āghāsi, a native of Erivan, who had been tutor to the sons of 'Abbās Mīrza. The Hāji was an eccentric character, and by some has been described as half mad; but he rapidly acquired a commanding influence over his master.

Haji Mīrza Aghāsi as Prīme Minister.

The influence of Britain in Persia, notwithstanding the decisive part played by the British representative and by British military officers in the elevation of Muhammad Shah to the throne, was on the decline and had been so for some years. The transfer of the British Legation at Tehrān from His Majesty's Government to the Government of India had alarmed and offended Fat-h 'Ali Shāh, who regarded the Indian Government with distrust and considered the change insulting to his dignity; and the modification in 1828 of the Anglo-Persian Treaty of 1814 had destroyed the reliance of the Persian Court on British military aid in an emergency. The virtual control of the regular Persian army still remained in British hands; but as a weapon of offence or defence it was useless, for want of military qualities that no training could supply, except against Persian rebels. In the words of Sir H. Rawlinson, who himself had had no small share in organising them, "the disciplined forces of Persia were from the epoch of their first creation contemptible." For these and other reasons the policy of Britain in Persia, which was to regenerate the country by good Government, proved unrealisable in practice.

Respective position of Britain and Russia in Persia.

^{*} See Mr. J. B. Fraser's Narrative of the Residence of the Persian Princes in London, 1838.

The Russian position in Persia was greatly superior to the British: it was that of an immediately neighbouring and essentially military power which had lately crushed Persia in armed conflict and had dictated terms of peace. Nevertheless Persia did not readily comply with every Russian demand; and the appointment of Russian Consuls in Persia under the Treaty of Turkmanchai had been for sometime successfully resisted. Russia never failed to profess deep consideration for the interests of Persia; but her policy, after the appointment of Count Simonich to represent Russia at Tehran in 1833, seemed to be directed to undermining such little power as Persia still possessed. The Persian Prime Minister, Hāji Mīrza Āghāsi has generally been credited by British authors, perhaps unfairly, with Russian proclivities; and there is some reason to think that Manuchehr Khan, who was appointed Governor of 'Arabistān in 1839 through Russian influence and who was visited in his camp in the Bakhtiyāri country in 1841 by Baron de Bode, the First Secretary of the Russian Legation, was attached to the Russian interest.

Designs of Persia upon Herat, 1836. It will be remembered that Muhammad Shāh before his accession had, as Muhammed Mīrza, conducted operations against Herat in 1833 and obtained from Kāmrān, the Afghān ruler of that province, a promise of tribute. The tribute was never paid; and the Shāh, apart from an absurd claim which he now advanced to possession of the whole of Afghanistān as far eastwards as Ghazni, had various other causes of disagreement with the Government of Herat, among which was recent interference by them in the disputed frontier district of Sīstān. On the whole, however, the intentions of Muhammed Shāh with reference to Afghānistān appear to have been ambitious rather than moderate, aggressive rather than justifiable.

At length, in the summer of 1836, the Shāh set his army in motion towards the east, ill-success in some preliminary operations against the Turkomans of Astrābād caused him, however, to postpone his campaign against Herat until the following year.

Persian expedition against Herat, 1837-1838.

Course of the Persian military operations against Herat, 1837-38. An invasion of Sīstān by Kamrān of Herat in the summer of 1837 having in the meanwhile added fuel to the fire of his resentment, Muhammad Shāh in the autumn of that year took the field in person with an army of 1,500 cavalry and 8,000 infantry. Thirty guns, escorted by

our battalions of infantry, had preceded him, Ghorian was taken by the way, and on the 28rd November 1837 the siege of Herat was begun by the Persians. On the incidents of this famous, though in itself insignificant siege, which lasted for more than nine months, it is unnecessary to dwell. Suffice it to say that it failed largely in consequence of the energy and determination of * Lieutenant E. Pottinger of the Bombay Artillery, who was accidentally present in the town and who did not hesitate to associate himself with its defence; and that Muhammad Shāh was obliged to close the campaign without having attained a single one of the more important objects, such as the conquest of Herat or the payment of tribute by its Government which he had set out to gain.

It is certain that the Russian Minister at Tehran from first to last actively encouraged the Shah in his designs on Herat. That his instructions authorised him to do so was denied by the Russian Government, who afterwards recalled him; but the fact remains that a Persian expedition against Herat was well calculated to serve the interests of Russia. If it succeeded, Russia would be entitled under the Treaty of Turkmanchai to establish a Consul—in other words a political agent—at Herat, by which means the prosecution of designs in the Indian border land would be facilitated; if it failed of itself, Persia would be exhausted and discredited and so rendered more amenable to Russian influence; if it were prevented or frustrated through British intervention, hostility would be created between Persia and Britain of which Russia would reap the advantage. It seems to be the case, moreover, that Count Simonich advanced 50,000 Tumans or about £25,000 to the Shah towards the expenses of the campaign; that he promised, on condition of Herat being taken, that the balance of the war indemnity still due by Persia to Russia should be remitted; and that he connived at the utilisation against Herat of a regiment of Russian deserters in the Persian service commanded by a Colonel Samson.

The interests of Britain, on the contrary, were certain to be adversely affected by a Persian attack on Herat. The benefit to Russia from such an attempt, whatever the issue, meant a corresponding loss to Britain of

British and Russian interest in the Herat expedition, 1837-1838.

^{*} Lieutenant Eldred Pottinger had no official mission to Herat. He had been encouraged by his uncle Colonel (afterwards Sir H.) Pottinger, the British Resident in Sind, to undertake a private journey of exploration in Afghānistān, but he intended to place the information obtained at the disposal of Government. (It will be remembered that Colonel Pottinger was himself one of Malcolm's young officers; as such he and Captain Christie had travelled from India to Persia by land in disguise in 1809-10.) Lieutenant E. Pottinger died in 1843 on a visit to Hongkong.

strategical advantage or political influence. There were also more immediate considerations of a serious kind suggested by the state of Afghānistān, where rival members of the Bārakzai family now held Kābul and Qandahār; while the chief representative of the Sadozai dynasty, which the Bārakzais had supplanted in the other provinces, but which still survived at Herat was a political pensioner in India. Dōst Muhammad Khān of Kābul and Kuhndil Khān of Qandahār were thus drawn, in their circumstances not unnaturally, into negotiations with the Shāh of Persia for joint action against Herat, negotiations which actually resulted, in the case of the Qandahār Sardār, in an agreement with Persia concluded under Russian auspices. The prospect of the rulers of Afghānistān being allied, permanently or even temporarily, with the Persian Court, where Russian influence at this time reigned supreme, was not one that Anglo-Indian Statesmen could contemplate with indifference.

Intervention of the British Minister in Persia before Herat, 1838. On the 6th April 1838 * Dr. McNeill, the British Minister at Tehrān, arrived in the Persian Camp, where, after protesting to the Shāh against the expedition, he tendered his good offices as a mediator. The offer was at first accepted by both sides, and the difficulties between Tehrān and Herat seemed in a fair way to adjustment by British mediation in accordance with the Anglo-Persian treaty of 1814. At this juncture Count Simonich, the Russian Minister, arrived in the Shāh's camp and persuaded him to reject the aid of Dr. McNeill, after the latter had actually visited Kamran within the walls of Herat in his capacity as mediator.

Previously existing difficulties between Britain and Persia. There was already a serious case pending between the British Legation and the Persian Government, arising out of the unceremonious treatment by the Persian authorities in October 1837 of a Persian courier of the British Legation whom they had arrested, stripped, and deprived of letters from Herat addressed to the British Minister. For this outrage no reparation or even apology had yet been obtained, and it was believed to have been committed expressly in order to degrade the British representative in the public eye, and so to weaken the effect of his opposition to the Herat campaign. The persistent refusal of the Shāh to enter into a

^{*}Dr. McNeill (afterwards Sir John McNeill, G.C.B.), was born in 1795 and died in 1883. He was the younger brother of the Scottish lawyer and Judge Duncan McNeill, who became the first Lord Colonsay and Oronsay. An M. D. of Edinburgh he was, from 1816 to 1836, a surgeon on the Bombay establishment of the East India Company, first at the Büshehr Residency where he appears to have acted as Resident in 1831 and afterwards at the Tehrān Legation.

commercial treaty with Britain was a further indication of the sentiments with which, however, fair his professions, he was inspired.

The above and other points were accordingly raised by Dr. McNeill in a formal communication addressed to the Shāh at the invitation of that potentate, who now pretended that all he required was a sufficient pretext for raising the siege of Herat. But the Persian reply, while it contained some ostensible concessions, was wholly unsatisfactory. It rejected, as an infringement of Persian independence, Dr. McNeill's intimation of the disapproval with which the Herat expedition was regarded by the British Government.

On the 7th June 1838 the British Minister quitted the Persian camp. About the beginning of August, having received special instructions from London, he sent Colonel Stoddart of the Persian service back to the Shāh with a verbal message to the effect that "the enterprise in which His Majesty was engaged was looked upon by the Queen's Ministers as being undertaken in a spirit of hostility towards British India, and as being totally incompatible with the spirit and intention of the alliance between Great Britain and Persia," and that "the Queen's Government would look upon the occupation by Persia of Herat, or any portion of Afghānistān, in the light of a hostile demonstration against England."

A British military expedition, despatched from India, had in the meanwhile, as will be related more fully in another place, occupied the Persian island of Khārag in the Persian Gulf; and almost simultaneously a grand assault upon Herat, advised and arranged by Count Simonich, had resulted in a disastrous repulse. Rumours of an impending British advance into Afghānistān from India, in the Sadozai interst, had since then begun to paralyse the partisans of the Shāh, while they inspired with new courage the Sadozai defenders of Herat; and Muhammad Shāh judged it expedient to yield to the representations of which Colonel Stoddart was the medium. On the 9th September 1838 the Persian army commenced its retirement from Herat; but Ghorian still remained in the possession of the Persians.

A number of serious questions between Britain and Persia, including two that had their origin in the Persian Gulf, still remained to be adjusted; and the history of their settlement, which hardly belongs to the general history of Persia, will be found in the section below on British relations. Here it is enough to say that diplomatic intercourse between Britain and Persia was for a time virtually suspended, and that a complete understanding was not reached until 1841. After the Anglo-Persian settlement Britain and Russia for a time acted in concert in

Final warning by the British Minister, occupation of Khārag Island by a British force and relinquishment of the siege of Herat by the Persians, 1838.

Remaining British grievances against Persia. Persian affairs, notably in the important question of the delimitation of the Perso-Turkish frontier, to which reference is made further on.

Internal history of Persia, 1838-1848.

Rebellion of the Agha Khān, 1838-39.

We have seen that in* 1817 some trouble had arisen at Yazd through the death there, by violence, of the head of the Isma'ili sect, that steps had been taken by the Shah of the day to appease the indignation of his followers. In 1838, about the time that Muhammed Shāh withdrew from her abortive operations against Herat, Agha Khān, who had succeeded to the headship of the Isma'īllian, rose against the Persian Government, after sending his family for safety to Karbala: he apparently claimed the supreme power in Persia for himself. After some successes and reverses in the districts of Kirman and Lar he fled to the country, escaped by land to Balüchistan, and appeared at Karachi in 1843, eventually making Western India his permanent home. 1844 his brother Sardar Khān invaded Persia from Balūchistān and for a time held Bampur, but in the end surrendered to the Persian authorities and was made a prisoner. A sanguinary conflict at Bampur between Persian troops and the Baluchi inhabitants, was part of the aftermath of this rebellion. The Russian Government affected to believe that the Isma'ili rebels had been supplied with arms, ammunition, money, and even artillery from Bombay.

Appearance of Babism, 1844.

A religious heresy which was destined to produce serious political consequences in Persia made its appearance during the later years of Muhammad Shāh: this was Bābism, the creed of the Bābis or followers of the Bāb. The founder was Saiyid 'Ali Muhammad, the son of a grocer of Shīrāz, who, being sent as a youth to represent his father at Būshehr, soon left that place on pilgrimage to Makkah and afterwards sat as a student at the feet of Hāji Saiyid Kāzim, the greatest Mujtahid of the day at Karbala. On the death of his teacher he returned to Būshehr, where he proclaimed himself a prophet, the 23rd May 1844 being accounted the date of his manifestation in that character.

"†He now assumed the title of the Bab, or gate, through whom know-legde of the Twelfth Imam Mahdi could alone be attained. His pretensions

^{*} Vide page 1864.

[†] Lord Curzon's Persia, Volume I, page 497.

undoubtedly became more extravagant as time proceeded, and he successively announced himself as the Mahdi, as a re-incarnation of the Prophet, and as a Revelation or Incarnation of God himself." The Bābi faith was ecclesiastically proscribed throughout Persia; and massacres of its adherents, with counter-assassinations of leading persecutors, became the order of the day.

The internal administration of Hāji Mīrza Āghāsi, the all powerful Misgovern-Prime Minister of Muhammad Shāh during his entire reign, was Mīrza "Self-sufficient almost to fatuity; utterly ignorant of Aghasi. execrable. statesmanship, of finance, or of military science, yet too vain to receive instruction, and too jealous to admit of a co-adjutor; brutal in his language; insolent in his demeanour; indolent in his habits; he brought the exchequer to the verge of bankruptcy, and the country to the brink of revolution. Alienating at the outset of his career fully one-half of the revenues of the Empire in extravagant grants to pampered courtlings, personal dependents, upstarts and empiries, he consumed the remainder in amusing the military mania of the Shah, for whose edification he prepared a park of about 1,000 pieces of artillery, and commissioned above half a million of English muskets. At the commencement of 1848, the Government paper --- and it must be remembered that the finance of Persia is carried on entirely by a system of assignments——was at ninety per cent. discount. The pay of the army was generally from three to five years in arrears. The cavalry of the tribes was almost annihilated. The intense animosity of the Toorks and Persians had reached a climax which crippled the means of action of the provincial Governors, and threatened to produce complete disorganization. With the exception, indeed, of Azerbiján, in which the whole wealth of the empire had become pretty well concentrated by the constant return of its inhabtants laden with the spoil of the provinces, Persia generally presented the appearance of a country occupied in force by a foreign enemy."*

The best that can be said of him is that he paid some attention to sericulture and to public works.

The important province of Khurāsān was governed for many years by the Shāh's maternal uncle, Allah Yār Khān, the Asaf-ud-Dauleh, who had Khurāsān. been in the beginning a candidate for the Prime Ministership and whose relations with his successful rival, Hāji Mīrza Āghāsi, were always of the worst. For political reasons the Governorship of Khurāsān and the guardianship of the shrine of Imam Riza at Mashhad were in general

ment of Hāji

Affairs of

^{*} Rawlinson's England and Russia in the East, page 72.

carefully separated, in order that the one high dignitary might act as a check upon the other; but the Asaf-ud-Dauleh, by exchanging the former for the latter office, while at the same time he secured the appointment of his son, the Sālār, as his successor in the Governorship, succeeded in combining the tenure of both posts in the hands of his own family. This triumph profited him little, however, for he was soon superseded in the custodianship of the shrine, summoned to Tehrān, and sentenced to pass the remainder of his days in exile at Makkah and Karbala. The Sālār soon after rebelled against the Persian Government; but Hamzah Mīrza, a brother of the Shāh, after a campaign full of vicissitudes, drove him across the Persian border into the country of the Turkomans, where he took up his residence.

Death of Muhammad Shāh, 1848: his character. Muhammad Shāh, who had long been a martyr to gout, and some of whose political errors may no doubt be attributed to physical pain, breathed his last on the 4th September 1848 at the age of 39. In the earlier years of his reign his ruling passion was military glory and he displayed considerable energy; but he had sunk, ere his death, into an obese, feebleminded dotard, whose chief pastime was to shoot at sparrows with a pistol.

Relations of Persia with Turkey, 1838-1848.

Tension, which more than once threatened to resolve itself in war, was the chief characteristic of Perso-Turkish relations during the reign of Muhammad Shāh. Among its principal causes were the temporary occupation and pillage of the disputed town of Muhammarch by the Turks in 1837, when the Shāh's attention was absorbed by his enterprise against Herat; the rival claims by Persia and Turkey to Salaimānīyah; and other frontier squabbles which arose from the undelimited state of the common frontier. A general massacre at Karbala in 1843, in which many Persian subjects were slain by Turkish troops, very nearly caused an explosion after it had been decided in principle, to settle all frontier disputes by peaceful means. These events, as also the Commission and Treaty of Erzeroum (1843-47), by which Britain and Russia succeeded in averting war between the Shāh and the Sultān, are so fully described in the chapter on Turkish 'Irāq that it is enough merely to mention them here.

Relations of Persia with other States in the Persian Gulf, 1838-1848.

During the reign of Muhammad Shāh difficulties more than once arose between the ruler of 'Oman and the representatives of the Shah in the Persian Gulf; and Persian interests were involved, or were supposed by the Persian Government to be involved, in disputes which took place over the sovereignty of Bahrain. None of the matters thus raised were of real importance to Persia, however; and it will be sufficient to refer, in this place, to the accounts that are given of them in the histories of the 'Omān Sultanate and Bahrain.

Relations of Russia and Persia, 1838-1848.

The relations of Russia with Persia during the remainder of Muhammad Shāh's reign presented no remarkable features, if we except the measures which she took jointly with Britain, as already mentioned, in securing an adjustment of dangerous questions pending between the Persian Government and the Porte. About 1840, however, Russia took possession of the Persian island of Ashwadah in the Caspian, where later she established a small naval base on pretext of restraining the Turkoman raiders of the adjacent coasts. Her action in this quarter was a natural corollary of the clause in the Treaty of Turkmanchai which excluded the Persian war flag from the waters of the Caspian; and the good offices of Britain, though invoked by Persia, did not avail to secure its reversal. In 1844 Russia obtained a modification of the Treaty of Turkmanchai, rendering it incumbent on Persian and Russian subjects to provide themselves with passports and the permission of their respective Governments before crossing the common frontier.

Relations of France with Persia, 1838-1848.

In 1840, or somewhat earlier, the French King Louis Philippe des- Mission of patched a diplomatic mission to the Court of Persia; it was headed by

the Compte de Sercey; and it was charged with the King's congratulations to the Shāh, and with the task of arranging a commercial treaty between France and Persia. Husain Khān, an Ambassador whom the Shāh had sent to Europe in 1839 on a political errand to be noticed hereafter had engaged some French officers for the Persian army to take the place of the British military instructors who had lately been withdrawn and the French Mission was accompanied by M. Flandim, a painter, and M. Coste, an architect, who in 1840 made a tour for antiquarian research in the districts of Kirmānshāh and Burūjird. Simultaneously M. Boré, a layman but a zealous French Catholic, was engaged in trying to propagate Latin Christianity among the Armenians of Persia; and another Frenchman, M. Nicholas, born in Persia, was actually employed as a Secretary in the Persian Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

There was thus, for a time, a great appearance of French activity in Persia; but no commercial treaty was concluded between Persia and France, and the French military officers in Persia found difficulty in obtaining their promised pay and allowances. Before the end of 1840 it was clear that the French Mission failed, and its failure was attributed to British influence,—a circumstance which * caused some tension between individual Frenchmen and Englishmen in Persia.

Mission of the Comte de Sartiges. At length, in 1845, French trade was accorded the same treatment as that of the most-favoured nation; but, though the Count de Sartiges, who represented France at Tehrān in 1847, successfully arranged a commercial treaty, its ratification was in the end withheld by Persia. France had no material interests in Persia; and this fact, while it invested the French Legation for a time with a popularity greater than that of the British or the Russian, did not conduce to the establishment of permanent political influence. The activities of the Legation were practically limited, throughout, to the protection of Latin Catholics in Persia; and its credit was finally destroyed by the change in the form of Government which occurred in France in 1848.

General political relations of Britain with Persia, 1838-1848.

The retirement of Muhammad Shāh from before Herat was far from amounting to full compliance by him with the requirements of the British

^{*}See Layard's Early Adventures, Volume I, pages 327-328.

Government, and so impracticable was his attitude in regard to the remaining points at issue that the British Minister found himself obliged to withdraw, along with his staff, to Erzeroum in Turkish territory, and to direct the British military officers serving under the Persian Government to return to India via Baghdad.

The chief cause of the Shāh's obstinacy was probably a hope that he entertained of favourable results from a mission to Europe which he had confided to one Husain Khān, and of which he was awaiting the outcome. The Persian emissary was instructed to obtain Dr. McNeill's recall, and he was furnished with a written statement of the Shāh's grievances against the British Minister and the British Government. Copies of this memorandum were forwarded also to Constantinople, St. Petersburg, and Paris.

Mission of Hussain Khān to Europe and demands of the British on the Persian Government, 1839.

The memorandum asserted that the Shah's main object in attacking Herat was to rescue Persian subjects from slavery; that he was justified. by provocation received, in taking military measures against Kāmrān: that he had not acted in a spirit of hostility to Britain; and that it had never been his intention to facilitate Russian designs in the direction of Kābul. Dr. McNeill was charged with having incited the people of Herat to persist in their defence of the town and falsely accused of having subsidised the Herat Government to the extent of 8,000 Tumans or £4,000, of having invited various rulers and tribal chiefs to attack the Shāh's camp, of having taken measures to produce a scarcity in that camp and of having persuaded caravans on the way to it to turn back to Mashhad. The document concluded with an obscure menace that, if justice were denied to the Shah by the British, he would "seek shelter under the shadow of a great mountain." What this threat meant became sufficiently plain afterwards, when the Shah addressed an appeal to Russia for protection or good offices, referring in the same to Herat as refractory province of his own dominions.

At Constantinople Husain Khān met only with discouragement; and overtures which were made by Russia on the Shāh's behalf were repelled by the British Government. At last Husain Khān reached London; but the sole result of an interview granted him by Lord Palmerston, the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, was the clear and full formulation on the 11th July 1839 of the British demands on Persia, which were these:

(1) A written apology to be offered by the Shāh's Government for the outrage on the British Envoy's courier.

- (2) A Farman to be published in Persia guaranteeing protection to all persons employed by the British Mission.
- (3) Ghorian and other places in Afghanistān still held by the Shāh's forces to be evacuated.
- (4) A written apology to be given for the illegal seizure of the house of a British officer at Tehrān.
- (5) All persons who had been concerned in an outrage on the Sarrāf of the British Residency at Būshahr to be punished.

 (This and the following requirement arose out of occurrences in the Persian Gulf which will be described further on.)
- (6) The Governor of Büshehr, who had affronted Admiral Sir F. Maitland, to be removed from office and the reason for his removal publicly stated by the Persian Government.
- (7) The claims of a British subject on account of some iron works in Qaradagh to be liquidated.
- (8) The amounts due to British officers lately serving under the Persian Government to be paid.
- (9) The signature of a commercial treaty between Great Britain and Persia to accompany the renewal of diplomatic relations between the two States.

With these demands Husain Khān returned to Persia. Russia and France had, it would seem, declined to support the Persian monarch's protest against the action of Britain. Not long after his return, in consequence of some fraud of which he had been guilty in connection with the engagement of the French military instructors, he was so severely bastinadoed as to be temporarily crippled; but not long aftewards he was found occupying the high post Governor-General of Fārs.

Compliance of Persia with the British demands, 1839-41. The compliance of the Persian Government with the conditions insisted on by the Britain was very gradual, almost every item in the schedule being contested with the utmost pertinacity. Farmans were issued in September 1839 and April 1840, guaranteeing for the future the proper treatment of the servants and dependents of the British Mission in Persia, even should they be Persian subjects, and their immunity from punishment by the Persian authorities without the knowledge of the British Minister. The discussions on other points were more protracted, and it was not until the 31st March 1841, that the settlement was virtually completed by the rendition of Ghorian to the Government of Herat, the most difficult of all the conditions, in the presence of Dr. Riach, the physician to the British Legation at Tehran.

Sir J. McNeill then returned to Persia, and the British Legation was re-established at Tehran, on the 11th October 1841; it had a flattering and even cordial reception. A few days later the desired commercial treaty was concluded and signed, and orders were despatched by the British Minister to the Persian Gulf for the evacuation of Khārag, which took place at the beginning of 1842. It is probably fortunate that everything had been arranged in Persia before the occurrence of the great disaster at Kābul which will render the months of November and December 1841, for ever memorable in the military annals of British India.

Return of the British representative to Tehrān and evacuation of Khārag, 1841.42

It has been shown that Fat-h'Ali Shāh resolutely declined, to the day Angloof his death, to enter into any commercial treaty that recognised the right of the British Government to appoint Consuls in Persia, alleging as his reason that to do so would be to provoke the anger of Russia, though the right was one which had already been conceded to Russia herself in the Treaty of Turkmanchai. On the same subject Muhammad Shāh was at first equally obdurate, and, up to the time of the Persian expedition against Herat, the utmost that could be obtained from him was a Farman, issued in 1836, which guaranteed protection and good treatment to British merchants in Persia and declared the duties, payable by them to be the same as those to which Russian merchants were liable.

Treaty of Commerce, 28th October

It was only as a consequence of the general settlement that followed the Anglo-Persian crisis of 1838-41, that Britain found herself once more, after the lapse of 27 years, in possession of a commercial treaty with Persia of indisputable validity; this new treaty was concluded by Sir J. McNeill on the 28th October 1841, soon after his return to Tehran, and it was expressly described as an adjunct to the Anglo-Persian Political Treaty of 1814. It provided that the merchants of Britain and Persia should be free to trade in the dominions of Persia and Britain, respectively, subject to payment of customs duty at the rates applied in either country to the trade of the most-favoured European nation; and that the merchants or persons connected with or dependent upon the high contracting parties should receive the same aid, support and respect as the subjects of the most-favoured nations. Further, the appointment by Britain of a Consul at Tehran and a Consul-General at Tabriz was authorised, Persian recognition being at the same time extended to the existing British Residency at Büshehr; and Persia received in return the right to locate consular officers in London and Bombay.

A Farman, known as that relating to Bankruptcies, was obtained from Farman the Shah in 1844, for the better protection of British merchants in

relating to Bankruptcies, 1844.

Persia. Its scope was somewhat wider than its title implied, for, besides decreeing a suitable procedure in bankruptcy and the punishment of fraudulent bankrupts, it made provision for the registration of deeds of purchase and sale, bonds, and other documents; enjoined that a Malik-ut-Tujjār, or official head of the Persian merchants community, should be appointed at every considerable seat of trade; abolished, with certain exceptions, places of asylum for debtors; and recognised the right of British official intervention, diplomatic or consular, in cases in which British subjects were concerned.

Farmān in restraint of the slave trade. 1848.

On the 12th June 1848, as noted in the Appendix on the Slave Trade, the Shāh in an autograph note, which was addressed to his Prime Minister, reluctantly forbade the importation of negro slaves into Persia by sea. This order was obtained, with great difficulty and after much delay, the prohibition which it conveyed being repugnant to the principles of Islām, and therefore resented by the priestly classes in Persia.

British official matters in Persia generally, 1834-1848.

British representation at Tehrān; Sir J. Campbell, 1834-1835. At the accession of Muhammad Shāh, in 1834, the British representative at Tehrān was Sir John Campbell, an officer under the orders of the Government of India, who had succeeded Sir J. Macdonald Kinneir in 1830 and had been knighted in 1832. Sir J. Campbell played a considerable part, as has been shown, in securing the throne to Muhammad Shāh; but, finding his influence insufficient to carry a treaty of commerce through, he recommended the despatch from England of a special mission from the Crown.

Sir H. Ellis, 1835-36. One was accordingly sent under *Sir Henry Ellis who had taken part in the negotiation of the Anglo-Persian treaty of 1814 and at an earlier period had belonged to the Hon'ble East India Company's civil establishment and served under Sir J. Malcolm in Persia, to congratulate the new monarch on his accession and conclude a commercial treaty; but in the latter and more important of these two tasks the Special Envoy, who arrived at Tehrān in November 1835, was as little successful as his permanent predecessor.

Dr. (Sir J.) McNeill, 1836-42. In August 1836, the transfer of the Tehran Legation from the Government of India to the Home Government still holding good, Sir H.

^{*}Sir H. Ellis's diplomatic career concluded with a special mission to the Brazils in 1848. He was born in 1777 and died in 1855.

Ellis was succeeded by Dr. (afterwards Sir John) McNeill, an officer of the Indian Medical Service, who had begun his career in Persia some 20 years before, as Residency Surgeon at Büshehr, and who had for some time been physician to the British Legation at Tehran.

Colonel (afterwards Sir Justin) Sheil succeeded Sir J. McNeill as British Minister at Tehran in August 1842, after the settlement of all the questions outstanding between Britain and Persia; but he quitted Persia on leave in October 1847, and at the time of Muhammad Shāh's death Colonel F. Farrant held charge of the British Legation. Both of Colonel F. these officers had come to Persia originally in the capacity of military instructors; and Colonel Farrant, as mentioned elsewhere, had been employed as a Special Commissioner, representing the British and Russian Governments at Karbala in 1843.

(Sir J.) Sheil, 1842-47.

Fareant,

Proposed abolition of the Assistantship to the Resident at Būshehr, 1835-42.

In 1835, when the re-transfer of the Tehran Legation from the Government of India to His Majesty's Government had been in principle decided on, the Government of India resolved that the office of Assistant to the Resident at Büshehr should, after the resignation or departure of Lieutenant Hennell, the actual incumbent, be abolished; and that the charge of the Residency should thereafter, in any sudden emergency, devolve on the Residency Surgeon.

In 1838, the question of Lieutenant Hennell's promotion or resignation having arisen, the Government of Bombay strongly opposed the intended reduction on the grounds that correspondence in vernacular with the numerous Arab chiefs having relations with the Residency was an onerous duty with which, single-handed, the Resident could not properly cope, and that the superintendence of the maritime peace frequently necessitated his presence, or that of a properly qualified Assistant, at places far distant from the Büshehr headquarters. They also laid stress on the importance of possessing at Büshehr, especially in critical times, a second officer thoroughly conversant with local politics and with the languages of the country, a qualification that the Residency Surgeon could not be expected to possess, any more than his medical duties permitted of his absence from Bushehr. To these arguments the Government of India yielded a reluctant and temporary assent; and * Lieutenant Edmunds, an officer of the Bombay Army and an excellent Oriental scholar, was appointed Assistant Resident.

Lieutenant Edmunds left Büshehr during the time of the difficulties between Britain and Persia. In May 1840 he was at Baghdad as a visitor; a little later he took part in the British operations against the Egyptians on the Syrian coast; and on return to India he was appointed First Assistant to the British Political Agent in Sind; but he died at Poona without having joined that post.

In 1841 Lieutenant (afterwards Sir Arnold) Kemball was selected by the Government of Bombay as Lieutenant Edmunds' successor. Hereupon the Government of India reverted to their original proposal for a reduction, suggesting that the absence of the Resident from Bushehr need no longer be more than occasional; that, when special circumstances necessitated it, the Residency Surgeon might hold charge of the current duties; and that communication with the maritime chief of the Gulf might be maintained through the British Naval Commodore. In reply to these suggestions it was pointed out by Captain Hennell, the Resident at Büshehr, through the Government of Bombay, who supported his views, that the political correspondence of the Residency had more than doubled within recent years; that the work of translating and copying secret letters, together with a general superintendence of the Residency accounts, was enough fully to occupy the time of a European officer; that Residents were sometimes appointed to Büshehr who had no knowledge at all of the languages of the Gulf; that it was important to secure continuity of policy in case of the death or sudden departure. for any reason, of a Resident; that the Resident's accustomed tours on the Arabian coast could not be discontinued without untoward political results; and that the Naval Commodore was not a suitable medium of communication with the Arab Shaikhs in cases which involved political interests or required close investigation. These arguments prevailed. though Captain Hennell admitted that he himself could, by great personal exertion, carry on the duties of his post without an Assistant; and the appointment of Lieutenant Kemball was confirmed.

Affairs of the Persian Coast and Islands, 1834-1848.

Re-appointment of Shaikh Nasir III to the Governorship of Būshehr, November 1837. In September 1837 Shaikh Nāsir III of Būshehr, whose flight to Khārag and then to Kuwait in 1832 has been related, proceeded to Shīrāz with the object of obtaining, if possible, a reduction of the tribute which Būshehr was liable to pay to the Government of Fārs and a postponement of the recovery of certain arrears which were already due. From this circumstance, and from the fact that Shaikh 'Abdullah, his uncle, was in charge of Būshehr during his absence, it would seem that Shaikh Nāsir must, at some time subsequent to the revolution which took place at Būshehr in 1833, have regained possession of his ancestral government.

Shaikh Nāsir's journey to Shīrāz appeared at first to have produced unexpected and unfortunate results; for, on the 1st November 1837. there arrived at Bushehr an individual named Mirza Muhammad Riza. who se intention it clearly was to assume the government of the town. He had been announced as the bearer of a robe of honour for Shaikh 'Abdullah, the Acting Governor; but on arrival he gave out that he had himself been appointed Governor, with instructions to examine into the affairs of Shaikh Nāsir and his treatment of those under his authority, and with authority to requisition the services of the adjoining tribes in case he met with any resistance. Shaikh 'Abdullah and his brother Shaikh Husain at once prepared to encounter the intruder by calling the Bani Hajar and the inhabitants of the Rud-Hilleh district to their assistance; but, having found that the Dumukh and the people of Tangistan would support the Mīrza, they sent their families to Khārag and themselves, on the 1st November, embarked on their vessels — two Batīls, a Baghlah, and a Bagarah, with crews amounting to 50 men only ---- in the Bushehr anchorage. Apparently with the idea of compelling the release of their nephew Shaikh Nāsir, whom they supposed to be a prisoner at Shīrāz, they pretended for a few days to levy dues on all shipping, even foreign, entering the port; but their action in this respect being unfavourably regarded by the British Resident and the supply of water on board their vessels exhausted, they weighed anchor and betool themselves to Khārag.

On the 7th November, however, to the evident surprise of all parties concerned, intelligence was received of the reappointment of Shaikh Nāsr to the Government of Büshehr; on the 8th the Dumükh and Tangistāii chiefs left Büshehr for their homes; and Shaikh 'Abdullah was invited to return from Khārag. The change in the attitude of the Shīrāz Government remained without adequate explanation: it was variously conjectued that the Bushehr fleet was needed for an expedition against Bahrain; that it was wanted for the recovery of Muhammareh, which the Tuks had taken by surprise; that it was required for the defence of Bushehr itself against an anticipated attack by the sons of the late Governor-Gereral of Fars, who belonged to the Persian royal family but were residing at Baghdad under Turkish protection; or that it was to be utilised as a neucleus for the formation of a Persian navy in the Persian Gulf.

Shaikh Nāsir did not remain long in possession of Būshehr. On the Flight of Shaikh May 1838 he again fled to Khārag, as an absconder from the Nāsir III to 30th May 1838 he again fled to Khārag, as an absconder from the Persian Government, on which the British Resident at Büshehr noted: "Whether any attempt will be made to wrest the possession of the June 1838,

and
Government
of Būshihr
by Mīrza
Abbās and
Mīrza Aad
Ullah,
1838-39.

island of Karrak from Shaikh Nasir remains to be seen, but I am inclined to think that the present authorities of Fars have neither the means nor the energy required for the success of an effort of this description."

The Shaikh's place at Būshehr was taken by Mīrza Abbās, who appears to have been a nominee of the Persian authorities, not a member of the Shaikh's family and Mīrza Abbās was very soon relieved by another Persian official, Mīrza Asad Ullah, who distinguished himself chiefly by his anti-British tendencies.

Shaikh Nāsir lived quietly on Khārag until early in 1839, when, as will be seen later, he was expelled by the officer commanding a British garrison that had been established there, in consequence of difficulties with Persia, only a few days after his own arrival on the island.

Suppression of Mīrza
Asad Ullah by Mīrza
Muhammad
Husain and usurpation of Būshehr by
Shaikh
Husain,
1839.

Mîrza Asad Ullah, who had in the meantime become involved in serious difficulties with the British, received notice on the 8th June 1839 of his supersession by Mîrza Muhammad Husain, a nephew of the Wazīr of the Governor-General of Fārs. Only three days previously he had been invested with a robe of honour from the Shāh, as had also Bāqir Khān, "Military Commandant of Būshehr" and Chief of Tangistān. Mīrza Asad Ullah retired to a place in the neighbourhood to await the result of a memorial got up in his favour by the chief Mulla and merchants of Būshehr, while Bāqir Khān temporarily carried on the administration of the town.

Mīrza Muhammad Husain duly arrived and assumed the government; but he was quickly expelled, in August 1839, by Shaikh Husain, the uncle of Shaikh Nāsir, assisted by Bāqir Khān. It seemed that Shaikh Husain aimed at possessing Būshehr himself in opposition to Shaikh Tāsir, and that the object of his ally, Bāqir Khān, was to render affairs as Būshehr so embroiled that the Persian Government would in the end be obliged to confer it on himself as the only local chief possessing sufficient power to maintain order.

Expulsion and intrigues of Shaikh Husain, 1839-40. Shaikh Husain must soon, in his turn, have been ejected from the Gorernment; for towards the end of 1840 he was at Behbehän, enlisting the support of Mīrza Koma, the ruler of that place, with a view to an attack on Būshehr. The British authorities on Khārag allowed an agent sent by Mīrza Koma to remove from the island some rusty cannon which were shown to be the Shaikh's own property; but the general feeling at Būshehr was unfavourable to Shaikh Husain's restoration. Mīrza Koma then prudently abandoned the enterprise, in which he had engaged only with the idea of obtaining Būshehr for himself.

In December 1839 "Agha Jamāl," evidently that Jamāl Khān who played a prominent part in the Būshehr revolution of 1833 and afterwards retired to Masqat, was murdered at the instigation of Bāqir Khān, Tangistāni. Jamāl Khān's offence seems to have been that he aspired to the Government of Būshehr and had undertaken a journey to Shīrāz in the hope of having it conferred on him under a guarantee offered by the Sultān of 'Omān. His assassination, as we have seen elsewhere, was deeply resented by his 'Omāni patron, who eventually obtained a promise from the Shāh that the murderer should be punished.

Murder of Jamāl Khān December 1839.

Meanwhile the cause of Shaikh Nāsir had been espoused by Manūchehr Khān, the Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh, who had lately been appointed Governor of Isfahān, Luristān and 'Arabistān, and to whom the Shaikh had recourse. The Mo'tamad evidently thought that the Shaikh might be of use in helping him to obtain the Governor-Generalship of Fārs, which he coveted, and it was stated at one time that a Farmān had been granted by the Shāh at the Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh's request, appointing Nāsir to be Governor of Būshehr and Lord High Admiral of the Persian Gulf. It does not appear, however, that Shaikh Nāsir was quickly successful in recovering his lost position.

Movements of Shaikh Nāsir III, 1839-40.

The British military occupation of Khārag, already mentioned and further on described, continued from June 1838 to February 1842; and, when it ceased, the island was left in charge of a Persian garrison from Lar commanded by a certain Lutf 'Ali Khan. Forced to withdraw to Büshehr by a mutiny of his own men, Lutf 'Ali Khan was able to attract the sympathy both of the Governor and of the chief Mujtahid of that town. Each of these authorities sent a deputy to Khārag to enquire into the facts and expostulate with the garrison; but the emissaries met with a disagreeable reception, for they were beaten and told to inform their masters that Khārag was under the ruler of Lār and that, if any force were sent from Büshehr against Khārag, it would be fired on. Lutf 'Ali Khān and his champion the Būshehr Mujtahid then wrote to the Chief of Lar, the one complaining of the insubordination of the Lāri garrison, the other suggesting that a small expedition should be organised for the purpose of punishing the soldiers and the islanders. Both of these were Sunnis,—a consideration which seems to have weighed with the Shī'ah Mujtahid. Lutf 'Ali Khān did not, apparently, wait for any reply, but took with him a body of "about thirty idle Shī'ahs whom he had enlisted at Būshire, and arrived at Karrak in warlike guise."

Occurrences on Khārag Island, 1842-43.

The Lar garrison soon terrified the invaders, who fied on board the boat that brought them, leaving Lutf Ali Khan, their leader, behind them. Nothing, however,

was done to molest him. He demanded that he should be allowed to occupy his old quarters in the fort of Karrak and to command his men, but his request being refused, he took up his residence close to the walls. After staying a fortnight there, he one day entered the fort when the gate was open, and having declared that he would cut down anyone who refused to obey his orders, a matchlock presented to his breast induced him to retreat. He then took up his quarters in a bungalow beyond the lines, and having one servant, posted him on a road near to his residence for the purpose of intercepting and bringing to him the unarmed islanders as they went to, and came from, their fields. Some Kharragis were thus taken prisoners, till at length one of them, provided with arms, resisted, a scuffle ensued, and Lutí Ali's man was cut across the head.

Meanwhile letters were received from the Chief of Lār disapproving the proceedings of Lutf 'Ali Khān, expressing indignation at the interference of the Mujtahid of Būshehr, and informing Mīrza 'Abdullah, the de facto commandant of the Khārag garrison, that the detachment would shortly be relieved, and that a relation of the Chief would be sent to take charge of the island "with the most strict injunctions to protect and not to harass the islanders." The inhabitants of Khārag received this last piece of intelligence with rejoicings; but in 1843 the garrison, as they had not yet been relieved and as they were no longer supplied with provisions from Būshehr, abandoned Khārag and returned to Lār. They left behind them Lutf 'Ali Khān only, who remained in occupation of the fort.

Soon after it was reported, to the great alarm of the Khāragis, that the Persian Government had decided to station regular troops on the island; and on the 17th September 1843 a force of 200 Sarbāz was actually landed. The result was that the small population emigrated, en masse, on the following day. With reference to these movements Lieutenant Kemball, the Assistant Resident at Būshehr, reported as follows:

The very constitution of the Persian soldiery causes them as a hody to become authorised robbers and plunderers in order to obtain the necessaries of life, and therefore feared and detested by the peaceable inhabitants of every town in which they may be quartered; their total want of discipline makes them, individually, wantonly oppressive.

Persia is now at peace with all the world. What then can be the object of sending so large a number as 200 Sirbaz to garrison a small island containing a population of 300 men, pilots and fishermen, with their families? We can only suppose that they have made themselves obnoxious to the Persian Government by the assistance they afforded in importing provisions, in establishing a bazaar, etc., for the use of the British troops; and their sole crime is having bettered their condition under a just and moderate rule, and accumulated small sums which it is intended to extort from them.

Their emigration under such circumstances cannot fail, I fear, to entail considerable loss of credit to the British Government in these parts, but not, I hope, any great inconvenience, for as a portion establish themselves on *Phelech, an island not much out of the track of vessels proceeding to the Euphrates, pilots will be procurable; and boats for the transport of coals from the shore to the steamers can be towed across from this port and returned in the same manner.

In September 1845 Shaikh Nāsir, whose movements from 1840 until that time are obscure, was reinstated in the Government of Būshehr.

Re-appointment of Shaikh Nāsi III to the Government of Būshehr, 1845.

British relations with the Persian Coast and Islands, 1834-1848.

The establishment under British auspices of a restrictive line, whereby warfare among the maritime tribes on the Arabian side of the Gulf was confined, from 1836 onwards, to their own waters, imposed on the British Resident at Büshehr a certain responsibility for justice and security upon the Persian coast. This was exemplified at the beginning of 1837, when, the inhabitants of Charak on that coast having dispossessed those of Tavuneh of the fort of Nakhl-i-Mir in the Gulshan valley in the interior, Shaikh Sultān-bin-Sagar of Shārjah, who had a hereditary connection with Tavuneh, appealed to the Resident on behalf of the people of that place. The Shaikh's request was that either he himself should be allowed to help the people of Tavuneh against those of Charak, or that the Resident should call upon the Charakis to make restitution. In his reply to a letter written him by the Shaikh, the British Resident pointed out that all outside interference was precluded by the fact that the contending parties were subjects of Persia, besides which the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain had already been prevented from sending military aid across the Gulf to the people of Chārak, and the Nakhl-i-Mīr dispute had in fact been settled by the Chief of Bastak. Shaikh Sultan-bin-Sagar was warned, in conclusion, that he would incur the displeasure of the British Government by an expedition against Chārak; and this threat seems to have sufficed to deter him from action.

Towards the end of the same year, when Shaikh 'Abdullah and Shaikh Husain of Būshehr proposed, by way of reprisals against the Government of Shīrāz, to exact irregular dues from vessels entering the port, the British Resident was obliged, by a probability of the "Colonel Newall,"

Tāvuneh-Chārak case, 1837.

The "Colon Newall" and "Nasra Shāh" questions, 1837. a vessel under British colours, being subjected to such treatment, to lodge a protest and to request Commodore Pepper, the senior officer of the Indian Naval Squadron, to keep the Büshehr fleet under observation. Shaikh 'Abdullah thereupon informed the Resident that it had never been intended to interfere with the "Colonel Newall" at all and the Shaikhs relinquished their obnoxious scheme.

A few days later it was the turn of the Shaikhs to seek the protection of the Resident for the "Nasrat Shāh", a ship belonging to Shaikh Nāsir, their nephew, which was expected shortly from Bombay with a cargo largely owned by British subjects, and which the Persian authorities were likely, in view of the differences between them and the Shaikhs' family, to attempt to seize. The Resident answered that it lay with the Shaikhs to take the necessary measures for the vessel's defence; but, fortunately, matters had been arranged between the Persian Government and the Shaikhs before the arrival of the "Nasrat Shāh" at Būshehr.

Kangūn-'Asalu case, 1838.

In 1838 Captain Hennell, the Acting Resident at Büshehr, considered it necessary, on his return from a visit to India, to address His Royal Highness the Governor-General of Fars on the subject of depredations committed by Shaikh Khalfan, the Zabit of 'Asalu, upon boats belonging to Kangūn, of which place Shaikh Jabarah was Zābit. This Shaikh Jabarah of Kangun may have been the same who attracted the favourable notice of General Malcolm in 1808. His adversary, Shaikh Khalfan, was in close relations with the Bani Yas tribe of the Arabian Coast who had been responsible for the last exhibition of armed lawlessness on a large scale in the waters of the Persian Gulf. The two hostile chiefs had, it appeared, been called to Shīrāz in order that their mutual proceedings might be enquired into, and the Kangun Shaikh had obeyed the summons, but he of 'Asalu had given no signs of compliance. The British Resident at Büshahr accordingly urged the Governor-General of Fars to insist on the latter's appearance and punish him for his misdeeds; but even this degree of intervention appears to have been resented by the Prince, who replied, civilly but not without asperity: "The oppressor will be subject to punishment without the necessity of foreign assistance."

The "Colonel Newall" case, 1838. In 1838 the British barque "Colonel Newall," already mentioned, again became a cause of difficulty at Büshehr. The ostensible owner of the "Colonel Newall" was Haji Mīrza Shafi', a Mughal merchant residing at Bombay, and the vessel possessed a British pass and colours; but the commander, Mulla Muhammad, and the crew were all natives of

Būshehr. In the interval between his reappointment to the Governmen of Būshehr in November 1837 and his flight from that place in May 1838, Shaikh Nāsir, during a visit of the "Colonel Newall" to his port, had entered into negotiations with the commander for the purchase of one-half of the vessel, and had entrusted him with 15,000 Qrāns on that account; but it was uncertain whether the bargain had been concluded, and whether the owner of the share which Shaikh Nāsir desired to purchase was Hāji Mīrza Shafi' or Mulla Muhammad, the commander, who was said to be himself part proprietor of the vessel. On the return of the "Colonel Newall" to the Gulf a few months later, Mīrza 'Abbās 'Ali, Governor of Būshehr, under instructions from Shīrāz, claimed from Mulla Muhammad either one-half of the vessel or the sum of 15,000 Qrāns paid for it by Shaikh Nāsir, on the ground that the Shaikh had absconded from Būshehr heavily in debt to the Persian Government on account of the revenue of the town and district.

The Resident was doubtful of the extent of the protection to which Mulla Muhammad was entitled, having been guilty—as it appeared—of an illegal or at least irregular act in receiving a sum of money from a foreigner for the secret purchase of a share in a vessel belonging to a British port and carrying British colours. He referred to India for instructions on the following points: "firstly, whether Mulla Mahomed was entitled to the same protection as a British subject commanding a British vessel; secondly, whether he was legally liable to be called upon by the local authorities for a sum of money received by him from Sheikh Nāsir, while that person was ruler of Būshehr, upon the bare assertion of the Persian Government that he had made away with a portion of its revenues; and thirdly, in the event of its being decided that he was to be protected against this claim, whether the same protection was to be extended to his family and relations, who by the barbarous practice of the country were all liable to be seized, punished, and stripped of everything in the absence of the offending party." The "Colonel Newall," in the meanwhile, had proceeded to Basrah; and Government accordingly instructed the Resident that the best course would be to advise the commander of the vessel of the risk he would incur-that of being arrested, in his character of a Persian subject, should he land-by bringing his vessel to Büshehr while the claim in question was hanging over him.

Whether the Persian authorities maintained the claim, or how the case was finally settled, does not appear.

Case of the "Fat-h-ar-Rahmān," 1838-41.

In May 1838 a Baghlah named the "Fat-h-ar-Rahmān," flying Arab colours but carrying a valuable cargo from Bombay, much of which was insured by British subjects, went aground on or near the island of Hanjām about 100 yards from the shore. The native master succeeded in landing all the cargo intact except some sugar, and he lost no time in despatching a messenger to the Sultān of 'Omān's Governor of Bandar 'Abbās to request help and protection. This messenger, however, fell into the hands of 'Abdur Rahmān, Shaikh of Qishm, who detained him. The Shaikh then proceeded with a body of about 1,000 men to the scene of the wreck, broke up the cases of cargo, mixed their contents together to prevent identification, and finally compelled the master by threats to sign a paper promising him half of the cargo as salvage.

A portion of the merchandise thus plundered arrived at Bushehr on the 15th August 1838 in the "Mombassa," a vessel belonging to the Shaikh of Qishm, with a request that it might be made over to the owners: but Captain Hennell, the British Resident, ascertained that the goods so restored did not amount to a sixth part of the original cargo. He consequently recommended that the Sultan of 'Oman should be called upon to compel the Shaikh of Qishm, who was under his authority, to restore the cargo insured by and bond fide the property of British subjects, or to make good its value; in the event of the Masqat authorities pleading inability to enforce this demand, direct naval action should, he thought, be taken by the British squadron in the Gulf against the Shaikh of Qishm. The amount of the claim, a doubtful item of shawls being deducted, was Rs. 21,500. Captain Hennell's proposals were approved by Government; a correspondence with the 'Omāni Governor of Banda & 'Abbas, and later with the Sultan of 'Oman himself, ensued; and in April 1839 Lieutenant Edmunds, the Assistant Resident, was successful in recovering, on a visit to Qishm, 8 boxes and 4 bundles belonging to the insured part of the cargo.

As the Sultān of 'Omān was unwilling to put much pressure on the Shaikh of Qishm, it was subsequently decided, in April 1840, to lay an embargo on Qishm vessels found in Indian ports. Under this order a Baghlah, the "'Aqūb,' was seized at Bombay: and at the end of August 1840 the claim against the Shaikh, reduced by restoration of goods and increased by incidental charges to date, stood at Rs. 14,377. In May 1841, on being threatened with the seizure of two other Qishm Baghlahs which had left for Bombay with horses, the Shaikh gave a bond for the balance still remaining of Rs. 7,867, and the case was apparently closed.

After receiving intelligence of the critical state of Anglo-Persian Organisation relations in consequence of the Persian expedition against Herat, the Government of India of their own motion issued orders, on the 1st May 1838, for the despatch of a small naval and military force to the Persian Gulf to be employed there, as the British representative at the Court of the Shah might direct, "with a view to the maintenance of our interests in Persia." The executive details were left to the Government of Bombay, who decided on the immediate despatch of the new armed steamer *" Semiramis," the sloop of war "Coote," the brig of war "Tigris" and a transport vessel to Büshehr with 500 rank and file of Native Infantry and two 6-pounders, completely equipped for service; it was resolved "that the Native Infantry be composed of detachments "from the 15th, 23rd and 24th Regiments and the Marine Battalion, now "forming part of the garrison of Bombay, in order to admit of those castes "being selected which are likely to suffer least from a sea voyage."

of a British military expedition to the Persian Gulf, May 1838.

The transport vessel needed could not, apparently, be obtained; for the expeditionary force as first despatched included only 387 sepoys. of whom the "Semiramis" was able to carry about 300. The "Tigris" preceded the other vessels with despatches for the British Envoy in Persia and the British Resident at Büshehr, and with orders for a concentration of the British Persian Gulf Squadron at Büshehr or Kharag. The command of the expedition was entrusted to Colonel Sheriff. subject to the political control of Captain Hennell, the British Resident at Bushehr, who was to exercise his powers as political officer under the instructions of the British Envoy in Persia.

Captain Hennell was directed to make the best arrangements in his power for landing the force, and was advised to choose the island of Khārag for that purpose; he was to apprise the Persian authorities at Bushehr that the troops had been sent on a special service to the Gulf, and that the British Government hoped that no objection would be made to their being landed on Khārag; but it was left to his discretion to land them on that island even in opposition to the wishes of the Persian authorities, provided that he deemed this necessary or expedient, and that it could be done without compromising the safety of the troops.

The "Semiramis," commanded by Captain Brucks, left Bombay on the 4th June and arrived on the 19th at Khārag, where the troops were landed on the same or the following day. The steamer "Hugh Lindsay"

Commencement of the British occupation of Khārag, 19th-20th

^{*} The "Semiramis" was a fine steam frigate of 1,040 tons, carrying two 68-pounder June 1838. pivot guns and 6 heavy guns on the main deck.

followed later with a reinforcement and additional stores. Captain Hennell, feeling sure that to refer to the Persian authorities at Būshehr would be to court delay, if not to invite a refusal, carried out the dismebarkation without consulting them. Subsequently he gave to Mīrza 'Abbās 'Ali, the Persian Governor of Būshehr, the prescribed explanation in regard to special service, adding that Khārag had been selected in preference to Bāsīdu and other places on account of the superiority of its climate; and he answered, in similarly conciliatory terms, a Raqam which presently reached him from the Governor-General of Shīrāz demanding an explanation of the British proceedings at Khārag. No objection was at first made by the local Persian authorities to the despatch of supplies from Būshehr for the British force on Khārag; and the occupation of the island seemed to be welcomed by Shaikh Nāsir, the ex-Governor of Būshehr, who was at the time residing on it as a refugee from the Persian Government.

Bungalows were built for the officers of the Khārag garrison, and the native troops there were comfortably hutted.

The relations of Persia with Britain were at this time of a decidedly hostile character; and the occupation of Khārag, though it had a sedative effect upon the Shāh and the central Government, seems locally to have caused irritation, and even provoked insults.

Outrage on the Sarrāf of the British Residency at Būshehhr, 17th Novem-1838.

Prominent among the ill-wishers of the British Government at Büshehr was Shaikh Husain, the Qāzi of the town, between whom and the Persian Governor, Mīrza 'Abbās 'Ali, there was a dispute in regard to certain taxes, the Qazi alleging that the inhabitants had paid them to Shaikh Nasir, the quondam Governor, before his flight, while the Mīrza declined to accept this excuse. On the 17th November 1838, the bazaars having been closed as a protest against the Governor's demands, Mīrza 'Abbās 'Ali sent Farrāshes to oblige the shopkeepers to open their shops, whereupon Shaikh Husain incited them to resist and called the town to arms. The Qazi, pretending that one of the Governor's Farrashes was intoxicated, next ordered a raid to be made upon the premises of the Jews, who were known to deal in liquor; and a rabble, headed by the Qazi's slaves proceeded, nothing loath, to the Jewish quarter, where they forcibly entered a number of houses. In one of these, which belonged to the Sarraf or money-changer of the British Residency, they destroyed wines and spirits, ready packed for exportation, to the value of 40 or 50 Tumans, and so beat and otherwise ill-treated the owner that he fled to the Residency in fear of his life. On the Resident referring the case to the Persian Governor, the latter made answer that he could do nothing as the Qāzi and merchants had risen against him and were endeavouring to expel him from Būshehr; and he even begged the Resident to inform the Governor-General of Fārs of the real state of matters in the town.

Captain Hennell was indisposed to take extreme measures at Būshehr at this time, though with a British force on Khārag he was in a position to do so, for he feared to prejudice the efforts which were being made to settle matters amicably between Britain and Persia. He wrote instead to the Governor-General of Fārs, though with little hope of a favourable result, and he suggested to the British Minister at the Persian Court that the deportation of Shaikh Husain and others from Būshehr, together with the punishment of those who had been most prominent in the outrage on the Sarrāf, should be required of Persia.

The incident was eventually included in the list of British demands for satisfaction presented to the Persian Government in 1839 and, like the other items in that list, was settled in the course of the two following years.

Before long obstacles began to be thrown by the Persian authorities in the way of the despatch of supplies from Būshehr to Khārag. First Mīrza 'Abbās 'Ali prohibited the export of wheat and flour to the island; and later Mīrza Asad Ullah, his successor, refused to let any Persian subject perform any sort of service for the Khārag garrison and laid an embargo on even the smallest articles required by the officers' mess.

Persian obstruction to the provisioning of the British force on Khārag, 1838.

The Resident consequently suggested, at the end of 1838, that retaliatory action might be taken by stopping the trade of Būshehr; but Lord Palmerston, then Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, considered the proposed measure inexpedient inasmuch as it would injure the interests of Indian merchants trading with Būshehr as well as of Persian merchants who were well disposed to the British, would furnish the Shāh with an excuse for stopping the importation of British goods into Northern Persia, and would probably, in any case, be ineffectual. He recommended, instead, that the Persian Government should be warned that, if supplies were not forthcoming, the British Government might be reduced to the necessity of obtaining them by means of its own; also that action should be taken in that sense, if the warning were disregarded. Convenient arrangements having been made, however, for obtaining from Basrah the supplies required at Khārag, the matter was allowed to drop.

Grave insult to Rear-Admiral Sir F. Maitland at Būshehr, 25th March 1839. Worse was to come. The undefined relations existing between Britain and Persia, bordering as they did on a state of declared enmity, were *such as a Persian provincial governor could hardly be expected to understand; and the British occupation of Khārag doubtless appeared to local Būshehr officials in the light of a menace calling for a defiant answer.

On the 23rd March 1839, Rear-Admiral Sir Frederick Maitland, the Naval Commander-in-Chief in India, then visiting the Persian Gulf, made an official return call on Mirza Asad Ullah, the Persian Governor of Büshehr. The Admiral was accompanied by Captain Hennell, the Resident, by Commodore Brucks, I.N., and by the commanders of H.M.S. "Wellesley" and of the Indian Navy vessels "Clive," "Elphinstone," and "Emily." The interview passed off well notwithstanding a previous altercation at the Residency, until the Admiral mentioned that the supplies from shore for himself and his ship had been stopped that day, and pointed out that such action, unless it were due to some accidental omission on his own part to comply with a regulation of the port, was contrary to the custom of civilised nations when at peace. The Governor pretended, in reply, that there was a practice of submitting a list of supplies to be sent on board ships. which had not been followed in the present instance; but this excuse was immediately disposed of by Captain Hennell, who stated absolutely, from long experience of Büshehr, that no usage of supplying a list of articles to be embarked existed in regard to British ships of war, whether of the Royal or Indian Navy, and that the first attempt to establish one had been made in connection with his own baggage just a fortnight before, but was successfully resisted. The Governor then proceeded to say that it was against local regulations for ships' boats to touch or leave shore anywhere except at the landing stage in Büshehr town, and that direct communication between ships and the British Residency was consequently inadmissible. The Resident, on being appealed to by the Admiral, was

^{*}The position of British subjects throughout Persia was at this time disagreeable; everywhere they were regarded with distrust and dislike; see, for example, Layard's Early Adventures, Vol. I, page 229. Later the Persian suspicions of Britain were deepened by the occupation of Käbul by troops from India, and a British invasion of Persia by way of Afghänistän came to be feared. (Layard, Early Adventures, Vol. I, pages 262—263.) The Persians seem also to have dreaded that use might be made of the refugee Persian princes who resided at Baghdād as British and Turkish pensioners. (Mitford, Land March, Vol. I, pages 344—345.)

able to refute this statement also, which was entirely false; for the immemorial custom at Büshehr was that ships' boats made free use, weather permitting, of the Residency landing-place, and that the baggage of visitors at the Residency was sent on board from there direct, whenever this was the most convenient course. Sir F. Maitland accordingly announced his intention of going on board his ship direct from the Residency on the next day but one, and asked the Governor whether he would attempt to prevent his embarkation. To this question, more than once repeated, the Persian official declined to reply; whereupon the Admiral rose to take leave of him, but refused to shake hands. Mīrza Asad Ullah then laid hold of Sir F. Maitland and induced him to sit down again; but, on an answer to his question being still obstinately withheld, the Admiral and his party quitted the room. Immediately after their return to the Residency a detachment of Persian troops were marched to a seatower near it, which they occupied, and a Persian sentry was posted at the Residency landing-place. It was ascertained that these had orders to prevent boats from communicating with the Residency.

On the morning of the 25th March the boats of H. M.S. "Wellesley" and of the Indian Naval Squadron approached the shore to protect Sir F. Maitland's embarkation. Two gigs came further inshore than the other boats, in neither of which were arms displayed, though they were carried. The Admiral, the Resident, and several officers of the Royal and Indian Navies, all unarmed, were standing on a cliff above the landing-place; and a native crowd had collected around. As one of the gigs touched the beach a Persian private soldier cocked his musket and ordered it to push off again. No attention being paid to what he said, he lowered his weapon and would have shot at Captain Maitland of the "Wellesley" (afterwards Admiral Lord Lauderdale); but the veteran Admiral was in time to strike the musket up, and the Resident and other officers threw themselves upon the man and disarmed him, not without a struggle. The native crowd then attacked the British party with sticks and stones, and Captain Maitland and several other officers were struck, but not the Admiral. On the gigs' crews displaying their arms and jumping ashore, the mob dispersed. As the other boats were nearing the shore fire was suddenly opened on them from a breastwork which had been thrown up during the night. The boats replied with two volleys, killing one Persian and wounding two, but immediately ceased fire by order of the Admiral; and a messenger was sent to the Persian Governor to inform him that he would be held responsible for the consequences if his people did not stop shooting. A little later the firing from

the breastwork ceased, and the Admiral's embarkation took place without further incident.

The attempt of the soldier to fire on Captain Maitland and the erection and manning of a temporary work proved, beyond possibility of doubt, that the outrage was premeditated. Reparation was ultimately obtained along with the satisfaction of the other British demands of which a schedule was presented to the Persian Government a little after this time.

It seemed to Captain Hennell inadvisable, though the Residency building had been placed in a state of defence, to remain at Büshehr after such an occurrence, and he accordingly decided on transferring the Residency to Khārag.

On the 27th March the "Clive" signalled that an artillery detachment with two guns under Captain Leslie had arrived from Khārag, and that 100 Europeans under Captain Strong had left Khārag for Būshehr on the previous day. As the boats carrying the Europeans had not arrived, and it was thought that they had passed to leeward, Captain Hennell volunteered to go to Halīlah, at the southern end of the Būshehr Peninsula, in Her Majesty's brig "Algerine" and try to pick them up as otherwise, in ignorance of what exactly had occurred, they would probably land and march on the town of Būshehr. These precautions were succesfully taken, and on the 28th the "Algerine" was back at Būshehr.

The final embarkation of the Resident and his staff, on the 29th March, was not unattended by danger. Bāqir Khān, the Tangistāni chief, had occupied the cliffs at the Residency landing-place with about 400 men, and it was thought that he might attempt to prevent the operation But the sight of ten gunboats from the "Wellesley," "Clive" and "Elphinstone" commanding the shore was sufficient to deter him from interference, though not from insolence. At 2 p.m. the "Wellesley," "Algerine" and "Elphinstone" weighed anchor for Khārag, the "Clive" remaining at Būshehr as a guardship to protect British interests and shipping.

The Government of India approved generally of the removal of the Residency to Khārag, but they suggested that it might have been avoided by resort to conciliatory explanations in the beginning, and they thought that it might, in any case, have been conducted with somewhat less precipitancy. At the same time they admitted that some preparations which the Persians had made for establishing a fortified building between the Residency and the beach had boded ill for the continuance of their representative at Bushire in either honour or safety.

Removal of the British Residency from Bushehr to Khārag, 29th-30th March 1839. The situation was such as might conceivably have warranted Captain Hennell in stronger action than merely withdrawing from Būshehr, for instructions previously received by him from the British Minister regarding the employment of the Khārag force were to the effect that "if any hostile demonstration should be made by the Shīrāz Govern-"ment, and especially if it were found that it was proposed to fortify and strengthen Būshehr or to place a garrison there, and if the Resident was of opinion that the force under Colonel Sheriff with the naval force at his disposal was sufficient for the occupation and defence of Būshehr, he was to intimate to the Governor of Shiraz that any hostile demonstration he might make would oblige him immediately to occupy Būshehr, and defend it if necessary; but, if no such demonstrations were made, "the troops should remain on Khārag until the receipt of further "instructions."

As matters actually fell out, the Persians claimed a victory and pretended to have expelled the British from Büshehr; and the affair, trivial as it was, had a most unfortunate effect on British prestige throughout the whole Persian Gulf region.

No injury was done to the Residency building after the departure of the Resident; the general feeling in the town was reported to be favourable to the British; and communication between Khārag and Būshehr seems to have remained open. A Persian nobleman, Husain Khān, was shortly sent by the Governor-General of Fārs to the British Resident to confer with him on the subject of the withdrawal of the Residency from Būshehr. Captain Hennell discussed the whole question with him in terms that the Government of India afterwards held to have been judicious. At the same time they remarked that the return of the Residency was a matter for the decision of the British Envoy to Persia, then at Erzeroum, and that the Resident should not entertain, without reference to Government, any further overtures that might be made to him by the Persians.

The transfer of the Residency to Khārag had the unforeseen result of bringing about a conflict of authority between Captain Hennell, the Political Resident, and Colonel Sheriff, the Military Commandant. There was a two-fold difference of opinion between them in regard, firstly, to the expediency of allowing Shaikh Nāsir to remain on Khārag and, secondly, to the necessity of making preparation for offensive action against Persia.

From the beginning the presence of Nasir on Kharag had been a source of embarrassment. He was practically in rebellion against the

Conflict
between the
British political and military authorities on
Khārag in
consequence
of the expulsion of Shaikh
Nāsir by the
latter, 1889.

Persian Government, and at first he was eager to undertake operations against them from Khārag. The Resident, however, succeeded in inducing him to lay that idea aside by the argument that his conduct would naturally be supposed by the Persian Government to have been instigated by the British authorities, though Britain and Persia were technically at peace. Again, Shaikh Nāsir was anxious that the British should hold themselves responsible for the defence of the village of Khārag, as well as of their own camp, against the Persians. This proposal, too, was effectually discountenanced by the Resident. There was also a difficulty about accommodation for the coals and other stores belonging to the British expedition, for which the Resident was anxious to hire the old Dutch fort; but the Shaikh was unwilling to part with the fort, which was the place of residence of his and his relations' wives and families. He offered instead the southern bastion of the village wall, which commanded the best landing-place in the prevailing winds.

It was however Colonel Sheriff, the Military Commandant, who in the end decided, in opposition to the views of the Resident, that Shaikh Nāsir must leave Khārag. The chief ground on which Colonel Sheriff took action was that, the Shaikh being an avowed enemy of Persia, his presence on the island was likely to be misinterpreted by the Persian Government.

The Shaikh's expulsion seems to have been effected by harsh methods which Captain Hennell did all that he could to mitigate. Shaikh Nāsir, it may be noted, claimed the sovereignty of Khārag for himself; but the truth seemed to be that he had held the island as a fief from Persia, in the same manner as Būshehr.

In regard to the second point, Colonel Sheriff considered the recent acts of the Persian Governor of Büshehr to be tantamount to a declaration of war by the Persian Government against Great Britain and wished to take measures accordingly, whereas Captain Hennell was of opinion that Mīrza Asad Ullah's proceedings had been entirely unauthorised by higher authority.

The Government of India, when the difference between the two officers was submitted to them, apportioned all the blame to Colonel Sheriff. Not only did they hold that his conduct in encroaching on the sphere of the political officer in purely political questions had been wrong, but they pronounced his view of the situation to be erroneous and his action in expelling Shaikh Nāsir unjustified. Captain Hennell's attitude and opinions were approved; but it was observed that he should have declined to correspond with the military authorities on political subjects and should have held himself responsible to Government alone for the

correctness of his own opinions and measures. It was ruled that the administration of the island and village should be military, under the officer commanding the forces, the Resident's establishments being excluded from his jurisdiction; these were Captain Hennell's suggestions. It was ordered that some Balūchis left on Khārag by Shaikh Nāsir should be taken into the service of the British Government, and that arrangements should be made for the safety and comfort of Shaikh Nasir himself, to whom just compensation for his losses and expenses was to be allowed, at the discretion of the Resident.

In 1841, the British military occupation of Khārag still continuing, it seems to have been proposed by the Resident in the Persian Gulf that the island should be purchased from the Persian Government with a view to the location of the Residency there instead of at Büshehr, and as a permanent settlement and coal depôt. The suggestion was referred to England, where it was attentively considered by the India Office and Foreign Office; but in the end it was decided that to acquire Khārag by purchase would be to give Russia an opportunity of obtaining the cession of the whole or a portion of Gilan in the north in return for a remission of the balance of the war indemnity due to her by Persia, --- a most undesirable result,—and that it would be better to do nothing which might so compromise the integrity of Persia. The British Minister at Tehran, however, was instructed to explain to the Persian Government, when the time for the evacuation of Khārag arrived in consequence of the fulfilment of the British demands, that a British Resident would remain on the island for the protection of British commercial interests, and that a coal depôt would be required there for the use of the British steam vessels navigating the Tigris and the Euphrates; and he was directed to ask the Persian Government to order the local authorities to afford the necessary facilities.

Khārag had proved, apparently, a not unpopular station. By the end of 1840 a well-furnished bazaar existed on the island, and ready money payments had made abundant supplies procurable; but fever and other diseases continued to be prevalent, in summer, among the troops of the garrsion.

It having been arranged that on the conclusion of an Anglo-Persian Termination Commercial Treaty the British occupation of Khārag should cease, Sir J. McNeill wrote on the 28th October 1841 to the military officer of Khārag, commanding on Khārag, desiring him to arrange, in concert with the Resident, for an immediate evacuation of the island; to deliver it up to

Proposed purchase of Khārag by Britain from Persia, 1841.

of the British occupation 1841-42.

such officer as the Persian Government might appoint to receive charge of it; and to inform the Persian representative that a British officer would continue to reside there, and that the British coal depôt would be maintained. Some delay occurred, due probably to the necessity of obtaining tonnage for the troops; but in the course of January and February 1842 the force was withdrawn. Naval stores which remained behind were removed in October or November.

Return of the British Residency from Khārag to Būshehr, May 1842, followed by an unofficial villégiature on Khārag and complaints by the Persian Government.

In May 1842, the Acting Resident, Colonel H. D. Robertson, struck his flag at Khārag and removed the Residency to Būshehr; but he presently returned himself to Khārag, where he resided during the whole summer. It seems that the Būshehr Residency building had become uninhabitable, and that the Acting Resident had proposed that it should not be repaired, but that a new Residency should be built in the country some miles from the town, in regard to both of which points he was awaiting orders. From the fact that the Persian Government complained to the British Minister at Tehrān of the Resident's continuance at Khārag it would seem that the earlier scheme of retaining the Residency there had not been communicated to them or had been withdrawn in deference to their objections. To their complaint they added an unfounded charge that the Resident had appointed a headman over the islanders.

The temporary return of the Resident to Khārag was, in fact, unofficial. He did not hoist his flag; he was accompanied by only half his guard of 36 men; the whole office establishment with him consisted of one clerk and one Mīrza; he had allowed the Assistant Resident and Residency Surgeon to select their own summer quarters, but both had chosen Khārag; and he himself and the Assistant Resident visited Būshehr as often as necessary, remaining there from a week to three weeks at a time.

Shaikh Nāsir's title to the island of Khārag, 1842-43. In 1842, the British Legation at Tehrān seem to have intervened in a question between Shaikh Nāsir and the Persian Government, the former having apparently been deprived by the latter of the island of Khārag. Whether the question had any connection with the recent British military occupation is not clear. In connection with the case the British Minister called upon the Resident in the Persian Gulf to report on the nature of Shaikh Nāsir's former tenure of the island, viz., whether it was his hereditary property or whether he held the revenue of it as a fief, also what amount of income the Shaikh had been accustomed to derive from

the island or its inhabitants, and whether he had received any compensation for being deprived of it. Colonel Robertson in reply practically confessed his inability to cast any light on the nature of Shaikh Nāsir's title to Khārag, no reliable materials being available on which to found an opinion.

The re-appointment of Shaikh Nāsir once more, in 1845, to the Governorship of Būshehr seems to have been regarded with satisfaction by Colonel Hennell, the Resident. He reported in connection therewith that there was every prospect, for the future, of friendly relations being maintained between the British Residency and the Persian authorities at Būshehr.

Relations of Shaikh Nāsir with the British Residency, 1845.

NĀSIR-UD-DĪN SHĀH, 1848—1896.*

Before the death of Muhammad Shāh his eldest son, Nāsir-ud-Dīn Mīrza, had been recognised by the British and Russian Governments separately and conjointly, as heir to the throne of Persia; consequently, when the Shāh expired, Colonel Farrant, the British Chargé d'Affaires, and Prince Dolgoruki, the Russian Minister at Tehrān, worked together to ensure the peaceful succession of that youthful Prince. Information of his father's approaching end was even despatched to him post haste at Tabrīz, where as Governor-General of Āzarbāijan he had his residence as soon as it was certain that the Shāh had not many hours to live. It

* The principal authorities for the general history of Persia during this period are. in chronological order: Lady Sheil's Glimpses of Life and Manners in Persia, 1856; Mr. C. B. Eastwick's Journal of a Diplomate's Three Years' Residence in Persia, 1864; Mr. R. G. Watson's History of Persia, 1866; a Memorandum on Persian Affairs, by Mr. J. Talboys Wheeler, 1871; Sir C. R. Markham's History of Persia, 1874; Sir H. C. Rawlinson's England and Russia in the East, 1875; and Lord Curzon's Persia and the Persian Question, 1892. The Treaties of the time will be found in Aitchison's Treaties; Engagements and Sanads, vol. XII, 1909.

The chief sources of information regarding the Anglo-Persian war are: Captain G. H. Hunt's Outram and Havelock's Persian Campaign, 1858, containing excellent illustrations and information as to the causes of the war; Sir J. Outram's Persian Campaign in 1857, printed for private circulation in 1860 with plans; and Major M. S. Bell's Account of the British Wars with Persia, 1889. Lieutenant C. R. Low's History of the Indian Navy, 1877, deals with the naval operations in the war.

The local history of the Persian Coast and Islands is to be derived chiefly from the annual Administration Reports of the Persian Gulf Political Residency, a series beginning from 1871-72, and from the general records of the Government of India which are summarised by Mr. J. A. Saldanha in his Précis of Correspondence regarding the Affairs of the Persian Gulf, 1801-53, and Précis of the Affairs of the Persian Coast and Islands, 1854-1909, both printed in 1906. Some facts are given also in Mr. R. B. M. Binning's Journal of Two Years' Travel in Persia, etc., 1857, and Mr. E. Stack's Six Months in Persia, 1882.

was inevitable notwithstanding every precaution, that some amount of disquiet should attend the change of sovereign; and the considerable interval that occurred between the death of Muhammad Shāh and the arrival of Nāsir-ud-Dīn Mīrza at the capital was full of anxiety. A provisional government was formed at Tehran, over which the Mahd Aulivah or Queen-Mother presided; but the members. who belonged to different political factions, and whose individual interests also were at variance, were united in nothing except in demanding the retirement from public life of the lately omnipotent Prime Minister, Hāji Mīrza Aghasī. That peculiar but astute individual, who had enriched himself enormously by the exercise of the supreme power and who had become greatly attached thereto, seemed at a loss how to act; at one moment he promised the British and Russian representatives to abstain from political activity during the crisis; at another he shut himself up in the citadel of Tehran with 1,200 followers, as if preparing to assert himself by force : and finally he took sanctuary at the shrine of Shah 'Abdul 'Azīm near the capital.

Accession of Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shāh, 20th October 1848. Nāsir-ud-Dīn Mīrza entered Tehrān on the* 20th October 1848 and was invested with the insignia of royalty at midnight following, hist age being then 17 years. The young Shāh had already made choice of his principal adviser: this was Mīrza Taqi Khān, of whom we shall have more to say hereafter, and who chose the military title of Amīr Nizām in preference to that of Sadr A'zam or Prime Minister, the latter having been rendered inauspicious in his opinion by certain evil precedents. One consequence of the selection of Mīrza Taqi Khān was the banishment or flight of Hāji Mīrza Āghāsi to Karbala, where he shortly died.‡

At first matters seemed to go from bad to worse, and the fall of the Qāj'ār dynasty and a breaking up of Persia were commonly predicted. The Treasury was empty; risings or riots took place at Yazd, Isfahān, Shīrāz and Kirmān; and the highroads became so unsafe as to cause despair among merchants, no less than 1,500 animals with their loads being carried off or detained in the neighbourhood of Yazd alone in

^{*} So Watson (*History of Persia*, page 364), but Rawlinson makes the date the 21st (*England and Russia in the East*, page 74). There is the same discrepancy of one day between the dates assigned by these writers to the death of Muhammad Shāh.

[†]Lord Curzon states definitely that Nāssir-ud-Dīn Shāh was born on the 17th July 1831 (*Persia*, vol. I, page 393), and the statement doubtless rests on conclusive evidence. According to Watson (*History of Persia*, page 364) the Shāh was 16 at the time of his accession; while Lady Sheil, on the other hand, calls him 21 in November 1851, and Binning makes him complete his 21st lunar year on the 11th December 1850 (*Journal of Two Years' Travel*).

[‡] Loftus (Travels and Researches, page 56) mentions his tomb as existing at Karbala in 1849 and relates a characteristic anecdote of the Hāji in connection with his decease.

about two months. By degrees, however, these troubles subsided or were quelled. Tehran itself was at one time threatened by Saif-ul-Mulk Mīrza, a son of that Zill-us-Sultān who had disputed the throne with Nasir-ud-Din Shah's father; but the force which this pretender managed to collect was quickly scattered and he himself brought a prisoner to Tehran.

The greatest and most prolonged danger to the new government arose from the state of affairs in Khurāsān, where the Sālār, whose father the Asaf-ud-Dauleh was still in exile, had re-appeared upon the scene. Before long the Salar, who enjoyed the support of most of the chiefs of Khurāsān and was a favourite—almost an idol—of the people, had obliged Hamzah Mīrza, the Shāh's uncle and representative at Mashhad, though aided by Yar Muhammad Khan of Herat, to evacuate the town and retire towards the Afghan border. Proposals for British and Russian mediation were rejected by the Amīr Nizām, who was firmly opposed on principle to all foreign interference in Persian internal affairs. Instead reinforcements were sent under Sultan Murad Mirza, another uncle of the Shah, to the Persian army investing Mashhad. Meanwhile Turkoman robbers from beyond the border were overrunning Khurāsān in all directions; and Yar Muhammad Khan, while pretending to assist the Shāh's troops, was merely awaiting the issue of the struggle, by which he hoped to profit. Towards the end of 1849 another force was despatched from Tehran to Mashhad, but it sustained a serious reverse on its first arrival. At length, after a siege lasting a year and a half, the towns people, seeing that some important redoubts had fallen and that a general assault was imminent, threw the gates of Mashhad open to the royal forces under Sultan Murad Mirza. The Salar was dragged from the shrine of Imam Riza, where he had taken sanctuary, and underwent execution by the bowstring. His death, though regretted by many on account of his enterprising and chivalrous character, tended greatly to the consolidation of the new régime, especially as the ordinary inhabitants of Mashhad were treated with leniency, a fine only being exacted from them as punishment for having participated in the rebellion.

It does not appear that the Sālār himself aspired to the throne of Persia, but he probably aimed at restoring his family to their former position as semi-independent Governors-General of Khurāsān.

Mīrza Taqi Khān, the Amīr Nizām, under whom order and confi- Mīrza Taqi dence were gradually restored, is perhaps the strongest and most remarkable character in the modern history of Persia. In person he was "a tion, fall, and large, portly, good-looking man, with an open intelligent countenance." He owed his success in life entirely to his own personal qualities. He was of plebeian origin; and when he accompanied the mission of Khusrau Mīrza to St. Petersburg about 1830, it was in the humble

Rebellion of the Sālār at Mashhad, 1848---1850.

> Khān ; his administradeath, 1848

capacity of a servant. Through clerkships and secretaryships he rose to the post of Persian representative on the Perso-Turkish Frontier Commission at Erzeroum (1843—1847), which was offered him under English advice. He proved to be * "beyond all comparison the most interesting" of the personalities which the Commission brought together; he maintained the Persian case with great steadiness and ability; and he was disliked by the Turks, † "with more than uncommon aversion, from his dignified bearing and stately manners".

Mīrza Taqi Khān was afterwards placed on the staff of Nāsir-ud-Dīn Mīrza, when that Prince was appointed by his father to the Governor-Generalship of Āzarbāijān; and it was not unnatural that Nāsir-ud-Dīn should have wished, on promotion to the throne, to retain the services of his tried confidential adviser. But the Shāh acted unwisely in bestowing on him the hand of his own full sister in marriage,—a proceeding disapproved by many of the royal family; and his favourite found a determined enemy in the Queen-Mother.

The problem which confronted Mīrza Taqi Khān on assuming the direction of affairs was in the first place financial, in the second military. During the first few months of the new reign no revenue reached the public Treasury, while the Government as yet possessed no financial credit; and in Khurāsān the situation was critical and called for military effort. With a fearlessness worthy of the highest praise the minister at once addressed himself to the double task of reforming the finances and creating an efficient army. His economies consisted largely in the abolition or reduction of undeserved pensions which his predecessor had granted liberally to princes and priests, - a measure which made him intensely unpopular with a large and influential class; and his own incorruptible integrity enabled him to go even further and suppress in a great degree the peculation which flourished on all sides, especially in the military departments. The first serious sign of opposition to the Amīr Nizām's praiseworthy but dangerous reforms was a mutiny of the military garrison of Tehran in March 1849, instigated by his enemies and directed against him personally. He met the emergency by retiring quietly from office until the incident had been arranged, after which he resumed his post and the introduction of reforms. A leading principle of his policy was the repression of all influences which encroached upon the prerogatives of the civil government, and of such there was no lack in Persia in his day. In the realisation of this principle he caused the Shaikh-ul-Islām at Tabrīz to be arrested, deprived the Imām Jumāh at Tehrān of his prescriptive right of affording sanctuary, and even sought to prohibit,

^{*} The words are those of one of his English colleagues; see the Hon'ble R. Curzon's Armenia, page 55.

[†] The same, page 56.

through the ecclesiastical authorities, those exhibitions of Shī'ah fanaticism which in Iran are associated with the month of Muharram. In the matter of foreign relations he was equally * uncompromising, it being his ambition to reclaim Persia from her attitude of humiliating dependence on the good pleasure of Russia, Britain, and Turkey. He refused, as we have already seen, proffers of foreign intervention between the Shah and the Mashad rebels; and he turned an equally deaf ear to British suggestions that the Asaf-ud-Dauleh's family should be restored to power in Khurāsān and to Russian demands that Bahman Mīrza, an uncle of the Shah who had fled from his post and taken refuge in Russian territory, should be replaced in the Governor-Generalship of Azarbāijān, His strict observance of his engagements was as remarkable as his unwillingness to enter into any; and his simplicity and inaccessibility to flattery were no less striking. By honesty, industry, energy, and courage, the Amīr Nīzam succeeded in imparting relative prosperity to the fiscal resources of the State and to private trade, as well as a certain degree of efficiency to the army; but hardly had affairs begun to mend when he suddenly incurred the distrust of the Shah.

The Amīr Nizām had the defects of his qualities; he bore himself with a hauteur and self-sufficiency that cannot but have been disagreeable to his royal master; and it was even whispered that he had spoken slightingly of the Shāh as "that young fellow." It may have been falsely represented to Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shāh that the Minister cherished designs upon the throne itself; and, if so, the devotion with which the army now regarded him may have seemed to lend probability to the charge. On the night of the 13th November 1851, the Shāh, after taking extraordinary precautions for his own safety, sent to inform the Amīr Nizām that he was relieved of all but his military functions,—an order to which the Minister respectfully bowed.

Efforts were made on Mīrza Taqi Khān's behalf by the British Legation and resulted in his being offered the Government of Kāshān; but he hesitated to accept any provincial government, believing that his life would be in danger immediately that he was cut off from direct communication with the Shāh. The Russian Minister then interposed on his behalf, but so tactlessly as to become in the end the cause of his destruction. An attempt by Prince Dolgoruki to place him openly under Russian protection at Tehrān having provoked alarm and indignation on the part of the Shāh and his new advisers, the Amīr Nizām was sent as a political

According to Binning (Journal of Two Years' Travels, vol. II, page 237) the Amīr Nizām showed an unreasonably strong anti-foreign bias, persuading the Shāh to discard Europeans from his service, and even proposing to exclude all foreign manufactured goods from the country by way of encouraging native industries.

prisoner to Kāshān'; and there he remained, in danger but unharmed, until an unlucky boast by the Russian Minister excited fears of foreign intervention on his behalf, and so sealed his doom. On the 9th January 1852 Mīrza Taqi Khān was seized and cruelly bled to death at the palace of Fīn, near Kāshān, by emissaries from Tehrān. Circumstances of unusual ingratitude and heartless deception intensified the tragic character of the event, the only bright feature in which was the devotion displayed by the victim's girl wife.

It was not long until the Shāh perceived that the crime into which he had been betrayed by calumny and misrepresentation was a political blunder of the first magnitude; and he gave signs of sincere, if transient, remorse. The murder of the Amīr Nizām excited horror even in distant Europe; and in Persia the brief period of his administration was remembered, for some years at least, as a sort of golden age.

Visit of the Shāh to Isfahān, 1851 At frequent intervals during his long reign Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shāh gave proofs of personal energy and of a desire to make himself personally acquainted with affaris by undertaking journeys to different parts of Persia, and even to foreign countries.

His first important tour in his own kingdom was undertaken in 1851, while the Amīr Nizām was still in power, and its objective was Isfahān. The Shāh was accompanied on his progress by a large number of his courtiers and part of his army; and the Foreign Missions at Tehrān, led by the Russian, decided on taking part in the journey as a mark of attention. The Shāh left his capital about the end of April and, travelling by a circuitous route, arrived on the 15th July at Isfahān, where Colonel Sheil, the British Minister, as also the representatives of Russia and Turkey had preceded him. He remained at Isfahān, the presence of the disorderly crowd that he brought with him greatly deranging the life of the place, until the 28th August, when he left again for Tehrān.

Bābi troubles and attempt on the Shāh's life, 1849— 1852. The Bābi heresy or new religion which originated—as has been described—in the preceding reign, was a cause of serious political trouble during the earlier years of Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shāh. Persecution seemed only to give greater vitality to the Bābi movement. The Bāb himself had been arrested at Shīrāz in 1845, and thereafter he spent the greater part of his life in prison until his execution at Tabrīz in July 1850. At Yazd a Bābi rising occurred, but was suppressed with the aid of the populace. At Tehrān a Bābi plot against the life of the Amīr Nizām was discovered and seven Bābis were publicly executed,—the first instance of departure from the established practice of Persia under which condemned

criminals were privately strangled in the presence of the Shāh. In May 1850, almost simultaneously with the rising at Yazd, a more serious Bābi revolt broke out at Zinjān, where a handful of 300 Bābi rebels continued, notwithstanding the execution of the Bāb himself, to maintain themselves until the end of the year against the forces of the Crown. Their defence was desperate; their methods were ferocious; and thier punishment was extermination.

The efforts of the Bābis culminated, after a period of quiescence following on the reduction of Zinjān, in an attempt upon the life of the Shāh, made on the 15th August 1852, from which it was clear that the principles of some of the sect had now become actively anarchical. The Shāh escaped with a slight wound from a pistol bullet in the thigh, and of his four Bābi assailants one was killed on the spot and two were captured. About 30 persons held to have been involved were put to death some of them after horrid tortures; and a certain amount of sympathy with the sectaries was awakned by the haste and severity of the Government measures. A number of the highest officials of the Persian Government were compelled to take a personal share in the execution of the condemned Bābis, the idea being to distribute responsibility for the act and the anticipated revenge of the Bābi brotherhood over as large a body as possible of distinguished persons.

The Amīr Nizām was followed in the highest office of state by the Itimād-ud-Dauleh, better known as Mīrza Āgha Khān, a man of a different stamp, who did not hesitate to accept the title of Sadr A'zam or Prime Minister. His policy, in the beginning, was prudent and reserved; but his tortuous dealings and anti-foreign sentiments gradually involved Persia in complications of which the final issue was, as will be explained in another place, the Anglo-Persian War of 1856-57.

Prime Ministership of
Mirza Agha
Khān, 1851
—1858.

In 1858 the Shāh dismissed Mīrza Āgha Khān and took upon himself the general direction of affairs, a charge which he never again, though he afterwards appointed more than one Sadr A'zam, entirely resigned into other hands.

More than a decade of Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shāh's reign was characterised by bad harvests and consequent distress in various parts of the country, which better means of communication would have sufficed, in some instances, to avert. On the 28th February and 1st March 1861 there were serious bread riots at Tehrān, in the course of which the mayor of the city was put to death. In the summer of 1865 there was an émeute, due to scarcity, at Shīrāz, in which some lives were lost; and in the spring of the following year, during a tour of the Shā to the Caspian

Recurrent scarcity in Persia, 1861 —1872.

littoral, tumults of a like nature broke out at the capital, which necessitated His Majesty's instant return and the opening of the royal granaries to the public. A serious famine which occurred in the South in 1870-72 is noticed further on in the history of the Persian Coast and Islands.

Visit of the Shah to Mashhad, 1867. In 1867 the Shāh visited Mashhad, where he arrived on the 17th of June, partly as a religious duty and partly for reasons of State; he was accompanied by the Queen-Mother and all his ladies, and he did not return to Tehrān until the 23rd of September. During his halt at the provincial capital of Khurāsān he received a visit from Muhammad Ya'qūb Khān, son of the Amīr of Afghānistān and Governor, in his father Sher 'Ali Khān's name of Herat.

Journey of the Shāh to Turkish 'Irāq,' 1870 --1871.

A journey which Nasir-ud-Din Shah made in the winter of 1870-71 to Turkish 'Iraq,' as a pilgrim to the Shī'ah Shrines there, and also perhaps as an observer of the condition of his subjects in the Ottoman Empire, is described, as regards its stages lying beyond the Persian frontier, in the chapter on the history of that province. The Shah left Tehran on the 25th September 1870 with the Queen-Mother and other ladies of the royal establishment. He arrived at Kirmanshah on the 27th of October, the journey thither from the capital having been "attended throughout with discomfort and privation of no ordinary character to the whole camp, aggravated by the presence of the cholera." As he approached Kirmānshāh from Hamadān he was disturbed by noisy complaints of misgovernment against the Prince-Governor of the province, into which, on his arrival, he promised to enquire. personally; and he remained at Kirmānshāh till the 5th of November. The Shah re-entered Persian territory from Khanaqin on the 9th January 1871 and regained Kirmanshah on the 24th of the same month.

Prime
Ministership
of Mīrza
Husain
Khan, 1871
—1873.

In 1871 the Shāh, feeling the need of some one to share with him the burdens of government, revived the office of Sadr A'zam or Prime Minister and appointed to it Mīrza Husain Khān, an enlightened and experienced official, who had represented Persia at Tiflis and at Bombay and who had subsequently held for 12 years the high post of Persian Ambassador at Constantinople. The new Prime Minister was the author of the Reuter Concession, which will be noticed hereafter in its proper place, and he encouraged the Shāh in a design that he had long entertained of visiting the principal capitals of Europe,—two measures which by their unpopularity eventually brought about the Prime Minister's own downfall.

On his first journey to Europe the Shāh took with him several princes of the blood whom it was judged inexpedient to leave behind in Persia; but, even so, the fact of his being able to leave Persia at all bore witness to his consciousness of being firmly established on the throne. Constantinople, Vienna, St. Petersburg, Berlin, Paris, Brussels, and London were among the capitals which he visited; and at Constantinople a unique personal meeting took place between him and the Sultān of Turkey, the two Principal Muhammadan monarchs of the world.

The Shah's first European tour, 1873.

Some of the political results of the Shāh's journey are noted elsewhere; here it is only relevent to mention the circumstances attending its conclusion. Rumours of disaffection at home abridged the Shāh's tour in its last stages; and when he returned to Persia it was to find that the Reuter Concession had caused a dangerous ferment in the country, and that the removal of the Prime Minister was demanded by a large body of malcontents, some of whom were actuated by public, but a larger number by private considerations. For a time it was feared that the Shāh might consider himself obliged to sacrifice Mīrza Husain Khān, as he had sacrificed Mīrza Taqi Klān in 1852 to appease the general resentment; but, while he dismissed him from Prime Ministership, he protected him from harm and even maintained him in power, for a time, as Sipāh Sālār or Commander-in-Chief; and in the end suitable punishments were meted out to all the more prominent personages who had shown symptoms of disloyalty.

The Shah's second European tour, 1878.

Emboldened by the success of his first journey to Europe the Shāh in 1878 undertook a second. On this occasion he visited Russia, Germany, France and Austria, but not England; and the chief visible consequence of his excursion was the importation of Austrian instructors for the Persian army on a considerable scale. Since the disappearance, about 1850, of most of the French officers employed by Muhammad Shāh, the Persian army had passed through the hands, successively, of Austrian, Italian, and other French experts none of whom remained very long in the country. There was some murmuring in Persia regarding the extravagance of the Shāh's expenditure on his second European tour.

In 1889 the Shāh travelled in Europe for the third time, once more visiting England.

The Government of Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shāh was probably never seen to greater advantage than about the year 1889, by which time its

The Shāh's third European tour, 1859.
* Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shāh's Government, 1889.

^{*} The government of the Shāh as it existed in 1889 is fully described and analysed by Lord Curzon in his *Persia*, Vol. I, pages 391—463, from which are taken most of the facts in the text above and in the rext paragraph but one,

maximum degree of stability had been attained; many experiments had been tried, and the results either adopted or rejected; and a general policy and body of administrative methods had been developed through circumstance and custom, if not from other materials. The principal Minister of State at this time, though not honoured with the title of Sadr Azam, was Mīrza Ali Askar Khān, known as the Amīn-ud-Dauleh; he was of Armenian extraction and young, but possessed natural ability and force of character. To British visitors he professed liberal and Anglophil sentiments, and he was the chief member of the Shah's suite on His Majesty's third journey to Europe; but, as will appear from his measures in the Persian Gulf, to be described hereafter. his policy presented some marks of chauvinism. Ordinary business was disposed of to some extent by a Council of State formed after the Shah's first journey to Europe, which consisted in 1889 of about 30 members including the heads of departments; but there was also an inner Council of Five, constituted by the Shāh in 1888 to advise him on important matters.

Assassination of Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shāh, 1st May 1896.

Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shāh's reign, perhaps the most meritorious in Persia since that of Karīm Khān, Zand, was terminated by his assassination on the 1st May 1896, when preparations were already on foot for celebrating the completion of the fiftieth unar year of his rule. The scene of the occurrence was the shrine of Shah Abdul Azīm near Tehran, to which he had gone to pay his devotions. His Majesty refused to let the mosque be cleared of the public for his convenience, and, as he was passing through the crowd, a man raised a pistol and shot him through the heart. The assassin was Mīrza Riza, a small tradesman of Tehran, who was hanged on the 12th of August following. He was not a Bābi but a disciple of Kamāl-ud-Dīn, Afghān, a born subject of the Shah but settled at Constantinople, from whom Mīrza Riza had imbibed revolutionary and anarchical ideas. The Persian Government demanded the extradition of Kamāl-ud-Dīn, whom the murderer expressly inculpated in a confession; but, while the negotiations were still pending, Kamāl-ud-Dīn died.

Character of Nāsir-ud-Din Shāh and principal measures of his reign. Judged by his actions Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shāh, though he did not shrink from the exercise of great severity when he considered it to be required was a humane and progressive ruler. In his later years official punishments throughout Persia became less frequent and less cruel; he was imperious, but "diligent and fairly just" and he had come to be unanimously regarded as "the most com-

petent man in the country, and the best ruler that it can produce." Brigandage and disorder were held in check in his days with a success which cannot but excite envy and admiration at the present time. He was partially successful in the policy, initiated by the Amīr Nizām, of curtailing ecclesiastical influence and the abuses connected therewith, such as that of Bast or sanctuary; and he was even able to introduce some degree of civil control into the management of religious properties and endowments.

The establishment of telegraphic communication in Persia and between Persia and the outer world, though the agency of this epochmaking change was mainly British, and the creation of a Persian Post Office, also through foreigners, were great* advances in civilisation redounding to his personal credit.

Numerous internal reforms were essayed by Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shāh and varied considerably as regards both their importance and their success. Efforts made by him to establish Courts of Justice remained without result; an attempt to draw up a code of secular law was equally infructuous; and a system of Local Administrative Councils, of which in 1875 he decreed the establishment as a check upon provincial governors and clerical influence, never really entered on the stage of material existence. The depreciation of the currency, which had become extreme, engaged the attention of the Shāh so early as 1865; and in 1877 a mint was established at Tehrān for the coining of money on European principles. On the 26th May 1888 a Royal Proclamation was issued, and ordered to be published, which was in effect a charter of the liberties and rights of Persian subjects and contained the following sentences—

Therefore, for the information and re-assurance of all the subjects and people of this kingdom generally. We do proclaim that all Our subjects are free and independent as regards their persons and property, it is Our will and pleasure that they should without fear or doubt, employ their capital in whatever manner they please, and engage in any enterprises, such as combination of funds, formation of companies for the construction of factories and roads, or in any measures for the promotion of civilisation and security. The care of that is taken on Ourselves; and no one has the right or power to interfere with, or lay hands on, the property of Persian subjects, nor to molest their persons or property, nor to punish Persian subjects except in giving effect to decrees of the civil or religious law.

This Proclamation had little effect in the provinces; but it was honourably observed by the Shāh himself, and, being officially commu-

^{*}Some account of these will be found in the Appendices on Telegraphs and Post Offices.

nicated to the Foreign Missions at Tehrān, provided the latter with a foundation on which to base protests in case of flagrant acts of oppression coming to their notice. A measure of general utility, explained elsewhere in its proper place, was the opening of the Kārūn River below Ahwāz to international navigation; this was effected by a royal edict, dated 30th October 1888.

Relations of Persia with Afghanistan and Turkistan, 1848-1896.

During the first part of Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shāh's reign the external relations of Persia were governed by the question of Herat, which had given much trouble in his father's time and was now to become the chief cause of a rupture between Britain and Persia. Herat continued to be regarded by British statesman as a corner-stone of the defence of India, and * resistance to its incorporation in Persia was still a leading article of British policy.

Events leading to the Anglo-Persian agreement concerning Herat, 1851—1853.

Kāmrān, the Sadozai prince who ruled Herat at the time of the Persian expedition against it in 1837-38, had been removed in 1842 by his able but unscrupulous Wazīr, Yār Muhammad Khān, who governed it in his stead until his own death in 1851. The successor of Yār Muhammad Khān was his son Sa'īd Muhammad Khān, a dissolute and drunken imbecile, who, distrusting his own subjects and fearing to be attacked by the Bārakzai Sardār of Qandahār, threw himself upon the protection of Persia. From the middle of 1851 onwards there were frequent rumours of the imminent despatch of a Persian force to Herat and negotiations between Sa'id Muhammad Khān and the Persian Government undoubtedly took place; but the queries of Colonel Sheil, the British Minister at Tehran, were either parried or met by assurances that Persia would take no action, unless in an emergency and to save Herat from falling under the domination of Qandahār or Kābul. Early in 1852, however, some movement on the part of the Qandahār Sardār having been observed, a Persian force actually advanced to Herat and occupied the town, while various Afghan chiefs in the district were arrested and sent to Persia. At this stage of the case the diplomacy of the Persian Government, no longer directed by the Amīr Nīzām, became false and self-contradictory; and in the end it was intimated to

^{*} Wrongly, according to Sir H. Rawlinson; see his England and Russia in the East, pages 85-86.

the Persian representative in London that he could no longer be employed as a medium of communication between the two Governments. Meanwhile, in October 1852, a Farmān was issued by the Shāh annexing Herat to Persia and appointing Sa'id Muhammad Khān to be Governor. The situation became so strained, in consequence, that at the beginning of 1853 Colonel Sheil suggested the withdrawal of the British Mission from Tehrān or the reoccupation of the Island of Khārag in the Persian Gulf; but almost at the same moment the Persian Government yielded and entered into satisfactory arrangements with Britian regarding Herat.

These were embodied in an Agreement signed by the Sadr A'zam on the 25th January 1853, of which the chief provisions were these: the Persian Government should not in future send troops into Herat territory unless to repel a foreign attack, and even in such case the Persian forces were not to enter Herat town and were to return to Persia as soon as the danger had ceased; the relations of Persia with Herat should be replaced on the footing on which they had existed in the time of Yār Muhammad Khān,—in other words the Persian Government must not attempt to set up their own direct rule at Herat or to interfere in the internal affairs of the principality; no mark of dependence on Persia, such as the * coining of money or the recitation of the Khutbah in the name of the Shah should be required of the ruler of Herat, there should not be any permanent Persian representative at Herat nor any permanent Herati representative at Tehrān, a Persian agent named A'bbās Quli Khān, who had already gone to Herat, being recalled on his completing a four months sojourn there; occasional voluntary assistance might be rendered by the ruler of Herat to the Shah of Persia for the purpose of chastising the Turkomans or of suppressing disturbances or revolts in Persia itself; and, finally, Herati chiefs should not be detained in Persia against their will as political prisoners or suspects, though they might be afforded asylum in that country. The Agreement itself represented the above stipulations in the light of concessions made by Persia, notwithstanding the existence of Persian rights over Herat, out of amity towards Britian, and it was added that, if Britain should interfere in the internal affairs of Herat, the whole Agreement should be null and void. The British Government on their part were expected, in the event of the independence of Herat being threatened by an Afghan or

Anglo-Persian Agreement concerning Herat, 25th January

^{*} This condition was not to prevent the acceptance by the Shāh of offerings of money voluntarily struck in his name, as a complement, by the ruler of Herat.

other foreign power and of the Persian Government requesting assistance, to use their influence to discourage or restrain the aggressor from the prosecution of his designs. As the Agreement contained no article with reference to Persian troops actually at Herat, it may perhaps be inferred that the Persian garrison installed in 1852 had already been withdrawn. The Agreement was communicated to Sa'īd Muhammad Khān of Herat by Colonel Sheil along with a Farmān of the Shāh and a letter from the Sadr A'zam to the Khān's address in which the recognition by Persia of the independence of Herat was more clearly and emphatically declared than in the Agreement itself.

Events ending in the occupation of Herat by the Persians, 1855-56.

The Agreement of 1853 had been imposed on the Persian Government, who executed it with a bad grace; and it marked the beginning of a period of steadily increasing trouble between Persia and Britain, due partly to other controversies and partly to a mistaken apprehension by the Persian Government of the situation of Britain as affected by the Crimean War (1854—56).

Persia at first sought to arrange a quadripartite treaty between herself, Herat, Kābul, and Qandahār, which would have given her a commanding influence in Afghan politics; and thwarted in this by the opposition of Dost Muhammad Khān of Kābul, who now inclined to a British alliance, she next tried to embroil the Herat Government with that of Qandahār and so create a pretext for intervention by herself under the Agreement of 1853. Dost Muhammad Khan, alarmed by the threatening attitude of Persia towards Afghanistan as a whole, then entered into a treaty of peace and friendship with the Hon'ble East India Company, signed on the 30th March 1855. Almost simultaneously Muhammad Yūsuf, a Sadozai Prince of good character and a nephew of the late Kāmrān, who had been living for some time under Persian protection at Mashhad, succeeded in possessing himself of Herat with the good will of the inhabitants; and Sa'id Muhammad Khān, having fallen into his hands, was put to death in revenge for the murder of Kāmrān by Yār Muhammad Khān.

In the spring of 1856 the Persian Government, presuming on the supposed embarrassments of Britain, whose representative had lately withdrawn from Tehrān in consequence of other disputes, or wishing perhaps to gain advantages at Herat which could be relinquished later on in part settlement of British claims, despatched troops to Herat; these were at first readily admitted to the town by Muhammad Yūsuf, in whose interests they were ostensibly sent. This Persian occupation lasted only a few weeks; a rising occurred which resulted in the

expulsion of the Persians from the town; and Muhammad Yūsuf then hoisted the British flag and applied to Dōst Muhammad Khān for aid against the Persians. Almost immediately, however, another internal revolution took place at Herat; Muhammad Yūsuf was deposed and handed over a prisoner to the Persians; and charge of Herat was assumed by his Lieutenant 'Isa Khān who was equally resolved, as the event proved, to maintain the independence of Herat. 'Isa Khān held out gallantly for a time; but at length, on the 26th October 1856, direction of the operations against the town having meanwhile been transferred from Sultān Murād Mīrza to M. Bühler, a French officer of engineers in the service of the Shāh, he was obliged to capitulate, and the Persians re-entered Herat. 'Isa Khān was treacherously put to death, in disregard of previous assurances of pardon and favour; and Sultān Murād Mīrza was installed in the Government of Herat.

War was at this juncture declared by Britain against Persia, the principal ground being the occupation of Herat by Persia; and, under the Treaty of Peace which ended it, the Persian Government undertook to evacuate Herat and to recognise the independence of that principality, and of all Afghanistan, in relation to Persia.

Evacuation of Herat by the Persians and installation of Sultan Ahmad Khan, 1857.

The Persian Government, however, by astute manœuvring, succeeded in preserving for a time supreme influence at Herat. The sons of Sa'id Muhammad Khān were enabled to assassinate at Tehrān Muhammad Yūsuf, their father's murderer, who might probably have regarded himself, as indebted to the British Government if he had been restored to power at Herat; and when, on the 27th July 1857, Herat was formally retransferred to Afghan administration, the ruler left in possession was Sultan Ahmed Khan, a Barakzai and a nephew and son-in-law of Dost Muhammad Khan, but devoted to the interests of the Persian Government with whom he had sought and found asylum from his uncle, and secretly pledged to strike his coinage, and cause the Khutbah to be pronounced in his dominions, in the Shah's name. British action was thus completely stultified; and British remonstrances, there being no violation except in spirit of the Treaty of Peace with Persia, proved unavailing.

Though Sultān Ahmad Khān, who had watched—if he had not taken part in—the assassination of the British Envoy at Kābul in 1841, was not a persona grata to the British Government, he was in other respects well fitted to govern Herat; and chiefly to emphasise his indepedence, a British Mission under Colonel Taylor was sent from Tehrān to congratulate him on his accession and promise him moral

Government of Herat by Sultān Ahmad Khān, 1857 —1863. support. He continued, nevertheless, to behave in every respect as a vassal of Persia. In 1858 he received a Russian Mission under M. Khanikoff at Herat, but he gave it no encouragement.

Persia and Turkistan, 1855—1861.

The Persian province of Khurāsān suffered greatly at this time from Turkman raids, and this circumstance was an important factor in the relations of Persia with Herat. According to one Persian official, Persia's chief object in desiring possession of Herat was merely to secure a good base for operations against Merv. Early in 1855 His Royal Highness Sultan Murad Mīrza, then Governor-General of Khurasan, invaded Turkistan and temporarily occupied Merv; but Herat affairs soon diverted the attention of the Persian Government to another quarter. In 1858. after the settlement of the Herat question, a Persian army again beseiged Merv, but was almost annihilated by the Turkmans; a Herati force, however, was successful, soon after, in visiting the Turkmans with condign punishment. Somewhat later the Persian Government substituted His Royal Highness Hamzah Mīrza for Sultān Murād Mīrza in the Governor-Generalship of Khurāsān, and this change was followed by a Persian advance against Merv, in June 1860, in very great force: but the operations again resulted in the almost total destruction of the Persian army. In September 1861, Hamzah Mirza having in the meantime been recalled, an effort was made by the Persian Government to retrieve this disaster; but the force which they sent was routed and cut to pieces before it reached Sarakhs.

Hostilities between the rulers of Kabul and Herat and annexation of Herat to Kabul, 1862—63.

Döst Muhammad Khān, the Amīr of Kābul, had some years been gradually extending the limits of his power in Afghanistan. In 1855, on the death of Kuhndil Khān, Sardār of Qandahār, he annexed that principality to his own dominions; and in 1856, Herat being then in the power of the Persians he took possession of Farāh, an undoubted dependency of Herat. In 1862 Sultān Ahmad Khān availed himself of local troubles to expel the Kābuli garrison of Farāh; and Döst Muhammad Khān instantly replied to his action by marching against Herat. In June the Amīr was at Qandahār, and by October he had closely invested the town of Herat. The siege continued until May 1863, when Herat fell and was incorporated with the Afghan principality of Kābul, now called Afghanistan. Sultān Ahmād Khān had died of apoplexy shortly before the capture of the place, and Döst Muhammad Khān himself expired in the month of June following.

The proceedings of Dost Muhammad Khān excited the liveliest apprehensions on the part of the Persian Government, who regarded the unification of Afganistan with dismay and feared that the next undertaking

of the Afghan Amir, if successful at Herat, would be an invasion of Khurāsān with Turkmān support. Sultān Murād Mīrza, better known as the Hesām-us-Saltaneh, was accordingly posted at Qalandarābād between Mashhad and the Herat frontier with a force of 14,000 men, including 6,000 regular infantry, ostensibly to hold Turkmans in check; Mr. Eastwick of the British Legation at Tehran, who had served under Sir J. Outram in Sind and had held charge of Shikarpur during the Afghan war, was deputed to the Persian camp, though for what purpose is not very clear. Mr. Eastwick had a correspondence, but of a very ordinary character, with Dost Muhammad Khan, whom he proposed to visit but did not visit; and his non-interference to prevent the fall of Herat caused acute disappointment to the Persians, who had counted on his intervention. There was force in the Persian argument that the case was one in which, under the Agreement of 1853, the British Government ought to have lent their good offices; but there was force also in the Afghan contention that the Persians had, by inducing Sultan Ahmad Khan to coin money and have the Khutbah read in the name of the Shah of Persia, forfeited their claim to the benefits of British intervention.

On the death of Dost Muhammad Khān, Shīr 'Ali Khān, whom he had nominated to be his successor, hurried to Kābul, leaving Herat in charge of his son Muhammad Ya'qūb Khān. The Young Khān succeeded in maintaining himself in possession during the troubles which ensued throughout Afghanistan, and observed a correct but altogether independent attitude towards the Persian Government. Herat thereafter remained a province of Afghanistan and did not again give rise to differences between Britain and Persia.

Government of Herat by Muhammad Ya'qūb Khān, 1863.

In 1863 a dispute arose between the Persian Government and the Afghans in regard to the frontier province of Sīstān; and the good offices of the British Government were invoked by Persia, but were withheld, Afghanistan being then in a state of confusion. Persia profited by the refusal of Britain to intervene by occupying a part of Sīstān between 1864 and 1866; and in 1867 she strengthened her hold on the territory thus annexed. In 1870 Shīr 'Ali Khān, whose power in Agfanistan was by this time consolidated, began to move in the question; and an armed conflict between Afghanistan and Persia seeming not improbable, the British Government at last consented to arbitrate. The result was an award passed in 1872 by Colonel Goldsmid, the British Commissioner selected, which was accepted, though under protest, by both parties.

Perso-Afghan dispute in regard to Sistan, 1863 -1872. Ayūb Khān in Persia, 1881—1887.

In October 1881, after a temporary success at Qandahār, Ayūb Khān, a son of Shīr 'Ali Khān and a claimant of the Afghan throne, took refuge in Persia. Under an arrangement concluded between the British and Persian Governments in 1884 he was interned at Tehrān on a pension of £8,000 a year, but escaped on the 14th August 1887 and made another attempt to assert himself in Afghanistan. Failing in this, he gave himself up to the British Consul General at Mashhad in November of the same year, and was sent under an escort to the Turkish frontier and so removed, vid Baghdād, to India, where he has since resided under surveillance. The Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, the Mushīr-ud-Dauleh, who was alleged to have connived at his escape from Tehrān, was dismissed from office.

Relations of Britain with Persia, 1848-96.

The relations of Britain with Persia during the long reign of Nāsirud-Dīn Shāh were on the whole excellent, except during one period of strain which began in 1854 and ended with the Anglo-Persian war of 1856-57, following a diplomatic rupture, after which matters resumed their ordinary course. The Crimean War was largely responsible for this interruption of Anglo-Persian amity: it will be recollected that the hostilities between Turkey and Russia began in October 1853, that Britain and France were drawn into the struggle in March 1854, and that peace was not concluded until March 1856.

Anglo-Persian Convention relating to the slave trade, 1851. A last indication of friendliness on the part of the Persian Government at the beginning of the period was their acceptance in 1861 of a Convention in restraint of the slave trade, for the conclusion of which the British representative at Tehran had for some time laboured in vain; it was granted as a set-off to the compliance by the Persian Government with a Russian demand of a more questionable character which will be mentioned further on, and its conclusion was one of the last notable acts of the Amīr Nizām. The effect of this Convention, which related to the importation of slaves into Persia by sea, is described in the Appendix on the Slave Trade.

Friction between Britain and Persia; case of Hāshim Ahān, 1854Persia was already smarting under the frustration of her policy in regard to Herat by the Agreement of 1853 when, in 1854, there arose a paltry difficulty concerning the employment by the British Legation at Tehran of a Fersian subject named Hāshim Khān. In June 1854

Mr W. T. Thomson, the British Minister in Persia, nominated this individual to the First Persian Secretaryship of the British Legation; but his employment in that post was strenuously opposed by the Sadr A'zam, who disliked him personally, and was not pressed. In June 1855 Mr. Thomson proposed to send Hāshim Khān to Shīrāz, instead, as British Agent at that place, - an alternative which the Sadr A'zam himself had suggested, but, when steps were taken by the Hon'ble* C. A. Murray, Mr. Thomson's successor, to carry out this arrangement, the Persian Government refused to sanction it and intimated that Hāshim Khān would not be allowed to accept any post under the British Government. The reason assigned was that Hashim Khan had never been formally discharged from the Shah's service, to which he had once belonged; but this was the merest subterfuge, for no custom of granting formal discharges from the Shah's employment had ever existed. The Persian Government added that, if Hashim Khan tried to make his way to Shīrāz, he would be arrested; and on Mr. Murray's remonstrating with them on the subject of this threat, they caused Hashim Khan's wife, who was a sister of one of the Shah's wives, to be arrested. Hashim Khān himself apparently continued to reside in safety within the precincts of the British Legation. Mr. Murray demanded the release of the lady, as being the wife of a British employé, and informed the Persian Government that, if this were granted and if immunity from punishment and employment on suitable terms in the Persian service were guaranteed to Hāshim Khān, he would discharge that person from the British service. Efforts to accommodate the matter on this basis were made by the Turkish and French representatives at Tehran, who feared the results of a breach between Britain and Persia while Turkey, France and Britain continued to be at war with Russia, but in vain. Sadr A'zam then produced charges against Mr. Thomson and Mr. Murray of having retained Hāshim Khān solely on account of his wife, with whom-he alleged-they had held improper relations. In assuming an aggressive tone the Persian Prime Minister may have been emboldened by the ill-success of the allied arms against Russia in the Asian field of operations adjoining Persia; and he probably reflected that, in any case, the absence of the British Mission from Tehran would facilitate the execution of the designs of his Government upon Herat. On the 20th November 1855 Mr. Murray struck his flag; and on the

55; and withdrawal of the British Mission from Tehran, 5th December 1855.

^{*} Afterwards Sir Charles Murray. He was born in 1806, was a son of Lord Dunmore, had been British Consul-General in Egypt, and possessed linguistic and literary talents.

5th December, after the failure of a fresh endeavour made in the interests of peace by M. Bourrée, the French Minister, he left Tehrān for Baghdād with the other members of the British Legation.

At some time after the British Minister's departure Hāshim Khān made his peace with the Persian Government; on his renouncing British employment and protection the royal favour, together with a salary, was conferred on him; and the imputations against his wife were retracted by the Sadr A'zam himself, as being merely calumnies concocted to serve a purpose. The Persian preparations against Herat then entered on an active stage, and before the end of December 1855, Sultān Murād Mīrza left Tehrān to take command of the troops in the field.

Unsuccessful Anglo-Persian negotiations at Constantinople, —Jan. —Dec. 1856.

The question of a settlement was first opened at Constantinople on the 2nd January 1856 by the Persian Chargé d'Affaires, who presented the British Ambassador with a memorandum embodying the Persian version of the whole case. A separate statement on the subject. prepared by the Persian Government, seems to have been communicated also to other European Powers. The general effect of the two documents was to attribute the rupture to immoral conduct on the part of Mr. Thomson and Mr. Murray; but denunciations of former British Ministers-Sir J. McNeill, Sir J. Sheil, and Colonel Farrant-were added as a make-weight. It further appeared that the Shah himself had in December 1855, written an intemperate letter to the Sadr A'Zam. declaring for the information of the foreign Missions, that he would not again receive a British representative at Tehran until the Queen ("Malikeh") of England had herself apologised to him for the misconduct of Mr. Murray; and that, somewhat earlier, he had personally subscribed to the offensive charges brought against the British representative.

After the discussion at Constantinople had continued for some time a British ultimatum was presented to the Persian Chargé d'Affaires, requiring that all imputations against Mr. Murray should be withdrawn, that he should be invited to return to Tehrān, that he should be honourably received at the Persian Court with particular ceremonies, and that a salute of 21 guns should be fired on the rehoisting of the British flag, after which the Persian Government must agree to evacuate (or not to occupy) Herat, while the British Government would refrain from insisting on the employment of Hāshim Khān at Shīrāz, provided only that his wife was restored to him and that arrangements were made to indemnify

him for the loss of his British appointment. The terms of this ultimatum were not accepted and the situation was in the meantime aggravated by a series of insults directed against the British officials and employés remaining in Persia.

On the 17th October 1856 Farrukh Khān, the Persian Ambassador, arrived at Constantinople with full power to settle all the matters in dispute between Britain and Persia; fresh discussions ensued; and on the 22nd November a modified ultimatum was delivered to Farrukh Khān by Lord Stratford de Redcliffe In this revised document the question of Herat, which was now critical, held the principal place; it was laid down that the Persian Army must be withdrawn from Herat and compensation paid for such damage as it had done; that Persia must by treaty renounce for the future all interference, whether external or internal, in the affairs of Herat, and the other provinces of Afghanistan, and must agree to refer to British mediation such differences as she might have with their rulers; that a new Commercial Treaty between Britain and Persia must be concluded, giving Britain the right to appoint Consuls in any part of Persia; that all debts due to British subjects must be liquidated and disputed claims discussed and settled; that an arrangement must be made in regard to the lease of Bandar 'Abbas which would be agreeable to the Sultan of 'Oman; and that the Sadr A'zam, in consequence of the part played by him in the differences that had arisen, must be removed from office. The conditions regarding the return to Tehran and reception there of the British Mission were maintained, except in so far as the ceremonies required would be affected by the dismissal of the Sadr A'zam. Hesitation was expressed by the Persian Plenipotentiary in regard to acceptance of some of the terms, especially that requiring the dimissal of the Prime Minister; and the arrival of authentic information of the fall of Herat did not, it is probable, increase his disposition to concede any point. Meanwhile on the 1st November 1856 in consequence of previous instructions sent from Europe, the Government of India had declared war on Persia; and towards the end of December, on receiving news of this event, Farrukh Khan broke off the negotiations, declared such engagements as he had already formed to be null and void, and quitted Constantinople.

We now proceed to give an account of the Anglo-Persian war in its War between more general aspects, reserving for examination elsewhere the naval and military operations that took place in the neighbourhood of Būshehr, at __1857. Muhammareh, and on the Kārūn River. The war with Persia was not popular in Great Britain, where its cause was not known, the papers con-

Britain and Persia, 1856 cerning the disputes from which it originated not being published until after the conclusion of peace. The war was undertaken by the Government of the day on their own responsibility, and it was at first condemned by some in Parliament and in the press.

The British preparations September—October, 1856.

On the 22nd September 1856 instructions to withdraw from Persia to Baghdād with his whole establishment were addressed to Mr. Stevens, His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Tehrān. He was directed to remove the public archives with him; to make the best arrangements that he could for the protection in his absence of the Mission premises and such property as must necessarily be left behind; to decline, on the ground of Persia's attitude with reference to Herat, any invitation to stay that might be extended to him by the Persian Government; and to inform British subjects at Tehrān of his approaching departure, allowing them at their choice either to accompany him or to remain behind under the protection, which he was to request, of the French Legation. It was intimated to him that a British naval and military expedition would shortly be despatched to the Persian Gulf, but he was expressly cautioned not to refer to the intentions of the British Government in this respect. His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Tabrīz was also ordered to leave Persia.

Negotiations were opened with Dost Muhammad Khān, the Afghān Amīr of Kābul and Qandahār which resulted, on the 26th January 1857, in the conclusion of an agreement directed against Persia; and a mission under Major Lumsden was sent to Qandahār to supervise the execution of the terms arranged. The agreement provided that the Amir should, from the 1st January 1857, receive a subsidy of Rs. 1,00,000 monthly from the Hon'ble East India Company on condition of maintaining his existing establishment of artillery and cavalry \mathbf{not} less than infantry, of whom 18,000 less than 13,000 should be regulars, and of communicating to the British Government any overtures which he might receive from Persia, or from the allies of Persia, during the war; the past offences of Afghan tribes on the British border should be condoned by the British Government; and the Amīr should be presented with 4,000 muskets, in addition to 4,000 already given him. The subsidy was to cease at the conclusion of the war, or earlier, at the discretion of the British Government.

In the Persian Gulf the British political representatives, evidently acting without authority, offered allowances to various chiefs of the Persian coast districts on condition of their assisting the British in the war: among the chiefs thus tampered with were Bāqir Khān, of

Tangistān, the Shaikh of Chāh Kūtāh, and the Khāns of Burāzjān, Tul Siyāh, Ganāveh, Rīg, and Dīlam. These proceedings, which were accompanied by the taking of sealed agreements from the chiefs in question, seem to have been repudiated by the Indian Government with the concurrence of the commander of the British expedition, who recommended that " the entire transaction should be annulled, the objectionable documents destroyed, and the correspondence obliterated from our records."

It may be mentioned that the French sloop of war "Sybille", Captain Maisonneuve, a vessel heavily armed for her size, was sent to the Persian Gulf in advance of the British forces "to protect French interests, and show the Persians that the entente cordiale between France and Britain was still uninterrupted;" and she remained in Persian waters almost until the end of the campaign.

As soon as war was seen to be probable the Persian Government made arrangements for strengthening their position in the districts most exposed to attack. Large military reinforcements were despatched from the north to Fars and 'Arabistan in each of which provinces an army of defence was organised. The troops in 'Arabistan were placed under H. R. H. Khanlar Mirza, the Prince-Governor, an uncle of the Shah, who was considered to be one of the best officers in the Persian service; those in Fars were commanded, during the active operations, by the Shujā'-ul-Mulk, a nephew of the Sadr A'zam. The Sarkishīkchi-Bāsli or Commandant of the Shah's Bodyguard, a Qajar prince of high standing, was sent by the Sadr A'zam, as soon as he realised the probability of disaster to the Persian arms, to relieve his relative of the command in Fars; but the substitute did not arrive upon the spot until the war was practically over in that quarter.

Under official instigation an attempt was made to excite, throughout Persia, a Jihād or holy war against the British; but it met with no response. The Persian military leaders qualified the expedient as contemptible; several high Persian officials condemned it in emphatic terms; the leading Persian merchants disapproved of it; and for the Persian people it had evidently no attraction. At Shīrāz there were even indications * of a popular movement in favour of the British.

It was early decided to entrust the military command of the British Organisation expedition, as well as the control of local political relations, to Lieutenant-

The Persian dispositions.

> of the British expeditionary

^{*} The Comte de Gobineau, as cited in Watson's History of Persia, page 434, footnote.

General * Sir James Outram, a military officer of the Hon'ble East India Company's service, but employed in the Political Department. The annexation of Oudh had lately been effected through Sir J. Outram, who had experience of many other parts of India also; but when war with Persia was decided on, he was at home in England. The appointment of an officer of his service and antecedents to the chief command was an innovation; but the result justified his selection in an eminent degree. Sir J. Outram arrived at Bombay on the 22nd December 1856, by which time some preliminary operations had taken place in the Gulf, and sailed again on the 15th January 1857, for Persia. On the 27th January he reached Büshehr, which had been occupied before his arrival.

The expeditionary force originally destined for Persia, afterwards the 1st Division of the Persian Field Force, was embodied in India with effect from the 20th October 1856 and sailed at various dates on the following month, arriving at the place of rendezvous in the Persian Gulf by the 24th November. It consisted, apparently, of two † squadrons of the 3rd Regiment of (Native) Light Cavalry and two troops of the Poona Irregular Horse; of the 3rd Troop of Horse Artillery and the 3rd and 5th (European) Light Field Batteries with a reserve; and of two Infantry Brigades, the first consisting of His Majesty's 64th Regiment of Foot and the 20th Regiment of (Bombay) Native Infantry, the other of the 2nd European Light Infantry, the 4th (Rifle) Regiment of (Bombay) Native Infantry, and the 2nd Baluch Battalion; together with two Companies of Sappers and Miners. The total strength of the force was 5,670 fighting men, of whom 2,270 were Europeans, with 3,750 followers, 1,150 horses, and 430 bullocks. It was conveyed to Persia in 37 transports (7 steamers and 30 sailing ships), escorted by 8 war

^{*}Sir J. Outram (1803—63) was educated at Aberdeen and obtained an Indian cadetship in 1819. He formed the Bhil Corps, and in 1835 he became a Political Agent of the Government of India. In 1838 he was extra A. D. C. to Sir J. Keane, and in 1839 he was appointed Political Agent in Lower (and later in Upper) Sind. He disapproved of the annexation of that province, but he valiantly defended the Sind Residency when it was attacked. In 1843 he was employed in a military capacity in the Maratha country. In 1847 he was transferred from Satara to Baroda. He became Resident in Oudh in 1854, carried out the annexation of Oudh in 1856, and was the first British Chief Commissioner of Oudh. The conduct of the Persian War was his principal achievement, but he also distinguished himself in the Mutiny operations in India which followed it. Made a K. C. B. in 1856, and a G. C. B. in 1857 after the Persian War, he received a baronetoy in 1858. Sir C. Napier described him as "the Bayard of India," and it was said of him: "A fox is a fool and a lion a coward by the side of Sir J. Outram."

⁺ The remainder of the 3rd Light Cavalry and Poona Horse must have been added later, for both regiments are afterwards found in strength at Büshehr.

steamers of the Indian Navy, which formed a very important and even indispensable part of the armanent of the expedition.

The 2nd Division, formed as soon as it was seen that more troops would be required in Persia, was organised on the 10th January 1857 and comprised the following units: the King's 14th Light Dragoons and the 1st Sind Irregular Horse; a troop of Horse Artillery and one or more Light Field Batteries; the 78th Highlanders, 23rd and 26th (Bombay) Native Infantry, and a composite Light Infantry Battalion formed of a company with three European officers from each of the Native Regiments of the Bombay Army. The 2nd Division partly reached the scene of operations at the beginning of February 1857; but the arrival of a portion of it, mostly cavalry, was unfortunately delayed till much later.

The general command in Persia was held until Sir J. Outram's arrival by Major-General F. Stalker, who thereafter commanded the 1st Division until his death in March 1857. The 2nd Division was given to Brigadier-General * Henry Havelock; and General Stalker's successor in the command of the 1st Division was Brigadier-General John Jacob,† who arrived on the very day of his decease. General Jacob, like Sir J. Outram, who had a high opinion of his capacity, was a political as well as a military officer, and had been employed for a number of years in the administration of Sind.

Sir J. Outram's plans for the campaign which he was to conduct were begun in England, on such information as he could obtain there; and on the voyage out he drew up a tentative scheme of operations, which he forwarded from Aden to the military authorities in India. Unfortunately the information that had been supplied to him was misleading, as later experience showed; it erred in underestimating the number of troops which

The British scheme of operations.

^{*} Sir H. Havelock (1795—1857) served as a Captain in the 13th Light Infantry. He became a Baptist. He was A. D. C. to Sir W. Cotton at Ghazni in the first Afghan War and afterwards served in the Maratha and Sikh campaigns. In 1854 he was Adjutant-General in India. He died of dysentery at Lucknow in November 1857, and his name is now best known in connection with the operations there during the Mutiny. His eldest son received a baronetcy that had been intended for him, and his widow was granted a pension.

[†] General J. Jacob (1812—58) belonged to the Bombay Artillery and served under Sir J. Keane in the first Afghan War. His organisation and administration of the new province of Sind gave him a high reputation; but his premature death, from overwork and brain fever, prevented his attaining the wider fame which those acquainted with his remarkable and forceful personality augured for him.

the Persian Government would be able to place in the field between Shīrāz and the coast, and in exaggerating the difficulties which the Persians would have to encounter in bringing guns down from the high plateau of Persia to the seaboard. These mistakes necessitated some readjustment of Sir J. Outram's plans after his arrival at the front.

Another disappointment which the commander of the expedition had to face was caused by the discovery that there were no independent Persian or Arab tribes, such as he had been authorised to enlist, and on whose enlistment he had largely counted: all the available local tribes were subjects either of the Shah or of the Sultan of Turkey. Sir J. Outram's instructions in regard to his dealings with Persians were explicit. No attempt was to be made to subvert the reigning Shah or his dynasty; the Shah's people were not to be instigated to rebel against their own Government; and no Persian subjects were to be enrolled in the British service. Sir J. Outram's original scheme depended to a great extent upon the organisation of local mounted levies on the model of the Sind Horse, -a task which he intended to entrust to General Jacob. He argued strongly, at first, in favour of a modification of his orders which would admit of his taking the natives of territory actually occupied into British military service, for he considered that there was little difference in principle between encouraging the inhabitants of districts under occupation to furnish supplies and inducing them to serve as soldiers, he feared that the tribes could not remain neutral and he thought that the future safety of such tribesmen as might enlist with the British could be sufficiently guaranteed by an amnesty clause inserted in the final treaty of peace, no encouragement being in the meanwhile given to any tribal notions of permanent independence of Persia. The Governor-General of India, however, for various reasons, was strongly opposed to local enlistment; and Sir J.Outram himself in the end came to disapprove of it, and even wrote to Lord Canning after peace had been concluded: "Fortunately I had no occasion to resort to the contemplated measure of embodying levies from among my so-called 'conquered tribes,' for I am now convinced by Your Lordship's unanswerable arguments that I should, by so doing, have committed a very grave error." On the other hand, after the war had ceased, authority for the enlistment of local levies was received from Her Majesty's Government who had been persuaded of the expediency of the measure by Sir J. Outram's original arguments. The absence of telegraphic communication had a marked effect upon the conduct of the Anglo-Persian war from first to last.

Sir J. Outram's plans contemplated prolonged operations and an ultimate advance into the heart of Persia, or even to the capital itself. The objectives to be attained by the first year's operations were Shīrāz and Shūshtar, from both of which Ispahān would be threatened. But the troops at the General's disposal were at first insufficient for simultaneous action upon two lines; delay in obtaining land transport for a time prevented any serious movement inland, even from Būshehr; and the restrictions placed on the employment of levies greatly increased the difficulty, in Sir J. Outram's estimation, of reaching Shūshtar. Before leaving England he had foreseen the necessity for a 2nd Division; and, though one was organised at his instance, he had long to wait for its arrival complete at Būshehr.

In February 1857, finding that the enemy were gathering in strength between Büshehr and the hills, Sir J. Outram took advantage of the arrival of the leading troops of the 2nd Division to make a raid on Burāzjān, and gained the victory of Khushāb. In March, without waiting for the completion of the 2nd Division and being still almost without cavalry, he turned his attention to Muhammareh, which was taken; and the enemy there were pursued up the Kārūn to Ahwāz by a small flying column. The General was preparing to return from Muhammareh to Būshehr in order to attack a Persian force which was concentrating at Nānizak, some distance inland, when news of the conclusion of peace between Britain and Persia—a month previously—arrived, and active operations were at an end.

It was Sir J. Outram's intention, had the war continued, to place the 1st Division at Burāzjān in Dashtistān during the summer of 1857, the European portion of that force being quartered on the slopes of the lofty adjoining mountain of Gīsakān, and to locate the 2nd Division in 'Arabistān with headquarters at Ahwāz or Shūshtar. He looked forward to forcing his way to Shīrāz in the autumn of the year, for which purpose he estimated that a reinforcement of 7,500 men would be required; and he thought that, if Persia still remained obdurate, an advance upon Tehrān might be begun in the spring of 1858.

It may be mentioned that at one time Sir J. Outram was inclined, if Government approved, to allow the Turks to occupy Muhammareh—a measure which, as he pointed out, would make them allies with the British in the war against Persia instead of neutrals, would justify the recruitment of Arab levies in Turkish territory, and would render Baghdad available as a base for British operations against Persia; but, on being brought into closer contact with local conditions and coming

to know more of the Turkish character and administration, he very quickly withdrew some suggestions that he had made on the subject.

Operations of the war, 1856-57.

The principal incidents in this prematurely suspended war were the capture of Rīshehr on the 9th and of Būshehr on the 10th December 1856; the defeat of the Shujā'-ul-Mulk at Khushāb on the 8th February 1857; and the bombardment and occupation of Muhammareh, chiefly a naval operation, on the 26th March. The details of these actions are given elsewhere in the sections that deal with British relations with the Persian Coast and Islands and with 'Arabistān.

Land transport in the war.

One of the initial difficulties of the war was the want of land transport. which it was necessary to procure locally. On the 2nd Division being formed, energetic measures to this end were taken in the Persian Gulf region; and, had the military operations continued longer, an abundant supply of both camels and mules would soon have been available. Lieutenant Pengelley, I.N., who had had experience of land transport with the Turkish Contingent in the Crimean War, was sent to Turkish 'Iraq, where purchasing agencies were established without delay and eventually extended so far to the north as Müsal. At the time of the capture of Muhammareh, in March 1857, the British Field Force was still almost entirely without transport; but ten days later some 5,000 camels and 600 mules had been obtained in Turkish 'Iraq, and in another fortnight their shipment had begun at Magil near Basrah. When news arrived of the conclusion of peace, the question of how to dispose of the animals purchased was a serious financial problem, especially as out of 4,000 camels brought from Kuwait and Suq-ash-Shuyūkh 1,000 had already died through unskilful management, and there were by this time * 15,000 mules in hand. It had been decided, should transport animals be required for operations from Büshehr, to march them thither by land from the Shatt-al-'Arab under military or levy escorts which might have taken about two months. Some mules were shipped to Büshehr for the use of the force left there after the conclusion of the peace. The superfluous camels seem in the end to have been sold on the spot for what they would fetch, while the balance of the mules, after being collected at Baghdad for sale, were in July 1857 marched down to Magil and there embarked for Karachi, probably for use in the suppression of the Mutiny in India.

^{*}Sic in Outram's Persian Campaign, page 350, but the figure may be a misprint for 1,500.

The arrangements in the Commissariat Department in connection Commissariat with the war appear to have been excellent and elicited from Sir in the war. J. Outram, after active operations had ceased, the following encomium:

arrangements

I cannot conclude without expressing to your Lordship * my deep sense of gratitude to the Bombay Government. Throughout this expedition their exertions have been unceasing and unwearied, and in every instance my requests in behalf of this force have been scrupulously attended to, and in many instances anticipated. By late letters from Lord Elphinstone, I am informed that no less a quantity than 8,500 tons of coal † have been despatched since January last, the greater portion of which has been made available there and at different parts on the intermediate line, the remainder being on its way. We are, further, in actual receipt, or in expectation of upwards of 70,000 bales of compressed hay, amounting to no less than 14,000,000 pounds. This, in addition to the supplies from the Shat-al-Arab, would, had the war continued, have sufficed to provision the whole of our cavalry and baggage cattle for some months to come. The extraordinary labour and diligence which must have been used to collect and despatch these stores, and therewith also other stores for the immediate and prospective wants of the army, deserve the highest acknowledgment on my part and I feel persuaded that the prevailing sentiment of this army, at seeing its wants so carefully attended to, is one of heartfelt gratitude to a really provident and paternal Government.

Health of the troops.

This opinion of the General in command regarding the provision made for the welfare of the force was borne out by the general good health of the troops. There was some sickness at first in the 2nd European Regiment, and later among the 4th Rifles; but after the Burāzjān raid, which had a tonic effect on the force, the number of sick in hospital fell below 8 per cent., and in May Sir J. Outram was able to report that the European units were returning to India in better health than they had left it. Base hospitals were organised on Khārag Island at an early stage of the campaign; and arrangements were made for a hospital ship at Muhammareh to receive cases from the 2nd Division on board, of which the more serious were to be forwarded to Khārag. As it was expected that the hot season would prejudicially affect the health of the force, much thought was given to the question of summer accommodation for the troops, particularly the Europeans, in case their retention in Persia should be necessary as was at first expected.

It should be mentioned that on the morning of the 14th March 1857 General Stalker, commanding the 1st Division, committed suicide by shooting himself through the head with a pistol; and that on the 16th

Suicides of General Stalker and Commodore Ethersey.

^{*} Lord Canning, Governor General of India.

[†] Scarcity of coal was at one time a serious difficulty, a shortage having apparently occurred even at Bombay. A fortnight before the attack on Muhammerah the vessels of the fleet had only enough coal for 7 days' steaming.

[†]Bushehr.

Commodore Ethersey, the senior officer of the Indian Navy in the Persian Gulf, took his own life in a similar manner. Neither tragedy was attributable to any disagreement with superior authority. With General Stalker the causes seem to have been over-anxiety as to the hutting of his European troops and the receipt of bad news of a private character from India, acting on a mind temporarily enfeebled by indisposition contracted on the Burāzjān raid. Commodore Ethersey, who had asked leave to retire from the service two years previously on account of failing health, appears to have succumbed to a fear that he might mismanage the naval attack on Muhammareh, which was impending; but he was also affected, in all probability, by General Stalker's melancholy example.

Supreme political as well as military control of the expedition was vested, as already remarked, in Sir J. Outram; and that judicious leader did not fail to turn to the best account all the knowledge and experience of such political officers as were within his reach, whether under his authority or not.

British political representation in the war.

The Hon'ble C. A. Murray, late British Minister at Tehran and temporarily residing at Baghdad, visited Bushehr at the beginning of the war, accompanied by Dr. Dickson, the physician to the British Legation in Persia. He came by way of Basrah, descending the Shatt-al-'Arab in the "Hugh Lindsay," and passing Muhammarch with his flag at the mast-head, yet without drawing the fire of the Persian batteries,—a circumstance which the author * by whom it is mentioned interprets as a courtesy on the part of the Persians towards a British Minister. Sir J. Outram on arrival at Bushehr found Mr. Murray there, and a cordial interview took place between them; nor did Mr. Murray leave again for Baghdad until the 23rd of February. He was apparently in favour of vigorous measures against Persia,—an attitude very natural on his part in view of the causes of his retirement from Tehran.

It was at first ordered that Commander Felix Jones, I.N., the Resident in the Persian Gulf, should cease to exercise his functions as such on the arrival of the expeditionary force and that he should be attached, as a Political Agent with advisory powers, to the staff of the General in command. After the occupation of Büshehr Commander Jones was employed, with his Assistant Lieutenant Disbrowe, "in giving

^{*} Watson in his History of Persia, page 447, footnote. But it may be doubted whether Persian artillery officers would be able to distinguish one British flag from another; and it does not appear that any British vessel in the river was fired on by the Persians before the "Comet" on the 3rd March which on her previous downward journey had passed without annoyance.

confidence to the townspeople, securing the magazines, granaries, and other public stores, endeavouring to re-open the bazaars, and in adopting measures for the public safety, as well as in taking steps for obtaining supplies." Later, it would seem, on the recommendation of Sir J. Outram, he was replaced in the position of Resident, at least with reference to territories not included in the sphere of operations. At the end of January 1857 Commander Jones was sent, along with the Rev. P. Badger, who accompanied the forces in the capacity of Arabic interpreter to Sir J. Outram, as well as of chaplain, to advise the Arabs of Muhammareh to remain neutral in the approaching struggle at that place; and in the course of a fortnight he returned with a chart of the river at Muhammareh and a sketch of the enemy's works, which he had prepared. Commander Jones was not present at the actions of Khushāb or Muhammareh; but he and Lieutenant Disbrowe were mentioned in despatches, notwithstanding the unfavourable notice which the engagements obtained by them from chiefs under the Persian Government had attracted, for aid willingly rendered to the military authorities. At the end of April Sir J. Outram advised Commander Jones not to delay any longer a tour which he proposed making, in the character of Resident, to various ports in his jurisdiction.

A political assistant on whose services Sir J. Outram appears to have set a higher value was Captain A. B. Kemball,* British Political Agent in Turkish Arabia, who arrived at Būshehr from Baghdād towards the end of February 1857 and apparently placed himself at the disposal of the General. Early in March Sir J. Outram sent him and the Rev. Mr. Badger to Basrah to remove objections which were being raised by the Turks to the intended British operations at Muhammarch, and to Muhammarch or its neighbourhood to obtain information of the enemy's strength and dispositions,—two tasks in which Captain Kemball and his colleague seem to have succeeded admirably. Mr. Badger appears to have visited Kuwait a little later and to have brought back with him some useful political information. Captain Kemball accompanied the flying

^{*} Captain (afterwards General Sir) Arnold Burrowes Kemball entered the Bombay Artillery in 1837. He saw service in Afghanistan, at Ghazni, in 1839; and in 1841 he became Assistant Resident in the Persian Gulf. In 1855 he was promoted to the Political Agency in Turkish 'Irāq, in which he had previously officiated; and an account of his services at Baghdād will be found in the chapter on the history of that province. In 1873 he attended the Shāh of Persia during his first visit to England. In 1875-76, as mentioned elsewhere, he was employed on a Turko-Persian Boundary Commission at Constantinople; and in 1876 he accompanied the Turkish army in Servia as a British Commissioner.

column which pursued to Ahwaz the Persian force expelled from Muhammareh; and a few days later Sir J. Outram applied to the Indian authorities to regularise Captain Kemball's presence on his staff by appointing a *locum tenens* in his place at Baghdad. Captain Kemball's services on the campaign, as also those of the Rev. Mr. Badger, were afterwards highly commended by Sir J. Outram, both publicly and privately.

"Pelly," no doubt the same who a few years late attained distinction as Resident in the Persian Gulf and became well known as Sir Lewis Pelly, visited Baghdād from Muhammareh in April-May 1857; but it does not appear in what capacity he was at this time employed.

Attitude of the Turkish Government.

The attitude of the Turkish Government during the Anglo-Persian War was, so far as could be judged from the behaviour of their local officials at Basrah and Baghdad, favourable to the British. that, at the end of February 1857, Rashid Pasha, Governor of Basrah. protested in writing to Captain Kemball against the contemplated British attack on Muhammareh, alleging that the place was claimed by Turkey; but Captain Kemball, deputed for the purpose by Sir J. Outram, succeeded in inducing him not only to withdraw his objections, but also to remove a Turkish war vessel which was stationed at the mouth of the Kārūn. The argument used by Captain Kemball was, apparently, that the rights of Turkey to Muhammareh, whatever they might be, could not suffer through the expulsion by the British of the Persians, who were at the moment in armed possession; and firing by the Persians, on the 3rd March, upon the British steamer "Comet" as she passed Muhammareh seems to have disinclined the Pasha to insist on the neutrality of the river, as it had been apprehended that he might do. Soon after the capture of Muhammarch by the British forces Rashīd Pāsha betook himself to Baghdād to agitate for the transfer of the place to Turkey, and his acting substitute proposed to replace the Turkish guardship at the mouth of the Karun; but the latter demand was staved off, and the Pāsha's manœuvres at Baghdād proved ineffectual. Neither step on the part of the Turk had any connection with Sir J. Outram's transient idea, already mentioned, of placing Muhammareh in Turkish charge; but it is probable that the magnitude of the preparations made by the Persians for the defence of Muhammareh was due partly to a fear that Muhammareh, if taken, might be handed over by the British to the Turks.

The Turkish authorities threw no obstacles in the way of the purchase in Turkish Irāq of transport animals for the British Field Force;

but they prohibited their subjects from taking part in the war, and they even exacted security not to cross the frontier into Persia from those of them who were engaged to drive the animals purchased by the British Government to Basrah. This last precaution, however, was stated by Rashīd Pāsha himself to be merely a pro formā proceeding, of which the real object was to prevent the men employed with the animals from passing as an organised body into the British service. Numerous bashi-bazouks appeared who presented certificates of having been employed with British officers in the Crimean War, but it does not appear that their services were accepted.

The dissolution of the British Field Force in Persia was undertaken by Sir J. Outram irrespective of the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny, news of which did not reach him till the 7th of June or about a month afterwards, when he was at Baghdad. He was probably to some extent aware of the critical state of affairs in India, for on the 27th April he had referred to "the mutinous spirit so extensively displayed in the Bengal army" and had remarked that, "as at present constituted, the Bengal Army never can be depended on;" but he seems at first to have been under the impression that troops which he was being urged to send back to India were required for service not there but in China. Although his instructions from England did not authorise him to reduce the force in Persia until the Treaty of Peace concluded had been ratified by the Shah, he decided to send away a portion of it without waiting for official information of that event, which, however, almost immediately reached him. A Field Force order, dated Muhammareh, the 9th May 1857, directed that the following troops should be held in readiness to embark for India: H. M.'s 14th Dragoons, the 3rd Troop of Horse Artillery, the 2nd Light Field Battery, and the reserve Companies of Artillery, H. M.'s 4th Regiment of Foot, H. M.'s 78th Highlanders, the 2nd European Light Infantry, the Light Battalion, and the Madras Sappers and Miners. On the 17th May the evacuation of Muhammareh by the Second Division was completed, the sloop of war "Clive" alone remaining to prevent the re-occupation of the place by the Persians, and General Havelock and his staff sailed for India, where as one t of the officers of the party on board wrote, "a new field for adventure, though a melancholy one for military distinction, opened out to the comrade regiments in Persia." The 23rd Native Light Infantry

Dissolution of the Field Force, May 1857.

^{*} As a matter of fact this regiment had already sailed on and before the 3rd May.

[†] Captain G. H. Hunt:—see his Outram and Havelock's Persian Campaign, page

and 26th Native Infantry were transferred to the 1st Division, which was left, under the command of General Jacob, in occupation of Bushehr and Khārag and consisted of the following units: the 3rd Light Cavalry, Sind Irregular Horse, Poona Irregular Horse, and Aden Troop,* forming a cavalry brigade under Brigadier Steuart; the 4th Troop of Horse Artillery, 3rd, 5th and 8th † Ligh Field Batteries, and 3rd Company of the 2nd and 4th Company of the 4th Artillery Battalion, commanded as an artillery brigade by Lieutenant-Colonel Trevelyan, with two companies of Sappers and Miners; the 20th and 26th Native Infantry, making one infantry brigade under Colonel Macan; and the 4th Native Infantry, 23rd Native Light Infantry and 2nd Baluch Battalion making another under Colonel Honner. On the 23rd May the strength of the Bushehr force was approximately 7,000 men, of all arms, the European troops (except some artillery) having by then left for India. The troop of Horse Artillery and two batteries were afterwards sent away, and other reductions also must have been effected, for on the 17th June, the day of Sir J. Outram's own departure for Karachi, the Büshehr force consisted. excluding officers but including the garrison on Khārag, of 1,200 cavalry, 278 artillery, 3,739 infantry, and 214 Sappers and Miners,-in all 5,431 fighting men of whom only 202 (artillery) were Europeans. The sick in hospital numbered 534, or about 10 per cent. of the whole, but their ailments were mostly trifling. On the departure of Sir J. Outram the political as well as military charge devolved on General Jacob.

Effect of the war in Persia. The military results of the war, notwithstanding its short duration, were perfectly conclusive. Nowhere had the Persian forces, though fighting in every case on ground chosen by themselves and with a great numerical superiority on their side, shown any ability to withstand a British attack; and it is probable, besides, that after the capture and destruction of the Persian magazines at Būshehr, Chāh Kūtah, Burāzjān and Muhammareh, little war material remained in the country, the Persian armies of Fārs and Arābistān being thereafter certainly reduced, as regards ammunition, to the supply that they happened to be carrying with them in the field. The excellent conduct of the British troops in camp and on the march enhanced the political values of their victories; Sir J. Outram observed, in his order breaking up the Field Force, that "scarcely one instance of misconduct on the part of any individual" had been brought to his notice during the whole campaign, and the Government of India thought themselves justified in remarking, in a notifica-

^{*} When the Aden Troop arrived in the Persian Gulf, or when it left, is not clear.

[†] The 8th Light Field Battery had only just arrived from India by sailing ships.

tion published on the 6th November 1857, that "the British troops leave behind them in Persia a reputation, not for valour alone, but for discipline, moderation and justice." In addressing the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs regarding his dealings with the Arab tribes Sir J. Outram, shortly before his departure from Persia, wrote:—

"It will be as satisfactory to your Lordship as it is to myself, to know, that whilst our relations with the Arab tribes have been carried on in the most friendly spirit, in no one instance has their presumed loyalty to the Shah been tampered with, neither have we fettered ourselves with a single after engagement towards them.

"Their only regret seemed to be, that we were not to continue in permanent possession of their country, and when it is remembered that such sentiments were expressed after our victorious troops had occupied their soil for nearly two months, the fact reflects the highest credit upon the discipline and morale of our Anglo-Indian army."

But the most convincing evidence of the moral effect of the war on the people of Persia, as distinguished from the Persian Government, was supplied by Colonel Taylor, Herat Commissioner, who reported as follows more than a year after the ratification of the Treaty of Peace:—

... during my march through Persia I have observed in many instances the good effects of the late occupations by British troops. The whole people of Fars (Southern Persia) are loud in their praises of the justice and humanity evinced on every occasion by all officers with whom they came into contact; the treating wounded soldiers and presenting them with a gratuity on their recovery was contrasted with the conduct of their own people, who instantly plundered them of the clothes and money they had received from their enemies; the prompt payment and liberal price given for every necessary article has kept up the impression of the unlimited resources of the Government, and the wealth of individuals.

* * * * * *

Throughout the country, overtures have been made to me by all classes, and not only unsought, but positively discouraged. The soldiers at Shiraz spoke cut boldly against the Shooja-ool-Moolk (the Hero of Kooshab) and their other officers. The Elkhaneey (the most influential man in all Fārs) remarked that we could take the low country easily enough, but that we should find difficulty inforcing the passes, "which," he significantly added, "are in my hands." He continued, "your Government makes a mistake in not placing chiefs in higher positions: when Fārs is annexed, confer the rank of Colonel, etc., and do not limit them to soobadars and jemadars." The eldest son of the Tungistan chief, who has the sole control of everything, said with much emphasis, that the next time British troops came into Persia, he should join them bodily with every efficient man, without even waiting for a guarantee for the future.

To all these overtures I gave a general assurance that the English Government was not disposed to weaken Persia, but rather keep her strong, as was manifested by the mild chastisement inflicted on the occasion of the last war; but, I added, that their appreciation of the justice, humanity, and liberality of the English officers could not fail to afford satisfaction to the Governor-General.

At the conclusion of the operations the relations between the British and Persian military chiefs were friendly, though not close; and no

bitterness in regard to the events of the war was manifested by the Persian Government, unless in the punishment of some of their own officers and soldiers by whose cowardice they had been disgraced.

Satisfaction of the Nawāb Iqbāl-ud-Dauleh. The result of the campaign gave keen satisfaction to the Nawāb Iqbāl-ud-Dauleh, a British political pensioner at Baghdād, as may be gathered from the following lines written by Sir J. Outram to General Jacob at Būshehr on the 13th May 1857:

I send an original letter, and its translation, from a member of the royal family of Oude, who resides at Bagdad, and was by some considered the rightful heir to that throne, when the ex-king succeeded. I would not, of course, accept his proffered present for the troops, referred to in his letter; but, perhaps, you may think it right to communicate to them the warm congratulations of their countryman, which Kemball assures me are perfectly sincere; for the Nawāb has always stood up manfully for the character of the Indian soldiers when sneered at, as heretofore the Bagdadees, and Persians especially, were wont to indulge in (sic).

The gift offered was not accepted; but the Nawab's letter was communicated to the native troops and was acknowledged by General Jacob on their behalf in cordial and characteristic terms.

Anglo-Persian Treaty of Peace, concluded 4th March and ratified 13th April, 1857.

A Treaty of Peace, terminating the war, was signed at Paris on the 4th March 1857, the Persian plenipotentiary being the same Farrukh Khān, a Kāshāni, who had conducted the abortive negotiations at Constantinople in 1856 on the part of his Government; he was rewarded by the Shāh with a jewelled girdle valued at £10,000, and not long afterwards he was promoted to the Ministership of the Interior with the title of Amīn-ud-Dauleh. The slowness of communications at the time prejudiced both parties to the peace, for intelligence of the British victory of Khushāb did not reach Paris in time to influence the discussion of the terms, while on the other hand the news of the conclusion of peace arrived too late in the Persian Gulf to save the Persians their crowning humiliation at Muhammareh. The Treaty was the result of the occupation of Rīshehr and Būshehr alone.

Its main provisions were: the establishment of perpetual peace and friendship between Britain and Persia from the date of exchange of ratifications, which was to take place within three months; the release of prisoners of war on both sides; a complete amnesty for all Persian subjects who might have compromised themselves by their relations with the British forces during the war; the withdrawal by the Persians of their troops and officials, within three months after ratification, from Herat and every other part of Afghanistan; the relinquishment by Persia of all claims to sovereignty over, and demands for proofs of obedience from, the principality of Herat, recognition by her of the

independence of Herat and the whole of Afghanistan, entire abstinence on her part for the future from interference in the internal affairs of Afghanistan, the submission of her differences with Herat and Afghanistan thereafter to British mediation, and the intervention of Britain-when appealed to by the Persian Government-for the purpose of adjusting such differences; the restriction of Persian military operations in Afghanistan, in event of the failure of British mediation, to purely temporary measures; the release without ransom of all Afghan political prisoners and détenus in Persia, provided a corresponding release were made by the Afghan authorities, the process to be carried out (if necessary) by a Commission of British and Persian representatives; the establishment of consular officers of all ranks by either country in the dominions of the other on the footing of the most favoured nation, their recognition correspondingly, and the mutual treatment on a similar basis of subjects and trade; the return of the British Mission to Tehran and its reception there with certain prescribed apologies ceremonies; the appointment, within three months after the return of the Mission, of a Persian Commissioner to enquire, in conjunction with a British Commissioner, into the pecuniary claims of British subjects against the Persian Government, and the liquidation within a year of such claims as should be held proved, also the settlement of similar * claims of Persian and other subjects who until the departure of the British Mission had been under British protection and had not since renounced it; the abandonment by the British Government, for the future, of the right of protecting Persian subjects not actually in the employment of the British Legation or of British consular officers, provided that no such right were accorded to or exercised by other foreign powers in Persia, and the enjoyment by the British Government, its servants and subjects, in Persia, of the same privileges and immunities as were enjoyed by the most favoured foreign power, its servants and subjects; and finally, the renewal of the Agreement of August 1851 relating to the slave trade. The penultimate Article of the Treaty ran:

Immediately on the exchange of the ratifications of this Treaty, the British troops will desist from all acts of hostility against Persia, and the British Government engages further that as soon as the stipulations in regard to the evacuation by the Persian troops of Herat and the Afghan territories, as well as in regard to the

^{*} A case belonging to this category, that of Mīr 'Ali Naqi Khān, dragged on till 1863, when Mr. Eastwick succeeded in settling it personally with H. M. the Shāh. The Persian Commissioner had persistently refused to discuss it, while the British Government considered its settlement a point of honour, and it had given rise to an enormous mass of correspondence.

reception of the British mission at Tehrān, shall have been carried into full effect, the British troops shall, without delay, be withdrawn from all parts, places, and islands belonging to Persia; but the British Government engages that, during this interval, nothing shall be designedly done by the Commander of the British troops to weaken the allegiance of the Persian subjects towards the Shāh, which allegiance it is, on the contrary, their earnest desire to confirm;

An Annexure to the Treaty laid down in detail the satisfaction to be afforded to Mr. Murray on arrival at Tehran.

No previous Treaty or Agreement between Britain and Persia was revived by the Treaty of Peace, except that of August 1851, as already mentioned.

The moderation of the terms arranged excited some surprise, especially in Persia itself, where the Sadr A'zam, whose policy of irritation and defiance had provoked the war, on learning that his own dismissal was not required, breathed a fervent "God be praised!"; but the same moderation no doubt prevented a reaction in Persia against the settlement when, later, the difficulties of Britain in the Indian Mutiny declared themselves. General Jacob, it is true, held that 'Arabistān, Būshehr, and Khārag should have been permanently incorporated with the British dominions; and Sir J. Outram himself was in favour, as will be shown further on, of the retention of Khārag, but the conclusion of peace without reference to him robbed him of an opportunity of making recommendations on the subject.

The Treaty was ratified by the Shāh on the 13th April 1857; and the ratifications were exchanged at Baghdād, where Mr. Murray then was, on the 2nd May.

Mission of Colonel Taylor to Herat, 1857-1858. On the evacuation of Muhammareh, on the 17th May, Sir J. Outram proceeded to Baghdād, accompanied by Captain Kemball, Political Agent in Turkish 'Irāq, partly to confer with Mr. Murray on the subject of a proposed political mission to Herat, and partly to arrange, with Captain Kemball's help, for the disposal of the land transport left over from the expedition. He arrived at Baghdad about the 23rd May and seems to have left it again about the 8th June. Mr. Murray thought he found warrant for the despatch of a mission to Herat in the article of the Treaty relating to the mutual release of Afghan and Persian political prisoners and detenus, which Sir J. Outram considered irrelevant, and he was anxious that strict search should be made for Persian secret agents in Herat, which to Sir J. Outram appeared inexpedient; but the latter thought that a mission to Herat might be advisable, if its sole object was to ascertain that the Persians had really withdrawn from Afghanistan; and he proposed Captain (Brevet-Lieutenant-Colonel) R. L.

Taylor of the 18th Native Infantry, as a suitable emissary. Colonel Taylor was eventually ordered to Herat, where he arrived in December 1857, was well received by Sultān Ahmad Khān, the new ruler, and remained till the following March, returning to Būshehr on his way to India at the beginning of June 1858.

Meanwhile Mr. Murray had returned to Tehrān on the 18th July 1857; and, all the requirements of the Treaty in regard to his reception having been honourably executed, preparations were made for the evacuation by the British troops of Büshehr and Khārag.

Return of the British Legation to Tehran, 18th July 1857.

On the 2nd October 1857 Būshehr was evacuated by the British troops and Commander Felix Jones resumed his duties as Resident there; but a garrison, including the 23rd Native Light Infantry, was temporarily left, under the command of Brigadier Honner, upon Khārag Island. Meanwhile the Persians continued to occupy Lāsh-Juwain in Sīstān. Eventually, beginning in December 1857, the British garrison on Khārag was also withdrawn, the process being finally completed on the 4th February 1858.

Evacuation of Būshehr and Khārag, October 1857, February, 1858.

After the war the relations of Britain and Persia resumed an amicable course; but for a number of years, apart from telegraph operations to be mentioned presently, apathy was the principal characteristic of British policy in regard to Persian affairs. After the serious military reverse which they sustained in Turkistan in 1860, the Persian Government once more sought to obtain British officers for the Persian army; but their proposals were coldly received by the British Government, and the negotiations ultimately* broke down on a question of the proportion in which the cost of the arrangements should be divided between Persia and India.

British
Military
officers not
lent to the
Persian army,
1860—70.

The Persian request for British military officers was renewed in 1870, when it was again ignored; and thereafter the guidance of Persia in military affairs passed into the hand of foreigners of other nations.

The construction of lines of telegraph in and across Persia between 1861 and 1870, on British advice and by British agency, was a work of great magnitude and in its result conferred vast advantages on the country. It had an excellent and happy effect on Anglo-Persian relations, besides which it maintained British prestige in Persia and kept on

The Anglo-Persian telegraphs, 1861—1870,

^{*}The loss of this opportunity is bewailed by the principal writers on British policy in Persia—see Rawlinson's *England and Russia in the East*, page 101, and Lord Curzon's *Persia*, pages 586-7—and possibly, had it been embraced, the situation of Persia at the present time would have been more favourable than it is.

foot a body of British officers possessing Persian experience,—two results which, in the atmosphere of indifference to Persia then prevailing in British official circles, could not otherwise have been attained. A full account of the telegraph operations in Persia will be found in the Appendix on the Telegraphs of the Persian Gulf.

Anglo-Persian Makrān Boundary Commission, 1869—71. Difficulties in regard to the position of the boundary between Persia and Kalāt having arisen in connection with the passage of a telegraph line through Makrān, a joint Anglo-Persian Boundary Commission was suggested in 1869, formed in 1870, and resulted in September 1871 in the acceptance by the Shāh of a frontier proposed by Colonel Goldsmid, the British Commissioner. Details concerning this Commission and its work are given in the chapter on the history of Persian Makrān.

The Reuter Concession, 1872.

The establishment of telegraphs drew the attention of commercial Europe to Persia, and projects for the exploitation of the natural and industrial resources of the country followed as a matter of course. Mīrza Husain Khan, the enlightened Prime Minister whom the Shah called to office in 1871, showed from the first a strong disposition to a good understanding, of an active and practical character, with Britain. He did what lay in his power to remove an evil impression that had been produced in Persia by the establishment of close relations between the Government of India and the Amīr of Afghanistan in 1869; he combated the idea, prevalent in Persia, that in the frontier difficulties between Persia and Turkey, which had become acute, Britain inclined perversely to favour the Turks; and he facilitated, so much as he could, the adjustment of differences which arose between Britain and Persia in regard to the Makran and Sistan boundaries and to Bahrain affairs. But the supreme effort of his policy, which "aimed at the regeneration of Persia through the identification of her interests with those of Great Britain" was the Reuter Concession, granted on the 25th July 1872, not long before the Shah's first journey to Europe. The concessionaire was Baron Julius de Reuter, a naturalised British subject; and the scope of the concession itself will appear from the following description of it by* Sir H. Rawlinson:

This gigantic monopoly, at which Europe stood aghast, comprised the following items: the construction of a railway from the Caspian to the Persian Gulf, with any number of subsidiary branches; the laying down of tramways throughout the Kingdom; the exclusive working of all the Persian mines, excepting those of gold and silver; the introduction of works of irrigation on whatever scale was deemed expedient; the establishment of a national bank; the issue of a loan of six millions sterling, with a Persian guarantee of 5 per cent. interest, and 2 per cent. sinking fund; together

^{*} England and Russia in the East, page 125.

with a right to initiate all remunerative public works, such as lighting with gas, paying and embellishing the capital; making roads, bridges and embankments; postal and telegraphic extensions; mills, factories, and workshops, etc., and finally a farm of the entire customs of the empire for a period of 25 years. The Grant Vizier, who, with his confidential adviser, Mīrzā Malcom Khan, now minister in England, was responsible for this extraordinary delegation of Imperial powers to the hands of a private company, no doubt considered that he had sufficiently protected the interest of the Persian Crown, by providing that 20 per cent. of the net profits of the Railway and 15 per cent. of all other net profits should accrue to the Government; while in respect to the customs, he had stipulated that the aggregate proceeds of the present time should be augmented for five years by an annual fixed sum of £20,000, and during the remainder of the term by a transfer to the Shāh of 60 per cent. of the difference between the present farm and the actual proceeds.

The concession evoked a storm of indignation in Russia, and eventually in Persia itself, where a nationalist party had begun to take shape and chafed against alienation to foreigners of,* "the complete and exclusive control of the whole industrial resources of the empire for a period of seventy years." In the autumn of 1873, on his return from his tour in Europe, the Shāh found it necessary, in view of the excited state of public opinion, to rescind the concession entirely. The caution money, amounting to £40,000 was declared forfeited to the Persian Government on the ground of failure by the concession-holder to carry out what he had undertaken to perform within a given period; and for sixteen years, though forfeiture was unjust, the money was not repaid.

It has already been mentioned that Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shāh, in the course of a European tour, paid a visit to England in 1873. He was attended during his stay there by Sir A. B. Kemball, formerly Assistant Resident at Büshehr and Political Agent in Turkish 'Iraq. There is no doubt that an effort was made in England by the Shah and his Prime Minister, Mīrzā Husain Khān, who accompanied him, to elicit some admission from the British Foreign Office of the importance of Persia as afactor in the defence of India, and some promise of support; but it was not deemed expedient by the Statesmen to whom they applied to approach Russia, offended and alarmed as she then was by the still uncancelled Reuter Concession, on the subject of an express renewal of the Russo-British assurances jointly extended to Muhammad Shāh on his accession; and the conversations ended merely in agreement as to the desirability of cordial and sympathetic relations being maintained between Britain and Persia. The Shah is also understood to have expressed his dissatisfaction with the award of the British Commissioner in the Sistan boundary case; but no modification of the award resulted.

The Shah's first visit to England, 1873.

Slave Trade Convention, 1882. On the 14th June 1882 a permanent Convention between Britain and Persia in regard to the slave trade was substituted for the provisional agreement of 1851, which, renewed by the Treaty of Peace of 1857, had till then remained in force. This Convention is noticed in the special Appendix on the Slave Trade in the Persian Gulf Region.

Foundation of the Imperial Bank of Persia, 1889.

The years 1888 to 1892 were marked by great British financial and commercial activity in Persia, and witnessed the grant of various concessions to British subjects and the initiation of a number of British enterprises, some of which had been long under discussion.

The opening of the Lower Kārūn to international navigation may be regarded as a British achievement, inasmuch as it was brought about by British diplomacy; it is dealt with fully elsewhere, in the chapter on the history of 'Arabistān.

Banking operations were begun in Persia, in 1888, by the New Oriental Bank Corporation, which opened agencies in various Persian towns: but this society withdrew from the country two years later in favour of the Imperial Bank of Persia, a concession for the establishment of which was granted by the Shāh in 1889 to Baron de Reuter, previously holder of the famous concession of 1872. The Bank's concession was for 60 years, during which it was to enjoy a monopoly of issuing bank notes, as well as the exclusive right of working mines (with certain exceptions) throughout Persia, the views of its founders not being restricted to operations of a purely financial character. The retirement of the Imperial Ottoman Bank from Persia in 1893, the Imperial Bank of Persia simultaneously withdrawing from Baghdad, left the latter for the time being in sole possession of the Persian field. The Bank is at the present day one of the most promiment institutions in Persia, enjoys an almost official status, and has been the parent of other British undertakings.

The Shāh's second visit to England, 1889.

No political interest seems to attach to the Shāh's second visit to England, which was paid in 1889, in the course of his third European tour. He remained in England about a month, attended by Sir H. D. Wolff, who then held the office of British Minister at Tehrān.

British preferential rights in regard to railway construction in In March 1889 Sir H. Drommond Wolff, His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehrān, obtained from the Shāh an important engagement conferring on Britain preferential rights of railway construction in Southern Persia. In form it was an autograph letter from the Shāh to his

Minister for Foreign Affairs; it was ante-dated 16th September 1888; and the important portion of it ran as follows:—

Southern Persia, 1889-90.

Convey these commands to His Excellency, the (British) Minister Plenipotentiary, even give him this very autograph, in order that he may keep it and be satisfied that Our former promise with regard to priority of the English Government and the Company of that Government over others in the construction of a Southern Railway to Tehran continues to hold good; and certainly, whenever railway concessions in the north are given to others, immediately a concession for a railway from Tehran to Shushtar, or such a one, will be given to the English Company; and, of course then the clauses and conditions will also be examined in order that it be to Our advantage and interest, and for the benefit of the commerce of both parties; and positively no Southern Railway, without consultation with the English Government, will be granted to any foreign Company. P. S. And it is clear that in Persia nobody will be granted permission to construct railways, except it be solely commercial ones; We say so now that they may know it.

A copy of this letter was communicated to the Russian Minister at Tehrān in October 1890, and the assurance which it contained, was repeated by the Shāh in writing in November 1890.

In 1890 a concession for the construction and exploitation during 60 years of a road connecting Tehran with Shushtar or Ahwaz, viá Qum, Sultānābād, Burūjird, and Khurramābād, was acquired from the original concessionaire, a Persian, by the Imperial Bank of Persia, and work was commenced; but means have not up to the present been discovered of enabling the road to pass through the disturbed Luristan districts between Khurramābād and 'Arabistān. In the same year a Mining Rights Corporation was formed in order to turn to account the mining privileges of the Imperial Bank; but the operations of this body came to an unsuccessful end in 1894, largely in consequence of borings for oil unsuccessfully undertaken at Daliki and on the island of Qishm, in the Persian Gulf region. Also in 1890, a monopoly for the holding of lotteries, and another for dealing in tobacco, were unadvisedly granted by the Shah during the temporary absence from his side of the Persian Prime Minister and of the permanent British representative at Tehran. The former concession was obtained by a Persian subject, who resold it to a British syndicate for £40,000, and the latter by a group of British capitalists. The lotteries concession was afterwards cancelled without compensation, and the British speculators lost their money-a circumstance which did not increase the popularity of Persian investments in the London market. The tobacco concession taken up by an Imperial Mobacco Corporation in 1891, also led to trouble; and, a riot in connection with it having occurred at Tehrān in January 1892, it also was withdrawn, but on payment of an indemnity of £500,000 to the investors.

Various British undertakings, 1890. British preferential tramway rights in Southern Persia, 1890. At the end of 1890, much dissatisfaction having been caused to the British Government by the Russo-Persian agreement prohibiting the construction of railways in Persia during the next ten years, His Majesty the Shāh, as "a proof of his sincere friendship for England" engaged in writing "not to give any concession for the construction of "tramways south of Tehran without first informing Her Majesty's Government who have a preferential right for tramways in South Persia."

British official matters general to the whole of Persia, 1848-1896.

Dependence of the British Legation in Persia. A problem which exercised the British Government during the reign of Nasīr-ud-Dīn Shāh, and of which no final or decided solution seems to have been reached, was that of the proper place to be assigned to the Tehrān Legation in the British diplomatic and political machine. The difficulty arose from the equivocal position of Persia itself, in contact with Indian questions as that country was and must remain through Afghanistan, Baluchistan and the Persian Gulf, but brought within the purview of European diplomacy also by its relations with Russia and Turkey.

1855-59.

Until the appointment of the Hon'ble C. A. Murray to be Minister at Tehrān in 1855, the post of British representative in Persia had always been held, with one exception, by officers of Indian training and experience; but, unless in very early times, the instructions on which they acted had been framed exclusively in London.

1859-60.

In 1859, on the transference of the Government of India from the Hon'ble East India Company to the Crown, an attempt was made to reconcile the conflicting requirements of the situation by placing * "the Teheran establishment under the charge of the Secretary of State for India, instead of the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, so as to concede the point that our Persian interests belonged to Indian rather than to European diplomacy, while at the same time the British representative at Teheran remained under the direct control of the Crown. As a subsidiary measure, Indian officers were appointed to the post of Minister and Secretary of Legation, and an Indian character was generally given to the establishment." The Minister appointed under these arrangements was Sir H. Rawlinson, formerly Political Agent at

^{*} Sir H. Rawlinson's England and Russia in the East, page 97.

Baghdād. In the following year, however, the decision was reconsidered and the Tehrān Legation replaced under the Foreign Office, Sir H. Rawlinson resigning his appointment as Minister, apparently by way of protest.

1870-71.

The question in regard to Tehran was among the subjects submitted to a Committee of the House of Commons which was appointed in 1870 to report on the British diplomatic and consular services; and their finding on it, dated 18th May 1871, was worded as follows:

That, while they have received conflicting evidence of the highest authority, on either side of the question, your Committee, on the whole, incline to the opinion, that the Persian Mission should be placed under the authority of the Secretary of State for India; but that if the responsible advisers of the Crown decide that such a change is not for the public interest, your Committee recommend that the members of the Persian Mission generally should be selected by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs from Her Majesty's Indian Service, and that the present charge of £12,000 a year on the Indian revenues for the expense of such a Mission should be diminished, so as to throw a larger proportion of the expense upon Imperial revenues.

No action was taken on these recommendations, unless such may be traced in subsequent appointments of officers of the Indian army to the post of military attaché at Tehrān, or in the selection in 1894 of Sir Mortimer Durand of the Indian Civil Service to be British Minister in Persia.

Relations of Russia with Persia, 1848—1896.

The relations of Russia and Persia during the reign of Nasir-ud-Dīn Shāh present no very salient feature; but the latter part of the period was marked by increasing Russian influence and pressure in Northern Persia, which however, in accordance with the changed spirit of the times, were rather commercial than military in their manifestations. Russian political rivalry of Britain in the Persian field still prevailed, and even became intense; but the aspect which it assumed was outwardly economic, and the Anglo-Russian understanding of 1834 for the maintenance of the independence and integrity of Persia still subsisted and was even reaffirmed in 1888.

On Easter eve, or Easter night, 1851 a daring raid was made by independent Turkmans on the Russian naval station of Ashurada in the Caspian; and, notwithstanding the presence of at least one Russian man-of-war, a clean sweep was made of the settlement, some Russians being killed, some wounded, and others carried off into captivity. The Russians persisted in attributing blame, in connection with this affair, to

Turkman raid on Ashurada, 1851. the Persian Governor of Māzandarān, who was a brother of the Shāh; and prudence in the end obliged the Persian Government to comply with a Rusian demand for his removal. This concession by Persia to Russia was the basis on which the Anglo-Persian slave trade Agreement of the same year, already referred to, was obtained by the British Minister.

Attitude of Persia in the Crimean war, 1853— 56.

On the outbreak of war between Turkey and Russia in 1853 the Shah was solicited by Prince Dolgoruki, the Russian Minister at Tehran. to throw in his lot with Russia and invade the Turkish provinces of Erzeroum and Traq. One of the baits displayed to him was the prospect of his possessing himself of Baghdad and the Holy Cities of Karbala and Najaf, besides other territories; and it seems to have been promised that Russia would support him in either retaining such districts as he might conquer, or requiring a heavy price in money for their restitution to Turkey. The further inducement was held out of a complete remission. in case Persia actively joined in the war, of the balance of the war indemnity of 1828 still due by Persia to Russia, or, if matters did not go so far, reduction of the balance by such amount as had been spent by Persia in military preparations. These proposals were accepted by the young Shah without reference even to Mīrza Āgha Khan, his Sadar A'zam or Prime Minister, and they were brought to the latter's knowledge only through the energetic action of the Turkish Ambassador in Persia, who, perceiving indications of what was on foot, threatened to leave Tehran unless satisfactory assurances were immediately forthcoming. Meanwhile, it would appear, secret orders had been sent by the Shāh for the assembling of over 50,000 troops at two points near the frontier threatening Erzeroum and Baghdad; and, as is described in the chapter on the history of Turkish, 'Iraq, Perso-Turkish relations on the border between Muhammareh and Basrah became exceedingly tense.

The Sadar A'zam, who had in the early days of his power the reputation of being an Anglophil, whose rival the Amīr Nizām had for that very reason been sustained by the Russian Minister, and who at heart was probably more anti-Russian than he was anti-British, devoted himself, on becoming aware of what was contemplated, to the task of persuading the Shāh to refrain from any formal engagement with Russia; and he even suggested that it might be more to Persia's advantage to ally herself with the coalition then forming against Russia,—a policy by which the recovery of the Caucasian districts wrested by Russia from Persia might conceivably be attained. The Shāh, swayed by these counsels, in the end refused to continue the negotiations with Russia; and Prince Dalgoruki, who had already advised his Government of the

Shāh's entire readiness to enter into their views, found himself placed in a highly embarrassing predicament. He argued repeatedly and vehemently on the subject with the Sadar A'zam,—whom at one interview he had the misfortune to strike with his cane,—but to no purpose; and presently he was recalled from Tehrān.

Later the Shāh, excited by the news of warlike preparations in Europe, once more lent a favourable ear to Russian overtures for an offensive alliance; but again the Sadr A'zam succeeded in penetrating his intentions and in inducing him to repudiate engagements that he had formed.

The Persian Government, it would seem, found it almost impossible to abstain from plunging, on one side or the other, into so great and interesting a struggle as the Crimean war; and their assistance was next offered to the Allies. These, however, declined it and strongly recommended Persia to remain neutral, which in the end she decided to do; but not until recourse had been had by the Government of India, as described in the chapter on the history of Turkish 'Irāq, to a mild naval demonstration in the Persian Gulf and on the Shatt-al-'Arāb.

After the Crimean war Russia embarked on a forward policy in Asia, and her progress eastwards and southwards seemed for a time to be viewed by Persia with a complacent eye. About 1869, however, Russia's proceedings on the eastern coasts of the Caspian brought the question of the Russo-Persian frontier in that quarter under dispute, and thenceforward Persia was again all caution in her dealings with her northern neighbour.

Later relations of Persia and Russia.

As illustrating the attitude of Russia in commercial questions during the latter part of Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shāh's reign, may be quoted some proceedings which she took in regard to the construction of railways in Persia. On the 18th September 1887 the Shāh was brought by the Russian Minister at Tehrān to sign an agreement binding himself not to authorise the construction of any railway or waterway in Persia by a foreign company without previous consultation with the Russian Emperor. The engagement was extorted by a threat that, in event of a concession being granted without reference to Russia, the Tsar might withdraw from his position as a guarantor of the integrity of Persia; and it was clearly directed against a British scheme for a railway from Ahwāz to Tehrān. As a set-off to the opening of the Lower Kārūn to navigation in October 1888, which was regarded as a British success, the Russian Minister at Tehrān in March 1889 obtained from the Shāh

Interdict imposed by Russia on the construction of railways in Persia, 1889-90. a written agreement conferring on a Russian Company, not specified, the option of undertaking any railways in Persia of which the construction might be resolved on during the next five years, during which period no other company should be granted permission to construct railways. About the same time, as already mentioned, Britain secured priority in regard to railway construction in the South of Persia. In November 1890 there was substituted for this agreement another by which all railway construction in Persia, with one immaterial exception, was interdicted for the following ten years, and in which the question was treated as one exclusively between Russia and Persia.

As, with the exception of a Belgian line six miles in length, opened in July 1888 and connecting Tehrān with Shāh 'Abdul 'Azīm, no railway has as yet been constructed in Persia, the importance of these maucuvres by Russia and of the counteractive measures taken by Britain cannot be properly rated; but the facts show that Russia regarded with alarm the commercial methods introduced into the struggle for influence by the Reuter Concession of 1872, and that she felt a policy of obstruction to be the one most conducive to maintenance of her prestige.

Relations of France and other European powers with Persia, 1848—1896.

France.

Muhammad Shah's French officers mostly left Persia about 1850, as has been already mentioned; and a later body of French military instructors, who made their appearance in Persia in 1859, remained only until 1861. In 1855 a perpetual Treaty of Friendship and Commerce was concluded between Persia and France; and thereafter, with the exception of certain abortive engineering and marcantile schemes in 'Arabistan, few traces are found of French activity or interest in Persia until 1895, in which year the French Government obtained an exclusive and permanent right, throughout the whole of Persia, of searching for objects of antiquarian interest.

Other European nations. Treaties of Commerce, of Friendship and Commerce, or of Commerce and Navigation were concluded at various dates between 1856 and 1873 between Persia and the United States of America, Austria-Hungary, the Netherlands, Belgium, Sweden and Norway, Denmark, Greece, Italy,

Spain,* Germany, and Switzerland; but none of these were of political significance or betokened the existence in Persia of important interests on the part of the countries mentioned.

Relations of Persia and Turkey, 1848-1896.

The political relations of Persia and Turkey did not cease, during the reign of Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shāh, to be of importance to both countries; and they were, as usual, those of near and generally unfriendly neighbours.

The question of their common frontier, though settled in principle by the second Treaty of Erzeroum (1847), continued to be debated with heat and acrimony for many years, and no final settlement was attained. Of the proceedings in connection therewith, which are related at length in the chapter on the history of Turkish' Irāq, the earliest were those of an abortive Delimitation Commission, including British and Russian representatives, that lingered in existence from 1848 to 1852, during which period the Turks quite unjustifiably appropriated Qōtūr.

Perso-Turkish frontier question, 1848—52.

The Treaty of Erzeroum did not ameliorate the lot of Persian subjects in Turkey, maltreatment of whom seems to have reached its height about 1848; and in 1849 the rights of consular extra-territorial jurisdiction claimed by Persia in Turkey seem to have been set at nought by the Turkish Government.

Position of Persian subjects and Consuls in Turkey, 1848-49.

So late as 1851 Turkey was the sole power, besides Britain and Russia, that maintained a representative at Tehrān; and in 1852 Ahmad Vafīq Effendi on his artival as Turkish Ambassador in Persia in succession to Sāmi Effendi, became engaged in a conflict with the Persian authorities, characteristic of both nations, concerning his right to display an Ottoman flag at his residence on the analogy of the practice of his British and Russian colleagues.

Turkish Embassy at Tehrān, 1851—52.

Official encroachments and the misdeeds of border tribes contributed to embitter frontier relations; and a Perso-Turkish Convention, signed in 1869, for the maintenance of the *status quo*, which was itself incapable of definition, proved of no effect. The Shāh's visit to Turkish 'Irāq (1870-71) temporarily alleviated the friction between the two States; but it was renewed, immediately on his departure, by the refusal

Visit of the Shāh to Turkish 'Irāq, 1870-71, and frontier question and difficulties 1869—76.

^{*} There was an earlier Treaty of Commerce (1842) between Persia and Spain.

of the Persian Government to surrender a gang of Hanawand outlaws who had made of Persia a base for depredations in Turkish territory; and trouble in regard to cultivated land on the border had arisen on the confines of Pusht-i-Kūh. Joint Commissions for the definition of the frontier assembled at Constantinople in 1874-75 and 1875-76, on the second of which Britain and Russia were represented; but the results attained were exceedingly small.

Settlement of the position of Persian Consuls and subjects in Turkey, 1875. Meanwhile the difficult questions of the powers of Persian consular officers and the immunities of Persian subjects in Turkey were disposed of by a Convention between Persia and Turkey dated 20th December 1875. Strong feeling on these points had threatened to prevent a personal meeting between the Shāh and the Sultān at Constantinople in 1873; but a compromise had been arranged in time by the united efforts of the British and Russian Ambassadors in Turkey.

Threatened hostilities between Persia and Turkey, 1877. In 1877, when, as mentioned in the chapter on the history of Turkish 'Irāq, there was a dispute between Persia and Turkey regarding the island of Shalhah in the Shatt-al-'Arab, besides other differences, a war being also in progress between Turkey and Russia, Persia showed a disposition to make common cause with Russia against Turkey. A Persian force of about 1,000 men with 200 horses was even collected at Muhammareh; but in the end the Shāh's Government decided to remain neutral.

Arrangements regarding the importation of Persian corpses into Turkish 'Irāq, 1870—78.

In 1878 an Agreement was reached between the Persian and Turkish Governments in regard to the conditions under which corpses might be imported from Persia into Turkish 'Irāq for burial at the Holy Cities; it replaced or supplemented an earlier Convention on the subject signed at Baghdād in 1870, evidently on the occasion of the Shāh's visit, by Mid-hat Pāsha, Wāli of Baghdād, and Mīrza Husain Khān, Persian Ambassador in Turkey.

Frontier troubles, 1880—89.

In 1880 Shaikh 'Obaid Ullah, a Kurdish chief and Turkish subject, invaded the Urumīyah districts of Persia at the head of a large force not without encouragement, it was thought, from Turkish officials; and there was consternation at Tehrān. The invasion failed, however of itself; and in 1881 the leader was deported from his home to Constantinople on the representation of various European Governments. In 1889 trouble occurred on the Perso-Turkish frontier near Khānaqīn.

Relations of Persia with other States in the Persian Gulf, 1848—1896.

In an earlier part of this chapter it appeared that there was in 1820 some difference between the opinions of the Shāh of Persia and the Saiyid of 'Omān regarding the nature of the right by which the latter sovereign then held possession of Bandar 'Abbās and its dependencies, including Qishm; and an account, from the 'Omāni point of view, of subsequent transactions between the two States relating to the districts in question will be found in the chapter on the history of the 'Omān Sultanate. Here it will be enough to mention the features of the case which were most important to the Persian Government.

Connection of the rulers of 'Omān with Bandar 'Abbās, Qishm, etc., 1848—68.

The Perso-'Omāni Treaty of 17th November 1856 marked a decided strengthening of the position of Persia with reference to Bandar 'Abbas, for it demolished the basis of any claim to independent sovereignty which the Saiyid of 'Oman may have been inclined to cherish. The Treaty did not clearly define the dependencies of Bandar 'Abbas, but it specified the districts of Shamīl and Mīnab and the islands Qishm and Hormuz as connected therewith, and laid down that the whole of these must be considered as forming an integral part of the Persian province of Fars. Numerous conditions were added to that of payment of revenue, making it clear that the status and powers of the ruler of 'Omān at Bandar 'Abbās were henceforth not to differ from those of any other fief-holder under the Persian Crown; such conditions were liability of the Governor of Bandar 'Abbas appointed by the ruler of 'Oman to removal on a bare complaint from the Governor-General of Fars; the non-erection of new fortifications at Bandar 'Abbās town; rendering of high honours to the Governor-General of Fars, should he visit Bandar 'Abbas; the flying of the Persian flag on all occassions; the furnishing of necessary assistance to Persian military expeditions; and the surrender of fugitives from Persian jurisdiction to the Persian authorities.

1856.

It is noteworthy that in one of the ultimata presented by Britain to Persia in 1856, before the Anglo-Persian war, the grant of a lease of Bandar 'Abbās to the Saiyid of 'Omān figured among the British demands; but the matter found no place in the Treaty of Peace in 1857, being then known to have been settled by direct negotiation between Omān and Persia.

1868.

The terms of the Agreement of 1868, whereby, on British advice. the Persian Government granted a fresh lease of Bandar 'Abbas and its dependencies to the Sultan of 'Oman, were even more stringent than those of the Treaty of 1856 in their assertion of Persian sovereignty over the districts and islands concerned. The items specifically included in the new lease were Bandar 'Abbas, meaning the town of that name; the district of Shamīl, in which Tāziyān and 'Īsīn, separately mentioned in the Agreement, are at the present day comprised; the districts of Mīnāb and Biyābān; the islands of Qishm and Hormūz; and the part of Khamīr, which is now in the district of Bastak. The Sultan's required to acknowledge in Governor of Bandar 'Abbās was writing his subjection to the Persian Government; the moat surrounding the Bandar 'Abbās fort was to be permanently filled up; the Persian flag was to be flown at Bandar 'Abbās, where several persons in charge of it, as also a passport writer on the part of the Persian Government, were to be allowed to reside; a salute was to be fired on the Shah's birthday; individuals who had served the Shāh at Bandar 'Abbās were to be well treated instead of being molested; the Sultan's Governor was not to interfere with places unmentioned in the lease, even such as might formerly have been under Masqat; the Governor was to receive the Governor-General of Fars and the Governor of Laristan with every mark of honour and respect in case of their visiting Bandar 'Abbās for recreation and sport; he was to furnish with guides and provisions such forces as the Governors-General of Fars and Kirman might send in the direction of Makran and Baluchistan; he was to be changed at once if any act of his should be disapproved by the Governor-General of Fars; refugees from Fars and Laristan were to be handed over to the Persian Government; the officers* of foreign Governments were to be excluded from the leased districts. and the Sultan of 'Oman was to arrange for the defence of the ports, was to prevent "all inteference and intrusion of strangers, whether under friendly pretext or otherwise," and was not to allow any foreign vessel to make use of the anchorages; the Sultan was not to sublet the districts to any other Government; and duties on goods at Bandar'Abbās were to be levied according to a former scale, and not at Masqat rates.

^{*}The Government of India thought it unnecessary to protest against any part of this Article, which treaty rights in Persia would render innocuous in so far as the British Government and British subjects were concerned.

In less than two months after its execution the lease of Bandar 'Abbās to 'Omān was determined by a change of Sultāns at Masqat, and no other was ever granted. This was the end of the long-standing connection between Masqat and Bandar 'Abbās.

Proceedings by which the Persian Government from time to time intimated that they harboured a claim to the Bahrain Islands are described in full in the chapter on the history of Bahrain.

Persian proceedings in regard to Bahrain, 1848—88.

In 1859, when Bahrain was threatened by the Wahhābis, the Shaikh, ignoring his close relations with the British Government, appealed to the Shāh of Persia and the Sultān of Turkey for protection; and one result of his appeal was the arrival in Bahrain of a Persian Agent, who hoisted the Persian flag and proclaimed Persian sovereignty, but with brief success.

1869.

In 1869 Persia entered a protest against strong action which had recently been taken by the British Government in Bahrain, chiefly on the ground that previous notice had not been given to Persia; and in reply a pledge was volunteered by Her Majesty's Government without admitting the Persian pretensions to sovereignty implied, that in future the Persian Government should be fully informed of any punitive measures to which the British Government might find it necessary to resort in Bahrain. Renewed disturbances obliged the British authorities again to intervene forcibly in Bahrain before the end of the year, and the Shāh's Government were duly apprised and made no objection to the operations; but they protested against interference with a Persian emissary to Bahrain which had been exercised in the course of the same.

In 1886 the Shāh, in conversation with the British Minister at Tehrān, claimed the sovereignty of Bahrain and quoted the assurance given by the British Government in 1869 as an admission thereof; but he did not press the matter, and the counter statement of their views drawn up by Her Majesty's Government remained undelivered.

1886.

Later, evidence came into the possession of the British authorities which showed that in 1887 a scheme had been approved by the head of the Persian Ministry for the seizure of Bahrain by the Shaikh of Qatar, apparently in the Persian interest; but this design did not reach the point of practical action.

1887.

In 1887-88 overtures for the establishment of Persian suzerainty over Persian Trucial 'Omān were made by a Persian agent, *Sartīp Haji Ahmad intrigue Trucial

Persian intrigues in Trucial 'Omān, 1887-

^{*} This man was a needy adventurer who hopedito benefit himself by pushing the supposed scheme of Persian statesmen in the Gulf. His action at Lingeh is noticed further on in this chapter.

Khān, to the Shaikhs of Abu Dhabi, Dibai, and Umm-al-Qaiwain. These were, to all appearance, connected with the Bahrain plan of 1887 and were equally resultless; and the Persian Government repudiated their emissary's proceedings, a full account of which will be found in the chapter on the history of Trucial 'Omān.

Outrages on the Persian coast against boats from the Arabian side, and reprisals, 1892-93.

After 1888 no political relations or correspondence between the Persian Government and the independent Arab principalities of the Persian Gulf can be traced; but in 1892-93 a sort of petty war seems to have been in progress between the inhabitants of Persian coast villages and those of ports on the Arabian littoral opposite. In June 1892 a Bahrain boat was looted by armed men at Tibin in Shībkūh, and cash and goods to the amount of Rs. 880 were said to have been carried off. In August following, a determined attack was made upon the village of Kashkunār in the Gābandi valley by Āl Bu Fakhru (Hūwalah) natives of the place who had emigrated to Qatar some time previously, seven Kashkunāris being killed and property valued at Rs. 70,000 Qrāns plundered. Kashkunār, it will be remembered, is closely connected with Tibin, as Qatar is with Bahrain. The Kashkunār people afterwards retaliated by seizing three boats from Qatar, whereupon the Shaikh of Qatar complained to the British Resident in the Persian Gulf, but was told that, unless he restrained his subjects from committing offences, he must expect them to suffer from reprisals. Also in 1892, however, a boat from Jazeh on the Persian coast was attacked near Wakrah in Qatar and several of the crew were killed. Boats belonging to Bahrain were again plundered or seized by inhabitants of Basatīn in April 1893, and by Bustanu people in the following September, the villages of the robbers being apparently the places so named in the Gābandi Valley. It does not appear that redress was afforded or sought by the Persian Government in any of the above cases, which they were content simply to ignore.

A general spirit of lawlessness was perhaps abroad on the Persian coast at this time, for at the end of 1892 or beginning of 1893 a Rās-al-Khaimah boat was attacked at Khargu Island and a slave taken from it by the robbers, while another Rās-al-Khaimah vessel was dealt with in a manner little, if at all, short of criminal by the Persian Deputy-Governor of Bandar Abbās.

General, administrative, and internal history of the Persian Coast and Islands, 1848-1872, and their general history, 1872-1896.

We have seen that Shaikh Nasir III, the head of the old ruling family of Büshehr, was reappointed to the government of that town and its dependencies in 1845 after many vicissitudes of fortune. his reinstatement difficulties, due chiefly to hostile action by Baqir Khan, the chief of Tangistan, came upon him thick and fast. On the mainland the Tangistānis attacked and captured Tul Siyāh, raided the district of Rūd-hilleh, sweeping off the livestock and all the other property of the inhabitants, and treacherously put to death the Shaikh of Ahmadi, near whose village, afterwards destroyed by them, they sustained a severe check and lost some 50 of their best men. This state of matters, by interfering with the trade of Büshehr and making the revenue of the Shaikh's outlying districts irrecoverable, caused him great financial embarrassment, especially as he was obliged to maintain a large garrison for the defence of the town; and there were at Shīrāz, in the neighbourhood of His Royal Highness Bahram Mirza, Governor-General of Fars, those who were ready to take advantage of the Shaikh's difficulties, if they had not even created them by inciting Baqir Khan to attack him. The chief enemy of Shaikh Nāsir at Shīrāz was Muhammad Ali Khān. known as the Nizām-ul-Mulk, who for various reasons may be conjectured to have been closely connected with the Haji Qawwam, Kalantar of Shīraz, by far the most influential man of the day in Southern Persia. The Qawwam, it may be observed, was a son of Haji Ibrāhim, that minister by whose desertion of the Zand cause the establishment of the Qajar dynasty in Persia was greatly facilitated.

There was consequently no reason for astonishment when, on the 2nd Attempted October 1849, an emissary of the Government of Fars charged with the removal of Shaikh Nāsir arrived at Būshehr. This was Muhammad Hāshim Khān, a nephew of the Hāji Qawwām; and his first step was to obtain an interview at the British Residency with Major Hennell, the He informed Major Hennell that he had been commissioned to invite Shaikh Nāsir to proceed to Shīrāz for a settlement of his accounts, which were greatly in arrear, and to prepare the way for Mīrza Mehdi Khān, whom the Nizām-ul-Mulk, his brother, having obtained a grant of Büshehr and some adjacent districts, had appointed to represent

Difficulties of Shaikh Nāsir III as Governor of Büshehr. 1849.

supersession of Shaikh Nāsir in the government of Bushehr, October 1849.

him locally. Muhammad Hashim Khan delivered to the Resident a letter, to the same effect, from the Governor-General; and he seemed to hope that the Resident would offer to prevent the escape of Shaikh Nāsir by sea; but in this, needless to say, he was disappointed. The Persian emissary then visited Shaikh Nasir, to present his credentials; and the Shaikh the same day called on Major Hennell, accompanied only by Shaikh Muhammad, the Shaikh of the Dumukh Arabs of Chah Kutah. to ask his advice. The Dumukh Shaikh, who had heard that Bagir Khān of Tangistān was to be associated at Būshehr with Mīrza Mehdi Khān as his principal adviser, recommended resistance, and in the last resort flight; while Shaikh Nasir said that he would in the first instance appeal to the clemency of the Prince-Governor, and thereafter if unsuccessful, fly or resist as circumstances might dictate. Major Hennell recommended Shaikh Nasir to eschew extreme measures, and rather to comply with the order summoning him to Shīrāz, -a piece of advice which the Shaikh seemed loath to accept from dread of the power of his rival the Nizām-ul-Mulk at head-quarters, and one which the Government of Bombay afterwards characterised as somewhat imprudent, regard being had to the results which might have followed on its being accepted.

In the end Shaikh Nāsir solved the problem by putting Muhammad Hashim and his attendants into a boat on the night of the 4th October and sending them over to Shīf on the mainland, where they were set ashore with an exhortation to make the best of their way to Shīrāz.

Removal of Shaikh Nāsir from the government of Būshehr and rebellion of Shaikh Husain, 1850. This expedient was unavailing, however, except as a means of gaining time; and in the end Shaikh Nāsir was persuaded to visit Shīrāz, whence he was sent a prisoner to Tehrān. The Governor-General of Fārs,* His Royal Highness Fīrūz Mīrza, then appointed a son of the Hāji Qawwām of Shīrāz to the Governorship of Būshehr; but in October 1850 Shaikh Husain, an uncle of Shaikh Nāsir, who had already once usurped possession of Būshehr in 1839, took upon himself the administration of the place and was able for a short time to retain it. Shaikh Husain, who did not cease to profess loyalty to Tehrān while he defied the mandates of Shīrāz, and who at the same time cultivated a good understanding with the British Resident, is described by a

^{*}Prince Fīrūz Mīrza, who succeeded Prince Babrām Mīrza at Shīrāz about the beginning of 1850, was an uncle of the Shāh, and his age at this time was about 3. He was a strong and energetic ruler, especially in his treatment of crime, and generally respected in spite of his grasping avarice.

British traveller * who saw him at this time as an elderly man, mild and good-tempered in appearance, facetious in conversation, but courageous and energetic in action and reputed faithless and cruel to a degree rare even in Persia. His personal following, on which alone he could depend in a crisis, consisted of about 300 desperadoes armed to the teeth; but they were too few to enable him to resist, with any prospect of success a Persian force from Shīraz such as it had been decided to send against him. The town was in a state of panic; about four-fifths of the population had fled to the Persian mainland, to Khārag Island, to Basrah, and to other places; and such of the inhabitants as remained were busily feigning poverty, partly to escape from the relentless exactions of Shaikh Husain, and partly with an eye to the possible arrival of a Persian Governor.

The reason publicly assigned by the Persian authorities for the displacement of Shaikh Nāsir was a large deficiency in his contributions to the Treasury during the previous two years; and the fact was undeniable, though it was largely due to circumstances not under the Shaikh's control. According to the British representative at Būshehr Shaikh Nāsir's removal was not attributable, at least so far as the Shīrāz authorities were concerned, to his friendly connection with the British Residency; but Major Hennell thought that the Amīr Nızām, then Prime Minister, had come to the conclusion that it would be for the advantage of Persia if the government of Būshehr were placed in the hands of officials having no traditional intimacy with the British, and more under the influence of the Persian Government than the Shaikhs of Būshehr were ever likely to become.

The Shīrāz authorities succeeded before long in installing their nominee, a son of the Hāji Qawwām, at Būshehr under the style of Darya Baigi or Lord High Admiral,—a title which, however, inappropriate to an official who controls no naval force, has since then more than once been borne by the representative of the Shāh's Government at Būshehr. Already, during the administration of His Royal Highness Bahrām Mīrza at Shīrāz, one 'Isa Khān had been appointed to Būshehr as Darya Baigi; and this may have been the Governor now actually set up, who was "a sallow, sickly-looking young man" with a countenance showing "no sign of genius or talents of any kind."

Shaikh Husain retired, at the advent of the Darya Baigi, to the island of Khārag, where he and his followers proceeded to tyrannise

Government

of Bushehr by a Persian Darya Baigi and flight of Shaikh Husain, 1851-52.

^{*} See Binning's Journal of Two Years Travel, vol. I, pages 153-54

grievously over the inhabitants. The Darya Baigi on his part sent emissaries to Khārag who, after swearing fidelity to Shaikh Husain on the Qurān, entered his service and then attempted to seize him; but the Shaikh, leaving behind him his cannon and military stores, which fell into the hands of the Persians, made good his escape to the banks of the Shatt-al-Arab. In January 1852 the Darya Baigi received a robe of honour as a reward for his success at Khārag, salutes were fired, and the people of Būshehr were ordered to decorate their houses in honour of the auspicious occasion.

The immediate results of the establishment of a regular administration at Büshehr were excellent. The Tangistānis ceased to give trouble; the inhahitants of Büshehr returned to their homes; and trade began to flourish. The Shaikhs of Büshehr never regained their position as Governors, and history does not even relate what became of Shaikhs Nāsir and Husain.

Cholera at Bushehr, Aug.—Oct. 1851. There was an epidemic of cholera at Büshehr in the autumn of 1851, which at first threatened to be severe. When the disease broke out in August the number of deaths daily was about 30; but it disappeared in October after causing a total mortality of about 500 only.

Famine in Southern Persia, 1870-72. A famine which caused great distress and a heavy mortality, especially in the southern provinces, prevailed in Persia from the middle of 1870 to the middle of 1872. The inhabitants of Fars were scattered in all directions, and there was a ghastly influx into Būshehr of foot-sore and emaciated multitudes, some of whom fell dead on arrival at the town, while others dropped by the way along the road from Shīrāz. An outbreak of cholera at Būshehr in February 1871 contributed to aggravate the situation. Measures which were taken through the British authorities at Būshehr to prevent grain from leaving the country and to organise a system of famine relief fall under the head of British relations and are discussed further on.

Interest shown by the Shāh and Central Government of Persia in the Persian Coast and Islands, 1874-91. Before passing to the internal and administrative history of the districts of the Persian Coast and Islands after 1872, we may notice symptoms of interest in that part of their dominions which were manifested from time to time by the Shāh and the Central Government.

In 1874, under orders from Tehrān, a "box of justice" was set up at Būshehr in which persons of all classes having grievances were allowed to place petitions for direct transmission to the Shāh, and an octroi duty on fruit and vegetables, till then levied at Būshehr, was abolished.

A weekly Persian post between Büshehr and Tehran was established in 1877, as related in the special Appendix on Mail Communications,

putting an end in 1878 to the carriage of general correspondence on that line under arrangements made by the British authorities; and in 1879 the new indigenous service was reported to be working admirably. In the latter year a census was ordered to be taken in the province of Fars, including most of the districts of the Persian Coast; but it is not known to what extent the operation was successful.

In 1885 arrangements were made for a visit by the Shah to Fars; but scarcity, and consequent difficulty regarding supplies for the royal camp, caused the project to be abandoned for the time being.

His Majesty's manifesto of 1888 concerning the rights and liberties of Persian subjects was published in the districts of the Persian Gulf as in other parts of the Empire and elicited from the British Resident at Bushehr the remark: "The effects of this measure are not yet palpable, but, owing chiefly to increased intercourse with Europeans and interchange of ideas with them, there is a gradual amelioration of the condition of the people in progress, and the Royal Proclamation is a sign of the times at all events, and may yet bear fruit."

At the end of 1891 the Shah again contemplated a tour in Fars. This was a measure entirely in accord both with His Majesty's humane solicitude for the welfare of his subjects and with his fondness for travel; but once more a failure of crops necessitated its postponement, and it was never accomplished.

A matter deserving separate notice is the manifestation by Nasir-ud- Naval policy Din Shah, though somewhat intermittently, of an ambition to possess a naval force in the Persian Gulf.

About the year 1865 the Shah proposed to acquire three or four armed steamers, which, commanded by British naval officers and manned by Arabs or Indians, should discharge maritime police duties in Persian waters at least; but the scheme, which was believed to cover designs on Bahrain, was discountenanced by the British Government and came to nothing.

Some fifteen years later it seems to have been suggested to the Shah that, if the Persian coast were watched and its ports brought under control, the result would be a great increase in the productiveness of the customs; and with this idea it was decided, in 1883, that the Persian Government should acquire one vessel per annum and so gradually build up a flotilla of preventive vessels, which would be available for other purposes also. Tenders were invited in Britain and Germany, and in the end a contract was given to a German firm at Bremerhaven for the construc-

of Nāsir-ad-Din Shah in the Persian Gulf, 1865-88.

tion of two vessels. The larger of these, the "Persepolis," was finished in January 1885 and arrived at Büshehr in May in charge of German officers and a German crew: the smaller, the "Susa," was sent out in parts about the same time and put together at Muhammareh. Shah's desire to visit Fars in 1885 may have been connected with these rudiments of a navy. Both vessels were screw steamers; but, while the "Persepolis" was a sea-going craft of about 600 tons and 450 horse power, carrying four Krupp guns and designed for general service in the Gulf, the "Susa," though she also originally carried guns, was only a river boat of 36 tons and 30 horse power, resembling a harbour launch. The cost of the two was £32,000, but neither steamer yielded satisfactory results: this may have been due to the conditions under which they had to be maintained, by a staff mostly native and far from all docking facilities. The farmers of the Persian Gulf customs had not, it would seem, a belief equal to that of the Persian Government in the efficacy of the "Persepolis" as an aid to the collection of customs duty, for they demurred to paying the cost of her maitenance, which was considerable: and in 'Arabistan the Shaikh of Muhammareh at first raised objections to the employment of the "Susa" on the Kārnū. Consequently, for a time, the "Persepolis" lay idle at Büshehr and the "Susa" at Failīveh: and, when at length the "Persepolis" was taken into use, for political purposes in the Gulf and the "Susa" placed on the Kārūn above Ahwāz as a despatch boat under the orders of the Governor of 'Arabistan, all dreams of an expanding Persian marine seemed to have been discarded.

Administration of Fars, 1872-96.

Some account of the general administration of Fars during the period may also, as that province at first included almost all the districts of the Persian Coast, usefully be prefixed to our examination of local history.

The number of coastal districts and villages subject to the Governor-General of Fārs was greater at the beginning of the period than it is at the present day, when an independent administration described as that of "the Gulf Ports," with headquarters at Būshehr, exists. Dīlam, it is true, belonged not to Fārs, but to Behbehān, as the Līrāvi district surrounding it still does; but Būshehr itself, with the connected districts of Hayāt Dāvud, Rūd-hilleh, Angāli, Dashtistān, Tangistān, and Dashti, were then under the Government of Fārs; and the whole remainder of the Persian Coast down to Biyābān, including the entire districts of Shībkūh, Lingeh, Bastak, Bandar 'Abbās, Shamīl, Mīnāb, Biyābān and Jāshk formed a part of Fārs. Dashti and Tangistān afterwards passed from dependence on Būshehr to direct dependence on Shīrāz, and Dashtistān was divided between Būshehr and Shīrāz; but the gains

of Būshehr at the expense of Fārs, since its detachment from the latter in 1887, comprise 'Asalu and Nāband in Shībkūh with their dependencies, and the whole districts of Lingeh, Bandar 'Abbās, Shamīl, Mīnāb, Biyābān and Jāshk, with their islands.

After the lapse, in 1868, of the lease of Bandar 'Abbās given to the Sultān of 'Omān, nothing resembling an independent Arab state existed upon the Persian littoral; but Lingeh remained for a time in the hands of an Arab Shaikh who farmed the revenues from the Persian Gcvernment without admitting their interference in local affairs; and at other places also there were Shaikhs of minor importance who enjoyed a sort of autonomy.

In 1873 the Governor-Generalship of Fars was conferred on the Hisām-us-Saltaneh, an uncle of the Shāh, who had previously played a conspicuous part in Khurāsān and Herat affairs. He retained it until 1875, in which year he gave a hospitable reception at Shīrāz to the British Resident in the Persian Gulf and the officers of his staff.

The Hisām-us-Saltaneh was succeeded by Yahya Khān, known then as the Mo'tamad-ul-Mulk and later as the Mushīr-ud-Dauleh, who had married the Shāh's sister, the widow of the Amīr Nizām, and who rose later to be Minister for Foreign Affairs,—a post which he forfeited on the escape of Ayūb Khān from Tehrān.

In August 1876, the Mo'tamad-ul-Mulk was superseded by His Royal Highness* Farhād Mīrza, known as the Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh, an uncle of the Shāh, whose first act was to overthrow the power of the Mushīr-ud-Dauleh, the permanent Vazīr of the province, till then all-powerful. The Prince, who was an elderly man, assisted by his son the Ihtishām-ud-Dauleh, established and preserved unexampled security and good order throughout Southern Persia; but his methods, which comprised the crucifixion of criminals—real or supposed—and their burial in mortar pits, can only be described as ruthless. In its financial aspects his administration was so oppressive as commonly to be summed up by his subjects in the phrase "Fārs tamām shud" (Fārs is done for). He maintained very friendly relations with the British representatives in his province; and in April 1880, the Resident at Būshehr, with his staff, paid him a visit at Shīraz.

In the spring of 1881, the Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh was removed from Shīraz to make way for Sultān Mas'ūd Mīrza, the Zill-us-Sultān, a son of the Shāh, who was then about 32 years of age and already held charge

Government of the Hisamus-Saltaneh, 1873-75.

Government of the Mo'tamad-ul-Mulk, 1875-76.

Government of the Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh, 1876-81.

Government of the Zillus-Sultān, 1881-87.

^{*} Stack , Six months in Persia, Vol. I, page 48), calls him "Firuz Mirza," but this seems to be a mistake.

of the districts of Ispahān, the Bakhtiyāri country, Yazd, Burūjird, Luristān and 'Arabistān. Until the arrival at Shīrāz in June 1881 of the Jalāl-ud-Dauleh, a young son whom the Zill-us Sultān deputed to represent him in Fārs, he himself remaining at Ispahān, the administration was carried on provisionally by the Qavvām-ul-Mulk, the most influential noble of Shīrāz; and the Jalāl-ud-Dauleh was accompanied to his post by the Sāhib Dīvān, a brother of the Qavvām-ul-Mulk, in the capacity of mentor. In revenue matters the Government of the Zill-us-Sultān was more considerate, at least at the outset, than that of the Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh; but he did not shrink from acts of extreme severity, and for a time the tranquillity of the province was maintained with great success. The Zill-us-Sultān had pretensions to European culture, and he devoted some attention to the military training, on Austrian lines, of the troops under his orders; but the sincerity of the pro-British sentiments which he frequently expressed was open to doubt.

In 1882 began the removal, piece-meal, of ports and districts in the Persian Gulf from the jurisdiction of the Governor-General of Fars. The first to go were Lingeh and Bandar 'Abbās; they were transferred to the management of the Amin-us-Sultan, a favourite officer of the Shah and afterwards head of the Persian Ministry, who about this time became sole manager or rather farmer of the customs throughout Persia, and udder whose orders the customs house at Büshehr also, though not as yet the administration of that town, was placed. At the end of 1883 died the Mushīr-ul-Mulk, ex-Vazīr of Fārs, whose power the Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh had broken; he was a man of immense wealth and the originator of many useful public works. His death was followed within a few days by that of the Qavvām-ul-Mulk, his rival and bitter enemy, whose title was continued to his son Muhammad Riza Khān. In 1884 there were dissensions between the Sahib Divan, the actual ruler of Fars, and his nephew the new Qavvām-ul-Mulk; and the administration of the province began to deteriorate and to provoke unfavourable comparisons with what it had been in the days of the Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh. In 1886 the Jlal-ud-Dauleh had reached years of discretion; but he remained a cypher in the Government, and real power continued to be wielded by the Sāhib Dīvān alone, who obtained the removal of the Qavvām-ul-Mulk to Isfahān as a prisoner.

Separation of the Gulf Perts from Fars and In February 1887 Fārs was taken from the Zill-us-Sultān and conferred on the Amīn-us-Sultān; and the result was a general upturn of political conditions. The Qavvām-ul-Mulk, who had meanwhile been

released from custody on paying 60,000 Tūmāns, was taken into favour; the seaboard towns, including Būshehr, Lingeh and Bandar 'Abbās, with their dependent districts and the islands of the Persian Coast were formed into a Gulf Ports charge independent of Fārs; and H. R. H. the Ihtishām-ud-Dauleh, son of the Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh, was set over the districts that remained subject to Shīrāz, or most of them.

Government of the Intishām-ud-Dauleh. 1887-92.

The Ihtishām-ud-Dauleh, who in 1888 had received his father's title of Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh, was relieved in February 1892 by H. R. H. Muhammad Taqi Mīrza, the Rukn-ud-Dauleh, a brother of the Shāh. This Prince initiated a firm administration and came in collision with the Qavvām-ul-Mulk, who had temporarily to retire from the scene, but ere many months had passed the Rukn-ud-Dauleh had to retire in favour of the Nizām-us-Saltaneh, an official of undistinguished origin but a successful Governor of 'Arabistān, who held charge for more than a year. In 1894 the Rukn-ud-Dauleh was reappointed to Fārs, where he remained in power till after the assassination of Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shāh.

Government of the Ruknud-Dauleh and Nizāmus-Sultaneh, 1892-96.

Administrative and internal history of the Persian Coast and Islands, 1872—1896.

The most important jurisdiction on the Persian Coast was that of Büshehr, the history of which can now, in the light of the foregoing account of the affairs of Fars, be made intelligible.

History of Bushehr, 1872-96.

For a short time in 1873 Büshehr town, with the country district dependent on it, was separated from the province of Fārs under His Royal Highness Asad Ullah Mīrza, the Nāib-ut-Tiyāleh; but it returned to its former position on the arrival of the Hisām-us-Saltaneh at Shīrāz, Prince Asad Ullah continuing to govern it until the removal of that Governor-General in 1875, when he resigned.

Government of the Naibut-Tiyaleh, 1873-75.

The relations of the Prince Governor of Büshehr with the British Residency were uniformly courteous and friendly; but the state of the districts and roads, which were infested by bands of robbers, left much to be desired. In 1873-74 the Büshehr customs were farmed to an Isfahāni for 32,000 Tümāns, or about Rs. 1,28,000, and the assessment of the dependent districts was approximately Rs. 1,50,000. In the summer of 1874 the Naib-ut-Tiyāleh went to Shīrāz, leaving his son in charge at

Büshehr; and in 1875 he made a tour in his districts to collect the revenue due to Government.

Various Governors, 1875-76. On the Prince's resignation Būshehr was entrusted to Sartīp 'Abdul Husain Khān; but his administration was unsuccessful and of short duration. The Sartīp's place was presently taken by one Husain Quli Khān, who at once proceeded to collect the outstanding revenue with the help of a force of infantry and artillery; but in the summer of 1876, he having left for Shīrāz, the Government devolved on unworthy or incompetent substitutes; and during the months of June and July crime was rife in the town and environs of Būshehr,—a state of matters largely due to the presence of a considerable body of Persian troops whose pay was in arrears. Some of the Persian soldiers, on measures being taken against them, sought refuge under the flag staff of the Turkish Consulate.

Government of the Intisham-ud-Dauleh, 1876-81. On the supersession of the Mo'tamad-ul-Mulk by the Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh His Royal Highness 'Awais Mīrza, the Ihtishām-ud-Dauleh, was appointed Governor of Būshehr by his father.

The Prince was much or upied by the affairs of other tracts, including Behbehān, for which he was responsible; and this prevented his devoting much personal attention to Büshehr; but it was his practice, during his father's and his own very effective administration of Fārs, to make an annual tour of inspection through the southern districts of the province. Early in 1877, accompanied by a formidable body of non-local troops, he spent about two months at Būshehr, which he again visited in February 1878. He generally maintained a Deputy Governor in the town, at first Hāji Ismā'īl Khān and afterwards Āgha Muhammad Bāqir Khān, the latter of whom vacated office along with his patron on the appointment of the Zill-us-Sultān to Fārs in 1881.

In 1877 there died at Büshehr Āgha Muhammad 'Ali, the Malik-ut-Tujjār or officially recognised head merchant of the place. He was reputed the richest private individual in Persia; and his estate, as he had no children, passed to his elder brother, Hāji Bāba, a naturalised British Indian subject residing at Büshehr.

The customs of Büshehr were not invariably leased to the Governor of Büshehr, and in 1878-79 they had been granted to the Nasīr-ul-Mulk of Shīrāz, a brother of the elder Qavvām-ul-Mulk and the Sāhib Dīvān, notwithstanding that a royal prince was then Governor of the town and its districts.

The arrangements at Büshehr in 1881-82, while the Zill-us-Sultan was establishing his administration at Shīrāz, seem to have been indeter-Muhammad Bāqir Khān, the Ihtishām-ud-Dauleh's Deputy Governor, was succeeded as a temporary arrangement by the Karguzar or representative of the Persian Foreign Office at Bushehr and he in his turn by a certain Mo'tamad-us-Sultan.

Various Governors, 1881-86.

In 1882 the Government of Bushehr was granted to the Nasīr-ul-Mulk, who had farmed the customs of the port three years earlier; but he left for his home at Shīrāz in February 1883, making over charge to the local Kārguzār, and a little later the Amin-us-Sultān at Tehrān, as already mentioned, obtained control of the Büshehr customs along with those of other places in the Persian Gulf.

Hāji Bāba, the heir of Āgha Muhammad 'Ali, Malik-ut-Tujjār, died in May 1883; and his property was inherited by his grandson, Hāji Muhammad Mehdi, who was appointed Malik-ut-Tujjār.

In June 1883 Mirza Muhammad Husain Khān, a son of the Sāhib Dīvān, arrived at Būshehr, having been appointed to succeed the Nasīr-ul Mulk; but he remained only until January 1884, when, being summonedto Shīrāz, he nominated his son-in-law Hāji Fazl 'Ali Khān as his locum tenene. Muhammad Husain Khan retained the government of Bushehr in 1884-85, receiving from the Shah the title of Motaman-ud-Dauleh, and being appointed by the powerful Amīn-us-Sultan his Agent for the collection of the customs of Būshehr, as well as Governor on his behalf of Lingeh and Bandar 'Abbās.

The Motaman-ud-Dauleh resigned the government of Büshehr in June 1885 and was followed in it by Shāhzādeh Nauzar Mīrza, a grandson of Hasan 'Ali Khān, Farmān-Farmā of Fārs, and a great grandson consequently of Fat-h 'Ali Shāh; but the Shāhzādeh was soon displaced by one Safar 'Ali Khān.

At the beginning of 1886 Bushehr was governed by Hāji Muhammad Mehdi, Malik-ut-Tujjār; but in May he made way for Hāji Fat-h 'Ali Khān; and later the Nasīr-ul-Mulk again assumed control of Büshehr and its dependencies.

In 1887, on the fall of the Zill-us-Sultan, who was at this time Government deprived of all his governments except Isfahan, the whole of Fars was made over to the Amīn-us-Sultān and parcelled out by him to various 1887-91. deputies. The Ihtishām-us-Sultān received, as already mentioned, Shīrāz and the central districts; Būshehr and other coast towns and islands were conferred, as a separate Gulf Ports government, on Muhammad Hasan Khān, a brother of the Nizām-us-Saltaneh, with the title of

of the Sa'ad ul-Mulk,-

Sa'ad-ul-Mulk; and some outlying districts such as Dashtistān, Tangistān and Dashti went to His Royal Highness Nauzar Mīrza.

At the beginning of the year the Nasīr-ul-Mulk had been in charge of Būshehr; but from about April to July he had been absent at Shīrāz, during which time Haidar Quli Khān, and later Sartīp Hāji Ahmad Khān, had officiated for him; and on his return, though he brought with him 200 infantry and 400 mounted men, he had found it necessary to resign in consequence of the intrigues of his brother the Sāhib Dīvān against him at Shīrāz, and had been succeeded by Shāhzādeh Nauzar Mīrza. It was by this prince that Būshehr was eventually handed over to the Amīn-us-Sultān's representative, the Sa'ad-ul-Mulk.

Governments of the Nizām us-Saltaneh and Sa'adul-Mulk, 1892-94. In 1891 or 1892 the Sa'ad-ul-Mulk was replaced by his brother the Nizām-us-Saltaneh, but in the latter part of 1892 the Nizām-us-Saltaneh was called to the Governorship of Fārs and transferred Būshehr to his nephew, Riza Quli Khān. After a short interval the Sa'ad-ul-Mulk resumed the government of Būshehr, but he continued to reside chiefly at Shīrāz.

Government of the Qavvām-ul-Mulk, 1894-96. In March 1894, at the beginning of the Persian official year, the government of the Gulf Ports passed to the Qavvām-ul-Mulk of Shīrāz; but he did not arrive at Būshehr, the headquarters of his administration, till the following July. He was re-appointed in 1895; but intrigues which had been organised against him by a coalition of merchants resulted in his resignation in March 1896, before he had quite completed his second year of office.

It having been suggested to him from Tehrān that the Malīk-ut-Tujjār might with advantage be temporarily removed from Būshehr, he imprudently attempted to remove that personage in a forcible and ignominious manner. The result was that the Malīk took sanctuary at the Imāmzādeh near Sabzābād, while noisy demonstrations in his favour were got up in the town, the shops being shut and business brought to a standstill, and the telegraph office besieged by excited crowds of memorialists,—circumstances which the Qavvām-ul-Mulk's adversaries did not fail to turn to account.

Appointment of the Hisam-us-Saltaneh, 1896. History of Dilam, 1872-96.

On the resignation of the Qavvām-ul-Mulk the Hisām-us-Saltaneh was appointed Governor of the Gulf Ports, but he did not reach Būshehr until June 1896, after the death of the Shāh.

Dilam, as we have seen, was included in the province of Behhehān at the commencement of the period now under consideration; and the time at which it was brought under the Government of Fārs, or more probably—as a Gulf Port—under Būshehr cannot be exactly fixed.

In 1873, it being then still subject to the Government of Behhehān, piracies were committed by an ex-ruler of the town upon Persian boats, the master of one of which was murdered. The services of a British vessel were offered to the Persian authorities, but were not accepted; and the pirate seems to have escaped the penalty of his misdeeds. In 1879-80 there were disturbances at Dīlam due to the supersession of Khān 'Ali, the Zābit or tribal ruler recognised by the Persian Government, in favour of 'Abdullah Khān, a new nominee. In December 1892 Ja'far Khān, then Zābit of Dīlam, was declared by the Persian authorities to be evading payment of revenue, and a detachment of 30 soldiers was sent to arrest him; but the people of the place rose in arms in defence of their chief, and the detachment was defeated. Later, however, Ja'far Khān was removed and the Zābit of Rīshehr installed in his place.

In 1878-79 there was trouble at Rīg, consequent on the replacement of one Zābit by another. In 1892-93 hostilities took place between Khān Ali Khān, ruler of Rīg, and Muhammad Khān, ruler of Angāli, who then held the Rūd-hilleh district also in farm. Both Khāns were discontented with the Persian Government, who played them off against each other; but the death of the Angāli chief, who was killed in a bloodfeud, produced a temporary lull. In 1893, however, Khān 'Ali Khān, having made his peace with the Persian Government, took the villages of the Angāli in farm; but the resistance of the inhabitants to his rule was not overcome until a gun had been sent to his assistance by the Persian authorities at Būshehr.

History of Hayāt Dāvud, Rūdhilleh and Angāli, 1872-96.

Dashtistan was not distinguished by greater tranquillity from the other districts adjacent to Bushehr. In 1878 Muhammad Hasan Khān of Burāzjān was a prisoner at Shīrāz, where one of his sons had been put to death. In April 1886 there were serious disturbances at Burāzjān. In 1889, when Prince Nauzar Mīrza relinquished the government of Dashtistan, to which he had been appointed in 1887, he was succeeded by Sartip Muhammad Hasan Khān; the district was at the time distracted, except the town of Burāzjān and its dependencies, by feuds between local chiefs. In 1895 an attempt was made by the Persian authorities to pacify the district by placing a particular chief in universal control; but the change was resisted by a competitor, Ahmad Khān, who shot his favoured rival dead. Under orders from Tehran a punitive force with one small naval gun was then sent against Ahmad Khān; but the rebel was joined by contingents from the neighbouring districts of Shabānkareh and Tangistān; and reinforcements had to be sent from Bushehr to the Persian force. The final result was the recognition of

History of Dashtistān, 1872-96.

Ahmad Khān himself, after he had made submission at Būshehr, as the sole chief of Dashtistān.

History of Tangistan, 1872-96. In 1879 Tangistān came under the rule of a single authority, Haidar Khān, on the expulsion of his first cousin Ali Khān, who had disputed the government with him. A rebellion against Haidar Khān's authority seems to have occurred in 1893; and the insurgents, who were armed with Martini rifles, succeeded in repelling an attack made on them by the Khān in conjunction with Persian troops and a gun from Būshehr.

History of Dashti, 1872-96.

On the occasion of the Ihtishām-ud-Dauleh's first visit to Būshehr in 1877 the chief of Dashti, Haidar Khān, who had not paid his respects to the Persian authorities for a number of years, thought it advisable to wait on the Prince there; and the latter, when he left Bushehr, made a tour in Dashti and remained in the district for some time. In the following year Haidar Khan preferred to make a journey to Shiraz. whence he had received assurances of pardon for past misdeeds, rather than to trust himself again in the power of the Prince-Governor at Bushehr; but he died at Shīrāz, and the accident was commonly ascribed to his having partaken of "Shurbeh-i-Qājari" or Qājār broth, in other words to his having been poisoned. His brother Muhammad Khān. who had in the meanwhile visited the Ihtishām-ud-Dauleh, was appointed ruler of Dashti in his stead; and the Prince-Governor once more returned to Shīrāz by way of Dashti. In 1879 there were local disturbances in Dashti, incident on the collection of the revenue; and in June 1881 Muhammad Khān died at Būshehr, where he had been imprisoned on account of arrears alleged to be due by him to the Government. He was succeeded by his nephew Jamal Khan, a son of Haidar Khān. In July 1884 a fracas occurred at Būshehr between Persian soldiers and some Dashtis who had come to town with a widow of Muhammad Khān, the late chief, and several lives were lost. In 1887 Jamāl Khān appeared at Būshehr in the train of the Nasīr-ul-Mulk, on the latter's short-lived resumption of his Government. Dashti was one of the districts of which the charge devolved, on the departure of Prince Nauzar Mīrza in 1889, on Sartīp Muhammad Hasan Khān; and, like Dashtistan, it was at the time disturbed by feuds.

History of Shibkuh, 1872-96. In Shībkūh, during this period, interest centred chiefly in the exploits and tragic end of Shaikh Mazkūr of Kangūn. This chief was, about 1877, arrested and sent to Shīrāz; but, his successor Mahammad Hasan Khān having failed to give satisfaction, he was reinstated on paying—or promising to pay—100,000 Qrāns. In May 1878, after his return home, helped by Hamad-bin-Ismā'īl, the 'Obaidli Shaikh of

Chīru, and by Muhammad-bin-Hasan, Shaikh of Chārak, he undertook an expedition against 'Abdullah-bīn-Muhammad, the Hamadi Shaikh of Kalat, whose village of Marbakh the allies were successful in plundering, besides killing 17 men of the Hamadis. In July the Qavvām-ul-Mulk, then Governor of Lar, sent 200 Sarbaz and 700 irregulars with one gun against Shaikh Mazkūr ostensibly to punish him for this outrage; but the force was surprised and defeated by the Shaikh and his adherents. In February 1879 the Qavvam-ul-Mulk in person arrived in Shībkūh with troops, but apparently effected nothing. At length in May 1880, after prolonged petty warfare, Shaikh Mazkūr, who had shut himself up in a fort called Surkh, fell into the hands of the Persians. "Lured out by treachery, he was forced, though sorely wounded, to ride post in fetters to Shīrāz, where ominous preparations were made to put him to a cruel death immediately on arrival. presence of some European spectators in the throng seems to have served so far to mitigate the form of punishment that the Shaikh was simply strangled at the foot of the scaffold, and the corpse gibbeted on a gallows over which was inscribed an ironical legend." A few of his followers were put to death at the same time; but one of his sons, Hasan, escaped to Bahrain with other members of the family. Mazkur's fate excited much commiseration, for it was generally believed that his cruel punishment was due less to his raid on the Hamadis than to his failure to make good promises of enhanced revenue which he had rashly given to the Persian authorities. One Muhammed Ibrāhīm Baig was set up in his place, and Shībkūh remained undisturbed for some time after his death. In April 1883 considerable excitement was caused by the return from Bahrain of Hasan, the son of Shaikh Mazkur, who landed at Tāhiri; but, on troops being sent against him, he disappeared.

It may be noted that in 1878 or 1879 Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Hasan, the ally of Shaikh Muzkūr, was removed from the Government of Chārak in favour of a certain 'Abdullah-bin-Musabbah, and fled to the island of Quais.

In 1895 trouble occurred at the Tāhiri, where Shaikh Ibrāhīm, the Zābit or official recognised tribal governor, resisted displacement by the Persian authorities to make room for a new nominee; and a considerable force had to be sent to the spot to effect his expulsion.

In October 1874 a charge took place in the Government of Lingeh, which at this time was still a tribally administered Arab principality, in consequence of the death of the Shaikh, Khalīfah-bin-Sa'īd.

History of Lingeh, 1872-96. Government of Shaikh 'Ali, 1874-78.

Shaikh Khalifah was succeeded by his son 'Ali, who too young to transact business himself, was at first largely in the hands of others; and the Persian authorities profited by his minority to interfere more in Lingeh affairs than they had been accustomed to do, and to increase their financial demands. The revenues were let to the Shaikh's principal adviser, Muhammad Hasan Khān at an enhanced rate; but that individual, finding the inhabitants prepared to desert Lingeh rather than submit to increased taxation, was fain to sublet them at a loss to the youth his master. Even the reduced amount proved incapable of collection; and the Wazīr was then made a scape-goat and exiled, his private property being all confiscated.

Government of Shaikh Yūsuf, 1878-85. In November 1878 the short and troubled administration of Shaikh 'Ali ended with his assassination at the village of Mīrakūn by the followers of a certain Shaikh Yūsuf, the guardian appointed for him by his father, whom he had dismissed from employment. The Persian authorities showed no displeasure at this occurrence, and even recognised Yūsuf as Deputy Governor of Lingeh on their behalf but in 1878-79, perhaps from the death of Shaikh 'Ali, the Nasīr-ul-Mulk of Shīrāz, became titular Governor of Lingeh.

In 1881, in consequence of aggressions by Shaikh Yūsuf on British Indian traders, the Governor-General of Fārs appointed a "Passport Officer" to reside at Lingeh and act in matters affecting foreigners.

In the spring of 1882 it was reported that Lingeh had been separated from Fārs and made over to the Amīn-us-Sultān, the court favourite at Tehrān; but the statement was contradicted by high Persian authorities, though they admitted that the customs had been farmed to the Amīn-us-Sultān. The separation of Lingeh from Fārs proved, however, to be a fact; and Muhammad Hussain Khān, the agent of the Amīn-us-Sultān in the Persian Gulf, soon began to exercise general authority there through a local Wāli, who was none other than Shaikh Yūsuf himself.

An attempt was made in May 1882 by the Amīn-us-Sultān's representative to introduce various innovations at Lingeh, among which was the institution of a permanent committee of mechants to decide all mercantile cases; but the last mentioned scheme was opposed by the British authorities and was abandonded. Shaikh Yūsuf still possessed considerable tribal power, and in March 1885 an armed conflict between him and the Shaikh of Chārak was with difficulty averted by mediation.

On the 19th April 1885 Shaikh Yūsuf was murdered by a relation, Shaikh Qadhīb. His widow and sons fled at first to the British settle-

Government of Shaikh ment at Bāsīdu; but in June, on the advice of the Amīn-us-Sultān. they removed thence to the town of Qishm. Lingeh continued for a time in a very disturbed state. In September 1885 Shaikh Qadhīb applied to the Qawasim of Trucial 'Oman for armed aid against his enemies; but a warning, conveved through the Native Agent of the British Government at Sharjah, sufficed to prevent the Shaikhs of Shārjah, and Rās-al-Khaimah from responding to his appeal. A little later Shāhzādeh Muhammad Husain Mīrza, who had been appointed Governor of Lingeh and Bandar 'Abbas, arrived on the spot and confirmed Shaikh Qadhib in the Deputy Governorship of the town and district, the yearly revenue of which was now fixed at 190,000 Qrans.

> Establish. ment of direct ministration,

Qadhib. 1885-87.

The Arab population of Lingeh were loyal to the Shaikh, preferring an Arab to a Persian ruler; but the Persians had resolved on abolishing the system of Local Deputy Governors and on the abasement of the Persian ad-Arab ruling family. On the 11th September 1887 Shaikh Qadhīb 1887. was surprised and captured at Lingeh by Sartīp* Hāji Ahmad Khān, deputed from Bushehr for the purpose, after a struggle involving very little loss of life; the Shaikh was removed to Bushehr, and thence in chains to Tehran, his family property being virtually confiscated; a Persian official was installed in his place in the person of Mīrza Hidāyat Khān, a man of sense and moderation; and a garrison of 200 regular Persian troops was located at Lingeh, where barracks were built for them. These changes were not relished by the people of Lingeh, some of whom actually emigrated to other places, while a larger number held themselves in readiness to do so. Lingeh, already detached from Fars, was now included in the new administration of the Gulf Ports.

In 1888 the Persian troops were mostly withdrawn from Lingeh, and Mīrza Muhammad 'Ali, formerly Kārguzār of Bandar 'Abbās, was appointed Deputy-Governor. In 1889 there was a detachment of 50 Persian soldiers at Lingeh, and Mirza Muhammad 'Ali was succeeded in the Deputy-Governorship by Mīrza Ismā'īl. In April 1892 Lingeh and Bandar Abbās were combined into one charge under Muhammad Khān, who was appointed Deputy-Governor of both places. In 1895 seme alarm was caused at Lingeh by the violence of one Saiyid Yūsuf, who, having killed a man, not only evaded capture but even brought a party to attack the fort. A more vigorous effort at his arrest, directed by the Qavvām-ul-Mulk, was unsuccessful; and afterwards it was found impossible to persuade him to renounce his outlaw state and return to Lingeh.

Various Persian Deputy-Governors. 1888-96.

^{*} The same who was employed in Persian intrigues on the coast of Trucial 'Oman in 1887-88. See page 2047 ante.

Affairs of Sirri Island 1887-88.

The affairs of Sirri Island claim notice in connection with the history of Lingeh, there having been, ever since the first settlement of the Qāsimi Arabs on the Persian Coast, a close relation between the two places. In September 1887, on the occupation of Lingeh by the Persians. the Commander of the Persian expedition, Sartīp Hāji Ahmad Khān. sent a party of 30 soldiers with two guns under Shaikh Hasan, Shaikh of Qishm, to erect a Persian flagstaff and hoist the Persian flag on Sirri. This was done, the presence of the flag on the island being reported soon after by H. M. S. "Ranger," and drew a reprotest from the Qāsimi Shaikh of Shārjah, who claimed that Sirri belonged to the Qawāsim, a tribe settled chiefly in Trucial 'Omān, not to Persia. This was the view entertained also by the British authorities, who had always understood that the superintendence over Sirri exercised by the Shaikh of Lingeh resulted from his position as a Shaikh of the Qawasim, and not from his tenure of the Persian port and district of Lingeh. A diplomatic discussion of the question ensued between the British Legation at Tehran and the Persian Government; but it was discontinued by the British Minister in August 1888, in order to facilitate a settlement of other matters then pending with Persia, without any conclusion having been reached. In the course of argument the Amīn-us-Sultān, the Persian Minister concerned, alleged that Sirri had paid revenue to the Persian Government since 1878, in other words since the usurpation of Lingeh by Shaikh Yūsuf; but an assertion by him that documents proving the title of Persia to Sirri existed at Büshehr was found, on reference to the best source of information there, to be incorrect. The Persians did not, after their annexation of Sirri in 1887, place a permanent official there; but from that year taxes began to be collected annually on the island by emmissaries of the Persian Deputy-Governor of Lingeh.

History of Bandar 'Abbās, 1872-96. In 1873 the roads in the vicinity of Bandar 'Abbās were unsafe. In February 1874 the Bahārlu, a nomadic Arab tribe of the interior, advanced in a threatening manner to within 15 miles of the town, obliging the inhabitants to arm themselves. Āgha Ahmad Shāh, Governor of the place under the Governor-General of Fārs, was at Mīnab and refused to take any steps for the defence of Bandar 'Abbās; but the tribesmen, fortunately, withdrew without delivering the expected attack.

1876 81.

In July 1876 Ahmad Shāh died, and the Mo'tamad-ud-Daulah soon afterwards granted the government to the Nasīr-ul-Mulk of Shīrāz, who appointed a nephew of his own to represent him at Bandar 'Abbās, but subsequently visited the place in person. In 1877-78 Bandar 'Abbās was still held by the Nasīr-ul-Mulk; and it appears that the coast districts as far as Jāshk, together with the islands of Qishm, Hanjām, Lārak and Hormūz were included in his grant. In 1878 Haidar Quli

Khān, then deputy of the Nasīr-ul-Mulk at Bandar 'Abbās, quitted his post for reasons of health and returned to Shīrāz.

In 1881 the administrative arrangements at Bandar 'Abbās were reported unsatisfactory; but in 1882 Bandar 'Abbās, like Lingeh, was separated from Fars and came under the authority of the Amin-us-Sultan.

In 1883 the administration of Bandar 'Abbās was conducted by one Muhammad Hasan-bin-Nāsir, representing Muhammad Husain Khān. the agent in the Persian Gulf of the Amin-us-Sultan; but in the following year Muhammad Husain Khān was generally in personal charge of the place, and his government was found much superior to that of the underlings who represented him in his absence. He resigned his post. however, in March 1885. His successor was Shāhzādah Muhammad

Husain Mīrza, who arrived at Būshehr in April 1885, but apparently did not visit Bandar 'Abbās and Lingeh until the following autumn. In 1886 Bandar 'Abbās was administered, with indifferent results, by obscure and uninfluential persons whom the Malik-ut-Tujjar of Bushehr selected

1883-86.

In 1887, the year of the formation of a Gulf Ports administration 1887. and of the removal of the Arab Shaikh of Lingeh by the Persians, Bandar Abbas also was garrisoned with Persian troops; but most of these were withdrawn in the following year, and in 1889 only 20 soldiers remained.

under orders from the Amin-us-Sultan.

One Mahammad Hasan Baig was Deputy-Governor from 1887 to 1887-96. 1889, and a certain Mīrza Hādi in 1889-90. In 1892-93 Bandar 'Abbās was again in danger from the Bahārlu, who in October 1892 rebelled against the Persian authorities adjoining their usual seats, and, on troops being sent against them from Shīrāz, retired towards the coast with their families, plundering caravans and committing all sorts of The trade routes were closed in consequence, and the excesses. Government revenues could not be collected. Persian troops were sent from Büshehr and other places for the defence of Bandar 'Abbās; and H. M. S. "Cossack" proceeded thither from Bombay in January 1893 for the protection of British subjects, and remained for about a fortnight until fear of an attack was over. Eventually the Bahārlu were pacified by concessions, including—it would seem—permission for their patron the Qavvām-ul-Mulk to return to Shīraz, whence he had been removed by the Prince Governor; and before the end of May 1893 trade had been reopened and affairs generally had resumed their normal course.

The affairs of the island of Qishm, which though attached to Bandar History of 'Abbās had interests of its own, call for a short separate notice.

1877-78 the local ruler of Qishm was Shaikh Sagar, who had in the past given trouble to the British authorities, especially in the matter of supplies for the British Station of Basidu, but had ceased to do so. Complaints of habitual oppression brought against him by his own subjects were investigated under the orders of the Governor-General of Fars and were dismissed; but the Shaikh had to pay heavily for his exoneration. He was at this time in an advanced stage of consumption and visited Masgat for treatment, but he did not die until 1881, when he was succeeded by his nephew Hasan-bin-Muhammad. Qishm was governed by Shaikh Ibrāhīm, a cousin of Shaikh Hasan; but he was removed by the Malik-ut-Tujjār of Būshehr, and afterwards sent in chains to Tehran, Shaikh Hasan returning to power. The charge against Shaikh Ibrāhīm was that he had allowed the Shī'ahs of Qishm to be attacked, during their Muharram celebrations, by the Sunnis; and. though he had in reality done his best to prevent the trouble, he was obliged to pay a fine of 2,000 Qrans. In 1883 Shaikh Ibrahim was released from Tehran and allowed to return to Qishm.

British political relations with the Persian Coast and Islands before the Anglo-Persian War, 1848-1856.

Intervention of the Assistant Resident on behalf of Hāji 'Abdul Muhammad, Malik-ut-Tujjār, 1849.

In 1849, during an absence of Shaikh Nāsir III from Būshehr on a visit to Shīrāz connected with the difficulties, between himself and the Government of Fars, Haji 'Abdul Muhammad, the Malik-ut-Tujjar or officially recognised head of the Persian mercantile community, suddenly found himself in great danger from Shaikh Husain, the uncle of Shaikh Nasir; and on the 10th May he came to the British Residency to solicit the protection of Lieutenant Kemball, the Assistant Resident, who seems to have been officiating in charge. The immediate cause of the rupture between the Malik-ut-Tujjār and Shaikh Husain was perhaps an order received by the former from the Shiraz Government, with which, however, he had neglected to comply, that he should direct the merchants of the town to postpone payment of customs duty; but he was suspected by Shaik Nāsir's relations of working for the Shaikh's removal from the Government besides which the strongest animosity had existed between the parties to the quarrel for a number of years. When the Malik-ut-Tujjār made his application to the Assistant Resident he had already assembled all the principal merchants of Büshehr at his house, where they remained day and night, their presence affording some guarantee for his safety; and Lieutenant Kemball felt that the slightest appearance of indifference on his own part would probably seal the doom of the unfortunate man. Accordingly, in the course of the two following days, he received the principals in the dispute at the Residency, where he discussed matters with them; and his mediation was so far successful that on the 14th May the Malik-ut Tujjār thought it safe to dismiss the other merchants from his house, and the excitement that had prevailed in the town was allayed.

But Shaik Husain soon renewed his threats against the Malik-ut-Tujjār and took measures for preventing his escape from the town by sea On the 22nd May the Malik-ut-Tujjār visited the Assistant Resident again, in a state of great alarm, and it appeared that he had been called on to leave the town at once, — a movement on which he thought that he could not venture with safety. He proposed to accept offers that had been made him by Ahmad Khān, son of the Tangistāni Chief Bāqir Khān, who was absent at Shīrāz, to come with an armed party to Büshehr and carry him away to a place of safety; but this idea was discountenanced by Lieutenant Kemball, who feared that a serious encounter might result between the Tangistanis and Shaikh Husain's men. At length on the 25th May, preparations by Shaikh Husain for an attack on Hāji 'Abdul Mahammad as he left the town by land having been foiled by the Assistant Resident, who induced the Shaikh actually in charge of Büshehr to convoy him through the gates, and who sent two representatives from the British Residency with him as a precaution against treachery, the Malik-ut-Tujjār was enabled to gain the open country. He was met, at a distance of 5 or 6 miles outside, by an escort of 50 Tangistānis.

Lieutenant Kemball's intervention was approved as judicious by Colonel Farrant, the British Chargé d'Affaires at Tehrān.

Operations on the Persian Coast and Islands in the course of the Anglo-Persian War, 1856-1857.

A general account of the British Campaign in Southern Persia, in 1856-57 has been given above, but it remains to notice some of the principal features of the local operations.

The assembling in the Persian Gulf of the transports of the original expeditionary force, with the vessels of the Indian Navy by which they

Rendezvous off Bandar.

'Abbas, 24th November 1856. were conveyed, was completed on the 24th November 1856 off Bandar 'Abbās. This place had been chosen by the Government of Bombay as the rendezvous; but the Government of India, on the selection coming to their knowledge, suggested that it might be preferable, in order to avoid compromising (or eliciting objections from) the Saiyid of 'Omān, who held Bandar 'Abbās as a fief under the Persian Government, to substitute Bāsīdu. The Government of Bombay in reply pointed out that Bāsīdu, being situated on the island of Qishm which was included in the Saiyid's fief, was open to the same objections as Bandar 'Abbās; and that the Saiyid was not likely to protest against, or to be held accountable for, the utilisation of Bandar 'Abbās by the British expedition in a manner which he had not authorised and was not in a position to prevent. Meanwhile a number of the vessels employed had left India for Bandar 'Abbās, and, as their destination could not be altered, the discussion was not pursued.

Declaration of war and occupation of Kharag Island, 3rd and 4th December.

On the 29th November the leading ships of the armament appeared off Būshehr; and the Persian Governor of the town, Mīrza Hasan 'Ali Khān, Darya Baigi, wrote officially to Commander Felix Jones, the British Resident, to enquire the reason of their coming. On the 3rd December, Commander Jones, who had in the meantime betaken himself on board the "Assaye," the flagship of the fleet, replied that his functions as Resident had ceased; and his answer was accompanied by a copy of the Declaration of War issued in India on the 1st November, which was sent on the part of General Stalker, Commanding the British forces.

On the 4th December the British flag was hoisted on Khārag Island, where a military depôt was formed.

Landing at Halileh, 7th to 9th December. On the 6th December, most of the transports having at length arrived from Bandar 'Abbās, the vessels were collected at Bandar Hālīleh, at the south end of the Būshehr peninsula, which had been chosen as a suitable place for disembarking the whole force. The first shots in the war were fired by the steam frigate "Ajdaha", which with a division of 8 gunboats covered the landing, and some 300 of the enemy who had occupied date groves adjacent to the beach retreated to a distance. The process of disembarkation, though favoured by the weather, was arduous in the extreme, few boats being available except those of the fleet; but it was completed in the short space of three days and two nights.

Capture of Rishehr On the morning of the 9th December the advance on Büshehr was begun, the armed vessels of the fleet under Rear-Admiral Sir Henry

Leeke, R.N., Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Navy, following a fort, 9th December. parallel course along the coast.

The old fort of Rishehr, a very high and extensive earthwork surrounded by a deep and wide ditch, was found to be held by 400 or 500 Tangistānis under Bāqir Khān, chief of Tangistān, some of whom at first sallied forth to annoy the British advance guard, while a fire of musketry was also opened from the fort. On the arrival of the British main body the fort, after being shelled by the 8-inch guns of the "Assaye" from a distance of 1,700 yards, was stormed with the bayonet, H. M.'s 64th Regiment scaling the north face of the work, while the 20th Native Infantry entered it at the north-eastern, and the 2nd Europeans and 2nd Baluch Battalion at the south-eastern angle. The first man on the parapet was Captain Wood, Commanding the grenadier company of the 20th Native Infantry, which led the assault; he was struck almost at once by seven musket balls, but passed his sword through a leader of the enemy; and he ultimately recovered of his wounds. The defenders of the fort fled out of it on the side next the sea and were pursued southwards, along the beach below the cliffs, by the 3rd Light Cavalry. The casualties on the British side were 8 killed and 37 wounded; the loss of the enemy seems to have been between 200 and 300, including a son and a nephew of Bagir Khan, both killed. Among the British killed were Brigadier Stopford who fell, leading H. M.'s 64th Regiment, near the top of the steep incline, and Lieutenant-Colonel Malet of the 3rd Light Cavalry, who was treacherously attacked by a man to whom he had granted quarter. The British wounded included, besides Captain Wood, Lieutenants Utterson and Warren, also of the 20th Native Infantry, both of whom died of their wounds. The fort was occupied, as soon as taken, by the 2nd Balüchis, and the wounded were sent on boardship the same evening.

When the tribesmen occupying the Peninsula were thus being Attempt by dispersed, Commander F. Jones, the Resident, made an effort to reach Bushehr town in a small steamer under a flag of truce, his object being to avert bloodshed, if possible, and in any case to offer a refuge on board the fleet to such merchants and other inhabitants of the town as desired When the "Assyria" arrived at about 500 yards from the shore, however, several shots were fired at her from the Persian batteries; and Commander Jones was obliged to turn back with his mission unaccomplished. A written apology was almost immediately sent off by the Persian Governor, who attributed the incident to the ignorance of the

the Resident to visit Bushehr, 9th December.

Persian artillerymen; but the attempt to communicate with the town was not renewed.

Capture of Bushehr, 10th December. About 8 A.M. next morning * fire was opened by the steam frigate "Ajdaha", the steam sloops "Berenice" and "Victoria", and the sloop "Falkland" on a redoubt and trenches a mile and-a-half south of the town, where the Persians were preparing to oppose the British advance by land. After an hour's naval bombardment, which did little damage on account of the greatness of the range, the enemy, seeing the British military force approaching, quitted the position and retired into the town with their artillery; and General Stalker, when he reached the spot with his troops, passed it without encountering resistance. When the redoubt and trenches were abandoned a flag of truce was sent off from the town to Sir H. Leeke, with a request for an armistice of 24 hours to allow of terms being proposed; but the request was refused on the ground of the firing upon the "Assyria" on the previous day.

A bombardment of the defences of the town from the sea was then undertaken, the "Semiramis" and "Ferooz", bearing the brunt of the action, which was at first well sustained on the part of the Persian artillery; and in three hours two batteries without the town, a masked battery below the Residency flag staff outside the walls, and a tower on the north-west angle of the fort were silenced with but little injury however to the works containing them, and a breach in the south-west angle of the town wall had been commenced.

Shortly after noon, on the arrival of the British land forces near the walls, the Persian flagstaff in the town was lowered in sign of surrender; after a little hesitation the Persian Governor and the Persian Military Commandant, Sarhang Mehtar Khān, came out and gave up their swords; and some 1,500 or 2,000 men, all that remained of the Persian garrison, many of whom had escaped across the creek to the mainland while others had been drowned in trying to do so, grounded their arms in front of the British line. The town was occupied, the British colours being hoisted on the Residency flagstaff at 4-30 p.m.

There were no British casualties at the capture of Bushehr; but some of the vessels of the Indian Navy engaged were damaged in hull, masts and rigging. After occupation the Persian flag was obtained as a

^{*}The action of the fleet seems to have been premature, if not actually contrary to arrangement, in the opinion of the military, who also deplored the failure of the naval authorities to arrange for preventing the escape of the Persian garrison across the creek at the back of the town to the mainland; but the reasons of the Rear Admiral for the couse which he followed are not on record.

trophy, and possession was taken of 65 guns found in the place, besides large quantities of ammunition and other military stores. The Persian Governor and Commandant, together with Mīrza Muhammad Riza, the Karguzār or Foreign Office Agent of the Persian Government, were sent on boardship for removal to India; but the ordinary Persian prisoners, after being detained for the night, were set at liberty next morning.

The British camp was formed about a mile south of the town near the Persian redoubt, the 14-gun sloop "Clive," a small steamer, and some gunboats with 24-pounder howitzers being placed in the creek behind the town to cover one flank, while the other next the sea was protected by the "Victoria" and "Ferooz." The camp was surrounded by an entrenchment consisting of a simple ditch three feet deep and six feet wide, with a parapet formed of the earth thrown out; there were flanking batteries at the corners and other salient points; and the only outpost was a cavalry picket two miles to the southward.

British ariangements after the occupation of Būshehr.

Sir H. Leeke left Büshehr for Bombay in the "Assaye" on the 16th December; but in passing down the Persian Gulf, he received information at Lingeh that a Persian force of 3,000 men, commanded by Mustafa Quli Khān, Amīr-i-Panj, and destined for Būshehr or possibly for an attack on Bāsīdu, was in the neighbourhood. On the 19th December he found it encamped on the coast, about 200 yards from the beach, and opened fire on it at a range of about 1,200 yards. The Persians at first replied with their artillery, but after 35 minutes they retreated in great confusion, leaving their guns, tents, and wounded behind, and pursued inland by shells from the "Assaye."

Dispersal of a Persian force near Lingeh, 19th December.

A few days after assuming command of the British Field Force, Sir J. Outram resolved on an expedition from Bushehr to upset a formidable concentration of the enemy which was taking place under the Shujā'-ul-Mulk at Burāzjān. This Persian Commander was reported to have already about 8,500 cavalry and infantry at his disposal, with 17 guns and a mortar, while 12 infantry regiments and 35 guns were believed to be on the way from Tehrān to join him, and it was understood that tribal levies to the number of 4,000 men could be collected by him at 24 hours' notice.

Expedition to Burāzjān, 3rd to 5th February 1857.

The arrival of the 1st Brigade of the 2nd Division from India having rendered action possible, on the evening of the 3rd February a force of all arms marched from Büshehr under Sir J. Outram's personal command: it consisted of the 3rd Light Cavalry and Poona Horse, mustering 419 sabres; of the 3rd Troop of Horse Artillery and 3rd and 5th Light Field Batteries, each of six guns; of the 64th Foot, 78th Highlanders, and 2nd Europeans, making 2,212 Europeans; of Sappers, 20th and 26th

Native Infantry, 4th Rifles, and 2nd Balūchis, totalling 2,022 sepoys: in all 4,653 men, exclusive of the artillery. The Garrison left behind at Būshehr for the protection of the camp comprised 378 European Infantry, 1,466 Indian infantry, and one company of European artillery with 14 guns, besides details from the ships.

The column marched all night and on the morning of the 4th reached Chāh Kūtah, 26 miles distant, where 30,000 lbs. of the enemy's powder had been destroyed by a cavalry force from Büshehr on the 1st January 1857. In the evening it advanced another 14 miles and then bivouacked for the night in thunder, hail, rain, and a cutting wind, against which no shelter was available. The march was resumed next morning, the 5th and shortly after mid-day Burāzjān was occupied without opposition, the bulk of the Persian army having withdrawn towards Dāliki. was taken of the entrenched camp of the enemy, which had been very hastily abandoned; and the 6th and 7th were passed in collecting great quantities of stores which the Persians had left behind, These included thousands of rounds of gun ammunition, hundreds of thousands of musket cartridges, and 10,000 lbs. of gunpowder, besides other military requisites and some tons of grain; and it was estimated that the explosives destroyed by mines before leaving amounted to 40,000 lbs. There were also tents and camp equipage, but most of these had already been plundered by the villagers.

It was decided, after a reconnaissance not to follow up the enemy, who had retired with their guns to strong positions in the hills.

March from Burāzjān to Khushāb, 7th to 8th February. The return march to Bushehr was begun on the evening of the 7th February. About midnight the rearguard was attacked; and soon afterwards the column, annoyed on all sides by Persian horse and skirmishers, was halted for the night in a defensive formation, the troops facing outward on every side and the baggage and camp followers being in the centre. These dispositions were hardly completed when the enemy opened fire with 4 or 5 heavy guns; the British artillery replied; and a desultory cannonade continued with little effect, until dawn.

Battle of Khushāb, 8th February. As day broke on the 8th of February the Persians were discovered in position to the north-cast, on the left rear of the British force. The Persian right rested on the village of Khushāb, which the British column had passed shortly before halting, and the strength of the enemy seemed to be 6,000 or 7,000 men, including considerable bodies of tribal horse which were posted on the flanks, the Persian position was reconnoitred by Captain Graves of the 3rd Light Cavalry, who rode along the enemy's entire front, at a distance of 200 yards from it, under

an incessant fire. About this time Sir J. Outram was temporarily disabled by his horse falling and rolling upon him, and the operations that followed were directed by General Stalker and Colonel E. Lugard, Chief of the Staff.

The British advanced in line to attack the Persian position; but the Persians, paralysed by the fire of the artillery and shattered by cavalry charges, did not wait to encounter the assault of the infantry.

They dispersed and fled. The most brilliant feat of the day was performed by a squadron of 120 men of the 3rd Light Cavalry which led by Captain Forbes, broke into a well formed square consisting of a regiment of 800 athletic northern Persians, scattered it and fell upon the Persian artillery in rear. In this charge Captain Forbes was severely wounded, no less than three of his officers (Captains Moore and and Cornet Combe) had their horses wounded places each, and the horse of another (Lieutenant Moore) fell dead upon his rider after leaping into the square. At least 700 of the enemy remained dead upon the field; two 9-pounder brass guns were captured, with ammunition and a few horses and mules; and 1,000 or more stand of arms were picked up upon the ground. The action was over by 10 A.M.

Sir J. Outram, who recovered from his accident towards the close of the engagement, afterwards wrote of the defeat of the enemy: "Our small body of horsemen scattered them like chaff, and literally cut them down like corn under the sickle: most stalwart men though their gigantic carcases proved them to be, I never witnessed such carnage at such little The fellows really appeared to court death unresistingly, as if to spite their cowardly officers, who so shamefully deserted them." The conduct of the enemey's horse, from first to last, was "dastardly in the extreme." The majority of the defeated Persian force did not stop until they reached Shīrāz. The British casualties were only 3 Europeans and 7 Indians killed, and 31 Europeans and 31 Indians wounded, of whom 3 Europeans and 3 Indians subsequently died.

An amusing account of the battle was afterwards published by the Persian Government in the Tehran Gazette, in which it was pretended that the magazines destroyed at Burāzjān were those of the British, and that the Persians had chased the invaders back to Büshehr.

The British column marched again the same evening, in heavy rain and a biting wind, through an ocean of mud; and, the way having hab to been lost through the fault of the native guide, it only reached Chaghādak on the forenoon of the following day. Part of the force reached February.

March from Khus-Büshehr, 8th Büshehr that night, the 9th of February, and the remainder next morning.

Not a single fighting man had been left behind, alive or dead, to fall into the hands of the enemy. The troops had marched from Būshehr to Burāzjān (46 miles) in 41 hours, and returned by another route (44 miles) in 50 hours, the time taken on the way back including the action at Khushāb. The only protection of the troops against the inclement weather consisted in the greatcoats and blankets carried by the men themselves in default of animal transport, and the ground traversed was such as to necessitate an issue of new boots to the entire force on its return to Būshehr.

British camp at Bushehr, February 1857.

On his return to Büshehr Sir J. Outram at once addressed himself to the strengthening of the British entrenched camp, from which he intended shortly to remove the greater part of the Field Force for operations at Muhammareh. Four redoubts were constructed in front of the camp, which now faced the south, and one, with a martello tower in the centre of it, to the rear.

British dispositions at Bāsīdu during the war.

The necessity of protecting the British naval station of Basidu on Qishm Island, where coal was stored and where there were buildings of some value, seems to have been overlooked at the beginning of the War. Sir H. Leeke, the Naval Commander-in-Chief, after his bombardment of a Persian camp at Lingeh on the 19th December 1856, took steps to remedy the omission by landing two 68-pounder guns and 80 native marines under the command of a Havaldar, besides stationing the "Punjab" to guard the station and the "Constance" to patrol the channel between Qishm Island and the mainland. The dispositions made by the officer of the Indian Navy left in charge were revised by Sir J. who visited Basidu on the 25th January 1857 on his way to the front. He caused the guns which he found located a mile away from the buildings they were intended to protect, to be moved nearer; and he recommended that a proper complement of officers and non-commissioned officers should be supplied to the marines, besides giving it as his opinion that the "Constance" alone would suffice for the naval defence of the place.

Khārag Island during the operations. Khārag island was occupied during the active operations as a hospital station and coal depôt, and a detachment from a Native Infantry regiment—supplied in March 1857 by the 4th Rifles—seems to have been considered a sufficient garrison. On the 30th April 1857 Khārag was examined by Sir J. Outram with reference to its suitability as a

sanatarium for the force which it might be necessary to keep at Büshehr during the summer.

Sir J. Outram, like Sir J. Malcolm in 1808-09, and the officers concerned with the occupation of the island from 1838 to 1842, seems to have been strongly impressed with the advantages offered by Khārag. With regard to its annexation to the British dominions, at one time contemplated, he wrote in May 1857 to the President of the Board of Control of the East India Company.

You will see that I approved of the proposal in the draft treaty drawn up at home for the retention of Karrack, and I confess I feel some regret that that point was not secured. In any future war with Persia, a small garrison there, with a few ships of war, might effect all that would be required in this quarter, and thus leave the army free to operate upon some more vulnerable * point. Its occupation would have given us, moreover, the command of the Gulf, and rendered null the competition of any other power which may be seeking to establish its influence here.

A month later he remarked, in connection with the withdrawal of the greater part of the Field Force to India.

Karrack...is, in my opinion, a preferable position to Bushire, whether considered politically or on military grounds, as commanding† this port and the mouths of the Euphrates, and capable of being maintained even in its present state, by a small garrison against all the power of Persia, and of easily being rendered impregnable to more formidable naval powers.

It appears to me that Karrack would also be a preferable position for the Resident in the Persian Gulf, as placing that functionary beyond the necessity of exercising the vexatious interference with Persian subjects which cannot be avoided while he is located in this town.

The occupation of the island will not involve the necessity of our taking possession of it as British territory, should the Shāh really fulfil the conditions of the treaty. And it is now the most valuable acquisition we could retain if he does not do so.

British political relations with the Persian Coast and Islands after the Anglo-Persian War, 1857-1896.

After the Anglo-Persian war difficulties arose from an extension given by the Persian Government to their system of Kārguzārs,—a class of political agents stationed at important centres where there were foreigners, working directly under the orders of the Persian Foreign Office and independent of the Persian local authorities.

Inconveniences occasioned by the Persian Kārguzār System, 1860-87.

^{*} Meaning, probably, more vulnerable than the hinterland of Bushehr.

[†] i.e., Būshehr.

That the system was not entirely new is proved by the fact that the local Kārguzār was one of the most important prisoners taken by the British at the capture of Būshehr, as already related. The duty of the Kārguzār was to watch the interests of the Persian Government in all matters in which foreign representatives and subjects were concerned; and in 1860 the British Resident at Būshehr was instructed by the British Minister at Tehrān to communicate in future with the Kārguzār in regard to all business which he had been accustomed to transact with the local Governor.

In 1867-68, when numerous questions of the treaty rights of British subjects were under dispute at Būshehr, much inconvenience and delay resulted from this restriction on direct dealings between the British Resident and the ordinary Persian officials. Before this there had been no Kārguzār at Būshehr for four or five years; and in 1868 strong representations on the subject were made to the Persian Government. These resulted in the appointment as Kārguzār at Būshehr of Mīrza Muhammad Khān, who promised that his attitude would be conciliatory. It does not appear that the inderdict on direct dealings between the British Resident and the Persian Governor was formally removed, though its removal was urged both by Her Majesty's Foreign Office and by the Government of India; but it is clear from the later history of local relations that it must have ceased to be regarded as absolute.

In 1873 the British Resident, Colonel E. C. Ross, was able to report that his relations with the Kārguzār, as well as with the Prince Governor of Būshehr, were excellent; but in 1877 he was obliged to complain of misconduct on the part of that official, with the result that the latter—still Mīrza Muhammad Khān—was removed from Būshehr and replaced, as a temporary measure, by one Mīrza 'Abdul Karīm.

In 1881 the Kārguzār of Būshehr, Mīrza 'Ali Akbar Khān, was placed in charge of the town as Governor, being relieved in the capacity of Foreign Office agent, by Hāji Mīrzā 'Abdullah Khān, his colleague at Bandar 'Abbās, where also the Kārguzār system had by this time been introduced. Mīrza 'Ali Akbar Khān, having been guilty of mischievous obstruction as Governor, was complained against by the British Minister at Tehrān and did not retain the Governorship long.

In November 1887 the Kārguzār of Būshehr, Mīrza Muhammad Khān, Mo'tamad-al-Vazāreh, whether the same who had held office before does not appear, became entangled in the accounts of the custom house and was imprisoned in his house and deprived of food for two

days. He managed to escape to the British Residency, where he remained in sanctuary until arrangements had been made for his proceeding to Tehrān for an investigation into his conduct. In the end he was dismissed, his place being taken by Najaf Quli Khān, an individual of little experience and less standing.

At the end of 1859 or beginning of 1860 Commander Felix Jones, the British Resident at Büshehr, offered H. R. H. the Hisām ud-Dauleh, Governor-General of Fārs, the assistance of a British naval squadron for repressing serious disorders which had broken out along the Persian Coast and threatened to extend to the interior with evil results to trade and the peace of the country; but in vain. The Persian Government, to whom the offer was perhaps renewed through the British Minister at Tehrān, evinced no inclination to accept it; and Sir H. Rawlinson thought that, as the proceedings of the Russians at Ashurada in the Caspian had rendered them suspicious of foreign tenders of naval aid, the proposal should not be pressed on them but might be left to be recommended by the Hisam-ud-Dauleh himself, when experience should have convinced him of its eligibility. In this view the Government of Bombay concurred.

Non-acceptance by the Persian Government of an offer of British naval assistance for repressing disorders on the coast, 1859-60.

In 1862 some trouble arose through wilful acts of trespass on the British burial ground at Büshehr, committed by Persians, who even brought a part of it under cultivation. Some damage was done also to the enclosure wall. After the matter had been referred to Tehrān a fine was inflicted on one of the offenders; and, a paid watchman having been engaged, complaints ceased. It does not seem, however, that action was taken on recommendations by Colonel Pelly, the Acting Resident, that a grant of the land covered by the cemetery should be obtained from the Persian Government and that compensation should be paid to Āghāi, the owner of the ground.

Difficulties connected with the British cemetery at Bushehr, 1862.

In 1870, a famine impending and Büshehr being at the time without a Governor, popular demonstrations took place there against the exportation of grain by British subjects. The Persian Government also requested the British Minister at Tehrān to use his influence to restrain British firms from sending grain out of the country. Colonel Pelly, the Resident at Büshehr, was able to arrange that the grain then in the warehouses of British merchants, mostly wheat, should be handed over to the Persian local authorities; but at first there was no Persian official on the spot who would take charge of it, and for a month it was sold to the people at a low price through the British

British measures of famine relief at Būshehr, 1870-72.

merchants themselves. On the arrival of a Governor the British grain still remaining in store was transferred to him. The forced sale of their stocks was regarded as a grievance by the two British firms mostly affected, Messrs. Malcolm & Co., and Hāji Mūsa, Maimani, who had purchased the grain in April 1870 or earlier, before the Persian Government had announced their intention of preventing exportation; and they were unwilling to accept payment at the rate of 12 Qrāns per Man which was offered them by the Persian Government. Eventually a compromise was arranged on a basis slightly more favourable to the merchants; and, though the latter were dissatisfied with this final settlement also, the Government of India decided not to support their further objections.

The famine still continuing, relief committees were organised in 1870 or 1871 at London, Calcutta, and Bombay; and in 1872 His Majesty the Shah formed a Persian relief committee. The originators of the relief movement in India seem to have been Khōjah 'Abdul Ghani Mīyan, C.S.I., and his son Asad Ullah, of Dacca; and Hindu gentlemen also contributed liberally to the funds. A local committee was constituted at Büshehr for the administration of the British and Indian contributions; it consisted of some of the European gentlemen there and was presided over by the Resident; and the money placed at its disposal between July 1871 and February 1872 amounted to 148,507 Qrans. This committee at first distributed cooked food, and afterwards copper coin; but both of these expedients failed owing to the greatness of the crowds that they attracted, which gave rise to confusion and opened the door to abuses. In the end it was found best, at Büshehr, to employ able-bodied applicants for relief in scavenging the town and making roads in the country, while for the aged and helpless, for women, and for children infirmaries, orphanages, etc., were established. Bread was given daily to the poor at Sabzābād, the Resident's country house, where the women and children from the villages mostly congregated; and relief in cash was afforded to many persons of respectability whom famine had reduced to poverty. The Bushehr committee also made grants for famine expenditure at Kāzarān, Shīrāz, and Isfahān. In August 1872, a good harvest having been garnered, the relief operations practically ceased, a balance of 9,713 Qrans remaining in the hands of the Bushehr committee, exclusive of a reserve fund for orphans of 7,260 Qrans or Rs. 3,000. 1873 the proceedings and accounts of the Büshehr committee were closed, at the suggestion of the central relief committee in London.

In 1873-74 there were various occurrences on the Persian Coast which affected British subjects and necessitated official remonstrances or claims for redress. In January 1873 pilgrims created a disturbance at Bandar 'Abbas, obliging the British Mail Agent to fly for safety, upon which the gun boat "Hugh Rose" was sent to the spot, with satisfactory results, and orders were obtained from the Persian Government for the careful protection of British subjects by the local Persian A somewhat similar fracas took place at Lingeh; but there the Shaikh protected the Mail Agent and repressed the unruliness of the pilgrims. Near Bushehr a British naval officer was wounded and robbed by a gang of brigands, but the Persian Governor, "notwithstanding many sincere efforts," was unable to bring the offenders to justice. In March 1874 a British barque went ashore on the island of Shaikh Shu'aib and became a wreck. The presence on the spot of a Munshi from the British Residency prevented the vessel being entirely plundered, and the Native Agent of the British Government at Lingeh soon arrived to assist the captain and to arrange terms of salvage with the Shaikh of Kangun.

Miscellaneous British case, 1873-74.

A case of not less political than legal and commercial interest was that of Marwārīd, a Hindu trader at Kirmān, who was associated in business with Mul Chand, a Hindu merchant at Bandar 'Abbās. At the beginning of 1873 this man, after defrauding his partner and another Hindu British subject, turned Muhammadan and assumed the name of Mīrza 'Ali Akbar, his idea being to attract Persian support and so escape from British justice.

Case of Marwarid, Hindu, 1873-77.

At the instance of the British Legation instructions on the case were sent by the Shāh's Government to the Persian Governor of Kirmān; but they resulted only in proceedings which afforded no prospect of real redress. At length in 1875, in consequence of representations made by one of the Hindu plaintiffs, the British Minister again addressed the Persian Government and obtained from them an order directed to the Governor of Kirmān under which Marwārīd was to be sent to Bandār 'Abbās in order that his accounts might be examined there, at a meeting of Hindus and others, with the cognisance of the Persian Kārguzār, and a settlement arranged and reported to the Persian Government. Mr. Thomson, however, perceived two serious difficulties: in the first place the case, as it lay entirely among British subjects, was one in which the Persian authorities had no right, according to treaty, to intervene; and, secondly, he understood that neither he himself as Minister nor the Resident in the Persian Gulf, possessed

powers by which they could legally dispose of the case, were Marwarid to be brought before them. In the end it was decided by Her Majesty's Government that the presence of Marwarid should be required, with a view to an adjudication by the Resident at Būshehr in accordance with usage; and at the end of July 1876 a Ghulam of the British Legation was despatched from Tehran to Kirman with an order to the local authority to send Marwarid with his books and vouchers to Bandar 'Abbās. In September Mr. Edwards, Second Assistant Resident, arrived at Bandar 'Abbās, having been deputed by Colonel Prideaux, the Acting Resident, to enquire into the case; but Marwārīd was not there, and Mr. Edwards learned, on proceeding to Mīnāb, that he was still at Kirmān. It appeared that Marwārīd had taken refuge at the house of a Mujtahid named Hāji Āgha Ahmad, compelling the Governor to arrest him by a stratagem, whereupon a mob of angry Muhammadans attacked the Hindu caravanserai and seized one of the inmates, whom they handled somewhat roughly and detained until Marwārīd was restored to the protection of the Mujtahid. The Governor, whom the Hindus suspected of having been bribed, then combined with the Mujtahid to represent the danger, in the excited state of local Muhammadan feeling, of any attempt to send Marwarid to Bandar 'Abbās, and to recommend instead a pecuniary settlement on the spot; but the Ghulam refused to listen to these proposals as being at variance with the orders of which he was the bearer. Energetic representations were then made by Mr. Thomson at Tehran, in consequence of which Marwarid was at last, on the 20th November 1876, sent off to Bandar 'Abbas. It transpired that the prograstination of the Persian Government in the matter proceeded not from any inclination to deny the rightfulness of the British demand, in regard to which the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs himself wrote: "The British Legation has a distinct right to force and urge upon its subjects to do justice," but from a desire on the part of the Shah to favour Marwārīd as much as possible, he being a recent convert to Islām, and to afford time for a compromise at Kirman where the Mujtahid had started a public subscription on the man's behalf.

At the beginning of January 1877 Marwarid, with some of the Hindu witnesses against him, arrived at Büshehr; and the facts elicited made it necessary that he should be tried on a criminal charge. Under orders from the Government of India Colonel Prideaux, the Resident, conducted the trial at Büshehr; and on the 25th June he sentenced the prisoner, who pleaded guilty to criminal breach of trust, to six months'

rigorous imprisonment, exclusive of six months' detention which he had already undergone while under trial. It had previously been ordered by the Government of India, perhaps on account of a doubt whether a warrant signed by the Resident could be legally recognised by the prison authorities in India, that any sentence passed should be carried out at Büshehr under arrangements made by the Resident.

In March 1876 a large Baghlah under British colours was stranded at Hanjām, and immediately on receipt of the intelligence H. M. S. "Arab" was despatched to the spot. Her presence saved the Baghlah from being plundered; and the Shaikh of Qishm, who had sent a number of boats from Qishm to the scene of the accident, confined himself to causing the vessel to be towed to his port, in hopes of benefiting by her eventually. Afterwards he sent a deputation to Būshehr to explain that his only intention had been to save the Baghlah and her cargo; and he entered into an agreement, which was duly carried out, for the restoration to the owners of all that he had received from them.

Case of a British Bagblah at Hanjām, 1876.

In June 1877 the Mo'tamad-ud-Dauleh, then Governor-General of Fārs, requested the Acting British Resident at Būshehr to furnish the Persian authorities there with a nominal roll of the servants and dependents of the British Residency for transmission to the Minister for Foreign Affairs at Tehrān; but Colonel Prideaux declined to comply, on the ground that to do so "would be equivalent to admitting the claims of the Persian authorities to interfere with any right to employ such servants in this Residency as I may think fit."

Demands by the Persian authorities for lists of British employés and protéges, 1877-1883.

The request was repeated, apparently in a more extensive form, in the following year, when it was again refused by the Resident, Colonel Ross. In justification of his attitude the Resident explained that to frame a list correct even for the moment was impossible, owing to the multitude and diversity of the British clients who were continually passing through the ports of the Persian Coast, while persons employed by the British Government or by private British subjects were daily being discharged and replaced by others; that any attempt to keep the Persian authorities continuously informed on the subject would not only be futile but might cause discussions, hitherto rare, to become frequent; the Persian authorities could always ascertain instantly and without difficulty, by referring to the Residency, the status of any particular individual; that every assistance was invariably afforded to the Persian Government in dealing with Persian subjects in British employment who were accused of misconduct or breach of the laws, and that such persons when convicted of crime were not again employed;

and, finally, that it was the practice of the British Residency at Būshehr not to exceed the bounds imposed by treaties and usage, with the happy result that disputes were uncommon. Colonel Ross's reply to the Persian Governor was generally approved by Her Majesty's Government, who remarked that Persian official interference with the menial establishment of the Būshehr Residency could not be permitted, and that the recognition by the local Persian authorities of the status of individuals at Būshehr as British subjects or under British protection could not be allowed to be conditional on the assent of the Government at Tehrān; but they thought that a list of the persons in question might be given, if again asked for, as an act of courtesy.

In May 1883 the Sāhib Dīvān of Shīrāz complained to H. R. H. the Zill-us-Sultān, Governor-General of Fārs, that the British Resident at Būshehr moved to his country house at Sabzābād unaccompanied by a guard, and that the Persian authorities were kept in ignorance of the number of his followers and attendants. The first part of this complaint could at once be declared incorrect, inasmuch as a guard of native infantry and some mounted men were always stationed at Sabzābād when the Resident was there; and, as regarded the second part, the Zill-us-Sultān was informed by Mr. Thomson, the British representative at Tehrān, that, if the reference were to British subjects and protégés, no list of such persons had hitherto been furnished to the Persian authorities, and that to supply one would be inconvenient.

False complaints by the Persian authorities regarding British subjects on Qais Island, 1879-80. At the time of the murder of Shaikh 'Ali of Lingeh by Shaikh Yūsuf in 1878, an event which threw the neighbouring coast districts into confusion, the island of Qais was regarded as subject to Muhammad-bin-Hasan, the Āl 'Ali Shaikh of Chārak, whose tribe were closely connected with the Āl 'Ali of Umm-al-Qaiwain on the Arabian side of the Gulf. After the arrival on Qais of a respectable merchant family who had left their home in Bahrain in 1849, in consequence of the misgovernment of Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Khalīfah, and had settled in the first instance at Lingeh, the island developed a modest degree of prosperity; the head of these Bahraini immigrants in 1879 was a certain Mashāri-bin-'Abdul Latīf.

In April 1879, the Persian authorities having conceived the idea of interfering in the affairs of the island and enhancing the revenue assessed on it, a complaint was suddenly preferred by the Persian Government to the British Legation at Tehrān of Persian refugees being harboured on Qais by British subjects residing there. As the only British subjects on the island, were Khājahs and Hindu Baniyahs,

four in number, and their servants, who certainly did not harbour Persian refugees and who had been specially warned against interfering in politics, it seemed probable that the Persian complaint was really aimed at the head of the Bahraini settlers, whom it may have been intended to prejudice. Eventually the Persian Government intimated their intention of punishing some of the Arab inhabitants of Qais who had been guilty of misbehaviour, and asked that the British subjects on the island might be sent somewhere else for a few days; but it is not recorded whether any practical proceedings followed this intimation and request.

In January 1880, the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain proposed to interfere in Qais to support his Al 'Ali kinsmen of Chārak against the Persians; but he was informed by the Resident that, Qais being a part of the Shāh's dominions, intervention by him could not be permitted.

Some years later it became known that the family of the Qavvāmul-Mulk of Shīrāz claimed Qais under a grant which they alleged had been made to them, by the Shāh personally, in 1878.

In 1880 Shaikh Yūsuf, the usurping Arab Shaikh of Lingeh, arbitrarily imprisoned one British Indian trader and compelled others to close their shops. His Mejesty's Ship "Vulture" was sent to the spot from Būshehr, carrying a Persian official to whom the duty of investigating the affair had been delegated; and suitable compensation and an ample apology were exacted.

Ill-treatment of British Indian subjects at Lingeh, 1880.

In February 1885, a Hindu Faqir named Moti Ram disappeared from the Hindu settlement at Bandar 'Abbās, and simultaneously money and other valuables were missed from the temple of the Hindu community. The Hindus complained to the Persian Karguzar, who referred to Mīrza Nasr Ullah Khān, the acting representative of the Persian Deputy Governor; but there was great delay in the production of the accused, and when he appeared it was found that he had been circumcised and now called himself a Muhammadan. Great excitement followed among the Hindus, who closed their shops by way of expressing their indignation and accused Mīrza Nasr Ullah Khān of being privy to the theft. The Resident, doubtless on the analogy of Marwarid's case, caused Möti Rām to be brought to Büshehr for trial as a British subject; but, though strong suspicions of his guilt existed, judicial proof was wanting. In regard to the man's change of religion, the Resident considered that the local authorities had acted with indecent haste and regrettable secrecy; but the convert himself professed that his conversion was due to religious motives alone. The Deputy Governor

Case of Moti Rām, Hindu, 1885. promised to remove his acting representative, deposed another petty official, and concurred with the Resident as to the undesirability of the ex-Hindu being allowed to return to Bandar 'Abbās.

Anti-British proceedings of the Aminus-Sultan's representatives in the Persian Gulf, 1887-88.

The years 1887 and 1888 were signalised, as we have already seen, by a spasmodic attempt on the part of the Persian Government to assert themselves in the politics of the Persian Gulf. The prime mover in this undertaking seems to have been the Shāh's favourite, the Amīn-us-Sultān, to whom the Government of the Gulf Ports had been entrusted; and indications of his ambition of reducing foreign influence were naturally soon manifested in the Persian districts under his jurisdiction, as well as in foreign relations.

In July 1887 Ya'qūb-bin-Bashīr, a Persian Mufattish or informer who had been posted at Lingeh, brought false accusations of a serious nature against the Native Agent of the British Government there, and misrepresented the action of the Resident, Colonel Ross, in regard to certain claims against pearl-divers of Sirri Island. The Persian Government having adopted the statements of the Mufattish and complained to the British Minister at Tehrān, proof was produced of the absolute falsity of the charges against the Native Agent, whereupon the matter dropped.

In 1888 the Sa'ad-ul-Mulk, the Amīn-us-Sultān's first Governor of Būshehr, essayed to distinguish himself by high-handed aggression on British interests. In August, in the case of a consignment of goods from Messrs. C. Sassoon of Manchester, the chief of the Būshehr customs, supported by the Governor, declined to recognise the usual certificate granted by the British Residency for its clearance at foreign rates; and the Governor went so far as to announce to the Resident his intention of opening at the custom house all packages for * His Britannic Majesty's Legation and of examining their contents,—a proceeding as much contrary to established usage as it was to ordinary courtesy. The British Minister, Sir H. Drummond Wolff, having reported that the Amīn-us-Sultān's real object was to lower British prestige, Her Majesty's Government authorised him to inform the Persian Government that they would be held strictly responsible for any acts discourteous to the British Resident at Būshehr, as well as for

^{*}Under the Treaty of Turkmanchai, and the Treaty of Peace of 1857, read together, the British Mission had the right to import articles necessary for their own consumption free of custom duty. Actual verification of the contents of packages for the Legation implied, therefore, insulting suspicions.

such injury as might befall British subjects through the arbitrary behaviour of Persian officials; and the remonstrance was made in so telling a fashion that the Amīn-us-Sultān not only gave suitable orders to the Governor of Būshehr, but even offered to telegraph directing him to apologise to the Resident and dismissing the chief of customs. It was not considered necessary, however, to accept these unsolicited amends.

In March 1889 the British merchant steamer "Transition" went ashore on the island of Qais and much trouble was experienced from the rapacity of the Shaikh of Chārak. His Majesty's Ship "Kingfisher" however rendered timely assistance, and the vessel was refloated undamaged.

Stranding of the "Transition" on Qais Island, 1889.

In December 1891 a disturbance took place on board the British India S. N. Co.'s steamer "Kilwa" between Būshehr and Lingeh, some Arabs in charge of horses attacking the ship's officers. The "Kilwa" fortunately overtook H. M. S. "Redbreast," whose commander sent an armed party on board and removed the ringleaders in the disturbance. They were subsequently tried at Bombay and punished.

Disturbance by Arabs on the "Kilwa," 1891.

In October 1892 a British Indian subject named Mughu, residing in Bahrain, complained that he had been robbed by Mālikis, at Nāband, of property, chiefly pearls, worth about 26,000 Qrāns. Orders that redress should be afforded were obtained from Tehrān; but, in consequence of the obstructiveness of the local authorities, the proceedings seem to have ended with the recovery of 3,388 Qrāns' worth of pearls only—a result deplored by Colonel Wilson, the Resident, who considered the case to be one of great hardship.

Robbery of a British Indian at Nāband, 1892.

British commercial and general interests on the Persian Coast and Islands, 1848—1896.

In 1856 a case occurred which brought under discussion the position of the British Resident in the Persian Gulf with reference to the recovery of sums lent by British Indian subjects to Arab chiefs and others on the Persian Gulf littoral, particularly on the Persian side.

Recovery of a debt due by the Shaikh of Lingeh to a British Indian creditor, 1856-58.

The lender in the case specially in question was Pachabhai Tejsi, a Bombay merchant; the borrower was the Shaikh of Lingeh; and the amount of which recovery as claimed was 1,500 Qrans. The circumstances were considered exceptional by Captain Felix Jones, the Resident, a virtual fraud being involved to which the Native Agent of the British Government at Lingeh seemed to have been a party; and he accordingly sent the "Clive" to Lingeh with orders that repayment should be pressed on the Shaikh in an uncompromising manner, yet without committing the British authorities to any course of action, of which the British Minister in Persia might disapprove. Circumstances connected with the Anglo-Persian War no doubt influenced the Resident in his choice of this somewhat unusual course; the mission, however, succeeded and the money was recovered.

Afterwards, the Court of Directors of the Hon'ble East India Company having animadverted on his conduct in interfering between a money-lender and an Arab Shaikh, Captain Jones wrote:—

The recovery of sums lent by our subjects to Arab Chiefs does in reality form no part of the duty of the British representative in these parts, though in his intercourse with the Chiefs and people he has always endeavoured by friendly remonstrances to advance their claims by recommending them to the Chiefs, so that they may receive attention in regions where, without the occasional countenance of protecting authority, their mercantile transactions and British Indian trade in general would be precarious if not altogether stagnant.

* * * * *

At the same time I am fully impressed with the correction that the adjustment of ordinary transactions between British Native traders and the Chiefs and the people of these regions should not come under the consideration of the British Resident, conducted as such transactions are, in a complicated and usurious manner, peculiar to a needy population on the one hand and a highly speculative and exacting class like the banians on the other. Indeed, were interference the rule instead of the exception, it would necessitate Courts of Appeal and British Consular authorities in every petty locality of the Gulf. Moreover, owing to insecurity attending trade in all Arab localities, I have more than once promulgated, to those engaged in trade, warning that they are pursuing it at their own risk. The profits are, however, so great that they are heedless of temporary losses and continue in the prosecution of gain, content with the assurances of our general protection against open insult or oppression.

It was eventually laid down by the Government of Bombay that "the Resident should, as a general rule, abstain from all interference with the claims of merchants against chiefs and others on the shores of the Persian Gulf;" and the Secretary of State for India, with reference to these instructions remarked that "Her Majesty's Government are extremely anxious to avoid all useless interference with the pecuniary and commercial transactions of these Arab chiefs and tribes, and cordially approve the orders issued by you on the subject." Notwithstanding the

wide construction of which they were capable, these orders can hardly, it must be supposed, have been intended to apply to all the commercial dealings of British Indian subjects in the Persian Gulf.

In 1866 difficulties arose at Bushehr in consequence of a veto placed Right of by the local officials on the purchase of houses by British merchants from jects to ac-Persian subjects. The question was governed by Article 5 of the separate quire or Compact attached to the Treaty of Turkmanchai between Persia and etc., in Russia (1828), of which, under the Treaty of Peace between Persia and Britain (1857), British subjects were entitled to enjoy the benefit. article referred to laid down that, as it was difficult for foreigners in Persia to hire dwelling houses, warehouses, and places for depositing their merchandise, Russian subjects — and consequently British subjects - should be free to acquire immoveables of those classes in full ownership.

build houses, Persia, 1866—85.

In November 1866 the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs informed Sir C. Alison, the British Minister in Persia, with reference to the Büshehr disputes, that British subjects might acquire immoveable property in Persia only if the hiring of accommodation was impossible, and that even in such cases the extent of the property must not exceed the requirements of the occupier as regards either living room or space for the storage of goods. This reply was forwarded by the British Minister to the Resident at Bushehr with the remark that, while Europeans had undoubtedly bought land in Persia and built on it, the building (as distinguished from the purchase) of houses by foreigners was not specifically authorized by treaty; and that Sir C. Alison thought it well in the circumstances, that Europeans should in the first place try to hire what accommodation they needed, and in case of failure to hire, should arrange to purchase (instead of building) premises. But the limitations which the Persian Ministry sought to impose on the acquisition of immoveable property by foreigners were regarded by Her Majesty's Government as unwarrantable, and the British representative at Tehran was instructed to shape his action in accordance with this view.

Nevertheless, in July 1867, the Persian Minister or Foreign Affairs gave instructions that no landed property should be alienated to British subjects or the subjects of other nations, — an order which the Karguzar of Bushehr interpreted as meaning that no houses, habitations, or plain ground could be sold to British subjects or dependents, or to Persian subjects in British employment. In January 1868 the Kärgüzar sent the Resident a list of the British subjects and dependants in whose favour, under orders from Tehran, no transfer of immoveable property in town or country might be registered; and the list which purported to be issued from the office of the Governor, was evidently as comprehensive as it could be made, including all who were in any way connected with the British Residency down to the very Persians employed in it as servants. In 1868 Her Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehrān obtained permission for two British subjects to purchase houses, but it was granted by the Persian Government as a concession, and Her Majesty's Government thought that on the next occasion which presented itself the general rights of British subjects in the matter must be firmly insisted on.

After this the question seems to have remained dormant until the end of 1874, when Messrs. Gray, Paul & Co., bought some land at Bushehr intending to build warehouses on it, but the Kārguzār declined to recognise the validity of the transfer or to register the deed of sale unless under orders from the Persian Foreign Office. In May 1875 the necessary orders were procured, not without the intervention of the British Legation; but the dimensions of the land acquired by the British firm were strictly defined, and orders were given that the local Persian authorities should demolish whatever the purchasers might erect beyond its limits. The British Minister at Tehran, Mr. Thomson, thought it necessary to challenge an expression used by the Persian Government in authorising the sale to Messrs. Gray, Paul & Co., which implied that the authority was granted "by the Persian Ministers out of respect for the British Legation, and with a view to friendly co-operation, which they deem necessary, as far as possible;" and he further claimed, on behalf of British subjects in general, the right to acquire land for building warehouses whenever such were needed. The Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs demurred, in his reply, to these views; and, though Mr. Thomson cited numerous cases in which land had been acquired and built on by foreign subjects in Persia, the correspondence ended inconclusively.

In 1876, the Persian authorities at Büshehr having declined, in the absence of orders from headquarters, to let Messrs. Gray, Paul & Co., Limited, a residential house for members of their firm on a plot of land outside the town specially bought for the purpose, the help of the British Minister at Tehrān was requested by Colonel Ross, the Resident, and permission was accorded after some delay.

The removal of the British telegraph office from Büshehr to Rīshehr, ultimately effected in November 1877, after four years of correspondence, gave rise to fresh discussions regarding the acquisition of immoveable property in Persia by foreigners. The Persian Government,

in assenting in 1876 to the transfer of the office, made it a condition that the premises to be occupied at Rishehr should be erected by Persian subjects and leased, merely, to the British Government; but Mr. Thomson was careful to state to the Persian Government that the acceptance of the condition was not to be regarded as derogating in any way from British privileges in regard to immoveable property dependent on treaties. A controversy on the subject was purposely avoided, there being a doubt not only whether British subjects were entitled by treaty to build houses in Persia, but also, whether, in such a matter, the British Government could properly claim rights identical with those of their own private subjects.

In January 1882 the question was re-opened by a circular note which the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs addressed to the foreign repre-In this document it was asserted that Article 5 of sentatives at Tehran. the Separate Compact had frequently been interpreted in a sense too favourable to foreign subjects, "thereby causing an infraction of the sovereign rights of this country and the rules of its internal organisation." and the recipients were invited to caution their nationals against overstepping the true limits of the article. This note was not answered by the Russian Legation, who proposed to deal with cases as they arose; but the vagueness of its terms did not prevent Mr. R. Thomson, the British representative, from sending a reply in which he pointed out that foreigners had been allowed, for many years past, to acquire and hold landed property in Persia, especially in Azarbāijān, and that British subjects could not consistently with treaty be shown less indulgence than other foreign subjects. From the tenor of the correspondence it would seem that the point now principally in issue was whether foreigners were entitled under treaty to acquire immoveable property of the nature of estates, and villages in Persia, or whether they were restricted to the items mentioned in the treaty of Turkmanchai,-dwelling houses, warehouses and places for depositing their merchandise. As proof of the existence of the more extensive rights now claimed, the British Minister relied chiefly on the fact that the Bankruptcies Farman 1844 clearly contemplated ownership of whole villages, even, by foreign subjects; and he remarked that no exception had hitherto been taken to the acquisition and holding of estates and villages by Georgian subjects of Russia in Azarbāijān and other Persian provinces, or by British Indian subjects in certain localities.

No further discussion of the subject seems to have taken place; but in 1885 the Persian Kārguzār at Shīrāz informed the Native Agent

of the British Government there "that, in accordance with the holy treaty the subjects and dependents of friendly powers should not be owners of landed property, in the Persian territories, except under the permission and sanction of the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs."

Interference with British trade, particularly grain embargoes, 1863—96. Administrative interference with British trade, dictated sometimes by political and sometimes by other considerations, was not infrequent upon the Persian Coast during the reign of Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shāh.

In 1867 the agents of the British India Steam Navigation Company at Büshehr complained to the Resident that they found it almost impossible to carry on business at all with Persia, owing to vexatious obstacles thrown in their way by the authorities, especially in the form of sudden embargoes upon particular articles of export. The treatment from which they suffered was totally inconsistent with the liberty of British trade with Persia supposed to exist under treaty; and the Company proposed to abandon Lingeh as a port of call for their vessels, in consequence of a recent Persian prohibition against the landing of cargo there.

Embargoes on the exportation of grain, for which scarcity often afforded a pretext or justification, were of common occurrence; and it was noticed that, though they were enforced with great rigidity against foreign merchants, disregard of them by others was tolerated to such an extent as to constitute a serious injustice to British traders. In 1863, 1866, and 1868 protests on these grounds against grain embargoes were received from British merchants; but during the famine of 1870—72, as we have already seen, the British authorities in Persia acquiesced and co-operated in the bringing of the grain trade temporarily under official control.

In 1873 there were complaints of the exaction of Rāhdāri, or irregular road tolls, on British goods in transit between Būshehr and Shīraz,—a serious and oft-recurring impediment to trade by the mountainous routes leading from the coast into central Persia.

At the end of 1874 scarcity was apprehended at Büshehr; and on the 23rd December a Saiyid, acting on behalf of one of the Mujtahids, visited some British protégés engaged in the grain trade and threatened them with riots if they should persist in exporting grain which they had bought some time before, and for which they had actually chartered tonnage. Next, in spite of protests by the British Minister at Tehran and a demand by him that the usual month's notice of an embargo should be given, the exportation of grain from Büshehr was suddenly prohibited by the Persian Government after only 15 days' warning;

but there was hope of an indulgence being obtained for Messrs. Malcolm and Company who had had a large quantity of grain in hand before any embargo was proposed. In the end all difficulties were removed by an opportune fall of rain.

In 1877 there was a rise in the price of grain in Persia, attributed by some to the Russo-Turkish war; and the Mujtahids, the self-constituted guardians of the public interest in such matters, began to agitate for the imposition of an embargo on export. Early in the year a prohibition was actually issued by the Government of Fars, but it was soon rescinded, not without the unfortunate result of provoking a riot at Bushehr. The moving spirits in this disturbance were two Saivid brothers, one of them named Agha Saivid Sulaiman; and the principal sufferer was Hāji Muhammad Ja'far, apparently a British Indian subject, wheat belonging to whom was plundered or destroyed by the mob, to the value of 1,800 Qrans, after it had been loaded on a boat. Prompt and judicious steps were taken by the Acting Resident with the Persian authorities, and the ringleaders were arrested, punished, and obliged to make good the value of the grain lost. In March, there being at the moment no interdict in force against the exportation of grain, the Persian Governor of Bandar 'Abbas obliged a British subject there, under threat of a heavy fine, to reland a consignment which he had shipped; and a claim for compensation was lodged by the British Minister at Tehran on behalf of the sufferer by this illegal act. The Government then announced a new grain embargo, to come into force from the 12th June; but the British Legation were able to obtain its postponement until the 15th August in the interest of British exporters.

In June 1878 the British Resident at Būshehr, at the request of some British merchants, urged the removal of the embargo imposed in the previous year, representing that the exportation of grain was really unchecked, and that the only effect of the restriction was to enable the local Persian officials to extort money from would-be exporters. The British Chargé d' Affaires at Tehrān was successful in persuading the Persian Government to order the withdrawal of the embargo on an understanding that the amount of grain exported monthly should be reported to the Persian Government and registered, that exportation should take place at Būshehr, Bandar 'Abbās, and Rīg only, and that on 40 days' notice being given a fresh and absolute embargo might be imposed. To these conditions the Governor of Būshehr added another of his own,—that not more than 8,000 bags of corn should be exported in one month. Meanwhile the British India Steam Navigation Company had

proposed to include Rig in the ports visited by their steamers; but the scheme was obstinately resisted by the Persian authorities, who regarded with disfavour the development of trade at ports north of Būshehr. where they were not in a position to levy customs. The Bushehr Government even went so far as to seize several wheat-cleaning machines which Messrs. Gray, Paul & Co. had placed in boats for despatch to Rig, and one of the machines was broken. These proceedings and the unauthorised limitation of the amount of grain that might be exported from Büshehr necessitated fresh representations at Tehran, in which a point was made of the virtual closure of the port of Rig to British trade: and after a time the machines were restored to the owners with compensation, the restrictions on the quantity of grain to be exported from Büshehr were withdrawn, and British merchants were permitted to buv grain at Rig on condition of exporting it from Büshehr,—another matter in regard to which there had been difficulty. Finally, however, the Governor of Büshehr, ignoring the orders of the central Government. intimated to the British Resident that, as there was scarcity at Büshehr. the amount of grain exported by British merchants must not exceed 4.000 Mans per mensem. The manipulation of a local restriction in some shape or form was evidently too valuable a privilege to be foregone.

On the 22nd April 1889 the British Minister at Tehran telegraphed to the Resident at Büshehr that, on account of scarcity the exportation of corn from the South of Persia had been forbidden. The British merchants at Büshehr protested against the imposition of this embargo without notice, and asserted that grain was plentiful, mentioning that they themselves held considerable stocks. On representations being made, the Persian Government gave orders against interference with the export of grain purchased before the embargo had been notified.

Again in June 1891, notwithstanding an excellent harvest in the plain country, the exportation of grain was again interdicted; but contracts formed before the issue of the edict were allowed to be executed.

An embargo on the exportation of wheat was enacted in May 1893 and remained in force until January 1894, drawing from the British Resident at Büshehr the following remarks:—

The measure, which is of periodical recurrence, though injuriously affecting the regular operations of the more important merchants, who are Europeans, is very generally recognised as being practically ineffectual. Any real restraint on export from the rich corn-producing sea-board tracts from Bushire towards the mouth of the Euphrates would be most difficult; and, even if seriously intended or attempted, would be hardly

practicable,* in view of the fact that scarcely any other means than by sea are available for disposing of the produce. A thinly veiled and quasi surreptitious export is understood to be carried on at Bushire itself during these embargoes.

In regard to the following year, April 1894 to March 1895, the Resident wrote:—

The beginning of the year saw a revival of the vexatious and useless embargo on the export of wheat. The action taken was sudden; it was unexpected also in view of the fact that the previously existing embargo had only been removed three months before; indeed, everything connected with this mischievous measure was irregular, capricious and uncertain. Difficulties at once arose in regard to stock for export already purchased or contracted for, and were not arranged without much trouble. British merchants protested, and the newly appointed Governor, immediately on his arrival, sought our support in representations at Tehran against the measure on the ground of its uselessness as regards its ostensible object—the relief of scarcity at Shīrāz—which the miserable state of the road and the cost of transport practically barred, and the injury to the producers in view of the abundant harvest in the coast districts. A certain remedy for the situation after Persian methods was soon found in an extensive evasion of the edict, considerable shipments being made with very transparent secrecy, with the result that export to the value of over £21,000 was effected during a year over threefourths of which the embargor ested. So good a harvest would, however, doubtless have produced a heavier export under normal conditions as the uncertainty and vexatious demands to which the trade was liable could not but operate to materially restrict it.

In 1895-96 grain was again subject to a nominal embargo throughout the year; but the prohibition was freely evaded during the greater part of the period. One of the chief recommendations of the measure in the eyes of the local Persian officials was still, clearly, the means which it afforded of extorting money from merchants—in the form of doucaurs for connivance at evasion—without open violation of the treaty rights of foreigners.

The working of the Persian customs in relation to British trade also, at times, gave cause for serious dissatisfaction.

In 1856, the Persian authorities having enhanced the revenue payable by the Arab Shaikh who then governed Lingah, the Shaikh in his turn sought, apparently at the suggestion of the Persian authorities themselves, to increase the rates at which customs duty was recovered from merchants. The British India traders of Lingah at once protested, and they were supported by the British authorities in their refusal to pay customs at a higher rate than the 5 per cent. ad valorem sanctioned by the Anglo-Persian Commercial Treaty of 1841, which was then still in force.

British trade and the Persian Customs, 1856—92.

^{*} The meaning seems to be that, though export by sea might be prevented, other districts of Persia would not benefit on account of the badness of internal communications, and that the measure could therefore hardly be successful.

Of a different nature was a difficulty that arose in 1874 respecting the treatment, in regard to customs duty, of Persian subjects employed as agents by British mercantile firms. The question seems to have been first raised by Messrs. Gray, Paul and Co., who drew the Resident's attention to "the large increase of merchandise imported here by Persian subjects who succeed in passing the same under foreign treaty stipulations, on the plea that the said merchandise ostensibly belongs to Indian subjects in Bombay, thus evading the higher customs on particular articles (due) from them as subjects of the Shah;" and they suggested that none but British subjects residing in Persia should be held entitled to the benefit of the treaty stipulations in respect of customs. The point was referred by the Resident, Colonel Ross, to the Government of India, who replied that, provided goods were bond fide the property of British subjects, they must be allowed the benefit of the lower scale of duty secured to British merchants by treaty, without regard to whether the owners resided in Persia or not, or to whether their local agents were British or Persian subjects. The Government of India did not think that British merchants dealing with Persia should be hampered in their choice of local agents. Meanwhile the Persian Government, moved by considerations connected with the loss of customs revenue by fraud, and so different from those actuating Gray, Paul & Co., had also taken up the matter; and they presently informed the British representative at Tehran that orders had been issued forbidding Persian subjects to be agents for foreign merchants at Persian ports, or to concern themselves with the goods of such merchants or the payment of customs duty thereon. Thomson protested against the interference implied with the choice of local agents by British firms, and promised them any specific instances of fraud that could be alleged should be fully and impartially dealt with by the local British authorities. The Government of India, it may be observed, had previously informed the Resident that they did not regard it as their province to devise measures for protecting the Persian customs house against frauds perpetrated by subjects of the Shāh. The Persian Government persisted for a time in their objection to the tenure of foreign commercial agencies by Persian subjects; and early in 1876, under instructions from Tehran, the Government of Büshehr actually took bonds from several Persian subjects not to act in future as the representatives of foreign firms. Ultimately, however, on the matter being pressed at Tehran, the bonds taken were returned, and no more were exacted.

The farming of the customs of all Persia to the Amīn-us-Sultān about 1882 was productive of difficulties at various places, especially at the

smaller Persian ports, the customs of which, formerly collected by the local chiefs on their own account, were now claimed by the Farmer-General as his. In May 1882 goods on which British merchants had already paid export duty at Rig and Ma'shūr ('Arabistān) were taxed a second time at Bushehr, the previous payments to the tribal Zabits of the places mentioned not being recognised; but refunds of the second payments were obtained. In the same month the Zabit of Dilam, while continuing to realise dues of the same amount as the former export duties at his port, declined to grant certificates of customs liability having been discharged; and the result was that Dilam exports were taxed at a double rate, for they were assessed to export duty on shipment from Bushehr. In April 1884 there was a fresh crop of complaints, the Zābits of minor ports having begun, on a hint from Tehran, to recoup themselves for the export duties which they were no longer allowed to collect by levying a charge on the carriers of goods from their ports to Bushehr,—a charge which in the end necessarily fell upon the actual exporters at Bushehr. Receipts for duty paid at Rig and Dilam by Messrs. Muir & Co., British grain merchants, were dishonoured on presentation at the Büshehr Customs House, and the firm found themselves under the necessity of paying a sum of about £70 a second time over. Extra duties were also levied at the gates on merchandise entering Büshehr town from the interior, and for these no receipts were granted. Air. Thomson, the British representative at Tehran, was successful however, after some delay, in procuring the issue of orders that not more than 5 per cent. ad valorem in all should be levied on goods exported by British merchants; these apparently reached Bushehr in July 1884, and they were followed by a refund through the Persian local authorities of over £120 on account of second payments wrongfully extorted from British merchants.

Double recovery of customs duty seems to have continued to some extent, however, until 1886 or 1887, when the Amīn-us-Sultān argued that British merchants were not entitled to make use of any ports but Būshehr and Bandar 'Abbās, that it was permissible to levy internal dues on the transit of goods from one port of Persia to another, and that the "Officials" at Muhammereh ('Arabistān); and Dīlam, and Rīg,— meaning probably the tribal chiefs of those places — had no printed customs forms and that their manuscript certificates of payment could not be accepted at other Persian custom houses. By April 1887 an attempt which was being made to bring the customs of the ports north of Būshehr under the administration of the Amīn-us-Sultān had fallen through, and the Minister himself informed Mr. Nicolson, the British representative at

Tehran, that consequently no customs would be levied at those ports, — an arrangement which seems to have removed every difficulty.

At Bushehr it was always the custom that foreign goods imported paid 5 per cent. import duty on landing, after which a Jawaz (a pass) was granted, entitling them to be conveyed to places in the interior without further payment at internal custom houses, toll stations, etc., on the way. At Bandar'Abbās, before 1889, a different system prevailed. There only 31 per cent. was collected on importation, but Jawazes were not issued: and persons carrying imported goods up-country had to meet all the roadside demands to which the ordinary traffic of the country was liable, and which in some cases amounted to more than the balance of $l_{\frac{1}{2}}$ per cent. The British merchants of Lingeh naturally preferred the existing system, under which they paid only 31 per cent. altogether; but those of Mashhad seem to have found it disadvantageous, and to have complained. The maintenance of a double system at Bandar 'Abbās, for the benefit of two classes of British traders, could not reasonably be pressed on the Persian Government; so eventually in 1892, after discussions at Tehran. the practice at Bandar 'Abbās was assimilated to that at Būshehr.

British status of Messrs. Malcolm & Co., Būshehr, and the Bombay and Persia S. N. Co., Bouday In 1871 the British status of Messrs. Malcolm & Co., a business firm having its head-quarters at Būshehr, was called in question by the Persian authorities, careful examination of the history of the family by which it was owned showed that, though Persian subjects, they had been taken under British protection about 1820; that their status as British protected persons, which the Treaty of Peace of 1857 could not be held to have affected, had remained unchanged after the Anglo-Persian war; that ever since the war, as well as before it, they had paid customs duty on the footing of foreign subjects; and that the Persian authorities had in the past invariably treated them as under British protection. Their title to be regarded as British protected persons was accordingly, under the orders of Her Majesty's Government maintained by the British Minister in Persia; but in 1877 it was held by the Government of India that they were nevertheless not entitled, under the Merchant Shipping Act, 1854, to own British vessels or to fly the British flag.

In 1880 the case of the Bombay and Persia S. N. Co. came under consideration. This was a Steamship Company composed of Persian and British Indian shareholders, many of the former class being residents of Büshehr, Tehrān, Yazd, and Bombay, some of them naturalised British subjects. The Company was registered in Bombay, and its vessels were registered as British ships and carried British colours; but its local

agents in the Persian Gulf were Persian subjects. On the principle that the corporation and not the individual shareholders were the owners of the ships, the Government of India decided to treat the concern as a British interest and instructed the Resident in the Persian Gulf "to grant to the Company the assistance required, on the understanding that their Agents at Bushire and other Gulf ports, being Persian subjects, are not personally entitled to British protection or to assistance in matters unconnected with the Company's vessels and trade."

British official matters on the Persian Coast and Islands, 1848-96.

The most important change of the period in the British official arrangements connected with the Persian Coast and Islands was the transfer, in January 1873, of the Persian Gulf Residency and its dependent establishments from the superintendence of the Government of Bombay to that of the Government of India. This radical alteration is noticed more fully in the chapter on the general history of the Persian Gulf.

Transfer of the Persian Gulf Residency from the Government of Bombay to the Government of India, 1873.

Reverting to local matters, we find that the superior staff of the Büshehr Residency varied but little during the time now under consideration, except in regard to the number and status of the Resident's Assistants,—a question which will be fully treated further on.

Superior Staff of the Persian Gulf Residency, including the Resident, and their pay, 1848-96.

In 1860, as in 1834, the officers of the Residency Staff were three: the Resident, whose salary was still Rs. 2,400 per mensem; the Assistant Resident, whose consolidated pay had been increased from Rs. 500 to Rs. 700; and the Surgeon, whose total emoluments had been reduced from Rs. 650 to Rs. 515. In 1862, in the course of a general readjustment of salaries at Büshehr, Masqat, Aden, and Zanzibar, the salary of the Resident in the Persian Gulf was reduced to Rs. 2,000 a month; but in 1866, on the representation of Colonel Pelly, it was raised again to its former level. In 1870 the Government of India proposed to increase Colonel Pelly's pay to Rs. 3,000 a month, economies being made per contra in the cost of the Political Agency at Baghdād; but the Government of Bombay were averse from any reduction in the salary of the

Political Agent at Baghdād and thought that the Būshehr Resident's pay should not be too greatly increased with reference to that of the British Minister at Tehrān (£5,000 a year), to whom he would become entirely subordinate in case the Legation were placed, as had been proposed, under the Indian Government. In the end a compromise was effected, and it was decided to raise Colonel Pelly's salary Rs. 2,600 per mensem, the Rs. 200 a month required being found by the suppression of the Baghdād-Syria Dromedary Post subsidy.

Assistants to the Resident, 1848-96.

The possibility of abolishing the Assistant Residentship at Büshehr. contemplated in 1835, 1838 and 1841, was considered anew in 1852. 1860 and 1862. In 1852 on the departure of Colonel Hennell, the Resident, from the Gulf, and the appointment of the Assistant Resident. Lt. Kemball, in his place, the Government of Bombay referred the point to the Government of India for orders, with a strong recommendation that the post of Assistant Resident should be maintained, observing that "the Offices of Political Agent in Turkish Arabia and of Resident in the Persian Gulf are, as has been shown on the occasion of Lt.-Col. Rawlinson's recent absence in Europe, dependent on the appointment of the Assistant to the Resident for a qualified officer as a locum tenens in case of any sudden emergency"; and the Government of India concurred in their views. In 1860 the Resident in the Persian Gulf was invited by the Government of India to consider whether he could dispense with an Assistant; but, on his reporting that he could not, the appointment was provisionally continued. In 1862, the importance of Zanzibar having increased and work in the Persian Gulf being diminished by the withdrawal of the Indian Navy from its waters, the Resident at Büshehr seems, besides having his pay reduced as already mentioned, to have been deprived of his Assistant; and for four years he would appear to have carried on the work of the post single-handed. In 1864 the status of the Head Clerk and Accountant of the Resident's Office was altered to that of "Uncovenanted Assistant in charge of the Residency Treasury", his salary being raised to Rs. 250 a month, but this was obviously not a change that could afford much relief to the Resident in his more important duties.

In 1865-66, in connection with British hostilities against the Wahhabis; the question arose of how to supply advisers conversant with local politics and languages to the commanders of vessels of the Royal Navy employed in the Persian Gulf; this was a part which had been efficiently played by the officers of the Indian Navy until the abolition of that service; and the dubious success of operations against Qatīf and Dammām

in 1866, to accompany which Col. Pelly had been able to depute a Native Agent only, emphasised the necessity for proper arrangements. Ultimately it was decided that two Assistants to the Resident,—a first Assistant on Rs. 1,000 and a Second Assistant on Rs 700 a month—should be appointed at Büshehr. The senior of the first pair nominated was Capt. A. C. Way.

In 1879, on the recommendation of a Financial Committee in India, the Second Assistantship was abolished, the chief reason assigned being a diminution of work in consequence of the removal of the Residency steamer; and the pay of the remaining Assistantship was cut down to Rs. 800 a month. This was, perhaps, an excessive reduction of staff; for in 1882 the appointment of a Native Assistant to the Resident on a consolidated salary of Rs. 350 was considered justifiable. Personal considerations accounted in part for the creation of the new post, which was conferred on Assistant Surgeon 'Abdur Rahīm, Hakīm, till then in medical and general charge of Bāsīdu, whose knowledge of Arabic and Persian, professional qualifications, and Muhammadan religion combined gave him peculiar advantages in his intercourse with natives of the country; and it was ordered by the Secretary of State for India that the new Assistantship should not be regarded as a permanent addition to the Residency Staff.

In 1889, on the transfer of Assistant Surgeon 'Abdur Rahīm to an Attachéship in the Foreign Office of the Government of India, the question of the assistance required by the Resident was re-examined, and Colonel Ross was able to convince Government that, in view of increasing work, an Extra Assistant would be permanently needed at Būshehr, in addition to the First and Uncovenanted Assistants. Mr. S. Lucas was the first incumbent of the Extra Assistantship created.

So early as 1856, and perhaps earlier, there was at Lingeh a Native Agent of the British Government, subordinate to the Resident at Bushehr. This Native Agent was charged with the immediate supervision of British interests on the greater part of the Persian Coast below Bushehr.

Native Agency Lingeh, 1848-96.

There was also a Native Agency at Shīrāz, which had existed from very early times.

Native Agency at Sīrāz, 1948-96.

In 1850, the appointment, which carried with it a salary of 400 Tumāns a year and much local influence and prestige, was vacant, the incumbent having been dismissed for misconduct. Nominations to the

Shīrāz Agency were made by H. B. M.'s Minister at Tehrān; and it will be remembered that the opposition of the Persian Government to a certain appointment to this post in 1855 was among the causes leading to the Anglo-Persian war.

In 1873 the Shīrāz Agency was described as being partly under the Government of India, and the Agent as receiving occasional instructions from the Resident at Būshehr. The Agent in 1875 was Mīrza Hasan 'Ali Khān, from whom Colonel Ross, Resident at Būshehr, reported having received "very efficient and zealous assistance"; and this gentleman held office until 1878 at least, when his brother Nawāb Haidar 'Ali Khān temporarily succeeded him. In 1881 Haidar 'Ali Khān was still, or again, acting as Native Agent at Shīrāz.

Judicial and Consular powers of the British political authorities for purposes of extra-territorial jurisdiction, 1848-96. The subject of the judicial and consular powers exercised by the British political authorities on the Persian Coast and Islands, in connection with the extra-territorial jurisdiction possessed by them under treaty over British subjects in Persia, is highly technical and does not fall, in its details, within the scope of the present political review; but certain facts bearing on the origin and conferment of those powers may be shortly mentioned. The need of lawful authority for disposing of the cases, criminal and civil, of British subjects was early felt by the British local officers, and was from time to time represented by the Resident at Bushehr, especially after the great increase of activity in the Persian Gulf caused by the introduction of regular steamer communications, telegraphs, and Post Offices. Owing to the extraordinary complexity of the political and legal considerations involved it was long, however, before arrangements were devised to meet the requirements of the situation.

The grant of consular powers to the Resident was suggested by Major Hennell in 1844 and by Captain F. Jones in 1855, but was* deemed impracticable in view of the terms of the Anglo-Persian Treaty of Commerce of 1841. The Treaty of Peace of 1857 opened the way for the conferment of consular appointments elsewhere than at Tehrān and Tabrīz; and in 1878 Colonel E. C. Ross, Resident at Būshehr, was appointed H. B. M.'s Consul-General for the Province of Fārs and the Coast and Islands of the Persian Gulf within the dominions of Persia. Before this, in 1873 and 1877, the Resident and Assistant Resident had been appointed by the Government of India to be Justices of the Peace for the greater

^{*}It is not clear why consular powers should not have been conferred, giving jurisdiction over British subjects, without regard to their recognition or non-recognition by the Persian authorities.

part of the same, and for other territories, and had been invested with certain judicial powers of limited application. The extra-territorial jurisdiction of the Resident, as Consul-General, over British subjects in Persia was not regularly established or defined, however, until the appearance of the Persian Coast and Islands Order in Council, 1889, in the drafting of which great difficulty was experienced, and an essential modification of which was found necessary, in consequence of Persian objections, in 1895. The Order placed the jurisdiction of the Consul-General on a legal basis and subjected him to the supervision, in criminal and civil matters, of the High Court of Bombay.

The Residency building in Bushehr town, which continued at the site which it had occupied since the early part of Fat-h 'Ali Shāh's reign, was described as follows in 1850: "The Residency is situated on an exposed and airy spot on the south side. It consists of a court surrounded with buildings, including the Resident's mansion and various other lodgings, with out-houses and stables. On the side towards the sea, stands the flagstaff. Besides the British Resident and his family, the medical officer attached to the station has apartments here, and there are also lodgings for strangers..."

Residency building at Būshehr.

Additions were made to the Residency building down to the period of the Anglo-Persian war, and possibly after it.

In April 1869, Colonel Pelly complained of the unhealthiness of Büshehr town and sought the aid of the British Minister at Tehrān in obtaining a site for a new Residency building in the open country; but the Shāh was opposed to the idea of a removal, and the scheme was shelved.

In 1850 the Resident had a country house at Chaghādak on the mainland, where there were also two other houses belonging to Residency officials; these were built with the consent of the Persian Government. They were destroyed in the war of 1856-57 and were not rebuilt.

Country
houses connected with
the Residency.

To replace them a site at Sabzābād on the Būshehr peninsula was obtained by Captain F. Jones from the Persian authorities in 1858; and there he built the Resident's present country house; but while it was in course of erection it was made the subject of gross misrepresentations at Tehrān, and a plan of it had to be submitted to the Persian Central Government before its completion was authorised. In 1860 a small bungalow for the Residency Surgeon was begun at the same place, and at first no objections were raised by the Persians; but some months later, in retaliation for British opposition to Persian proceedings in Bahrain, it was one night razed to the ground by the Persian authorities on the plea

of its being an unauthorised addition to the plan sanctioned by the Persian Government. On the final departure of Captain Jones from Būshehr in 1862 the Sabzābād house was purchased for the telegraph department, but before long it was transferred to the Resident for his use.

British Residency guard and Resident's mounted escort.

The Indian military guard of the British Residency at Bushehr consisted in 1850 of 36 sepoys. In 1856 its strength was still the same and it was commanded by a Subadar. In the latter year Captain Jones, the Resident, proposed to reduce it to 2 non-commissioned officers and 12 men, substituting for the remainder a mounted escort, recruited locally, which would be more useful for various purposes such as carrying despatches. This scheme was sanctioned by the Government of Bombay, but was not carried into effect owing to the Anglo-Persian war.

In 1863 Colonel Pelly revived Captain Jones' proposals with two modifications, viz., that the whole infantry detachment should be replaced by a mounted escort, organised on the Silladar system, and that this escort should be obtained from India. The last infantry guard returned to India-in September 1864, its place being taken by the new mounted escort, of which the authorised strength seems to have been 3 non-commissioned officers and 18 troopers.

In 1878 there was again, in addition to the mounted escort, a detachment of 16 men of the Bombay Marine Battalion at Büshehr. Difficulty have been experienced in maintaining the mounted escort, for which volunteers of a proper class were not easily obtained in India, the expense of keeping up their horses and equipment under the Silladar system being apparently regarded by the men as a grievance; and the escort was progressively reduced to 2 non-commissioned officers, 12 troopers and 4 menials in 1891, and to 1 non-commissioned officer, 8 troopers and 4 menials in 1892, the individual pay being at the same time raised. Finally, in 1893, the purchase and feed of horses and the supply of saddlery was undertaken by the Government of India, a small subscription being still required from the men for other purposes; and the strength of the escort was finally fixed at 1 non-commissioned officer The Indian infantry detachment thus became again the and 8 troopers. main protection of the Residency.

Residency steamer. So long as the Indian Navy continued to exist, that is until 1863, there was always some vessel available to carry the Resident on his frequent and necessary tours to different parts of the Persian Gulf. But, when the duties of the Indian Navy were transferred to the Royal Navy and the ships of the former withdrawn, the provision of a

special steamer for the Resident's use and for other political duties became imperative; and the "Berenice," formerly belonging to the Indian Navy, appears to have been supplied, her guns being first removed. At a later period there was for a time,—from 1876 to 1887,—no Residency Steamer at Büshehr; but in the latter year a permanent vessel was given, the * " Lawrence," belonging to the Royal Indian Marine.

It has been shown that Basidu came finally under British occupation in the autumn of 1823, evidently without the consent of the Persian Government, who claimed full sovereignty over the whole island Basidu. of Qishm and who had previously protested against the presence of a British force thereon.

Affairs of the British Station of

The Bāsīdu station was at first a dépôt of the Indian Navy; and the stores there were in charge, until 1833, of the purser of the ship of the Commodore in the Persian Gulf, an allowance of Rs. 200 a month being paid him on this account. In 1833 the allowance was withdrawn, and the Commodore became responsible for the stores.

The dispositions made for the defence of Basidu during the war of 1856-57 have been described in an earlier paragraph.

In 1858 Commodore Jenkins, I.N., reported that he had divested himself of charge of the Basidu stores and had appointed the purser of his ship to be Store-keeper, as well as receiver and Superintendent of liberated slaves, from which it would appear that Basidu was at this time a place of some importance in connection with British measures for the extinction of the slave trade. This arrangement did not commend itself to the Commander-in-Chief of the Indian Navy; and in 1860, on his recommendation and that of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, a native store agent and Store-keeper was appointed at Bāsīdu instead of a European.

In 1863 it was considered whether the Basidu station might not be abandoned altogether or, as an alternative, whether the stores there -chiefly coal-might not be left without military protection, a detachment of native infantry which was generally kept there as a guard being withdrawn. The Resident, Colonel Pelly, pointed out however that Bāsīdu, though not an ideal station, possessed certain advantages; that a coal dépôt was required somewhere in the Persian Gulf; that Bāsīdu, for physical, political and military reasons, was

^{*} The "Lawrence" is a steel paddle steamer of 902 gross tonnage and 1,277 indicated horse power, with a speed of 12 knots. She has a crew of 4 officers, 2 Engineers, 3 Warrant Officers, and 80 Petty Officers and men. Her armament consists (1906) of four 4-inch B. L. guns (not mounted), four .6-pr. Nordenfelts, and four 45-inch fivebarrel Nordenfelts.

probably preferable to Bushehr—the only other possible place—as the site for one; that the necessary buildings already existed at Bāsīdu and that possession of the place, once relinquished, might be difficult to recover in consequence of opposition by the Persian Government. Colonel Pelly also thought that the dépôt, if retained, could not be left altogether unprotected. On these grounds it was decided not at once to withdraw the existing guard, of which the ordinary strength seems to have been only 1 non-commissioned officer and 6 sepoys of the Bombay Marine Battalion.

On different occasions from 1863 to 1868 the surrender of fugitive slaves who had taken refuge in the British station of Bāsīdu was requested by the Persian authorities, an accusation of their having committed some offence being sometimes added to give colour to the demand. The question of the action to be taken was more than once referred by the Resident to the Government of Bombay; but, Bāsīdu being regarded by that Government as virtually British territory and no agreement for extradition existing between the British and the Persian Government, it does not appear that compliance with the wishes of the Persian authorities was in any instance sanctioned.

In 1868, when as yet no powers of extra-territoral jurisdiction had been conferred on the Resident in the Persian Gulf, a different question arose through the commission by one Sa'īd Sīdi, who admitted his guilt of a murder at Basidu. This case ultimately came before the Government of India, who suggested that, as there was-for technical reasons of jurisdiction-no prospects of a conviction being obtained in any Indian court, and as it was undesirable that the prisoner should merely be deported to the mainland and released as had been proposed, arrangements should be made for the trial of Sa'īd Sīdi's and other similar cases by the Resident in the Persian Gulf or his subordinates, theoretically under authority delegated by the native ruler of the territory in which the case arose,—a system analogous to that followed by the British authorities in Native States in India. Whether this solution of the difficulty was actually adopted does not appear; and, from the discussions regarding the Resident's powers which continued without result till many years later, it would seem that there were at least grave difficulties in the way of its adoption.

The importance of Sa'īd Sīdi's case was political, however, rather than judicial, and lay in the following distinct pronouncement by the Government of India, which it occasioned, on the subject of the status of Bāsīdu: "There may be some obscurity as to the exact nature of our derivative title to the town of Bassidore, and it may have been thought that our rights over the town existed by continued usage, or that we had obtained a prescriptive title; but in looking closely into the question, it becomes evident that our rights are subordinate to those of Muscat, which again are, admittedly, entirely subordinate to those of Persia, and have been always so treated up to this very hour."

In 1872 it was decided to transfer the Bāsīdu coal dépôt to Hanjām Island, where a British telegraph station had been established; but the idea was abandoned on account of difficulties, noticed further on, regarding the ownership of Hanjām.

In 1873 the military guard at Bāsīdu was still furnished by the Bombay Marine Battalion (21st Native Insantry); the station was under the general supervision of Assistant Surgeon 'Abdur Rahīm, Hakīm, of the Indian Medical Service, who resided there; and the only local troubles arose from difficulties thrown by the Shaikh of Qishmin the way of obtaining supplies, and from the dilapidated state of the pier. The coal dépôt was still kept up, and Government vessels occasionally called to fill their bunkers.

In 1874, of four native appointments existing at Bāsīdu, those of Clerk, Slave Agent, and Munshi were abolished, a Coal Agent only being retained.

In 1875 ill-feeling had sprung up between the inhabitants of Bāsīdu and those of some of the neighbouring villages, and the Shaikh of Qishm appeared to be encouraging petty annoyances at the station; but these matters were arranged, after full investigation, by Colonel Ross, the Resident, on a special visit to Qishm; and all trouble ceased. The pier had been repaired; the buildings were in good order; the health of the community was satisfactory; and the work of Assistant Surgeon 'Abdur Rahīm, who still continued in general charge of Bāsīdu, was commended by the Resident.

A Bāsīdu Coal Agent, Hāji 'Abbās, was dismissed in 1877, by order of the Resident, for possessing a slave in defiance of British proclamations, annually published on the subject.

About the beginning of 1878, in compliance with orders from the Government of India, Colonel Ross reported the reasons for which, in the Persian Gulf, Bāsīdu was regarded as a British possession; these were resolvable, practically, into the plain marks and open exercise—or what had been regarded as such—of British sovereignty, against which the

Persian Government had never made any protest. There were buildings, a good stone pier, a coal dépôt, and water tanks; a military guard was maintained, though scarcely now required for protection; and the plain Union Jack was constantly flown, not to mark the presence of a political representative—for there was none, but as a sign of occupation in full right. The Persians and Arabs of the adjoining country, no less than the British political officers in the Gulf, had been accustomed to regard Bāsīdu as British soil. Colonel Ross considered that the station was, for the time being, of little actual use; but he held that, for the simple reason that the place was under the British flag, its retention was desirable until a more useful equivalent, also under the flag, should have been obtained elsewhere.

In 1878, with a view to more frequent relief of the Indian military guards at Baghdād, Būshehr, etc., a full company of the 21st Native Infantry seems to have been posted at Bāsīdu; but in 1879, the health of this detachment having suffered severely from the climate, the garrison was reduced to a Havaldar's guard, the remainder, namely a Native Officer, 7 non-commissioned officers, and 62 sepoys, being transferred to Jāshk.

In 1880 the project of a removal from Bāsīdu to Hanjām was revived, but was again relinquished in consequence of the abandonment of Hanjām as a British telegraph station.

In 1883, Bāsīdu being haunted by malarial fever, the military guard was removed altogether; Assistant Surgeon Abdur Rahīm, Khān Bahādur, who had held charge of it for 14 years, received promotion elsewhere; and the Coal Agent remained in sole possession.

Arrangements for the occupation of Hanjam as a British Telegraph Station, 1866-68, and its retention as such till 1880.

For reasons which are described in the appendix on the Telegraphs of the Persian Gulf, it was proposed in 1865 to establish a British telegraph cable station on the island of Hanjām; and in 1866 the question came under consideration in its political aspect. A change of ruler at Masqat in the beginning of the latter year, involving the termination of the lease of Bandar 'Abbās and its dependencies by Persia to the Sultan of 'Omān, but not without a possibility of its being renewed, increased the complexity of the situation; for it was assumed at the outset, by the superior British authorities concerned, that Hanjām was one of the dependencies of Bandar 'Abbās. What was at first proposed was, apparently, to obtain Hanjām island in exchange for Bāsīdu and upon the same terms, thus concentrating the British establishments at the mouth of the Persian Gulf in one place under the British flag; and Sir C. Alison, the British representative at Tehrān, thought that this might be

arranged directly with the Sultan of 'Oman without reference to the Persian Government. The lease of Bandar 'Abbas in favour of the Sultan having lapsed however, the Government of India, on the assumption that Hanjam had been included in the lease, considered that negotiations in regard to the island could not properly be opened with that potentate; and it was clearly impossible to make permanent arrangements with the actual lessee of Bander 'Abbas, who was only a Shaikh farming the districts for one year from the Persian Government. In the circumstances, as they were understood, no alternative to broaching the subject to the Shah's Ministers remained; and an application was accordingly made at Tehran, without raising the question of the proprietorship of the island, for permission to establish a British telegraph station on Hanjam. The application was successful; and, on the 29th March 1868, permission was granted in writing by the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs under authority from the Shah, subject to certain conditions as to the size and nature of the buildings to be erected and the strength and composition of the staff to be employed.

In July 1868, after these arrangements had been concluded and the Persian ownerships of Hanjam in substance admitted, Colonel Pelly, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, who had not been informed of what was passing and who was at the moment engaged at Shīrāz in negotiating for a renewal of the Bandar 'Abbas lease to the Sultan of 'Oman, suddenly reported that the Sultan claimed Hanjam as a part of his dominions quite independently of the Bandar 'Abbas lease, and was anxious to transfer it to the British Government, retaining for himself a right of free anchorage only. Colonel Pelly stated that the islands of Hanjam and Lārak were not shown in a map of the Bandar 'Abbās territories leased to the Sultan in 1856 which the Persians themselves had recently exhibited, and that both were inhabited by Arabs owing allegiance to Masqat, while on Hanjam there was not a single Persian resident; and it was certain that, unlike Qishm and Hormuz, neither island had been mentioned by name in the Perso-'Omāni Treaty of 1856, or was mentioned in the new lease negotiated by Colonel Pelly. The information, through no fault of Colonel Pelly's, really came too late to be of use, though there was still some faint idea of meditation by the Governor-General of India between Persia and 'Oman in territorial questions: and it does not appear that the Government of India were convinced by the Resident's arguments that the Sultan possessed a valid title, not derived from Persia, to Hanjām or Lārak.

The British telegraph station on Hanjām was maintained until 1880, when it was abolished as being no longer required.

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MUZAFFAR-UD-DĪN SHĀH, FROM 1896.*

Before proceeding to consider events and questions belonging particularly to the Persian Coast and Islands, we may take a rapid survey of the general internal and external history of Persia under Muzaffar-ud-Dīn Shāh, the son and successor of Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shāh.

Internal affairs of Persia, 1896-1905.

Muzaffar-ud-Dīn Shāh's character.

Government of the Aminus-Sultan, 1896.

Muzaffar-ud-Dîn Shāh, whose age at his accession to the throne of Persia was about forty-three years, possessed fair personal abilities; his natural disposition was easy-going, amiable, even kindly; but he was weak, timid, extravagant, and too indulgent of himself and of others.

The head of the new Shāh's first Government was the Amīn-us-Sultān, a very able but very unscrupulous Minister whom he inherited from his father, and whose influence, it will be remembered, had been powerful in the south of Persia and in the Persian Gulf during the latter part of Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shāh's reign. On the accession of the new ruler a cabal was formed, or—if it already existed—became active, against the Amīn-us-Sultān; and in November 1896 he was obliged to retire to Qum, whither the physician of the British Legation accompanied him as a protection against any act of violence similar to that by which the Amīr Nizām lost his life in 1852. The Minister's adversaries were numerous and influential, perhaps the most prominent among them being the Farmān-Farmā, a great-grandson of Fatah-'Ali Shāh and at once brother-in-law and son-in-law of the reigning sovereign.

Government of the Aminud-Dauleh, 1897-98.

The place of the Amīn-us-Sultān and his supporters was taken by a makeshift Ministry which maintained itself with difficulty until February 1897, when the Amīn-ud-Dauleh was summoned from Tabrīz to assume the direction of affairs and was soon appointed Sadr-i-A'zam with the Nāsir-ul-Mulk as Minister of Finance. The chief business of the

^{*}Authorities for this period are nearly all official. Among those relating to Persian affairs as a whole are Persia and the Persian Gulf by Messrs. C. L. S. Russell and J. G. Lorimer (forming Volume IV of the official Summary of the principal Events and Measures of the Viceroyalty of Lord Curzon of Kedleston, Viceroy and Governor-General of India, in the Foreign Department, 1899-1905); and Persia: a Statement showing the Pronouncements as to Intention or Policy which have been made by responsible British Ministers, and the Assurances which have been given to Great Britain by the Persian Government, by Mr. S. M. Fraser, 1904. Local history is contained in Mr. J. A. Saldanha's Précis of the Affairs of the Persian Coast and Islands, 1854-1905, printed in 1906, and in the annual Administration Reports of the Persian Gulf Residency. Of non-official publications Mr. V. Chirol's Middle Eastern Question, 1903, is the most useful.

Government was now, as will be shown by and by, to provide funds for public expenditure and for the personal requirements of the Shāh, to whom a tour in Europe had been recommended by his medical advisers: and in June 1898, having failed in this task, notwithstanding more or less serious efforts both to place the finances of the country on a better footing and to obtain a loan, the Amin-ud-Dauleh was compelled to resign office and retire to his private estates near Rasht. His administrative programme, it may be observed, had been a reasonable and not unpractical one: it contemplated a separation of the revenue-spending from the revenue-collecting agencies of the State, an assessment de novo of the land tax, a reduction of the regular army, and the organisation of a properly disciplined gendarmerie, but, except an improvement of the petty currency of the country which he effected by the introduction of nickel coins, and a preliminary step which he took towards a reform of the Customs Department by the engagement of Belgian experts, his ideas remained virtually unexecuted.

The Amīn-ud-Dauleh was succeeded in the headship of the administration by the Mushīr-ud-Dauleh, Minister for Foreign Affairs and President of the Cabinet; but this official proved unable to cope with the political situation and the pecuniary demands of his royal master, and his tenure of power was short.

Government of the Mushīr-ud-Dauleh, 1898.

In August 1898 the Amīn-us-Sultān returned to power in his former capacity of Grand Vizier; and his principal opponents, including the Farmān-Farmā, the Qawwām-ud-Dauleh, the Nāsir-ul-Mulk, the A'la-ul-Mulk, and the Hakīm-ul-Mulk, were removed to positions in which their political influence was greatly diminished. In the spring of 1900, a Russian loan having in the meanwhile been obtained, Muzaffar-ud-Dīn Shāh started on his long-anticipated European tour; and a Council of Ministers, presided over by H. R. H. Malik Mansur Mīrza, better known as the Shū'-as-Saltaneh, his second son, governed Persia in his absence. Contrexéville, Paris, and St. Petersburg were visited by His Persian Majesty; but a royal decease prevented this time the inclusion of Britain, Germany, or Italy in his programme.

In 1902 the Shāh made a second journey to Europe, in the course of which he visited England.

In 1903 troubles of various kinds broke out at many places in Persia, and there was for a time an agitation against the Shāh's Government which seemed to be partly instigated by the political rivals of the Amīnus-Sultān or Atabaig-i-A'zam, as he was now styled, and partly promoted by the ecclesiastical authorities on patriotic grounds. Important foci of this quasi-seditious movement were Karbala and Najaf in Turkish

Government of the Aminus-Sultān, 1898-1903. Iraq, in the chapter on the history of which province an account of the proceedings of the Persian Mujtahids at the Holy Cities will be found. The Persian masses, who before the Amin-ud-Dauleh's reform of the currency had suffered severely from depreciation, confusion, and speculation in the copper coinage, and especially the inhabitants of the towns where dearness of animal food, unrelieved (in consequence of the operations of speculators) by the removal of taxes thereon, had at times reduced the poor to great straits, were seething with discontent. these conditions, aggravated by the wasteful expenditure of the Shāh and his Court, particularly in connection with His Majesty's European tours, by the introduction of numerous Belgian officials into the Persian Customs Department, by foreign loans, proposed or effected, and by a great revival of Babiism, it was not difficult for intriguers to excite actual violence; and the earlier part of 1903 was characterised by riots. anti-foreign demonstrations, and massacres of Babis at more than one important centre. In September 1903 the sudden death in suspicious circumstances of the Hakīm-ul-Mulk, one of the Atabaig-i-A'zam's principal opponents, in conjuction doubtless with the seriously disordered state of the country, seemed to produce a mysterious revolution at the seat of power; and the Atabaig fell and was exiled from Persia. It seemed possible that his failure to satisfy all the demands of Russian diplomacy had contributed, also, to his displacement.

Government of H. R. H. the 'Ain-ud-Dauleh, after 1903. A period of comparative quiet followed, during which the affairs of State were directed by H. R. H. the 'Ain-ud-Dauleh, a grandson of Fat-h 'Ali Shāh, and doubly brother-in-law of the ruling monarch.

The Shāh was able, in 1905, to make a third journey to Europe, on which he visited Vienna and St. Petersburg; but popular discontent in Persia was far from being allayed, and demands for representative Government had begun to make themselves heard.

The employment on a considerable scale of Belgian Customs officials,—which, though exasperating to nationalist feeling now beginning to bud, had a beneficial effect on the revenues,—the gradual Europeanisation of the Customs administration, and the transfer of other departments of State business to the management of the Belgian Customs advisers are fully noticed in the Appendix on the Imperial Persian Customs.

Mutual opposition of Britain and Russia in general matters in Persia, 1896-1905.

Though the Anglo-Russian understanding in regard to maintenance of the independence and integrity of Persia, formed in 1834 and renewed

thereafter from time to time, the last occasion being in 1888, still remained in force, the course of Persian affairs during the period under consideration was dominated by antagonism between Britain and Russia in most questions of importance, whether general or local. On certain phases of this international conflict of interests it is now necessary to enter, and we may examine first those which were general to the whole of Persia.

In 1891 it was calculated that there was a surplus of public revenue over public expenditure in Persia amounting to about £100,000 annually and the country had then no debt. The economies of Nasir-ud-Din Shah, whose administration in the financial as in every other department was personal and autocratic, at one time aggregated, it was believed, about £4,000,000, but before the end of his reign this reserve fund had been greatly depleted, and at his death its amount probably did not exceed 30,000,000 francs. Liabilities, meanwhile, had begun to accumulate. In 1892 a Persian loan had been floated in London through the (British) Imperial Bank of Persia for the purpose of paying an indemnity of £500,000 due to the (British) Imperial Tobacco Corporation on account of cancellation of their concession; and in the course of the next few years £200,000 had been borrowed by the Persian Government from the Imperial Bank of Persia. By 1898 the public debt of Persia, including an unpaid balance of the British loan of 1892, had risen to about £1,000,000, yet the pay of the army and the salaries of civil officials were in arrear. Early in 1898 British financiers were willing to lend £1,250,000 to Persia at 5 per cent., the loan to be issued at 82, on the security of the customs of Fars and the Persian Gulf, subject to a proviso that their agents should be placed in charge of the customs houses of which the revenues were assigned to them. Their proposals were accepted in principle by the Amīn-ud-Dauleh, the Persian Prime Minister of the day; an advance of £50,000 was paid in March 1898; and the customs houses of Büshehr and Kirmanshah were handed over to the management of the Imperial Bank of Persia. Opposition to the transfer of the customs houses arose, however, with the result that it was abandoned; and, on the supersession of the Amīn-ud-Dauleh by the Mushīr-ud-Dauleh, it was discovered that the financial requirements of the Persian Government were about double what had been supposed. Thereupon the negotiations with the British group fell through.

Proposals for a joint Anglo-Russian loan to Persia were then made by the British to the Russian Government and appeared to be favourably entertained; but in January 1900 it was suddenly announced that an

State of the Persian finances and British loans to Persia, 1898.

> Russian loan to Persia, 1900.

exclusively Russian loan had been accepted by the Persian Government through the Banque des Prêts de Perse, a branch of the Russian State bank. The nominal amount of the loan was about £2,400,000, with issue of bonds at 85; the rate of interest was 5 per cent. guaranteed by the Russian Government; and the security — which was liable to realisation by direct control in case of default of payment only — consisted of the customs revenues of Persia except those of Fārs and the Persian Gulf Ports. The balance of the British loan of 1892 and most other outstanding liabilities were paid off from the proceeds of this loan, one condition of which was that Persia should not, without the consent of the Russian Government, raise any money in foreign markets before 1910. The control thus established by Russia over the fiscal affairs of Persia appeared to be absolute.

Refusal of a British loan by Persia, 1901. In the following year, the Shāh having returned from his first European tour and the Fersian exchequer being again empty, the British Government were approached by the Atabaig-i-A'zam with a view to a loan. The Government of India were willing to provide £500,000 on certain conditions, and an offer based on their suggestions was made to the Persian Government, but was in the end rejected by them, chiefly perhaps from a fear on their part that the receipt of British money, even through the medium of the Imperial Bank of Persia, might be regarded by Russia as an infringement of the conditions of the Russian loan of 1900.

Further Russian loans to Persia, 1902-03.

In 1902, the Shah having resolved on a second trip to Europe and the financial difficulties of Persia having become more acute, in January and March advances aggregating about £300,000 and in April a loan of approximately £1,000,000 were accepted by the Persian Government from the Russian Bank. This additional accommodation cost Persia dear, and the conditions on which it was granted affected British interests unfavourably. Among the advantages which Russia secured were a renewal for ten years of the Russo-Persian agreement in restraint of railway construction in Persia, an extension of the period of Persian financial tutelage to Russia by two years (from 1910 to 1912), and an undertaking by Persia that changes then contemplated in the Persian Customs tariff should be settled between Russia and Persia alone. security for this new loan included not only the existing customs of Persia generally (excluding Fars and the Persian Gulf Ports), but also the revenues of such customs posts as might afterwards be established, the posts in question being evidently some which it was intended to create on the frontier of Baluchistan.

By 1903 the indebtedness of Persia to Russia amounted, in round figures, to nearly £4,000,000, of which it was estimated that at least half represented sums swallowed up by the Shah's Civil List.

Meanwhile the Government of Persia, their financial difficulties still continuing, had again made overtures to the British Legation at Tehran. The Government of India were prepared to lend any sum not exceeding £1,000,000 upon suitable conditions; and it was suggested that the transaction might take the form of the purchase of a monopoly of road and railway construction and other commercial enterprises in Sistan and South-Eastern, Southern, and South-Western Persia; but it proved impossible to obtain such terms. In the end, an advance of £200,000 was made to Persia on the 4th April 1903, and a supplementary advance of £100,000 on the 1st September 1904, through the Imperial Bank of It was arranged that these advances should be treated as one loan, bearing interest at 5 per cent., repayable in 20 annual instalments, and secured on the Caspian Sea Fishery dues, the Post and Telegraph revenue of Persia, and the customs of Fars and the Persian Gulf. The Government of India, who were the lenders, received from His Majesty's Government a guarantee against loss to the extent of one-half of the amount involved.

British loan to Persia,

1903-04.

In 1905 His Majesty's Government were disposed to facilitate, on certain conditions, an advance of £150,000 by the Imperial Bank of Persia to the Persian Government; and in October of that year the Shāh's Grand Vizier appeared to be on the point of closing with the offer, but desired that the amount of the advance should be increased to £300,000.

Proposed British loan to Persia, 1905.

The Persian Customs, partly as constituting the sole reliable and convenient security for repayment of foreign loans that the Persian Government had to offer, and partly for reasons connected with national trade and prestige, naturally became a subject of controversy between Britain and Russia. It was of essential importance to the British Government that no sort of lien on or control over the Customs of Southern Persia should be acquired by Russia, and that, if those Customs were to come under foreign management at all, it should be British management; also that Russia should not obtain such power over the commercial policy of Persia as would enable her to manipulate the Persian Customs tariff, to an indefinite extent, to the advantage of her own trade and the injury of British interests. These desiderata of British policy gave rise to developments which are fully described in the Appendix on the Imperial Persian Customs. Among the most important

Questions relating to the Persian Customs, 1892-1904.

were a specific assurance obtained from the Persian Government in 1897; a temporary transfer of the Büshehr Custom House in 1898 to the Imperial Bank of Persia; the exclusion of Russia, by a process completed by stages between 1892 and 1904, from all connection with the customs of Southern Persia, or at least of Fārs and the ports of the Persian Gulf, the latter term including Muhammareh, Jāshk, Chahbār and Gwatar; and the frustration, in 1902, of an attempt by Russia to deprive Britain of a voice in the modification of rates under the Persian Customs tariff.

Questions of railway construction in Persia, 1899-1904. The contest between Russia and Britain in regard to railway construction, definitely initiated in 1889, continued without relaxation during the period now under review.

In December 1899 the Russo-Persian agreement interdicting the construction of railways in Persia was renewed for ten years; nevertheless, as described in another place, a Russian Technical Commission in 1900 overran Persia and carried preliminary railway reconnaissances southwards from Tehrān and Isfahān to Muhammareh, Būshehr, Bander 'Abbās, and even Chahbār. By 1899 the railway system of the Russian Empire had been extended to Qārs; and in 1904 a Russian line reached Julfah on the Russo-Persian frontier.

The grant of preferential rights to Britain in 1889 with reference to the construction of railways in the south of Persia was admitted by the Shāh in 1900, and was recognised by His Majesty as still binding. A slight extension of the railway system of British India from Quetta in the direction of Persia was completed in 1905.

Questions of road construction in Persia, 1899-1905. Competition between Russia and Britain in regard to the construction of roads was not so acute as in regard to that of railways, the interests of the two powers lying, in this matter, in different territorial spheres.

In 1899 a Russian road had been carried from Ashkabad on the Trans-Caspian Railway to Mashhad, and another from the port of Enzeli on the Caspian by Qazvīn to Tehrān was nearing completion. In 1902, as part consideration for the loan made by Russia to Persia in that year, a concession was given for a Russian road from Julfah to Qazvīn with a branch from Qazvīn to Hamadān. By 1905 all the roads mentioned were open for traffic, and on some of them a motor service had been introduced. Qazvīn, and consequently the Persian capital not to mention Hamadān, had been made easily accessible from the Russian rail-head at Julfah, and from Enzeli, where improvements of the harbour had been taken in hand by Russia.

On the British side the execution of the Imperial Bank of Persia's concession of 1890 made slow progress; but by 1899 the road con-

structed under it hadreached Qum and carriages were being run by the Bank, though it was unmetalled, as far as that place. By 1903 it was open to Sultānābād. Meanwhile a road from Ahwāz to Isfahān had been made by the British firm of Messrs. Lynch, acting as the agents of the Bakhtiyari Chiefs, who, as described in the chapter on the history of 'Arabistan, had obtained a concession; and at the beginning of 1900 it was brought into use. In 1904 a British corporation was formed, under the title of the Persian Transport Company, to take over and work not only the Imperial Bank of Persia's road concession, but also the interests possessed by Messrs. Lynch in the navigation of the Kārūn river and in the Bakhtiyāri road between Ahwāz to Isfahān. The new Company was assigned a subsidy of £2,000 a year for ten years, of which half was to be contributed by His Majesty's Government and half by the Government of India. Measures were next taken to extend the Tehrān-Sultānābād road southwards through Luristan to Ahwaz; but, as related in the chapter on 'Arabistan affairs, political obstacles of a local character declared themselves, and the enterprise was perforce abandoned for the time being. In 1905 the possibility and desirability of obtaining a concession for the construction by British agency of a road from Bandar 'Abbas to Bam, with extensions towards Isfahān and Sīstān, were discussed.

There was also rivalry between Britain and Russia in Persia with regard to the construction and working of lines of telegraph on behalf of the Persian Government.

Questions of telegraph construction in Persia, 1901-1905.

The first move in this contest was made on the British side; and in the Appendix on the Telegraphs of the Persian Gulf an account will be found of how, under a Convention signed in 1901, a Central Persian land line of telegraph was constructed by the Indo-European Telegraph Department from Kāshān by Yazd and Kirmān to a point on the frontier of Baluchistan where it joined the British Indian system. This new line was the property of the Persian Government; but it was arranged that it should be held on lease by the Indo-European Telegraph Department until 1925, or during such shorter period as the British Government might desire.

The Russian Government on their part, in connection with the Russian loan to Persia in 1900, obtained a promise that they would be given permission to carry a telegraph from Mashhad to Sīstan. This line was not taken in hand until 1903, but once begun it was quickly completed. A pretence was made of its being a purely Persian enterprise, but was ill-sustained. About April 1903 a secret agreement was

concluded between Russia and Persia whereby the former power obtained a right to employ two engineers and three signallers on the Mashhad-Sīstān line, and to link the telegraphs of Persia with those of Trans-Caspia. By 1905 the number of Russian signallers on the Mashhad-Sīstān line had risen to thirteen, and the Russian technical staff had, with the consent of the Shāh, virtually taken it under their charge. The British Government did not fail to protest against the Russification of this line, and their opposition was so far successful that a few British signallers were placed on it, at Birjand, Turbat-i-Haidari, etc.

Mutual opposition of Britain and Russia in local matters in Persia, 1896-1905.

We pass now to manifestations and consequences of Anglo-Persian rivalry in Persia which were more local in their character than those considered above.

Russian and French activity in the Persian Gulf and British counteractive measures, 1895-1905.

A field in which Russia displayed an almost feverish activity, and in which France also made a transient appearance at her side, was that of the Persian Gulf. The Russian and French proceedings in that quarter during the decade ending in 1905, together with the counteractive measures adopted there by Britain, are fully described in the chapter on the general history of the Gulf, to which it will be convenient at this point to refer. They were among the most important of all the developments of the period.

It may be added here that, outside the region of the Persian Gulf proper, steps were taken to strengthen the British political position in the Gulf, by the establishment in January 1903 of a permanent British Consulate at Kirmān, under an officer of the Indian Political Department, but at the joint expense of His Majesty's Government and of the Government of India, in place of makeshift arrangements which had existed since 1893; by the institution of a British Consulate at Shīrāz, in November 1903, under a member of the Levant Consular Service, in substitution for the previously existing Native Agency; and by the appointment of a Native Agent of the British Government at Bampūr in 1901. The official last mentioned, however, in deference to Persian objections, was shortly removed to Kirmān and remained there until 1904, when he was stationed at Bam.

Russian activity in Eastern In 1889 a Rusian Consul-General had been appointed at Mashhad, and a British Consul-General, to whose staff a Military Attaché was

afterwards added, had immediately been sent there to counter- Persia, 1889-1905. balance the effect of the appointment. Russia, however, did not fail to acquire a commanding position, both political and commercial, in Khurāsān, where the proximity of the Trans-Caspian Railway and the Russian garrisons in Central Arabia, assisted by a lavish expenditure of money, gave her great advantages. Nor was her attitude an expectant or indolent one; Russian consular officials, news-agents, surveyors, and emissaries of all sorts quickly pervaded the districts of Eastern Persia southwards, penetrating, as we shall see later, even to Sīstān.

In 1897, bubonic plague having become prevalent in India, the Russian political authorities took advantage of the circumstance to assert their power in Khurāsān by establishing a quarantine cordon on Persian soil which barred access to Mashhad from Afghanistan on the east and from Sistan on the south. No cases of plague had occurred in Afghanistan or Baluchistan, and the raison d'être of the cordon was clearly political rather than prophylactic, especially as it remained unwithdrawn after signature of the Venice Sanitary Convention of 1897, which condemned land quarantines in principle. The principal results of the cordon were to divert Afghan trade from Persian to Russian territory and to check the growth of nascent commercial intercourse between Quetta and Mashhad vid Sīstān. The cordon was in charge of Russian doctors, whose authority was supported by a force of over 100 Russian Cossacks; and, though the latter were after a time replaced by Persian Cossacks, their officers remained and continued to take orders from the Russian Consul-General at Mashhad. Attempts to advance the Russian cordon further to the south were frustrated by the despatch of a British medical officer from India to Sistan, of which mention will be made in a later paragraph of this chapter. In 1903 His Majesty's Government endeavoured, first through the Shah's Ministers and afterwards in direct communication with the Russian Government, to obtain the abolition of the cordon, but without success. Accordingly, towards the end of 1903, a British Consul with a British medical officer and an Indian cavalry guard was located at Turbat-i-Haidari, which was the central point in the Russian quarantine line; and British subjects and interests were by this means secured from improper interference. In 1905, an isolated case of cholera having occurred at Birjand, an attempt was made by the Russian Consul at Nasratābād in Sīstān to institute a quarantine cordon between the two places, but it was foiled by British representations at Tehran.

In 1903 Russia incited the Persian Government, who were themselves indifferent on the subject, to protest against alleged Afghan encroachments on Persian territory in the district of Hashtadān; but in 1904, steps having been taken with the concurrence of the Amīr of Afghanistan to bring the dispute under settlement by the good offices of the British Government, so completing a partial delimitation which had been affected in that quarter in a similar manner in 1891, and Russia having moreover become involved in war with Japan in the Far East, Persia ceased to complain, and the status quo was left unaltered.

Anglo-Russian contest for political influence in Sīstān, 1894-95. From 1894 the isolated Persian district of Sīstān, which had in a great measure fallen out of notice since the adjustment of conflicting Persian and Afghan claims there by a British mediator (Colonel F. J. Goldsmid) in 1872, became the theatre of a very energetic contest for political influence between Britain and Russia. The strategic importance of Sīstān to India was considered to be great, and it was therefore held necessary to prevent the extension to it of that Russian ascendency which already radiated from Mashhad over a great part of the province of Khurāsān. In 1894, when Colonel Yate visited Sīstān, a Russian Native Agent had been installed there, while Britain was as yet unrepresented.

In 1895-96 British missions from India delimited the frontiers between Baluchistan and Afghanistan and between Baluchistan and Persia, and their proceedings led to a fuller appreciation by the British authorities of the importance of Sīstān and of the advisability of extending British effective control across Baluchistan to its confines. 1896 a British Political Officer was appointed to Chagai, midway between Quetta and the Persian frontier; Captain Webb-Ware, the first nominee, visited Sistan in the beginning of 1897; and the opening up of a trade route from Quetta by Robāt to Nasratābād, the chief place in Sīstān, running for 463 miles through inhospitable country within the Baluchistan border, was undertaken. Meanwhile reports were received of a Russian design to institute, as already described, precautions in Persia against the importation of bubonic plague from India; and, in order to forestall any extension of the apprehended Russian measures to Sīstān, Major Brazier-Creagh, a medical officer, was deputed from India to the spot; but it was not found necessary that he should remain there long.

In 1898 information reached the British representative at Mashhad of the contemplated appointment of a Mr. Zeidler as Russian Vice-

Consul to Sīstān; and, to meet this emergency, Major Sykes, then employed at Kirmān, was directed to proceed to Sīstān, where he arrived at the beginning of 1899 and was duly recognised as the first British consular representative. Major Sykes spent the summer at Birjand, returning in the autumn for a short time to Sīstān, and thence to his post at Kirmān. No sooner had he left the district than it was announced, this time with truth, that a Russian officer was on his way to establish a Vice-Consulate in Sīstān. Mr. Miller, the officer in question, reached Nasratābād in February 1900; but the effect of his appearance was neutralised by the arrival there, a few weeks later, of Major Chenevix-Trench, who had been selected for the appointment of His Britannic Majesty's Consul-General at Mashhad. Early in 1901 Major Trench was relieved by Captain Benn, who was designated and recognised as His Britannic Majesty's Consul in Sīstān.

With the location on the spot of a commissioned representative of either power, friction between Russia and Britain in local questions began; and, the attention of the Persian Government having been thus forcibly drawn to the district, Belgian officials of the Persian Customs Department appeared on the scene in 1901, and were followed by a Persian Kārguzār or Foreign Office Agent in 1902. The local Persian Governor, the Hashmat-ul-Mulk, was thus superseded in two of his principal functions; and a complicated and uneasy situation arose. 1901 difficulties between Persians and Afghans on the Sistan border became acute, not, it was alleged, without the fostering of the Russian Vice-Consul; and in the same year it was alleged that Russia had applied for the conveyance to herself, by one means or another, of control of the revenues of Sīstān, possibly on purchase by Russian agents of lands which belonged to the Persian Crown, and were said to compose the greater part of the district, or of their produce. This rumour occasioned energetic British representations at Tehran which resulted, at the end of the year, in a written assurance by the Persian Government that the internal revenues of Sīstān would not be alienated to any foreign Government or its subjects. In 1903 and 1905 there were renewed rumours of a transfer of the Persian Crown lands in Sistan, or thier produce, to foreigners; but diplomatic representations at the Persian capital frustrated the proceedings by which they were occasioned.

In 1902 the status of Mr. Miller, the Russian representative in Sīstān, was increased from that of Vice-Consul to that of Consul, and a corresponding change in the rank of the British representative followed. The Belgian Customs officials, probably in consequence of the ascendency

of Russian influence at Tehrān, behaved as strong partisans of Russia and neglected no opportunity of showing hostility to British interests. Their persecution of trade arriving by the new British caravan route from Quetta was as unremitting as it was severe; and in July 1902, the Persian postal administration in Sīstān having been transferred to their management, they substituted a service organised by the Russian Consul for one which the British Consul had instituted in the previou year between Robāt, Nasratābād, and Birjand, connecting with the Indian postal system at Robāt: a protest at Tehrān, however, secured the restoration of the service between Robāt and Nasratābād to the former British employés.

But by far the most important questions in Sīstān were now those of the Perso-Afghan border and the rights of irrigation in the waters of the Halmand belonging to Persian and Afghan subjects respectively. These questions had been settled by Colonel Goldsmid in 1872; but physical changes on a large scale had revived them. In July 1902 the Persian Government, under the Anglo-Persian Treaty of Peace of 1857, claimed the good offices of the British Government for the adjustment of the new disputes; and their demand was at once acceded to. of the local Russian representative in exacerbating the frontier difficulty was undoubtedly to create a situation in which Russia might find opportunity to assert herself in Sīstān; and desperate efforts were made by the Russian Government between July 1902 and March 1903 to obtain a share in the proceedings. The Russian argument was that the integrity of Persia, in respect of which there was an understanding between the Russian and the British Government, was in danger, and that Russia had consequently a joint interest in the question; but it was pertinently replied that Russia herself had, notwithstanding the common interest of the two powers in the integrity of Persia, declined in 1888 to admit British participation in discussions concerning the frontier between Trans-Caspia and Khurāsān. Successive Russian proposals for the introduction of a Russian arbitrator into the case, for the association of a Russian delegate with the British Commissioner, and for the attachment of a Russian adviser to the Persian Commissioner were successfully resisted.

The British Mission under Colonel (afterwards Sir A. H.) McMahon entered Sīstān in March 1903 and remained there until May 1905. Many expedients were resorted to by the Russian Consul for inconveniencing the British Mission and preventing the success of their operations; but, like the efforts of his Government to obtain a locus standi in the matter, they ended in failure. In November 1903 Colonel McMahon

announced his decision in regard to the Perso-Afghan boundary, which had already been submitted to the Shāh and approved by him; in March 1904 the award was accepted by the Amīr of Afghanistan; and by the end of 1904 the new frontier had been demarcated on the ground. The British Commissioner's finding in regard to water rights was announced in April 1905; but at the end of that year it was still under consideration by the Persian and Afghan Governments.

Meanwhile, in August 1903, a Persian Passport Officer had been deputed to Sīstān; and, under Russian instigation, his powers were exerted to annoy British and Afghan subjects to the utmost possible extent. In the summer of 1903 Mr. Miller, by disseminating false reports, succeeded in provoking an anti-British agitation at Nasratābād, and in driving the British Indian traders there to take refuge in the British Consulate. But in this he had overstepped the bounds of prudence; Mr. Dobbs, his British colleague, was able to obtain the punishment of the rioters by the local Persian authority; and Mr. Miller was presently transferred to some other scene of activity. His brother, Dr. Miller, who had at one time figured as an unofficial adviser of the Yamīn-i-Nizām, the Persian Frontier Commissioner, supplied his place for a few months after his departure, and was then himself withdrawn. Steps were taken by the British Government to secure the position of the Hashmat-ul-Mulk, Governor of Sīstān by hereditary right and in virtue of recognition by the Persian Government, whose attitude had been generally not unfavourable to British interests, and whom Mr. Miller had for this reason denounced as a traitor to Persia; and, though in 1904 the Hashmat-ul-Mulk was summoned to Tehran, and compelled to obey the summons, there appeared in 1905 to be a fair prospect of his restoration to his Governorship.

In the meantime, in December 1903, a branch of the Imperial Bank of Persia had been opened at Nasratābād; and in 1905 the British Indian railway system had been extended to Nushki, 93 miles on the way from Quetta to Sīstān, of which a lease had been obtained from the Khān of Kalāt in 1899. There were also negotiations on foot at the end of the period for the connection of the Indian telegraph, which had reached the frontier station of Robāt in 1904, with the Persian station at Nasratābād by means of a line, 100 miles in length, to be constructed by British agency.

It may be added that the establishment of a British frontier post at Mirjawa in 1901 gave rise to protests on the part of Persia, founded on a delimitation of the Perso-Baluch frontier in 1896, which the

Russian intervention with reference to the Persia Baluchistan Frontier, 1901-1905. Russian Government in 1902 warmly supported. It was intended that the question of Mirjawa should be disposed of by Colonel McMahon, in co-operation with a Persian representative, on the conclusion of his mission to Sīstān; but eventually this was found unnecessary, the British post having been removed to another site, and the Persian Government having undertaken to let supplies be furnished to it from certain villages in Persia.

Russian and British activity in Central and Western Persia, 1897-1905. Russian trade had by 1899 reached Isfahān, where in 1897 a Russian Consulate-General had been established, and the supremacy of British trade in Central Persia was threatened. At the beginning of 1904 a British Vice-Consulate under an officer of the Indian Political Department was established at Kirmānshāh and was shortly raised to the status of a Consulate to meet a change in the grade of the local Russian representative. In the summer of 1904, cholera having been introduced into Western Persia by travellers from Turkish 'Irāq, the Russian authorities in Persia proposed that the quarantine arrangements at Kirmānshāh should be placed in the hands of one of their doctors; but this move was checkmated by the prompt despatch of a British Consular Surgeon to Kirmānshāh, with whose help the local Customs officer was able to carry out the sanitary precautions considered necessary.

Russian and British policy in Persia, 1896-1905.

Such were the principal manifestations of activity by Russia in Persia and some of the measures taken by Britain for the protection of her interests in that country.

In 1900, which was perhaps the most critical year of the period, it was evident that Russia had proposed to herself two great objects for ultimate or even immediate attainment. The first of these was the establishment of a Russian naval base in the Persian Gulf or the Gulf of 'Omān, to be connected by railway with the seats of Russian military power; the second was the political absorption of Sīstān. Both projects were inimical to the interest of the British Empire in India, and the policy of Britain was to prevent the realisation of either. Different lines of action were suggested by various British authorities; and the whole Persian problem was twice officially examined in London—first by a Conference of representatives of the Admiralty and Foreign, India, and War Offices in November 1902, and again by the Committee of Imperial Defence in

March 1905. It is unnecessary here, however, to describe either the schemes that had been propounded or the conclusions that were reached.

The attitude of the British Government towards Russian designs on ports of the Persian Gulf was clearly intimated in March 1900 to the Persian Government, who were informed that "the control of these ports by a foreign power might lead to a state of things which Her Majesty's Government, in the interests of the Indian Empire, would be bound to resist." Similarly, with reference to Sīstān, a communication was made to the Grand Vizier of Persia in July or August 1901, to the effect that "His Majesty's Government regard it as of the utmost importance that Sistan should remain as heretofore under the exclusive control of Persia, and they could not tolerate or acquiesce in any project which would result in the alienation of its revenues to any other power, or the intrusion of any foreign authority there." At the beginning of 1902, the British warning to Persia was repeated in more forcible terms. The British Minister at Tehran, Sir A. Hardinge, was instructed by Lord Lansdowne, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to explain that in Southern Persia Great Britain could not reasonably be expected to abandon a position obtained by many years of sustained effort; that she could not consent to the acquisition by Russia of a military or naval station in the Persian Gulf; and that, if at any time the Persian Government should make such a concession to Russia, it would be necessary for His Majesty's Government to take such measures in the Gulf as they might consider necessary for the protection of British interests. His Majesty's Government, moreover, could not acquiesce in the grant to Russia of any preferential political rights or advantages, or of any commercial monopoly or exclusive privilege, in the southern or south-eastern districts of Persia, including Sistan. Finally, if, in disregard of British admonitions, the Persian Government were to encourage the advance of Russian political influence and intervention in those regions, His Majesty's Government would be obliged to reconsider their policy, and would regard themselves as justified in taking such measures as might appear to them best calculated to protect British interests, even though in the adoption of such measures it might no longer be possible to make the integrity and independence of Persia their first object as hitherto. This remonstrance elicited an autograph letter from the Shāh to his Grand Vizier in February 1902 which was communicated to the British Legation, and which contained the following passage:

The Persian Government has never come, and will not come, to any understanding with any power against the British Government, and has never desired, and does not

now desire, to alienate any part of its territory, to the extent of a span, to any one for the erection of fortifications against the English Government. The latter should not listen to false reports and become suspicious of Us. It should have full confidence in our good-will, and rest assured that we are doing our best to encourage British trade, and will continue to do so in so far as such efforts of Ours do not affect the independence of Persia, in which case no foreign power has the right to expect this of Us.

In the summer of the same year, the Shāh being then in England, Lord Lansdowne took the opportunity to impress upon His Majesty at a private interview, the cardinal points of British policy in Persia, stating that His Majesty's Government adhered to their oft repeated recognition of the independence of Persia, but that they were specially concerned in the southern part of Persia and in the Persian Gulf, and that they were determined, should occasion arise, to put forth their whole strength in order to prevent encroachment by foreign powers in those quarters.

From the beginning of 1902 onwards, occasion was frequently taken to announce to Russia and to the world in general, through the medium of ministerial speeches in the British Parliament, the policy deliberately adopted by His Majesty's Government with reference to Persia and, more particularly, the Persian Gulf. On the 22nd January 1902 Lord Cranborne, Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, declared in the House of Commons:

We are anxious for the integrity of Persia, but we are anxious far more for the balance of power; and it would be impossible for us, whatever the cause, to abandon what we look upon as our rightful position in Persia. Especially is this true in regard to the Persian Gulf, as I had the honour to state to the House a few days ago. It is true not only of the Persian Gulf, but of the southern provinces of Persia, and those provinces which border on our Indian Empire. Our rights there, and our position of ascendancy, we cannot abandon. In the Gulf itself, as I ventured to state on the previous occasion, our ascendancy is not merely a question of theory, but a question of fact.

On the 5th May 1903 Lord Lansdowne, as Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, made a weighty and unmistakable pronouncement on the subject of British policy, which, relating as it did exclusively to the Persian Gulf, is quoted verbatim in the chapter on the general history of that region. After this official and final statement, the Russian Government were approached with reference to the possibility of a definite adjustment of the respective interests of Britain and Russia in Persia, and a suggestion was thrown out that separate spheres of influence might be arranged; but the Tsar's Ministers were not at the time disposed to enter into negotiations on the subject.

In February 1903 Muzaffar-ud-Dīn Shāh was invested with the Order of the Garter by the hand of Lord Downe, who, at the head of a British complimentary Mission, was deputed to Tehrān or the purpose.

In December 1904 a special Persian Mission under Mīrza Riza Khān was received at St. Petersburg by His Majesty the Tsar.

British official matters general to the whole of Persia, 1896-1905.

Increased British activity in Persia resulted in increased expenditure, the incidence of which became a question between the Imperial and Indian Governments. In 1899 the contribution of His Majesty's Government to the maintenance of the British establishments in Persia was £15.460, that of the Government of India £61.052 per annum. re-adjustment of these charges was desired by the Government of India, who suggested that either the whole expenditure of the two Governments in Persia should be thrown together and then divided between them in a fixed proportion, or each Government should undertake the expenses relating to a particular territorial sphere. The whole question was settled by the report of a Royal Commission appointed in 1897 to consider the question of Indian expenditure. Their recommendations, which were made in April and adopted in September 1900, were to the effect that the annual contribution of £7,000 from Indian revenues on account of the British Mission Persia, which had been fixed in 1891, should be lowered to £2,000; and that future additions to the charges of the Mission and Consulates in Persia should be evenly divided between the Home and the Indian Treasuries, the two Governments agreeing not to create new establishments or add to existing ones except by mutual consent.

In 1899 an officer of the Indian Army was appointed to be Military Attaché in His Britannic Majesty's Legation at Tehran, and to combine with his functions as such those of Oriental Secretary. But in 1901 this arrangements ceased, and, though an Indian officer still held the 1899-1901. post of Military Attaché, he was no longer charged with any political duties.

During the period under review, chiefly in consequence of the supply by Russia of Cossack guards to her Consulates in Persia, a large increase was made in the number and strength of the British consular guards also, the additions consisting wholly of Indian cavalry. In 1899 the only British consular guards in the country were 56 Indian infantry and a mounted escort of 9 sabres at Büshehr, besides 5 Indian cavalry at

Division of expenditure in Persia between His Majesty's Government and the Government of India, 1899-1900.

Personnel of His Britannic Majestv's Legation at Tehrān,

Increase of British Consular guards in Persia, 1904.

Mashhad,—in all 70 men. In 1904 additional Indian cavalry to the number of 127 sabres were distributed to 12 British Consulates in Persia, while the infantry guard and mounted escort at Büshehr and Indian infantry detachments at Jāshk and Chahbār of 100 and 50 rifles respectively, for the protection of the telegraph stations at those places remained unaffected. The introduction of the new cavalry guards was viewed with disfavour by the Persian Government.

Administrative and internal affairs of the Persian Coast and Islands, 1896-1905.

Having taken a survey of the political conditions governing Persia generally during the period under consideration, we now turn to our proper subject,—the history of the Persian Coast and Islands.

Administration of Fars, 1896-1905. The administration of Fars, as that province included in 1905 the districts of Līrāvi, Shābānkāreh, Mazāra'i, Dashtistān, Tangistān, Dashti, Shībkūh, and Bastak, situated on or adjacent to the shores of the Persian Gulf, and was at all times connected with the Persian Gulf, in other ways, may first be shortly noticed.

In the spring of 1896 His Royal Highness the Rukn-ud-Dauleh, who had governed Fars since 1894, was confirmed in office; but in July, after the assassination of Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shāh, he was removed in favour of the Nāzim-ud-Dauleh. The new Governor-General did not, however, assume charge of his post until October.

1897-1899.

In 1897 the Nāzim-ud-Dauleh was succeeded by the Farmān-Farmā, a brother-in-law of the Shāh, under whom the Gulf Ports, separated from Fārs about ten years before, seem to have been at first placed; but they were withdrawn again from his authority in the following year. Supported by the Qavvām-ul-Mulk of Shīrāz, whose influence over the nomadic tribes of the province was great, the Fārman-Farmā, himself an enlightened and well-educated man, governed for a time with vigour and success; but difficulties at length arose between him and the Central Government; and in February 1899 he relinquished his appointment and retired temporarily to Karbala.

1899-1901.

The Farman-Farma was followed by the Nizam-ul-Mulk, who remained only one year and was succeeded, in 1900, by the Muaiyid-ud-Dauleh.

In the spring of 1901 the Shū'-us-Sultaneh, the Shāh's second and 1901-1902. favourite son, was appointed Governor-General of Fars, arriving in April at Shīrāz; he ruled with a strong hand and maintained general security; but he had the misfortune to quarrel with the Qavvām-ul-Mulk of Shīrāz, who on his representations was removed to Tehrān along with his son the Baiglar-Baigi. In January 1902, however, the Qavvām-ul-Mulk was allowed to return from the capital and entered on a course of intrigue, the outcome of which was that in March the Prince and his adversary were both summoned to the capital while the Governor-Generalship of Fars was conferred on the Asaf-ud-Dauleh.

The administration of the Asaf-ud-Dauleh was popular, but weak; 1902-1903. the unruly tribes of the province made head; and the highways became unsafe, meanwhile, in August 1902, the Qavvām-ul-Mulk was again permitted to return to Shīrāz; but he had not been there two months when he was ordered to proceed on pilgrimage to Karbala; later in the year, however, he was pardoned and came home.

In the spring of 1903 the A'la-ud-Dauleh took up the reins of 1903-1904. government; when he appeared at Shīrāz, in April, the Qavvām-ul-Mulk was found to be in his train; but the new Governor-General at once gave proofs of independence and force of character. At the end of the year he proceeded to Büshehr, where it was intended that he should welcome Lord Curzon, the Viceroy and Governor-General of India, then on tour in the Persian Gulf; but circumstances deprived him, as related elsewhere, of the expected honour.

In 1904, the A'la-ud-Dauleh having been recalled to Tehran, Fars 1904-1905. remained without a Governor-General until the month of June, when His Royal Highness the Shū'-us-Sultaneh, who had held office in 1901-1902, was reappointed to Shīrāz. His administration, praiseworthy during first tenure of office, was this time execrable in every respect. disorders broke out at Shīrāz, where the Jewish community had for some time been mercilessly harried; and something approaching a general revolt of the people of Fars against his government, which was "unconscionably corrupt and unscrupulous," occurred and necessitated his removal.

We at length reach the Persian Gulf proper, and may first of all Administranote the manner in which the administration of the Gulf Ports, a division including the most important ports of the Persian Coast, as well as 1896-1905. all its islands, was conducted during the period.

tion of the Gulf Ports.

At its commencement the Governorship of the Gulf Ports was held 1896. by the Hisam-us-Sultaneh, whose rule was characterised by "an utter

neglect of all the duties and obligations of his office." The financial responsibilities and advantages of the Governorship had been transferred before his arrival, to the mercantile combination which had ousted his predecessor, the Qavvām-ul-Mulk, from Būshehr; and the Hisām-us-Sultaneh was consequently deprived of all incentive to burden himself with public affairs. He allowed his power to be secretly usurped by others, and their exercise of it was attended by all the abuses and disadvantages commonly incident to covert and irresponsible authority. The Hisām-us-Sultaneh was also constantly at variance with the Central Government; and in December 1896 he informed the British Resident at Būshehr that he had resigned, and declined to transact business.

1896-1898.

After this no fewer than nine persons succeeded one another in the Governorship of the Gulf Ports in the space of about fifteen months: these were the Iqtidar-us-Saltaneh, who was appointed in March 1897 and removed in September of the same year; the Amīr-i-Panj, so called from his military rank, who died in Persian Makran; the Mujīr-us-Sultaneh, a nephew of the Nizām-us-Sultaneh. whose appointment was cancelled almost as soon as notified; the I'timād-us-Sultān or Baiglar-Baigi, representing his father the Qavvām-ul-Mulk, who arrived at Büshehr in November 1897 and resigned in February 1898; the Malik-ut-Tujjar of Bushehr, temporarily; the I'mad-i-Nizām, a dependent of the Farman Farma and appointed by him, who assumed charge in March 1898 and, finally, the Sa'id-us-Sultan (in May 1898), the Muzaffar-i-Nizām, and the Mu'izz-ul-Mamālik, all nominated in rapid succession to one another by the Farman-Farma. The Gulf Ports were then taken from the Farman-Farma, to whom they had been assigned, and conferred on the Mujīr-us-Sultaneh, already mentioned, who continued in office the last Governor appointed by the Farman-Fārmā.

1898-1910.

In September 1898, however, apparently in consequence of representations by the British Government to whom the Mujīr-us-Saltaneh was unacceptable as being a nephew of the * Nizām-us-Saltaneh, a new appointment was made in the person of Mīrza Āhmad Khān, better known as the Darya-Baigi, then commanding the Persian gunboat "Persepolis" at Būshehr. The Darya-Baigi incurred local enmities; he quarrelled with the Mu'īn-ut-Tujjār, by whom he was financed; charges of embezzlement were brought against him which he seemed unable to refute; and, with the formation of the Imperial Persian Customs, the appointment which he held ceased to be valuable.

^{*} See the chapter on the history of 'Arabistan, page 1763.

In April 1901 he resigned and proceeded to Tehran, not however before he had been presented by the British Government with a sword of honour for useful services in Makran and had received a decoration from the Russian Consul-General.

The next Governor of the Gulf Ports was the Sālār-i-Mu'azzam, a 1901-1903. nephew of the Nizām-us-Saltaneh, who was appointed in August 1901, but did not reach Büshehr until December; his acting representative, from September till December, was the Mu'izz-ul-Mamālik. The Sālār-i-Mu'azzam restored order at Büshehr and in its neighbourhood, which had declined after the departure of the Darya-Baigi; but in the spring of 1903 he was recalled to Tehran.

Pending the arrival from the capital of the Darya-Baigi, who had 1903-1905, made up his differences with the Mu'in-ut-Tujjār and was so enabled to purchase his re-appointment to Büshehr, the duties of Governor were satisfactorily carried on by the Karguzar, Mirza 'Ali Muhammad Khan, Muwaqir-ud-Dauleh. In 1905 the Darva Baigi was still Governor of the Gulf Ports; but it was remarked that he was the puppet of the Mu'īn-ut-Tujjār and that, though conciliatory and even cordial in his dealings with the British Residency, he had little real power under the existing régime and was seldom able to fulfil the promises of which he was prodigal.

It may be mentioned that in 1903 four guns of position were brought to Büshehr, where a Persian artillery officer from Tehran also arrived; but no immediate steps were taken to construct the works in which it was intended to mount them.

Customs administration, 1900—1905.

Under the Government of the Gulf Ports there were during the period regular Deputy Governors at Lingeh and Bandar 'Abbās, besides functionaries of a more local or tribal character at Qishm, Hormūz, and Mīnab, and in Shamīl and Biyābān.

From 1900 onwards the administration of the Customs was an important matter in the Persian Coast and Islands, being carried on there elsewhere in Persia, by Belgian Officials and on a European system; a full account of it will be found in the appendix on the Imperial Persian Customs.

Here, however, may be mentioned a particular incident connected with the Customs which occurred in the Governorship of the Salar-i-Mu'azzam. At the beginning of May 1902 the town of Büshehr swarmed with Tangistāni and Dashti musketeers, about 1,000 in number, whom the Customs authorities had enlisted and assembled on their own authority and at the middle of the month the Khān of Angāli arrived at Shīf with an armed levy to join the gathering. The object of the preparations was studiously concealed; but there was little doubt that coercion of the Khān of Rīg, who was then resisting the establishment of a Customs post at his port, was contemplated. In the end the tumultuary force was quietly disbanded without having been employed, operations having been prohibited at the last moment by the central Government, to whom the Sālār-i-Mu'azzam had reported the matter. The history of particular places and districts follows.

History at Būshehr, 1896—1905. The winter rains of 1896-97 having failed there was in 1897 a great scarcity of grain at Būshehr and in its neighbourhood, and heavy importation of food stuffs from abroad took place, notably of rice from Burma. That the conditions at Būshehr did not amount to actual famine and that public relief did not seem to be immediately required were circumstances quoted by the British Resident as proving an increase of prosperity among the people since the great famine of 1870—72. The Resident obtained the sanction of Government, however, for the utilisation, in case of necessity, of a balance remaining in his charge of the famine relief fund of 1872.

During the prevalence of scarcity there was considerable insecurity in and about Büshehr; and in 1897 the Persian soldiers of the garrison, who suffered from official neglect as well as from high prices, took sanctuary at the flagstaff of the British Residency and demanded their pay, which was five months in arrear, from the Persian anthorities; but the matter having been satisfactorily settled, they returned to duty.

A timely fall of rain in March 1898, following a second failure of the usual winter rains, averted distress which must otherwise have been wide-spread and severe.

In 1905, owing partly to the dissatisfaction of the people of Färs with the Shū'-us-Saltaneh's government and partly, perhaps, to a lawless and anarchical spirit which was abroad among them, the Būshehr-Shīrāz road became disturbed and unsafe.

History of Tangistan, 1896—1905. The feud in Tangistān between the rival Chiefs Haidar Khān and 'Ali Khān, begun in 1879 or earlier, continued in the reign of Muzaffar-ud-Dīn Shāh. In the autumn of 1896 difficulty arose in connection with the removal from 'Ali Khān's jurisdiction of certain villages on the coast, which had been sanctioned; and Persian troops, with guns from the Persian gunboat "Persepolis," were sent to help Haidar Khān in enforcing the measure and in collecting revenue. After a collision between the opposing forces, an arrangement of some kind was effected;

but it profited the Persian authorities little. A month later, Haidar Khān, on being called upon to disgorge the amounts which he had been enabled to collect, merely presented a pistol at the head of the Governor of the Gulf Port's representative, who thereupon returned, followed by the Persian troops and guns, to Būshehr.

At the close of 1897 Haidar Khān was required to punish 'Ali Khān, who had made default in his fiscal obligations to the Persian Government; and 'Ali Khān, not finding himself in a position to offer resistance, took sanctuary at the Imāmzādeh shrine in the middle of the Būshehr Peninsula with a large number of followers. Numerous violent crimes, among them murders, took place at the beginning of 1898 in the surrounding villages and were attributed, probably with justice, to the refugee chief's dependents; and the situation at Būshehr, of which the Persian military garrison had been depleted by the despatch of 150 men to Persian Makrān, began to give cause for serious anxiety. After a time, perhaps in consequence of orders issued by the Persian Government for a movement of troops from Shīrāz, 'Ali Khān fled from the Imāmzādeh and returned to Tangistān.

The Persian force from Shīrāz, which consisted of about 800 infantry and was commanded by the Sa'id-us-Sultan, an officer on the staff of the Farman Farma, then Governor General of Shīraz, presently invaded Tangistān on pretence of punishing the Tangistānis for the outrages committed by them near Bushehr. A field gun accompanied the expedition. The district was ravaged, and a few men were taken and executed; but the guilt of these victims was doubtful, and it was stated that the real offenders had escaped scot-free. On the other hand, the expedition was believed to have been financially profitable to the Persian authorities; for some revenue had been realised, and ransoms had been extorted from such solvent individual as fell into the hands of the troops. At the conclusion of the operations the Saīd-us-Sultān, who had been appointed Governor of the Gulf Ports, apparently recognised Haidar Khan as sole chief of Tangistān; and 'Ali Khān, fearing the consequences, at first fled to a port further up the coast with the intention of embarking for Basrah. Shortly, however, seeing that no attempt was made to arrest him, he returned to his home in Tangistan.

In 1990, offences which the Persian authorities ascribed to Tangistanis having occurred on the Büshehr Peninsula, another Military expedition was ordered; and at the end of September the Darya Baigi, Governor of the Gulf Ports, took the field with several hundred regular Persian infantry, 3 or 4 guns, and a large force of armed levies. A few

of the inhabitants of the district were killed, and some tribal forts and other property were destroyed; but 'Ali Khān remained at large, and Haidar Khān was successful in evading the Persian force and in reaching the Būshehr Imāmzādeh in their rear, where he placed himself in sanctuary.

Trouble was renewed in 1903 by competition between two Tangistāni Chiefs, Zāir Khidar and Zāir Ghulām Ali, whose identity or connection—if any—with the former protagonists, Haidar Khān and 'Ali Khān, is not described. In May a reconciliation was effected between them; but presently Zāir Ghulam 'Ali was killed by one of his rival's followers; and Zāir Khidar was decoyed to Būshehr, and treacherously seized there, by the Governor of the Gulf Ports. Three of the Governor's men and two Tangistānis were slain in a fracas attending the arrest. In October, under orders from the central Government, the Darya Baigi proceeded with 100 Tufangchis to the assistance of the Zābit of Dashti, who had been ordered to chastise the district of Tangistān; and Zāir Khidar, who seems in the meantime to have regained his freedom, sought safety in flight to a distance. The Darya Baigi, after looting and setting fire to the village of Ahmadi in Dashtistān, returned to Būshehr.

History of Shībkūh, 1896--1905. In 1896 an attack was made on the port of Tāhiri in Shībkūh by Shaikh Ibrāhīm, a Zābit of that place who had been expelled in the previous year; but it was repulsed with loss to the assistants.

History of Lingeh, 1896 -1905. It will be remembered that in 1887 Lingeh had been brought under direct Persian administration on removal of the hereditary Arab Zābit, Shaikh Qadhīb, Qāsimi; and that the latter had been deported to Tehrān.

1898.

The Persian occupation of Lingeh remained undisturbed until 1898, when, on the 4th July, Muhammad-bin-Khalīfah, a scion of the former ruling family, suddenly appeared on the scene, and in a forcible but orderly manner, made himself master of the place.

1899.

Early in 1899 the Persian authorities gave signs of an intention to repossess themselves of Lingeh; and, when in February the Persian gunboat "Persepolis" with the Darya Baigi on board left Büshehr in a southerly direction, H. M. S. "Pigeon" was ordered to follow her and watch her movements. The "Pigeon," however, on the Darya Baigi assuring her commander that no attack would be made on Lingeh without previous notice to the British authorities, ceased to accompany the "Persepolis"; and the Shaikh of Lingeh, after paying up the arrears of revenue which were due by him on account of the district, allowed himself to be lulled into a false sense of security.

Suddenly, in the early morning of the 2nd March, when the Shaikh had disbanded the greater part of a force that he had collected for purposes of defence, the Darya Baigi with 700 Persian troops entered the town by its western end; and by day light he was in possession of all the quarters between it and the Shaikh's fortified residence the sound of firing H. M. S. "Sphinx" hurried over from Basidu, where she happened to be lying, and found the "Persepolis" engaged in bombarding the Shaikh's fort. Desultory firing continued during the day and the following night; and, on the morning of the 3rd March, the Shaikh abandoned his resistance and made good his escape to the open country. The Persians then took possession of his fort, hoisting the Persian flag on it, and the Darva Baigi guaranteed the maintenance of order in the town. Throughout the operations British subjects were not intentionally molested by the combatants on either side; but, during the progress of the fighting, some shops were looted in the eastern part of the town; and the claims for compensation lodged by British subjects ultimately amounted to \$63,500. On the Persian side only some 15 men were killed and 20 wounded, the Arab losses were also inconsiderable, and the only building damaged was the Shaikh's fort, shelled by the "Persepolis."

For about four months the ex-Shaikh lingered in the interior, in the neighbourhood of the village of Mīrakūn, and the Persians complained of attacks by his followers on caravans and even on detachments of their troops; but their statements were not free from exaggeration. Eventually he embarked at the small port of Bandar Mahtābi and betook himself to the Arabian side of the Gulf.

In January 1900 the ex-Shaikh was found to be living in Trucial 'Omān under the protection of the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah; and the Persian Government immediately gave way to fears of a great Arab attack on Lingeh organised in the ports of Trucial 'Omān. The action taken by the British Government on the Persian representations and an intrigue with the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi upon which the Darya Baigi entered, on his own account, for the purpose of averting the imagined danger are described in the chapter on the history of Trucial 'Omān.

In August 1902 Saiyid Yüsuf, who had been the ex-Shaikh's right-hand man in his Government of Lingeh, landed at Duvvān and succeeded in destroying a large consignment of dates, the property of the Persian Government on its way from Lingeh to the interior. He was unable, however, to maintain himself on the Persian coast and shortly sailed for Qatar, his master being then at Rās-al-Khaimah. The only

1900.

1902.

result of his raid was a visit which the Governor of the Gulf Ports paid to Lingeh two months later in the "Persepolis." The Sālār-i-Mu'azzam fined Shaikh Yūsuf-bin-Ahmad and his brother, the chiefs of the Āl bū Samait Arab Colony at Lingeh, a sum of \$6,000 on a charge of complicity in Saiyid Yūsuf's proceedings, and obtained from them besides a written document in which they declared themselves to be subjects of the Persian Government.

1903.

About the end of July 1903 the ex-Shaikh landed once more on Persian soil, with only a dozen followers, and established himself in the hills behind Lingeh. His tone was now that of a suppliant; and from his retreat he wrote to the Governor of the Gulf Ports asking leave to settle and lead a quiet life in Lingeh district. At the same time he invoked, through the Residency Agent at Lingeh, the good offices of the British Government. A safe-conduct for visiting Büshehr was offered him, but he did not avail himself of it; consequently, as a precaution, some Persian troops were sent to Lingeh under the Mujīr-us Saltaneh, brother of the Sālār-i-Mu'azzam, lately Governor of the Gulf Ports. At the end of November 1903 Muhammad-bin-Khalīfah returned to the Arabian side.

1904-1905.

Arrived there, he resided by turns at Rās-al-Khaimah, Shārjah and Dibai, and in Qatar: he was, in 1905, a man of quiet and respectable appearance about 35 years of age. The chief supporter of his cause, Saiyid Yusūf, who was connected by marriage with the Qawāsim, settled at Dibai and there engaged in trade in pearls and rice.

History of Bandar 'Abbās, 1896—1905. On the 9th June 1912 and following days severe shocks of earthquake were experienced at Bandar 'Abbās. In that and the following year the roads in the neighbourhood of the town were very unsafe, and raids were committed in the district by gangs of Bahārlus and Bashākardis. Excitement and unrest continued in 1903-04; for some weeks caravan traffic was altogether suspended; and it was feared that the town itself might be attacked. The only cause assigned for these disorders was the prevalence of alarming rumours concerning the health of the Shāh.

History of Qishm, 1896—1905. On the 11th January 1897 a terrible earthquake laid almost the whole town of Qishm in ruins and occasioned much loss of life. Qishm also suffered from the series of earthquakes which affected Bandar 'Abbās in June 1902, but not so severely as on the former occasion. In 1900 the Zābit of Qishm was changed, one Shaikh 'Abdullah being substituted for Shaikh Hasan.

History of Shamil, Minab, and In May and June 1902 considerable annoyance was caused in Mīnāb by incursions of Bashākardis. In 1905 disorders were caused in Shamīl,

by Siraj, a dismissed Kalantar of the District; and in the same year the Deputy-Governorship of Bivābān was disputed between Mir Hāji-bin-Husain and Mir Barkat-bin-'Abdun Nabi, the former of whom was at first in possession. In October 1905 Mir Barkat, having visited the Governor of the Gulf Ports at Büshehr, procured the dismissal of Mīr Hāji, whom he had temporarily ousted, in his own favour; but Mīr Hāji at once appealed to the Persian Deputy-Governor of Bandar 'Abbās, who was the Darya Baigi's brother, and obtained his countenance. The two kinsmen were then left to fight the matter out between themselves. Hāji, when in charge of the district, had his seat at Sirīk, Mīr Barkat at Namurdi. The family to which both Mirs belonged was that which governed the adjoining district of Jashk in Persian Makran.

Biyābān, 1896-1905.

Relations of Persia with other local powers, 1896-1905.

Various cases in which the Arabs of Trucial 'Oman were immediately and the British Government indirectly interested arose on the Persian Coast and Islands during the period under review.

In 1898 division was made among her heirs of the moveable property of one Maryam, daughter of Muhammad Ghaith, Qāsimi, who was wife at the time of her death of 'Abdul Qadir, a resident of Lingeh; but some date gardens which she left were kept as joint property by her husband and by Salīm, Ahmad, and Nāsir, sons of Sultān, who were also among her heirs and who were subjects of the Shaikh of Sharjah. The date gardens continued in the possession of 'Abdul Qādir until the recapture of Lingeh by the Persians in 1899, when he was put to death by the Darya Baigi on the charge of having been a confederate of Shaikh Muhammad-bin-Khalifah. The date gardens, apparently on the assumption that they belonged exclusively to 'Abdul Qadir, were at the same time confiscated by the Governor of the Gulf Ports; and subsequently they were sold to the Mu'in-ut-Tujjar of Bushehr, whose influence was then second to none in Southern Persia. A claim for the shares to which they were entitled was lodged by the Sharjah heirs, and was supported by the British Political authorities as representing, in his foreign relations, the Shaikh of Sharjah; but up to the end of 1905 it had not been admitted or satisfied.

In the summer of 1902 four Sudan boat-owners, subjects of Abu Murder of Dhabi, were murdered on the pearl banks on the Arabian side of the Gulf

Civil claim of Sharjah ubjects at Lingeh, 1899-1905.

Abu Dhabi subjects by natives of Tavuneh, 1902. by three men of Tāvuneh, a village on the coast of the Persian district of Shībkūh, whom they had engaged as a crew. The boat itself and the whole season's take of pearls were carried off by the murderers. The Shaikh of Abu Dhabi claimed, on behalf of the heirs of the victims, 6,000 Tūmāns as blood-money and general compensation; and he pressed in addition for the punishment of the offenders. Four persons were subsequently arrested by the Persian authorities, but one of them was allowed to escape; the proceedings dragged; and notwithstanding the best efforts of the British Political Resident and strong feeling aroused at Abu Dhabi by the procrastination of the Persian Government, the case was still unsettled in 1905.

Question of the international status of Tunb and Bū Mūsa Islands, 1904.

In the chapter on the history of Trucial 'Oman it is mentioned that the islands of Tunb and Bū Mūsa, belonging to the Arab principality of Shārjah, were in 1904 unceremoniously occupied by the Persian Government through their Customs Department; but that the Persian occupation was discontinued, before it had lasted three months, in consequence of British diplomatic representations at Tehran. There was reason to believe that the action taken by the Persian Government had been prompted by the Russian Legation at Tehran, who, in view of a tour made by Lord Curzon, Viceroy and Governor General of India, in the Persian Gulf at the end of 1903, were apprehensive of measures on the part of His Britannic Majesty's Government for the consolidation of their position in that quarter, possibly by the occupation of fixed points. When the Persian Government consented to remove their flag from Tunb and Bū Mūsa, it was promised that an opportunity would be given them of discussing the status of those islands with the British Government, but no serious arguments in proof of the ownership by Persia were produced, and the discussion lapsed.

Question of the international status of Sirri Island, 1904. It will be remembered that in 1887, on the institution of direct Persian Government at Lingeh, possession was taken by the Persian authorities of the island of Sirri; and that, though a protest was entered by His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehrān on behalf of the Shaikh of Shārjah, the Persian occupation was permitted to continue. In 1904, when the dispute regarding Tunb and Bū Mūsa occurred, there were Persian employés on Sirri, a Persian flagstaff existed there, and the Persian flag was periodically hoisted. The history of Sirri before 1887 had been very similar to that of Tunb and Bū Mūsa, and the fact was utilised to deter the Persian Government from urging their claims to the other two islands, it being intimated to them that, if they persisted, the claim of the Shaikh of Shārjah to Sirri might be revived and supported

by the British Government. The Belgian Minister of Persian Customs, M. Naus, on the status of Sirri being explained to him by Sir A. Hardinge, the British representative at Tehrān, agreed to strike Sirri out of a list of Persian Customs posts which was then being prepared; but he requested that no objection might be raised to the retention of some Persian Customs guards who had been located on the island to prevent smuggling to the mainland; and the question of Sirri was not further pressed by the British authorities.

British political relations with the Persian Coast and Islands, 1896—1905.

Some political incidents affecting the British Government or their subjects occurred on the Persian Coast and Islands during the reign of Muzaffar-ud-Dīn Shāh and are mentioned below.

In January 1897 a mob of several hundred men, a number of whom carried firearms, proceeded from Bushehr to the British t elegraph station at Rīshehr, five miles destant, and destroyed some bench-marks which had recently been placed near the main telegraph building in connection with British observations of longitude, also a British marine tide gauge close by. Their violent proceedings were accompanied by threats of death to any who might venture to interfere, and no opposition was offered by the telegraph staff. The riot was instigated by certain Saivids of Büshehr, in accordance with a popular superstition that the obnoxious marks and gauge caused a deficiency of rain in the country. The affair did not take place without some premonitary symptoms, but these had been ignored by the Governor for the time being of the Gulf Ports, and that official showed no disposition to afford redress for the outrage after it had occurred. A certain number of ignorant villagers were arrested and punished; but the Saiyid instigators were not called to account, and it was only after the departure of the Hisam-us-Saltaneh from Bushehr that the damaged scientific apparatus could be replaced.

In March 1898, when the Tangistāni Chief 'Ali Khān and a number of his followers were in sanctuary at the Imāmzādeh on the Būshehr peninsula, the house of one Mahmūd, a Persian subject employed as a Jamadar by the Indo-European Telegraph Department, was attacked and looted, and two of his relatives were killed, 'Ali Khan himself owned

Mob outrage at Rishehr telegraph station, 1897.

Outrage on a British protégé at Rishehr, 1898. land in the vicinity, and a dispute regarding an irrigation channel between him and the family of the Jamadar seemed to be the cause of the outrage. In view of this case, and of the general lawlessness of the Tangistāni horde, fears began to be entertained of an attack on the Rīshehr telegraph station, or upon Europeans in general. A party of bluejackets was consequently landed from a British man-of-war as a guard. pending the arrival from Bombay of a reinforcement of 25 rifles which it had been decided to add to the Residency guard. After the conclusion of the Persian expedition into Tangistan, already described, which resulted from this and other misdeeds by 'Ali Khān's followers, that chief, having returned to his home, began to write letters to Mahmud and to the British Resident asserting his innocence and asking that he might be exonerated of blame in the case of the Jamadar's house. He threatened, if proceedings against him were continued, to take sanctuary with the complainant, Mahmud; and under Persian custom. had he done so, it would have been impossible to take steps against him so long as he remained. Finally 'Ali Khan proposed to surrender to the British Resident, on condition that he should receive a fair trial and should not in any circumstances be handed over to the Persian authorities; and his offer was accepted by Captain Prideaux, the Assistant Resident, in the absence of the Resident, Colonel Meade, at Shīrāz. From the investigations which followed it seemed clear that the chief was not really guiltless, and he was accordingly called on to pay 4.000 Tumans as compensation to the sufferers by the crime. This he was not unwilling to do, provided an undertaking were obtained that the Persian Government would not molest him afterwards; but the Residency were unable to procure the desired assurance from the Persian authorities. Accordingly, as he had come in on a safe-conduct, 'Ali Khān was allowed to leave the Residency, where he had been living for six months, and the claim against him was preferred to the Persian Government instead of himself; but the result, if there was any, is not recorded.

Firing on the Resident's country house at Sabzābād, 1900. In June 1900 a relative of a Persian employed in the British telegraph office at Rīshehr was murdered. Again on the night of the 30th August a number of shots were fired from a short distance into the grounds of the British Resident's country house at Sabzābād. Several bullets struck the buildings, and a horse belonging to the Resident's escort was killed. This demonstration was not attributable to any resentment against the British Residency; it seemed rather to have been organised by the Nāzim-ut-Tujjār, between whose uncle, the all-powerful Muīn-ut-Tujjār,

and the Darya Baigi, then governing the Gulf Ports, there was at the time a quarrel. The affair, however, was attributed by the local Persian authorities to Tangistānis; and an expedition into Tangistān, directed by the Darya Baigi, followed, which has already been described. The Nāzim-ut-Tujjār was also required, at the instance of the British Government, to quit Būshehr for a season.

In 1903 a deputation from the Muhammadan College of Aligarh in India visited Persia to explain, from a Muslim standpoint, the advantages of education at the institution which they represented. In September and October the deputation were at Shīrāz, and, when later they returned to India, they took with them a few recruits for the College whom they had secured in Persia.

Deputation from the Aligarh College to Persia, 1903.

At the end of 1903, as related in a special Appendix, Lord Curzon, Viceroy and Governor General of India, made a cruise in the Persian Gulf, in the course of which he visited various places on the Persian Coast and was met at Būshehr by Sir A. Hardinge, His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehrān.

Visit of Viceroy of India and British Minister at Tehran to the Persian Coast, 1903. Murder of a British subject at sea, 1905.

In January 1905 two natives of the disputed island of Sirri took violent possession at sea of a boat from Qishm, which they had joined at Shārjah in the guise of passengers. They murdered all on board except one boy, who was spared by them or otherwise escaped. The motive of the crime was robbery; one of the victims was a Khōjah, a British subject. The offenders having been captured by the Persian Deputy-Governor of Lingeh, the British Resident at Būshehr was instructed by His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehrān to apply to the Governor of the Gulf Ports for their prompt and adequate punishment, on the ground that, though the status of Sirri was contested, the criminals were actually on Persian soil and in Persian custody. One of the prisoners meanwhile succeeded in making his escape, but the other was eventually put to death by drowning.

A serious incident occurred at Lingeh in 1905, Laris and Girashis to the number of nearly 100 surrounding the house of the Native Agent of the British Government there in a threatening manner. Afterwards, though they continued to surround the house, their demeanour was more quiet, and they alleged that they only wished to complain against the action of the Agent in a Hindu bankruptcy case, and had therefore taken sanctuary under the British flag which flew over his residence. The affair was engineered by a notorious mischief-maker, Haji 'Ali, Lari, who intimidated or cajoled the Persian Deputy-Governor into siding with the rioters. Several visits to Lingeh by His Britannic

Disturbances at the British Agency at Lingeh, 1905. Majesty's Consul at Bandar 'Abbās followed; and eventually, after 17 days, the crowd were dispersed, the Deputy-Governor was deposed, and he and Haji 'Ali were banished from Lingeh. This settlement and the manner in which it was enforced had a most satisfactory effect in restoring British prestige along the whole coast from Mugām to Mīnab, where it had been somewhat impaired by the incident.

British claims for compensation, 1900— 1905.

Since 1892 a number of claims for compensation had arisen on the part of British subjects and persons entitled to British protection in Persia, and little or no progress had been made in disposing of them. Not having as yet been jointly examined by British and Persian officials,-an omission due to the apathy of the Persian Government in the matter,—the claims could not be considered as proved in their entirety; but many were undoubtedly well-founded, and a number related to losses sustained through failure of the Persian Government itself to maintain security and good order. When an account of outstanding British and quasi-British claims was made out, at the beginning of 1900, for the Persian Coast and Islands, 'Arabistan, and Persian Makran, it was found that there were no less than 105 cases calling for joint investigation and settlement, and that some of them were as much as eight years old. The total of the compensation claimed in the whole of the cases was £27,597, and about two-thirds of this amount was referable to the Persian Coast and Islands, a considerable proportion of it representing losses alleged to have been suffered at Lingeh in consequence of the Persian operations there in 1899. Two urgent claims preferred by European firms were specially settled by the Persian Government, who paid £1,152 to Messrs. Sassoon and £114 to Messrs. Lynch; but their treatment of the rest was dilatory.

In April 1901 a Persian Commissioner from Tehrān, the Hisām-ul-Vazāreh, arrived at Būshehr to investigate the pending claims in conjunction with the British Resident; but he had not been provided with powers sufficient to overcome the inertia or obstruction of the Governor of the Gulf Ports and the local Kārguzār; and, though he remained at Būshehr for a year, not even a partial settlement was achieved through him.

At the beginning of 1903 a new Kārguzār, the Muhtashim-ul-Vazāreh, was appointed to Būshehr for the ostensible purpose of disposing of the claims in consultation with the Resident; but still there was no progress.

At the end of 1905 the whole mass of claims was under investigation by the British Resident, the Governor of the Gulf Ports, and the Karguzar, sitting as a committee.

British commercial and general interests on the Persian Coast and Islands, 1896—1905.

Certain matters which affected British commercial and general interests during the period deserve separate mention.

Red oxide of iron had at one time been exported from the island of Hormuz by the Mu'in-ut-Tujjar, whose interests extended to the whole of the Persian Coast, and even to 'Arabistan and the Karun river; but by 1897 his operations in that quarter had apparently ceased. In the year mentioned a concession for working the Hormuz oxide deposits was obtained by Messrs. A. and T. J. Malcolm, a native firm at Büshehr enjoying British protection, to whom a Farman in the usual form was issued. No sooner, however, did Messrs. Malcolm begin to exercise their rights than the Mu'in-ut-Tujjār protested and produced an earlier Farman granted during the reign of the last Shah. At his demand the Persian Government seized the Hormuz workings and transferred them to him, and Messrs. Malcolm had recourse to the British Legation at Tehran. Through the Legation it was arranged that the dispute should be settled by the Sadr-i-A'zam of the day. the Amin-ud-Dauleh, as arbitrator; and that, pending his decision. the Hormuz workings should be re-transferred to Messrs. Malcolm. This last condition was complied with; and in January 1898 the Amin-ud-Dauleh announced his award, which was in favour of the Mu'in-ut-Tujjar, but which directed that all expenses incurred by Messrs. Malcolm at Tehran in obtaining their concession, or on Hormuz in turning it to account, should be re-imbursed to them.

The workings were restored to the Mu'in-ut-Tujjār without delay; and the question became, chiefly, one of recovering a sum equivalent to £1,960 which represented Messrs. Malcolm's expenditure at Tehran. Cheques drawn by the firm fortunately existed to prove the correctness of the amount claimed; but to all demands for execution of the Sadr-i-A'zam's award in respect of their indemnification the Persian Government now turned a deaf ear.

In 1905 the Mu'in-ut-Tujjar, on a visit to England, concluded a contract with the British firm of Messrs. Strick and Co., for the export of 8,000 tons of red oxide from the Hormuz deposits.

The embargo system, which had been a cause of much inconvenience Embargoes to foreign merchants ever since 1863, remained in force during the period;

Hormuz red oxide workings, 1897—1905.

duce, 1896-1905. and, whereas formerly it applied to grain only, it was extended in 1903 to sheep and goats, and eventually to other articles such as lamb-skins. Towards the end of 1905, with a view to preventing the imposition of embargoes by local authorities for corrupt purposes, it was suggested to the Persian Government by the British Minister at Tehrān that no embargo should in future be allowed to become operative until it had been approved as necessary by the Minister of Customs.

Abolition of Rahdāri and other irregular charges, 1905. Rahdāri (or road dues), Dāllali (or brokerage), Qapāndāri (or weighment fees) and other irregular charges levied on foreign trade in the interior survived for a time the conclusion of the Anglo-Persian Trade Declaration of 1903, and even the promulgation of the Réglement Douanier of 1904, which are described in the Appendix on the Imperial Persian Customs. Dāliki on the Būshehr-Shīrāz road was a principal scene of these exactions, which were kept in force mainly through the influence of H. R. H. the Shū'-us-Saltaneh, Governor-General of Fārs. Representations by the British and Russian Ministers, however, resulted in orders for the abolition of Rahdāri with effect from the 5th October 1905.

British official matters on the Persian Coast and Islands, 1896—1905.

It remains to consider questions connected with British establishments on the Persian Coast and Islands, which, as indicated in a previous section, underwent a great expansion during the period.

Consular status of certain members of the Bushehr Residency Staff, 1904-05. In 1904 it was suggested that consular rank should be bestowed on certain members of the superior staff of the British Residency at Büshehr, and the suggestion was approved by Sir A. Hardinge, His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran, who thought that diplomatic status even might be given them in order to increase the prestige of the Residency and to emphasise the fact that the functions of the Resident and his staff were of a different nature from those of their foreign colleagues and more extensive in their territorial range. His Majesty's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs did not consider that a sufficient case for the grant of diplomatic status was made out; but he accepted the suggestion that consular rank should be conferred, and the Government of India recommended that the First

Assistant Resident at Büshehr should be commissioned as Consul, and the Residency Surgeon as Vice-Consul.

At the end of 1904 a Vice-Consul of the Levant Consular Service was attached to the Residency at Büshehr, as an aid to the Resident in commercial matters.

In 1905 the Resident was supplied with a Second Assistant, but provisionally, the question of creating a Second Assistantship being then under consideration. The officer attached to Major Cox's staff in these circumstances was Lieutenant C. H. Gabriel, I.A., who was shortly after received as a probationer into the Political Department of the Government of India, and was succeeded by Lieutenant R. L. Birdwood, I.A

In 1904 it was arranged that on expiry of the contracts of service of the men serving in the Resident's mounted escort, formed in 1863, their place should be taken by troopers of Indian cavalry, supplied in the same manner as the guards allotted to the British Consulates in Persia generally in that year.

Bushehr Residency mounted escort, 1904.

Other matters connected with the Būshehr Residency, 1905.

In accordance with a suggestion made by the Chief Manager of the Imperial Bank of Persia in 1903, the Government of India Treasury at Būshehr was abolished with effect from the 1st April 1905 and the monetary transactions of the Residency transferred to the local branch of the Bank. The object of this measure was to increase the credit and prestige of the Imperial Bank of Persia, a British interest, and the charge was accompanied by a condition that no charge should be made by the Bank except for actual expenditure in packing, insuring, and forwarding specie.

In May 1905 telephonic communication was established between the British Residency building in Būshehr town and the Resident's country house at Sabzābād, distant from it six miles. The Persian Government had consented in 1891 to the erection of a telegraph between the two, and it was not considered necessary to consult them in regard to the substitution of a telephone for the telegraph which had not been erected.

It having been decided that a British Consulate should be established at Shīrāz in place of the Native Agency hitherto maintained, Mr. G. Grahame of the Levant Consular Service was nominated to the post in July 1903 and assumed charge of his duties in November of the same year. Although the new Consulate was placed under the superintendence of the British Legation at Tehrān and not of the Būshehr Residency, it was arranged that the new appointment should not interfere with

British representation at Shīrāz, 1903. the custom under which, for some years past, the Resident had been wont to make Shīrāz his summer station; and a house was provided at Shīrāz for his occupation.

British representation at Bandar 'Abbās, 1900 —1905.

The question of appointing a British Political Officer to Bandar 'Abbās had been raised by Colonel Ross, then Resident in the Persian Gulf, so far back as 1879, and had been considered anew in 1882, 1884, 1885, 1888 and 1892, the proposals for the creation of an appointment being supported, on most of these occasions, by petitions from Khōjah and Hindu British subjects engaged in trade at the port. In 1893 the appointment as Vice-Consul at Bandar 'Abbās of a British merchant residing there was approved by the Government of India and sanctioned by His Majesty's Government, but was not proceeded with; and in 1896 the matter was again raised, but a decision post-poned.

At length in February 1900, in view especially of the growth of an illicit trade in arms between Masqat and Bandar 'Abbās, Lieutenant V. de V. Hunt, of the Indian Political Department, was deputed provisionally to Bandar 'Abbās in the capacity of Assistant to the Resident in the Persian Gulf. A Vice-Consular exequatur was obtained from the Persian Government in his name covering the districts of Bandar 'Abbās and Yazd, it being intended that his summer quarters should be at the latter place. An Indian Hospital Assistant was attached to the Vice-Consul, and the opening of a charitable dispensary under the management of the former was contemplated.

In June 1904 the status of the British officer at Bandar 'Abbās was raised to that of Consul, and his consular jurisdiction was enlarged, so as to include, besides the town of Bandar 'Abbās, the coast districts of Shībkūh, Lingeh, Shamīl, Mīnāb, Biyābān, and Persian Makrān, and the islands belonging to Persia in the eastern part of the Gulf, while in his capacity of Assistant to the Resident he was placed in charge of the Ruūs-al-Jibāl and Shamailīyah tracts of the 'Omān peninsula, of the Arab islands of Tunb and Bīr Mūsa, and of the British station of Bāsīdu on the island of Qishm; and it was ordered that one of the British gunboats in the Persian Gulf should ordinarily be stationed within his district. The first incumbent of the appointment thus remodelled was Lieutenant W. H. I. Shakespear.

A guard of one Non-Commissioned Officer and three troopers of Indian cavalry were allotted to the Bandar 'Abbās Consulate under the general scheme which provided military guards for all British Consulates in Persia.

The British representative was at first accommodated in a hired building at Nāiband, three miles east of Bandar 'Abbās; but eventually, in 1905, it was resolved to construct suitable Government quarters for him at a site nearer to the town.

At the British station of Bāsīdu on Qishm Island difficulty was from time to time caused by the threatened or actual immigration from the adjoining Persian districts of political malcontents or victims of official tyranny.

Affairs of the British station of Bāsīdu, 1896—1905.

In 1897 some of the Āl Bū Samait, an Arab tribe of Bahrain origin but settled at Lingeh, took refuge for a time at Bāsīdu; and at the beginning of 1901 the Shaikh of Bahrain wrote to the Resident requesting protection for the Āl Bū Samait colony of Lingeh, whose intention it then was to remove in a body to Bāsīdu, in consequence of an enhancement of the Persian tax on their pearling boats. The movement did not, however, take place. In November 1901 some of the 'Abādilah on the Persian island of Shaikh Shu'aib expressed a wish to emigrate to Bāsīdu and place themselves under British protection; but their proposals were discouraged and they took no action.

In 1902 the Native Coal Agent representing the Būshehr Residency at Bāsīdu was instructed not to prevent British subjects from settling within the limits of the British station, but he was ordered to prevent the erection of permanent buildings there without previous reference to the Residency. The object of this order was to prevent the occupation of sites which might one day be required for public purposes, but it had the incidental effect of preventing any undesirable influx. A number of poor Persians from Old Bāsīdu and from the mainland, however, built themselves a temporary village at Singau within the British boundary and remained there for some time, their object being to place themselves beyond reach of molestation by the Persian Customs officials.

In April 1905 the well known Mu'īn-ut-Tujjār of Būshehr asked permission to store red oxide at Bāsīdu for exportation, his idea being evidently to escape the formalities and expenses which attended shipment of the oxide from Hormūz, where it was extracted and where there was a Persian Customs post. To grant his request might have been to cause trouble of different kinds so it was refused.

The Persian Customs officials on Qishm Island at one time seemed inclined to annoy the residents of British Bāsīdu, and tried to oblige native sailing vessels bringing supplies for the station to discharge them at Old Bāsīdu, where they were liable to duty. The Persian Mudīr

of Customs used also sometimes to pry within the British limits; but, having been threatened on one occasion by some emancipated slaves, he discontinued the practice.

In 1905 it was observed by the Political Resident at Büshehr that a packet of stationery sent by him to the British Coal Agent was classified by the Imperial Persian Customs as "export," in other words that Bāsīdu was regarded by the Customs as non-Persian territory.

Re-establishment of a British telegraph station on Hanjām, 1904-05. Hanjām Island, abandoned in 1880 as a British telegraph station, was re-occupied as such in 1904 for reasons which are explained elsewhere. A cable was landed without previous notice to the Persian Government, and on the 19th April telegraphic communication with Büshehr and Jäshk was restored.

The immediate effect of the British proceedings was to draw the attention of the Persian Government to Hanjām and stimulate them to assert their authority over the island. In November or December 1904 the European Director of Persian Customs at Bandar 'Abbās visited Hanjām where he set up a flagstaff and established a Customs post, occupied by a Persian Mudīr and two subordinates, in close proximity to the telegraph station. A Persian flagstaff erected by the Malik-ut-Tujjār in 1889, when he found the island unoccupied, on the site of one of the former British telegraph buildings, remained where it was until January 1905. It was then, on the representations of the British Government, removed to another place, but it continued to be inconveniently close to the British settlement.

The evident intention of the Persian Government to make their control over Hanjām effective alarmed the Bani Yās Arab inhabitants, whose position hitherto had been one of virtual freedom and independence; and the Shaikh of the island, Ahmad-bin 'Obaid, a son-in-law of the Shaikh of Dibai, sought the support of the British authorities in resisting encroachments and innovations. In February 1905 he even applied to Lieutenant Shakespear, His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Bandar 'Abbās, who happened to visit Hanjām on tour, for British protection; he asserted that the status of Hanjam was the same as that of Tunb, that the Persians had never exercised the slightest authority on the island, and that he would resist by force any attempt on their part to alter the situation; but his overtures were not, of course, entertained. The demeanour of the Arabs towards the new Customs post was for a time threatening; and the continuance of the Persian employés on the island was made possible only by the presence of the British telegraph staff, who protected them and supplied them with drinking water.

In May 1905 it was found necessary, in order to placate the Eani Yas, to cease giving water to the Persian Customs post from the tanks of the British station; and the Persian Mudīr, resenting this deprivation, attempted to prevent the supply of provisions from Qishm Island to the telegraph staff; he desisted, however, after complaints had been made to the Customs administration. In October 1905 Lieutenant Shakespear again visited Hanjam and found the feelings of the Arab population towards the Persians much exacerbated; but on this, as on the former occasion, no hope was held out to him of British intervention. On the 30th of November the Sultan of 'Omān, in returning to Masqat from a visit to Abu Dhabi, called at Hanjām; he had been for some months previously receiving written appeals for help from the Shaikh of the island; and a few days later he wrote to the Resident protesting against the subjection of the Bani Yas of Hanjam to any form of Persian jurisdiction, and justifying his interest in them by an assertion that their ancestors had been settled on the island by former Sultans of 'Oman.

About August 1905 a Lloyd's station from which ships could report themselves was opened on Hanjām by the agency of the telegraph staff; and during the latter part of the year negotiations were in progress at Tehrān for a re-arrangement of the Persian buildings and flagstaffs which would assure the amenity of the British settlement and the purity of its water supply.

CHAPTER XII.

HISTORY OF* PERSIAN MAKRĀN.

Makrān under the Maliks, early in the 17th century.

In or about the year 1613, the last ruler of the dynasty of "Maliks," who had been the local Governors of Makrān for many generations, came into power. It is probable that the authority of this family did not extend so far westward as the Jāshk district; but Gwādar, now included in the 'Omān Sultanate, was, at the time when our survey of Persian Gulf affairs begins, a dependency, at least in name of the Persian empire; and its earlier history, accordingly, forms a part of that Persian Makrān.

Adventure of Sir Robert Sherley at Gwadar, 1613. In 1613, on his return from his first embassy to Europe, where he represented Sháh 'Abbās at various courts, Sir Robert Sherley, as related in the chapter on the general history of the Gulf, touched at Gwādar; and here "a revolted duke† from the Persian, with his forces being there, "sought, treacherously, to surprise the ambassador, and to take the ship "with the merchants, their goods, and all; but by God's providence, "the duke's treason was discovered by a Persian hermit, by which means "the English were miraculously delivered from extreme danger." Sir Robert, possibly actuated by resentment against the treacherous duke, wrote from Gwādar on the 18th of September 1613 to the Court of the East India Company in London, "persuading the settling of a factory there, which although not in Persia, is under the Government of a tributary," and stating, with ignorant or perhaps unscrupulous exaggeration, "that it promises the richest traffic in the world, and is free from the Portugals."

^{*} The chief authorities for the history of Persian Makran from 1600 to 1800 are:— Lieutenant E. C. Ross's Memorandum of Notes on Mekran, 1865, and the Imperial Gazetteer of India (Sections Baluchistan and Makran). See also The Three Brothers, 1825, and the works of della Valle, Tavernier, and A. Hamilton in loc.

[†] In the older English books and reports the title "Khān" is generally translated "Duke," but closer acquaintance with Persian Khāns brought this honorific style into disuse.

In 1624, according to information obtained by the Italian traveller Makran in Pietro della Valle, Gwadar was comprised in the dominions of a local chief who ruled over Kaich and Makran and who was on friendly terms with the Persian Government. After the taking of Hormuz a land route from India to Persia across Makran which was very secure, began to be much frequented by camel caravans carrying merchandise; and the native ruler of the country derived much profit from tolls on the transit trade which he levied at Gwadar.

Makrān under the Bulaidais, viz., from early in the 17th century to 1740.

In or about 1613, as we have already seen, the last "Malik" of Makran succeeded to the position of his ancestors. This Malik, whose name was Mirza, was eventually slain by the Bulaidais; and the victorious tribe, during the century which followed, provided the local rulers of the country to the east of the Jashk district.

Attacks by the Persian governor of Hormuz apon the chief of Jāshk, between 1641 and 1652.

Tavernier, a traveller in the Persian Gulf in 1652, describes a series of attacks which were made by the Persians upon the chief of Jashk after the accession of Shah 'Abbas II to the throne and, consequently, not more than eleven years before he collected his information.* According to Tavernier the country of Makran from Jashk to Gwadar was in his day divided into three states, of which the westernmost, Jashk, was governed by a Muhammadan, while the other two were subject to † "idolatrous" rulers. In the reign of Shah Abbas the Muhammadan chief of Jashk had been a dependent of Persia, but in the following reign he had shaken off his allegiance to the Shah, and no measures were taken to coerce him until 'Abbas II ascended the throne. The task of punishing the rebel was at length entrusted to the Khān of Hormūz; but on the march to Jashk this chosen instrument of vengeance, who indulged in hunting by the way, "had the misfortune to fall into a bogg "-probably one of the Mins in the Biyaban district-" where he was stiff'd, together with 20 to 30 horsemen more." The brother of

^{*} See Tavernier's Persian Travels, Book V, Chapter VII. Tavernier, it should be noted, loved a good story and seems to have been credulously inclined.

[†] Gaih and Qasrkand, the two districts to the east of Jashk, were governed from a few years after 1613 onwards by Bulaidai rulers who were Zikris, an unorthodox Muhammadan sect. (See Appendix on Religions.)

the deceased Khān, having been appointed by the Shāh to succeed him in the government of Hormuz, at once invaded the territory of Jashk. but he was beaten and forced to retire with the loss of many men. Soon afterwards, however, he succeeded in capturing the chief of Jashk at sea, on his way to Makran, and brought him back a prisoner to Bandar 'Abbās. But the matter did not end here, for, while the Khān was spending the summer in the mountains inland of the Shamil district. the chief's wife surprised his camp one night with a body of horse and released her husband, besides killing the Khan himself and a number of his men. A third brother of the same family then became governor of Hormuz and attempted, with a large force drawn partly from Lar. Kirmān and even Shīrāz, to avenge his predecessor; but the chief of Jashk, assisted by his two "idolatrous" neighbours on the east, once more defeated the Persians in a pitched battle. The second in command of the Jashk forces, described as an "Indian" and therefore probably a Balūchi, was however captured by the Khān and brought to Bandar 'Abbas, where he was shamefully tortured until "the chief of the "Holland Company and other strange merchants, abhorring so much "cruelty, begg'd of the Kan to surcease his rigour, who readily granted "them their request."

Baluch; incursions from Persian Makrān into Kirmān, etc., 1694-1722. The behaviour of the inhabitants of Makrān during the reign of Shāh Husain, that is from 1694 to 1722, is described by Captain Hamilton, a contemporary writer, in these words: "The whole reign "of the last Sophi, or King, was managed by such Vermin, that the "Ballowches and Mackrans, who inhabit the Sea-coast from Cape "Jasques to Indus, observing the weakness of the Government, threw "off the Yoke of Obedience first, and, in full Bodies, fell in upon their "neighbours in Carmania, who were thriftier and richer than the maritime Freebooters, and plundered their Fellow Subjects of what they had "got by their painful Industry. There was no Want of Remonstrance "and Petitions put into the Court to put a stop to those Enormities, but no Redress could be had." As shown in the general history of the Gulf, Balūchis of Mākran, encouraged apparently by the Afghān invasion of Persia, made an incursion into Lār in 1721 and even attacked the British and Dutch Factories at Bandar 'Abbās.

Persian expedition to Makran, 1739.

In 1738 or 1739, apparently in the course of his invasion of India, Nādir Shāh sent orders to Muhammad Taqi Khān, governor of Shīrāz, to take command of some troops that had been prepared for service in 'Omān and to advance with them by land into Sind, sending his artillerv by sea. In 1739 Muhammad Taqi Khān wrote to Sind reporting that

he had been delayed in Makrān, but that he had since taken the fort of Kaich and Ireduced Malik Dīnār, a Gichki chief, to obedience. He was informed in reply that Sind had been conquered, and that he should dismiss his troops and join Nādir Shah without delay. It seems probable that Muhammad Taqi Khān during his invasion of Makrān occupied Gwādar and made it his port. The immediate object of the Persian operations in Makrān appears to have been to help Shaih Qāsim, a Bulaidai chief who had become an orthodox Muhammadan, against Mahk Dīnār, who was a Zikri; but their effect was transitory. On Taqi Khān's departure, Gwādar, the last Bulaidai stronghold, fell into the hands of Malik Dīnār; and Bulaidai rule in Makrān came to an end.

Makrān under the Khans of Kalāt, 1740-97.

We may take as the next period in Makrān history, though it is an artificial one, the time which intervened between the downfall of the Bulaidais and the accession to the throne of Persia of Fat-h 'Ali Shāh. During the greater part of this period the predominant authority in Makrān was that of the Ahmadzai (Brāhui) ruling family of Kalāt, who, after the decline of the Mughal Empire of Delhi, owed allegiance to the Durrāni sovereign of Afghānistān.

The Gichki tribe, who were Zikris like most of the Bulaidais, succeeded at first to the control of the former Bulaidai districts; but the Khāns of Kalāt, who were orthodox Muhammadans, early began to encroach upon their territories and independence; and Mir Nasir Khān I, who reigned at Kalāt from 1750 to 1793, made no less than nine expeditions against them. The struggle was ended, apparently before the year 1778, by a compromise under which the revenues of the country were divided equally between the Gichki chiefs and the Khān, the direct administration, however, remaining in the hands of the Gichkis. The Gichki Government was dual, for, while an elder branch of the family held Panjgūr, a younger one possessed Kaich and Gwādar.

One of the most important consequences of the intervention of the Khāns of Kalāt in Makrān affairs was the transference of Gwādar, as decribed in the history of Gwādar and Chahbār, by Mīr Nasīr I to Saiyid Sultān, then a refugee from Masqat, about the year 1784. The town, with the district attached to it, was retained by the Saiyid after his succession to the Sultanate of 'Omān, of which in this manner it became a dependency; and the grant, though its validity and justice have been impugned, has remained in effect to the present day

Reduction of the Gichkis by the Khāns of Kalāt, cira 1778.

Transference of Gwadar to the 'Oman Saltanate, 1784-92.

FAT-H 'ALI SHAH, 1797-1834.

Cessation of Kalat control, after 1794. From the beginning of the reign of Fat-h 'Ali Shāh in 1797, we may treat Persian Makrān, though as yet the Persian Government had no real footing in the province, as a portion of his dominions. Almost immediately on the death of Mīr Nasīr ·I of Kalāt, in 1793 or 1794, Brāhui influence had ceased to be felt in Makrān; and the whole country was thereafter parcelled out among local chiefs, belonging to various tribes, who were in every respect independent.

* Journey of Captain Grant in Makran, January to April 1809. The first European officer to explore Persian Makran was Captain N. P. Grant, an officer on the staff of General Malcolm, who deputed him to travel in the country at the beginning of 1809, when the seizure of Khārag Island by a force from India was contemplated. The ostensible object of Captain Grant's mission was to purchase horses; but its real purpose was "to ascertain whether an European army could penetrate into India by the southern coast of Persia."

Captain Grant embarked at Bombay on the East India Company's cruiser "Ternate" on the 18th January 1809, and on the 29th he arrived at Gwadar; but on the advice of Captain Seton, the British Resident at Masqat, who considered the country in that neighbourhood too unsettled to be safe, he landed instead at Gwatar, which belonged to Mīr Subhān, the Jadgāl chief of Dashtyāri and Bāhu, whose tribe was at this time the most influential in Makran. From Gwatar Captain Grant marched by land to Chahbar, where he arrived on 9th February; and on the 11th he left again for Nigor, meeting there with Mir Subhan, by whom he was well received. On the 28th February he reached Qasrkand, of which place he found the chief, Shaih Samandar, to be independent of other authority; and there he waited until the 17th of March for Muhammad Khān, the chief of Gaih, under whose protection alone it was possible for him to proceed further into the interior. Gaih was at this time the second place in all Makran, being inferior in importance to Kaich only. From Gaih, Captain Grant marched to Bampur; but the bad character of the chief of that place made it imprudent for him to attempt to travel thence direct to Bandar 'Abbās, which was the goal of his journey; and he therefore retraced his steps viá Qasrkand and Gaih, where he halted on the 5th and 7th of April

^{*} See Captain Grant's Journal of a Route through the Western Parts of Makran, in the Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society for 1839.

respectively, to Chahbār, arriving there on the 10th. He then returned to Gaih and marched thence (13th April) by Balak and the Kārwān tract (16th April), Kāshi (17th April), Sadaich (18th April), where he entered the Jāshk district, and Jāgīn (19th April), to Old Jāshk, which he reached on the 20th April. The Chief of Jāshk had removed to Sirīk in the Biyābān district, and thither Captain Grant pursued his way, passing through Bahmadi before he quitted the Jāshk district. The remainder of his route to Bandar 'Abbās lay beyond the bounds of Persian Makrān.

Captain Grant reported that his journey was made possible only by the high respect in which the name of Captain Seton, the British Resident at Masqat, was held throughout the whole of Makrān. He was furnished by that officer with letters of introduction to Mīr Subhān, the chief of Dashtyari and Bāhu, who in his turn provided him with the credentials that enabled him to visit Qasrkand and the country beyond. He carried letters of credit from Masqat, between which place and Chahbār there was a considerable trade, but the largest bills which he could obtain in return for these upon villages in the interior did not exceed Rs. 200. He travelled in European costume, making no secret of his nationality, and he "found the inhabitants more civil and hospitable than they had been represented."

In view of the Gallophobia by which the Government of India and all Anglo-Indians were at this time possessed, we are not surprised to find Captain Grant reporting, on the conclusion of his journey, that a European invasion of India by way of Makrān was "perfectly practicable," and that the idea that scarcity of water would be a great obstacle to the movement of troops by this route was erroneous. The former opinion, it need hardly be added, is not borne out by the typographical facts, which are more fully ascertained at the present time than they were in his day.

At the time of Sir Gore Ouseley's mission to Persia in 1811, though Persian influence in Makran was probably no stronger than it had been at the time of the visit of Captain Grant, who did not even mention it, or in 1810, when Lieut. Pottinger found Persian authority held in contempt by the chief of Bampūr, the country seems to have been regarded—at least by the Persians—as under the sovereignty of the Shāh. In 1613, as we have seen, the claim on behalf of Persia apparently existed; and during the two centuries which had since elapsed, though never enforced except by Nādir Shāh in 1739, it had probably not been abandoned or allowed to fall entirely into desuetude.

Political position of Makran in 1811.

MUHAMMAD SHĀH, 1834-1848, AND NĀSIR-UD DIN SHĀH. 1848-1896.*

The period covered by the reigns of Muhammad Shah and more specially, Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shāh was an important one in Makrān. The closing events of Agha Khān's rebellion, which continued from about 1838 to 1844 and is mentioned as a matter of general importance in the history of the Persian Coast and Islands, drew the attention of the Persian Central Government to Bampur; and the partial assertion of Persian authority in some of the districts of Western Makran followed, almost immediately, as an indirect consequence.

Growth of Persian influence in Makran, 1844-1861.

About May 1843 Agha Khān, who was head of the Ismā'īli sect but had been obliged to leave Persia by the failure of his insurrection against the Shah, sought an asylum at Karachi, which had then very recently come under the British flag. Towards the close of the year Sardar Khan, Agha Khan's brother and a sharer in his exile, left Karachi with a body of 200 horsemen whom he had managed to collect, and marched by land to Gwadar, and from Gwadar to 1844. Chahbar. Arrived at Chahbar, which as the seat of a small Khōjah community devoted to Agha Khan was a convenient base for his proceedings, Sardar Khan entered into correspondence with the inhabitants of Bampur, then ruled by an independent Baluch Chief, and the surrounding country; and before long he was in possession

> The Persian Governor-General of Kirman, however, having reported these events to Tehran, presently received orders to reduce Bampur. This he effected after an investment; Sardar Khan was taken prisoner and sent to Tehran; and Bampur remained in the hands of the Persians.

of that place and had succeeded in attracting some 2,000 men to his

standard.

Invasion of Persian Makrān in the interest of the Agha Khān, and occupation of Bampur by the Persian Government,

^{*} The principal authorities for the history of this period in Persian Makran are the Persian Gulf Residency Administration Reports, from 1872; General Sir F. J. Goldsmid's Eastern Persia, 1876, consisting chiefly of contributions by Majors St. John, Lovett, and Euan Smith; the Official History of the Mekran Telegraph Line, 1895; and Mr. J. A. Saldanha's Précis of Mekran Affairs, 1905.

From Bampur Persian control was quickly extended southwards Extension of to the Baluch Chiefdoms of Gaih and Qasrkand, Gaih was held at Gichki chief named Mir 'Abdullah-bin-Murad the time by Muhammad, who seems to have been carried off to Kirman by the Persian authorities and detained there for a year until a sum of over £500 had been collected and paid into the Persian Treasury on his behalf by Dīn Muhammad, the Jadgāl chief of Bāhu. Dīn Muhammad was then appointed Persian Deputy Governor of some of the Baluch tribal districts under Bampur; and in that capacity he afterwards took part in levying an annual contribution of 100 camels, besides occasional lump sums in cash, from his former friend the Chief of Gaih.

Persian authority to Makrān districts east of Jāshk. 1844-1849.

The political status of the Jashk district, when examined in 1861, was different from that of the eastern districts just mentioned. It was a part of Biyābān, as the term "Biyābān" was then understood; and as such it was included in the Persian fief of Bandar 'Abbas and its dependencies held by the Sultan of 'Oman. The Sultan's tenure of the district was of old standing, but it had lately been confirmed, its terms being at the same time more strictly defined, by a Treaty concluded between him and the Shāh in 1856. The Governor of Jāshk on the part of Masqat in 1861 was one Mir Husain; and the Sadaich stream then, as now, marked approximately the eastern limit of the district.

Position in the Jāshk district, 1861.

By 1861 Mir 'Abdullah of Gaih had recovered his position as the principal chief in the Makran districts east of Jashk. The coast from Sadaich eastwards to Tiz was under his direct authority, and the name of Din Muhammad of Bāhu was respected, on the seaboard, at Gwatar only. Inland, to the north of the maritime districts with which we are concerned, the Persians were engaged in extending their effective control eastwards. They were reported to have occupied Dizak and Sarbāz and to be meditating an attack on Kaij, the chief place in the Makran territories of the Khan of Kalat.

Position in the districts east of Jāshk excluding Chahbār. 1861.

The town of Chahbar, forming as it were a very small enclave in the coast districts to the east of Jashk, belonged in 1861 to the Sultan of 'Omān, by whose family it had been held as a conquest since 1792, entirely without reference to Persia.

Position at Chahbār, 1861.

Political questions in Makran connected with the Indo-European telegraph, 1861-1862.

The project of carrying a line of telegraph from India to Europe viá the Persian Gulf, in regard to which the appropriate Appendix to this book may be consulted, brought the political constitution of Makran suddenly under scrutiny. This was in 1861, when the dependence of the districts was as described above.

Rev. Mr. Badger's report, June 1861.

A preliminary report on the political aspects of a land line through Makran was obtained by the Government of Bombay in June 1861 from that ingenious divine the Rev. G. P. Badger, who had been chaplain and Arabic interpreter with the British Field Force in Persia in 1856-57 and later Secretary to the British Commission on the separation of 'Oman and Zanzibar in 1860, and whom the possession of influence and good sources of information at Masqat particularly qualified to unravel the complications of the various jurisdictions in Makran and the connections of the districts with the central Persian Government. Mr. Badger's report brought out clearly an initial difficulty from which British Political action in Western Makran could not be freed. To ignore the Persian Government and to deal direct with the Sultan of Oman and the Baluch chiefs concerned seemed inadmissible; while, on the other hand, to negotiate with the Persian Government over the heads of the chiefs, who possibly regarded their subjection to Persia as wrongful and temporary, might be to incur the dislike of the very authorities upon whom the safety of the telegraph line would really depend.

Discussion in regard to the procedure to be adopted, July-O-tober, 1861.

After considering Mr. Badger's report, the Government of Bombay suggested that the principles guiding British political action should be recognition of such status as Persia had actually acquired in Makrān, and the institution, by her permission only, of direct relations with local chiefs. The Government of India, however, considered that an indispensable preliminary to any negotiations with Persia was to ascertain, with some precision, the extent of the Persian claims in Makrān and the degree and nature of the Persian control over the local chiefs, as otherwise the result of a reference to the Persian Government might be to raise questions embarrassing to the British authorities and prejudicial to the chiefs whose allegiance was brought under discussion. They accordingly addressed His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehrān on the subject.

Claim of Persia to all Makrān, 1861-62. The Persian Government, as the Government of India had foreseen, utilised the question of telegraph construction, which they declared themselves most anxious to promote, to lay claim to all the country between Bandar 'Abbās and the frontier of the British province of Sind; and they went so far as to propose an agreement by which "their power, authority, and proprietary right" in the territories in question should be preserved "in statu quo," the British Government undertaking that it would not oppose, "either overtly or secretly," any measures which the Persian Government might take for increasing their influence in the

The introduction of such stipulations into the discussion was deprecated by Mr. Alison, the British Minister in Persia; their acceptance was earnestly opposed by the Government of India; and the result was temporary deadlock in regard to the telegraph in Makran.

Meanwhile, however, it had been decided to carry matters as far as was possible without coming into contact with Persian opposition; and in pursuance of this decision Colonel Goldsmid was deputed to survey and report upon the coast of Makran. During the progress of his enquiries various petitions were presented by local Chiefs, to him and to other British authorities, praying for protection against the tyranny of 1862-63. the "Qājārs" in collecting revenue; but no encouragement was held out to the petitioners. The immediate results of Colonel Goldsmid's mission were the conclusion of telegraph agreements with the Khan of Kalāt, the Jām of Las Bailah, and the rulers of Pasni and Kaij, and the completion in April 1863 of a land line from Karāchi to Gwādar.

Colone! Goldsmid's first mission to Makran and completion of the telegraph to Gwādar,

Claims advanced by Persia to Gwadar and Chahbar, 1863.

As the telegraph line approached Gwadar from the side of India, Opposition of Ibrahīm Khān, Bami, the Persian Governor of Bampūr, began to organise opposition to its progress and addressed letters on the subject to the Sultan of 'Oman, to the 'Omani Wali of Gwadar, and to the Khan of 1863. Kalāt. To the Sultān he wrote that it was the duty of that potentate, as holding Chahbar under Persia, to prevent the British from landing telegraph material there until they exhibited an authority from the Persian Government for doing so; and he indicated that, if the Sultan were not equal to the occasion, he would himself proceed to the spot with 300 cavalry, 6 guns, 3 regiments of infantry, and local levies,—a step which he would have taken earlier, he said, if he had not been dissuaded by Mir 'Abdullah, Chief of Gaih.

Meanwhile there were constant reports at Gwadar of the approach of a large body of Rind tribesmen under Persian leaders, and communication between the town and the interior was cut off. On the 12th March Rind marauders under Shāh Döst, an agent of Ibrāhīm Khān, came within four miles of Gwadar and carried off a large number of camels and cattle; twelve persons were killed by them, and several natives of the country whom they had wounded were brought into Gwadar; but the telegraph working parties, though alarmed, were not m olested.

the Persian Governor of Bampur to the telegraph, Gwādar and Chahbār claimed by Persia, 1863. On the completion of the line up to Gwādar, Ibrāhīm Khān wrote to the Wāli of that place and to Mr. Walton, the British Telegraph Superintendent there; but, while "speaking of Mekran and Baluchistan in most vague terms," he seemed "to confine his threats to the carrying of the Telegraph beyond Gwadur."

On the proceedings of Ibrāhīm Khān being brought to their notice, the Persian Government repudiated his action, and undertook that orders should be sent him not to interfere with the telegraph operations, unless under instructions from themselves. But they claimed Gwādar and Chahbār as Persian possessions, and they requested an assurance that the passage of the telegraph line through either place would not be held to prejudice the right of Persia to it. In reply it seems to have been pointed out that Persia had not, for generations past, professed or exercised any rights to the eastward of Gwādar, and that it was intended to continue the telegraph beyond that point by submarine cable, not by a land line.

In October 1863 the Persian Ministry asked for information in regard to a statement, which they said was current, that the Sultān of 'Omān was about to lease Gwādar and Chahbār to the British Government; and protested by anticipation against any such transaction, alleging, absolutely without foundation, that both places were included in the lease by Persia of Bandar 'Abbās and its dependencies to the Sultān.

Proceedings with reference to the telegraph in Makrān, 1863-1864.

Colonel Goldsmid's report on political rights in Makrān, December 1863. At the end of 1863 Colonel Goldsmid was ordered by the Government of Bombay to prepare "a detailed statement, for communication to Her Majesty's Minister at Tehrān through the Secretary of State for India, showing, according to the best information available, how far the claims of Persia, Kelat, or Maskat, or any other State to any sovereign right in any town or district in Mekrān are founded on Treaty, or possession, or acknowledgment by the local rulers." Accordingly Colonel Goldsmid submitted a report in which he remarked with reference to Persia, "as to her right, I know of none but of the strong over the weak, of the prestige of a high-sounding monarchy over the obscurity of a small Chiefdom;" but at the same time he thought that, generally speaking, "her claim to possession was fully equal to that of any Government stronger than that of the petty Chiefs themselves whom she

subjugates." It seemed to him, however, that the Sultan of 'Oman had prescriptive and indefeasible rights of sovereignty over Gwadar and Chahbar. He was not aware of the existence of any Treaties; and he recommended that the progress of Persia should be arrested, in the interests of British India, at the point which it had actually reached. He suggested that, in view of a* request by the Persian Government for an amicable adjustment of her eastern frontier, which had been rejected by the British Government, and of the status conferred on Kalat through the conclusion by the British authorities with her, as an independent State, of a telegraph agreement, the time might be opportune for a friendly delimitation of the boundary between Persia and Kalāt in Makrān; and he proposed, as the most suitable line of demarcation, one running from Gwatar bay to the confines of Sīstān.

In consequence of this report Colonel Goldsmid was himself deputed to Makran to complete, "by such oral enquiry as he might find safe and practicable, the collection of evidence as to the actual exercise of sovereign rights on the Mekran Coast within living memory." The outcome of this mission was a series of three exhaustive reports, in which Colonel Goldsmid reaffirmed in general his former conclusions. He had ascertained that the collection of revenue in Dashtvari and Bahu on behalf of the Persian Government was an innovation even more recent than the similar procedure in Gaih; and he mentioned a Persian raid in 1862 on territory undoubtedly belonging to Kalat, in which more than one member of the leading family of Jinwri was killed, as a proof that some understanding as to the position of the frontier had become desirable.

At the end of 1864 a tour was made by Colonel Pelly, Resident in the Persian Gulf, from Bandar 'Abbās to Jāshk by land in connection with the telegraph question.

General position in Makrān in 1864.

In 1864, notwithstanding a suspension of the activity of Ibrāhīm Khān, Governor of Bampūr, in the direction of Chahbar and Gwadar, croachments the attitude of the local Persian officials continued to be aggressive. attack upon Kaij in Kalāt territory by Mīr 'Abdullah, Chief of Gain, was apprehended; and it was generally believed that he had secured countenance, if not a definite promise of assistance, from the Governor-General of Kirman and Ibrahim Khan of Bampur, in connection with his designs in that quarter.

Second mission of Colonel Goldsmid to Makran and further reports by him on the questions at issue, also tour by Colonel Pelly, 1864.

An in 1864.

^{*} A Persian request for aid in settling the boundary between Persia and Afghanistan had been finally refused by the British Government in November 1863, after about two years' discussion.

Jāshk and Biyābān in 1864. The Chief of the Jāshk and Biyābān districts about this time was Mīr 'Abdun Nabi, who had usurped possession of them and of the fort of Old Jāshk on the death of Mīr Husain, an earlier chief. He was an energetic and influential man, and was soon confirmed in the position which he had made for himself by the ruler of 'Omān.

Gaih, Dashtyāri, and Bāhu in 1864.

The only local chiefs of importance between Gwadar and the Jashk district in 1864 were those of Gaih, Dashtyari and Bahu, of which districts the last two, though actually governed by separate rulers, seem to have been regarded as forming one chiefdom. The chief of Gaih was still Mīr 'Abdullah, who received Rs. 200 a year from the Sultan of 'Oman for protecting Chahbar; and Dashtyari and Bahu were ruled by Mīr Dīn Muhammad and Mīr Mahammad 'Ali, Jadgāls, of whom the former was paid Rs. 900 a year by the Sultan of 'Oman from the revenues of Chahbar, while the latter appears to have been in direct charge of Gwatar. These two chiefs were near collateral relatives of one another; and Din Muhammad was married at this time, or not much later, to a sister of Mīr 'Abdullah of Gaih. Mir 'Abdullah was revenue collector, on the part of the Persian Government, for all three districts. At Gwatar liability to pay revenue to Persia was repudiated, in theory but not in practice, as an unjust innovation resulting in a double collection of taxes, one in the name of the Persian Government and a second time for the benefit of the local chief.

Gwädar and Chahbār in 1864. Meanwhile Gwādar and Chahbār continued to be administered and taxed, without the interference of any Persian agent, by representatives of the Sultān of 'Omān on their master's behalf.

Further proceedings with reference to the telegraph in Makrān, and question of the border between Persia and Kalāt, 1865—1868.

Recommendations of Colonel Goldsmid, 1865. In 1865 Colonel Goldsmid, who had in the interim become Chief Director of the Indo-European Telegraph and who was at the moment engaged in assisting Her Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran to conclude a telegraph convention with Persia, was consulted by the Government of Bombay in regard to the extreme limit to which a land line might be extended westwards from Gwādar without encountering opposition or reasonable objection on the part of the Persian authorities. After pointing out a practical distinction between "opposition" and "reasonable objection," Colonel Goldsmid gave it as his opinion that Persia could not reasonably object to the extension of the telegraph by

land from Gwādar to the eastern extremity of the Jāshk district, then held by the Sultān of 'Omān on lease from Persia; but he thought that the Persian claims included everything to the west of Gwādar; and he recommended that, in the interests of the telegraph as well as of the state of Kalāt, in alliance and friendship with Britain, the position of the boundary between Persia and Kalāt should be discussed and defined. The greatest difficulty in the way of this was the discontent that might be excited among the petty Balūch chiefs who found themselves definitively placed under Persia in consequence of a settlement. Colonel Goldsmid inclined, on the whole to an arrangement under which Persia should assent to direct dealings between the British authorities and the local chiefs from Gwādar to Jāshk in telegraph matters, the question of the suzerainty over those chiefs being left undecided.

On the conclusion of the Anglo-Persian Telegraph Convention of 1865, Colonel Goldsmid was authorised to return to India by any route that he pleased, bearing in mind the desirability of promoting, if possible, the prolongation of the Makrān telegraph line by a branch into the interior of Persia. He accordingly travelled with his Assistant, Major Smith, from Tehrān by Isfahān, Yazd, and Kirmān to a point 100 miles east of Kirmān, where they parted, Colonel Goldsmid afterwards proceeding to Bampūr and thence through the hills to Chahbār on the coast, while Major Smith marched direct to Bandar 'Abbās and, landing again at Jāshk, made a short tour along the coast to the east of that place. The courtesy and hospitality of Ibrāhīm Khān of Bampūr to Colonel Goldsmid on this journey formed an agreeable contrast with his usual attitude towards the British in Makrān.

The result of the reconnaissance was a scheme for duplicating part of the Indo-European telegraph system by means of a land line connecting Gwādar with Isfahān by way of Bandar 'Abbās, Kirmān, and Yazd; and a draft convention to this end was elaborated by the Government of India and Her Majesty's Government in consultation, from which all reference to the disputed boundary between Persia and Kalāt was excluded, a settlement of that question by separate negotiations being now contemplated.

The character and limits of Persian authority in Makrān were clearly ascertained by Colonel Goldsmid on his journey in 1866. Mīrza Saīd Khān, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, had already informed him at Tehrān that the extent of Persian jurisdiction was best known to the Vakīl-ul-Mulk, Vazīr and virtual Governor General of Kirmān; and that official, on whom the title of "Sardār of Balūchistān" had recently

Journey of Colonel Goldsmid and Major Smith in Persian Balüchistän and resulting scheme, 1866.

Position of Persia in Makrān in 1866-67.

been bestowed, frankly told Colonel Goldsmid that Persia had no title to Gwadar, and that her power on the sea coast to the west of that place was too slight to allow of his issuing permits to foreigners for landing on it. Colonel Goldsmid found the seaboard tract "comparatively cut off from the upper country by a rugged hill range" inhabited by Balüch tribes, to the north of which lay the district of Bampur, "about as much Persian as Kirman Proper;" while the status of the districts to the south of it was entirely different. Bampur was governed by Persian officials and was garrisoned by Persian troops, regular and irregular, as well as by Baluch levies; but in the southern districts Baluch rule continued. those hereditary chiefs who most readily accepted Persian suzerainty being recognised by the Persian authorities, and Persian garrisons as a rule were not found. Ibrāhīm Khan, Governor of Bampūr, told Colonel Goldsmid that he could not undertake to protect telegraph operations to the west of Gwadar; and the fluctuating character of the Persian position from place to place was illustrated by Colonel Goldsmid's own experiences. Shaik 'Abdullah, chief of Qasrkand and Sarbaz, had recently been murdered, and the Persians, in recognising his son as ruler of Qasrkand. had given Sarbaz to the head of another family, who was devoted to the Persian interest: the result was that the direct road from Bampur to Chahbar, vid Qasrkand, had become unsafe for travellers under Persian protection, and that Colonel Goldsmid was obliged to take a route by Fanoch. Over this he travelled more than 200 miles in perfect security. without other escort than that of a petty Persian official, who was unarmed, as were also his Balüch attendants.

From another source we know that in 1867 Mīr'Abdullah of Gaih exercised direct authority over the coast districts between Chahbār and Jāshk, and indirect authority over those between Chahbār and the Kalāt frontier, and that he was extremely unpopular on account of his exactions; also that Yār Muhammad, a Hōt chief at Bāhu Kalāt in the Bāhu district, still held out against the payment of tribute to Persia. About the same time Mīr 'Abdun Nabi, chief of Jāshk and Biyābān, having killed some of the Tāhirzai tribe, was imprisoned by the Persian Deputy Governor of Bandar 'Abbās, and charge of the districts was assumed by Mīr 'Ali, a brother of the former chief Mīr Husain: Mir 'Ali was an old man and incapable of making his authority felt.

Colonel Goldsmid's opinion, formed in accordance with information collected on his journey in 1866, was that Dizak (including Jālk), Sarbāz, and Pīshīn (or Pīshing) should go to Persia, and Tump and Jinwri to Kalāt, the boundary at the coast being placed at the mouth of the Dasht Khor on Gwatar bay.

Captain Ross, Assistant Political Agent at Gwadar, writing in 1867 recommended a line passing near the coast, a few miles to the west of the Drabol hill on Gwatar bay; and his view seems to have been accepted.

In 1866 negotiations for the continuation of the telegraph by land westward from Gwadar were initiated by Mr. Alison, Her Britannic Majesty's Minister in Persia, with the help of Colonel Goldsmid, who 1866-1868. was again at Tehran; but the British proposals were not at first entertained by the Shah, and the discussion was interrupted by a tour which His Majesty made to Khurāsān in 1867. On the Shāh's return from Mashhad the proceedings were resumed, under more favourable auspices, and brought to a successful conclusion in 1868, after the rejection of a Persian scheme according to which Persian jurisdiction was to be recognised as far east as Gwadar and the telegraph line was to be constructed by Persia at her own cost with the assistance, only, of British officers. The Persian Government was, in fact, extremely loath to enter into any engagement that might seem even to countenance a doubt of the validity of their most extensive territorial claims; but this difficulty was at length circumvented by a judicious wording of the convention, in which no mention was made of the Khan of Kalat, the Sultan of 'Oman, or the Baluch Chiefs, it being simply stated that the British Government should arrange for the construction and efficient working of a line from Gwādar to a point between Jāshk and Bandar 'Abbās, while Persia should employ her good offices and authority for the construction, maintenance, and protection of the same, in return for an annual payment of 3,000 Tumans to be made by the British Government in consideration of the sanction accorded by Persia to their telegraph operations at places under her sovereignty. One of the main objects of Persia in the negotiations was to guard against the creation of a state of matters which might tempt the local chiefs to defy an authority which she could not enforce on them, and to be guided in all political matters by the wishes of the British authorities. The actual conclusion of an agreement was delayed by a difficulty in obtaining the consent of the Shah to the establishment of a British Telegraph Station on Hanjam Island; but, this point having been separately settled, the Anglo-Persian Telegraph Convention of 1868, framed on the convenient non-territorial basis indicated above, was at length signed.

Persian administration in Makran still remained much the same as it had been in the years immediately preceding; but it had become, possibly, somewhat more defined and systematic. Gaih, Qasrkand,

Telegraph negotiations at Tehran,

Dashtyāri, and Bāhu were all subject, in a sense, to Mīr 'Abdullah of Gaih; he held the position of Nāib or Persian Deputy Governor of those districts in subordination to Ibrāhīm Khān, Governor of Bampūr, who in his turn was under the orders of the Vakīl-ul-Mulk, Governor-General of Kirmān or acting as such. The tribute of Dashtyāri and Bāhu jointly was now \$\frac{1}{2}\$,000 a year; and, when the people could not or would not pay the revenue demanded of them, nominally an agricultural tithe, a military force was sent to ravage the refractory districts. There was still no pretence of interference by the Persian authorities in matters of internal administration.

In the part of Makran dependent on Kalat the principal authority was Faqīr Muhammad, who held the position of Naib or Deputy Governor in the Kalat State and had his seat at Kaij. The tract on the coast between Chahbar and the eastern end of the Jāshk district was known at Gwādar by the name of Qiblah.

Threatened aggression of Persia on Kalāt, 1868-69.

In the autumn of 1868 information was received from various sources, independent of one another, that a Persian expedition against Kaij in Kalāt territory was contemplated; and Ibrāhīm Khān of Bampur undoubtedly wrote to Mīr 'Abdullah of Gaih on the subject. General opinion connected the Persian designs with the presence at Gaih of Muhammad Khān, a Gichki of Kaij who had fled to Persian Makrān on the expulsion of his uncle, Shaik 'Umar, from the fort of Turbat by the Khān of Kalāt's Nāib of Kaij.

There were as yet no actual military preparations at Bampur or elsewhere in Persian Makran, and it even seemed unlikely that the projected expedition would materialise; but it was thought well, especially in view of a recent forward movement by Persia in Sistan, to take the precaution of interrogating the Shah's Government. In November 1886 the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs denied knowledge of any intention on the part of the local Persian authorities invade Kalāt, but promised to enquire into the matter; and about the same time the death of Mir 'Abdullah, Chief of Gaih, deprived the Persians of their most useful instrument in Makran. In January 1869 an assurance was received from the Persian Government that no movement against Kalāt had ever been intended, "but that the Governor-General of Kirman had been authorised, as in former years, either to despatch a small force or to proceed himself in the direction of Chahbar and the Gwadar territory, which were, as had been often explained during the negotiations last spring for the Makran Coast line of telegraph, considered to form part of the Persian dominions." This language on the part of a Persian Minister, together with the attitude of Ibrāhīm Khān of Bampūr in regard to Kaij in the previous year, and with a desire which he had more recently expressed to visit Khārān was used in March 1869 by Sir W. Merewether Commissioner in Sind, to impress on the Government of Bombay the desirability of a settlement of the Persian frontier question; and in the meantime the Commissioner advised the Khān of Kalāt to take steps to strengthen his western border.

While these matters were in progress, steps were taken by the British authorities to arrange for the prolongation of the Makran land line of telegraph beyond Gwādar by subsidies, in a manner compatible with the Convention of 1868. At the end of the year Colonel Goldsmid, who had just returned from England to Bombay, visited Gwādar and other places on the Makran Coast to prepare the way for an understanding with the local chiefs; but the recent death of Mīr 'Abdullah of Gaih, the most important of them all, and delay on the part of the Fersian Government in appointing a successor to him made it impossible to enter on actual negotiations. Meanwhile, at the close of 1868, a British telegraph station for submarine work only was established at Jāshk as described in the Appendix on the Telegraphs of the Persian Gulf.

In February 1869 Colonel Goldsmid returned to Makran with instructions from the Bombay Government to "deal with the Chiefs west of Kalat territory as he should find most advisable when on the spot;" and, in virtue of the ample discretion thus given him, he was able to dispose finally and satisfactorily of the whole matter. Accompanied by Captain Ross, Assistant Political Agent at Gwadar, he marched by land from that place to Chahbar, meeting by the way with the Chiefs of Dashtvāri and Bāhu; from Chahbār he proceeded by sea to Jāshk, where he left Captain; Ross to begin the local negotiations, while he himself visited the new telegraph station on Hanjim; and, in returning from Jāshk to Gwādar, he had an interview at Chahbār with the new Chief of Gaih, or his representative, the arrangements with whom were made without difficulty. Colonel Goldsmid's political work in Makran was finished in March; and the extension of the telegraph, in connection with which the subsidies arranged by him were granted, was completed in August 1869. The Jashk district was at this time divided between Mīr 'Ali and Mīr 'Abdun Nabi, the latter chief having been released by the Persian authorities; but Mir 'Abdun Nabi now held the eastern part of the district only, from Jagin to Sadaich; and Biyābān was apparently in the possession of Mīr 'Ali.

British telegraph arrangements in Persian Makrān, third mission of Colonel Goldsmid and conduct of the Persian Governor of Bampūr, 1868-69.

In January 1869, shortly before Colonel Goldsmid's visit, a letter objectionable in its tone was received by the Assistant Political Agent at Gwadar from Ibrahim Khan, Governor of Bampur, in which the writer intimated that he had not been authorised by his Government to let the telegraph be carried beyond Gwadar; and his attitude so alarmed the chiefs of Dashtvari and Bahu that they were at first unwilling to enter into negotiations for a British subsidy. Very shortly, however, Ibrāhīm Khān informed Captain Ross in a courteously worded communication that a copy of the Convention of 1868 had reached him from his Government and that the work might proceed. But his friendship seemed likely to be almost as embarrassing as his opposition, for he "had received the orders of his Government to aid us: he must come down to the coast: he must personally ascertain that we have got all that we require: and his coming must be the coming of a large body of armed men." The Khan at first proposed a meeting between Colonel Goldsmid and himself in Bāhu, but the prospect of his arrival so disturbed the people of that district that Colonel Goldsmid twice wrote to assure him that his presence was unnecessary; and, whether for this or for other reasons, he did not appear in Bāhu. At Chahbār a Persian envoy was found waiting with proposals for a visit to be paid there to Colonel Goldsmid by his master, who was then in Sarbaz; but the reply was that the journey to the coast would be a needless trouble to the Khan again he did not come. His absence greatly facilitated matters and enabled Colonel Goldsmid to conclude telegraph agreements with the local chiefs in which no reference was made either to Ibrāhīm Khān himself or to the authority of the Persian Government.

Continued aggressive attitude of Persia towards Kalat, 1869.

During Colonel Goldsmid's tour along the Makrān coast Ibrāhīm Khān hovered in the interior to the northward, at first in Sarbāz, later in Pīshīn, threatening descents in various directions; and, about the time that Colonel Goldsmid finished his task, it became known that the Khān had demanded tribute of Mīr Murād, Chief of Tump in Kalāt territory, with vague and misleading references to an understanding between the British and Persian Governments. Tump was near Kaij, the head quarters of the Kalāt administration in Makrān, to which the Persian Deputy Governor might almost equally well have laid claim. His action, which may have been prompted by the Gichki refugee Muhammad Khān, then in his camp, was successfully counteracted by Faqīr Muhammad, Nāib of Kaij, who at once took effectual steps to support the Chief of Tump. Ibrāhim Khān then quitted his position on

the Kalāt frontier and visited Chahbār on the coast. On his entry into this possession of 'Omān, at the beginning of April 1869, he was accompanied by 100 to 200 horsemen. He remained at Chahbār until the end of the month and then left for Qasrkand, taking all his men with him.

Settlement of the Perso-Kalāt boundary, 1869—1871.

Matters soon reached a point at which it became imperative, without reference to the telegraph question already settled, to define in some way the frontier between Persia and Kalāt.

Between December 1869 and February 1870, on information from India regarding the state of that border, the British Minister at Tehran more than once impressed on the Persian Government the necessity of restraining their local officers from encroachments; but the assurances which he received in return were unsatisfactory, and even conveyed an impression that Persia did harbour designs upon territory regarded by the British authorities as belonging to Kalāt. In February 1870, under instructions from London, prepared by the Foreign and concurred in by the Indial Office, Mr. Thomson took a stronger line and requested, in view of the disturbance and excitement which were being caused in districts upon the frontier of British India, that aggression and even threats by the Persian local authorities on the side of Kalat should be peremptorily forbidden. Mirza Sa'id Khān, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, having asked in reply whether this was said in the way of friendly suggestion or of authoritative demand, and whether a reference to any particular Convention was implied, Mr. Thomson explained that the British Government could not look with indifference on the apprehensions of the state of Kalāt, with which they had treaty engagements; that the apprehensions in question were justified by the policy which, notwithstanding disavowal by the Persian Government, the Persian local officials saw fit to maintain, and that in the circumstances it was necessary that orders should be issued preventing unauthorised movements by the Persian functionaries on the spot.

In April 1870, in consequence of these remonstrances, it was suggested—apparently by the Shāh himself—that the frontier between Persia and Kalāt should be determined by a mixed commission on which Persia, Britain and Kalāt should be separately represented. The suggestion commended itself to the British Government; and Colonel Goldsmid, who was almost simultaneously appointed

British representations regarding Persian aggression on Kalat, 1869-70.

Formation of a mixed Boundary Commission, 1870.

arbitrator between Persia and Afghanistan in respect of an adjacent disputed boundary in Sīstān, was nominated British Commissioner for the determination of the Perso-Kalāt frontier. In July the Persian Government showed signs of a desire to depart from the original arrangement, remarking that "the British and Persian Commissioners were to proceed and draw up a map of Persia's possessions and those of the Khan of Kalat in Baluchistan with their boundaries, and bring the same with them to Tehran;" and though Mr. Alison, the British Minister, immediately pointed out that this would involve the substitution of mere preliminaries for a final settlement, the Persian Government insisted that "the meaning of the Shah in respect to the demarcation of the frontier" had been "that the Anglo-Persian Commissioners should prepare a map on the spot for the subsequent settlement of the boundary line." It was also strongly urged by them that the question of the Sistan boundary, by the settlement of which, it may be observed, they thought that they had more to gain than by the delimitation of the Perso-Kalat frontier, should be disposed of first; but internal disturbances in Afghanistan, which were likely to delay the proceedings in Sīstān, made such a course inconvenient.

Movements and instructions of General Goldsmid, August 1870—January 1871.

It having been at length agreed, with the utmost difficulty, that the Perso-Kalāt Boundary Commission should not be postponed on account of the delay in the Sīstān case, General Goldsmid, who started from England in August 1870, who reached Tehrān after the departure of the Shāh on pilgrimage to Karbala and Najaf, — the Mustaufiul-Mamālik remaining in charge of the realm,—and who was detained at Tehrān, Isfahān, and Kirmān by discussions between the British Legation and the Regent and references by the latter to the Shāh, reached Bampūr on the 28th January 1871.

Detailed instructions in regard to the Sīstān dispute had been given General Goldsmid by Her Majesty's Government, but it was left to the Government of India to guide his proceedings in regard to the Perso-Kalāt border. The directions of the Government of India, issued to him in January 1871, were to the effect that his object should be to secure to Kalāt the places properly dependent on that state; that a very liberal view might be taken of the claims of Persia further to the westward; and that Kōhak, Panjgūr, Kaij, Tump, Nasīrābād and Mand should apparently, in accordance with his own previously expressed views, be included in Kalāt, while Jālk, Dizak, Sarbāz, Pīshīn and Bāhu were assigned to Persia. Colonel Goldsmid was

recommended to exercise great caution in proposing any line to the north of Jalk, and even to postpone suggesting one, the reason being that a premature determination of that section might compromise the position of the Sīstān border, to be settled later, which must necessarily be a continuation of it. The Government of India explained that Captain Harrison, Political Agent at Kalat, and Major Ross. Assistant Political Agent at Gwadar, though they would be attached to the Commission, were not to be regarded as possessing any authority co-ordinate with that of General Goldsmid, their duties being only to supply him with information and perform such other services as he might require of them. It was added: "When the three Commissioners," viz., Colonel Goldsmid himself and the representatives of Persia and Kalat, "are unanimous, the boundary will be defined in accordance with their opinion. When they differ, the boundary will be laid down in accordance with the views of the majority." On the question whether any settlement that might be reached by the Commission would be treated as final, the Government of India were unable, in consequence of the attempted modification of the original understanding by the Persian Government, to pronounce a decided opinion.

This last point was referred to the Secretary of State for India, who replied that General Goldsmid should communicate the decision at which he might arrive to the Commissioners of Persia and Kalat in writing, with a statement of the facts and arguments on which it was based; that he should await on the spot the result of the references which they would then make to their respective Governments; that he should endeavour to remove any objections that might be raised; and that, if he failed in this, he should inform his colleagues that his task was at an end, and then report to his own Government. The Government of India in transmitting these instructions to General Goldsmid, told him that the clause relating to the communication of written papers to his colleagues need not be regarded as absolute, but that he might use his discretion in the matter; and that, on the conclusion of the operations on the spot, he should repair to Tehran with the information collected, and there assist in effecting a final settlement in communication with Mr. Alison and the Indian and Her Majesty's Governments.

At the end of January 1871 General Goldsmid and the Persian Commissioner, Mīr* Ma'sum Khān, who had joined him near Tehrān on

Proceedings of the Boundary Commission in Makrān 1871.

^{*} Major Euan Smith's account of the Persian Commissioner, though long, may be given here on account of the light which it throws on the difficulties encountered by the British Commissioner (Goldsmid's Eastern Persia, pages 147-148).

"Mirza Ma'súm Khán was a native of the province of Adarbaiján, very dark and

the 25th October 1870, were, as we have seen, at Bampūr. Meanwhile the arrival at Qasrkand of the Kalāt Commissioner, Faqīr Muhammad, Nāib of Kaij, accompanied by Captain Harrison and Major Ross had been announced; and some sensation was caused by the size of the Kalāt party, whose camp contained nearly 300 persons,—fortunately they were not escorted, as had at one time been proposed, by a detachment of the Sind Horse. The Persian Commissioner, though surprised, agreed to their entering Bampūr which General Goldsmid had proposed to obviate by going to meet them; but their presence seemed highly distasteful to the Persian authorities and to the local tribes, and they left again after a six

swarthy, and with a sufficient knowledge of French to enable him to converse fluently in that language, though Turkish was his ordinary medium of communication with servants. He was a man of no family or position, and owed his present appointment to his being the nephew or cousin of Mirza Sa'id Khán, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who at this time possessed much influence with the Shah. Mirza Ma'súm Khán's fitness for political employ had not as yet been put to the proof: he had hitherto filled but very subordinate offices, and had been attached to the Persian embassy at St. Petersburg as one of the smaller attachés, where he picked up his knowledge of colloquial French. He had no lack of general intelligence, and was possessed of a considerable fund of humour, which, when matters of duty were not on the tapis, made him a very pleasant travelling companion. But it is nevertheless probable that a more unfit man could not have been found for the work to be accomplished. Being possessed of no wealth of his own, he looked upon his present appointment as, above all, affording him the means of enriching himself by bribes and extortion, to which ruling idea the whole of his conduct was entirely His want of social position, again, paralysed anything like free or independent action, through fear of responsibility; and his only notion of carrying on diplomatic work, evidently acquired in the Persian Foreign Office, found vent in endless carefully-worded letters in which the sole object was so to distort the true sense of matters as to render it no longer recognisable. In this accomplishment he took especial pride, and showed great skill in using words which might bear two or three meanings different to that which they naturally at first sight conveyed. He was in utter ignorance of the nature of the work which lay before him, an ignorance which even extended to the geographical position of the province of Sistán; but it is fair to say that on this point he made no profession whatever of even superficial knowledge. Being a man of a singularly presuming nature, he was always striving for a little more than he had a rightful claim to; but the many and severe rebuffs to which he subjected himself by this line of conduct never served to ruffle his extraordinary good nature. This wonderful good humour certainly stood him in good stead; it made him a bearable companion, even when the knowledge of his endless petty wiles, deceits, and malversations of the truth was ranking very deeply in the mind-and possibly more than once saved matters from coming to a complete standstill; for it was evidently useless wasting anger upon a man who would not see or believe that you were angry with him. Mirza Ma'sum Khán was, in short, a deceitful friend, and a tricky and untrustworthy public servant; but he was ever and always a cheerful and good-humoured travelling companion."

days' halt. Their coming had been taken as a sign that the title of Persia to Bampur itself was about to be called in question.

It early became apparent that no co-operation in a reasonable settlement of the boundary was to be looked for on the part of the Persian Commissioner. His feelings had probably been worked on by Ibrāhīm Khān of Bampūr, who feared to lose the territories that he had annexed during the previous few years. Mīrza Mas'um Khān pretended that the proceedings of the Commission had been limited, by an arrangement at Tehran, to an enquiry into the status of Kaij only, which was claimed by Persia but was in possession of Kalāt. He declined to commence operations in the north; and when General Goldsmid proposed by way of concession that the districts adjoining the sea should be taken in hand first, he rejected that suggestion also. He even refused to discuss the boundary in the neighbourhood of Kaij itself on the basis suggested by General Goldsmid, viz., that, after the Persian claims had been preferred, any counter claim by Kalat should be admitted to a hearing He was at length induced to agree to an opening of the proceedings at Pishin; but as the British Commissioner objected to his being accompanied to the frontier by a Persian armed force, he again withdrew his consent, alleging that the Persian frontier was beyond Pishin.

Some time having been lost in fruitless discussions, General Goldsmid, who had not yet received the instructions sent him from India. arranged to proceed to Gwadar, where he would be in telegraphic communication with Tehran and India, and requested the British Minister in Persia to obtain orders for the Persian Commissioner to rejoin him At the same time he detached Captain B. Lovett, R.E., a member of his staff, to march down the approximate line of the frontier from north to south, collecting by the way such topographical and other Mīr Ma'sūm Khān data as he could in regard to the border districts. promised General Goldsmid, before the latter left Bampur on the 16th February, that he would come down to Gwadar, when instructed to do so, and discuss the results of Major Lovett's survey or reconnaissance there; but on the 18th March he began to make difficulties about visiting Gwadar and to suggest that the next meeting should be at Kaij. Colonel Goldsmid reached Gwadar on the 6th, Major Lovett on the 21st of March.

The Persian Commissioner, who had in the meantime received his orders, arrived at Gwādar on the 11th April; but he declined to meet the Kalāt Commissioner, refused to listen to evidence adduced by the Kalāt

authorities in proof of their claims, and even gave a different account of his latest instructions from that which had been supplied to Mr. Alison by the Persian Government. Instead of being ready to "visit the necessary places," to prepare a map, and to co-operate in a suitable manner with General Goldsmid, he had,—according to a statement which he made to Major Euan Smith, General Goldsmid's Personal Assistant, at Chahbār, where he had embarked for Gwādar on the British gunboat "Hugh Rose,"-only been authorised to visit certain specified places; and, in point of fact, he refused to go anywhere but to Kaij. "Even Kedj he would not visit unless it was evacuated by all the Khelat soldiers before his visit, and unless he was accompanied by Ibrāhīm Khān, in whose persistent encroachments the boundary question originated ". On the 24th April, notwithstanding orders obtained from his Government that he should remain at Gwādar, he persisted in leaving that place for Chahbar, whence he had come; and joint proceedings were thus finally rendered impossible.

Mīr Ma'sūm Khān preferred unfounded charges against General Goldsmid which were afterwards referred by the Persian Ministry, in a memorandum, to the British Legation at Tehrān; but Her Majesty's Government having signified displeasure at so unbecoming a step, the memorandum was withdrawn with excuses and professions of high regard for General Goldsmid. The British Commissioner was accused of acting unfairly and in a way calculated to create disorder in the Persian Frontier districts, of having declared places admittedly Persian not to be so; and of disturbing men's minds by enquiring about the rights of Persia to other places indisputably hers. The object of the Persian Government in adopting these charges was, perhaps, only to bring about an adjournment of the proceedings in Makārn, in order that those in Sistān might be held first.

In May 1871, General Goldsmid, who had then nearly completed the collection of information bearing on the actual status of the districts between Persia and Kalāt in Makrān, was directed by the Government of India to proceed to Makrān with a map that had been prepared by Captain Lovett under his orders; and, after a visit to Karachi for the purpose of obtaining further proofs of the title of Kalāt to certain disputed tracts, he betook himself to the Persian Capital, arriving there before his Persian colleague on the Commission.

At Tehran strenuous discussions ensued, occupying the whole month of August. On the 6th and again on the 20th of that month, General Goldsmid was admitted to personal audience of the Shah. Some

Acceptance by the Persian Government progress was marked by His Majesty's abandonment, on the 13th, of the Persian claims to Kaij and Gwādar; but he showed some anxiety to obtain, before committing himself to acceptance of the boundary proposed by Colonel Goldsmid, not only certain trifling modifications of the same, but also a general assurance on the part of the British Government that Kalāt was an independent state and that the arrangements about to be made would affect only the Khān and his descendants,—in other words, apparently, that Britain herself was not directly interested in the settlement. Suspicion, in fact tinged the whole attitude of the Persian Government in the Kalāt frontier question, it not being understood by them, perhaps, that what was desired by the British Indian authorities was to keep at a distance from India not Persian influence, but the Russian influence which might follow in its train.

of the boundary proposed by General Goldsmid, with a reservation as to Kōhak, 4th September 1871.

It having been pointed out that Kalāt, though independent, was bound by a Treaty of 1854 to subordinate co-operation with the British Government and to abstention from negotiations with foreign powers unless with the British consent, the point seems to have been waived; and on the 4th September 1871, General Goldsmid's boundary was accepted in a letter addressed by the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs to Mr. Alison, from which the following is an extract:—

In obedience to His Majesty's orders I beg, in reply, most respectfully to state that the Persian Government, notwithstanding the clear right which it considered itself to have over Balüchistän, simply out of regard for the wishes of Her Britannic Majesty's Government that this question should be brought to a satisfactory conclusion by the definition of a boundary line, has hereby accepted Your Excellency's letter, and the map. The Persian Government now looks forward to the desirable results and important advantage which it expects from the British Government for this great act of compliance and co-operation on the part of Persia, and awaits to see what will emanate from the suitable manner in which the matter will be represented through the good offices of Your Excellency, an experienced Minister, and a well-wisher perfectly cognisant of the whole details of the merits of the question.

In the letter of the British Minister to which the above was a reply the line proposed for acceptance had been thus described:—

Commencing from the northernmost point or that which is furthest from the sea, the territory of Khelat is bounded to the west by the large Persian district of Dizzūk, which is composed of many dehs or minor districts, those on the frontier being Jalk and Kallegan. Below these two last named is the small district of Kōhāk, which together with Punjgar, comprising Parum and other dependencies, is on the Khelat side of the frontier, while on the Persian side is Bumpusht.

Below Panjgur, the frontier possessions of Khelat to the sea are Boleida, including Zamiran and other dependencies, Mund, and Dusht. Within the Persian line of frontier are the villages or tracts belonging to Sirbaz and Baho Dustyaree. The boundary of

Dusht is marked by a long line drawn through the Drabol Hill, situated between the rivers Baho and Dusht, to the sea in the Bay of Gwuttur.

To summarise, Punjgur and Parum and other dependencies, with Kohuk; Boleida, including Zamiran and other dependencies; Mund, including Toomp, Nascerabad, Kedj, and all districts, dehs, and dependencies to the eastward; Dusht with its dependencies as far as the sea,—these names exhibit the line of actual possession of Khelat, that is to say, all tracts to the east of the frontier of actual Persian possession, which frontier comprises Dizzak and Bumpusht, Sirbaz and Peshin, Baho and Dustyaree.

The acceptance by the Shāh of General Goldsmid's proposed line was qualified by a reservation, or at least a representation, in regard to Köhak, which the Shah was very desirous should be included in Persia. General Goldsmid seems to have found no trace of either Persian or Kalāt supremacy over Kōhak, and would apparently, if left to himself, have classed it as neutral and independent; but he was bound by the clear instructions of the Government of India, which bore that if the Persian Government can establish no claim to take their boundary to the east of Köhak, the line should be drawn to the west." The British Commissioner accordingly threw the burden of proof on Persia. and, no evidence having been produced on her behalf, assigned Kōhak to Kalāt, London was chosen by the Persian Government as the best place for further discussion of the Köhak question, apparently from an idea that the Government of India were more adverse to concessions to Persia than Her Majesty's Government,--an idea which thus found expression in a memorandum presented by the Persian Minister in England.

Votre Excellence me permettra de ne pas lui dissimuler que dans plus d'une circonstance le Gouvernement de Sa Majesté Impériale a rencontré en certains points de la part du Gouvernement des Indes une inflexibilité qui semblait peu dictée du désir d'être agréable à un Gouvernement ami, et qui aurait pu le décourager dans l'œuvre qu'il n'a pas cessé de poursuivre axec ardeur—celle de resserrer chaque jour de as en plus les bons rapports qui unissent nos deux pays.

The matter was referred in England to Sir H. Rawlinson, formerly British Minister in Persia, who considered the question of Kōhak intrinsically unimportant and thought that "it would be... to our advantage, if, without violating justice or giving real offence to the Khān of Khelat, we could confer an obligation upon the Shāh of Persia by modifying the Mekran frontier arrangement in his favour." Eventually, to meet His Majesty's wishes, the line forming the western boundary of Kalāt was drawn to the east of Kōhak; but no opinion was expressed "as to the position of the Persian, frontier" that is, on the

academic question whether Köhak was independent or a possession of Persia. Köhak was occupied by Persian Troops in 1874.

In the letter proposing for the Shāh's acceptance the line recommended by General Goldsmid, the British Minister in Persia had suggested, in the following terms, the appointment of a Subsidiary Commission for the actual delimitation of the frontier:—

Subsidiary or Delimitation Commission, 1872

The undersigned proposes, with the concurrence of the Persian Government, that, for purposes of future reference and identification, he shall obtain the services of an experienced English Officer of Engineers, who may meet an Officer duly appointed by the Government of Persia, and an officer from the Khelat State, so as to lay down the more prominent landmarks and features of the actual line agreeably to the above description, and make a careful survey thereof for record. This subsidiary Commission should meet as early as practicable in Gwuttur Bay, and proceed upwards from the boundary terminus between the rivers Baho and Dusht to Jalk or the neighbourhood, submitting the result of their work in the form of a map to the Representative of Her Britannic Majesty's Government and the Persian Government at Teherān.

The Persian Government having agreed to this suggestion, Captain O. St. John, R.E., Acting Director of the Anglo-Persian Telegraphs, who would have accompanied General Goldsmid as his technical assistant in 1870 if his services could have been spared, was appointed to carry out the work of delimitation on the part of the British Government. The Persian representative was a youth named Mīrza Ashraf Ali, dubbed "Sarhang" for the occasion, who possessed a fair knowledge of map and plan drawing, but was content to copy and adopt the results of Captain St. John's survey. The representative of Klāta failed to appear. Captain St. John started from Gwadār on the 22nd January and reached Jalk on the 13th March 1872. His proceedings mostly lay beyond the region with which this book is concerned; but his description of Ibrāhīm Khān of Bampūr, who now possessed the title of Sartīp may be quoted:

The redoubtable ruler of Bam-Narmashīr and Bālūchistān is a short punchy man, of any age from forty-five to sixty, with a full and well-dyed beard, and small sharp eye. He speaks Persian with the broad southern twang, and uses provincialisms not very easy to understand by any accustomed only to the conversation of educated men. My experience in out-of-the-way parts of Fārs, however, enabled me to get on with him pretty well, but our conversation was confined to generalities, and the examination of fire-arms. To our breechloaders he made the usual objection of the difficulty of obtaining cartridges. There seemed nothing in his talk or in his face to indicate the really superior man he must be, not only as having risen to his present position by sheer merit, unaided by money or interest, but as having reduced one of the most turbulent countries in Asia to a state of order and tranquillity, comparing favourably not only with most of his own country but with many native states further

east. Lucky would it he for his people and ours on the Sindfrontier, if His Highness Khūdadād of Kalāt had Ibráhîm Khān's head on his shoulders. *

Annexation of Chahbar to Persia 1872.

The circumstances in which Chahbār was captured by Sartīp Ibrāhīm Khān of Bampūr in February 1872, and so passed permanently into the possession of Persia, need not be described here. An account of them will be found in an Annexure to the chapter on the history of the 'Omān Sultanate, where it is more appropriately placed, as the place was a dependency of Masqat at the time of its fall, and its loss to Masqat was occasioned largely by dissensions in the ruling family of 'Omān.

During the decade following the annexation of Chahbār to Persia little occurred to draw external attention to the affairs of Persian Makrān, and to the end of the reign of Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shāh such events as were reported from that province were of local importance only.

General Persian Administration, 1872-1896.

Governor-Generalship of Kirman, 1880-91. From about 1880 till 1891, or longer, His Royal Highness the Nāsirud-Dauleh was Governor-General of Kirmān, in which province Bampūr and with it Persian Makrān were included. The Prince-Governor, who possessed in the later years of his rule the title of Farmān-Farmā, made a tour to Chahbār early in 1883. His administration appears to have been vigorous, though much disturbed by the insubordination of local chiefs. One of its principal incidents was the treacherous seizure, in 1891, of various turbulent tribal leaders, some of whom the Prince caused to be blown from guns and put to death in other ways.

Governorship of Bampur, 1882—96.

In or about May 1882 Sartīp Ibrāhīm Khān was removed from the Governorship of Bampūr, which he had filled with much distinction

^{*}Goldsmith's Eastern Persia, pages 77-78. In the same book (pages 206-7) will be found Captain Euan Smith's account of Ibrāhīm Khān: "This famous chief, quite a despot in these regions, was a little squat stumpy man, very stout and round, with a good-natured face, a pair of piercing eyes, and an unusually long, handsome and silky beard. Probably about 50 years of age, he looked much younger, owing to the jet black dye of his abundant hair. Though evidently full of vivacity, he did little to initiate conversation. His Persian was very difficult to understand, being mixed with Balūch, and he talked very quickly, clipping his words at the same time."

for twenty years or more; his removal, as will be seen hereafter, was not unconnected with representations made by the British Legation at Tehran. His immediate successor was one Wali Khan, but in the spring of 1883 Sartīp Sulaimān Khān, a Persian, was in power at Bampūr. Later in 1883, or possibly in 1884, Sartīp Ibrāhīm Khān was reinstated in the Governorship; and immediately, from all the districts under his charge, reports began to be received of distress and of emigration on a large scale to Masqat, India, and elsewhere. He died, however, in May 1884. and his death was quickly followed by a general return of the emigrants to their homes.

In 1887 a certain 'Abdul Fat-h Khān was appointed Governor of 1887-89. Bampur. His rule was distinguished by unparalleled atrocities, of many of which his brother Mohsin Khān was the instrument. In 1889, the Shah being then absent in Europe, the exasperation of the Baluch tribes had been raised to such a pitch by his conduct, that most of the chiefs rebelled and besieged him in a fort near Bampur. Having been captured by them he was deposed by order of the Regent, the Amin-ul-Mulk, on information supplied by the British Legation, and was temporarily a prisoner at Kirman. The insurgent chiefs, whom the local British authorities had done their best to restrain by friendly advice, remained for a time in possession of Bampur.

The next Governor of Bampur was a certain Zain-ul-'Abidīn Khān, 1890 -97 who seems to have had a hand in the fall of Abdul Fat-h Khān, and who retained his position until 1897.

Affairs of the Jashk and Biyaban districts, 1872-1896.

After the formation of the Gulf Ports administrative charge, about Persian ad-1887, Jāshk and all the places dependent on it were transferred from the jurisdiction of the Governor-General of Kirman to that of the Governor of the Gulf Ports; but the exact time of the transfer is uncertain. Previously to this, in 1884, Biyābān seems to have been detached temporarily from the Jäshk chiefdom, in which perhaps it was usually included, and conferred on one Saiyid Nasīm.

ministration of Jashk and Piyābān, 1884 -- 90.

In 1886 a Persian Deputy-Governor, in the person of one Nasr Ullah 1896-87. Khān, was appointed to Jāshk. The short period distinguished by general self-assertiveness on the part of the Persian authorities in the Persian Gulf had now begun. In the summer of 1887 a patrol of 100 Persian soldiers under Muhammad Kāzim arrived from Rūdbar at Jashk,

where it was intended that half of them should remain as a permanent guard; but the difficulty of rationing them proved excessive, and they were sent away and local levies substituted. In October 1887 much wilful damage was done to the British telegraph in the neighbourhood of Jāshk, but the reason seemed to be the hostility of the people to the new Persian authorities. In the same year Mīr 'Abdun Nabi and Mīr 'Ali, the chiefs between whom the Jāshk district was divided, were made prisoners by the Persians and removed at first to Tehrān. It was believed that a secret friendship with the British with which they were credited was the cause of their being thus severely treated. Mīr Ali was released in June 1888, but Mīr 'Abdun Nabi languished in detention at Būshehr and Bandar Abbās for two years longer.

1888. In February 1888 the Malik-ut-Tujjār, whose influence flourished under the Amīn-us-Sultān's Government from 'Arabistān to Makrān, visited Jāshk with Persian troops; and the Persian flag was hoisted and saluted there. This ceremony may have marked the formal inclusion of Jāshk in the Gulf Ports.

1889-90. In February 1889, by which time Jāshk must certainly have come under the jurisdiction of Būshehr, the Sa'ad-ul-Mulk, Governor of the Gulf Ports, came to Jāshk in the "Persepolis." Mīr 'Abdun Nabi was with him, but was not allowed to land. A detachment of 20 Persian soldiers was posted at Jāshk about the same time. It was stated that a payment of 4,000 Qrāns and substantial security for his future good behaviour had been required of Mīr 'Abdun Nabi; and in 1890, perhaps on satisfying these demands, he was released.

In 1893 or 1894 an affray took place at Jāshk between some fishermen, whose cause was espoused by the general population of the place, and the Persian military detachment. The latter were besieged in their fort. on the British Assistant Superintendent of Telegraphs promising to report the matter to superior authority, the fishermen and their allies drew off. The result of the British official's report was the removal of the Persian Deputy-Governor, Ghulām Riza Baig, and the substitution for him of a Persian Military officer.

Internal history of Jāshk and Byāhān, 1891-96.

1893-94.

In July 1891 Mir 'Abdun Nabi, one of the chiefs of Jāshk and Biyā bān, began to levy extraordinary taxes on grain and dates, on the plea that the contractors for the revenue of the district had not paid him his dues; and the Governor of the Gulf Ports despatched the Naibs of Shamīl and Mīnāb into Jāshk with a force, said to be 2,000 strong, to capture him and recover the revenue. The expedition was a failure; but Jāshk, deserted by Mīr 'Abdun Nabi, was placed in charge of the Persian Deputy Governor of Baundar

'Abbās. In January 1892 Mīr 'Abdun Nabi reappeared in the district. displaced the agents of the Deputy Governor of Bandar 'Abbas after some desultory fighting, and again began to collect taxes to the great dissatisfaction of the people, especially in Biyaban, which district the Persian authorities now conferred on Mīr Hāji, son of Mīr Yūsuf, 'Abdun Nabi's leading opponent there. In August 1893 Mīr 'Abdun Nabi, assisted by Shaikh Hasan, Nāib or Zābit of Mīnāb, attacked with a large force at Surag the small Tāhirzai tribe of Khotak; the losses on either side were slight; and the tribe paid 400 Tumans for pardon and permission to reside at Khōtak, but subsequently removed to Bashākard.

Serious disturbances arose in the neighbourhood of Jashk in 1894 in consequence of the death of a son of Mir 'Ali, joint chief of Jashk and Biyābān, shot by dependents of Mīr 'Abdun Nabi in a fray that arose out of a dispute about camels. Both parties had recourse to the British telegraph authorities at Jashk, from whom Mīr 'Ali's party even tried unsuccessfully to oltain ammunition; and the arrest of Mir 'Abdun Nabi was ordered by the Persian authorities, but could not be effected. Subsequently the contending chiefs were summoned to Bandar 'Abbās; but Mīr 'Abdun Nabi was attacked by enemies on the way there, several men being killed in the fight which ensued, whereupon he refused to continue his journey. The Persian officials then announced that he had been deprived of the chiefship of Jāshk in favour of Mīr Hāji, who had already supplanted him in have been nominal, settlement seems to Bivābān: but this In April 1895 several Balüch leaders met at or at best partial. Jashk with large followings to demand the appointment of a responsible chief over the whole Jashk district, and much excitement at first prevailed, but it was allayed by assurances that, whatever was done, their wishes would be considered by the Persian Deputy-Governor of Jashk. Nothing more was heard of Mir 'Abdun Nabi until his death, which occurred in December 1895. He was succeeded by his son Mir Mustafa.

British interests at Jāshk, 1872—1896.

Cases involving British interests from time to time arose at Jashk in consequence of the existence of a British telegraph station there after 1868 and of the presence of an Indian military guard from 1878 to 1887.

In May 1884 five sepoys of the military guard were fired on, while out Sepoy's case walking, by two natives of the country and were robbed of some money.

Mr. Sally, the Assistant Superintendent in charge of Jāshk, was able at once to recover part of the money taken through a clerk of Mīr 'Aldum Nabi, that chief being at the time absent from Jāshk; and the balance was paid up by 'Abdun Nabi on his return.

Anglo-Persian Agreement concerning the limits of, and jurisdiction in the Jashk telegraph Station, 25th February 1887.

Inlass difficulties arose from the exercise of jurisdiction by Persian O-figals in the British telegraph station at Jāshk. The past history of the question was investigated, and it was found that, soon after the omening of the Station, in consequence of frequent petty annoyances caused by Baltich thribesmen and their chiefs, an arrangement had been made be tween the British political authorities and Hāji Ahmad Khān, then Deputy-Govermor of Bandar 'Abbās, whereby, after the spot had been examine-db ya Commission of Persian officers a line was drawn from the creek on the ewest side of the peninsula to the sea on the east to mark the b our dar-youf the station, within which no interference by chiefs or collection of our spins duty was to be permitted in future. This local unders-tanding vas violated in 1886 by the newly arrived Deputy-Governor, Name Ullaba Khan, who took up a position within the limits of the s-tation and began to collect customs on provisions imported by the tele-Emph:staff for their own consumption and that of their servants, and o-thenwisset comake himself obnoxious. The people of the country also proceeded top-lant date palms round the station well, the supply of water from which was wery scanty; but most of the trees were removed at the request of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf. About the same times that Shah, in consequence of alarming reports received from a French membant and intriguer about the Indian military detachment ant J ask karned the British position there generally, showed reluctance to ementa milway concession which was being solicited through the British Legation aut Tehran; and it was resolved that some regular arrangement In regard to the belegraph station should be made. It was settled that the Indian military guard should be withdrawn by the British authorithe Ter.sia 1. Government on their part removing Nasr Ullah Khan and theata. formul agreement as to the limits and immunities of the station should be concluded.

There A greenment which resulted was dated 25th February 1887, and the following were its principal provisions that the local Persian officials should energy authority within the limits of the station, which were defined in the Agreement; that the well and the road and water channel commenting it with the station should be protected from interference; that three custom house and other buildings to be erected by the Persian Government should be located outside the station at a place to be settled

by local arrangement; that the members of the telegraph staff and persons genuinely employed by them as servants should be exempt from customs duty, this privilege not to extend to shopkeepers in the station; that no dues should be levied on supplies entering the station from the interior, if for the consumption of the telegraph establishment; and finally, that sanctuary or protection against the Persian authorities should not be afforded by the telegraph officials to local Persian subjects other than persons actually in their service.

In April 1887 Nasar Ullah Khān was removed from Jāshk in accordance with the understanding that preceded the Agreement, being succeeded as Deputy-Governor by Hidāyat Khān, a conciliatory personage, who did not remain long and who was followed by Mirza 'Ali Khān, an official of similar temper. The Indian military detachment was also removed, and it was at first proposed to replace it by a guard of 20 Indian police; but ultimately local levies were engaged. It may be noted that the boundary of the station, as actually marked out afterwards, did not agree* in every respect with the indications contained in the Agreement; but the deviation was apparently acquiesced in by the local Persian authorities, and neither at the time nor at any later date did it give rise to dispute.

In 1889, soon after the departure of the Sa'ad-ul-Mulk, Governor of the Gulf Ports from Jāshk, the wife of a boatman who was employed by the telegraph staff and had his residence in the station was seized, when outside the boundary, dragged to the Persian Deputy-Governor's house, and there—it was said—ill-treated. The reason was a quarrel between her and the wife of the Deputy-Governor's clerk, who also resided in the telegraph station. This case became the subject of a correspondence between the Political Resident at Būshehr and the British Minister at Tehrān; but, the former (Colonel Ross) having pointed out that jurisdiction over Persian subjects, even in the telegraph station, could not be claimed by British officials under the Agreement of 1887, it was apparently allowed to drop, lest representations in regard to the woman's treatment should give rise to inconvenient discussions of principle.

Question of jurisdiction under the Agreement, 1889.

^{*} See Aitchison's Treaties, 4th edition, volume XII, pages 96-97, and Volume II of this Gazetteer, article "New Jashk," page 915, footnote. From the latter it will appear that the directions as to boundary given in the Agreement were, in part at least, impossible to reconcile with actual distances on the spot.

Affairs of the districts east of Jashk, 1872-1896.

Fragmentary information only is available in regard to events in the districts to the east of Jāshk during the period following the appropriation of Chahbār by Persia; and the events themselves were confused and of no great significance.

1881.

In 1881, the first year of which there is anything to relate, Gaih, including the coastal tract known as Qiblah, seems to have been held by a chief named Mīr Hōti; Qasrkand, to which Sarbāz was attached, by one Mīr Mauladad, son of Jān Muhammad; Dashtyāri, now comprising Chahbār, by Mīr Dīn Muhammad; and Bāhu by Mīr Muhammad 'Ali. The chief feature of the political situation was an intense enmity between Mīr Dīn Muhammad of Dashtyāri and Sardār Husain Khān, a man of influence in Gaih, favoured by Sartīp Ibrāhīm Khān, Governor of Bampūr, whose lieutenant he had been at the capture of Chahbār. Sardār Hussain Khān had a brother, Chākār Khān, also a person of some consequence, who resided at Fanōch. Mīr Maulādād of Qasrkand, having married a daughter of Mīr Dīn Muhammad, belonged to his faction; and there was therefore enmity between Husain Khān and Maulādād also.

1881-82.

Apparently in 1881 Sartip Ibrāhīm Khān, who had a grudge against Mīr Dīn Muhammad on account of having failed to seize him and extort money from him, as he had done at one time or another to most of the other local chiefs, instigated Sardar Husain Khan to invade Dashtyari, which he did, nothing loath; and Mir Din Muhammad sought safety in flight. Sardar Husain Khan was helped in his operations by 'Abdullah Khān, a son of Dīn Muhammad, who had been on bad terms with his father for many years and consequently without means of subsistence; this individual indicated to Husain Khān the people of the country from whom money could best be wrung. Husain Khan, on returning to the interior, installed 'Abdullah Khān as Deputy Governor of Chahbār; but the latter could not maintain order in the town or its environs; and his manners were offensive and his charges exorbitant, especially to British Indian traders. On the departure of Husain Khān, Mīr Dīn Muhammad returned to Dashtyāri and resumed his position as chief without opposition, 'Abdullah Khān simultaneously disappearing from Chahbār. British Indian subjects being among the victims of Husain Khān's rapacity, the raid on Dashtyāri led to representations by Her Britannic

Majesty's Minister at Tehrān, in consequence of which Sartīp Ibrāhīm Khān was in 1882 temporarily removed from the Government of Bampūr and transferred to that of Rūdbar and Bashākard, while Sardār Husain Khān was said to have been imprisoned and made to disgorge his spoil. The pretext for the invasion, possibly a true one, was non-payment by Mīr Dīn Muhammad of the revenue due by him to the Persian Government.

In 1882 Mīr Muhammad 'Ali of Bāhu, of whom Rs. 5,000 a year was demanded, having failed to raise more than Rs. 4,800 or to obtain a reduction, though he visited Bampūr in person, resigned the chiefship of his district and retired to Gwatar. Thereupon Mīr Maulādād of Qasrkand came down to Bāhu, and, with the help of A'zum Khān, a brother of Muhammad 'Ali, collected a considerable sum from the inhabitants, with which he returned to Qasrkand, A'zam Khān accompanying him. He had promised to set A'zam Khān up as chief of Bāhu, but failed to keep this engagement, whereupon Sardār Husain Khān, who was A'zam Khān's maternal uncle, invaded his principality, made him a prisoner, and extorted from him the money he had realised in Bāhu. Mīr Maulādād was liberated on payment of a heavy fine, to which his father-in-law, Mīr Dīn Muhammad of Dashtyāri, contributed Rs. 1,000.

In 1883, Husain Khān being still in possession of Qasrkand, of which he had deprived Mauladad, a fine of 6,000 Tumans was inflicted on Mir Din Muhammad by the Prince Governor of Kirman, apparently as a punishment for having allowed British Indian subjects in Dashtyāri and at Chahbar to complain of having been robbed by Husain Khan and 'Abdullah Khān in 1881. On an appeal by the chief the matter was reported by the Resident in the Persian Gulf to the British Legation at Tehrān; but Mīr Dīn Muhammad, before being released, had been obliged to give two of his sons as hostages and to produce as sureties for payment of the fine Sardar Husain Khan of Qasrkand and Mir Hoti of Gaih; and in order to raise the money required of him he had to undertake a begging tour to Masqat, and even to Sind. Bahu was at this time almost depopulated as the result of fiscal exactions, failure of rain, and the collapse of an embankment on which the irrigation of the district depended and a reduction of the annual revenue of the district was promised by His Royal Highness the Nasir-ud-Dauleh on a tour to Chahbar. There was also hostility between Mīr Muhammad 'Ali of Bāhu and Mīr Dīn Muhammad of Dashtyāri, the latter claiming Gwatar from the former, and Major Mockler, the Assistant Political Agent at Gwatar, was induced by Mir Muhammad 'Ali to go with him to the Prince Governor and

1882.

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explain that Gwatar had belonged to Bāhu for ten years at least; but His Royal Highness disregarded Major Mockler's representations and almost immediately placed 'Abdi Khan, a son of Mīr Dīn Muhammad, in charge of Gwatar. The assessment of Dashtyāri and Bāhu jointly, which in 1865 was Rs.5,000 a year, had since been raised to Rs. 15,000, viz., Rs. 10,000 for Dashtyari and Rs. 5,000 for Bāhu; but it must be remembered that the receipts of the Chahbār customs had since 1872 gone to swell the income of the Dashtyāri chief.

In 1886 the state of Bāhu was lamentable, owing to excessive taxation of the people by Mīr Muhammed 'Ali under severe pressure from the Persian authorities. Gwata was forsaken by its inhabitants, most of whom removed to Kalāt territory.

In the next year Dashtyāri was still governed by Mīr Dīn Muhammad; Mīr Maulādād had recovered Qasrkand from Sardār Husain Khān; and in Gaih, on the death of Mīr Hōti in July 1887, his son Saiyid Muhammad had succeeded to the chiefship. The people of Gwatar had returned to their homes, and the place seemed to have regained its former comparative prosperity.

1888. In 1888 Sardār Husain Khān was dismissed by the Governor of Bampūr from the chiefship of Gaih, which he had usurped or to which he had been appointed in supersession of Saiyid Muhammad: the ostensible cause of his removal was failure to protect the British telegraph line. Saiyid Muhammad was reinstated.

Chahbār, which was held by Mīr Dīn Muhammad of Dashtyāri, was taken from him in 1890 and conferred on Sardār Husain Khān; but that restless individual was among the Balūch chiefs seized in the following year by the Prince Governor of Kirmān on a charge of sedition. He was imprisoned, and three of his adherents were blown from guns by the Prince's orders.

1894--96. Mīr Dīn Muhammad of Dashtyāri died in 1894 and was succeeded by his son 'Abdi Khān; but 'Abdi Khān's position was disputed by his brother Mahmūd Khān, and fighting ensued. In January 1896 it was reported that 2,000 people had emigrated from the district, and the British Indian traders of Chahbār complained that their trade was ruined.

British interests in the districts east of Jashk, 1872-1896.

Injury and compensation to British

The claims of British Indian subjects arising from events connected with the capture of Chahbar by the Persians in 1872 and their settle-

ment are noticed in an Annexure to the chapter on the history of the Indian sub-O'man Sultanate.

jects at Chahbar, 1872.

British Indian claims at Chahbar and in Dashtyāri, 1881-83.

Several British Indian subjects were sufferers by the incursion of Sardar Husain Khan into Dashtyari and the subsequent misrule of 'Abdullah Khān at Chahbār in 1881; and, on the representations of the British Legation at Tehran, a Persian official named Zain-ul-'Abidin was specially deputed to Makran to investigate their claims to compensation. This agent left Chahbar on the 22nd June 1882, promising to remit an indemnity of Rs. 3,396 within 20 days; but he did not do so, and it became necessary to remind the Persian Government. The Governor-General of Kirman visited Chahbar in February 1883, where he met Major Mockler, Assistant Political Agent, Gwadar, and offered to compromise the case by a payment of Rs. 2,000. The proposal was accepted by Major Mockler on behalf of the complainants, whereupon the Prince withdrew it and quitted Chahbar without making any settlement. The true amount of compensation due was then reported by Major Mockler to be Rs. 3,841; and the Persian Government, on being again approached by the British Minister at Tehran, directed their local officials to pay this amount. Arrangements were eventually made for the satisfaction of the claims; but the actual time and manner of their adjustment are not recorded. It was apparently in connection with this case that Mīr Dīn Muhammad of Dashtyāri incurred the displeasure of His Royal Highness the Nasir-ud-Dauleh and was fined 6,000 Tūmāns, as already related.

In September 1883 a British Indian trader named Khōjah 'Ali Bakhsh expired suddenly in Bāhu territory. The circumstances of his death were somewhat suspicious, and the property which he had in his possession at the time was seized by Mīr 'Abdun Nabi, a local notable. Mir Muhammad 'Ali, the hereditary chief of the district, was absent, having gone to Kirman to protest against the recent invasion of Bahu by Representations were made to the Persian Mīr Maulādād of Qasrkand. Government at Tehran with the result that in August 1885, after much delay, Rs. 408 was paid by Mir 'Abdun Nabi to a brother of the deceased Khōjah 'Ali Baksh.

About 1884 a British subject in Gaih, originally a Hindu and named Sher Singh, but who had become a Muhammadan some 18 years previously in order to marry a Muhammadan woman, was plundered and Satisfaction was obtained through the authorities.

About 1884 a slave named Doshambi escaped from Parag in Gaih and made his way to Karachi. In 1885, having taken service on a

British Indian case in Bāhu, 1883-85.

British Indian case in Gaih, about 1884.

Doshambi's case, 1885.

native vessel flying the British flag and bound from Karachi to Büshehr, he was seized at Chahbār from the vessel's small boat by his former master, the headman of Pārag. Demands for his release were addressed to the chief of Gaih and to the central Persian Government; and eventually the former, Mīr Hōti, on receipt of stringent orders through the Governor-General of Kirmān, sent his son to Chahbār to liberate the man.

Dharmu's case, 1888.

In January 1888, Dharmu, son of Mul Chand, a British Hindu trader, was "sold up, ruined, and subjected to cruel ill-treatment," apparently at Bampūr, by the Persian Governor of that place. The explanation was that the chief of Dizak, imprisoned by the Persian authorities for non-payment of revenue, had, after inducing the Hindu to become surety for payment and after conveying to him titles to certain date plantations and millet seed, repudiated the whole transaction. The local Persian officials sought to justify their action in the case; but a reference to the central Persian Government at Tehrān resulted, in December 1888, in the payment of Rs. 8,000 to Dharmu.

British official matters in Persian Makran, 1848-1896.

British political supervision of Persian Makrān affairs, 1863—96.

British military detachment at Jāskh, 1878—87. British political supervision over affairs in Persian Makrān was exercised from 1863 to 1879 through an Assistant Political Agent at Gwādar, and after 1879, through a native Agent at that place, who was generally under the orders of the Director of Persian Gulf telegraphs at Karachi. The affairs of the Gwādar Agency, it being situated outside Persian Makrān, belong to the history of the 'Omān Sultanate, in an Annexure to the chapter on which an account of them will be found.

It was decided in 1877 that a small Indian military guard should be posted at Jāshk for the protection of the telegraph station, and the strength originally prescribed was 12 men. There was a difficulty about accommodation at Jāshk, however, not overcome until the end of 1878, when temporary huts were erected. In 1879, in consequence of the transfer from Bāsīdu, for reasons of health, of the bulk of a company of the 21st Native Infantry sent there in the previous year, as mentioned in the history of the Persian Coast and Islands, the size of the Jāshk guard was increased greatly beyond what had been at first intended. Successive reductions in the British Agency guard at Gwādar in 1880, the superfluous men being withdrawn to Jāshk, raised the detachment at the latter place to about 90 rifles, a strength at which it remained fairly constant until its complete removal in 1887 in deference to the wishes of

the Shah, as already described. In 1881 the maintenance of permanent quarters occupied by the guard was undertaken by the Public Works Department.

We have already had occasion to notice the conclusion by Colonel Goldsmid in 1869 of arrangements with the principal chiefs of Persian Mākrān; by these they pledged themselves to protect the telegraph line and to render aid and certain special services to the telegraph officials. The subsidy allotted to the chief * of Gaih was Rs. 3,000 a year, and the region for which he was responsible was described as extending from Chāhbār to Sadaich. The chiefs of Dashtyāri and Bāhu, who were included in one Agreement, received Rs. 1,000 a year each, and the extent of their responsibility was from Chahbar to the Kalat frontier. subsidies were made payable from the 1st January 1869 in half-yearly instalments. Similar arrangements were concluded with the chiefs of Jāshk, but the allowances given them were smaller. †

Telegraph subsidies and other telegraph matters, 1868-94.

In 1873 a nephew of Mir 'Abdun Nabi, chief of Jashk, was arrested 1873. "for climbing a telegraph pole;" but a party of Baluch came and released him by force. The Assistant Political Agent, Gwadar, then sent for Mir 'Abdun Nabi; and, as he refused to appear, his subsidy was provisionally stopped. The case must have been in some way important, for orders were obtained from the Persian Central Government that the Deputy-Governor of Bandar 'Abbas should warn Mir 'Abdun Nabi and his people against damaging telegraph property: possibly the chief had given vent to threats.

The revolutions that often convulsed the interior and sometimes affect- 1881-82. ed the coast of Persian Makran occasioned, from time to time, doubts as to the proper recipients of the telegraph subsidies. Thus in 1881. when Mīr Dīn Muhammad was driven out of Dashtyāri, and in the following year, when Mir Muhammad Ali unwillingly resigned charge of Bāhu, claims were advanced by the usurpers of their places to the subsidies which the rightful chiefs had enjoyed. It would seem that these claims were coldly received, and it does not appear that the subsidies were ever paid to any but the two chiefs mentioned, who before long recovered the hereditary positions from which they had been ousted.

^{*} It was made payable, in the first instance, to the widow of the late chief, Mir 'Abdullah.

[†] The text of the Gaih and Dashtyāri-Bāhu Agreements will be found in Aitchison's Treaties, 4th edition, Vol. XI, (Baluchistan), pages 235-36. An account of the Jashk Agreement is given in the Official History of the Mekran Telegraph Line, page 97.

As an instance of the working of the subsidy system, it may be 1883. mentioned that the allowance of Mîr Hôti, chief of Gaih, for the first half-year of 1883 was placed in deposit instead of being paid to him, because he had taken no steps to punish Mūsa, a telegraph line guard and subject of his who had absconded with Rs. 636 belonging to the Government of India, most of which remained unrecovered, and because he had failed to pay up Rs. 144 due on account of camels, etc., stolen from line guards in his district. The chief was at first told that he must punish Mūsa and recover the balance of the missing property before any of the subsidy in deposit was paid him; but subsequently as he represented that the Persian authorities were pressing him for money, the Resident agreed that he might be given Rs. 1,000 out of

1888.

An attempt was made in 1888 by the Persian Governor of Bampur to divert one of the local telegraph subsidies to his own coffers. Having dismissed Sardar Husain Khan from the chiefship of Gaih, he in May informed the British authorities of the fact and of the appointment. instead of Husain Khan, of Saivid Muhammad, heir to the chiefship of Gaih, and of Mīr Maulādād, chief of Qasrkand, as revenue collectors. A request was added that the balance of the Gaih subsidy due might be sent him through Saivid Muhammad. This claim was the more unsustainable that the Persian Government already received, under the Convention of 1868, a payment of 3,000 Tumans a year on account of the Makran telegraph; and Colonel Ross, the Resident in the Persian Government. held strongly that the subsidy must be paid to the local chief direct, not to the Persian Governor, the only question being who should be considered the local chief. The Resident, after ascertaining that Saivid Muhammad had in fact been recognised as chief of Gaih by the Persian authorities, directed that the Gaih subsidy should be paid to him.

the instalment due, the remainder (Rs. 500) only being withheld until

he had procured or given satisfaction.

1894.

In the same manner, in 1894, on an intimation that Mīr Hoti had been appointed chief of Jashk in place of Mīr 'Abdun Nabi, the subsidy which had been held by the latter was transferred to his successor.

MUZAFFAR-UD-DĪN SHĀH, FROM 1896.*

General Persian administration of Persian Makran, 1896-1905.

Governor-Generalship of Kirman, 1896-1905.

The Farman-Farma resigned the Governor-Generalship of Kirman, under which Persian Makran was included, soon after the death of Nasir-

^{*}Almost the only authorities for events in Persian Wakrān during this period are Mr. J. A. Saldanha's *Precis of Mekran Affairs*, 1905, and the *Administration Reports* of the Persian Gulf Political Residency.

ud-Din Shāh; he appears to have been succeeded by the Asaf-ud-Dauleh. The Hisām-ul-Mulk governed the Kirman province at a later period, and was replaced in the spring of 1902 by the A'la-ul-Mulk.

The Persian Governorship of Bampur was retained by Zain-ul-'Abidīn, appointed in 1890, until 1897, when he was removed and one Sulaiman 1896—1905. Khān temporarily appointed in his place. General misgovernment and over taxation by Zain-ul-'Abidin, had contributed to bring about a general insurrection, which will later be described; and, the safety of British subjects and of the British telegraph having been seriously endangered by the rising, representations were made by the Hon'ble C. Hardinge, His Britannic Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran, which led to his recall. In 1900-1902 the Governor of Bampur was a certain Hashim Khan, whose Government was corrupt, and who failed to maintain any semblance of order, Hāshim Khan was followed by Mustafa Quli Khān (1902-03), Wāli Khān (1904), and the Zahīr-us-Sultān (1905).

Governorship of Bampur,

In 1901 an attempt was made by the Imperial Persian Customs to establish a post at Tank on the coast of the Gaih district, but it was opposed by the inhabitants and was not persisted in. At North Jashk, however, a post was duly inaugurated in 1902, and in the same year the customs of Chahbar and Gwatar, previously farmed to Indian contractors, were taken over by the Persian Government.

Imperial Persian Customs. 1901-02.

Administration and internal history of the districts of Persian Makrān, 1896—1905.

The chiefs of the Jashk district in 1899 were Mir 'Ali and Mir Jashk Mustafa, son of Mir 'Abdun Nabi, the former controlling the territory to the west, the latter that to the east of Jagin. Mir 'Ali died on the 1st May 1900 and was succeeded by his son Mir Höti, who was a distant cousin of Mir Mustafa. In 1904 Mir Mustafa was actively assisted by a younger brother, Mīr Barkat, in his administrative duties. In 1905 Mīr Barkat represented the interests of his family in Biyābān, events in which district during the period are noticed in the chapter on the history of the Persian Coast and Islands.

An annual tribute of 12 camels which had formerly been paid by the chiefs of Jashk to the Governor of the Gulf Ports had by this time been discontinued, apparently in consequence of the construction of a Persian fort at New Jashk, for the care and upkeep of which the chiefs were made responsible,

The Jashk district also continued to enjoy an exemption of old standing from payment of any ordinary revenue to the Persian Government.

Gaih district, 1896—1905.

At the beginning of the period Sardar Husain Khan seems to have been chief of Gaih, but in 1898, in circumstances which will be explained further on, he was superseded by Mir Mauladad of Qasrkand and his own son Sa'id Khan, whom the Persian authorities appointed joint chiefs of Gaih. This arrangement was evidently found unworkable and Sa'id Khān eventually became sole chief. In 1902 Sa'id Khān was displaced in favour of Mohim Khan, the son of Mir Hoti, a former chief of the district; but, having visited Kirman and spent some months there, not voluntarily it would seem, he was allowed in 1903, to resume the chiefship of Gaih on a greatly enhanced assessment. His first act on his return to power was to plunder and destroy property belonging to the adherents of Mohim Khan; and, as the revenue for which he had made himself responsible could not be recovered by usual means, he had recourse to a practice of moving about the country with a large armed retinue, to extort money. His followers committed unheard of oppressions, and inhabitants of the district even began to be sold by the chief as slaves. By these means Sa'id Khān became the strongest and most feared chief in Persian Makran; but a general exodus of the population rendered his financial responsibilities increasingly hard to meet. In 1905. instead of visiting the southern part of his dominions himself, he sent his nephew Islam Khan to collect the taxes on his behalf.

Qasrkand district, 1896—1905.

At midnight on the 22nd June 1899 Mauladād Khān, chief of Qasrkand, was assassinated at Bampūr, while sleeping in front of the Persian Governor's house. The actual murderer was captured and executed, but it was suspected that the crime had been instigated by Husain Khāu of Gaih. Jān Muhammad, a son of the deceased, at first succeeded to the chiefship of Qasrkand; but about a year later it was taken from him and conferred on Sardār Sa'īd Khān of Gaih, in whose possession it thereafter remained.

Dashtyari district, 1896—1905.

In 1898, Mīr 'Abdi Khān, the chief of Dashtyāri, was imprisoned by the Persian authorities at Kīrmān, charge of his district being handed over to Mauladād Khān of Qasrkand. 'Abdi Khān was released, however, after being detained for about a year, and returned to Dashtyāri in May 1899.

A claim to part of the district was maintained by 'Abdi Khān's brother Mahmūd Khān, who was of stronger character, hasty in temper, quick in action, commanding both respect and fear, and who enjoyed moreover the favour of Sa'īd Khān, chief of Gaih, who was his cousin.

Mutual raids by the brothers kept Dashtyāri in a constant turmoil, and even the interests of British subjects were affected. In 1902 Sa'īd Khān, having been appointed by the Persian Governor of Bampūr to be ruler over Dashtyāri, nominated Mahmūd Khān as his deputy on the spot. Mahmūd Khān greatly abused the power thus entrusted to him; he destroyed the property of his brother Mīr 'Abdi Khān, who was forced to take refuge at Chahbār, he committed various murders by way of enforcing respect for his authority, and he behaved generally in such a manner that Dashtyāri was quickly forsaken by most of its inhabitants. In 1904 an accommodation was reached between the brothers, who became virtually joint chiefs, and the state of the district then greatly improved.

It was reported, with reference to the year 1905, that the annual revenue of Dashtyāri was about Rs. 10,000 and was paid to the Persian Government through the chief of Gaih; also that Mīr 'Abdi and Mīr Mahmud, of whom the former had gone on pilgrimage, were both much more popular with their subjects than the chiefs of the adjoining districts with theirs.

Bāhu was ruled in 1899 by Mīr Ashraf Khān, a son of the former chief Mîr Muhammad 'Ali, who was by this time dead. In 1902, the chief of Gaih was invested with charge of Bāhu as well as of Dashtyāri and selected as his local deputy, Mir Ashraf having proved a weak ruler, a cousin of the latter named Mir Ahmad Khan. This individual obtained his appointment on the understanding that he should pay Sa'id Khān Rs. 3,000 on account of arrears, and that the annual revenue of the district should be increased by Rs. 1,500; but, though he treated his people with the greatest harshness, he was unable to fulfil his contract. After this Bahu was governed by Mir Ashraf and Mir Ahmad jointly and was reduced by misrule, aided by scarcity, from a prosperous district to a poverty-stricken and almost uninhabited waste. Many of the inhabitants emigrated to India, settling for the most part at Karāchi. In 1903 two thriving communities, one of Maids on the coast and another of Lattis in the interior, were driven out of Bāhu, of which they had been the financial mainstay. After being plundered at Gwatar, the Maids, who were fishermen, removed to Jīwnri; but Mīr Ahmad Khān, having obtained the connivance of the Nāzim of Makrān, pursued them thither with his exactions, obliging them to seek an asylum at Gwādar. The Lattis, who were cattle owners and cultivators, found it necessary to emigrate to Palairi in the Gwadar district, where some of them settled.

Bāhu district. 1896—1905. In 1905 the annual assessment of Bāhu was about Rs. 6,000; but nothing had been paid to the Persian Government for some years. In September of that year the chiefs were summoned to Bampur, whence Mīr Ahmad Khān was allowed to return home for the purpose of collecting the revenue in arrear, while Mīr Ashraf Khān was detained by the Persian Governor as security for its payment.

General history of Persian Makran, 1896-1905.

Anarchy in Persian Makrān, 1896-1897.

In 1896-1897 disorder became generally prevalent in Persian Makrān; it appeared to be due partly to the death of Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shah, concerning whom there was a local prophecy that he would be the last of his line, partly to the departure the Farman-Farma, who had governed the Kirman province with considerable strength for a number of years, partly to distress caused by scarcity and overtaxation, and partly to other causes. It was thought by some authorities that the tribal rising on the North-West Frontier of India in 1897, and even the victories of the Turks over the Greeks in that year, had had an unsettling effect on Muhammadan feeling even in Persian Makran; but this theory was not clearly established. The troubles finally assumed the shape of a rebellion against the Persian Central Government, which was headed by Sardar Husain Khān of Gaih. This chief had more than once made overtores for support, which were repelled, to the British authorities; and it was undoubtedly his ambition to found an independent Baluch principality in Persian Makran, similar to that of Kalat.

An inconvenient result of the general anarchy was that in places the executive power came into dispute between rivals, each of whom demanded that the subsidy paid by the British Government for protection of the telegraph line in the district should be awarded to himself. Among the means resorted to by claimants of subsidies for enforcing their views were insolent threats, and even attacks, upon British Indian subjects and their property; the Dashtyāri subsidy for the first-half of 1896 was paid to one chief; that for the second-half to another; and the position of the Telegraph Superintendent at Chahbār became difficult and full of anxiety. H. M. S. "Sphinx" was at one time sent to Chahbār to assure the safety of British subjects there; and remonstrances were addressed to the Persian Government, but with no result except that of demonstrating the absolute powerlessness of the

Tehrān authorities in Makrān. In January 1897, at the desire of His Britannic Majesty's Minister in Persia, the Resident in the Persian Gulf visited Chahbār in the R. I. M. S. "Lawrence" with a view to his influence being exerted on the turbulent local chiefs whom the Shāh's Government could not control; but he failed to secure a meeting with any of them. In April 1897, Old Jāshk was raided by a Balūchi gang, and British Indian traders were robbed of property valued at Rs. 5,000. Representations concerning this incident were made to the Persian Government, in consequence of which the Persian gunboat "Persepolis" was despatched to Jāshk to restore order, and a garrison of 100 Persian infantry with guns was installed at New Jāshk.

Such partial measures, however, were of no avail; and, at the end of 1897, a culminating outrage which occurred near the coast brought matters to a crisis. Mr. Graves, Acting Superintendent in the Indo-European Telegraph Department, an elderly man with long experience of Persia, had pitched his camp, in the course of an annual tour of inspection from Jāshk, at a place half a mile east of the Rāpch river where the Jāshk-Gwādar telegraph line crosses it. On the night of the 2nd December 1897 a gang of about 20 Kārwāri Balūchis attacked the camp and barbarously murdered Mr. Graves with swords, the fatal blow being struck by Malik Ghind-bin-Shāh Baig, a headman of the Shāhūzai tribe.

The sole motive of the crime was plunder; and the robbers, after destroying Mr. Graves' tents, carried off all that they found in the camp including a considerable sum of money which was for distribution in wages to the telegraph staff, upon the camels of the deceased officer.

Mr. Graves had established telephonic communication bet ween his camp and Jāshk and the occurrence consequently became known the next day to Colonel Meade, the Political Resident at Būshehr. His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehrān, on receiving news of it, impressed upon the Persian Government the necessity of immediate action, at the same time instructing the Resident to proceed himself to the spot, hold a local enquiry, and watch the proceedings, but enjoining him to leave measures for the capture and punishment of the offenders entirely to the Persian authorities.

The action of the Persian Government in the case was unusually prompt. On the 6th December the Persian gunboat "Persepolis," with the Darya-Baigi or Naval Commander-in-Chief and 80 Persian troops on board, sailed from Büshehr. H. M. S. "Pigeon" followed, carrying Captain Sykes, His Britannic Majesty's Consul for Kirmān and

Murder of Mr. Graves and Persian military operations in Makrān under British Superintendence, 1897-98. Persian Balüchistan, and Mr. R. Campbell, the successor of Mr. Graves. On the 12th December the "Persepolis" reached Galag, the landing place for the Rapch neighbourhood, the Persian troops were at once disembarked and marched to the scene of the outrage, where they were joined on the 16th by Captain Sykes, Mr. Campbell, and a party of 30 bluejackets under Lieutenant Mowbray, commanding the "Pigeon." Colonel Meade, the Resident, with Major Fagan, the British Consul at Masgat, arrived off Galag in the "Lawrence" on the 18th; they reached the Rapch camp on the following day. Meanwhile the Persian force, accompanied by Captain Sykes and by Lieutenant Mowbray with his naval detachment, had advanced into the portion of the Kärwän district lying to the west of the Rapch river, and a slight encounter with tribesmen of the locality had taken place. Colonel Meade, after interviewing some village headmen and recording such evidence as was available, proceeded with an escort consisting of 30 bluejackets under Lieutenant Carr of H. M. S. "Lapwing" to overtake the Persian expedition. On the 26th December Gāo was reached, a village at the entrance of the hills. the despatch box of the late Mr. Graves was found, two hamlets were burned, and a trifling night attack by Kārwānis was repulsed without any loss to the force. On the following day the Persians commenced destroying the date plantations of Gao; but, a message having been received from Sa'id Khān,son of Sardar Husain Khān of Gaih, to the effect that he would deliver up the actual criminals within a month, the Darya Baigi decided on the advice of Colonel Meade to suspend the infliction of further Sa'id Khan's promise was not, however, redeemed. Colonel Meade, accompanied by Major Fagan, left Galag on the 31st December for Masqat, where important affairs required their immediate presence; but Mr. Campbell remained in camp upon the Rapch river, a small party of British bluejackets and some sepoys of the Bombay Marine Battalion being left for his protection. The country had, from the commencement of the operations, been deserted by its inhabitants, who retired into the broken waterless hills to the northward; but the Persian force continued in touch with them, and in January 1898 a skirmish took place in which the Darya Baigi was wounded, losing the tips of two fingers.

In the meantime disturbances had broken out within a short distance of Chahbār; and on the 9th January 1898, a detachment of 150 rifles of the Bombay Marine Battalion was despatched from India. On arrival 40 were posted at Chahbār and 40 at Jāshk under Native Officers, while the remainder under Captain Creagh and Lieutenant Waller were employed to strengthen Mr. Campbell's camp on the Rāpch.

On the 13th February H. M. Ss. "Pigeon," "Cossack", and "Sphinx" being then assembled at Galag, Commander Baker, B. N., landed 103 British bluejackets and marines from them and marched to the Rapch camp. The Persian force had meanwhile been increased by reinforcements to a strength of 300; and there were thus 500 men with two machine guns available for active operations, if the British were allowed to assist the Persians. The Darya Baigi, however, had received orders on the 12th February to remain strictly on the defensive and await another Persian force which was moving towards him from the north; and the Government of India, who considered that the whole responsibility for what was done should be borne by the Persian Government, prohibited the use of the Indian troops except for the defence of Mr. Campbell's camp. Commander Baker's party, in the landing of which the British political authorities had not concurred was consequently re-embarked; and on the part of the Darya Baigi no further military movements took place. The prolonged sojourn of the mixed force in the district had, nevertheless, an excellent effect in Kārwān and beyond: the Persian troops, it may be remarked, would certainly not have remained so long as they did but for the presence of Mr. Campbell and his escort. On the 10th March the naval detachment with Mr. Campbell was relieved by 50 additional sepoys of the Marine Battalion. The Darva Baigi finally sailed for Bushehr on the 29th May, and thereafter no troops, either Indian or Persian, remained in Kārwān.

The proceedings of the Northern Persian force, by which the settlement was really effected, deserve mention. At the end of 1897, as already mentioned, there were serious disturbances about Bampūr and the chief of Gaih was in rebellion against the Persian Government. The Asaf-ud-Dauleh, Governor-General of Kirmān, having been ordered to march into Mākrān and suppress the rising in co-operation with the Darya Baigi, did eventually reach Bampūr without encountering any resistance; but the movements of his force were extremely tardy, and beyond that point he would not proceed. Captain Sykes, who in February was sent viá Bandar 'Abbās to hasten the movements of the Governor-General, was unfortunately taken ill before reaching Bampūr and returned by land to Chāhbar early in April; but his mission, though not completed, had apparently the effect of stimulating the Asaf-ud-Dauleh to further action. Troops were despatched southwards from Bampūr under Lutf Ullah Baig, a military officer; and this commander,

after deposing Sardār Husain Khan, the rebellious chief of Gaih, in favour of Mauladād Khān, who already governed Qasrkand, proceeded against the Kārwānis. In April 1898 Malik Ghind, the principal assailant of Mr. Graves, was killed in resisting capture; another of the gang was taken prisoner and subsequently executed at Jāshk; a third, who surrendered protesting his innocence, was sent in chains to Būshehr and only two out of five ringleaders remained at large. Lutf Ullah Baig ultimately visited the Darya Baigi near the coast before the latter's departure.

In acknowledgment of their services on the expedition, thus brought to a close, the Darya Baigi received a presentation sword, and Lutf Ullah Baig a presentation rifle, from the Government of India.

A claim for £5,000, to be paid as compensation to Mr. Graves' widow, was preferred by the British Legation at Tehran early in 1898; but it was contested by the Persian Government. His Britannic Majesty's Government founded their demand on the responsibility of the Shah's Government, under treaty, for the safety of British telegraph employés in Persia, and on the fact that Mr. Graves' murder was the result of anarchy which the Persian Government, notwithstanding remonstrances, had left unchecked during many months. The Persian Government, on their part, objected that Mr. Graves was not their servant but the servant of the British Government, and had therefore no claim on them, and that the amount demanded was excessive. The claim continued to be brought forward at intervals until 1903, but it was not strongly pressed, and it ultimately remained unsatisfied. effectual punitive action taken by the Persian Government in the case inclined the British authorities to treat them with consideration.

State of affairs near Chahbār, 1901—1903. In 1901-1902 the country near Chahbār was seriously disturbed by the violence, already described, of Mīr Mahmūd of Dashtyāri, who had not then succeeded in establishing his title to be regarded as chief of the district jointly with Mīr 'Abdi. Mīr Mahmūd had once refused to accept a portion of the Dashtyāri telegraph subsidy; but he was, nevertheless, annoyed when he found himself altogether excluded from participation in it; and the resentment which he felt against the British Government was increased by the seizure at Chahbr, in August 1900, of 6 Martini-Henry carbines which he was endeavouring to import. In the end he openly declared his intention of harassing British interests to the utmost of his ability; and in September 1901, in pursuance of his threat, he succeeded, though the Persian Government had enjoined their representative at Bampūr

to take all measures necessary for restraining him, in plundering several villages near Chahbar and in carrying off some camels and donkeys belonging to British Indian traders and to the Telegraph Department's employés. In May 1902, trouble still continuing in the neighbourhood of Chahbar, representations were made by His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran to the Persian Government concerning the deplorable state of Makran. It was suggested by the British Minister that Mīr Mahmūd, as also Sa'īd Khān of Gaih, who was known to be countenancing his proceedings, should be arrested and punished, recourse being had, if necessary, to a military expedition; but nothing was done. Mustafa Quli Khān, the Persian Governor, detained Sa'id Khān for a time at Bampur and made him pay heavily for being let go, but he did not require him to put an end to the troubles at Chahbar.

In 1902-08 the political unrest was aggravated by a severe drought which affected all the coast districts from Jashk to Gwadar.

Two pernicious developments of the period in Persian Makran were the growth of a trade with Masqat in modern rifles and ammunition, beginning soon after 1898, and the appearance in 1903 of the slave 1905. trade in a novel form. These matters are fully dealt with in the appropriate Appendices.

Arms trade and slavetrade, 1898-

The state of Persian Makrān in 1905 was still generally disordered and unprosperous. Major Cox, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, observed with reference to it:

State of Pesian Makrān, 1905.

This tract is the Ultima Thule of the Shah's territory, and, inhabited as it is by an alien race with strong Bedouin instincts and a rooted antipathy to its Persian overlords, it is hardly surprising that the administrative control exercised over it by the Central Government is of the slenderest character; and in the result the povertystricken country, often racked as it is from year to year with the miseries of famine, becomes a cock-pit of petty inter-tribal dissension and rapine, based usually on the rivalries of the petty "Mirs" who are incessantly struggling for mastery one over the other.

British relations with Persian Makran, 1896—1905.

British interests in Persian Makran have been touched on, incidentally, above: it remains to take a general survey of the effects upon them of the anarchy that prevailed.

The claim made on the Persian Government in connection with the British murder of Mr. Graves has already been discussed, but it did not stand and cases.

1896-1905. alone; the disturbances of 1896-97 gave rise to a large crop of claims by British subjects for compensation on account of losses suffered.

The settlement of these was begun at Chahbār in 1899 by Mr. Sealy, Director of the Persian Gulf Telegraphs, and a Persian Mamūr who was deputed to meet him; but the Persian official gave no real assistance, and progress was hampered by various obstacles,—among them the wilful departure of Sa'īd Khān, chief of Gaih, from Chahbār on the approach of the Mamūr, and the unavoidable absence of Mīr 'Abdi, chief of Dashtyāri, who was then a prisoner at Bampūr in the hands of the Persian authorities, and whose brother Mīr Mahmūd refused to give any help. Mauladād Khān, chief of Qasrkand, however, whom the Persian Governor had appointed chief of Gaih jointly with Sa'īd Khān, attended and did what he could to facilitate a settlement; and by his instrumentality some claims relating to the Dashtyāri district, of which the amount was nearly Rs. 7,000, were liquidated in May 1899.

1900. In March 1900 Mr. Whitby Smith, the Director of Persian Gulf Telegraphs, met Hāshim Khān, Governor of Bampūr, Sa'īd Khān of Gaih, and Mīr 'Abdi of Dashtyāri at Chahbār and discussed a number of the outstanding claims with them; but a balance of Rs. 22,881 claimed remained unadjusted; and, though the Persian Government promised to send a Mamūr to Chahbār at the end of the year to continue the proceedings, no such official made his appearance.

1901. In April 1901 the amount of the British claims in Persian Makrān had risen to Rs. 36,823 inclusive of Rs. 3,000 demanded on account of the murder of a Hindu who had been agent at Gwatar for a Karachi firm. A few claims were settled locally, but nothing was done by the Persian Government towards effecting a general clearance, and the total of the bill continued to be increased by fresh occurrences.

1902. Similarly during 1902 no progress was made, and fresh claims were constantly preferred.

1903. In April 1908 the value of the British claims outstanding had reached Rs. 48,221, and still no arrangements for a settlement were made by the Persian Government.

1904. In April 1904 a meeting at last took place at Chahbar between Wali Khan, Governor of Bampur, and a Persian Mamur named 'Ali Khan, Akram-us-Saltaneh, on the one side, and Mr. R. Campbell of the Indo-European Telegraph Department on the other, at which claims amounting to Rs. 81,783 were investigated. Some cases were thrown out and others postponed but decrees aggregating Rs. 24,660 were passed and

bonds for payment given. A further settlement to the extent of Rs. 3,002 was effected in the course of the year. The claim in the Gwatar murder case was among those rejected: that case seems to have been an old one dating from 1898.

In April 1905 there was another conference at Chahbar, the Nazim 1905. of Kalāt Makrān meeting there with the Zahīr-us-Sultān, Governor of Bampur, the Ittila'ud-Dauleh, Karguzār of Muhammereh, and a special Persian Mamur. The bill presented by the Nazim on this occasion was for Rs. 52,557. At the conclusion of the proceedings cases to the value of Rs. 37,262 still remained unsettled, but a further adjustment of Rs. 3,513 was obtained after the conference.

British official matters in Persian Makran, 1896-1905.

At the end of 1898 it was decided to modify the system on which payments had hitherto been made by the British authorities to local chiefs in Persian Makran in consideration of their protecting the telegraph line and rendering assistance to employés of the Indo-European Telegraph Department. Minor cases of damage to the line and of theft of property from members of the line establishment had become frequent in Gaih and Dashtyāri; in the former district, moreover Mr. Graves, a high local telegraph official, had been brutally murdered; and the Gaih subsidy had ceased to benefit the chief of the district, the Persian Government having virtually transferred it to themselves by adding its amount to their revenue demand on Gaih,-a circumstance which sufficiently explained the apathy now shown by the chief in telegraph matters.

Telegraph subsidy arrangements, 1898 -1905.

The object of the new arrangements, introduced in 1899 with the sanction of His Majesty's Government and the concurrence of the Government of India, was to ensure that the payments should benefit the men of local influence on whom the protection of the telegraph line really depended. In the Jashk and Bahu districts no change seems to have been made; but the allowance of the chief of Gaih was reduced from Rs. 3,000 to Rs. 1,000 a year, the greater part of the Rs. 2,000 thus saved being distributed among 9 minor chiefs of the district whose jurisdictions were on the coast; and the Dashtyari allowance of Rs. 1,000 a year was broken up, nearly half of it being similarly divided among minor chiefs. An agreement was signed by the new recipients in Gaih and Dashtyāri,and also it would seem by all former recipients except the chief of Gaih,

1899.

—in which they accepted the new arrangements and undertook to afford all necessary protection and assistance to the Indo-European Telegraph Department in return for half-yearly allowances, styled henceforth "presents" instead of subsidies, to be paid them in April and November, and to be withheld by the Director of Persian Gulf Telegraphs at his discretion in case of their failing to perform their duties efficiently.

The principal Gaih allowance of Rs. 1,000 a year was paid to Sa'īd Khān, as chief of Gaih, from the beginning of 1899 to the end of 1901. Its amount for the first-half of 1902 was forfeited and paid away to members of the line establishment in compensation for camels stolen. The recipient from July 1902 to June 1903 was Mohim Khān, who acted for those 12 months as chief of Gaih during the detention of Sa'īd Khān at Bampūr. From July 1903 the allowance was again paid to Sa'īd Khan, who had returned.

In Dashtyāri Mīr 'Abdi's share of the district allowance, which was at the rate of Rs. 600 a year, for the six months ending with December 1903 as also for the period from July 1904 to October 1905, was confiscated and handed over to telegraph employés in compensation for losses suffered.

The Bāhu allowance was permanently divided in 1902 between the joint chiefs of the district, Rs. 400 being awarded to Mīr Ashraf, originally sole chief, and Rs. 600 to his predominant partner Mīr Ahmad, Mīr Ahmad's share was placed under stoppage from July 1905 on account of camels looted from telegraph servants.

British
political
Establishment in
Persian
Makrān,
1896—1905.

Throughout this period, as during the latter of the part of the preceding one, British political interests in Persian Makrān were in charge of the Director of Persian Gulf Telegraphs, whose head-quarters were at Karāchi, and who was subordinate in political matters to the Resident in the Persian Gulf. He received an allowance of Rs. 150 a month on account of his political duties, and was locally represented by the European officials in charge of the telegraph stations at Jāshk and Chahbār. His political duties were defined as comprising maintenance of the rights of the Sultān of 'Omān at Gwādar, on the confines of Persian Makrān; the settlement of cases between British subjects and Persian, Kalāt, and 'Omān subjects; the payment of the telegraph allowances assigned to chiefs in Persian Makrān; and the investigation of general matters in which the British Government was interested, such as the arms trade and the slave trade.

British Vice-Consul at In the chapter on the history of the Persian Coast and Islands it is explained that in 1901 the British Government desired to establish a British

Vice-Consulate at Bampur for the protection of British subjects in Bam, Persian Makran, but that, in consequence of the opposition of the Persian Government, the idea was abandoned and a Vice-Consulate at Bam substituted, by means of which, though not so directly or fully, it was hoped that the same objects might be attained, besides others. The first nominee to Bam was an Indian Muhammadan, Khan Bahadur Asghar 'Ali, originally of the Survey Department, who joined his post in 1905, but unfortunately died in it in October of the same year from pleurisy or pneumonia.

It will be recalled that a British military guard of Indian infantry had been maintained at Jashk, for the protection of the Telegraph Station, from 1878 to 1887; but that it was removed in the latter year, in deference to the wishes of the Shah.

British military guards at Jashk, and Chahbār, 1898-1905.

In January 1898, in consequence of the murder of Mr. Graves and the generally unsettled state of the country, 150 rifles of the Bombay Marine Battalion under two British officers, of whom 100 were to be located at Chahbar and 50 at Jashk, were despatched from India. No objection was made by the Persian Government. In April the Chahbar detachment was reduced to fifty rifles under a Native Officer, and that at Jashk was placed on the same footing. As the presence of these guards had an excellent effect in giving confidence at both places, they were not withdrawn on the subsidence of the troubles which were the original cause of there being instituted, and permanent barracks were provided at Jāshk and Chahbār.

Foreign relations other than British with Persian Makran, 1886—1905.

As explained elsewhere the only European power besides Britain that showed an interest in Persian Makran during the period was Russia, who had no established interests there. The chief evidences of her attention being turned to the country were the *arrival of a Russian railway reconnaissance party at Chahbar in June 1900, and a visit by M. Zaroudni, a Russian political agent.

^{*} Vide pages 331 and 1761 ante.

APPENDIX A.

METEOROLOGY AND HEALTH IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION.*

In the present Appendix, as climatic conditions vary within considerable limits from one part of the Gulf to another, and as the subject of meteorology has been dealt with exhaustively in a number of published authorities, it appears unnecessary to do more than give an outline of the principal facts.

General Climatology.

The Persian Gulf lies almost outside the region of the south-western Absence of monsoon, and its climate is not much affected by that phenomenon the south-except indirectly; on the Arabian side, within Rās-al-Hadd, the monsoon western monis not felt at all; while on the opposite or Makrān coast the monsoon rains soon. do not extend further west than Ormārah, and, though the monsoon wind is not unfelt to the west of Gwādar, it reaches Jāshk in the form only

^{*}The chief sources of information are the following: the Persian Gulf Pilot, 1898, especially the sections "Winds" (pages 5-12), "Climate and Weather" (pages 12-19), and "Health" (page 24); the Annual Summaries of the Meteorological Department of the Government of India, containing abstracts of the observations recorded at their stations at Masqat, Manāmah (Bahrain), Kuwait, Basrah, Baghdād, Muhammareh, Būshehr, and Jāshk; a collection of reports, dealing with climate and weather from the point of view of military operations, forming enclosures to a letter No. 798, dated 21st April 1907, from the Resident in the Persian Gulf to the Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, and dealing with Masqat, Bahrain, Kuwait, Northern 'Arabistān, Southern 'Arabistān, Rūshehr and Bandar 'Abbās; an article, Climatology of Southern and Western Asia, by Mr. W. L. Dallas of the Meteorological Department of the Government of India in the proceedings of the Chicago Congress of August 1893, Meteorological Section, pages 672-686; and a lecture on Weather and Warfare, delivered by the same under the auspices of the United Service Institution of India and contained in the Journal of the Institution for October 1904, pages 334-347; Remarks on the Climate of Bushire in the Persian Gulf Administration Report for 1877-78, and remarks under the head "Observatory" in the same for 1880-81, both by Colonel E. C. Ross. Resident in the Persian Gulf; and an article, Medical Topography of Muscat, by Surgeon A. S. G. Jayakar, in the Administration Report for 1876-77. Information regarding the climate of particular tracts and localities, in some cases with special reference to health, will be found in the following articles in the Geographical Volume of this Gazetteer: "'Omān Sultanate" (page 1388), "Dhufār District" (page 443), "Trucial 'Omān" (page 1431), "Bahrain Principality" (pages 236-7).

of a light south-easterly breeze. The south-eastern coasts of 'Omān, however, outside the Gulf, are fully exposed to the monsoon, which is there the principal climatic factor, especially in Dhufār.

Air currents.

The general trend of air currents at most seasons of the year, in the region chiefly under consideration, is apparently down the Gulf from north-west to south-east; this is attributable in winter to the outflow from a high-pressure area over Central Europe, and in summer to the existence of a low-pressure area over the Gulf itself, Balūchistān and the Indus Valley. It is noticeable that, after the south-west monsoon in the Arabian Sea has begun to blow across the mouth of the Gulf of 'Om n, a strong and steady flow of air down the Persian Gulf, which during the two previous months was very noticeable, is almost immediately checked.

Seasons.

Principal seasons.

The seasons of the Persian Gulf are those generally characteristic of the temperate zone, namely a fine summer and a wet winter; the hot season may be said to extend from the beginning of May to the end of October, and the cold from the middle of November to the middle of March, the remaining periods being transitional.

Subdivisions of the seasons.

From the middle of May to the middle of July the heat is intense, but is moderated, at the upper end of the Gulf, by a constantly blowing Shamal or north-west wind. From the middle of July to the middle of August the heat is very oppressive, owing to the stillness of the atmosphere and to excessive moisture. Bad weather generally begins after the middle of December, and January and February are cold and boisterous months.

Winds.

Shamal and Barih.

The prevailing wind in the Persian Gulf is undoubtedly the Shamāl Jum or north-wester, by which, as already mentioned, a part of the hot season is rendered more tolerable. In May, June and July, when the Shamāl blows most steadily, it is known as the Bārih; and

[&]quot;Kuwait Bay and Town" (page 1051), "Turkish 'Irāq" (page 766), "Baghdād City" (page 198), "Basrah Town" (page 271), "Fāo" (pages 541-2), "Northern 'Arabistān" (page 152), 'Southern 'Arabistān" (page 159), "Būshehr Peninsula" (page 313), "Būshehr Town" (page 343), "Bandar 'Abbās" (pages), "Jāshk (1)" (page 915), "Chahbār Town" (page 353), "Gwādar District" (pages 586-7) and "Gwādar Town" (page 589). A few data relating to climate will be found also in the following articles in the Geographical Volume: "Qatar" (pages 1506-7), "Hasa Oasis" (page 644), "Qatif Oasis" (page 1536), "Southern Najd" (page 1354), "Qasim" (page 1487), "Jabal Shammar" (page 1736), "Līrāvi" (page 1101), "Rūdhileh District" (page 1595), "Angāli" (page 79), "Shabānkāreh" (page 1686), "Mazāra'i District" (page 1202), "Zīra" (page 1943), "Dashtistān" (page 380), "Dashti" (page 368), "Lingeh District" (page 1088), and "Shamīl District" (page 1701).

the time of the Barih is by some divided into two periods, the first, which covers 20 days, being called the Barih-al-Ward بارح الورد or "Rose Barih," while the second, of 40 day's duration, is known as the "Bārih-al-Mishmish" بارج المشمش or "Apricot Bārih". Natives believe that failure of the Barih necessarily results in a failure of rain during the ensuing winter, and there are some recorded instances which

corroborate this theory.

Perhaps the next most prevalent and distinctive wind is the Qaus Other winds. or south-easter, which in winter alternates with the Shamal. Other winds are the Na'shi نعشى or north-easter, which blows strongly in the Gulf of 'Oman, especially in winter, and during which the Batınah coast is a dangerous lee-shore; the Suhaili or south-wester, which is much dreaded by native mariners as it strikes nearly all the sheltered anchorages on the Persian coast; and the Yāhi ياهي and Bahri بحري, winds blowing from the north-north-east and east respectively.

Temperature.

The difference in temperature between the northern and southern ends Variations of the Gulf is considerable: at the southern end it never freezes, and according to snow is not seen except on distant mountains; but in Turkish 'Iraq strong locality.

frosts are experienced, and snow has been known to fall at Bushehr.

The highest absolute temperatures are probably experienced in 'Iraq, Heat. where the thermometer has been known to reach 123° F. at Baghdad, 113° F. at Basrah and 116° F at Fāo; but the heat is most felt in the lower part of the Gulf, on account of the moisture with which the atmosphere is laden, and it is perhaps more unbearable at Bandar 'Abbās than anywhere else. In the middle of summer most of the inhabitants of that town, as also those of the Ruus-al-Jibal coast on the Arabian side, migrate to other places in search of a more endurable climate; and in August 1905, at an elevation of 2,700 feet above the sea behind Bandar 'Abbas, the thermometer averaged 105° F., and even more, between 9 A.M and 6 P.M.; yet the highest temperature registered at Bandar 'Abbas in 1906-07 was only 108° F., in the month of May. It is said that the highest sea temperatures in the world are those registered off the Persian coast near Lingeh, where in July and August the sea water frequently remains at a temperature of 94° F.

'Iraq, the hottest of the districts, is also the coldest, and a reading of Cold.

less than 19° F. has been obtained at Baghdad.

Rainfall and humidity.

The rainfall in the Persian Gulf region is extremely light and the Distribution following table shows the apparent average, in inches, at the places of rain. where observations have been recorded:-

Arabian side.	Head of the Gulf.	Persian side.
Bahrain, 31.	Baghdād, 9.	Būshehr, 12.
Masgat, 3 to 6.	Basrah, 6.	Jāshk, 4½.
	Fāo, 2 to 4.	Chahbar, 5 to 6.

Rainy season.

Rain is almost confined to the winter months and apparently hardly ever falls before the middle of October or after the middle of May most of it appears to be received in the months of December, January and February.

Humidity.

The humidity of the atmosphere, which in most places must depend on evaporation from the sea and not on rainfall, is very considerable; at Baghdad, which is at a long distance from the Gulf, the mean annual humidity is only 56 per cent. of saturation; but in Bahrain, which is an island, it is over 79 per cent.

Health.

Moderate healthiness of the Gulf, except Bandar 'Abbās and neighbour-hood.
Unhealthy. seasons and diseases.

The climate of the Gulf, though during several months in the year it is extremely disagreeable to Europeans, does not appear to be more than usually unhealthy; but exception must be made of Bandar 'Abbās and its neighbourhood, where the mortality among the few Europeans from time to time resident has during the last three centuries been remarkable.

The cold weather, though less unpleasant to the feelings, appears to be more unhealthy than the hot; but at some places, as for instance at Bandar 'Abbās, sickness is most prevalent in the transitional seasons of spring and autumn. Malarial fever is the principal enemy, both of natives and Europeans; and the discomforts of summer are aggravated to the latter by prickly heat and boils. Crews of ships serving continuously in a hot part of the Gulf during the summer are liable to become, to a large extent, ineffective through physical exhaustion.

Meteorological history.

The following facts, dissociated as they are from scientific observations, are of little value except as illustrating some aspects of weather and climate in the Gulf, and especially deviations from the normal course of events. In the Persian Gulf region weather is a subject of great commercial importance, for trade, apart from the pearl fisheries, depends chiefly on agriculture, and agriculture is here almost altogether dependent upon local meteorological conditions, especially rainfall.

1873-74.* The year was stormy and therefore unfavourable to the pearl fishery; but the rainfall in Southern Persia was abundant.

1874-75. This was a calm year; but in 'Oman heavy and unseasonable rains did much damage to the date-crop.

^{*} The years in this paragraph run from the beginning of April in one calendar year to the end of March in the next.

- 1875-76. The rainfall generally was in great excess of the normal, but with beneficial results.
- 1877-78. In 'Oman the rainfall was abnormally great, and heavy floods occurred, but the effects were good.
- 1878-79. The winter rains of this year were deficient in Southern Persia, and extremely so in 'Omān.
- 1879-80. Winter rain in Southern Persia was scanty: in 'Oman almost none was received.
- 1880-81. In Southern Persia the rainfall in autumn and winter was unusually good, and fears of a famine, which had begun to be entertained, were dispelled. In 'Omān large quantities of rain fell, and the damage done by drought in the two preceding years was to a great extent repaired; some damage, however, was done by hail.
- 1883-84. There were heavy gales in the spring of 1884, occasioning several wrecks. In 'Omān heavy rain fell in February 1884 and floods occurred.
- 1884-85. In this year the rainfall in Southern Persia was unprecedentedly copious. In 'Omān, on the 30th of March 1885, a hurricane struck the Bātinah coast between Sīb and Masna'ah and travelled inland as far as Rustāq, causing some loss of life and destroying many thousands of date palms; simultaneously heavy rain fell over all 'Omān, by which crops, trees and houses were washed away and immense damage done.
- 1885-86. In April 1886 a furious gale blew at Bandar 'Abbās, the town was inundated by the sea, and much property was destroyed. In the same year the seaport towns of Manāmah and Muharraq in Bahrain were flooded and many houses destroyed.
- 1886-87. Good rains fell in Persian Makrān.
- 1887. In Turkish 'Irāq the local rainfall was deficient, but damage was done by flooded rivers.
- 1888-90. The summer heat at Būshehr was unusually trying in 1888, and the following winter was exceptionally free from gales. The same conditions recurred in 1889-90. In Turkish 'Irāq, in 1889, the rainfall was copious, but it came too late.
- 1890-91. In Southern Persia the rainfall was excellent. In June 1890 a cyclone, accompanied by a high tidal wave, did much damage to the town of Masqat; and the date crop in the neighbourhood suffered. In January 1891 a heavy storm struck the coast of Trucial Omān, unroofing houses, blowing down date trees, wrecking vessels at sea, and destroying boats on the beach.

- 1891-92. The rainfall on the coast of Trucial 'Omān was extremely deficient.
- 1892-93. The summer of 1892 on the Persian coast was long and trying, and in the following winter there were heavy gales; an exceptionally severe one, which occurred on the 17th of November, was accompanied by hail and did much damage. Rainfall was deficient in Southern Persia.
- 1893-94. In December 1893 a storm, accompanied by heavy rain, passed over 'Arabistān, and the Kārūn rose 20 feet at Ahwāz and remained in flood till the beginning of January; much country was inundated. In March 1894 heavy rain was experienced in Bahrain, where many houses collapsed. Rain and floods did immense damage in Fārs.
- 1895-96. There was good rain, early in 1895, in Turkish 'Irāq; in 1896 unparalleled inundations were caused there by the Euphrates and Tigris, and great destruction of crops took place. In Southern Persia rainfall was remarkably deficient, especially about Lingeh and Bandar 'Abbās; but near Lingeh, just as distress was becoming acute, the situation was improved by abundant rain in March 1896.
- 1896-97. Drought prevailed in Southern Persia.
- 1898-99. On the 3rd of June 1898 a disastrous cyclone passed over Masqat and the adjacent parts of 'Omān; small craft were destroyed in great numbers along the coast; and thousands of date palms and other trees were uprooted by the storm.
- 1900-02. The rainfall in Turkish 'Iraq was deficient; and at Bandar 'Abbas, on the 12th March 1902, there had been practically no rain for a year.
- 1902-04. The winter rains in Southern Persia were good.
- 1904-05. The winter was unusually cold and severe, and on the morning of the 29th of January 1905 ice was observed at Bandar 'Abbās.
- 1905-06. Floods occurred in Turkish 'Irāq. In Northern 'Arabistān the summer of 1905 was relatively mild, and at the end of December exceptional cold was experienced, several degrees of frost being registered. Heavy rain fell in parts of Persian Makrān, where, in the neighbourhood of Gwatar, 500 square miles of country were flooded,—an experience without precedent for many years; and rain was general between Jāshk and Gwādar
- 1906-07. The year appears to have been normal in most places and respects.

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Meteorological stations of the Government of India.

The following are the observatories maintained by the Government of India in the Persian Gulf region, together with the dates of their establishment:—

Masqat		•		- •		1st February	1893.
Manāmah		•			•	1st October	1901.
Kuwait		•				•••	1908.
Baghdād							1887.
Basrah		•				1st January	1900.
Muhammare	h		•		•	lst May	1908.
${f Bar u}$ sheh ${f r}$			•			1st April	1876.
Jāshk						1st December	1892.

At the present time observations are taken also by the staff of the Indo-European Telegraph Department at Fāo and Chahbār, by the British Consul at Bandar 'Abbās, and by the British Vice-Consul at Nāsiri (Ahwāz).

APPENDIX B.

GEOLOGY OF THE PERSIAN GULF REGION.*

BY

G. E. PILGRIM, ESQ., B. Sc., DEPUTY SUPERINTENDENT, GEOLOGICAL SURVEY OF INDIA.

It is impossible to give a complete account of the geology of the Persian Gulf as large portions, even of the littoral, have not been examined geologically. Still the known facts are sufficient to impart a fairly clear idea of the geological history of the region.

Formations.

The geological formations represented are the following, in descending order:—

Shelly conglomerates and dead-coral reefs of the littoral; red sandhills of the coast of Trucial 'Omān; alluvium of Turkish 'Irāq; river and lake deposits of 'Omān and the interior of Persia.
Foraminiferal Oolite or "Miliolite".
Bakhtiyāri Series : grits and conglomerates.
Fārs Series: marls, clays and sandstones with limestones and interbedded strata of rock-gypsum.
Clypeaster beds of the Bakhtiyāri mountains.
Nummulitic limestones of Persia; Masqat series; and Bahrain series.
Hormuz Series: lavas and tuffs with interbedded clays and sandstones.
Hippuritic limestones of Persia and 'Oman.
Serpentinous and other igneous rocks of 'Oman.
'Oman Series: limestones and slates with beds of chert.
Hatāt beds: schists and quartzites.

^{*} This Appendix (except the two Annexures) was very obligingly written for the present Gazetteer by Mr. G. E. Pilgrim, Deputy Superintendent, Geological Survey

These rocks are undoubtedly older than the oldest fossiliferous rocks met with; and, because of the great degree in which they have been metamorphosed and their resemblance to Archaean rocks elsewhere, have been classed as Archaean. They consist of mica-schists, hornblendeschists, talc-schists, quartz-schists, calc-schists, and quartzites. Great masses of quartz penetrated all these beds previously to the crushing stresses which have deformed, foliated and metamorphosed quartz veins and sedimentaries alike. They occupy various plains, of which Saih Hatāt is the largest, and are surrounded by cliffs of the next series. They are also seen on the edge of the great Samāil Valley and near the coast of 'Omān to the south-east of Masqat.

'Omān Series.

Hatāt Series.

This series consists mainly of limestones, many of which have been rendered quite fissile by crushing, while some are massive. In colour they vary from a pale reddish tint to almost black. Interbedded are a few shales, slates and sandstones, with red and green chert beds. Traces of fossils have generally been obliterated; but in one place the presence of Productus, Dielasmi and other Brachiopods points to a Carboniferous age for that portion, while a species of Myophoria from the Elphinstone Inlet indicates another portion as Triassic. The whole must at present be considered as a single series, extending from Jabal Ja'alān, near Rās-al-Hadd, through the whole of 'Omān to the end of the Ruūs-al-Jibāl peninsula and forming the great mountain ranges of 'Omān, of which Jabal Akhdhar is the best known. Rocks of this series crop out on the Persian side of the Gulf, both east and west of Lingeh, and on the little island of Daiyīnah off the coast of Trucial 'Omān.

A great abundance of basic igneous material has been injected, in the form of sills of immense thickness, into the 'Omāu series, or has flowed over their denuded surface. This includes diabase, diorite, gabbro and dolerite. These rocks have been largely altered into epidiorites and serpentine. The dark-greenish cliffs of Masqat for the most part consist of the latter, the joints being filled up with magnesite, a white decomposition product.

Basic igneous rocks of 'Omen.

This volcanic series has shared in all the folding of the 'Omān series, and both igneous rocks and limestones alike dip at angles which are hardly ever less than 45°. It is unconformably overlain by upper cretaceous limestones, and we may therefore conclude that this outpouring of volcanic material probably took place at the end of the Jurassic or at the beginning of the Cretaceous period.

of India, with the kind permission of Mr. T. H. Holland, F.R.S., Director. Mr. Pilgrim spent the entire cold season of 1904-05 in a geological exploration of the Gulf region; and his papers, Summary of the Geology of the Persian Gulf and the Portions of Persia and Arabia adjoining it and Report on the Economic Mineral Resources of the Persian Gulf Region, are the latest and most comprehensive authorities on the subjects with which they deal. A full list of the earlier authorities on the goology of the Persian Gulf area is given by Mr. Pilgrim at the end of his second paper, and their names, accordingly, need not be quoted here; but a reference may be added to the report; of Dr. W. H. Colvill on the Persian coast, forwarded to Government by the Resident in the Persian Gulf with his letters No. 73 of 31st December 1864 and No. 46 of 4th May 1866 and to Ainsworth's Researches in Assayria, Babylonia, and Chaldaa. Annexure No. 1 to this Appendix is founded chiefly on the Administration Reports of the Persian Gulf Political Residency, and Annexure No. 2 on a special report by Mr. Pilgrim.

Cretaceous. Hippuritic Limestone. Limestones containing members of the characteristic family of the Hippuritidae, with some interbedded shales, are widely diffused throughout Persia. A small inlier is found at Khamīr, surrounded by younger rocks; and it is well developed on the Arabian coast to the south-east of Masqat, where rocks whose fossils indicate an Upper Cretaceous age overlie the older rocks unconformably.

Hormůz Series.

Occupying the whole of the eastern or larger portion of the Persian Gulf proper are series of lavas and tuffs with some interbedded sandstones and shales. Associated with these are vast beds of rock-salt and gypsum, deeply tinged with red from the presence of red iron oxide (red ochre), produced by the decomposition of haematite or specular iron ore, which is abundantly found throughout the formation. Red ochre exists in Hormuz, Bu Musa and some other places in large deposits, which have been profitably worked. Iron pyrites, sulphur, dolomite and anhydrite are found also to some extent in the deposit. The underground solution of the salt and the consequent falling in of the surface have given the ground occupied by the Hormuz series a singularly craggy aspect; and their almost entire barrenness increases the peculiarity of their appearance. The beds have been greatly disturbed and are almost always found to dip at high angles. At Khamir their connection with the Hippuritic limestone clearly proves that their age is not older than Upper Cretaceous; and as the Eocene rocks which overlie them are probably not older than Middle Eocene, a date between these two periods may be assigned to them. They were probably formed in shallow water in a slowly subsiding area.

Eccene and Oligocene.

Rocks of this age are distributed in three distinct areas in the Gulf:-

- 1. Persia. Nummulitic limestone extends over great areas in the interior of Persia and Balüchistän, overlying the Cretaceous rocks unconformably. Sandstones, with interbedded limestones of an Upper Eocene age, form the big range running behind Bandar 'Abbās and approaching the sea at Khamīr. Southern Persia probably does not contain any representative of the Lower Eocene limestones of Balüchistän and Sind; but a more or less uninterrupted deposition seems to have continued into Oligocene or even into Lower Miocene times. The newest beas seen are limestones, containing Clypeaster, in the Bakhtiyāri series.
- 2 'Omān. Sandy limestone with a basal conglomerate, belonging to the Upper Eocene, rests on all the older beds.
- 3. Bahrain. This area was separated from the preceding two areas by a land barrier consisting of the older rocks of 'Omān and of the once continuous land formed by the Hormuz series, of which the Gulf islands and a few places on the mainland are now the sole surviving remnants. The rocks are limestones, often very argillaceous and characterized by the large amount of gypsum and siliceous matter scattered through them, the latter as flint, chert, or quartz geodes. Nummulites and echinoids are numerous in some beds. The Bahrain series almost certainly occupies a large area in the interior of Arabia, and probably is a representative of the Egyptian Eocene, with which it shows strong fossil affinities.

This widely-spread series of indurated marls and clays veined with Fars Series. gypsum, with interbedded limestones and sandstones, probably attains a thickness of not less than 17,000 feet. It forms the big Gīsakān range behind Bushehr and is found practically all along the coast. Inland it reaches an elevation of 7,000 feet above the sea. It rests uncomformably on the Hormuz series and all nummulitic limestones of Oligocene age. The basal beds contain a great thickness of rock-gypsum, amounting to at least 300 feet. It is in this part of the series that most of the petroleum of Persia and the Gulf occurs. These basal beds do not appear to extend to the east of Bandar 'Abbas, having probably been overlapped by newer beds. The fossils met with in Qishm, Hanjam, and other islands also indicate that this portion of the series is newer than the great mass of clays in the interior of Persia.

The beds of this series are more or less unconformable to those of the Bakhtiyari Fars series: but at the same time no violent earth movements took place prior to their deposition. They do not approach to within a distance of 50 miles of the Gulf, but are largely developed inland, stretching from Musal to Shīrāz, and appearing in the hills of Ahwāz and Behbehān and amid the Bakhtiyāri mountains. Red sandstones, grits and conglomerates are the prevailing rocks. A conglomerate containing pebbles of red and green chert is a characteristic and widely-spread rock in the series. These rocks also rest unconformably on Eccene and Cretaceous beds. They were probably deposited in large deltas or estuaries, which were then being converted into dry land. They are unfossiliferous, with the exception of a footprint of a carnivorous animal found by Mr. Loftus.

Subsequently to the great orogenic movements which elevated and Pleistocene. folded the Tertiaries, an colitic limestone seems to have been formed on most of the Gulf islands; it consists of the remains of small foraminifera along with some sand, round which lime has been deposited in layers. It was probably a wind deposit and is identical with that of the Kathiawar coast, which is known as "Miliolite".

Of later date than the "Miliolite" are the shelly conglomerates which are found on all the coasts of the Gulf and have been met with at an elevation of 450 feet. The shells which they contain invariably belong to species now living in the Gulf. With regard to many of the deposits here classed, it is not unlikely that they are really pleistocene; but we have no means of determining their age exactly. The red sandhills of the coast of Trucial 'Oman are found for a distance of 8 miles or more inland: they owe their colour to numerous round grains of chert. Great quantities of blown sand are to be seen in Qishm Island. The great desert plains of the interior of Persia were once the sites of lakes, which have left terraces of gravel and clay. The alluvium of Turkish 'Iraq is deltaic in origin and is composed of sand and sandy marl containing numerous marine shells. The formation is being extended at the rate, it is calculated, of 1 mile in 30 years. The fluviatile clays and gravels of Turkish 'Iraq and 'Arabistan and the alluvial gravels of the Persian highlands and 'Oman can receive no more than a mere mention.

Recent and Sub-recent.

Geological history of the Gulf.

In the present state of our knowledge of this area it is impossible to trace the sequence of events prior to the great stresses which folded in the serpentinous basic igneous rocks of Masqat and 'Oman amongst the Carbo-Triassic beds. These movements probably occurred at the beginning of the Cretaceous. We may therefore date from this period the elevation of the mountain ranges of 'Oman. In the ocean-bed whose southern limit was defined by these upheaved older rocks were deposited the Upper Cretaceous beds of Hippuritic Limestone which cover large areas in Persia. Following closely upon these, and perhaps extending into the Eccene period, occurred the Hormuz series of volcanic flows, accompanied by the formation of thick beds of salt and gypsum. not unlikely that shallow-water conditions prevailed here during part of this epoch, and some of the lavas and tuffs of the Hormuz series were probably formed beneath the water After this period of volcanic activity occurred a great depression of most of Southern Persia this depression the Eocene rocks were deposited. This was accompanied by an upheaval of the volcanic area of the Hormuz rocks into dry land, which formed a barrier running in an approximately north-west and south-east direction, separating the Eocene sea of Persia from that of Bahrain. It seems not unlikely that this land barrier continued through the Upper Eccene, Oligocene and Miccene. This appears to have been a tranquil period, the distribution of land and sea remaining almost unaltered except as demanded by the slight unconformities before the deposition of the Fars series and the Bakhtiyari grits. In early Pliocene times occurred the world-wide movements which produced amongst others the present mountain ranges of Persia. The actual Persian Gulf area seems to have been less disturbed than the Persian plateau, witness the almost horizontal strata of the Fars series in Hanjam, and the gently rolling Eocene rocks of 'Oman and Bahrain. It is on the whole likely that sub-aërial denudation continued over this area, and that the carving out of the topographical features to which the floor of the Persian Gulf and the Gulf of 'Oman owe their present contour was concluded during Pliocene times. The limit of this land was doubtless determined by the steep submarine cliff which runs along the Makran coast and then, cutting across the Gulf of 'Omān, runs parallel to the Arabian coast. This feature may have been the result of a fault, but the writer inclines to the idea that it was produced by the denudation of a gradually rising area during Pliocene and possibly during Pleistocene times. Then a widespread submergence took place, which buried fathoms deep the steep mountain valleys, river systems and sea cliffs which were being carved out for so many ages previously. To movements of this nature do we owe the deeply-cut inlets of Musandam and the islands dotting the Gulf, which are merely isolated peaks of the Hormuz volcanic series just rising above the surface of the water. The latest movement to which the Gulf has been, or is now being, subjected is one of gradual elevation, of which traces are found in recent littoral concretes, now as much as 450

feet above the present sea-level, and in the flat ledge which surrounds Masqat harbour. In the upper portion of the Gulf the deltaic deposits of the Tigris and Euphrates have contributed to this work of reclamation in an entirely different manner; within historical times these rivers have silted up their mouths to an extent which has materially altered the coastline of this part of the Gulf, and in the future they are destined to unite Hasa to Fars just as in the past they have produced the fertile plains of Turkish Iraq.

Minerals.

Petroleum.—Numerous "shows" of petroleum exist along a broad belt running north-west and south-east through Turkish 'Irāq and down the Persian Gulf. These are most abundant at the foot of the chain of hills where the naptha springs of Dāliki, Behbehān, Rāmuz, Shūshtar and Qasr-i-Shīrīn are situated. Small quantities of oil have been yielded by the Shūshtar well for many years, but all deep borings made in the area in the hope of obtaining large supplies have hitherto proved unsuccessful.

Asphalt.—A small deposit of good quality, but trifling in amount, occurs in Bahrain.

Coal.—Thirty miles inland from Sūr in 'Omān some seams of good coal are found in newer tertiary strata. Their small extent and difficulty of access seem to prohibit their being exploited.

Sutphur.—The sulphur mines of Khamīr and Bustāneh near Lingeh have been profitably worked in the past, but are not sufficiently valuable now-a-days to make them remunerative.

Copper.—This occurs as copper glance and malachite in the interior of 'Omān.

Red Ochre.—Deposits of this exist on several islands in the Gulf and are profitably worked.

Salt.—This occurs in unlimited quantity in the Hormūz series, especially on Hormūz and Qishm Island, and large amounts are exported.

Gypsum.—This is widely distributed thoughout the Gulf area. It is of good quality and is easily available. It is everywhere used as a cement in building.

Iron.—As haematite and pyrites this is widely scattered through the Hormuz series.

Magnesite, Alum and Steatitic clay.—Have been noticed.

Building stones—The littoral shelly concrete is largely used. Some of the Bakhtiyāri sandstones on the Kārūn are fairly good. Much of the Bahrain rock makes an excellent building stone. The nummulitic limestone near Masqat also furnishes excellent stone.

Road-mending material.—The Masqat serpentine rock would be admirable for this purpose.

ANNEXURE NO. 1.—EARTHQUAKES IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

Earthquakes are frequent and sometimes severe in the Persian Gulf Proper, especially towards the lower end upon the Persian side. In 1865 an earthquake levelled the villages of Darveh Āsūh, near Mugām, with the ground; and its remarkable effects were witnessed by Dr. Colvill of the Būshehr Residency.

In August 1880 an earthquake was said to have destroyed some houses and caused about 120 deaths in Bastak.

On the 16th of October 1883 a severe shock was experienced at Kangūn, 'Asalu and Tāhiri and in their neighbourhood, where much damage was done, and tremors continued until the 24th; this shock was felt also at Būshehr.

In 1884 a somewhat serious earthquake occurred and was felt most severely on Qishm Island; the shocks continued for several days, the most violent being on the 20th of May, when a number of villages were partially destroyed; and 132 deaths were said to have been occasioned. Many of the inhabitants left the island and there was much distress, in consequence of which the annual revenue was remitted; and the Shāh of Persia subscribed 1,400 Tūmāns for the relief of the destitute and the repair of mosques. Shocks were experienced at Lingeh also, but did no damage there; and in June one was observed at Ras-al-Khaimah on the Arabian side of the Gulf.

Smart shocks of earthquake were felt at Büshehr on the 14th and 24th of November 1887.

By far the most severe earthquake of recent times in the Persian Gulf area was one which, on the night of the 11th of January 1897, laid Qishm town in ruins; only two mosques and three or four other buildings were left standing, and over 1,600 bodies were said to have been afterwards recovered from the ruins. There was some loss of life, on this occasion, on the island of Lārak; and vibrations were felt as far to the west as Lingeh.

In June 1902 Qishm and Bandar 'Abbās were affected by seismic disturbances, which began on the 9th of June and lasted for several days, and as usual the damage was greater at Qishm town than elsewhere.

In 1905 shocks were experienced on Hanjām Island on the 25th of April and on Qishm Island on the 27th of April; and at the same time there were movements in the neighbourhood of Bandar 'Abbās which caused landslips and the collapse of houses at the Ginau mountain and 'Isīn village.

ANNEXURE NO. 2.—WATER SUPPLYIN RELATION TO GEOLOGY.

Masqat, on account of its rainless climate and the presence of steep hills of serpentine rock only, presents an appearance which is arid in the extreme; but there is reason to think that deep wells in the town basin would provide abundant water. Of two wells which exist one yields sweet, and the other slightly brackish water.

In the littoral district of Batinah, from Masqat westwards to the Batinah. Ruūs-al-Jibāl promontory, good water is obtainable everywhere by digging wells, especially in the neighbourhood of limestone hills of the 'Oman series.

The high, rocky, barren promontory of Ruus-al-Jibal, dividing the Gulf of 'Oman from the Persian Gulf proper, is waterless; almost no rain falls, and there is no probability of artesian wells being discovered.

Ruūs-al-

On the western side of the Ruus-al-Jibal promontory, along the coast of Trucial 'Oman, wells yield good water; and it is probable that in most places an abundant supply would be struck at 100 feet or less.

Trucial 'Omān

The copious springs of Bahrain and Qatif are derived, without doubt, from the highlands of Central Arabia. In the Bahrain islands great irregularity is observed in the quality of the water; and of two wells sunk only a few yards apart one may yield brackish water and the other sweet.

Bahrain and Qatif.

The water supply of places in the deltaic tract of the Shatt-al-'Arab and Kārūn is good and plentiful

Turkish 'Iraq and Persian 'Arabistān.

Persian coast, northwestern section.

Along the Persian coast as far to the south-east as the commencement of the Hormuz salt formation, that is to say at Bushehr and all other places west of 52°40' of longitude, wells are dug and generally yield abundant water. The water is contained in the porous, horizontally stratified conglomerates of littoral or fluviatile origin which cover the whole plain between the hills and the sea, and it is believed to be held up by clays and marls of Miocene and Pliocene age; it is derived from the rainfall of the lofty Pliocene hills inland of the coast. The water of Bushehr is drunk by natives, but in Europeans it is found to produce serious gastric disturbances; the prejudicial impurities may possibly be derived from basal gypsum beds of the Miocene series through which the water has passed, otherwise their presence is without obvious explanation.

The Persian coast and islands to the east of longitude 52°40' are generally destitute of potable water, for the salt formation of the Hormuz series, even when not visible, is not far beneath the surface, and the water from wells is consequently salt and undrinkable. These remarks apply to the coast between Bandar 'Abbās and Lingeh and to some distance beyond them upon either side. The inhabitants of the tract in question are dependent on surface rain water collected in Birkehs or reservoirs; but, the rainfall being small, this source of supply is precarious, and the quality also often leaves much to be desired.

Persian coast, southeastern section.

APPENDIX C.

THE PEARL AND MOTHER-OF-PEARL FISHERIES OF THE PERSIAN GULF.*

Pearl fishing is the premier industry of the Persian Gulf; it is, besides being the occupation most peculiar to that region, the principal or only source of wealth among the residents of the Arabian side. Were the supply of pearls to fail, the trade of Kuwait would be severely crippled, while that of Bahrain might—it is estimated—be reduced to about one fifth of its present dimensions and the ports of Trucial 'Oman, which have no other resources, would practically cease to exist; in other words, the purchasing power of the inhabitants of the eastern coast of Arabia depends very largely upon the pearl fisheries. Annexure No. 3 to this Appendix shows that the number of boats employed in the industry is now about 4,500, and that the number of operatives personally engaged in pearling is over 74,000; moreover, in estimating the importance of the fisheries as a means of livelihood, the families of the operatives must be borne in mind, as well as the numerous capitalists, large and small, with their dependents, whose funds are invested in the industry. Annexures Nos. 1 and 2 supply further proof of the magnitude of the interests involved, for the value of the pearls exported from the Gulf, estimated in 1833 at £300,000 and in 1866 at £400,000, was in 1905-06 (at the lowest computation) £1,434,399; and to this figure must be added the value of the mother-of-pearl exported, which in earlier times was little or nothing, but in 1903-04 amounted to £30,439.

The pearl fisheries have a political as well as a commercial aspect, and to that aspect we shall return after first considering the industry in a general light.

^{*}The older authorities are an article by Colonel D. Wilson in the J. R. G. S. Vol. III; an article by Colonel L. Pelly in the Tr. Bo. G. S., Vol. XVIII; an article by Captain E. L. Durand in the Persian Gulf Administration Report for 1877-78; an article in the same for 1885-86 by Colonel E. Mockler; and the Persian Gulf Pilot, 1898. Colonel Mockler was the first to cope successfully with the technicalities of the pear trade. Statistics will be found in the annual Administration and Commercial Reports of the Persian Gulf Residency. The present article is founded partly on the preceding, but also to a large extent on reports made in 1905, 1906 and 1907, by Captain F. B. Prideaux, Political Agent in Bahrain, and by his assistant Mr. In am-al-Haqq, who rendered invaluable service; by Captain S. G. Knox, Political Agent at Kuwait; by Mr. J. C. Gaskin, Political Assistant, and by the (Native) Residency Agents at Shārjah and Lingch. The acknowledgments of the writer are also due to Dr. N. Annandale of the Indian Museum, Calcutta. Interesting side lights are cast upon the subject of the Persian Gulf pearl fisheries by Professor W. A. Herdman's Report on the Pearl Oyster Fisheries of the Gulf of Manaar 1903-06.

The pearl banks.

The geological formation of the bottom of the Persian Gulf and the Extent temperature and shallowness of its waters appear to be favourable in a position. high degree to the growth of the pearl oyster.

The pearl banks which are known and actually worked occupy a very considerable proportion of the whole area of the Gulf, chiefly upon the Arabian side.*

The line between which and the Arabian coast lie the bulk of the pearl banks—the line in fact which may be considered as marking their seaward limit on that side—begins near the coast of Trucial 'Oman a few miles to the west of Dibai Town, passes slightly to the north of the island of Sīr Bū Na'air, and then curves, at a distance of 20 or 30 miles from the nearest land, round the promontory of Qatar and the Bahrain archipelago. Northwards of the Bahrain islands the belt formed by the banks diminishes in width, and it may be considered to end at Abu 'Ali Island, though some banks of minor importance occur to the north even of that place. In the great bay between Trucial 'Oman and Qatar the depth of water averages from 10 to 15 fathoms, but there are occasional deep places of 20 to 23 fathoms and many submarine knolls carrying only 3 to 9 fathoms; the last are the principal scene of pearling operations in this part of the Gulf.

The pearl banks on the Persian side are found chiefly on the coast between Lingeh and Tāhiri, and again in the neighbourhood of Khārag Island.

The largest and most productive of all the banks are situated on the Arabian side of the Gulf and are fished annually, the richest being those to the north and east of Bahrain: the banks off the Persian coast are poor as well as small, and are fished, at the present time, once in three or four years only. Pearl banks occur at all distances from land up to 70 miles, and at all depths from a little below high water mark down to 18 fathoms at least; it is possible that they exist also in deeper and more central waters where the native divers are unable to reach them, and the Arabs believe that there are beds in inlets of the Ruūs-al-Jibāl coast where the depths are 21 to 25 fathoms.

The term for an ordinary level pearl bank is Hair فير (plural, Classification Hairāt ميرات), while oyster beds formed on the top of submarine and nature. mounds surrounded by deeper water are known as Najwāt أنجوة). It is noteworthy that nearly every Hair (singular, Najwah appears to have been known from of old, whereas the Najwah is often of recent discovery and still bears the name of the finder. The best banks are considered to be those which are level, which are situated in clear

^{*}A list of the principal pearl banks in the Gulf will be found in Annexure No. 4 to this Appendix, compiled by Lieutenant Hose, R. N., of H. M. S. " Redbreast." Besides those mentioned there are many others which, though they have distinctive names, are in reality only portions of the larger banks specified.

water, and which consist of a fine whitish sand overlying coral; it is believed that a mixture of mud or earthy substance with the sand is detrimental to the pearl, and that beds having this defect are liable to exhaustion.

The oysters are not firmly attached to the bank on which they grow, but either lie loosely on the sand or adhere feebly to pieces of coral or seaweed. Sometimes they cling together in a mass, called Tabra تبرى (plural, Tabāri), and it is said that such concretions are frequently pearl-bearing, and that the discovery of a single rich Tabra will frequently make good the failure of a boat during a whole season. *

The pearl oyster. †

Varieties.

The pearl-producing oysters of the Persian Gulf are of three kinds each yielding mother-of-pearl as well as pearls.

The first sort or pearl oyster proper, called in Arabic Mahhārah ومتارع (plural, Mahhār), is the most prolific source of pearls; it is found all over the Gulf from a little beneath low water mark down to a depth of at least 18 fathoms.

The second kind is the Zanniyah (jural, Zanni zanni

The third variety is the Sadaifiyah صديفي (plural, Sadaifi مديفي) which occurs chiefly round the islands of Shaikh Shu'aib, Hindarabi and

^{*} In Ceylon waters the cysters generally occur on hard bottoms called paars; but they are also found on sand near paars, generally adhering to one another or to hard objects such as fragment of dead coral. A bunch of Ceylon cysters may consist of 3 to 16 individuals, and as many as 4 generations may be represented in the same bunch. (Vide Herdman's Report.)

[†] In accordance with general usage the word "oyster" is employed throughout this article to describe a pearl-braing molluse, but the term is not scientifically correct. The Mahhārah belongs to the family Aviculidae and is more nearly related to the European mussel (Mytilus) than to the European oyster (Ostrea). The pearl "oyster" and the mussel both produce a byssus or bundle of tough threads by which they attach themselves to rock, etc., while the edible oyster has no byssus. According to one classification the Mahhārah is Meleagrina vulgaris or Margaritifera vulgaris; the Zanniyah is Meleagrina margaritifera var. persica; and the Sadaifiyah is Avicula macroptera: according to another the Mahhārah is Meleagrina (Margaritifera) vulgaris; the Zanniyah is Avicula macroptera; and the Sadaifiyah is Meleagrina (Margaritifera) vulgaris is Deleagrina (Margaritifera) vulgaris; the Zanniyah is Avicula macroptera; and the Sadaifiyah is Meleagrina (Margaritifera) margaritifera See, however, an article by Mr. A. Galletly in the Proceedings of the Royal Physical Society of Edinburgh, Vcl. XI, 1890-92. There is apparently considerable difference of opinion regarding the correct names of these molluses.

Qais, about Chiru, at the islands of Das, Qarnain and Zirko, and off the coast of Ruus-al-Jibal between Ras-al-Khaimah and Ghubbat Ghazīrah; in its habitat the Sadaifiyah resembles the Zanniyah, for it frequents hard muddy or shelly bottoms in the same depth of water. The Sadaifiyah does not often yield pearls, but those which it produces are ordinarily large and of fine quality.

The laws which govern the growth of the oyster and the fluctuation Growth and of oyster colonies in the Persian Gulf are by no means ascertained;* and variation of the causes in accordance with which the yield of pearls varies from numbers. season to season have not been investigated there as they have been in Ceylon.

It is believed that the Mahhārah increases steadily in horizontal diameter until the end of the second year, when it measures about 2 inches, and that thereafter the rate of its growth diminishes; if

• The following facts in relation to the Ceylon pearl oyster, nearly all taken from Professor W. A. Herdman's Report on the Pearl Oyster Fisheries of the Gulf of Manaar, 1903-06, may be of interest to the general reader; it is, of course, uncertain how far they hold good of the pearl oyster of the Persian Gulf.

The pearl cyster is not hermaphroditic, and the sex of the individual, whether male or female, is permanently the same. The number of males and females is approximately equal, but there may be a slight preponderance of males. The cyster is gregarious without distinction of sex, and reproduction takes place by the emission of the generative products of male and female into the surrounding water where they commingle. Midsummer and midwinter are principal breeding seasons.

Larval development takes place in the surface waters. The young oyster exists at first in a free-swimming condition, which may cease within 5 days of fertilisation of the egg, but is capable, it is believed, of being considerably prolonged; during this period the rudiments of a shell are acquired.

The next stage is that of "spat", attached as a rule to Algae, either rooted or floating, or to Zoophytes but the animal, though now capable of fixing itself, is highly locomotive and can creep as much as an inch in a minute. This it does generally in an upward direction, probably from an instinct of avoiding sand; nor is it, like the adult oyster, deterred from movement by light. The maximum diameter of the oyster may increase during the "spat" stage from '4 of a millimetre to 1.5 millimetres and upwards.

The rate of growth of the animal during the first and second years of its life is shown to be rapid. In the third year growth becomes much slower, and in the fourth year still more slow; but the thickness and weight of the shell continue to increase greatly even after the external measurements have become almost stationary. The oyster may be considered mature in its fourth year, when its diameter measured at right angles to the binge line is about 31 inches; it is at its best however in its fifth; and it seldom, apparently, survives its sixth year.

The food of the oyster consists of microscopic organisms, both animal and vegetable; but, while silt, etc., is rejected after being formed into a small pellet, minute grains of sand and other non-nutritious particles are sometimes swallowed. The natural position of the oyster is with the right or less convex valve underneath and with the posterior edge of the shell elevated at an angle of about 20 degrees; when undisturbed it holds its shell slightly open with the lips about one third of an inch apart. If placed with the under side uppermost the oyster turns itself over by a violent jerk from a retractile sucker or "foot" which it is able to protrude from its shell to as much as 21 inches. By means of this "foot" the oyster is also able to travel, though slowly, from one place to another; while the "foot" is being advanced the valves of the shell are held widely open, and when it is retracted they are closed with a snap, a manœuvre which aids considerably in the forward movement. An oyster has been known to progress 27 inches in this manner in 12 hours. The first care of the oyster when it has attained a suitable position is to attach itself by a byssus or glutinous thread, generally of more than one strand, to some convenient object; the

this rule be correct, the majority of the bivalves brought to the surface by divers in the Persian Gulf are over two years of age, and a large number are over three years.

The movements of the oyster are entirely uncertain, defying forecast; thus in the season of 1876 nearly every pearl boat in the Gulf was riding in the vicinity of the Shah Alum shoal and a magnificent haul of oysters was obtained in a very restricted area, while in the following year the same locality—contrary to the expectations of the divers—proved almost barren. It is known that in the Gulf the oysters sometimes suffer severely from submarine disturbances, accompanied by the emission of gases and bituminous products; this was notably the case in 1900, when the sea in places on the Arab banks was reddish and turbid and the oysters on some of the beds were found to be dead or diseased and produced no pearls.

The notion that the Arabs feed the oyster beds at certain seasons of the year is erroneous; nor is the oyster itself often eaten, except by the natives of Trucial 'Omān.

Persian Gulf Pearls.

The classical word for a pearl in Arabic is Lulu لو (plural, Laāli لو (plural, Laāli لو و (plural, Arabic is Persian Marwārīd مرواريد but the term in common use all over the Persian Gulf is Qumāshah قماشه (plural, Qumāsha).

byssus is formed of material secreted by a special gland and the foot is used to bring each strand, as it is moulded or cast, into contact with the point selected for fixation. The byssus hardens on contact with sea water, and its colour changes within 48 hours from a pale almost transparent yellow to an opaque and lustrous bronze-green. The animal can at any time let go the inner end of the hyssus where the strands are fused into one, and it frequently does so when it is unable to find a place with which it is thoroughly satisfied; a specimen under observation at Galle changed its position 7 times and formed a byssus no less than 8 times in a fortnight, the byssus on one occasion consisting of 9 strands. The adult oyster is very sensitive to light and shade, and will close up even in a depth of 9 fathoms in consequence of a shadow passing over the surface of the sea; its movements, probably from fear of predaceous animals, are mostly performed during the hours of darkness, and are discontinued if an artificial light is brought to bear.

The animal can release itself from a covering of sand not exceeding $1\frac{1}{2}$ inches, but, if buried to a depth of 3 inches, it is helpless and dies. The shifting of sand, caused by monsoon or storm currents, is undoubtedly the cause of many disasters to oyster colonies, and it was probably an important factor in the total disappearance from the Periya Paar in Ceylon, between March and November 1902, of a number of young oysters computed at no less than a hundred thousand millions.

The principal enemies of the oyster are voracious fishes, chiefly rays and file-fishes, the former of which can apparently crush the shell of the adult oyster with their teeth; boring gastroped mollusca; boring sponges, which sometimes honeycomb the shell of the adult oyster so rendering it an easier prey for fish; boring worms; starfishes; lamellibranch mollusca, which smother the animal; crabs and cuttle-fishes; and, finally, associated animals such as corals, barnacles and sponges, which adhere to the shell and, mechanically or by competition for food, cause injury and even death.

Other causes of mortality among cysters are overcrowding, which interferes with nutrition and growth; also, possibly, the opposite evil of over-fishing by which the stock left for breeding may be too greatly reduced. Diseases due to parasites but probably epidemic and assisted by overcrowding, also claim many victims.

In the case of the Ceylon pearl oyster the cause of formation of the Causes of pearl is shown to be, as a rule, the secretion of nacreous matter within a formation. cyst surrounding the body of a minute Cestode parasite, and in the case of the Persian Gulf oyster it is probably the same or analogous.* The inhabitants of the Gulf still hold to the ancient superstition that the pearl is a drop of dew or rain, which the oyster has taken in by rising to the surface of the sea at night, or during a shower.

To the technical classification of pearls in the Gulf we shall return Principal later on; at present it is sufficient to observe that the natural distinctions varieties. are those of colour, shape, and specific gravity. With reference to colour it may be mentioned that black pearls (by Arabs called "dead" pearls) of high value are seldom found; such as are obtained are usually dull and

* The following data regarding pearl production are extracted from Professor W. A. Herdman's Report on the Pearl Oyster Fisheries of the Gulf of Manaar, 1903-06; it is possible, however, that the factors in the process may not be in the Persian Gulf exactly the same as they are in Ceylon waters.

The formation of a pearl in an oyster is not a natural or healthy, but on the contrary an abnormal and morbid occurrence. The cause of formation is not invariable; but it is generally the intrusion of a minute parasite,—the opaque white globular larva of a Cestode worm. This Cestode as a rule belongs to the genus Tetrarhyncus; its length, while it inhabits the body of the oyster, ranges from '07 to '53 millimetres. The life-history of this parasite is not yet fully determined; but there is reason to think that it exists at first as a free-swimming larva in the sea, that it then makes its way into the oyster, that it subsequently passes into the filefish which preys upon the oyster, and that it reaches its final and adult state in the shark or ray by which in its turn the file-fish is devoured.

The Cestode on finding entrance into the body of the oyster becomes surrounded by a sac, which in some cases consists of connective tissue, and in others is epithelial; in some localities hardly an oyster is free from such cysts, and as many as 45 have been counted in an individual specimen. The formation of a pearl generally takes place in one of these cysts, by the nacreous matter secreted by the interior walls of the cyst being deposited around the larval parasite in the centre. Only about one cyst in a hundred is pearl-bearing, and such a cyst seems always to belong to the epithelial variety; the chemical composition of the contained pearl, it has also been ascertained, resembles the nacreous lining of the shell, which is an epithelial product. The presence within the body of the oyster of epithelial cells (which must be derived from the epidermis of the mantle) is not yet fully explained: possibly the first cells of this kind are carried in along with itself by the burrowing parasite. Whether pearl formation commences before the death of the parasite or after is a point still undetermined. Cysts, both pearlbearing and non-pearlbearing, occur in many positions throughout the viscera and mantle of the cyster. The honour of being the first to connect the formation of pearls with vermian parasites belongs to Dr. E. F. Kelaart of Ceylon who died in 1859.

It should be clearly understood, however, that all pearls are not "cyst pearls" and that some are due to causes other than parasitic invasion. There are also "muscle pearls," which are generally found in the muscular tissue of the oyster near the insertions of the levator and pallial muscles and have as a nucleus a "calcospherale" or tiny calcareous concretion; such pearls, when present, are usually numerous, and on one cocasion 193 (of which 23 were visible to the naked eye) were found at the insertion of one levator muscle. Another variety is the "ampullar" pearl, formed between the shell and the mantle or in an external pouch (ampulla) of the latter. In this last kind the nucleus may be a grain of sand or other inorganic particle; but such is rarely the case, and, ont of some hundreds of pearls of all sorts examined in Ceylon, only 3 were found to have a nucleus of this nature. Nacreous excrescences or so-called "blister pearls" attached to the interior of the shell are due to the irritation caused by boring animals which work through from the outside, or to the entrance otherwise of foreign bodies between the oyster and its shell; but these can hardly be considered pearls. In some pearls no nucleus at all is discoverable.

of an impure colour, and they generally crack after a year or more. Particoloured pearls are not uncommon; they are mostly black or brownish, with white or bluish variegations. Besides pearls of spherical or pearshaped form, symmetrical probably because they have developed in a soft medium, malformed pearls of various types occur in the Persian Gulf as they do elsewhere; of these the commonest are the hemispherical "button pearl," flattened on one side, perhaps by contact with the shell, and the hollow irregularly shaped "blister pearl" which is formed by the oyster as an internal defence after a boring parasite has succeeded in penetrating its shell. Small pearls generally, whether round or deformed, are denominated "seed pearls"; but this is an English term, and, as will be seen from Annexure No. 5, has no single Arabic equivalent.

Pearls exceeding 30 grains Troy in weight are seldom obtained in the Persian Gulf, and the smaller sizes are numerous in proportion to their smallness. One of the finest Persian Gulf pearls on record was found in 1867 in 16 fathoms of water near the island of Shaikh Shu'aib; it was purchased by a merchant for 15,000 Qrāns, was sold in Paris for about £3,000, and was eventually purchased by a Baniyah and brought to India to make an eye for an idol. Another fine pearl was that referred to in the paragraph on the political history of the Arabian pearl banks.

Native opinions.

The experts of the Persian Gulf assert that the largest, whitest heaviest, and most perfect pearls are obtained in deep water, while the shallow bed;, though prolific, yield pearls of less specific gravity and tinged invariably with a shade of some colour; this stain of colour they attribute to the influence of the light of the sun, and they hold that there is a tendency to distortion in pearls grown between islands and the mainland, and that deep water is favourable to perfect sphericity as well as to lustre and to the other qualities conferring value. The pearl fishers of the Persian Gulf are possessed by a patriotic belief in the superiority of the produce of their own seas; and, estimating the fineness of pearls as they do by an imaginary number of "coats," * they assign one only to the Karāchi pearl, three to the Ceylon pearl, five to the Red Sea and Soqotrah pearl, and no less than seven to the ordinary pearl of the Persian Gulf, while fine pearls from Khārag have sometimes been described as having eight "coats."

Persian Gulf mother-of-pearl.

As has already been mentioned, mother-of-pearl is obtained from all the three kinds of pearl oyster that are found in the Persian Gulf; but the most important producer of this substance, as well of the pearl itself, is the Mahhārah variety of oyster. Mahhārah shells weigh from

^{*}The pearl is formed in concentric layers, and a dull pearl can (it is said) sometime be improved by stripping off one or more of the outer skins, but the several layers bear no relation to the "coats" of the Arabs. The "coat" is called Thob بُرِب (plural, Athyāb); and, the greater the number of "coats", the greater is supposed to be the power of the pearl to resist the effects of weather and climate.

21 lbs. to 71 lbs. the hundred, Zanni shells from 5 lbs. to 20 lbs. the hundred, and Sadaifi shells from a few ounces to 7 lbs. each. The shells of the Persian Gulf yst " usually exhibit a dark colour like that of "smoked pearl" about the edges, and they are said to be easily distinguishable from the "silver-lipped" shells of India.

Organisation and working of the pearl fisheries on the Arabian side.

Having taken account of the physical data of the industry, we proceed to enquire into the manner in which it is organised and prosecuted. The persons actually connected with the fisheries may be divided into two classes, namely financiers and operatives.

The money required to equip the pearl fleet for sea and to maintain Financiers. the crews while employed on boards is partly advanced from private means by those interested in the operations and partly borrowed from a

مسقمين plural, Musaqqamin مسقم مسقمين The Musaqqam is generally a man of substance, but some Musaqqams, who have not sufficient capital of their own, conduct their business by means of loans which they obtain for the season from wealthy Arab or Indian merchants at 10 to 25 per cent, interest. The manner in which the debts of operatives to financiers and of financiers to capitalists are adjusted will be described further on, but the different forms of contract prevalent among them are too numerous and too complicated to be detailed. Formerly the hold of the Musaqqam class upon the industry was very strong, and many boats were fitted out with their assistance; but their position is no longer what it was, and their numbers are dwindling. In Bahrain, it is said, there are now only 3 Musaqqams (2 Bahārinah and 1 a Sunni Arab), and not more than 10 per cent. of the Bahrain fleet have dealings with them. Once even Indian merchants did not despise the profession of Musaggam.

(literally Classes of "diving"), and all the classes that take part in the active operations operatives. are included under the common denomination of Ghawawis غواريص (singular, Ghawwas غواس).

The unit of organisation is the boat's crew, and within this unit the chief personage is the Nakhuda ناخده (plural, Nawakhidah ناخده) or captain, in whom full authority and entire responsibility are vested. The Nakhuda is, in 7 or 8 cases out of 10, the owner of the boat which he commands; but sometimes he is the hirer of the boat, or again he may be merely an employé of the boat owner. Next in importance to the Nakhuda are the Ghasah غامه (singular, Ghais غيص) or "" Divers," followed by the Siyūb سيرب (singular, Saib سيب) or " Haulers." One or more Radhafah رضف (singular, Radhīf رضيف) or extra hands are generally carried to assist the haulers, and sometimes a Walaid (plural, Aulad ارلاه) or apprentice is taken, whose duty it is to catch fish, cook, look after the pipes and coffee, and attend to other minor duties.

The Ghāsah, whose only work is to dive, are mostly poor Arabs and free negroes or negro slaves; but Persians and Balūchis are also to be found among them, and, in recent years, owing to the large profits made by divers, many respectable Arabs have joined their ranks. The efficiency of a diver depends more on his skill and daring than on the strength of his constitution,—the last being a point on which undue stress has sometimes been laid by writers upon pearling; and a slave diver who is not afraid to enter deep and muddy water containing weeds is ordinarily valued at considerably over Rs. 1,000. The Siyūb, whose duties are merely to manage the boat and to lower and pull up the divers, are usually landsmen or ex-divers whom age or other causes have obliged to abandon diving.

The total crew of a pearl boat varies from 10 to 40 men, the average number being about 16 for the whole Gulf. The number of the Ghāsah is generally less than that of the regular Siyūb in the same boat, standing to it in a proportion of 10 to 11, 12 or even more; the reason of this arrangement is that, if a diver were to be thrown out of work for want of a hauler, the loss would be greater than the expense of carrying a few extra Siyūb. These extra Siyūb, who must not be confounded with the

Radhafah, are called Jalālīs جلاليس or "Sitters" (singular, Jallās جلاليس).،

All sorts of boats are now used for pearling, even jolly-boats being in these days fitted out for the purpose, but the majority are Sambūks; and after the Sambūk come, in order of frequency, Batils, Baqārahs and Shū'ais. A pearl boat of the largest dimensions, to carry 40 men, costs Rs. 30,000 or more to construct and fit out.

There were formerly, and are still, two recognised seasons for the conduct of pearling operations at sea; but their incidence has changed in recent times.

Thirty years ago the earlier season was the Ghaus-al-Bard غوص البرد or "Cold Diving", which began at the middle of April and continued for 40 days. During the Ghaus-al-Bard the operations were confined to shallow water, and the coldness of the sea obliged the divers to work in alternate half-hour shifts.

The next, which has always been the principal season and is called the Ghaus-al-Kabīr غرص الكبير or "Great Diving", formerly began in June after the end of the Shamāl and lasted till the end of September; now, however, it begins at the middle of May and continues for 130 days, that is until about the middle of September; the beginning of this season is known as the Rakbah, and the end as the Quffāl "" or "Closing." The times of beginning and ending of the Ghaus-al-Kabīr are not exactly fixed, and they are liable to be affected by the month of Ramadhān, when it falls in the hot weather, as diving is prohibited during the fast. In 1906 the Ghaus-al-Kabīr of the Bahrain fleet lasted from the 16th of May to the 18th of September, with an interval of 5 days which began on the 22nd of August.

The second season is now the Raddah or "Return," which commences a few days after the conclusion of the Ghaus-al-Kabīr and

Boats.

Seasons.

is of about 3 weeks' duration. In 1906 the Raddah of the Bahrain fleet began on the 20th of September and ended on the 14th of October; and in that year the Bahrain and Kuwait fleets closed the season about the same time, -later than the Qatar fleet, but earlier than that of Trucial 'Oman, which had delayed in putting to sea at the beginning of the season.

Besides the seasons of pearling at sea, there is also a winter season for shore operations known as the Mujannah . In the Mujannah the fishery is conducted chiefly by wading in the shallows along the coast when the tide is out, and those who take part in it ordinarily return to their homes at night The pearls obtained in the Mujannah are ordinarily small and discoloured; nevertheless the magnificent specimen which gave rise to a dispute mentioned further on in the political history of the pearl fisheries was found by a wader of Kumzār.

It may be noted here that a number of Kuwait, Bahrain and Trucial 'Oman pearlers now visit the Ceylon banks in winter, instead of devoting themselves to ordinary deep-sea fishing at home, as was formerly the rule; the Government records do not show this practice to have prevailed earlier than 1889. Large boats in the Persian Gulf belonging to enterprising owners are sometimes sent away from the home fisheries to those of Sogotrah and the Red Sea, where they remain continuously for as much as two consecutive seasons, and return with Zanni and Sadaifi shells as well as pearls. This seems to be an old custom, and the season of 1885 is recorded as having been a successful one in the Red Sea; but, since the Italian Government began to tax pearl boats fishing in Eritrean waters, the Red Sea venture has become less popular than it formerly was.

The pearl fishers, who till recently had neither charts nor compasses Modus but are now generally provided with the latter, are extremely expert in operandi. finding their way to any bank they may desire to reach, and are generally able to make a direct voyage thither; they are guided, not only by the sun and stars and by bearings from the land when in sight, but also by the colour and depth of the sea and by the nature of the bottom. Some Nakhudas select the banks which most generally yield a fair return, and stay on them for the season; other commanders, of a more sanguine or less methodical temperament, remain on the move and change the scene of their operations every few days. In the choice of a bank the Nakhuda is limited by the powers of his divers; 8 fathoms is an ordinary depth, and 12 is perhaps the greatest at which work can be carried on without discomfort; boats with good divers, however, will work on banks carrying 14 fathoms. There are men who can negotiate 16 fathoms of water, but the strain at this depth is too great to be endured long, even by the strongest, and fatal accidents sometimes occur in working at such a level.*

On the banks diving is carried on every day during fine weather; work begins an hour after sunrise and ceases an hour before sunset. The interval between the early morning prayer and the commencement of diving is spent by the crew in opening the oysters collected on the previous day. This is done with crooked knives called Mufaliq مفاليق

^{*} In Ceylon waters 9 fathoms is the ordinary limit of the local diver. Individuals are found who can manage from 11 to 15 fathoms; but they can only bring up what they happen to find near them, and in the case of 15 fathoms they come up exhausted (see Professor Herdman's Report).

(singular, Mufliqah معلقه) under the personal superintendence of the Nākhuda, who takes charge of the pearls as they are extracted, and registers their weights and descriptions at such intervals as he considers necessary. Of the shells, only the best—that is to say some 3 or 4 per cent. of the whole—are kept, and the remainder are returned to the sea along with the juvenile oysters,—the latter unopened but unlikely, it is believed, to survive a separation of 16 hours on the average from their native element. The process of opening the oysters is unpleasant, owing to the smell and to the insects which it sometimes attracts.

The divers, before they commence operations for the day, are allowed a light meal of half a pound of dates and a few cups of coffee each. Once they have entered the water, work is continued without intermission until Dhuhr (in the pearling season about 1-30 or 2 p.m.) when it is suspended for prayers, a few cups of coffee, and an hour's rest; nor is it again interrupted, after being resumed in the afternoon, until the approach of evening. Soon after Maghrib or evening prayers the divers take a substantial meal of fish, rice and dates, and then, after a little smoking and coffee-drinking, retire to rest for the night.

The Ghais, before entering the sea, strips off his clothes, places a pair

of horn pincers called Fatam فطاع (plural, Aftamah فطاء) on his nose to compress his nostrils, plugs his ears with cotton-wool, or bees' wax, and puts on leather finger-stalls, called Khabat side (singular, to protect his fingers from abrasions; he also attaches a small bag or Dīyīn ديين (plural, Diyāīn ديين) of coir matting to his person, by hanging it round his neck or fastening it to his waist. To aid him in his descent he has a stone or lead sinker weighing 10 to 14 lbs.; this is fastened to a rope called Zaibal يبل Ziyābil زيابل), having above the weight a noose, in which the diver places his foot and so is lowered to the bottom of the sea; a second rope, called Ida (plural Ayadi ايدا ايادي), is fixed to his girdle and is used to raise him to the surface again. On reaching the bottom the diver removes his foot from the noose in the Zaibal, which is immediately hauled up by his attendant Saib, and proceeds to grope his way along the bottom with one hand and one foot, using the second foot to propel himself and the disengaged hand to collect oysters within his reach, and place them in the Divin. It is said that the oysters are generally found open-mouthed, but close up when approached. When he cannot hold his breath any longer, the diver signals to the Saib by jerking the Ida to which he clings, and is immediately pulled up to the surface and relieved of the shells he has brought. The shells gathered

by a Ghais in a single plunge or Tabbah (plural, Tabbāt) generally number from 3 to 20; sometimes however he returns entirely empty-handed. The time occupied by the plunge is usually from 40 to 75 seconds, but only a few divers can remain below water for more than one minute.* In the intervals between plunges, the Ghais, unless the sea is rough, rests in the water, supporting himself by an oar or by a rope which hangs over the side of the boat. The same diver will make as

^{*}In Ceylon it was observed that few divers remained more than 1½ minutes below, and that none reached 2 minutes; 15 oysters was apparently an ordinary number for a diver to bring up with him.

many as 50 plunges in a day if the weather is favourable, but only 10 or 20 if the water is cold. It is rarely that a diver is attacked by a shark (Jarjūr) or dogfish (Kalb-al-Bahr); but in 1900 an unusual number of sharks made their appearance off the banks and attacked nearly 30 divers, two of whom were killed under water, while others were rescued in a precarious condition. The diver sometimes suffers from the stings of the devil-fish or Hāmmah and and when there are many of these about he wears a long white shirt to protect him from their embraces. The exertion of diving is greatly increased by the existence of a current, and, where currents prevail, the diver is frequently floated away to a distance from the boat, and comes up much exhausted; in such places a long rope is allowed to trail from the boat, to which the Ghais can swim on reaching the surface and be hauled in by the Saib.

Here it may be mentioned that the occupation of diving, though a severe form of labour and fatiguing at the time, is not considered by those engaged in it to be particularly injurious to the health, and that it is practised even by old men; on the other hand, it undoubtedly gives rise, in some cases, to diseases of the respiratory system and to deafness. A common ailment among divers is a skin disease, to guard against which those who are liable to it occasionally rub themselves before going to sleep with a decoction, called Jaft ., from the inner shell of the Persian acorn.* Senna leaves and a few other common drugs are carried by pearling boats; but, in case of serious illness, recourse is generally had, whatever the nature of the symptoms, to actual cautery with a hot iron.

Social life, customs and discipline on the Arabian pearl banks.

Social life on the banks is confined to the hours of the evening, when the Nākhudas and their crews visit friendly boats to enjoy coffee, wafer cakes and tobacco, and to compare notes of their proceedings. During the season a small bazaar is formed on Dalmah Island for the sale of supplies, and Tawwāshes or petty dealers and Musaqqams come there to buy pearls and recover debts.

^{*} Dr. S. J. Thoms, M.D., of the American Mission Hospital, Pahrain, writes:—
"It has been my observation that pearl-divers are prone to disease of the respiratory system that may be caused by over-distention of the lungs and pressure, such as hæmorrhage and pulmonary emphysema, also to deafness from perforation of the ear-drum, and to various forms of aural catarrh; but, with the method used by the divers here, not to "paralysis and cramp". In six years of experience here I have not seen a case of paralysis due to diving. There is a peculiar skin disease among divers and all classes that spend most of their lives in the sea such as the fishermen and boatmen. The skin takes on a glazed appearance and breaks out in small postules which generally heal in a few weeks without treatment if they do not go into the salt water during this time, but I have never found a treatment that influenced the disease perceptibly where the patient pursued his occupation in the sea water. I believe the divers do use the decoction mentioned (Jaft) sometimes, and it is difficult to say of how much value it is as a prophylactic; but it seems to have little, if any, curative effect when the disease is once established".

On the occasion of a Tabrah' being discovered by a diver he receives a new suit of clothes from the Nākhuda, and the rest of the crew too become entitled to receive a present. A man also who finds a good pearl in opening the oysters is specially rewarded. Quarrels are of rare occurrence on the pearling ground, and the boats even of hostile tribes may be seen peacefully anchored within a few cables' length of one another.

The boats of each district form a fleet, with one of the Nākhudas, appointed before sailing by the Shaikh of the district, as its Admiral. The principal duty of the Admiral is to fix the day for cessation of work and return to port. No diver is willing to remain on the banks longer than his fellows, and the premature departure of even one boat, however successful it might have been, would probably bring about a strike of all the divers from the same district remaining on the banks; consequently no boat is permitted to leave until the Admiral has hoisted the signal for departure, and boats that reach home before the return of the Admiral are, in the absence of a sufficient excuse, severely dealt with by the Shaikh to whose jurisdiction they belong. A boat which returned to Kuwait prematurely in September 1905 was at once sent back to the fishery. Most crews, however, pay one or more brief visits to port in the course of the season to see their families, to take in provisions and to clear off the barnacles which have collected on the sides of the boats; in Bahrain one such interval is simultaneously observed by all boats, under the name of Saifivah .

Division of profits in the pearl fishery on the Arabian side. *

On return from the banks the Nakhuda, if financed by a Musaggam, is bound to hand over to his creditor the whole take of pearls, and all the shells brought home, at a rate previously arranged which varies from 15 to 20 per cent. below market value. This discount of 15 to 20 per cent. constitutes, in the case supposed, the profit of the Musaqqam; and the price of 80 to 85 per cent. of value paid by the Musaggam is divided among the owner, Nakhuda, and crew of the boat. The Nakhuda is not however precluded from disposing of the pearls and shells to a third party, provided that the price he obtains will enable him to discharge his obligations to the Musaqqam, and that the Musaqqam is himself not willing to give so much; and, as in practice the Musaqqam is generally unwilling or afraid to bid against the Tajir or professional pearl merchant, the Nakhuda frequently sells to a merchant. division of what remains after the claims of the Musaqqam, if any, have been satisfied, the owner of the boat receives one-fifth of the whole; the cost of the rations supplied to the crew during the season is next deducted for repayment to the person by whom it was advanced; and the balance is then divided up among the operatives, the Nakhuda and each Ghais

^{*} Here we give only the rules for a Khalawi or ordinary boat; but there is a specially organised boat called 'Amīl, in which the rule of distribution is different See Annexure No. 6 under "Dibai."

or diver receiving 3 shares, each Saib or hauler 2, and each Radhif or extra hand 1; the Walaid or apprentice is not entitled to a share. The Nākhuda, besides commanding the boat, may also own her, and may himself take part in the work of diving: in this case he will be remunerated not only as a Nākhuda, but also as an owner and a diver in addition.

Financial regulations of the pearl fishery on the Arabian side.

Pearling operations having been carried on in the past very largely with borrowed capital and being still to a considerable extent so financed, it is not surprising to find that the industry is governed by stringent customs as to debt, which have the force of law and are steadily enforced by local tribunals.

To make the situation intelligible it should be explained that many Prevalence of Nākhudas, especially those who are not owners of boats, owe more than debt. they can pay to their Musaqq ams on account of the expenses of fitting out and provisioning their vessels and of retaining the services of capable divers by giving them money advances; also that even those Nākhudas who are or free from debt are often in a precarious position, inasmuch as they are responsible for the debts due from their divers to Nakhudas by whom the divers may have been previously employed. In a similar way, and even more generally, the divers are indebted to their Nakhudas for advances, and, being an extravagant class, the amounts which they have borrowed are often large and in some cases reach so high a figure as Rs. 3,000 a diver; yet, in the stress of competition which now prevails, the Nakhudas dare not refuse advances to their divers, even in the off-season, in case they should desert them and take service elsewhere. In view of their own financial responsibilities and of the probability that the whole debt due by a diver may be lost in event of his death, Nakhudas are extremely careful in the choice of their Ghāsah. It is evident that, under such a system of finance and in such a society as have been described, the rights of lenders can only be safeguarded by rules of an exceedingly drastic character.

The Nākhuda, as we have already stated, is obliged, in certain Musaqqams circumstances, to transfer the whole of the season's take to his Musaggam and at a rate equal to about four-fifths of its market value; should he Nakhudas. disregard this obligation and dispose of his pearls to any other person, the purchaser becomes liable to the Musaqqam for the amount of the Nākhuda's debts, even if they exceed the value of the pearls which he has bought. The Musaqqam, on the other hand, has the right to abrogate his connection with the Nakhuda at any time, if he finds it to his interest to do so; and, should the Nakhuda, when this occurs, be unable to pay his debts, the Musaggam may insist on the sale of the Nakhuda's boat, if he owns one, after which the divers belonging to the boat may be engaged by new masters, on payment to the insolvent Nakhuda of the debts which stand against their names in his books: the house and other property of the Nākhuda, however, are exempt from seizure, unless

specially included as security in the agreement between himself and the Musaggam. There is, however, an alternative to these severe measures and, except in the case of wilfully defaulting Nakhudas, it is almost invariably preferred by the Salifat-al-Ghaus, -a tribunal presently to be mentioned; it consists in the fixing of annual instalments for the discharge of the debt, and, when this has been done by a decree of the Salifat-al-Ghaus and a paper has been given by the Musaggam to the Nakhuda stating the amount of the debt and of the annual instalment. the Nakhuda is free to form relations with another Musaqqam. event of his finding a patron, the new Musaggam by whom he is entertained becomes liable to the former Musaggam for the regular payment of the annual instalments and so continues as long as the Nakhuda remains in his service, and the debts of the original Musaggam must be discharged in full before the new Musaggam can claim repayment of any which may have become due to himself, but the second Musaggam enjoys a priority over any third or later Musaqqam similar to that which the first Musagam possesses in regard to himself.

Nākhudas and divers. The obligations of divers to Nākhudas are similar, that is to say, no diver may leave the service of a Nākhuda to whom he owes anything, and, if a diver violates this rule, the new Nākhuda by whom he is entertained is held responsible to the old Nākhuda for the whole amount of the debts due to the latter by the diver.

Capitalists and Musaqqams. The Musaqqam, it should be noted, is not bound to dispose of his pearls to the merchant from whom he may have borrowed money for his operations.

Tribunals.

The rules just described are enforced in every Arab principality by a tribunal known as the Sālifat-al-Ghaus مالغة الغرص or "Diving Court." This tribunal is not a permanent institution but is constituted, when required, by the Shaikh of the principality, who appoints one or more men—generally Nākhudas of repute who are well versed in the usages of the pearl fisheries—to compose it and act as judges. Before this tribunal the Musaqqam, the Nākhuda and the diver all stand on an equal footing; and by its decision they are absolutely bound. The Sālifah does not itself administer oaths, and, when an oath is necessary, the parties are sent before a Qādhi in order that it may be taken.

Special financial features of the fishery on the Persian side.

We have now dealt fully with the finance and working of the Arabian pearl fisheries; but, though many Persian boats take part in the operations there and the manner of prosecuting the industry is much the same upon both coasts of the Gulf, it is advisable, before passing on to consider the trade in pearls as distinguished from the business of procuring them, that we should take note of certain differences which prevail upon the Persian side.

On that side the fishery is less highly organised than on the

Arabian, the reason doubtless being that the banks are fewer, poorer. and more scattered; but the system of finance, the classes of operatives. the seasons and methods of fishing, the customs of the industry, and the manner in which the last are enforced are apparently much the same as in the Arabian fishery. The boats used, however, are smaller, sometimes carrying no more than four men besides the Nakhuda; and in the matter of the division of profits there are certain differences, for the share of a diver and that of a hauler are here, as a rule, the same. the Persian side, sailors and other extra hands are either paid monthly wages or are remunerated otherwise under a special arrangement. Persia the money-lender corresponding to the Arabian Musaqqam, from whom a Nakhuda may have taken an advance, is entitled to purchase the season's take at its full market value only, valuation being made by assessors; and, if he does so and if the Nakhuda is in need of further funds through the value of the pearls not exceeding the amount of his debt to the money-lender, the latter will give the Nakhuda a further advance and the Nakhuda will be bound to continue in his service. If, however, the money-lender foregoes his right to take over the pearls, the Nākhuda is entitled to sell them himself, and should he, after doing so, be unable to discharge his debt to the money-lender, the latter will have a personal claim against him only, and will have no power to attach his boat or to detain the divers from service elsewhere.

At Khārag Island the fishery is carried on under altogether exceptional conditions. There the operations are conducted under the supervision of the local Zabit by small boats carrying, as a rule, in addition to the Nakhuda who is almost always the owner, only two divers and two haulers. The crew receive pecuniary advances from the Nakhuda at the beginning of the season, but they are not supplied by him with food, for they live on shore and go to work at 8 o'clock in the morning, returning to their homes for the night. The day's take is brought every evening to the Zabit, who seals it up and returns it to the Nakhuda for custody. At the end of the season the whole catch is divided between the Khan of Hayat Davud and the operatives, in the proportion of onefourth and three-fourths respectively; or the Nakhuda may, if he pleases, retain the whole on paying to the Khan one-fourth the value of the pearls plus 15 per cent. of the same, and to the divers and haulers their proper shares.* Among the operatives about one-fourth goes to the Nakhuda as owner of the boat, and the balance is divided among the divers and haulers as it is upon the Arabian side, that is, in the proportion of three shares to each diver and two to each hauler; but here the Nakhuda, if he takes an active part in the fishing, is reckoned as a Saib only and not as a Ghais.

The trade in pearls.

We are now in a position to consider the manner in which the produce of the fisheries is disposed of.

^{*} See also statement on page 2289 from a different source.

Markets.

Until so recently as 1902 Manāmah and Lingeh were the only pearl marts of importance in the Persian Gulf; the former drew to itself all the trade of the middle, the latter that of the lower Gulf. Lately however, in consequence of the stringency of the Persian Customs at Lingeh and of the extension of steamer communication to the free port of Dibai, the trade of Lingeh has been in a large measure transferred to Dibai, and the transfer bids fair to become complete and permanent. The great bulk of the pearls from Bahrain, Lingeh and Dibai are exported to Bombay, where they are classified for despatch to European and other markets, but some are sent to Baghdād. The Baghdād market favours the white pearl and takes a large proportion of the small seed pearls. Yellow pearls find a sale in India and Turkey, and indifferent and bad pearls are disposed of in Persia, where they are used to ornament articles of male and female attire.

Dealers.

The pearl dealer of the Persian Gulf is either a Tajir طراش or a Tawwash (تجار (plural, Tujjār (plural Tawāwīsh صواريش). Of these the Tajir is a wholesale merchant, whose business is brought to his door, who makes his purchases for cash, and who has direct relations with Bombay; the Tawwash, on the other hand, is a petty merchant who must go in search of his trade, who obtains his pearls on shore by payment of cash or from the fleets at sea in exchange for provisions, and who invariably resells his acquisitions to a Persian Gulf Tajir. The Tajir is brought into relations with the Tawwash (or in some cases with the Musaqqam) by an agent or Dallal JJ, receives commission from both sides, but is generally, it would seem, of more service to the Tajir than to the Tawwash. A number both of the Tājir and Tawwāsh class are Indians, and the number of Indian Tājirs has increased in recent years, while that of Indian Tawwashes has not diminished; nevertheless, in both grades of the profession, Arabs have multiplied more rapidly, and it is estimated that three-fourths of the entire trade is now in Arab hands.

Assortment and valuation of pearls.

Exceptionally large and fine pearls, which we may take to be those of 30 grains Troy and upwards, are bought and sold singly, and there is no recognised method of assessing their value; but the intermediate and smaller sizes, which form the staple of the pearl trade, change hands in larger or smaller quantities, and their valuation, dependent as it is on considerations of size and weight as well as of colour and shape, is a process which demands some technical knowledge.*

Size.

Medium pearls are assorted with reference to size by being passed through a series of perforated bowls, called Tūs طرس (singular, Tāsah), which are made of brass or copper and fit into one another, so as to form a nest or pile. To assist them in their private operations, some pearl dealers keep sets of as many as 45 bowls, very finely graduated in

^{*}With the remarks which follow may be compared the section . Native classification of Pearls " (in Ceylon) in Professor Herdman's Report.

regard to the size of their perforations; but the standard set, used in ordinary transactions, is composed as follows:—

Name of bowl.	Diameter of the perforations in decimals of an inch.
Rās راس or " Head."	18
Batn بطی or " Belly.''	}
Rās-adh-Dhail راسی الذیل or " Upper Tail."	•13
Hadriyat-adh-Dhail حدرية الذيل or " Lower Tail"; also called Rābi'ah رابعه or " Fourth.") -11

The largest pearls which pass through the perforations in the last of these 4 bowls are called Khāmisah or "Fifth"; but of these the minimum diameter has not been ascertained. The smallest pearls retained in the Rās bowl weigh on the average, it is said, about 6.20 grains Troy each. The finest Rās pearls are called Naqwah is; but this is a class, not a size.

Wholesale purchases of pearls from Nakhudas by Tawwashes and others are, as a rule, made chiefly by size. In this case, after the Nākhuda has removed any specially fine pearls which he wishes to dispose of by the Chau, as hereinafter explained, the rest are assorted into Ras, Batn and Dhail, and change hands in the lump at a rate previously arranged of so many Tumans per Mashhad Mithqal. The Tuman, it should be explained, is a fluctuating unit of pecuniary value, sub-divided into 100 Muhammadis and depending, in its relation to actual currency. upon the variations of the pearl market; it is a peculiarity of its use that the rate for Batn and Dhail pearls is always 1 and 2 respectively, weight for weight, of whatever may be fixed for those of Ras size. The Mashhad Mithqal of the pearl trade appears to be the same thing as the ordinary Bahrain Mithqal (see next footnote) and weighs therefore about 444 grains Troy: it is sub-divided into 20 Daniqs دانق, (plural, Dawaniq or (درانیق into 66 Habbaha مبه, (plural, Habbat حبات

The ordinary pearl, after being purchased from an operative by size, usually passes from one dealer to another on a more precise kind of estimate based upon weight.

Chau.

The unit in the dealer's system is called a Chau \$\(\delta\) (plural, Achwah); and it should be clearly understood that this Chau, though derived from a weight, is not itself a weight. Chaus are of 4 kinds, obtained by an identical process from the 4 different Mithqals which follow :-

> =150 grains Troy. Bahrain Mithqal * =160do. do. Oatar =74do. do. Bombay. do. do. do. **=68**³⁄₄ do. Poons

In each case the number of Chaus in a pearl is found by squaring the weight (in Mithqals) of the pearl and multiplying the result by 330. Thus let c be the number of Chaus and m the number of Mithqals, then

$$c = m^2 \times 330$$

and the result (c) will be in Bahrain, Qatar, Bombay or Poona Chaus according as the weight of the pearl was expressed in Bahrain, Qatar, Bombay or Poona Mithqals. One Bahrain Chau, it should be observed is approximately equal to 4 Bombay Chaus; for, let m be the weight of the pearl in Bahrain Mithqals, then its weight in Bombay Mithqals is 150 m, and it follows that the number of Bahrain Chaus in the pearl in question is to the number of Bombay Chaus in the same as 330m2 is to 330 × $(\frac{150}{74} m)$, that is as 1 is to $4\frac{1}{10}$. In the same manner it may be demonstrated that 1 Qatar Chau represents approximately the same quantity of pearl substance as 43 Bombay Chaus.

Both Arab and Indian dealers have rules of thumb for the convenient calculation of Chaus from weights, but both classes have recourse by preference to ready reckoners in Arabic and Gujarāti which are obtainable from Bombay. The (simplified) Arab rule is: Express the weight of the pearl in Habbahs (of which there are 66 to the Bahrain or Qatar Mithqal), square the number of Habbahs, increase the result by 1 per cent., and divide by 100. The (simplified) Indian rule is: Express the weight of the pearl in Rattis † (of which there are 24 to the Bombay or Poona Mithqal), square the number of Rattis, multiply by 55 and divide by 96. Algebraic analysis will show at once that both of these rules are virtually the fundamental rule

 $c = m^2 \times 330$

thrown into a different form.

The Chau, to whichever category belonging, is divisible in the first instance into 100 Dūkrahs دوكره (plural, Duwākir دواكر). In the case of the Arab Chau each Dukrah is again resolvable into 100 Mazur, while in the case of the Indian Chau the Dukrah consists of 16 Badams . وسواسي and the Badam of 16 Visvasis بدام

When the number of Chaus in a pearl has been ascertained it only remains, in order to determine its value, to apply the market rate per

† The Ratti again is composed of 4 Dans, the Dan of 4 Anahs and the Anah of 6.

Dūkrahs.

Rates.

[•] These are both exceptional weights and are called Surati مسرزاي . The ordinary Bahrain and Qatar Mithqāls (the former called also Mashhad Mithqāl) are much heavier, being equal respectively to 6 and 7 Bombay Mithqals, but they are not used in Chan calculations.

Chau of the class to which it belongs. A table of the principal classes—which are distinguished from one another chiefly by colour and shape,—will be found in Annexure No. 5 to this Appendix, together with the rates for each class which prevailed in Bahrain in 1906. It should be noted that these rates furnish but a rough guide to the dealer, for they are in the form of maxima and minima only, and the actual rate for a particular pearl is determined by considerations of "skin" or purity and "orient," or lustre, which cannot be reduced to a formula. These rates are subject to change, and there is no doubt that during the last half century they have risen enormously; between 1852-53 and 1877-78 they doubled, and since 1877-78 they have more than doubled again.

Some experts, generally sea-going Tawwäshes, profess a power to Art of the distinguish roughly the depth of water and even the particular neighbour-pearl dealer. hood from which a pearl shown to them may have been obtained; thus they assert that pearls from the banks near Bahrain are marked by greater lustre, and those from banks further northward by greater "solidity." However this may be, the power to discriminate at a glance between pearls of different Aqsām [[ima]] (singular, Qism [ima]) or classes is possessed by all merchants; and, such being the case, it is evident that the success of the individual trader depends chiefly on his power to appraise the relative fineness of pearls belonging to the same class,—an operation in which, as we have already remarked, there are no rules to assist his judgment.

The merchant, even when otherwise illiterate, is ordinarily a clever mental arithmetician and benefits by the fluctuations of market rates and by the discrepancies of the weighing appliances in use in the Gulf. In Annexure No. 5 we have given the market rates per Bombay Chau only, but there are also market rates for the Bahrain, Qatar, and Poona Chaus, and, as these are not always in strict proportion, it is sometimes possible to buy cheap and sell dear by purchasing pearls according to one of these measures and disposing of them according to another; consequently a merchant who is versed in all the systems, and provided with the means of working by each, has a great advantage over a man who understands and practises only one of the four. The difference of weights in the Gulf is possibly a source of profit to some dealers of the less scrupulous kind, who pay attention to the discrepancies*; but a dealer detected in the use of false weights forfeits public confidence, and opportunities for individual frauds are few, because a seller does not often part with his pearls until they have been weighed and priced by a

The small weights representing the fractions of a Mithqal are frequently much heavier than they ought to be, Ratti weights being met with which are $\frac{1}{16}$ instead of $\frac{1}{14}$ of a Bombay Mithqal, and Bahrain and Qatar Habbahs which are $\frac{1}{16}$ and $\frac{1}{16}$ of a Bahrain and a Qatar Mithqal respectively, instead of $\frac{1}{16}$. Weights are made of agate or brass, the former being the more esteemed as they are not affected

by oxidation.

[†] Unless "Bahrain Chau" in Captain Durand's report is an error for "Bombay Chau" the increase has been extraordinary. Assuming first that there is no mistake in the report we find that the average rate for the Yakah Baidha class in 1877 was Rs. 46 per Bahrain Chau or Rs. 11½ per Bombay Chau, whereas in 1906 it was Rs. 325 per Bombay Chau. This seems impossible; but, on the alternative supposition even, the average rate rose from Rs. 46 to Rs. 325,—a very remarkable increase. Opinion in Bahrain, as elicited by further enquiry, favours the idea that Captaiu Durand's Chaus were Bombay Chaus (1908).

number of different persons. About 20 years ago, however, when the local price of pearls had been rising for over 15 years, the dealers as a body endeavoured to combat the operatives by gradually adopting slightly heavier weights while retaining the old denominations; when a point had been reached at which the pearlers refused to sell, the weights were made lighter again.

The largest pearls are sent to India to be sold individually by the Chau; but, in the assortment of the remainder into packets, each packet containing pearls of the same class but not necessarily or usually of the same size, the ingenuity of the dealer finds further scope, for each of such packets, if skilfully made up, commands a price higher than the pearls composing it would obtain if disposed of separately. Dealers are consequently averse to breaking up their packets, and a fancy price must generally be paid for a single pearl selected from a packet of which the remainder are not taken.

The trade in mother-of-pearl.

The principal mother-of-pearl emporia in the Gulf are Lingeh, Bahrain and Büshehr, and from these the shells are ordinarily shipped by direct steamer to Europe, where they are known by the name of "Lingeh shells." The trade has been somewhat injudiciously conducted and has experienced more than one crisis. Until 1897-98 it was one in which European and respectable native firms were unwilling to engage, on account of fraudulent practices associated with it; but its character has since improved, and a German firm in Bahrain now takes an important share in the shell business.

The local price of Mahhar shells is Rs. 1 to 3 per 140 lbs., of Zanni shells Rs. 4 to 8 per 60 lbs., and of Sadaifi shells Re. 4 to ½ per 1 lb. The annual quantities exported since 1873 are given in Annexure No. 2 to this Appendix.

Sovereignty and dues in relation to the pearl fisheries.

Coast of Arabia. On the Arabian side all the banks, whether near to or far from the coast, are free to the pearl fishers of Arabia and Persia without distinction of race or nationality. The boats from particular ports generally

[†] The explanation of the greater value of a packet as compared with the aggregate value of the pearls separately is not clear. It is suggested however that pearls weighed separately are rated as equivalent to the lower, and not to the higher, of the two small weights to which they may happen to be intermediate, and consequently that, when a number of pearls are taken together, the small fractions of grains otherwise sacrificed, being combined, give an additional number of grains.

frequent certain localities more than others, but they do this of choice and not of necessity.

The chiefs of the Arab littoral derive revenue from the pearl fisheries, but only by means of taxes imposed on their own subjects or on persons resident in their respective jurisdictions: a table of these imposts will be found in Annexure No. 6 to this Appendix. It has been stated that the chiefs of Trucial 'Oman are entitled to receive, besides the dues mentioned in the Annexure No. 6, a share in the sale price of any pearl worth \$200 or more which may have been found by a subject, but no particular share is specified, and it does not appear that the claim is universally, or even generally, admitted; on the other hand a decision in favour of the Sultan of 'Oman, mentioned below, seems to raise a presumption that such a right is, in some circumstances, allowed.

The first chief to levy dues is believed to have been the Shaikh of Bahrain, who is said to have instituted about the beginning of the 19th century, under the name of Nob نوب , a tax which was devoted (at least in theory) to the maintenance of 4 armed vessels on the banks for the protection of the Bahrain pearl fleet. With the growth of security under British surveillance of the Gulf these police vessels, if they ever existed, disappeared; but the system of taxation was maintained both by the Shaikh of Bahrain and by the other Arab chiefs, who had meanwhile followed his example.* The amount of the Nob was originally one diver's share per boat, but crews might compound for it at the rate in early times of \$3, and later of \$4, per operative.

A second tax, called Taraz عراز, also came into general vogue many years ago; it was originally assessed at the rate of one diver's share for each boat. The intention was to provide the means of engaging hired watchmen in towns and villages during the absence in summer of the able-bodied male population; and a part of the dues now realised is even yet spent in this manner on summer watchmen called Matrazīyah,

It appears that Nob is properly a tax on boats and Taraz a poll tax Persia. on operatives, also that Nob was originally collected only in autumn and Taraz only in spring; but the terms are not now clearly understood even by the natives of the Gulf themselves. Much confusion has been caused by irregularity in collection, the people always endeavouring to pay as little as possible, and the Shaikhs to take as much as they can, and that in advance.

All the banks on the Persian side, with the exception of the banks in the Lingeh District which are public, are subject to territorial jurisdiction; this is partly due, no doubt, to the fact that they are all near the coast and in few, if any, cases more than 3 miles distant from land.

The subjects of the Shaikh in whose territory a bank is situated may work on it without special permission, and so may the subjects of a neighbouring Shaikh who is on terms of amity with the territorial Shaikh; but all foreigners,—that is to say all others, and among them Arab pearl fishers from the opposite side of the Gulf, - must come to a

^{*} There is some doubt as to the correctness of these statements. There is not now any perl tax called Nob in Bahrain.

special arrangement with the local authority before they are allowed to dive on any Persian bank. The taxes ordinarily levied by the Shaikhs from their own subjects and from those of friendly Shaikhs on the same coast are given in Annexure No. 6; and here we may add that the sum realised by the Shaikhs from outsiders who wish to work upon their banks generally varies from \$20 to \$40 per boat for the season, and that the permission is given in writing. The finder of a valuable pearl is expected to bring it secretly to the Shaikh, and, if he does so, he is generally compelled to part with it on payment of a mere fraction of its value; if, on the other hand, he fails to bring it, his life and property will both be in danger.

Revenue from the pearl fisheries is not as yet included in the Pessian Tūmār or list of revenue assets for each district, and the local Shaikhs conceal the amount of their incomes from this source as best they can from the Persian Government. When the Nizām-as-Saltaneh was Governor of the Gulf Ports he aspired to levy a Mālyāt of 4,000 Tūmāns on the pearl banks of the Shībkūh and Lingeh Districts; but the Shaikhs refused to pay, and he was unable to give effect to his intentions. In the Governorship of the Sa'ad-ul-Mulk, however, with the connivance of the merchants of Lingeh, a Mālyāt of Rs. 800 per annum was assessed by the Persian Deputy-Governor on 30 pearl boats of the Āl Bū Samait tribe at Lingeh Town and has ever since been regularly collected; this is the sole item of revenue which any Persian official recovers from pearl fisheries, and it is believed that the proceeds are divided between the Governor of the Gulf Ports and the Deputy-Governor of Lingeh.

Political questions connected with the pearl fisheries.

We have seen that the pearl fisheries are, on the western side of the Persian Gulf, the chief means of livelihood of the people; that they are participated in by the subjects of a number of separate states and principalities; and that they are at present carried on entirely by the native inhabitants of the Gulf. From these facts spring political considerations of great importance, which we propose to explain and illustrate in a short historical review, dealing first with matters of a purely local kind, and then with issues of a wider and international character.

Local political questions.

Maintenance of the peace.

Since 1853—the year in which the Trucial Shaikhs entered into a permanent mutual agreement for the preservation of peace at sea, while the British Government simultaneously undertook the responsibility of

enforcing its provisions—the British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf has been the final arbiter in all disputes, including pearl fishing disputes, between the Shaikhdoms of Trucial 'Omān; and maritime security, to the great benefit of the pearl fisheries, has been fully maintained. In earlier days, when feuds were carried on without restriction of time or place, the pearl banks were naturally the scene of frequent combats; and weak fleets of which the owners were unable to come to an understanding with their enemies were often, to the financial injury or ruin of the ports to which they belonged, practically excluded, during a season or more, from taking a share in the pearling operations. Under British protection the rights and safety of all are now perfectly secured, and breach of the peace at sea, on the pearl banks as elsewhere, is promptly and adequately punished: the latest instance occurred in 1900. when a fine of Rs. 1,500 was inflicted on the Al Bū 'Ali fleet for having dared to attack the boats of 'Amamarah pearl fishers while both were prosecuting their operations off the coast of Qatar.

In 1897 an important agreement, having special reference to the circumstances of the pearl industry, was concluded by all the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Oman at the instance of the British authorities; it provided for the mutual surrender by the Shaikhs of fraudulent absconders, especially pearl divers and sailors, from one jurisdiction to another. Each Shaikh became responsible under this agreement for the debts of runaways whom he might fail to hand over to their lawful rulers, as well as to a fine of \$50 in the case of each fugitive; and he was made liable, in the event of his allowing an absconder to proceed to the pearl banks in pursuance of his vocation, to a fine of \$100. If the facts were disputed the case was to be tried by a council or Majlis, whose decision, subject to confirmation by the British Political Resident, should be final. The results of this agreement in practice have been beneficial; and it is obvious, in view of the peculiar financial conditions governing the fishery, that the existence of some such understanding is essential to the continuance of the industry on its present basis, which is largely one of credit.

A case important to Arab rulers was one which arose in 1899 through the finding by a native of Kumzār, a subject of the Sultān of 'Oman, of an extremely valuable pearl, estimated, it is said, at about 3,500 Bombay Chaus; the question was of the share, if any, in the proceeds of the sale to which the Sultan, as sovereign of the finder, was entitled. The pearl was originally sold by the finders for \$2,000 to subjects of the Shaikh of Sharjah; and, after coming into the possession of the latter, it was sent to Bombay, where it was valued at Rs. 4,00,000, and subsequently to London. The finders then claimed that the sale by them should be invalidated under a principle of Shara' law; but, in the end, they were apparently prevailed on to accept a sum of about \$8,000, less commission. Meanwhile the Sultan of 'Oman, having heard of the case, had also demanded cancellation of the sale; this he did partly to assist the finders, his subjects, but partly also with a view to claiming a share in the proceeds. The matter was eventually settled in 1901 by a Majlis held in Trucial 'Oman, whose decision, given in writing and approved by the Sheikh of Shārjah, awarded the Sultān of the net price that might be obtained by the owners. The pearl after remaining unsold for some time in London, was brought back to Bombay and disposed of there for Rs. 1,00,000, and the share of the

Agreement to surrender debtors, 1897.

Kumzār pearl case, 1899-1901. Sultān should accordingly have amounted to about Rs. 30,000; but it is believed that, in consequence of mortgages, etc., he was obliged to content himself with \$12,000. This case, having been in effect compromised, will not afford a very useful precedent for the future.

International political questions on the Arabian side, 1857-1907.

Disputes between local authorities are, however, of slight importance in comparison with the difficulties which might arise were the local divers on the Arabian banks to be subjected to the competition of Europeans furnished with scientific appliances, more especially if, as some authorities believe, the effect of deep-sea dredging would be to destroy the colonies from which the oysters upon the shallow beds accessible to native divers are recruited. The representatives of the British Government, by whom the question has at different times been considered, have never doubted that, whether real damage were done to the native fisheries or not, the appearance of European rivals would arouse great animosity on the part of the Arabs, who regard the fisheries as their common but exclusive inheritance; and, in view of this fact, as well as of the possibility that an industry, on which many thousands of persons depend for their subsistence might actually be destroyed, the British Government have never ceased to oppose, by such means as have presented themselves. the intrusion of foreigners-including European British subjects-into the fishery.

Messrs. Watson's project, 1857. The question of European participation appears to have arisen for the first time in 1857, when Messrs. J. and W. Watson of Bombay were anxious to engage in the pearl fishery. Captain Felix Jones, I.N., however, the British Political Resident, on the matter being referred to him, reported that plunder, if not bloodshed, would certainly be provoked; and Her Majesty's Government, in consequence apparently of this opinion, refused to countenance operations by the firm.

Bombay syndicate, 1862.

In the season of 1862 the steamer Johnstone Castle, chartered by a Bombay syndicate, proceeded without official sanction to the Bahrain pearl banks and stationed there three Europeans and some native employés, with patent diving machines, to carry on operations in a Baghlah; the steamer then crossed to Büshehr, where she arrived at the beginning of July, and Mr. Plunkett, one of the charterers, had an interview there with Captain Disbrowe, the Acting Political Resident. The Acting Political Resident evidently regarded the situation as dangerous, for he immediately despatched a Government vessel to the banks with instructions to remove the Baghlah from the banks and bring it to Bushehr. On its arrival at Bushehr, on the 10th of July, the boat was found to be of Turkish nationality, --- a circumstance which might have occasioned complications, but did not. The secrecy with which the enterprise had been managed was attributed by those concerned in it to the necessity of concealing their operations from a rival company, and it appeared that their action had been taken in good faith, on the strength of a statement contained in an official publication that the banks "were free to all". The total gains of the party during the days that they had been at work were represented by 23 small seed pearls only.

The affair, however, was reported to have given rise to some apprehension among the pearl divers of Bahrain, and it led to a full discussion of policy between the Government of Bombay and the British Residents at Bushehr and Baghdad. Colonel Kemball, the Resident at Baghdad, who had long experience of the Persian Gulf, pointed out that the case which had occurred was a simple one, and that it would have been more difficult to deal with had the speculators been European foreigners holding a pearl fishing concession from some Arab chief; his final recommendation was that the Government of India should treat the Persian Gulf as a mare clausum, for the purpose of pearl diving, against all persons coming from ports or coasts situated beyond its limits, and should accordingly by proclamation refuse protection to such persons, whatever their nationality; action on these lines would, he considered, be sufficient to deter Europeans, at least, from interference with the fisheries. The action of Captain Disbrowe and the views of Colonel Kemball were generally approved by the Government of Bombay, but the Resident in the Persian Gulf was enjoined to observe caution in matters which affected the rights either of foreigners or of Arabs, and he was ordered to report on the extent of the pearl banks and the nature of the rules and customs by which boundaries and rights were governed, as well as on the manner of settling disputes heretofore, and the best means of preserving the peace without involving the British Government in an inconvenient protectorate. Colonel Pelly, the Resident at Bushehr, on the ground that no practical advantage was likely to be gained, whereas the suspicions of the Arabs would probably be aroused and inconvenient claims by Persia, Turkey and the Wahhabi ruler might be provoked, deprecated inquiry or any attempt to systematise the rights and customs of the fisheries; and at the same time he suggested that the proclamation of a mare clausum in the Persian Gulf was a serious step, which might bring the British Government into conflict with European or American powers, and that a reserved attitude on the question would be preferable. In the end, no proclamation was made, and the demand for detailed information regarding the pearl fisheries was withdrawn by the Bombay Government.

The international position of the pearl banks attracted no further attention until 1872, when it became known that Mid-hat Pāsha, the Turkish Wāli of Baghdād, contemplated the exploitation of certain pearl banks in the Persian Gulf by means of an English diver. The diver reached Baghdād in May 1872, but a personal warning that British protection would not be extended to him in his operations apparently had the desired result, for, in the end, the Turkish scheme was not carried into effect.

In 1873 a British firm, Messrs. Smith and Company, of London, endeavoured to obtain a footing as pearl fishers in the Gulf; and in October of that year—while a request which they had made to the Foreign office for recognition and assistance was still under consideration—their representative in the person of Mr. W. Grant, an officer of the late Indian Navy, made his appearance at Büshehr. Here he had an interview with Colonel Ross, the Political Resident, who declined to

Discussions regarding British policy, 1862-1863.

Mid-hat Pāsha's scheme, 1872.

Messrs.
Smith and
Company's
project,
1873.

assist him without special instructions from Government; and Colonel Ross at the same time informed Government that, in his opinion, no Shaikh had the wish, the right, or the power to grant a pearl fishing concession. From Bühsher Mr. Grant made his way to Bahrain, but the Shaikh refused to hold relations with him; and, having been warned of the danger involved in visiting the rest of the Arab coast, Mr. Grant appears to have returned to Europe, re infecta; nor was anything more heard of Messrs. Smith and Company's project.

Mr. Streefer's application 1889.

The next prospector to come forward was Mr. E. W. Streeter of London, who at the end of 1889 approached the Foreign Office with a request for their countenance in fishing for pearls, with the permission of the Arab Shaikhs, at depths beyond the reach of native divers. Along with his application he submitted a pamphlet on the Gulf pearl fisheries, compiled by himself from all available sources of information, in which the existing methods were denounced as a "terrible system of bondage. as degrading and oppressive as slavery itself". Colonel Ross, the Resident in the Gulf, on being consulted, stated it as his opinion that the Arabs would not, of their own free will, consent to operations being undertaken by Mr. Streeter; and that, even if they did, the support of Mr. Streeter's scheme by the British Government would involve responsibilities, the nature and extent of which it was impossible to foresee. The Government of India, accordingly, advised the Secretary of State that it was not desirable to encourage Mr. Streeter; that the Arabs had long regarded the banks as their exclusive property, and would 1, sent the intrusion of foreigners; that operations in deep water might prejudicially affect the fertility of the shallower banks; and that inconvenient territorial claims on the part of the Persian and Turkish Governments might be revived. The application was accordingly refused by Her Majesty's Government on the ground that compliance with it "would be likely to give rise to serious difficulties "; but Mr. Streeter did not. apparently, at once renounce his ideas, for, in October 1891, a M. Steinberger of Paris called upon Colonel Talbot, the Resident in the Gulf, at Bushehr, and made enquiries, on behalf of Mr. Streeter and others, as to the feasibility of deep-water operations by Europeans on the Arabian side. His proposals were however discouraged, and he reported to his principals in a sense unfavourable to the undertaking.

Attempts to obtain concessions from the Porte, 1899-1900.

Early in 1899 it was reported that attempts were being made to obtain from the Turkish Government a pearl fishing concession in the Persian Gulf; but enquiries which were set on foot at Constantinople showed that, if proposals had been made, they had not as yet been entertained. About a year later, however, it became known that the Porte were anxious to find a financial group who would take up a concession of the kind in question, and that the matter had been discussed, in general terms, between a M. Rechnitzer and the Sultan's second Secretary. It was accordingly decided to warn the Turkish Government of the possession of prescriptive rights, in regard to the Arabian fisheries, by the littoral Arabs whose chiefs had entered into special relations with the Government of India: this course was dictated by the consideration that the British Government were generally regarded as under an obligation to protect the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Oman and Bahrain in the possession of their maritime rights. The Turkish minister who was addressed promised to bear this communication in

mind, and at the same time he denied that any recent application for a concession had been received by the Porte; but, notwithstanding this disclaimer, it was ascertained that one Montran Effendi Rashid had lately offered £T 100,000, on behalf of an Anglo-Syrian or Anglo-Ecyptian syndicate, for a concession of the pearl fisheries in the Red Sea and on the eastern coast of Arabia from Kuwait to Qatif, as well as a royalty of £T 40,000 per annum; that it had been ruled by the Turkish Financial Commissioner that the pearl fisheries were a matter within the province of the Public Debt Administration; and that the grant of the proposed concession had been held to be impossible on account of the opposition of the Arab Shaikhs, of disturbances in Hasa, and of various other political obstacles. About the same time the Wali of Basrah was pressed by the Turkish Government to recover the full pearling dues payable in Qatar and Bahrain; but he reported that the attitude of the Shaikhs made this impracticable, and that in any case two revenue cutters, which he had not at his disposal, would be required for the work.

In July 1900 Ratansi Parshotam, a British Indian merchant settled Trucial at Masqat, after obtaining leave from the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi Shaikhs and making arrangements with the Bani Yas tribe, sent two Indian drivers with diving apparatus to the pearl banks; but the venture failed, in consequence, it was said, of the inexperience of the divers 1900. in pearling operations, and of the boat being taken by the Arab guides to an unsuitable place. The Government of India thought that the affair, if no notice were taken of it, might form an embarrassing precedent; and Colonel Kemball, Political Resident at Bushehr, accordingly gave it to be known that permission for such undertakings should not be granted in future by the Trucial Shaikhs, and that British subjects seeking to obtain permission should be referred to the Resident. Enquiries by Colonel Kemball from the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Oman and Bahrain showed that the banks were regarded as the common property of the coast Arabs, that no Shaikh had the right to grant permission for diving to foreigners, and that the appearance of divers equipped with European diving dresses would probably not be regarded with equanimity by the local operatives. Accordingly in March 1902, when Tek Chand Dwarka, a British Indian subject in Bahrain, stated that he had been offered a concession by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi for pearl fishing by means of diving apparatus and enquired whether he could be guaranteed against molestation in case of his taking it up, he was informed by the Assistant Political Agent in Bahrain that it was not legally in the power of the Shaikh to grant any concession of the sort.

The next symptom of outside interest in the pearl fisheries was the visit of the "Selika", a small Belgian steam yacht, to the Persian Gulf in ture, 1901. the spring of 1901. The "Selika", after leaving Masqat, disappeared till the 11th of April, or about a month later, when she made her appearance at Bahrain; but those on board admitted that most of the interim had been spent in the neighbourhood of the pearl banks, and it was afterwards ascertained that on their return to Europe they had disposed of a quantity of small pearls.

Belgian ven-

It is noteworthy that in the same year it was announced, in the British com-"Daily Express" of the 9th of May 1901, that an influential German munication

to the Porte,

syndicate were negotiating with the Porte for a monopoly of the pearl fisheries along the Ottoman shores of the Red Sea and Persian Gulf, with a view to working them by scientific methods; a somewhat similar statement also appeared at the same time in the "Moniteur Oriental". The British Ambassador at Constantinople accordingly brought it to the notice of the Porte that the operations which appeared to be contemplated would excite the jealousy of the natives, and he alluded to the moral obligation under which the British Government lay to protect the rights of the Trucial Shaikhs in the matter. The Turkish Minister denied knowledge of the negotiations, but he promised to take note of the Ambassador's statement; and nothing further was heard of the syndicate or their scheme.

Proceedings of MM. Dumas and Castelin, 1903.

The question of the international status of the pearl fisheries was at length, in 1903, brought to an issue by the apparent intention of two French subjects to establish themselves in Bahrain and take part in the industry. M M. Dumas and Castelin, the former a partner in the Marseilles firm of Dumas et Guien, arrived in Bahrain in February 1903; M. Dumas was provided with letters of recommendation from the French Ministries of Commerce and Foreign Affairs. On the 25th of March M. Dumas called on the British Political Resident at Bushehr and sounded him as to the possibility of engaging in the fishery; he was informed by Colonel Kemball that his operations would be attended by risk, and that he would probably meet with active opposition. M. Dumas then returned to Bahrain, and in April he made advances to the Shaikh through Tek Chand; but his overtures were repulsed by the Shaikh, who asserted the grant of a pearling concession to be impossible. Ultimately, in May 1903, his affairs making no progress, and an outbreak of plague having occurred, M. Dumas left Bahrain and was not again seen there; but the importance and scope of the questions which his project had all but raised were now fully appreciated, and steps were taken by the of India to bring them to a settlement. It was foreseen that, in event of the forcible intrusion on the fishery of European foreigners, the Trucial Shaikhs would immediately appeal for protection to the British Government; and it was therefore necessary that a line of policy should be laid down in advance.

Legal opinion in regard to British policy, 1905. The matter was placed before His Majesty's Government in a despatch of the Government of India, dated the 8th of March 1904, and it was subsequently referred for opinion to the Law Officers of the Crown. The finding of the Law Officers, dated the 11th of February 1905, dealt separately with the question of the rights of the Arab tribes and with that of effective steps for their protection.

The Law Officers were of opinion that, within the three-mile limit and in any other waters which might justly be considered territorial, the tribes of the Arabian coast were entitled to the exclusive use of the pearl fisheries. As regards pearl banks outside territorial waters it was held that, as a matter of international law, such banks were capable of being the property of the tribes to the exclusion of all nations; and the case of the Ceylon pearl banks and the views of various authorities* were cited in support of this

^{*} One of these was the Swiss publicist Vattel who in his "Droit des Gens" has remarked: "Qui doutera que les pécheries de perles de Bahrein et de Ceylan ne puissent légitimement tomber en propriété?"

view: whether such proprietary rights existed in the case of the Persian Gulf banks or not was, however, a question the answer to which must depend on the evidence available as to the enjoyment of the bank fisheries by the tribes and the exclusion of others from them. It was added, with reference to the banks, that there appeared to be grounds for asserting the possession by the tribes of an exclusive right of fishery; that the enjoyment of such a right by the tribes in common was not a bar in law to its acquisition; and that, regard being had to the relations of His Majesty's Government with the tribes on the western shores of the Gulf, the existence of the right might properly be maintained on their behalf by His Majesty's Government. With regard to deep waters, where the tribes themselves had not been accustomed to fish, itdid not appear to the Law Officers that a claim by the tribes to exclude aliens from such waters could be advanced with any chance of success.

The recommendations of the Law Officers in regard to practical measures of protection were that fishing by foreigners within territorial waters might be prevented, but that indirect means should, if possible, be taken to discourage them from pearling on the non-territorial banks or in deep water; in the last resort, however, it would be admissible, in the case of the banks only, to effect the compulsory removal of the vessels; but such measures should be taken with caution, and only after obtaining authority from the local chiefs. The Law Officers also pointed out that the whole question might be raised, if this were considered politic, in a form suitable for decision by the Hague Tribunal; but they added that, as the result of such a reference was uncertain, it would probably be better to avoid raising the question internationally.

International political questions on the Persian side, 1883-1907.

The Persian pearl banks are situated, almost without exception, in the territorial waters of Persia, and their international status is correspondingly clear; moreover, as they are subject to the chiefs in whose jurisdictions they lie, there is not in their case any question of common popular rights on a large scale. Any difficulties which may arise on this side of the Gulf are likely to concern the Persian Government chiefly, and to have their origin in a conflict between the rights of the central Government and those of the local chiefs, who, as we have seen, have been able up to the present time, to exclude the Government from any share in the profits of the fishery. Nevertheless, the question of pearl diving operations under European or other foreign auspices is not without importance even on the Persian coast.

In 1882 a concession to fish for pearls on the Persian banks was obtained by the Mukhbir-ud-Dauleh, the Persian Minister of Telegraphs, who was also a candidate at the same time for a navigation concession on the Kārūn River and for oil-mining rights elsewhere; in all these schemes he was, either openly or privately, associated with the British firm of Messrs. Gray, Paul & Co. of Būshehr. The pearl fishing concession was the only one of the various projects which actually came into operation: it was expressly restricted to the territorial waters of

The Mukhbir-ud-Dauleh's concession, 1882. Persia. A European professional diver was brought out and tried the banks near Lingeh and Khārag, but the results were poor and the operations ended in loss.

Illicit enterprise of a British Indian, 1883. An attempt to exploit the Persian banks with modern appliances was also made by a Khōjah, a British Indian subject, who arrived at Lingeh in May 1883 with two Indian divers and a diving dress; he proposed to experiment first on the Persian side and then on the coast of 'Omān. Disregarding an injunction by the Commander of H. M. S. "Philomel" to wait until his intentions had been reported to proper authority and orders obtained, he commenced operations on the Persian coast; but his enterprise was a failure, and he eventually returned to Bombay, apparently without visiting the Arab banks.

Efforts of Messrs.
Malcolm, etc., to obtain a concession, 1890-94.

About 1890, persistent efforts were made by several foreign capitalists to obtain a pearl fishing concession from the Persian Government, but the particulars are obscure. Perhaps the first to move were the Armenian firm of Messrs. T. J. Malcolm & Co., trading under British protection at Būshehr, with whom were associated in this matter the British shipping firm of Messrs. Strick & Co., London. Other would-be concessionaires, among them Mr. Streeter of London, appear to have been in the field soon afterwards; and the Persian Bank Mining Rights Corporation seem to have advanced a claim to the pearl fisheries as falling within the scope of their mining concessions, but it was disallowed by the Persian Government. Eventually the promise of a monopoly was obtained by Messrs. Malcolm, but it was almost immediately revoked at the instance of the British Legation at Tehrān; the reasons for the action of the Legation are not ascertainable in India.

Nothing more was then heard of the matter until the end of 1893, when Mr. Streeter made inquiries from Colonel Talbot, lately Resident in the Persian Gulf, whether Messrs. Malcolm were a firm with whom he might safely have relations.

On the 6th of January 1894, Mr. T. J. Malcolm approached the Foreign Office in London and sought to obtain withdrawal of the objections to the grant of a concession in his favour. The point was referred to the Government of India, who regarded Mr. Malcolm's request with disfavour on account of the political complications with local chiefs which its acceptance might entail, of the impossibility of making sure that operations would really be confined to Persian territorial waters, and of the probability that a stimulus would be given to European interest in the pearl fisheries of the Gulf generally. In the end Mr. Malcolm's application was rejected, with the remark that the working of the concession would give rise to serious difficulties and that Her Majesty's Government were therefore unable to lend their support.

MM. Sunyé and Hagens' concession, 1898-1907. In March 1898, a pearl fishing monopoly was at length actually granted by the Persian Government to M. Sunyé, a Spaniard, and M. Hagens, a Belgian, both of whom were adventurers of notoriously bad character; the term of the grant was for 30 years from the 21st of March 1898. The privileges conveyed were restricted to deep waters inaccessible to native divers, but they extended, subject to this provision, and to a special stipulation against interference with the rights or methods of the existing native divers to "the whole of the Persian coasts." In return for the concession an annual royalty

of 250,000 francs was to be paid by the holders to the Persian Government. At the beginning of 1899, a British merchant in London was invited by a French correspondent in Paris to form a syndicate for taking over the concession, but, before the negotiations had made any progress. he was informed by M. Sunyé that the concern had now passed into the hands of Russian capitalists; M. Sunyé explained that the concession, which had lapsed through non-payment of the first instalment of the royalty, had been renewed in his sole name through Russian influence. Up to the end of June 1900 the first instalment of the royalty was still apparently unpaid, and attempts had been made to place the concession at Odessa; but the utmost secrecy was maintained by those interested, and little information could be obtained. There is some reason to think that the visit of the "Selika" to the Gulf in 1901, already mentioned, was connected with this matter; but active operations under the concession have not yet been begun (1907), and the concession may possibly have lapsd.

In 1899 and 1900 the subject of this concession was discussed Communicawith the Persian Government, who at first asked the reason of the British inquiries and were informed in reply that all matters connected with pearl fishing rights in the Persian Gulf were of interest to Britain, especially when there was any question of conceding them to foreigners. chief uncertainty, however, was as to the actual local limits of the Sunyé concession, and it necessitated a warning to the Persian Government that Her Majesty's Government could not recognise any contract which might interfere with the rights exercised by chiefs under British protection; to this the Mushir-ud-Dauleh merely replied, with some reserve, that the Persian Government could only grant a concession in so far as their own rights extended, and that it was out of the question that British rights should be affected. Reference to the charts of the Persian Gulf showed that the deep waters within Persian jurisdiction, to which alone the concession could apply, were of triffing extent, not exceeding 820 square geographical miles in all.

The latest venture threatening European interference with the Persian pearl fisheries is that of the Sponge Exploration Syndicate Limited, a company with a nominal capital of £1,000, registered in London but directed chiefly by foreigners of various nationalities. 1905 the company more than once addressed the Foreign Office in London, seeking their good offices for the purpose of obtaining concessions: they at first described their business as that of "sponge, pearl and coral finders", but subsequently declared their intention to occupy themselves, in the Persian Gulf, exclusively with sponges. No assistance was given them; but, during the late Shah's tour in Europe, they succeeded in procuring at Vichy, on the 29th of August 1905, a 50 years' concession and monopoly for sponge fishing in Persian waters. Under this authority some diving was carried on in 1905 and 1906 by Greek employés of the syndicate; but nothing happened to fulfil the expectation, locally entertained, that attempts would be made by the company to combine illicit pearl fishing with their legitimate operations in sponges.

A Parisian jeweller, Mme. Nattan, came to Bahrain for the pearl season of 1905 and remained there from the beginning of August till the end of October. She had some difficulty in establishing relations with the local dealers, but eventually succeeded in buying pearls on the spot to the amount of Rs. 40,000.

tions between the British and Persian Governments. 1899-1900.

Recent proceedings of European foreigners.

ANNEXURE NO. 1.—STATISTICS OF THE VALUE OF PEARLS EXPORTED ANNUALLY FROM THE PRINCIPAL EMPORIA OF THE PERSIAN GULF BETWEEN 1873 AND 1906.*

Year.	Trucial 'Oman (in Bs.)	Bahrain (in Rs.)	Lingeh (in Ks.)	Masqat (in \$.)	Būshehr (10 Rs.)	Bandar 'Ab- bās (in Rs.)	Approximate total annual values (in sterling).
	11.00.000	21,00,000	45,50,000	20,000	46,500		£ 625,933
1873-74	11,80,000	21,00,000	57 ,00,000	30,000			723,775
1874-75	12,00,000	28,00,000	32,00,000	50,000	•••		549,000
1875-76	14,90,000	21,75,000	23,72,000	20,000			391,806
1876-77	10,00,000	18,50,000	23,95,000	30,000		l	371,306
1877-78	21,24,200		29,95, 000	3,000	•••	•••	371,098
1878-79	12,16,560	15,20,000	22,40,000	50,000	•••	•••	344,187
1879-80	14,00,000	18,11,000 20,23,000	22,40,000 22,76,000	60,000	•••	•••	366,408
1880-81	30,50,000		28,47,000	80,000	•••	•••	378,922
1881-82	26,65,000	15,86,000	23,98,000	60,000	•••	•••	339,381
1882-83	22,87,000	16,59,000		45,000	•••	•••	385,742
1883-84	28,22,000	19,77,500	26,80,100	40,000	2,000	•••	408,267
1884-85	39,78,000	23,12,000	26,82,900	41,000	2,000	•••	375,071
1885-86	26,00,000	17,44,000	31,20,000	65,000	11,700	•••	327,968
1886-87	18,00,000	18,21,000	25,61,000	70,000	27,500	•••	408,870
1887-88	26,00,000	24,93,500	31,80,000		19,000	•••	523,637
1888-89	50,00,000	32,07,000	43,34,000	75,000		•••	
1889-90	40,00,000	33,31,000	44,85,000	80,000	13,000	•••	549,243
1890-91	27,00,000	38,76,000	32,05,500	60,000	21,200	•••	541,702
1891-92	35, 00,000	42,31,000	40,95,000	50,000	34,500	•••	588,709
1892-93	52,50,00 0	49,25,000	48,50,000	55,000	5,000	•••	614,004
1893-94	50,00,000	36,93,750	42,05,000	50,000	8,440	•••	483,767
1894-95	60,00,000	46,58,620	39,03,000	40,000	32,200		473,446
1895-96	80,00,000	38,55,000	41,02,000	30,000	•••	71,000	458,320
1896-97	1,00,00,000	51,67,000	38,65,000	30,000	•••		545,520
1897-98	75,00,000	39,11,000	35,72,000	35,000	•••	15,600	481,010
1898-99	55,00,00 0	47,93,000	38,51,000	40,000	***	20,000	577,523
1899-1900	77,49,990	68,24,430	33,99,900	50,000	52,005	•••	689,533
1900-01	42,00,000	39,61,700	27,50,000	55,000	•••		449,508
1901-02	50,00,000	71,30,100	40,13,500	25,0 00	•••	15,00 0	741,465
1902-03	80,00,000	84,95,610	70,41,648	52,0 00	2,025	•••	1,307,241
1903-04	90,00,000	1,02,75,300	4 9, 05, 000	22,000	•••	•••	1,493,975
1904-05	50,00,000	1,04,88,000	6,23,800	30,000	1,800	1,000	1,076,973
Totals	13,28,12,750	12,27,95,510	11,23,98,348	14,43,000	2,76,870	1,22,60 0	17,963,310
Averages	41,50,398	38,37,359	35,12,448	45,093	8,652	3,831	£561,353

*The figures in the last column of the table have been obtained by excluding those for Trucial 'Omān up to and including the year 1901-02, as during that period all pearls from Trucial 'Omān were exported through Lingeh and were therefore included in the exports of that place. In 1902-03 and in 1903-04, however, only about $\frac{1}{3}$ and $\frac{1}{3}$ respectively of the produce of Trucial 'Omān were exported through Lingeh; the remainder in those years and the whole in 1904-05 were exported direct. The interchange of pearls between the other emporia has been neglected (except in the year 1905-06, where it is allowed for) as it is insignificant and is, moreover, probably countervailed by a quantity of pearls escaping registration. The Masqat dollar from 1873-74 to 1896-97 inclusive has been converted at the rate of \$1 = Rs. 2 and from 1897-98 to 1904-06 at the rate of \$3 = Rs. 4. Rupees have been converted at the average sterling rate prevailing in India in each year.

The statistics for the Arabian side depend on the amount of business known to have been transacted by individual merchants; those for the Persian side are based on the Customs returns. In both cases the figures are probably below the truth, in consequence of omissions and intentional undervaluations.

The statistics for the year 1905-06, in which Kuwait figures for the first time, are as follow:—

							Rs.
Bahrain	•		•	•		,	1,26,03,000
Trucial 'Omān	•	•					80,00,000
Lingeh				•			6,95,861
Kuwait .							1,34,700
Masqat .			•		•	•	22,560
Bandar 'Abbās							Nil.

giving a total value, at the present rate of exchange, of £ 1,434,399 sterling.

A few remarks explanatory of the fluctuations from year to year of the total estimated value of the pearl harvest may not be out of place here. The principal factors are the number and quality of the pearls obtained, which vary from year to year, and the prices ruling in the market; the second of these considerations is perhaps the more important, and, in comparing recent years with early ones in the table above, it must be remembered that average prices have more than doubled since 1877. The number of the pearls obtained depends, partly, on the greater or less productivity of the oysters and, partly, on accidents of weather, epidemic disease, etc., which interfere with diving operations.

In 1877 the yield of pearls was good, but bad weather counteracted the success of the operations. In 1883 a new bank in 3 fathoms was found to the south of Hālūl Island. The season of 1885 was unpropitious, and a number of deaths from deep diving occurred. In 1893 cholera in Bahrain, and in 1894 fever in Trucial 'Omān, made those seasons less successful than they would otherwise have been. In 1896 and 1897 many boats and lives were lost in consequence of storms. In 1899, in anticipation of the Paris Exhibition of 1900, there was much speculation locally in pearls; but the speculators failed to realise the prices they expected, and many bankruptcies followed. The take in 1901 was good, as regards both quantity and quality, and the approach of the coronation of His Majesty King Edward VII caused a local rise in the price of pearls.

In 1902 the season was a good one for divers, but unprofitable to dealers, as local prices continued to increase. In 1903 the yield was not very large; but the quality was good, and prices still went on rising on the spot, in advance of the Bombay market. In 1904 there was a strong reaction, many of the previous season's pearls being still unsold: the take also was less, partly in consequence of gales.

ANNEXURE No. 2.—STATISTICS OF THE VALUE OF MOTHER-OF-PEARL SHELLS EXPORTED ANNUALLY FROM THE PRINCIPAL EMPORIA OF THE PERSIAN GULF BETWEEN 1873 AND 1906.**

Year.	Trucial 'Omān (in Rs.)	Bahrain (in Rs.)	Lingeh (m Rs.)	Masqat (in \$,)	Büshehr (in Rs.)	Approximate total annual values (in sterling.)
	Ť	1				£
	4 000	15,000		20.000		4,065
1873-74	4,900	2,500	20,000	30,000		7,424
1874-75	5,000	3,200	38,000	50,000		12,492
1875-76	1,300	400	32,000	20,000		16,158
1876-77	1,500	350	55,000	60,000		15,101
1877-78	2,500	4,500	2.04,000	18,000		19,792
1878 79	5,000	1,300	74,900	35,000	14,000	13,202
1879-80	10,600	2.000	1,52,300	12,000	30,000	17,147
1880-81	27,000	2,250	1,73,500	16,000	5,000	17,408
1891-82	88,000	2,400	1,40,500	23,000	•••	15,201
1882-83	45,000	2,550	1,65,000	9,545	1,500	15,130
1883-84	6,500	2,700	1,42,200	12,000	2,000	13,580
1884-85	73,000	2,850	1,27,400	15,000	9,700	12,725
1885-86	79,000	, 1	70,000	20,000		7,975
1886-87	50,000	***	96,000	20,000	•••	9,520
1887-88	15,000	•••	95,000	16,000	•••	8,625
1888-89	25,000	•••	1,65,000	13,000		13,131
1889-90	55,030	•••	1,49,000	14,000	•••	13,275
1890-91	60,000 80,000	22,100	99.000	20,000		10,056
1891-92		59,400	1,47,200	25,000	3,04,850	32,091
1892-93	78,000	79,100	1.12,000	30,000	4,25,060	37,267
1893-94	60,000 70,000	74,250	48,200	27,000	76,360	10,759
1894-95	65,000	75,100	50,800	20,000	1,87,650	16,842
1895-96	50, 000	79,500	30,200	20,000	2,23,040	18,786
1896-97	50,000	91,120	36,900	25,000	3,37,442	27,441
1897-98	50,000	1,11,320	48,600	30,000	7,95,200	60,395
1898-99	69,990	67,905	79,725	35,000	3,34,710	31,871
1899-1900	31,000	1,12,730	51,000	1,17,180	1,86,096	27,925
1900-01	35,000	1,61,515	92,000	22,588	1,07,606	17,894
1901-02	35,000	1,04,715	88,500	70,500	24,197	15,525
1902-0 1903-04	40,030	2,36,190	68,500	62,500	27,165	30,439
1904-05	25,000	2,05,420	52,405	60,000	32,457	26,260
Totals	12,93,290	15,22,365	29,04,830	9,68,313	31,24,033	5,85,502
Averages	40,415	47,573	90,775	30,259	97,626	£18,297

^{*} The figures in the last column of the table have been obtained by excluding those for Trucial 'Oman, of which the entire produce is exported through Lingeh, and is included in the returns for that place up to and including the year 1902-03; \(\frac{3}{2}\) of the produce of Bahrain also has been deducted for a similar reason during the same period. The exports of the other emporia do not overlap. The values of the Masqat dollar and of the rupee have been calculated as in Annexure No. 1.

The statistics for the year 1905-06 were as follow:—

								Rs.
Bahrain		•	•	•	•		•	86,500
Masqat	•	•			•	•		75,000
Lingeh	•							12,119

giving a total value, at the present rate of exchange, £11,572 sterling.

The fluctuations in the mother-of-pearl trade appear to depend chiefly on irregularities of demand, for supply can be assured so long as prices are good. In December 1891 the Shaikh of Bahrain conferred a monopoly of the shell export trade in his dominions on a British firm at Büshehr; the protests of Bahrain merchants soon caused him to revoke the concession, but he substituted for it, at first, a duty so heavy that it was feared the trade might be extinguished. In 1892-93 large quantities of inferior shells from the Persian coast were exported, with the result that in the following year there was no demand in Europe and the prices of shells fell very low, and in 1894-95 shells became almost unsaleable; but in the next year the market began to recover. In 1898-1899 there was a strong European demand, which led to speculation in shells and to the exportation of shells of bad quality, followed in 1899-1900 by heavy losses among Gulf merchants engaged in the trade. Prices were poor in 1900-01, and in 1901-02 the European market was still overstocked. In 1903-04 the trade underwent a sudden development in Bahrain in consequence of the local operations of Herr Wönckhaus, a German merchant.

ANNEXURE No. 3.—TABLE OF BOATS AND MEN EMPLOYED IN THE PEARL FISHERIES OF THE PERSIAN GULF, 1907.*

Arabian side.

		1	1		·
Region.	District,	Port.	Number of boats belonging to the port.	Number of men employed on the boats belonging to the port.†	Country under protection (or virtual protec- tion) of which the boats are.
Trucial 'Oman.	Rās-al- Khaimah.	Rams.	3	45	Great Bri- tain.
Do.	Do.	Rās-al-Khai- mah Town.	33	707	Do.
Do.	Do.	Jazīrat-al- Hamra.	25	608	Do.
Do.	Umm-al- Qaiwain.	Umm-al-Qai- wain Town.	70	1,759	Do.
Do.	Shārjah.	Hamriyah.	17	259	Do.
Do.	'Ajmān.	'Ajmān Town.	40	781	Do.
Do.	Shārjah.	Hairah.	25	405	Do.
Do.	Do.	Shārjah Town.	183	3,680	Do.
Do.	Do.	Khān.	74	1,295	Do.
Do.	Dibai.	Dibai Town.	335	6,936	Do.
Do.	Abu Dhaki	Abu Dhabi Town (and minor ports).	410	5,570	Do.

In Trucial 'Oman the total number of boats is 1,215 and of men 22,045; the average crew is thus about 18 men per boat.

The figures given in these tables do not always agree with those given in the Geographical Volume of the Gazetteer. Numbers of boats fluctuate from year to year at any given port according to the treatment of the owners, etc., by the Shaikh or other authority.

[†] In some cases a number of the men beloug not to the port but to some other place; and so throughout the remainder of the tables.

Region.	District.	Port.	Number of boats belonging to the port.	Number of men employed on the boats belonging to the port.	Country under protection (or virtual protes- tion) of which the boats are.
Qatar.	•••	Wakrah.	150	2,550	None.
Do.	•••	Dōhah.	350	6,300	Po.
Do.	***	Lūsail.	9	90	Do.
Do.	•••	Dha'āin.	70	840	Do.
Do.	•••	Sumaismah.	50	600	Do.
Do.	•••	Khor Shaqiq.	80	1,200	Do.
Do.	***	Dhakhīrah.	15	180	Do.
Do.		Fuwairat.	35	420	Do.
Do.	***	Ruwais.		270	Do.
Do.	•••	Abu Dhalūf.	20	200	Do.
Do.	•••	Khor Hassān.	20	240	Г)о.

In Qatar the total number of boats is 817, and of men 12,890; the average crew is thus about 16 men per boat.

Region.	District .	Port.	Number of boats belouging to the port.	Number of men of men employed on the boats belonging to the port.	Country under protection (or wirtual protec- tion) of which the boats are.
Bahrain.	Bahrain Is- land.	Hālat-bin- Anas	9	135	Great Britain.
Do.	Do	'Aqur.	6	78	Do.
Do.	Do.	'Askar.	16	380	Do.
Do.	Do.	Bārbār, Dirāz and Bani Jamrah.	17	238	Do.
Do.	Do.	Budaiya'.	57	1,482	Do.
Do.	Do.	Hālat Bin- Iswār.	16	384	Do.

Region.	Distric t.	Port.	Number of boats belonging to the port.	Number of men employed on the boats belonging to the port.	Country under protection (or virtual protection) of which the boats are
Bahrain.	Bahrain Is- land.	Jasairah.	11.	154	Great Bri-
Do.	Do.	Jaon.	23	474	Do.
Do.	Do.	Jubailāt.	23	368	Do.
Do.	Do	Jufair.	15	255	Do.
Do.	Do.	Ma'āmir.	17	283	Do.
Do.	Do.	Rās-ar- Rummān	19	347	Do.
Do.	Do.	Sanābis.	30	434	Do.
Do.	Do.	Sharaibah.	13	195	·Do.
ijo.	Do.	Zallāq.	16	224	Do.
Do	Muharraq	Pusaitīn.	32	629	Do.
Do.	Island. Do.	Dair.	21	378	Da
Do.	Do.	Hadd.	167	3,146	Do.
Do.	Do.	Muharraq Town.	282	5,582	Do.
Do.	Do.	Hālat-an-Na'- īm and Hālat- as-Sulutah.	51	1,172	Do.
Do	Do.	Qalāli.	21	441	Do.
Do.	Dø.	Samāhij.	11	186	Do.
Do.	Dø.	Umm-ash- Shajar.	1 2	231	Do.
Do.	Nabi Sālih Island.	•••	10	130	Do.
Do.	Sitrah Island.		22	308	Do.

In Bahrain the total number of boats is 917 and of men 17,633; the average crew is thus about 19 men per boat.

Region.	District.	Port.	Number of poats belonging to the port.	Number of men employed on the boats belonging to the port.	Country under protection (or virtual protec- tion) of which the boats are.
Hasa Sanjāq.	Jinnah and Musallamiyah Tslands.	•••	12	175	Turkey.
Do.	Qatif Oasis.	'Awāmīyah.	5	90	Do.
Do.	Do.	Babāri.	7	1.12	Do.
Do.	Do.	Dabaibıyalı.	4.	84	Do.
Do.	Do.	Kawaikib.	5	114	Do.
Do.	Do.	Qatīf Town (Farīq-al- Maqbarah).	4.	80	Do.
Do.	Do.	Qudaih.	10	185	Do.
Do.	Do.	Saihāt.	30	560	Do.
Do.	Tārūt Island.	Dārīn.	15	357	Do.
$\mathbf{D}_{\mathbf{G}}$	Do.	Fanyah.	7	122	Do.
Do.	Do.	Sanābis.	68	1,565	D o.
	1				

In Hasa the total number of boats is 167, and of the men 3,444; the average crew is thus about 21 men per boat.

3					
Region.	District.	Port.	Number of boats belong- ing to the port.	Number of men employed on the boats belonging to the port.	Country under protection (or virtual protec- tion) of which the boats are.
Kuwait.		Kuwait Town	461	9,200	Grent Britain.

In Kuwait the average crew is thus about 20 men per boat.

Region.	District.	Port. Number boats belonging the port.		Number of men employed on the boats belonging to the port.	Country under protection of which the bcats are.
Turkish'Irāq	•		. Nil.	Nil.	Turkey .

Thus, on the Arabian side, the total number of boats owned and employed in the pearl fisheries is at the present time about 3,577.

while the number of the inhabitants of that side to whom the fisheries afford employment appears to be about 65,212.

Persian side.

District,	Port.	D	Tumber of boats belonging to the port.	Number of men employed on boats belonging to the port.	Country under the protection (or virtual protection) of which the boats are.
Southern'Arabistan.	•••	- -	Nil.	Nil.	Persia.
Līrāvi.)			Do.	Do.	Do.
Hayat Davud.	Khārag Island.		40	250	Do.
Shabankareh.	•••		Nil.	Nil.	Do.
Rnd-hilleh.	•••		Do.	Do.	Do.
Angāli.			\mathbf{Do}_{\bullet}	Do.	Do.
Dashtistān.			Do.	Do.	Do.
Bushehr Peninsula.			Do.	Do.	Do.
Tangistān.			Do.	Do.	Do.
Dashti.			Do.	Do.	Do.
Shibküh.	'Asalu		25	137	Do.
Do.	Nakhl Taqi .		14	70	Do.
Do.	Hālat Nāband		25	257	Do.
Do.	Naband .		47	155	Do.
Do.	Barku .		16	16	Do.
Do.	Rās Ghurāb		20	20	Do.
Do.	Ghaf		12	12	Do.
Do.	Khuvādān .	•	13	29	Do.
Do.	Tibin .		11	23	Do.
Do.	'Amariyeh .	•	8	20	Do.
Do.	Dastūr .	•	8	24	Do.
	Bustanu .	•	9	125	Do.
Do.	7	•	6	30	Do.
Do. Do.	Ziyarat .	•	4	20	Do.

District.	Port.	Number of boats belonging to the port.	Number of men employed on boats belonging to the port.	Country under the protection (or virtual protection) of which the boat are.
Shibkuh.	Kalātu	6	6	Persia.
Do.	Shīvuh	33	333	Do.
Do.	Saif-ash-Shaikh .	5	25	Do.
Do.	Mugām	42	538	Do.
Do.	Nakhiln	12	134	Do.
Do.	Jazeh	12	92	Do.
Do.	Shaikh Shu'aib Island.	76	932	Do.
Do.	Makāhīl .	7	71	Do.
Do.	Hindarābi Island.	20	136	Do.
Do.	Chīrū	17	238	Do.
Do.	Kalāt	29	241	De,
Do.	Gürzeh	23	169	Do.
Do.	Qais Island	90	1,464	Do.
Do.	Tāvuneh	25	113	Do.
Do.	Chārak	25	400	Do.
Do.	Hasineh	15	75	Do.
Do.	Mughu	26	338	Do.
Do.	Farur Island .	2	6	Do.
Lingeh	Sirri Island	35	495	Indeter- minate.
Do.	Duvvān	35	407	Persia.
Do.	Bustāneh	51	169	Do.
Do.	Milu	5	5	Do.
Do.	Shanās .	3	3	Do.
Do.	Lingeh Town .	72	1,306	Do.

From this table it appears that on the Persian side of the Gulf there are at the present time 924 pearl boats,* and that the number of men

^{*}To these however should be added 36 boats at Hanjam village on Hanjam Island

employed on the boats is 8,884; it follows that the average crew of a Persian pearl boat is less than 10 hands.

The total number of pearl boats in the whole Persian Gulf is apparently about 4,500, and the number of men who engage in pearl diving exceeds 74,000. The average size of a pearl boat varies, as will be observed, from one part of the Gulf to another; but it may be stated generally that the crew of a sea-going boat is from 6 to 42 hands, while that a boat working along the coast only is usually from 4 to 6. In some localities, however, especially upon the Persian side, men work entirely single-handed in Varjis or small skiffs.

It will be noticed that, in some places, the number of hands required to man the boats belonging to the port is much larger than the port itself could possibly supply. The explanation is that the crews are completed by strangers: in Omān these strangers are, to a large extent, Bedouins from the Dhafrah, Baraimi and Dhāhirah districts.

More than half of the pearl fishing industry in the Persian Gulf is under the protection or virtual protection of Great Britain, the figures in this respect being:—

	I	^P rotectir	ıg powe	Number of boats protected.	Number of men employed on the boats protected.			
Great Britain		•		•			2,593	48,878
None .				•	•		817	12,89 0
Persia .	•						889*	8 ,38 9
Turkey .				•	•	-	167	3,444
Indeterminate		•	•				35	495
				To	tal		4,501	74,096

^{*}Exclusive of 36 boats at Hanjam village on Hanjam Island.

ANNEXURE No. 4.—TABLE OF THE PEARL BANKS OF THE PERSIAN GULF.

The pearl banks of the Persian Gulf may be divided into three sets, viz., (I) those on the Arabian side between Rās Tanūrah and Dibai Town; (II) those on the Arabian side between Kuwait Town and Rās Tanūrah; and (III) those on the Persian side.

A table of each set is given below.

I. Table of the pearl banks on the Arabian side from Rās Tanūrah to Dibai Town.*

No.	Name.	Vernacular.	Lat. N.	Long. E	Rвм	ABES.
1	Khūrah	خرره	26·37½	50 18	•••	•••
2	'Amairah	العمبرة	26.35	50.18	•••	•••
3	Sara	الصرا	26·30½	50·20½	•••	•••
4	Wushīr	الوشير	26.441	50.221	***	•••
5	Khor Bū H āqūl	خور بو حاقول	26.46	5 0 ·2 6	•••	•••
6	Shiqqatah	شفته	26·4 0	50.29	•••	***
7	Bū Daqal	بو دقل	26·47½	50.29	•••	•••
8	Tābli	توبلي	26·36½	50·30½	• • •	•••
9	Maiyānal	الميانه	26.40	50.37	•••	•••
10	Khor	النحور	26.32	50.40	•••	•••
11	Khor Bin-Nassār	خور بن نصّار	$26.35\frac{1}{2}$	50.40	•••	•••
12	Bū Ba'airah	ېو بعيرة	26.20	50.42	north-e	to 5 miles ast of Mu-
13	Rijlah	الرجلة	26.39	50.421	narraq	Island.
14	Bū 'Amāmah	بو عمامه	$26.48\frac{1}{2}$	50.43	•••	•••
15	Shitaiyah, a	ستيه	•••		•••	•••
	group compris- ing:— [a. Fisāqah	فساقه	26:33	50·44½	}	
	b. Dhahr	ظهر	26·35 ½	50·45½		
	c. Abyām	ابيام	26.34	50.47₺	This	group lies 20
	$\begin{pmatrix} 1 \\ 1 \end{pmatrix} d$. Jarāwal	چرارل	26.341	50.491	to	25 miles h-north-east
	e. Zarīyah	زريم	26.36	50.51		Muharraq Is
	f. Mudawwirah	مدورة	26.343	50.52	7	••
16	Tubāb-al-Qibli	طباب القبلي	26.19	50 48 3	•••	•••
17	Mashbak	مشبك	26.50	50.49		•••
18	Haimān	هيمان	26.32	50·49늘		•••

The positions of the banks in this section were fixed by Ineutenant Commander W. Hose, R.N., and are shown in a chart supplied in December 1906 by the naval authorities to the Foreign Department of the Government of India. A copy of the chart will be found in pocket No. 25 of Part III of this work. The numbers shewn against each name correspond with those shown on the chart.

I. Table of the pearl banks on the Arabian side from Ras Tanurah to Dibai Town—continued.

No.	Name.	Vernacular.	Lat. N.	Long. E.	Rema	rks.
19	Khor-al-Ghazarah	خور الغزرة	26:25	50·50½	•••	
20	Abul Ja'al	ابو الجعل	26·37	50·55½	•••	•••
21	Kharriqānah	النحرقانه	26·31½	50·56½	•••	•••
22	Bu Lathāmah	بو لثامة	26.54	50.58½	•••	•••
23	Tubāb-al-Fasht	طباب الفشت	26.23	50.59	•••	•••
24	Abul Kharab	 ابو النحرب	26.48	51.02	•••	•••
25	Bū Suwar	.ر بو صور	26.43	51.05불		•••
26	Dibal, a group comprising:	الديبل	•••	•••	•••	***
	a. Bin-Zaiyān	بن زیان	26.24	51.07	7	
	b. Jarāwal	الجرادل الجرادل	26.261	51.08	This are	oun lies 10
	c. Jufrah	. ررق الجفرة	2 6· 2 3	51.09	to 15 1	oup lies 10 miles north- t the Fasht-
	d. Thanyah	الثنيه	26.25	51.12	ad-Dit	
27	Suwuddāt	 سودات	26.15	51·1 0	•••	•••
28	Harf-bin-Sagar	حرف بن صقر	26.271	51·11 1	•••	•••
29	Najwat-ar-Ru- maihi	نجوة الرميعي	26.46	51·19½	•••	•••
3 0	Hafah	مغفم	26.18	51.20		•••
31	Najwat Umm-al- 'Arshān	نجوة ام العرشان	26.21 1/3	51.20		•••
32	Najwat-al-'Am- māri	نجوة العماري	26.411	50·20½		led Najwat h-bin-Saif.
33	Kharis-at-Tair	خريس الطير	26.18	51.22		•••
34	Harf-al-Qarai- mah	حرف القويمة	26·14}	51·23½	No. 34 inclusive north-ea of Qata Jazīrat	nks from to No. 59 e lie off the stern coast r, between Rās Rakan Rās-al-Mat-

I. Table of the pearl banks on the Arabian side from Rās Tanūrah to Dibai Town—continued.

No.	Name.	Vernacular.	Lat. N.	Long. E.	Rem	BKS.
35	Sawāhib-al-Qarai-	سواحب القريمة	26.13	51.24	•••	
36	Sawāhib Umm•al- Hasa	سواحب أمّ العسا	26.08	51.251	•••	•••
37	Sawāhib Muham- malīyah	سواحب مهمليه	26·07½	51.27	•••	•••
3 8	Harf Umm-al- Hasa	حر ف ام الحسا	26·09½	51.27	•••	•••
3 9	Bū Mallah	بو مله	26.02	51.271	•••	•••
4 0	Harf-al-Muham- maliyah	حرف المهمّلية	26·07½	51.29	•••	•••
41	Bū Kalb	بو کلب	$26.02\frac{1}{2}$	51.29	•••	•••
42	Wādi-ad-Dawāsir	وادي الدواسر	26.05	51.291	•••	•••
43	Jufrah	الجفرة	26.01	51.30	•••	•••
44	Abul Qamāqīm	ابو القماقيم	26.02	51·30½	•••	•••
45	Hawād-bin- Ramal	حواد بن رمل	26•12	51.303		•••
4 6	Qalil	القليل	25.58	51.52	•••	•••
47	Harf Mas-hah	حرف هسجه	25·54½	51·521	•••	•••
48	Hawad Jubailat	حواد جبيلات	26•10	51:36		•••
4 9	Umm-al-Qarm	ام القرم	26.19	51.40	•••	***
5 0	Umm-ash-Shaif Laffan	أم الشيف لقّان	26.11	51.44		•••
51	Dhāya'	ضايع	26.04	51.46	•••	•••
52	Buqshah	بقشه	26.07	51.493		
53	Mutabārjah	المتبارجه	25.59	51.34		• • • •
54	Umm-az-Zaighat- al-Khor	أم الزيغة النحور	25.58	51.34	•••	• • •
55	Jarāwal	الجراول	25.58	51·35½		•••
56	Umm-al-Qash	أم القش	25.57	51.37		•••

I. Table of the pearl banks on the Arabian side from Rās Tanūrah to Dibai Town—continued.

No.	Name.	Vernacular.	Lat. N.	Long. E.	Rei	(ABES.
57	Sūfān	صوفان	25·51 ½	51·37 ½		•••
5 8 '	Rī'at Umm-al· Qash	ريعة أمّ القش	25.56	$51.38\frac{1}{2}$	***	•••
5 9	Rī'at Bin-Hassān	ريعة بن حسان	25.50	51.41		•••
60	Sutūh-al-Wakrah	صطوح الوكوة	25.11	51.41	89 inclu Nos. 70 which as north, a which south) east coa between	o. 60 to No. sive (except) and 73, re to the nd No. 73, is to the lie off the st of Qatar, Ras-al- h and Khor-
61	Hawād Umm-al- 'Awāridh	حواد ام العوارض	25·08½	51·41 }		•••
62	Umm-al-'Awāridh	ام العوارض	25.07	51·41½	•••	•••
63	Qarādīd	ال قرا ديد	25.027	51.42	•,	•••
64	Azyāj-an-Nūf	ازياج الفوف	25.35 1	$51.42\frac{1}{2}$	•	
65	Markhān	مرخان	25·1 9	51.47		•••
66	Azyāj-al-Hālat Umm-al-Khai- fān	ازياج الحالة أم الخيفان	25·08½	51.47	•••	***
67	Tubāb-al-Hālat U mm-al-Khai- fān	ام الحيفان الحالة الم الخيفان	25.13	51.47½		***
68	Abus Salābīkh	ابو الصلابيخ	25.221	51.481		
69	Riqqah	الرقكم	25·15½	51.51	•••	•••
70	Abul Hambār	ابوالهمدار	26.01	51·33½		
71	Jarwalah	الجرولة	25.18	51.52		
72	Abul 'Arāq	ابو العروق	25.19 3	51.521		***
73	Najwat Lahdan	نجوة لحدان	26.00	51.34		1

1. Table of the pearl banks on the Arabian side from Rās Tanūrah to Dibai Town—continued.

No,	Name.	Vernacular.	Lat. N.	Long. E.	Remarks	S.
74	Umm-al-'Adhām	أم العضام	25.22	51.53	•••	
75	'Idd-al-Qibli	عد القبلي	25.27	51.57	•••	
76	Kharaiyis	النحريس	25·13½	51.58	•••	•••
77	Harbāt-al-'ſdd	حربات لعد	25·30½	51.59	•••	•••
78	Hair-al-Ghāghah	هير الغاغه	24.25	51.30	•••	•••
79	Abul Jalūf	ابو الجاوف	24·43½	51·33½		•••
80	As-hāt	اصعات	24.45	51.37	Group.	
81	Batn-al-Bushairī- yah	بطن البشيرية	24.55	51·37½		•••
82	Batn-al-As-hāt	بطن الاصحات	24·41½	51·37½	5##	•••
83	Dhahr-al-Qaffā'i	طهر القفاعي	24.34	51.41		•••
84	Haraif	الحريف	24.59	51.43	•••	•••
85	Rōdhah	الروضه	24.55	51.44		•••
86	Harbah	الحريف الروضة الحرية	24·52½	51.45	•••	
87	Hairāt Batn Mu- kāsib	هیرات بطن مکاسب	24:363	51.49	•••	•••
88	Riqqat Bin-Ayās	رقة بن عياس	24.51	51.54	•••	•••
89	Bū Khuwaisah	بو خويصه	24·56½	51.54	•••	•••
90	Fuwailid	فويليد	24.41	51.22	•••	
9.	Hālat Dalmah	حالة دلمه	24.46	51·56½	About 27 m west of Island.	iles nort Dalm
9	2 Mish'āb	ممشعاب	24.51	51.29 ²	•••	••
9	3 Zaharah	الزهرة	25.32	52.02	•••	•••
9	4 Bū Qarai'ah	بو قربعه	25.32	52.04		***
9	5 Bū Qara'ah	بو قرعه	25.32	1 52·05	•••	•••
ç	6 Abu Masān	ابو المسان	25.35	± 52·09 }		•••
ç	Abu Sillah	ابو سله	25.14	52·1 0	•••	
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Table of the pearl banks on the Arabian side from Rās Tanūrah to Dibai Town—continued.

No.	Name.	Vernacular.	Lat. N.	Long. E.	Remarks.
98	Qarn-al-'Ashairiq	قرن العشيرق	25·06½	52:11	About 6 miles north- west of Shura'awah Island.
99	Umm-al-Khart	ام <i>الخ</i> رط	25.18	52·11½	
100	Najwat Bin-Tarīf	ن <mark>ج</mark> وة ب ن طريف	25·59½	52·11½	
101	Tubābāt Shurā- 'awah	طبابات شراء وة	25·061/2	52:14	About 5 miles north of Shura'awah Island
102	Umm-al-Katīb	ام الكتيب	25.18	52:15½	•••
103	'Idd-ash-Sharqi	عد الشرقي	25.24	52·16	
104	Tubābāt Daiyīnah	طبابات ديينه	25.07	52·23½	About 11 miles north of Daiyīnah Island.
105	Hālūl	حالول	25·4 0	52·24½	A group surrounding Halul Island.
106	Dhahr Daiyīuah	ظهر ديينه	25.00	52.25	About 3 miles north- east of Daiyīnah Island.
107	Najwat Bin-Hilāl or Riqqat Hālūl	ن _ج وة بن هلال رقّة حالول	25.52	52·26½	About 16 miles north by east of Halul Island.
108	Hawad Bin-Man- sur	حواد بن منصور	25.04	52·3 0	About 10 miles north- east of Daiyīnah Island.
109	Mu'taridh-al Qatar	معترض القطر	25·19½	52·30½	Distinguished by the addition of "Qatar" from No. 182.
110	Umm-al-Khash- āsh	ام الغشاش	25.22	52.33	•••
111	Kharais Umm- al-Khashāsh	ُ خريس ام الخشا <i>ش</i>	25.18	52·38½	
112	Mahzam	محزم	25.40	52·45½	
113	Abul Qamāqīm	ابو القماقيم	25·13	52:47	About 7 miles north- west of Das Island.
114	Kharaiyis	خرس	25.12	52.48	About 5 miles north- west of Das Island.

I. Table of the pearl banks on the Arabian side from Ras Tanurah to Dibai Town—continued.

No.	Name.	Vernacular,	Lat. N.	Long. E.	Kem arks.
115	Umm-al-Bunduq	ام البندق	25·06½	52.48	About 6 miles south- west of Das Island.
116	Qidair	القدير	25.00	52.51	About 4 miles north of Qarnain Island.
117	Abul Hanainun	ابو ا ^ل حنينون	25.10	52.51 1/2	Apparently close to the north-west side of Das Island.
118	Riqqat Dās	رقة داس	25.083	52.54	About 2 miles southeast of Das Island.
119	Riqqat Manl'	رقة منيع	25.051	52.551	About 9 miles southeast of Das Island.
120	Dhahr-al-Yās	ظهر الياس	24·19 1	52 ·01	About 33 miles west of Yas Island and considerably nearer to Dalmah Island.
121	Umm-al-Ghazūz	ام الغزوز	24.39 2	52.09	****
122	Riqqat Harhūr	رقة هرهور "	24:36	52·09½	*** 3*4
123	Umm-ash-Shuw- āhīn	ام الشواهين	24.445	52·13	484
124	Abu Dastūr	ابو دستور	$24\cdot 26\frac{1}{2}$	52·13½	About 4 miles south- west of Dalmah
125	Abu 'Arūq	ابر عررق	24.401	52·18½	Island.
126	Umm-as-Sulsul	ام السلسل	24 ·38	52.181	About 8 miles north of Dalmah Island.
127	Manyōkh	مذيوخ	24·36½	52·18‡	About 5 miles north of Dalmah Island.
128	Hawād-ar-Raddād	حواد الرّداد	24.55	52.191	About 4 miles south- west of Daiyinah Island.
129	Batn Daiyinah	بطن دیینه	24.56	52·24½	About 2 miles south east of Daiyinah Island.
130	Hawād Bin- Musammih	عواد بن م سمّے	24:24 2	52.26	About 9 miles south- east of Dalmah Island.
131	Buwairdah	بويردة	24.14	52:31	About 5 miles southwest of Yas Island.

I. Table of the pearl banks on the Arabian side from Rās Tanūrah to Dibai Town—continued.

No.	Name.	Vernacular.	Lat. N.	Long. E.	Remarks.
132	Maiyānah	س میانه	24.43	52·34½	About 4 miles south of Arzanah Island.
133	Ghashshah	س هشذ	24·24½	52·35	About 3 miles north of the north-west corner of Yas Island.
134	Umei-al-Kurkum	ام اکوکم	24.24 }	52 ·38	About 3 miles north of the north-east corner of Yas Island.
135	Batīn Arzanah	بطيرى ارزنه	24·43½	52·4 9	About 16 miles east- south-east of Arza- nah Island.
136	Sutūh Arzanah	صطوح ارزنه	24 ·50	52·53	A large group extend- ing between the islands of Arzanah, Qarnain and Zirko.
137	Jizūl	الجزرل	24.35	5 2 ·56	
138	Sat-h Bin-Lūta	صطم بن لوتا	25.02	53.02	***
139	Bū Hasīr	بو مصير	52·01½	53.06	
140	Abul Khalākhīl	ابو الخلاخيل	25.07	53 07	
141	Abul Ghabār	اب و الغبار	25.13	53·07½	•••
142	Jāsir	جاسر	25 18	53.08	
143	Qalīl	القليل	25.06	53.10	
144	Bu Martabān	بو مرطبان	25.05	53.11	•••
145	Umm-as-Shaif Zirko	لم الشيف زركو	25.15	53.14	About 27 miles east- north-east of Zirko Island.
146	Abut Tabūl	ابو الطبول	25.17	53.15	Islana.
147	Abul Bakhūsh	ابو ا ^{لبخ} وش	25.19	53.16	
148	Bū Sha'arīyah	بو شعرية	25.02	53.211	***
149	Najwat Jubiān	نجوة جبران	25.06	53.55	
150	Umm-ad-Dafāf	الدفاف	25.061	53·59½	
151	Sutūh-al-Hūlah	صطوح الهوله	24:47	53.01	A group 7 or 8 miles south-south-west of Zirko Island.

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I. Table of the pearl banks on the Arabian side from Rās Tanūrah to Dibai Town—continued.

No.	Name.	Vernacular.	Lat. N.	Long. E.	Benarks.
152	Ghazıat Zirko	غزرة زركو	24.55	53·03½	About 2 miles north- west of Zirko Island.
153	Qasmul	قصمول	24.49	53·04½	About 4 miles south of Zirko Island.
154	Sutūh Umm-ash- Shait	صطوح أم الشيط	24.46	53·04½	About 8 miles south of Zirko Island.
155	Abuz Zarī'	ابوالزريع	$24\cdot44\frac{1}{2}$	53.13	
156	Umm-al-'Anbar	ام العنبر	24.471	53.13	
157	Abul Hasa	ابو ا ^ل عصا	24·49 ½	53.13	
158	Khor Zirko	خور زرکو	$24.57\frac{1}{2}$	53.14 ½	About 12 miles north- east of Zirko Island.
159	Abu Sikkīn	ابو سكين	$24.31\frac{1}{2}$	53.141	
160	Sat-h Rāzbūt	صطع رازبوت	24·52½	53.17	
161	Umm Salsal	ام سلسل	24·5 2	53·20½	
162	Abul Ardūm	ايو الاردوم	24·48½	53.201	
163	Qaf	القاف	24.45	53·20½	
164	Abul Bazam	ابو الييزم	2 4·51 ½	53·22½	***
165	Mudawwirah	البدورة	24.51	53·25½	
166	Musaddiq	المصدق	24.48	53·27½	
167	Abudh Dhulū'	ابو الضنوع	24.47	53.28	
168	Abul Aqrab	ابو الاقرب	24.445	53·29½	
169	Zaharah	الزهرة	24.57	53 36	
17 0	Zukhum	الزخم	24.421	53 ·39	
171	'Umairat-al- 'Audah	عميرة العودة	24.58	53·45½	
172	'Umairat-as-Sa- ghīrah	عميرة الصغيرة	24:58	53 [.] 54	•••
173	Bū Suwar	بو صور	25.02	54.00	
174	'Awaridh	العوارض	25.14	54.00	
175	Najwat Kārūn	نجوة كارون	25.07	54.02	

I. Table of the pearl banks on the Arabian side from Rās Tanūrah to Dibai Town—concluded.

No,	Name.	Vernacular.	Lat. N.	Long. E.	REMARKS.
176	Rijlah	الرجلة	25 ·0 7	54·04를	About eight miles south-west of Sīr Bū Na'air Island.
177	Lijjah	اللجمة	25·18½	54·07호	About six miles north-west of Sir Bū Na'air Island.
178	Hair Bin-'Adhbi	هير بن عذبي	25·19½	54.12	About six miles north of Sir Bū Na'air Island.
179	Khabak	الخبك	25·14	54.25	
180	Abul Khōs	بو النحوس	25·11½	54.42	
181	'Alaiwi	الخبك بو الخوص العليو <i>ي</i>	25·11	54 ·58	The easternmost of the banks, about 20 miles west-south- west of Dibai Town.
182	Mu'taridh	المعرض الحد	24.55	54.15	
18 3	Hadd	الحد	24.41	54·19½	About 15 miles north of Abu Dhabi Town.
184	Bu Dhalikhah	بو ذ ^{اليخ} ه	24.503	54.22	

It will be observed that banks called after islands, etc., are not always the nearest to the places from which their names are derived.

The following banks are said to be situated off Qatar, but their positions are not exactly known:—

Rajīb, الرجيب; Abu Thalūth, ابو ثلوث; الرجيب; الرجيب; الرجيب; Tubrat Naqīm, الرجيب; Tubrat-al-Midfa'; نبرة نقيم المعقبل المعتبل المعت

The following are said to lie more in the direction of Trucial Omān:—

Rijailah, التيج ; 'Idd-ath-Thāni, عدّ الثاني ; Taij, الرجيله ; Sat-h al-Batin, التحيف ; Tahaif, التحيف ; Safih, التحيف ; Najwat Hadd-adh-Dhā, نجرة حدّ الضا ; Gharābi ; برخيس ; and Qaran, القرن ; and Qaran ; الغرابي

II. Table of the pearl banks on the Arabian side from Kuwait Town to Rās Tanūrah.

No.	Name.	Vernacular.	Position.	Remarks.
1	Ghamīdbah	غميضه	On the coast, 6 miles south of Shi'aibah village in the Kuwait Principality.	In the jurisdiction of the Shaikh of Kuwait.
2	Qalai'ah	القليعة	On the coast at Ras- al-Qalai'ah.	Do.
3	Dōhat-az-Zarq	دوحة الزرق	On the coast, midway between Rās-al-Qalai'ah and Rās-az-Zor.	Do.
4	Rās-az-Zor	رأس الزور	On the coast, at Ras- az-Zor.	Do.
5	Khīrān	ا ^ل خيران	On the coast, near the Khor-al-'Ami inlet, about 6 miles south of Rās-az-Zor.	Do.
6	Hadd-al-Himā- rah	حد ال ح مارة	On the coast, 9 miles south of Khiran.	Do.
7	Nuwaisīb	النويصيب	On the coast between Hadd-al-Himārah and Rās Bard-halq.	Do.
8	Bard-hālq	برد حلق	On the coast at Ras Bard-halq.	Do.
9	Khafji	الخفجي	On the coast at Ras- al-Khafji.	Do.
10	Qumrat-al-'Āli- yah	قمرة العاليه	At sea, 15 miles east of Ras-al-Khafji.	••
11	'Usili	العسلي	On the coast, 4 miles south of Ras-al-Khafji.	In the jurisdiction of the Shaikh of Kuwait.
12	Umm-as-Sibāl	ام السحال	At sea, about 5 miles north-east of Hadd- al-Misha'ab.	This bank and those following it to No. 24 inclusive are said to form an irregular chain reaching from the neighbourhood of Hadd-al-Misha'ab to a point at sea about 60 miles east of that cape.* Banks Nos. 12 to 24 are given roughly in the order in which they occur from west to east.

^{*} These directions would however take the banks into very deep water. Probably he chain is more parallel to the coast.

II. Table of the pearl banks on the Arabian side from Kuwait Town to Ras Tanūrah—continued.

No.	Name.	Vernacular.	Position.	REMARKS.
13	'Aridh Yūsif	عارض يوسف	See No. 12 above.	See No. 12 above.
14	Nāsi'ah	الناسعة	Do.	Do.
15	Khalālo	خلالو	Do.	Do.
16	Abu 'Isaiyah	ابو عصيه	Do.	Do.
17	Sūfān	صوفان	Do.	Do.
18	Riqqat Bin- Q ā mis	رقتَّة پن قامس	Do.	Do.
19	I'faisān	اعفسان	Do.	Do.
20	Abu Dhalām	أبو ضلام	Do.	Do.
21	Umwaijalah	الامويجلة	Do.	Do.
22	Umm-at-Tifjān	ام التفجان	Do.	Do.
23	Abu Hid	اپو حد	Do.	Do.
24	'Aiyāi	العياي	Do.	Do.
25	Mukallaf	مكلف	On the coast, at or near Dohat Balbūl.	May be regarded as in the jurisdiction of the Shaikh of Kuwait.
26	Rās-al-Ghār	راس الغار	On the coast, at the cape Ras-al-Ghar.	In the Sanjāq of Hasa, in Turkish jurisdiction.
27	Mamlihah	المملحة	At sea, about 10 miles north-east of Rās- al-Ghār.	•**
28	'Awairadh	العويوض	A few miles off the coast at a point several miles north of Musallamīyah Bay.	•••
29	Kāsh	(لكاش	A few miles east of 'Awairadh.	Pronounced "Gash."
30	Wajh-al-Jazīrah	رجة ال ج زيرة	Adjoining Jinnah Island, on its north- east side.	

II. Table of the pearl banks on the Arabian side from Kuwait Town to Rās Tanūrah—continued.

No.	Name.	Vernacular.	Position.	REMARKS,
31	Dh shr-al-Baidhah	ظهرالبيضه	Adjoining Abu 'Ali Island on its north side, at about \(\frac{1}{2} \) of the distance from its west to its east end.	In the Sanjaq of Hasa, in Turkish jurisdiction.
32	Dhahr Abu 'Ali	ظهر ابو علي	A short distance off the north coast of Abu 'Ali Island, at a point somewhat nearer to the eastern than to the western end.	
33	Ras Abu 'Ali	راس ابو علي	Adjoining the east- ern extremity of Abu 'Ali Island.	Do.
34	Barābakh	بر اب خ	In the narrow part of the strait between Abu 'Ali Island and the mainland.	the Biyadh dis-
35	Batīn.	البطين	Between the Ras Abu 'Ali and Barabakh banks.	Do.
36	Tawaifah	الطويفح	On the coast, a few miles south of the strait between Abu 'Ali Island and the mainland.	
37	Biyadhat	البياضات	On the coast, a few miles south-east of the last.	
38	Abul Anājir	ا بو الا ناجر	Do.	Proncunced Abul
3 9	Fashajtāt	= (\$1	At sea, a few miles to the east of the last.	•••
40	D-ōh at-al-Magāwi	درحة المساوي	On the coast, a few miles south-east of the Abul Anajir bank.	Adjoins the coast of the Biyadh district in the Sanjaq of Hasa and is there- fore in Turkish jurisdiction.

II. Table of the pearl banks on the Arabian side from Kuwait Town to Rās Tanūrah—concluded.

No.	Name.	Vernacular.	Position.	REMARKS.
41	Najw a t-ad- Dimāgh	نجوة الدماغ	At sea, some miles to the east of the last.	•••
42	Dōhat-al-Ja'-silī- yah	درحة الجعيليّة	On the coast, near Rās-al-Ja'ailīyah.	Adjoins the coast of the Biyadh dis- trict in the Hasa Sanjaq and is in Turkish jurisdic- tion.
43	Ja'aimah	الجعيمة	On the coast, near Ja'aimah.	Do.
44	Abul 'Urūq	ابو العروق	On the coast, immediately to the southeast of the last.	Do.
4 5	Abu 'Adhum	ابو عظم	Do.	Do.
46	Duwaiyisain	الدريسين	Do.	Do.
47	Umm Rahīm	ام رحیم	Do., surrounding the tip of Ras Tanūrah.	Do.
48	Aba Bihaim	ابو بهيم	At sea, a few miles north-east of the Ja'aimah bank above	
49	Adhamah	العظمة	At sea, immediately south of the last.	1**
5	0 Wāsi'ah	الواسعة	At sea, a little to the east of the two last.	
5	1 Khabābān	الخبابان	At sea, some miles to the east of the last.	
5	Abu Is'afah	بو اسعفه	At sea, towards the Rennie Shoal, on the west side of the latter.	e l
ŧ	Khashainah	فشينه	At sea, a considerable distance to the east of Ras Tanurah.	e ···
i	54 Raqaiqah	لر ق یقه رکسه	Do.	
i	55 Riksah	ركسة	Do.	2.0

III. Table of the pearl banks on the Persian side.

No.	Name.	Vernacular.	Position and extent.	Remarks.
1	Jab	جب	Off the coast of the Līrāvi district, about 4 miles to the north or west of Jabal Bang.	Depth of water is 3 to 7 fathoms. At present this bank is infested hy sharks and the people of Khārag Island, who work it, have been compelled to desist from their operations. The bank is opposite the Līrāvi district and jurisdiction over it is exercised by the Khān of Līrāvi.
2	Khārag	خارق	Between the islands of Khārag and Khārgu; also on the west side of Khārag to a considerable distance.	to 16 fathoms. In
3	Khor-al-Qusair	خور القصير	On the coast, a few miles north from the mouth of the Rūd-hilleh river.	Depth of water is 3 to 7 fathoms; only a few shells are obtained here. Under the Khān of Hayst Dāvud.
4.	Rās Aswad	راس اسود	A little to the east of 'Ayanāt, at an average distance of \frac{1}{3} mile off shore. This bank is said to extend 1 mile in length and \frac{1}{3} a mile in breadth.	Depth of water is 1 to 9 fathoms. In the jurisdiction of the Khān of Dashti.
5	Rās-al-Bāgh ·	راس الباغ	2 or 3 miles west of Tahiri, at an average distance of 1 mile from shore.	Depth of water is 2 to 5 fathoms. Jurisdiction belongs to the Khān of Dashti, but it has been delegated by him to the Khān of Jam who lives in the interior.
6	Rās Majnūn	راس ^{مى} جنون	Near Tāhiri, at a distance of about $\frac{1}{3}$ a mile off shore; length about 3 miles.	Do.
7	Rās-ash-Shajar	راس ا ^{لش} جر	Near the coast at Rās-ash-Shajar.	Do.

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111. Table of the pearl banks on the Persian side—continued.

No.	Na me.	Vernacular.	Position and extent.	REMARKS.
8	Hāvneh	هاونه	At an inlet \(\frac{1}{2} \) a mile east of R\(\tilde{s} \)-ash-Shajar. This bank is \(\frac{1}{2} \) a mile long and \(\frac{1}{2} \) of a mile broad.	Depth of water is 2 to 5 fathoms. Jurisdiction belongs to the Khan of Dashti, but it has been delegated by him to the Khan of Jam who lives in the interior.
9	Nāband	نابند	From Naband village along the coast south-eastwards till it meets the Barku bank.	Depth of water $\frac{1}{3}$ a fathom to 10 fathoms. Formerly under the Harami Shaikh of 'Asalu; now under the Tamīmi Shaikh.
10	Barku	بركو	Continuous with the last; in the neighbourhood of Barku village.	Do., except that depth of water is 2 to 4 fathoms.
11	Rās Ghurāb	راس غراب	Off the coast from the east end of the Barku bank to Ras Ghurab.	Depth of water 2 to 6 fathoms. Under the Tamimi Shaikh.
12	Ghaf	غاف	Off the coast between Ras Ghurab and Ghaf village, ending one mile west of Ghaf.	Do.
13	Khuvādān	خواد ان	Off the coast from Ghaf to Khuvadan village.	The depth of water is 2 to 4 fathoms. Under the Tamimi Shaikh.
14	Tibin	تبن	From ½ a mile west of Tibin village westwards to Khuvādān, at an average distance of ½ of a mile off shore.	Do.
15	Shaikh Shu'aib	شیخ شعیب	All round Shaikh Shu' aib Island, except off Laz and Qurat.	Depth of water is 2 to 10 fathoms. Under the Hamadi Shaikh of Mugām
16	Shatvar	شطوار	At the south-eastern end of Shatvar Islet.	Depth of water is 5 to 10 fathoms.

III. Table of the pearl banks on the Persian side—continued.

No.	Name.	Vernacular.	Position and extent.	REMARKS.
		مكاحيل	At an average distance of \$\frac{1}{2}\$ of a mile off shore, beginning \$1\frac{1}{2}\$ miles west of Mak\bar{s}hil and extending \$1\$ mile westwards, with a breadth of \$\frac{1}{2}\$ of a mile.	Also called Ras Ba- zāli بزائي. Depth of water is 2 to 4 fathoms. In the jurisdiction of the Hamadi Shaikh of Mugām.
18	Rās Mansūri	راس منصوري	Close to shore, beginning at a point about 3 miles west of Chiru and stretching westwards for 1½ miles, with a breadth of ½ of a mile.	
19	Hindarābi	هندرابي	Surrounds Hindarābi Island as a belt ½ to ½ a mile broad and is interrupted at one place on the east side only.	Depth of water is 1 to 10 fathoms. Under the 'Obaidli Shaikh of Chīru.
20	Sambarun	سبڊرون	7 miles south and slightly east of Hindarabi Island.	Depth of water is 10 fathoms and less.
21	Chīru	چي رر	a mile off Chiru village, to the eastward; this bank measures only about 50 yards across.	Depth of water is 4 to 6 fathoms. Under the 'Obaidli Shaikh of Chīru.
	'Akar	عكر	About ½ of a mile off shore, running from about 1½ miles southwest of Kalat towards Gūrzeh for 1½ miles; width ½ to ½ a mile.	Depth of water is 3 to 5 fathoms. Under the Hamadi Shaikh of Mugām.
23	Kalan	كالان	Begins south-west of Gürzeh, and runs towards Kalat, at \frac{1}{2} a mile off shore.	Do.
24	Qais	قيس	Surrounds the island of Qais, except between Halah and Māsheh, and in places reaches to $1\frac{1}{2}$ miles off shore.	Depth of water is 2 to 11 fathoms. Under the Al 'Ali Shaikh of Charak.
25	Muveh	هروة	Closely adjoins the shore and extends from the vicinity of Gürzeh towards Tāvuneh village.	Depth of water is ½ a fathom to 5 fathoms. Partly under the Hamadi Shaikh of Mugām and partly under the Shaikh of Tāvuneh.

III. Table of the pearl banks on the Persian side - concluded.

No.	Name.	Vernacular.	Position and extent.	Remarks.
26	Tāvuneh	تاونه	Continues the Muveh bank to a point $\frac{1}{4}$ of a mile south-west of Tāvuneh village.	Depth of water is \frac{1}{3} a fathom to 5 fathoms. Under the Bushri (Ål 'Ali) Shaikh of Tāvuneh.
27	Failih	فيلح	½ a mile off shore, at the extremity of Ras Yarid, between Hasi- neh and Mughu.	Depth of water 2 to 4 fathoms. Under the Marzūqi Shaikh of Mughu.
28	Nīveh * Jazīrat Farūr	نيوة جزيرة فرور	Between Farūr Island and Bustaneh village on the mainland, round the "Farūr Shoal" of the charts.	Depth of water is 2 to 11 fathoms, Under the Marzūqi Shaikh of Mughu.
29	Davvān	ლ ეა	South-west of the village of Duvvān at $\frac{1}{4}$ of a mile from shore.	Depth of water is 1 to 5 fathoms. Like the village from which it takes its name this bank is partly under the Al 'Ali Shaikh of Chārak and partly under the Persian Deputy Governor of Lingeh.
3 0	Bustaneh	بستانه	Close in shore, from Bustaneh village to near Duvvan.	Do., except that the depth of water is \frac{1}{2} a fathom to 5 fathoms.
31	Milu	ملو	Off Milu, from the Bustaneh bank to \frac{1}{2} a mile west of Shanas; distance from shore \frac{1}{2} a mile.	Depth of water is 2 to 4½ fathoms. Subject to the jurisdiction of the Persian Deputy-Governor of Lingeh.
32	Lingeh	لنگه	South-west of Lingeh Town, about 250 yards north-west of the anchorage and 200 yards from shore; length about 100 yards only, and breadth 10 to 25 yards.	Depth of water 12 to 20 feet. Under the Persian De- puty-Governor of Lingeh.

The above are the principal pearl banks of the Persian Gulf; but there are others also, of less importance, along the shores of the Ruūs-al-Jibāl district, at the Daimāniyāt Islands and in the neighbourhood of Bandar Khairān, all of which are under the jurisdiction of the Sultān of 'Omān.

^{*} This is the Persian pronunciation of the Arabic "Najwah."

ANNEXURE NO. 5.—TABLE OF THE DIFFERENT CLASSES OF PEARLS WITH THE MARKET RATES, PER BOMBAY CHAU, IN BAHRAIN IN 1906.

	1110, 111 11111	1		
Colour.	Name among Arab pearl merchants.	Description.	Value per Bombay Chau in 1906.	REMARKS.
"White"	Yakah Baidha يكه بيضا	Round and pure white.	Rs. 150 to 500.	By Persians this class is called Sufid-i-Shīrīn سفيد شيرين.
Do.	Yakah Nabāti يكه نباتي	Round, but yello- wish.	Rs. 50 to 200.	•••
Do.	Yakah Battan یکه بطی	The "button" pearl, of hemispherical shape.	Rs. 40 to 150.	The name is taken from the English and has no connection with the term Batn بطن, which denotes a size.
Do.	Nīm Shīrīn نیم شیریں	Not perfectly round.	Rs. 25 to 50.	
Do.	Badlah Baidha بدله بیضا	Of the first quality, but shape irregu- lar.	Rs. 15 to 30.	···· .
Do.	Sijni سجني	A rather dull variety with a bluish tinge, round or oval, but having a projecting point which is sometimes sharp.		•••
Do.	Qāmshāhi قامشاهي	Of the second quality, but shape irregular.		\
Do.	Maghz Absadh مغز ابیض	Of the third quality, but shape irregu- lar.		•••
Do.	Kambāiti کمبائلتي	Of the fourth quality, but shape irregular.		64.
Do.	Kalaki کلکي	Elongated and misshapen.	Rs. 5 and upwards.	4

Colour.	Name among Arab pearl merchants.	Description.	Value per Bombay Chau in 1906.	Benabus.
"White"	Būkah بوكه	A very small pearl, but sometimes large enough to be bored for a thread.		The market rate in 1906 was Rs. 80 to 100 per Bahrain Mithqāl, this weight representing 600 to 1,800 pearls.
Do.	Khākah خاكم	A "dust" pearl, smaller than the Būkah and never large enough to be bored for a thread.		The market rate in 1906 was Rs. 5 to 6 per Bombay Mithqal, this weight representing 2,000 pearls and upwards. This kind and the last are powdered and used as medicine by the natives.
Biue"	Sangbāsi سنگباسي	Spherical and drop- shaped, colour blue to leaden, with a good orient.	Rs. 80 to 150.	•••
D o.	Maghz Azraq مغز ازرق	Irregularly shaped.	Rs. 30 to 60.	The further epithet Samāwi سماري is sometimes added to the name of this class.
Do.	Āsmāni أسماني	Of a dull bluish colour.	Rs. 20 to 40.	***
Do	ي Miyān ميان	Of a dead bluish colour.	Rs. 3 to 6.	•••
" Red "	1 = "	Round.	Rs. 20 to 50.	By Persian mer- chants this class is called Surkh-i- Shīrīn سرخ شيريى.
v_0 .	Sufri صفري	Copper coloured, of all shapes.	Rs. 15 to 40.	
Do.	Battan بطّی	The "button" pearl.	Rs. 5 to 30.	This name, as in the "White" group, is of English de- rivation, and has no connection with the term Batn بل denoting size, Persians call this class Surkh-i-Nim Shīrīn بنيرس

Colour.	Name among Arab pearl merchants.	Description.	Value per Bombay Chau in 1906.	Remarks.
" Red ''	Badlah Hamra بدلة حمرا	Of the first quality, but irregularly shaped.	Rs. 10 to 20.	
Do.	Badlah Hamra بدلة حمرا Maghz Ahmar مغز احمر	Of the second quali- ty, but irregularly shaped.	Rs. 6 to 15.	
"Yellow"	1	Cylindrical and pointed.	Rs. 8 to 15.	•••
Various	Nīmru نیمرر	Blister pearl con- taining foreign matter.	Rs. 2 to 30.	
Do.	Taulīf توليف	Dull and soft, of all shapes and colours.	Rs. 2 to 3.	
Do.	Tālbūkah نالبوكة	Do., but of a still lower grade.	•••	The market rate in 1906 was Rs. 2 to 5 per Bombay Mithqāl.
Do.	Khashrah قشرة	Inferior rubbish and chips, not necessarily white.	Rs. 1 to 3.	•••

The terminology followed in the above table is that current among Arab pearl dealers in Bahrain. The classes within the colour groups are given in the order of value in which they stood in 1906, but this order is liable to variation; it is only the first class of each group that is not liable to be displaced by one of the other classes. As shown by the range of price there are generally many grades of quality within the limits of a single class.

ANNEXURE NO. 6.-TABLE OF THE TAXES LEVIED FISHERIES OF THE

Arabian

			(
Principality. province, or district.	Port.	Nõb taxes, and when taken ; also miscellaneous taxes.	Tarāz taxes, and when taken.
Shārjah Princi- pality.	Rams.	2 bags of rice † per boat, in spring; also a Shōfah ‡ every second or third year.	Rs. 6 per operative, in spring.
Do.	Rās-al-Khaimah.	4, 3 and 2 bags of rice per large, medium and small boat § respectively, in spring; also a Shōfah of about Rs. 1,000 every second or third year.	\$10 per Qaltah, in spring.
Do.	Jazīrat-al-Ham- rah.	1, 2 and 3 bags of rice per small, medium and large boat respectively in spring; also \$200 at the beginning of the season, for home defence.	\$2 per operative employed on a boat belonging to another port.
Umm-al-Qaiwain Principality.	Umm-al-Qaiwain Town.	Rs. 20 and 2 bags of rice per large, and Rs. 10 and 1 bag of rice per small boat, in spring; also 1 hauler's share ¶ per boat, in autumn.	\$6 per diver and \$4 per hauler, in spring.
pality.	Hamriyah. Ajmān Town.	1 hauler's share per boat, in autumn. \$1 per diver as "Nōb-an-Nasāra"** in spring; also a Shōfah of about Rs. 2,000 every second or third year.	Nil Rs. 6 per Qaltah, in spring.
1		* 17	

^{*} Exemptions are chiefly in favour of relations,

[†] A bag of rice is taken in this \$\frac{1}{2}\text{Shoftah}\text{ sin an emergency}\$ \$A large boat is one carrying 12 or more divers, a medium boat one carrying 8 to || Qaltah abis means one

[¶] Calculation and enquiry show that a hauler's share comes, on the average, to about

and his family.

** About 20 years ago an Aden Sambūk was plunderedby 'Ajmān pearl fishers

Political Resident, the Shaikh of 'Ajmān imposed a special fine on the pearl fishing

Nasāra ازب النصارا means "the Christians' Nōb."

LOCAL AUTHORITIES ON ANNUALLY BY THE PEARL PERSIAN GULF.

side.

Gross revenue of port, in rupees.	Exemptions in Rupees.* (Number of exempted boats and men in brackets.)	Net revenue of port in rupees,	Cost of town guard in rupees. (Number of guards in brackets.)	Disposal of balance after paying town guards, and remarks.
2,154	120 (20 men).	2,034	50 (3)	The local Shaikh takes the balance of Rs. 1,984; out of this he pays Rs. 550 as tribute to the Deputy Governor of Ras-al-Khaimah and retains Rs. 1,434.
6,034	280 (40 men)	5,754	Nil. (Guards here are paid from other sources).	The whole is taken by the Deputy-Governor of Ras-al-Khaimah.
1,778	154 (5 boats and 132 men).	1,624	140 (8 men).	The local Shaikh takes the balance of Rs. 1,484; at present he pays nothing to the Shaikh of Shārjah. His predecessor paid about Rs. 500 a year to the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah.
24,695	3,814 (14 boats and 373 men)	20,881	1,612 (60 men)	,
1,190	Nil.	1,190	515 (30 men).	The balance of Rs. 675 is taken by the local Shaikh.
5,482	280 (2 boats and 52 men).	5,202	580 (20 men).	The balance of Rs. 4,622 is taken by the ruling Shaikh of 'Ajmān.

friends, officials and servants of the Shaikh. table to be worth Rs. 14.

contribution, taken when required.

\$200 a year; this at least is approximately the amount required to maintain the man

in the Red Sea. Payment of compensation having been ordered by the British community and has maintained it since for his own benefit under this title. Nob-an-

¹¹ divers, and a small boat one carrying 7 or fewer divers. (N.B. Divers not operatives.) diver and one hauler, taken as a pair.

Table of the taxes levied annually by local autho-

Arabian

Principality, province, or district.	Port.	Nob taxes, and when taken; also miscellaneous taxes.	Taraz taxes, and when taken.
Shārjah Princi- pality.	Hairah.	Rs. 50 in cash and 1 bag of rice per boat, in spring.	Nil.
Do.	Sharjah Town.	l bag of rice per boat, in spring; also 1 hauler's share per boat and Maba'iyah † in autumn. There is also a Shōfah of about Rs. 8,000 every two or three years and	Rs. 4 per diver and Rs. 3 per hauler, spring.
Do.	Khān.	an occasional Radhaf. 1 Rs. 10 and 1 bag of rice per boat, in spring.	\$3 per diver and \$2 per hauler, in spring.
lity.	Dibai Town.	1 bag of rice, \$4 as Khānchīyah \$ and \$1 as Riyāl Sūr ∥ per 'Amīl boat, ¶ and \$1 as Royāl Sūr per medium sized Khalawi (i.e., ordinary) boat, in spring; also 1 hauler's share per boat in autumn. Shōfah has been levied twice in the last 13 years, and on the last occasion amounted to Rs. 4,000.	\$10 per Khalawi (or ordinary) boat, in spring; Rs. 1½ per Qaltah, on 'Amil boats only, in spring; and 1 hauler's share per boat, in autumn.
Abu Dhabi Principality.	Abu Dhabi Town.	1 hauler's share per large or medium boat and 1 diver's share per small boat, in autumn; also \$100 royalty on every pearl fished worth Rs. 1,000 or more. Commission is also taken on the sale of pearls at Dalmah Island, and occasional Shōfahs are raised there and at Abu Dhabi Town.	\$2½ per Qaltah, in spring.

^{*} Exemptions are chiefly in favour of relations, † Mabā'iyah مباعية is a royalty on ‡ Radhaf رضف is an emergency tax

S Khānchīyah خانجينه was originally a خانجيه was originally a إلى سور Riyāl Sūr ريال سور or "the town wall dollar" was

¶ An Amil عبيل boat is one owned and fitted out by a capitalist who receives half among the orew. A Khalawi خاري is one organised on the usual principles.

rities on the pearl fisheries of the Persian Gulf.

side—contd.

Gross revenue of port, in rupees.	Exemptions in rupees.* (Number of exempted boats and men in brackets.)	Net revenue of port, in rupees.	Cost of town guard in rupees. (Number of guards in brackets.)	Disposal of balance after payin 2 town guards, and remarks.
1,600	Nil.	1,600	Nil.	The whole is taken by the local Shaikh, but out of it he pays Rs. 832 (on account of particular boats) to the Shaikh of Shārjah.
30,698	10,222 (71 boats and 1,317 men).	20,476	378 (30 men).	The whole balance of Rs. 20,098 is taken by the ruling Shaikh of Shārjah.
6,252	1,286 (15 boats and 268 men).	4,966	Nil.	The local Shaikh takes the whole and pays half (Rs. 2,483) to the Shaikh
41,388	20,528 (210 boats and 3,813 men).	20,860	Nil. (100 Bedouin guards are paid by ex- empted boats).	of Shārjah. The whole is taken by the ruling Shaikh of Dibai.
43,964	2,004 (21 boats and 315 men.)	41,960	1,450	The whole is taken by the ruling Shaikh of Abu Dhabi. Besides the dues specified the Shaikh derives some additional revenues from the pearl fisheries and trade.

friends, officials and servants of the Shaikh. the sale of pearls by Nakhudas. levied when war is apprehended.

tax by houses, whence the name.

originally taken to defray the cost of repairs to fortifications.

of the whole take at the end of the season, leaving the other half to be divided

Table of the taxes levied annually by local autho-

Arabian side—contd.

Principality, province or district	Ports.	Particulars of taxation.	Average total proceeds of taxation perannum, and distribution of the same.
Qatar.	Wактаh.	\$4 cash is paid annually for each Nakhuda, diver and hauler, and \$2 for each Radhif.	Some tribal communities are exempt from taxation, besides which there are boats owned by the Al Thani Shaikhs which pay nothing. It is believed that in all a sum of about \$3,400 is collected yearly, the whole of which goes to the Shaikh of Wakrah. Summer defence is here a smaller item than in Trucial 'Oman.
D o.	Dōhah.	Ditto.	Some tribal communities, especially the Sūdān of the Bida' quarter, are excused payment, and many boats belong to the Al Thāni Shaikhs themselves and are free. The amount actually collected is estimated at only \$8,400 per annum; it is all taken by the Shaikh of Dōhah. There is less expenditure here on defensive arrangements than in Trucial 'Omān,
Do.	Other ports.	No fixed sums are levied, but the pearlers on return from the banks are required to remunerate the Bedouins who have guarded the village during their absence. If the amount subscribed is insufficient, the more fortunate boats are called upon for an additional contribution.	The amounts are collected and disbursed by the local Shaikhs.
Bahrain.	All rorts.	Boats pay Rs. 10 to Rs. 80 a year, in theory according to the size of the boat, the number of the crew and the circumstances of the Nakhuda, but in practice according to the pleasure of the Shaikh of Bahrain. The tax is regarded as being entirely Taraz.	The boats of several tribes and of numerous individuals are exempt from taxation, and the total amount realised is only about Rs. 12,000 per annum. The whole of this amount is taken by the Shaikh of Pahrain.

rities on the pearl fisheries of the Persian Gulf

Arabian side (concld.) and Persian side.

Principality, province or district.	Ports.	Particulars of taxation.	Average total proceeds of taxation per annum, and distribution of the same.
Hasa.	All ports.	Half a Turkish Līrah is levied on each pearl boat, irrespective of size, at the beginning of the season.	The proceeds, amounting to about £75 sterling per annum, go to the Turkish Government.
Kuwait.	Kuwait Town.	The value of a diver's share of the profits is levied, in cash, upon each boat at the end of the season.	The revenue obtained, which fluctuates from season to season and has been variously estimated at \$20,000 to \$60,000 a year, is taken by the Shaikh of Kuwait.

Persian side.

District.	Port or ports.	Nõb taxes, and when taken.	Tarāz taxes, and when taken.	Amount, in rupees.	REMARKS.
Hayāt Dāvud.	Khārag Island.	•••		Not ascertainable.	The Zābit of the island receives from the vendor one-fourth of the price of every pearl at the time of sale, besides which he recovers from the purchaser a sum equal to 15 per cent. of the value of the pearl.* He also obtains all the shells from the operatives without payment. The whole proceeds are taken by the Khān of Hāyāt Dāyud.
Shībkuh.	Nakhl Taqi.	Nil.	\$5 per diver and \$4 per hauler of local operative in large and me- dium boats and \$2 per head of local operatives in small boats taken in spring.	196	The revenue has hitherto generally been taken by the Harami Shaikh of 'Asanl.

2290

Persian side—contd.

District.	Port or ports.	Nob taxes, and when taken.	Tarāz taxes, and when taken.	Amount, in rupees.	Remarks.
Shībkūh.	'Asalu.	Nil.	\$5 per diver and \$4 per hauler on local operatives in large and me- dium boats and \$2 per head on local operatives in small boats; taken in spring.	75 7	The revenue has hitherto generally been taken by the Harami Shaikh of 'Asalu.
Do.	Hālat Nāband.	Do.	Do.	965	Do.
Do.	Nāband.	Do.	Do.	560	Do.
$\mathbf{D_0}$.	Barku.	Do.	Do.	45	D ₀ .
Do.	Rās Ghur ā b.	Do.	Do.	28	The revenue has hitherto generally been taken by the Nasūri Shaikh of Gābandi.
Do.	Ghaf.	Do.	Do.	34	Do.
Do.	Khuvādān.	Do.	Do.	81	Do.
Do.	Tibin.	Do.		64	The revenue has hitherto generally been taken by the Harami Shaikh of 'Asalu.
Do.	'Amārīyeh.	Do	Do.	28	Do.
Do.	Dastūr.	Do.	Do.	67	The revenue has hitherto generally been taken by the Nasūri Shaikh of Gābandi.
Do.	Bustānu.	\$60, 40 and 30 per large medium and small boat res- pectively in spring; Varjing are ex- empted.	tives in large and medium boats; and \$2 per head on local operatives in	1,810	Do.

2291

Persian side—contd.

-					
Dis t rict.	Port or ports.	Nob taxes, and when taken.	Tarāz taxes, and when ta ken.	Amount, in rupees.	Remarks.
Shībkūh.	Buraghleh.	As at 'Asalu above.	As at 'Asalu above.	42	The revenue has hitherto generally been taken by the Nasūri Shaikh of Gabandi.
Do.	Ziyārat.	Do.	Do.	2 8	Do.
Do.	Kalātu.	As at Bustānu above.	As at Bustānu above.	17	Do.
$\mathbf{D_0}$.	Shīvuh.	Do.	Do.	3,503	Do.
Do.	Saif-a s h- Shaikh.	Do.	Do.	280	Do.
Do.	Mugām.	Do.	\$8 per diver and \$6 per hauler on local opera- tives in large and medium boats and \$8 per head on local operatives in spring; also \$5 per head on local operatives in large and medium boats, in autumn.	8,760	The revenue is taken by the Hamadi Shaikh of Mugam.
Do.	Nakhīlu.	Do.	Do.	2,44 0	Do.
Do.	Shaikh Shu'aib Island.	Do.	Do.	16,153	Do.
Do.	Jazeh.	Do.	Do.	1,851	Do.
$\mathbf{D_0}$.	Makābīl.	Do.	Do.	1,694	Do.
Do.	Hindarābi Island.	Nil.	As at Mugām above, but here the duties on local operatives in large and medium boats are levied also on all local operatives employed on boats belonging to other ports.	4,535	The revenue is taken by the 'Obaidli Shaikh of Chīru.
\mathbf{D}_{0} .	Chīru.	Nil.	Do.	4,302	Do.

2292

Persian side—contd.

District.	Port or ports.	Nōb taxes, and when taken.	Tarāz taxes, and when taken.	Amount, in rupees.	REMARKS.
Shībkūh.	Kalāt.	As at Mugām above.	As at Mugām above.	4,639	The revenue is taken by the Hamadi Shaikh
Do.	Gürzeh.	Do.	Do.	3,283	D ₀ .
Do.	Qais Island.	Various and com- plicated.	Various and com- plicated.	12,069	The revenue is taken by the Ål 'Ali Shaikh of Charāk.
Do.	Tāvuneh.	As at Mugām. above.	\$3 per diver and \$2 per hauler on operatives in large and medi- um boats, and \$2 per head on operatives in small boats.	1,240	Do.
Do.	Chārak.	Do.	Rs. 6 per diver and Rs. 4 per hauler on local operatives in large and medium boats, and on those who engage in boats belonging to other ports; taken in spring.	3,336	Do.
Do.	Hasīneh.	\$50 per large boat, and \$30 per s mall boat; taken in autumn.	\$6 per diver and \$4 per hauler on operatives in large and medium boats, and \$3 per head on operatives in small boats; taken in spring.	945	The revenue is taken by the Marzuqi Shaikh of Mughu.
Do.	Mughu.	Do.	Do.	4,238	Do.
Do.	Farūr Island.	Do.	Do.	109	Do.
•••	Sirri Island.	Nil.	Nil.	Nil.	•••

2293

Persian side—concld.

District,	Port or ports.	Nob taxes, and when taken.	Täraz taxes, and when taken.	Amount, in rupees.	Ramades.
Lingeh.	Duwvān.	The Ali inhabitants pay as at Chārak above; the Qawasim pay nothing.	the Qawasim pay	2,964	The revenue is taken by the Al 'Ali Shaikh of Charak.
Do.	Bustāneh.	The Mara- zīq in- habitants pay as at Mughu a bove; the Qaw- asim pay nothing.		1,445	The revenue is taken by the Marzūqi Shaikh of Mughu.
Do.	Milu.	Nil.	Nil.	Nil.	•••
Do.	Shanās.	Nil.	Nil.	Nil.	•••
Do.	Lingeh Town.	Nil.	Nil.	Nil.	114 .

APPENDIX D.

DATE PRODUCTION AND THE DATE TRADE IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION.

Date cultivation and the date trade in the Persian Gulf have been expressly described elsewhere * by a number of competent authorities, and it is unnecessary here to say much upon either subject. We shall therefore only describe date production and trade shortly, by territorial divisions, and conclude with a reference to the trade with India in Persian Gulf dates.

Omān Sultanate.

Date production in the 'Omān Sultanate. The date tree is found in all parts of the 'Omān Sultanate, except Dhufār, and flourishes even at an altitude of more than 2,000 feet; it is most abundant in Bātinah, Wādi Samāil and Sharqīyah. In Bātinah

^{*}The following are the principal specific authorities on dates in the Persian Gulf: Colonel S. B. Miles in the Persian Gulf Political Residency Administration Report for 1876-77, pages 79-80, with reference to dates in the 'Omān Sultanate; a Memorandum on the system of cultivating the Date Palm in the Vicinity of Bushire, with some Information connected with its Growth, Produce, Price, etc., by Mr. J. C. Edwards, Second Assistant Resident, in the Administration Report for 1877-1878, pages 43-46; Supplementary Notes on Care and Culture of Date Palms and Fruit by Mr. A. R. Hakim, Assistant to the Political Resident, in the Administration Report for 1883-84, pages 39-43; a Résumé of what has been done in the Persian Gulf as regards the Introduction of the Arabian Date Palm into India by the same, in the Administration Report for 1885-86, pages 16-20; Conditions of Date Cultivation in Persian Arabia by Mr. W. McDouall, Vice-Consul at Muhammareh, in the Administration Report for 1894-95, page 62; and Cuinet's La Turquie d'Asie, Vol. III, pages 20-21 and 231-238. Reference may also be made to the following articles in the Geographical Volume of this Gazetteer: article "Omān Sultanate", pages 1388 and 1413, with sub-articles "Badīyah", pages 195-6, "Bātinah", page 284, "Tbri", page 757, and "Wādi Samāil", pages 1671-1672; "Trucial 'Omān', pages 1439 and 1440, with sub-articles "Baraimi Oasis", pages 263; "Qatar", pages 1506 and 1532; "Bahrain Principality", pages 241 and 245-6; "Hasa Sanjāq," pages 1543-4; "Kuwait Principality", pages 1966, with sub-article "Jahrah", page 898; "Southern Najd", pages 1354; "Qasīm", page 1468; "Jabal Shammar", page 1736, with sub-articles "Aqdah", pages 89-90, "Jauf-al-'Amir", page 936, "Kahāfah", page 696 and "Taimah", page 1855, as also sub-articles "Aparah", page 97; "'Arabistān', pages 795 and 803, with sub-article "Shathal-'Arab", page 97; "'Arabistān', pages 795 and 803, with sub-article "Shathal-'Arab", page 97; "'Arabistān', pages 531. Endeavour has been made, in all the topogra

the plantations form an almost continuous belt, sometimes 7 miles deep, along the coast; in Wādi Samāil the palms are estimated at 600,000; and in the Badīyah division of Sharqīyah there are some 158,000 date trees. Large groves also exist at places in Dhāhirah, especially at 'Ibri, where the trees are supposed to number about 50,000. The best known species of dates in the 'Omān Sultanate are the Mibsali مبسلي, Fard مبسلي, and Khalās غلاص; of these the Fard is a small dark-coloured date, grown mostly in Wādi Samāil, while the palms of Badīyah are chiefly Mibsali. In Sharqīyah generally the Mibsali abounds.

By natives of the country the Mibsali date seems to be preferred to all other kinds; but it is also much appreciated in India and is exported in considerable quantities from Sūr to Bombay. The Fard is a very favourite date in America, where the supply is hardly ever equal to the demand; and an attempt has been made, though as yet without much success, to acclimatise the Fard palm in Arizona.

The date trade in the 'Omān Sultanate.

The exportation of dates from the 'Oman Sultanate depends chiefly upon accidents of season. In 1878 the crop was ruined by heavy and unseasonable rain, which fell just as the fruit had begun to ripen; but in 1879, a year in which there was no rain, the yield was excellent, and the export was double that of the preceding season.

History of the date trade in the 'Omān Sultanate, 1878-79.

In 1880 it was remarked that the exportation of dates from the 'Omān Sultanate, not only to India, Yaman and Zanzibar, but also to America, was increasing; dates were exported from Sūr, Quryāt and the Bātinah coast as well as from Masqat, and it was believed that half the trade of the country thus escaped registration.

1880.

In 1881, in consequence of a bad harvest, few dates were exported from Masqat; but in the following year the crop was exceptionally good and heavy consignments abroad were made.

1881-82.

In 1883 the trade to America was rapidly increasing, and, to meet the American demand, Fard palms were rapidly being planted.

1883.

In 1884 the New York market was reported temporarily overstocked; but large quantities of dates went as usual to America, South Arabia and East Africa. 1884

In 1892 the supply of dates for exportation was short, in consequence of political disturbances in Wādi Samāil which interrupted for a time communication between the Sharqīyah district and the port of Masqat.

1892.

In 1898 there was a heavy decrease in the quantity of dates sent to India, America and Turkey in Asia; it was due to a bad crop, resulting from the failure of certain hot dry winds without which, it is said, the date cannot ripen.

1898.

be embodied in the present Appendix will be found in the Foreign Office Library, Simla, in Special Reports on Date Culture and the Date Trade in the Persian Gulf, 1906, Misc. No. V. N. 140. Some facts in regard to the date trade are ascertainable from the annual Administration Reports of the Persian Gulf Political Residency and in the Consular Reports for Basrah, Baghdad and Muhammarch; from Mr. H. W. Maclean's Report on the Conditions and Prospects of British Trade in Persia, 1903; and from Mz. A. H. Gleadowe-Newcomen's Report on the Commercial Mission to South-Eastern Persia during 1904-05, printed 1906.

1901. In 1901 crop and demand were both good, and a prosperous season was the result.

1904. In 1904, in consequence of a two years' drought, the date crop was in places the scantiest on record for fifteen years, and there was a considerable falling off in the export.

In the seven seasons from 1899-1900 to 1905-1906 inclusive, the average annual value of the dates exported from Masqat was nearly £81,000, and the bulk of the export in each year went to India. The separate figures for these years are given in the Annexure to this Appendix.

Trucial 'Omān.

Date production in Trucial 'Oman.

Except in the Rās-al-Khaimah district and in the Baraimi Oasis, the latter of which can scarcely be considered to belong to this division, the production of dates is small; the fruit also, along the greater part of the coast, never fully ripens for want of water and is eaten fresh. At Rās-al-Khaimah there are 42 varieties of date, at Khatt in the same neighbourhood 20, and at Umm-al-Qaiwain and Dibai 22 each; among the best sorts are those known as Lulu لَوْلُونُ , Khanaizi , while among the most plentiful are the Bul 'Adhūj , under the Baraimi Oasis, where there are about 60,000 palms, the Mibsali, Fard and Khalās are grown; but they are not equal to their congeners of Sharqūyah and Wādi Samāil in the 'Omān Sultanate.

The date trade in Trucial 'Oman. The few dates produced in Trucial 'Omān are far from satisfying the large demand of the somewhat dense pearl-fishing population; and, during the six years from 1899-1900 to 1904-05, dates and date juice were imported to an annual average value of more than £20,000, chiefly from Persian ports and from Turkish 'Irāg.

Qatar.

Date production and the date trade in Qatar.

In Qatar date groves hardly exist; clumps of half wild palms are found at a few places in the promontory. Here, as in Trucial 'Omān, dates are imported for the consumption of the pearl-fishing population, largely from Hasa.

Bahrain.

Date production in Bahrain.

The dates grown in the Bahrain Islands are of nearly 60 kinds, the most plentiful sorts being the Murzbān مرزبان and Khanaizi; the

total annual crop is estimated at about 5,200 tons and the value of the same at about £33,255. The fruit, on the whole, is not of very good

quality.

The import of dates into Bahrain, chiefly from Hasa, is considerably larger than the export, which is principally to India, viz., Karāchi and Kāthiāwār; in other words, the local crop is inadequate to the local consumption. In 1904 and 1905 the date harvest in the Bahrain Islands was below the normal. During the seven years from 1899-1900 to 1905-06 inclusive, the average annual value of the dates and date juice imported into Bahrain was about £35 185, and of that exported only £19,000; the export is, to a large extent, a re-export of Hasa dates. It was estimated that on the 31st of December 1904 there were 10,000 cwts. of dates in hand in Bahrain, awaiting despatch to Red Sea ports and to Egypt. Of the dates grown in Bahrain, those of which the value does not exceed Rs. 12 per Qallah of 373lbs. are ordinarily sold as Tamar it that is in the dried condition, while those of higher value are sold only as Ratab رطب or fresh fruit; but the variety called Khanaizi is sold both dried and fresh, and is also boiled

The date trade in Bahrain.

Hasa Sanjāq.

Dates are the chief staple, both of agriculture and of trade, in the Hasa Sanjāq; the average annual production is estimated at no less than 75,000 tons, viz., 51,000 tons in the Hasa Oasis and 24,000 in the Oasis of Qatīf. The dates of the Hasa Oasis are considered by the Arabs of the Persian Gulf to be the finest in the world, superior to those both of 'Omān and of Turkish 'Irāq. Of the dates produced in the Hasa Oasis about one-third belong to the most esteemed variety, here the Khalās, and half to a class called Razaizi رزيري. Hasa Oasis dates are never boiled for exportation; those sent abroad mostly go to Bahrain or, through Bahrain, to the Red Sea and Qatar. Qatīf Oasis dates are exported largely to 'Omān and Persia and in a lesser degree to Bahrain or, through Bahrain, to India; those destined for India are boiled. In 1904 the date crop in the Hasa and Qatīf Oases was magnificent, and in 1905 it was exceptionally good.

Date production and the date trade in Hasa.

Kuwait.

In Kuwait date palms are very few and are not found except at the settled villages. At Jahrah, the principal agricultural settlement, there are about 2,000 trees only; the fruit too, instead of being preserved, is eaten in the fresh state. Dates are imported into Kuwait from the plantation of the Shatt-al-'Arab in 'Irāq.

Date production and the date trade in Knwait.

Najd.

Date production and the date trade in Najd.

In Najd or Central Arabia, especially in Southern Najd, the date palm flourishes on a considerable scale; the groves of Wādi Hanīfah are famed for their size and luxuriance, and in the district of Hautah the trees are usually fine and prolific, a single palm there—it is* said—sometimes yielding as much as 14,000 lbs. weight of fruit in a season. In the Aflāj district the plantations are extensive but thin.

In Qasīm a certain surplus of dates is produced; at 'Anaizah, the principal market, they sometimes sell at 30 lbs. to the dollar. There is generally some exportation to Jabal Shammar, and in exceptional years dates are even exported to Madīnah.

In Jabal Shammar, though dates are numerous in places, production hardly appears to equal consumption. The valleys of Jabal Aja and Jabal Salmah contain numerous plantations, owned to a considerable extent by Bedouins; the groves in the 'Aqdah amphitheatre alone, in the former range, are believed to aggregate 75,000 trees. In the Taimah Oasis some of the palms are 90 feet high and are said to be 200 years old; the produce generally is excellent. At Jauf-al-'Amir some 15 kinds of date are grown, among them the Hilwah "Air a juicy, luscious variety, which is found also at Taimah. At Kahafah, on the Qasīm border, the best kind of date is the Fankhah air, which is large and yellow.

Turkish 'Irāq.

Date production in Turkish 'Iraq.

Dates are one of the most important products of Turkish 'Irāq; they are grown chiefly on the banks of the Shatt-al-'Arab both above and below Basrah, on a stretch of the Euphrates extending 30 miles downwards from Hillah Town, in the neighbourhoods of Karbala and Najaf, and about Baghdād City. The palm belts which extend along both banks of the Shatt-al-'Arab have a depth of half a mile to two miles and are estimated to contain about 1,900,000 trees on both banks and on the islands between Basrah and Muhammareh, and about 250,000 trees on the right bank only below Muhammareh. In the Hillah Qadha there are about 330,000 palms; in that of Karbala about 750,000, of which some 50,000 belong to the Shifāthah oasis; and in that of Najaf about 250,000, of which perhaps 170,000 are situated in the Kūfah Nāhiyah on the banks of the Shatt-al-Hindīyah. Most of the dates exported from 'Irāq are grown near Basrah, the best being the kinds known as Halāwi and Khadhrāwi , while other miscellaneous

^{*} The statement seems incredible; it is from a native source.

varieties, some 40 in number, are classed together under the name of Sāir سائب . The exportable dates of the Baghdad neighbourhood are . كوسى and Kursi زهدى chiefly Zahdi

Dates are the principal export of Turkish 'Iraq; they are shipped entirely at the port of Basrah. The bulk of the trade is in dates grown near Basrah, which are exported in boxes to England and America; but a proportion consists in Zahdis and Kursis of Baghdad origin, which are packed in skins and now go chiefly to Egypt, the Levant, and Black Sea ports.

Date trade in Turkish

The Basrah date crop was estimated in 1887 at 60,000 tons, and of this amount about 44,000 tons were exported: viz., 20,000 tons by steamer to London, for Europe and America, and 24,000 tons by native sailing vessels to Arabia, Persia and India. The Halawi date was at this time the favourite in Europe and America, and the Zahdi had some sale in India.

History of the date trade in Turkish 'Irāq, 1887.

In 1888 a prohibition against the export of dates from Baghdad, which had been in force for some years, was removed; and in this season some 30,000 skins of Baghdad dates were exported to London by 3 or 4 merchants, to whom the trade was then confined.

In 1889 the quantity of dates shipped at Basrah was larger than in any previous year and prices were high; but some native merchants speculated recklessly, packed unripe dates, and were ruined; by these events the trade was thrown more into European hands than before. Many new groves were being planted at this time in 'Iraq to meet the increase of the trade.

In 1891 the date crop in 'Iraq was excellent. In 1892 it was reported that the production of dates in the Basrah neighbourhood had increased fivefold during the preceding 12 years; and that, whereas 12 years previously nearly all the dates exported were packed in baskets and went to England, part were now boxed for Europe and America, while the remainder, in skins, had begun to take a leading place in the Indian, African and Red Sea markets, but were in small demand in Europe.

1891-92.

In 1893, during the first part of the season, there was a doubt whether 1893. the Government of the United States, on account of a cholera epidemic, would allow the importation of Persian Gulf dates. The previous year had been a prosperous one at Basrah and large stocks of date boxes had been laid in by exporters, whereby growers were encouraged to demand excessive prices; but at the end of the packing season the growers, as great quantities of dates still remained on their hands, lowered their prices, and a large exportation of dates in baskets took place.

In this year the date crop of the Baghdad region was not very large, but in quality it was exceptionally good; as usual the operations at Baghdad only lasted a short time, for there only the first of the new crop is exported.

In 1894 the crop in the Basrah neighbourhood was a plentiful one, 1894. and moderate profits were obtained by holders who realised promptly, but those who did not sell until the end of the year suffered heavily from a fall of 25 per cent. in European prices. This fall was attributable partly to a prohibitive new duty imposed by the French Government on

the common dates till then imported at Marseilles and Havre for distilling, and partly to an extra import duty placed on wet dates in America; but by the low prices resulting in London, whither the shipments were in some cases diverted and sold at prices hardly covering freight and charges, the demand in the Midlands and Lancashire was stimulated.

At Baghdad, as at Basrah, the crop in this year was heavy and good and large quantities of dates were exported in September and October, chiefly to Syria, where however the prices were about 20 per cent. below those of the previous year; but in November the winter rains at Baghdad began unusually early and caused serious damage, for the dates still remaining on the trees turned black, fermented, and became unsaleable.

In 1895 the date crop at Basrah was below the average, nevertheless 1895. it was in excess of the demand in Europe; the Basrah exporters, however, combined to reduce the year's pack and in the end got; the better of the growers, who had at first demanded high prices. The London date market this season opened low, but it gradually improved, and Basrah shippers in the end realised good profits.

At Baghdad, in 1895, the crop was only one-third of average, the blossoms having appeared too early; the local price was consequently about £9 sterling per Taghar of 4,215 pounds, as against £7 in the preceding year.

The date groves of the Basrah neighbourhood were seriously damaged in 1896 by long-continued flooding of the Shatt-al-'Arab, and the mischief was aggravated by excessive heat and by a south-east wind which blew from the middle of August to the middle of September, causing large quantities of unripe dates to shrivel and fall from the trees; the result was a serious diminution in both the bulk and the quality of the crop. In consequence of large supplies of boxes having been imported in advance, there was a rush of dealers to purchase, and prices at Basrah rose rapidly; but a strong combination of selling agents having been formed in London, the prices at home and in the American market were forced up, and Basrah shippers in the end succeeded in obtaining tolerably remunerative prices.

The Baghdad crop in 1896 was fairly good, and shipments made to Jaffa, Bairut, Smyrna and Constantinople realised good prices; but those made to England sold at a loss.

The total export from Basrah in this year amounted to about 600,000 cases, of which 490,000 were sent to London in the first instance. 53,000 to New York direct, and 57,000 to Bombay and Mediterranean ports.

In 1897 the quantity of dates exported from Basrah was larger 1897. than usual; but this was mainly due to a large increase in the number of native exporters, to whom British firms—imprudently, as was believed gave facilities, and whom they financed; the London market, however, was overstocked, and the prices obtained from shippers by growers were excessive.

1896.

The date crop at Baghdad in this year was above the average, but grain was so scarce that the export of dates was prohibited by the Turkish authorities.

The Basrah crop in 1898 was small, and prices were kept high by 1898. the growers, who can combine in a way that is impossible to merchants; in the struggle between these two classes the latter are always at a disadvantage, as they have not only to lay out large sums in boxes, but also to engage freight in advance, with the result that later they must either ship or pay dead freight. Until late in the season, when a scarcity of Smyrna figs increased the demand for dates, no margin of profit was left to exporters; the average cost of landing Halawis in London was at first 14s. 6d. and the selling price only 15s.

The yield in the Baghdad neighbourhood was fairly good in this year, but the embargo of the previous year on exportation was maintained by the Turkish authorities in consequence of a continued scarcity of grain.

The total number of cases leaving Basrah in this year was about 500,000 of ½ a cwt. each; of these 65,000 were exported direct to New York, and 70,000 to Port Said for transhipment to Mediterranean ports.

The heavy floods of 1896, as already mentioned, did great damage 1899. to the date plantations of lower Turkish Traq, and the yield of dates in 1897 and 1898 remained comparatively small; but in 1899 the position of earlier years was regained. Large speculative sales were made in England in this year before the crop ripened and proved highly remunerative, the prices paid by exporters to growers having generally been low. The export of dates grown in the 1899 season continued into January and February 1900 and swelled the returns of that year. There was a great demand for dates in India on account of famine, enabling growers to export their surplus to that country as "basket" dates.

The Baghdad crop in this year was good, and towards the end of the season some exportation took place, merging in that of Basrah.

In 1900, encouraged by the results of the previous year, exporters 1900. again arranged for extensive operations; but the crop, though abundant, was inferior on account of cool dry winds which prevailed during the summer and parched the fruit upon the trees. Local growers combined to raise prices, the European market was low, and most exporters in the end lost heavily; but the export nevertheless exceeded the normal by some 6,000 tons and large unsaleable stocks accumulated in the United Kingdom.

The Basrah date crop almost invariably promises well at the begin- 1901. ning of the season; but, though almost independent of rainfall, it frequently disappoints the anticipations formed. The year 1901 was no exception to this rule, a promising crop being ruined by hot dry winds at the time of ripening; the produce was in consequence hardly up to the average in quantity, and it was so unequal in quality that for the first time on record Halawi dates were graded in two classes; but the season was a more favourable one to merchants than 1900, for, though profits were not particularly large, fewer losses were made and those

who held on to their stocks obtained good prices. Two direct steamers, instead of one as usual, carried dates to America; and a Russian steamer shipped dates straight for Levant ports, which it had hitherto been the custom to tranship at Port Said. Part of the export in this year consisted of basket dates of the 1900 crop.

The yield of dates in the Baghdād neighbourhood was good and plentiful; and, though larger quantities than usual were kept in hand for local consumption, the poorer class falling back on dates in default of grain, the exportation to Egypt and Syria was considerable. Local prices ranged from £8 to £9 per Taghār.

The crop of 1902 in the Basrah district was an average one, but the season was unsatisfactory to shippers; heavy sales of Halāwis and Khadhrāwis had been made in advance in London, and, though Sāirs were abundant, the other two kinds were deficient; growers also combined to maintain prices. Many exporters lost heavily.

The Baghdad crop of 1902 was not much below the average, but an embargo on exportation prevented, to a great extent, the usual consignments to Egypt and Syria. A quantity of dates for abroad was smuggled from Hillah, however, down the river Euphrates.

1903. The Basrah crop of Halāwi and Sāir dates in 1903 was large and the quality of both varieties good; but Khadhrāwis were scarce and poor. Local prices, in consequence of a combination among growers, were high as compared with the low rates at which speculative sales had been made in London, and shippers who had sold in advance suffered serious loss; the London market also continued to decline; and eventually dates became almost unsaleable in England.

The Baghdad crop was fair in quantity but inferior in quality; there was however a strong demand for Kursi dates in Egypt and Syria and at Constantinople, and large quantities purchased at £7-10-0 to £9-10-0 per Taghar were exported.

1904. The Basrah date crop in 1904 was much smaller than that of the previous year; this was due to strong north-west winds which prevailed almost all the summer and made the dates dry and light. The financial misfortunes of 1903 had caused many merchants to withdraw from the date trade; and again in 1904 few exporters of dates made any profits in the British market, while a number on the contrary lost heavily through the prevalence of low rates in America and of relatively high prices at Basrah. The export to America in this year was about 6,000 tons or the same as in 1903; and about 100 tons were sent by native merchants to Russia as an experiment, which turned out successfully.

The crop of Zahdi and Kursi dates around Baghdad was fair in quantity, but the quality was not good. Importation at Levant ports was forbidden on account of the prevalence of cholera in the Persian Gulf, and this circumstance further affected the trade.

Early in the year it was predicted, from climatic conditions, the state of the river and the appearance of the trees, that the Basrah crop of 1905 would be an unusually large one; but this expectation was not

realised except in the case of Sāirs; Halāwis and Khadhrāwis, though excellent in quality, were short in quantity. Large forward sales had been made by native merchants in London and Continental markets at low prices; but the despatch of a larger quantity of dates than had been foreseen to America caused rates to rise locally, and the level which they reached was maintained by the shortness of the crop: the result was unprofitable business and heavy loss to shippers. A new feature of the year was a considerable shipment of Halāwis and Khadhrāwis to Egypt, Tunis and Oran, where new markets for these varieties appeared to be opening. The dates exported to India were, as usual, mostly Sāirs; the largest quantities went in October and November, after which, the Bombay market being overstocked, the trade declined. Large quantities of pressed dates in baskets were kept back for a more favourable market. In this season prices at Basrah opened as follows:—

Halāwis, at 260 Shāmis (or £16-13-2) per 40 Manns of 143 lbs. each, or about £7-0-0 per ton;

Khadhrāwis, at 230 Shāmis per 40 Manns; and

Sāirs, at 160 Shāmis per 40 Manns.

At the end of October, however, the price of Sairs rose to 175 Shamis.

The Baghdad crop in this year was very large, and Zahdi dates sold at 8s. per 220 lbs. and Kursi dates at £7-11-6 to £8-8-4 per Taghar.

The statistics of exportation from Basrah between 1899-1900 and 1905-06 are given in the Annexure to this Appendix.

A meeting of growers and exporters generally takes place early in September of each year to settle the prices of dates for the season; it is sometimes held at Abul Khasīb, which is a centre of great activity during the date harvest.

'Arabistān.

In the Persian province of 'Arabistān dates for export are grown on a considerable scale in the district of Muhammareh, and to a lesser extent in the district of Fallāhīyeh; in the other districts the quantity of exportable dates is negligible. In a poor year (1897) the yield of the whole Muhammareh district, including the banks of the Bahmanshīr, was estimated at 5,310 tons. The best kind of date in 'Arabistān is the Qantār معارات , which is rich in syrup but is not exported; the Khadhrāwi خضراري ; here the best kind packed for export to Europe; the Halāwi معرات , not locally esteemed, but reckoned to come next after the Khadhrāwi for the purpose of exportation; the Sa'marān سعرات or "miscellaneous," comprising various sorts, which goes to India and other places abroad; the Dairi ديري which is deficient in syrup and dries hard; the Braiyim ديري which is boiled and dried in the hard stage; and the

Date production and the date trade in 'Arabistan.

Zahdi زهدي, borne by palms raised from seed, here the worst of all kinds but somewhat in demand for the manufacture of spirits and vinegar.

History of thedate trade in 'Arabistan. We may now briefly take account of the date trade and its fluctuations at Muhammareh since 1892.

1892-93.

In 1893 the crop was better than in 1892; at the beginning of the season the local price was 5s. per 160 lbs., but the Bombay market was overstocked and it fell to 3s. 6d.

- 1894. The date harvest in 1894 was similar in quantity and quality to that of 1893; but in the Bombay market there was little demand, and the price fell to 2s. per 160 lbs.
- 1895. The crop of 1895 was below the average, the palms having been exhausted by the yield of the preceding years; the price was 3s. 9d. per 160 lbs.
- 1896 In 1896 the crop was again small, this time in consequence of floods in spring, and prices rose to 5s. 10d. and even to 7s. 10d. per 160 lbs.
- 1897. The crop of the following year was also deficient, and prices stood at about Rs. 4-3-0 per cwt.
- 1898. A cold spring diminished the crop in bulk; but a strong demand, beginning in April, raised prices at first to Rs. 7½ and Rs. 9½ per cwt. according to quality; after packing for the European market was completed, rates declined agair. to Rs. 5 and Rs. 6-9-0 per cwt.
- The crop in 1899 was unusually large and prices were correspondingly low, ranging from 7 to 12 Qrans per 154 lbs. In this year, in addition to the £4,338 worth of dates shown in Annexure No. 1, about 6,000 tons weight of dates left Muhammareh in non-Indian sailing vessels, but chiefly for India.
- 1900. The yield of dates in 1900 was smaller than in 1899, but still above the average; the summer was an unusually dry one and the fruit was deficient in syrup. The price was about 5s. 8d. for 1½ cwts. In this year a greater than ordinary proportion of the dates exported in Arab sailing vessels was destined for Red Sea ports.
- 1901. In 1901 the Muhammareh date crop promised well, but a portion of it was spoilt by hot winds and dust. Until the time when packing for the European market was completed the ruling price was 3s, 10d. per 1½ cwts; but afterwards, owing to the arrival of coasting craft in great numbers to purchase, it rose gradually to 6s. 3d.
- The crop in 1902 was about the same as in the preceding year; and again some damage was done by persistent dry winds and dust Prices ranged from 4s. to 6s. 4d. per $1\frac{1}{2}$ cwts.
- 1903. The crop of 1903 was good on the whole, but it suffered to some extent by excessive damp in July.
- In 1904 the yield was below the average owing to dust storms; the average price was 4s. per 1½ cwts., at which figure the European and American demand was small but the Indian market continued open.

In 1905 the crop was large but inferior in quality to the last; 1905. prices, on the average, were the same as in the preceding year.

An estimate of the values of the dates shipped from Muhammareh from 1899-1900 to 1905-06 inclusive will be found in the Annexure to this Appendix.

Persian Coast.

In the districts adjoining Büshehr Town, particularly on the Büshehr Peninsula and in Dashtistān and Dashti, dates do not as a rule ripen well; there are about 50 varieties, among which the Halāwi and Khadhrāwi—as at Basrah—are considered the best, but the only kind exported is that known as the Qasb Zāhidi قسب زاهدي, which is packed in baskets and exported to India to the amount of 10,000 or 15,000 baskets a year. Owing to oppression by the Khāns of districts, many of the date cultivators in the Būshehr neighbourhood have lately emigrated to Fāo, Qasbeh on 'Abbādan Island, Bahrain, etc.

Date production and the date trade in the Persian Coast districts.

In the Shibkuh and Lingeh districts there are about 40 different sorts of dates, the best being the Qantar, Barhi مرداسنك Murdasang مُعاب Khanaizi, Khassab مرداسنك, Murdasang and Halao علار; the palms of the Lingeh district are about 180,000 trees. All the kinds of dates in these districts, with the exception of those just specified and of two other kinds known as Masli مسلي and Zāmardi زامردي), occur in small quantities and are consumed fresh; but the Masli and Zāmardi, which are very abundant, are exported. Of these the Masli is dark in colour, and, though smaller than the Zamardi, more expensive; the Zāmardi is yellowish and does not keep so well. The ordinary local price of a basket of Masli dates weighing 8 Lingeh Mans or about 72 lbs. is Rs. 2, and that of a similar basket of Zāmardi from Rs. 1-8-0 to Rs. 1-10-0; but these are liable to Some 5,000 to 6,000 baskets of Maslis and Zāmardis, according to rainfall, are available at the port of Lingeh every year. The dates grown at a distance inland are said to be superior to those of the seacoast.

At Bandar 'Abbās and in the Shamīl and Mīnāb districts the best dates are the Halīli علياني and Murdāsang, which are also among the most abundant. The Zarig زرّ , a fairly good date, is common to all three places, and the Suhrdang, also of moderate quality, to the first two. The Khanaizi (from Bahrain) and the Zahrāi بافري , both dates of a good class, are found at Bandar 'Abbās and also in Mīnāb. The numbers of different varieties of dates found at Bandar 'Abbās and in Shamīl and Mīnāb are estimated at 16, 18 and 16 respectively, including those already mentioned above; a proportion, especially in Mīnāb, belong to stocks imported from abroad, especially from 'Omān, Bahrain and Basrah,

Trade with India in Persian Gulf dates.

Importation of dates into India.

The wet dates carried by the North-Western Railway from Karāchi to Lahore, Amritsar, Umballa and Peshawar in 1902 and 1903 amounted to 1,035 and 892 bags respectively, and probably the whole of these dates were imported from the Persian Gulf. The traffic was almost confined, on the railway, to the months of November, December and January. Both consignors and consignees were in almost all cases Hindus.

ANNEXURE.—STATISTICS OF THE EXPORTATION OF DATES FROM PORTS OF THE PERSIAN GULF.

In the following table are shown the values, in pounds sterling, so far as they can be ascertained, of the dates which have The exportation to foreign countries from places in the Gulf other left the Persian Gulf for places abroad in recent years. than those mentioned is believed to be inconsiderable.

Year	1899-1900	1900-01	1901-02	1902-03	1903-04	1904-05	1905-06	Average for these years.
Masqat	£ 52,517-	£ 67,350	£ 78,909	£ 103,201	£ 98,913	£ 73,517	£ 92,500	£ 80,988
Bahrain *	10,553	15,583	13,716	19,991	23,274	23,701	25,853	18,953
Basrah	295,233	880,973	327,451	289,215	359,228	312,767	345,184	330,007
Muhammareh †	4,338	13,157	18,179	16,441	14,000	16,000	17,000	14,159
Büshehr	5,172	3,151	:	646	476	1,514	340	1,383
Lingeh	6,665	8,000	3,267	5,250	1,867	652	882	3,790
Bandar 'Abbās	21,900	2,005	672	412	1,009	2,849	3,955	2,187
Totals	396,378	490,219	442,194	435,162	498,767	431,000	485,664	

* The figures for Bahrain include date syrup as well as dates.

† The Muhammarch statistics to 1901-02, inclusive, refer only to exports by steamers and Indian sailing vessels; from 1902-03 onwards they include shipments by Arab sailing vessels to India but not to other countries. In 1902-03 the export to places on the Arabian coast in 'Omani vessels was estimated at 900 tons. The figures given are not reliable, but they represent the best estimates that can be formed.

APPENDIX E.

FISHERIES OF THE PERSIAN GULF.*

The subject of Persian Gulf fisheries has been so exhaustively treated by Lieutenant McIvor in an article in the Persian Gulf Political Residency Administration Report for 1880-81 that little remains to be added on the present occasion; a few references to other sources of information will be found, however, in the footnote to the title of this Appendix; and, in the text below, we give some additional information regarding the sea fish of the Gulf of 'Omān.

Fish and other sea creatures on the Arab coast of the Gulf of 'Omān.

Ordinary fish. The commoner fish of the Gulf of 'Omān, according to the nomenclature in use among Arabs, are these:—

-				
Serial No.	Name.	Colour,	Ordinary length (in inches).	REMARKS.
1	Aifah ميغه	Green.	44	Edible.
2	Andaq' عندق	Reddish.	15	D o,

^{*}The chief authority on Persian Gulf Fisheries is an article by Lieutenant I. McIvor, Assistant Political Resident, entitled Notes on Sea-Fishing in the Persian Gulf, which will be found in the Persian Gulf Residency Administration Report for 1880-81, pages 44-67; it deals with the entire Gulfs of Persia and Omān, contains full information in regard to fishing grounds, seasons of fishing, kinds of boats used by fishermen, methods and implements of the industry, coring of fish, kinds of fish, and number of boats and men employed, also an estimate of the quantities of fish taken annually. Some further details concerning the fisheries of 'Omān is given by Colonel S. B. Miles in the Persian Gulf Administration Report for 1876-77, page 81. Fresh information in regard to sea fisheries, the fish trade, etc., is contained in the following articles in the Geographical Volume of this Gazetteer—"Kuwait Bay and Town," (pages 1052-3), "Hanjām" (page 631), and "Coast of Persian Makrān" (page 1138); while the following give some facts in regard to river fisheries—"Turkish Irāq" (page 765) and "'Arabistān" (page 127). Further information regarding the fresh water fish of 'Irāq is contained in Cuinet's La Turquie d'Asie, 1894, Volume III, pages 58-59.

Serial No.	Name.	Colour.	Ordinary length (in inches).	Bewares.
3	'Agam عقام	White.	27	Edible.
4	Bā'īl باعیل	Dark green.	42	Do.
5	Baiyāh	White.	14	A kind of mullet (Gen Mullus). Edible.
6	Balālīt بلاليط	Dark green.	5	Not edible.
7	Baqar-al-Bahr بقرا ^{لب} ح ر	Yellow.	9	The coffre or trunk fish (Gen. Ostracion). Edible.
8	Baqsam Abu Silla بقسم ابو سلّا		9	The porcupine-fish (Diodon Hystrix) Edible.
9	Bar 'Ajam برعجم	White or yellow.	12	Edible.
10	Bārīsh باریش	Red or yellow.	6	Do.
11	Barīyah س بريد	Grey.	2	A small fish, like whitebait, which is dried in the sun and used for feeding animals, etc. Elsewhere it is generally known as Matūt
12	Chanchula پنچوو	Red.	10	Edible.
13	Dalas دلس	Yellow.	27	Do.
14	Darījab هجايع	Dark green.	12	Do.
15	Dhala'ah ضلعه	White.	9	Do.
16	Dhawa ضوا	Black.	10	Possibly of the genus Serranus. Edible.
17	Dīk-al-Bahr دیک ا ^{لب} حر	Red.	9	Possibly Apogor Edible. Name mean "Sea-cock."
18	Faião Qishrān	Dark green.		Edible.

Serial No.	Name.	Colour.	Ordinary length (in inches).	Remarks.
19	Ghaliyah ميلة	Yellow.	10	Edible.
20	Gharābīyah س غرابيه	Grey.	12	Do.
21	Ghasisah غسیسهٔ	Do.	4	Do.
22	Ghazāl عزال	Black.	27	Possibly Synodontis. Edible.
23	Ghazwān غزران	Red.	6	Edible.
24	Hādi حادي	Grey.	5	Do.
25	Halāwat-،l-Bahr ملاوة البحر	Do.	9	Do.
2 6	Halwāira). ملوائرة	Yellow.	7	A pomfret. Edible.
27	Hamānı حمام	Red.	36	A rock cod. Edible.
28	Hamrīya همريا	Do.	27	Edible.
29	Hāmūr blade	Dark green.	47	Closely allied to the Sabiti (No. 87) Edible, but has a prickly skin.
3 0	Haqībah ause	White.	27	Edible.
31	Harūsh حروش	Do.	8	D ₀ .
32	Hatām حطأم	Do.	15	Possibly a Lethrinus Edible.
3 3	Hibsah	Yellow.	27	Edible.
34	Jadal Jos	Do.	8	Do.
35	Jadhar	Dark green.	80	Do.

Serial No.	Name.	Colour.	Ordinary length (in inches).	Remares.
36	Jaidhar Jaidhar	White.	64	Salted for home con- sumption at Masqat, the 'Omānis ap- parently preferring it even to the seer- fish (No. 44 below) which they export.
37	Jalu جار	Do.	27	Not edible.
38	Janam جنم	Black or white.	10	Edible.
39	Jarjumah جرجمه	Black.	5	Not edible.
40	Jirrad-al-Bahr جرادالب ح ر	Green.	9	A flying fish, perhap Exocoetus Volitans Edible.
41	Jūlān جولان	Yellow.	36	Edible.
42	ر Ka'at کعت	Do.	10	Do.
4 3	Kaftār كفتار	Do.	24	Do
4.4 .	Kan'ad oxis	Black or white.	60	The seer-fish of "Indian salmon (Cybium guttatum Very abundant i the Gulfs of 'Oma and Persia; it salted for export Mauritius, Bourbo and India.
45	Kar	White.	20	Edible.
46	کو Kar Kabir	Black.	6	Do.
47	کار کبیر Kardūs کردوس	Do.	8	Do.
48	Kāstarmila کاستر ملا	Reddish.	8	Do.
49	Khaiyāt سفاط	White.	20	Do.
50	Khālqah خالقه	Black.	11	Do.

Serial No.	Name.	Colour-	Ordinary length (in inches).	REMARKS.
51	Kharkhūr) خرخور			
52	Kharkhūr Abu Lāwat خرخور ابو لارت	Green.	37	The pipe-fish. Edible.
5 3	Kharkhūr Abu 'Alaq خرخور ابو علق			
54	Khattām	White.	10	Possibly a Lethrinus. Edible.
55	خطام Khishām خشام	Reddish.	16	Edible.
56	Khūdīr خودير	Yellow.	13	Do.
57	Kīsu (Bin-'Amm)	Red.	8	Do.
	بن عم کیسو			
58	Kūfar کوفر	Reddish.	9	Do.
59	Kūsiyah كوسية		27	Do.
60	Lamah a.J	Green.	7	Do.
61	Lāzim لازم	White.	8	Do.
62	Mabār (Aba) ابو مبار	Green.	7	Do.
63	Mākhrīwah ماخريوة	Do.	6	Do.
64	Marān صراك	Do.	11	A species of lady-fish. Edible (see No. 71 below).
65	Masann 	Do.	72	Edible. The name means "Whetstone."
66	Masht	Black or yellow.	8	Probably Heniochus. Edible.
67	dinsīfah aغيسم	White.	20	Not edible.
68	Mash k wat قىشكوة	Yellow.	9	Edible.

Serial No.	Name.	Colour.	Ordinary length (in inches).	Remares.
69	Mazīmi (Abu) ابو صریمی	White.	7	Edible.
70	Miskīnah مسكينه	Dark green.	18	Do.
71	Mūrān موران	Yellow.	9	A species of lady-fish. Edible.
72	Muzif Abu Kuwāri. مزف ابر كواري	Do.	60	A kind of rock or sea eel. Not edible.
73	Muzif Saghar	Black.	60	Do. do.
74	'Ōmah موسم	Grey.	6	A kind of sardine. Caught in enormous numbers, and used as food and for manure.
7 5	'Ömah Zanāb عومه زناب	Do.	5	Do. do.
		ßlack.	27	The gar-fish (Gen.
76	Qadd قد	Yellow.	36	Belone). Edible.
77	Qāidh قائض	White.	10	Edible.
78	Qāidh Abu Rahi قائض ابو رعي	Do.	7	Do.
79	ت Qaisān قيسان	Yellow.	16	Do.
80	Qandawāh قندراح	Black.	37	Do.
81	Qaranshū' قرنشو ع	Grey.	5	Do.
82	Qarūb قررب	Green.	6	Not edible.
83	Qishrān قشران	Black.	27	Edible.
84	Qismah قصمة	Grey.	8	D ₀ .
85	Qūrān 'Ushāq قوران عشاق	Yellow.	7	Do.
86	Ramān (Abu)	White.	13	Do.
	ابو رمان			

Serial No.	Name,	Colour.	Ordinary length (in inches).	REMARKS.
87	Sabīti سبيتي	Black.	36	Closely allied to the Hamur (No. 29). Has prickles. Edible.
88	ً Sadas - س ن س	Dark green.	6	Has prickles. Edible.
89	Sāfi صافی	Black.	8	Do.
90	Safsūf صفصوف	White.	5	Possibly Selopsis. Edible.
91	Sahwah 898w	Black. White,	$\left\{ egin{array}{c} 47 \ 27 \end{array} ight\}$	Edible.
92	Saiyid	Red.	27	Do.
93	سید Sāl Abu Dhula' صال ابو ضلع	Dark green.	13	Do.
94	Sāl Madwāri صال حمدراري	Yellow.	8	Do.
95	Sālikh Bālikh سالنج بالنج	Green.	8	Do.
96	ر ر Salīs سیلس	Grey.	3	Do.
97	Samān سمان	Yellow.	4.0	Do.
98	Samarrah **	Do.	19	Po.
99	قيمر Samūkah سمبوكه	Grey.	3	Used as food for animals, but not eaten by human beings.
100	Sanduq-al-Bahr صندرق البحر	Black.	5	Not edible. Name means "Sea-box".
101	Sanīfi صنيفي	Yellow.	9	Edible.
102	Sansūl Jumim	Black.	72	A sword-fish (Histio- phorus), possibly Xiphias Gladias. Edible.

Serial No.	Name	Colour.	Ordinary length (in inches).	REMARKS.
103	Sawām سوام	White.	4	Edible.
104	Sha'am شعم	Dark green.	8	Do.
105	Sha'ban شعدان	Grey.	3	Used as food for ani mals, but not eaten by human beings.
106	Shakal شکل	Dark green	27	Edible.
107	Shalam (Abu) ابو شلم	Do.	14	Not edible.
108	Shamāhi شياهي	W hite.	35	The air bladder of thin fish is dried and exported to Europe for making isinglass and to China for making soun, under the name of "fish sounds" or "fish maws."
109	Shūqīyah	Brown.	5	Edible
110	شرقيه شرقيه Sihūk سيحوك	Yellow.	4	Not edible.
111	Sim Bambu	Green.	27	Do
112	Sīmah ouco	Brown.	7	A kind of sardine Edible.
1.13	 Sīnah منيس	White.	9	Edible.
114	Talīh طليے	Yellow.	30	Do.
115	Tankah	Brown.	11	Varieties of cuttle-fis (Sepia Octopus). Th
116	Tankah Abu Midad 	Dark green.	12	cuttle-fish is muce the eaten by the Arab who consider it delicacy; and it is the usual bait in fishing with hook an line in the Gulf.
117	Tar تر	Green.	50	Edible.

Serial No.	Yame.	Colour.	Ordinary length (in inches).	Remarks.
118	Tarbikh ترپيخ	Brown.	27	A kind of cuttle-fish. (See Nos. 115 and 116 above.) Edible.
119	Wālbakah دالکه	Yellow.	7	Edible.

The following are said to be whales:-

" Whales."

Hūtah موته , of a whitish colour, considered edible.

Jirām جراء, (Grampus delphinus), black, about 8 feet long, not edible and not commonly hunted.

" Porpoises."

The following are regarded as porpoises by the Arabs :-

Dughas دغس , (*Phocoena communis*), black, 3½ feet long, not edible, but taken for its oil.

Fajmah فجمه , black, of small size, considered edible.

Samān Jamjam سمان جمجم, of reddish colour and small size, edible.

Samān Jini سبان جنٰي , of reddish colour and small size, not edible.

Samān Mardhi سمان صرضي , black, of small size, not edible. Samān Sabīti سمان سبيتي , black, nearly 4 feet long, edible.

" Jarajsr" " Sharks." The following (sharks, sword-fishes, etc.) appear to be classed together by the Arabs under the name of Jarājīr جراجير (Singular, Jarjūr י הי פר פר און) or "Sharks":—

Da'alīs دعليس , white, small, edible.

Dhībah فيبغ , (possibly Anarrhicas), black, small, edible, considered dangerous.

Fantwa ننطوا , yellowish, edible.

Farākhah (Abu) ابو فراخه , dark green, length about 5 feet.

Ghaidhi غيضي , dark green, length about $4\frac{1}{2}$ feet, edible, considered dangerous.

Jabāyah جبايه , black, edible, considered dangerous.

Jahrah جهرة , yellowish, small, but considered dangerous.

Jarjur جرجور , a shark proper. Sharks are caught by the Arabs in enormous numbers, with hook or harpoon, at all seasons of the year; the industry is a profitable one. Shark's flesh is eaten by Sunni Arabs, who consider it to have aphrodisiatal properties, but Shi'ahs will not touch t; it is also used as manure. The dried fins and tails go to Bombay for export to China, and the oil is used for smearing boats.

Khalāsi خلاسى, small, of a dull yellow colour, edible.

Laji رَجِي, white, length about 6 feet, edible.

Ma'āqīb معاقيب, black, small, edible.

Makshīt مكشيت, white, small.

Mīkh مين , a kind of large sword-fish, about 12 feet long, said to attack boats.

Qirazi قرازي , black, small, but considered dangerous, edible.

Qit'ah Qirāzi قطعه قرارى , black, small, edible.

Qurun Marbu' (Abu) ابو قروك مربوع " the square-horned", white, small, edible.

Qurun Mathluth (Abu) ابو قررن مثلوت "the triangular-horned," dark green, small, edible.

Nimrāni نمراني , a black spotted shark, small, but considered dangerous.

Saif (Abu) ابر سيف , a sword-fish, black, length about 4½ feet, considered dangerous.

Saif (Abu) Mashāri ابوسیف مشاری , a sword-fish, yellowish, length about $4\frac{1}{2}$ feet.

Samīkah سميكه , black, small, edible.

Sanūr سنور, "the cat", perhaps an Anarrhicas, black or dark green, length 3 feet, considered dangerous. (By some fishermen the Sanūr is classed as a ray and is described as having prickles.)

Shitani شطانى , bluish, length over 4 feet, considered dangerous.

Silla (Abu) ابر سلا , dark green, small, edible.

Zamāri إمارى, dark green, small.

The following are described by Arabs as Shabih-al-Jarj ūr, شبيه الجرجور or "resembling the Jarjūr":---

Bām بام , dark green, length about 8 feet, edible.

Hām مام , yellowish, length about 10 feet, edible.

Jisri جسري, greenish, small, edible.

Mansif منسف , greenish, length about 4½ feet, edible.

Shabīh-al-Jarjūr شبيه الجرجور , dark green, length about 6 feet, edible.

The following (rays, skates, etc.,) are grouped together by the Arabs "Tabāq" or under the name of Tabāq " فباق :— "Rays".

'Alīmu عليمو , black, length 25 inches, edible.

'Anān (Abu) ابرعنان, yellow, length 27 inches, has prickles, edible.

Barbar י, red, length 16 inches, edible.

Hawairim موير , black, length 4 feet, edible

Kadwa کدرا , yellow, length 3 feet, edible.

Qafa'ān قفعان , black, length 21 feet, edible.

Rābidh برابض, yellow, black or white, length 2 to 2½ feet, edible; the white variety has prickles.

Rishah (Abu) ابوریشه , dark green, length 2 feet, edible.

Turtles, oysters and rustaceans. The turtle, called Hamas مفليم or Ghailam فليم, is found, the commonest species being the hawk's-bill variety (*Chelonia imbricata*) the carapace is exported as tortoise-shell, and the flesh is eaten by Sunnis.

Here may be mentioned also the pearl oyster (Mahhārah ريان), which is found in abundance and is of good quality; Shrimps (Ribyān ريان), which are red or white and attain 5 inches in length; and a kind of crayfish (Shanjūb شُجُوبُ).

Fish on the Persian coast of the Gulf of 'Omān.

Fish taken for local consumption. The fish of the Persian Makran coast are of numerous kinds; they may be roughly divided into two classes,—those which are taken for local consumption and those which are caught for export.

To the first class belong the Nambau نمبو and Chancho چنچر , two unpalatable species of rock-fish; the Murbah مرته or mullet; the Khundrau مرته or lady-fish; the Tārli مرتب or sardine; and the Dōtur كهندر , Mūsi , سوسي , Mūsi , سوسي , which have no names in English; most of these are procurable throughout the year.

Fish taken chiefly for export.

To the second class, of which about nine-tenths of the quantity caught, is cured and eventually exported, belong the Gullu or cat-fish, from which isinglass is obtained; the Kair, which is in season from April to June and also yields isinglass; the Matūta مقرق , a kind of whitebait taken between October and February and used by Arabs as manure for their date palms; the Mushku مشكو , a kind of rock-fish; the 'Owur ; the Pāgas باكس or shark, caught throughout the year; the pomfret, which here is scarce, but may be caught at intervals throughout the year; the Sāram سرمني ; and the Surma-i سرمني or seer-fish, which is in season between November and March.

Most of these are probably included, under other names, in the table of 'Omān fish above.

APPENDIX F.

SAILING CRAFT OF THE PERSIAN GULF.*

BY

COMMANDER A. ROWAND, R.I.M.

There are about fourteen types of native craft which belong to the Persian Gulf proper. These only differ materially in point of size, rig, shape of stern, and length of keel in proportion to total length; other slight differences are maintained in connection with the formation of stem and stern-post heads, and in the decorative art displayed in the carving on them. In some cases there is no apparent difference to the casual observer, and the whole show a similarity in general features, whilst the same principle of construction applies to nearly all. As a general rule these vessels are remarkable for the beauty of their lines, and it is probable that many of our modern yachts can hardly show more graceful curvature, though of course greatly excelling in finish. They sail well and are weatherly craft.

The following is a general description of the construction of the larger, or sea-going vessels, which practically applies to all. The hull are constructed of roughly adzed planks of teak and jungle-wood, which are nail-and trenail-fastened to the ribs in a very rude and somewhat unsafe manner, notwithstanding which many of them achieve extraordinary longevity. They are usually decked, with suitable hatchways, etc., and are often fitted with high poops, many being prepared by internal equipment for defence. Those of the Arab Coast usually carry one or two guns, now used for saluting only : war vessels are not now found in the Gulf. Some are sheathed on 2" plank bottoms with 1" board, and a preparation of cocoanut oil and damar (or country resin) is put in between, which causes the vessel to be very dry and durable, and prevents the teredo worm from attacking the bottom. The outside of the sheathing board is coated with a mixture of grease and whitewash, boiled together, to prevent fouling; this latter coat is renewed about twice a year. The topsides, outside, are coated with two applications of sharks' oil every year; and the whole of the interior is given one coat during a similar period: this prevents the timbers from splitting and warping. As a rule they have considerable beam in proportion to their length, and possess great sheer, with a sharp-rising floor. Many are fitted with ports in stern and poop; some have square and others pointed sterns. The seams of the planking are caulked with raw cotton. They are fitted with two masts raking forward, and inclined at an angle of about 15° to the

^{*} This Appendix (except the Notes and Annexures Nos. 2 and 3) was very kindly written for the present Gazetteer by Commander A. Rowand, R.I.M., who made a special study of the subject. Annexure No. 2 was compiled from information afforded, through Captain S. G. Knox, Political Agent, by Haji Hamud-bin-Badar of Bahrain, the principal boat builder at Kuwait, in 1905. The particulars contained in Annexure No. 3 were supplied by Mr. In am-al-Haqq of the Bahrain Political Agency. The spelling of native names in this Appendix has been adapted by the editor to the system used throughout the Gazetteer.

perpendicular for the purpose of keeping the ponderous weight of yard and sail clear in raising and lowering, and when working to windward; some, however, have been observed to be nearly perpendicular. These masts are roughly trimmed single trees, obtained usually from the Malabar Coast, sufficiently straight, naturally, for the purpose; at the upper end a sheave-hole is fitted, through which the pendant of the yard halyards is rove. The yard of the forward mast is usually about the same length as the vessel and has been known to be over 100 feet in length; it is frequently formed of several spars secured together, slightly tapering towards the lower or forward end, but considerably so at the peak or upper end. It is slung at about one-third of its length, and is served round with coir matting where it takes the mast. The after yard is similar, but considerably smaller, and is usually composed of one spar. The sails are lateen shaped, with a very high peak, and are in most cases excellently cut, and consequently set very flat when the sheets are hauled aft.

The natives make their sails in the following manner. A suitably flat piece of ground is chosen; four pegs are driven in the ground at measured points, forming the outline of the sail to be made; the boltrope is stretched and spliced round these pegs; and the sail cloth is cut to suit, and sewn together and to the boltrope, which is of coir rope. The natives appear to exercise great care in the cutting of their sails. They do not, however, utilize the excellent plan adopted by the native of India of running small coir lines through the seams, which are secured tautly to the head and foot boltropes. The sail cloth is made of cotton of various thicknesses and texture, suitable for the different sized craft. The natives weave the canvas by hand; it is made about 18" wide, and is sold by weight. It is made at Lingeh, Khamīr, Qishm, Dishkūn, Kung, Halīleh, and Bahrain, also, possibly, at Kuwait and other places.

The tack of the principal or forward lateen sail is brought to the stem-head generally through a fixed block there, but sometimes merely secured; the sheets lead aft in the usual manner. The halyards lead amidship, near the forepart of the poop, and consist of a pendant and treble block purchase which becomes the backstay when the yard is hoisted and the sail set; a bousing-to rope is also rove round yard and mast and hove taut when the yard is up. Generally speaking two or three pairs of shrouds complete the rigging, which is of coir rope throughout and very simple. The after sail is similarly fitted, but with suitably sized gear. In the event of heavy weather this after sail is furled; and, the foremast being fitted with a large, medium, and small lateen sail, these are in turn used as the weather increases, the yard being lowered and the smaller sail bent o. When the severity of the weather necessitates a smaller show of canvas, a small kind of staysail is hoisted alone. When working to windward these vessels both tack and wear, but generally prefer the latter in a breeze.

The vessels are constructed on blocks laid near the beach conveniently close to deep water. They are launched by first placing them on their bilges, with suitable blocks under; laying down well greased ways; and heaving them out, sideways to the water, by means of tackles secured to anchors conveniently placed in the water. The natives have ceased building for some years the larger class of cargo-carrying craft formerly seen in the Gulf. The reliable and quick despatch afforded by the

increased steamer communication possibly accounts for this. They seldom now trade to the Red Sea or Zanzibar, their voyages being generally confined to Kārachi, and sometimes Bombay and Jiddah. Kuwait appears to be the principal place where native craft are built, and Būms seem to be the type most frequently built there; but nearly all types of vessels are constructed. At Būshehr, the Jāli is the boat most frequently built, carrying from 10 to 50 tons. At Bahrain the Shū'ai is the most commonly built. On the Arab Coast the Baqārah, Shū'ai and Shāshah are built, whilst at Lingeh the Baghlah and Jāli are most often built.

The Tranki was a type of vessel formerly much used in the Gulf, and was impelled both by oars and sails; it is not now seen in the Gulf. The true Arab dhow has also disappeared; it was similar in appearance to the Baghlah, from which it was distinguished by having a long gallery projecting from the stern, this being its peculiar characteristic. They were sometimes brig-rigged, when formerly used for war purposes by the Qawāsim and other piratical tribes.

Formerly many wooden ships, barques and brigs were owned in the Gulf by natives, principally at Masqat and Lingeh, to which places some few still belong; they were originally bought from European shipping firms, having been condemned as unfit for their particular service; and they were commanded and manned by Arabs.

The largest native craft carry the following native officers, the smaller ones carry such of these officials as are suitable to their size:—

1 Nākhuda	خد	or Captain.
1 Mu'allim	صلعم ملعم	or Principal officer.
1 Karrāni	کرا ني	or Clerk.
1 Sarhang	س رهن گ	or Boatswain.
3 Sukkānis	سگاني	or Helmsmen, who make aud mend sails and tally cargo.
1 or 2 Tabbākhs	طباح	or Cooks.
1 Batīli	بتيلي	or Boatkeeper, in large vessels

Seamen are called Bahrīyah (مجرية) on the Arab Coast; Jāshu (جاشو) on the Persian Coast; Mallāh (جاشو) on the Shatt-al-'Arab.

I.--Baghlah (بغله).

Belongs to all Arab Coast Ports from Masqat to Abu Dhabi, Bahrain and Kuwait, Persian Coast, Büshehr, Lingeh, Qishm, Bandar 'Abbās, Jāshk, and in fact all Gulf ports.

A large native vessel able to carry from 80 to 300 tons of cargo—one "Baghlah the Jābiri" of Lingeh, which was lost about 20 years ago, is said to have had a carrying capacity of over 500 tons, had two regular

decks, a crew of 100 men, and carried 3 jolly-boats and one Māshuwah—has a long overhanging straight stem, with a small ornament at the stemhead. The keel runs straight between the stem and stern-posts; and the stern is square with overhanging counter, fitted on each quarter with projections similar to quarter-galleries. The stern-post slopes somewhat to the keel, the rudder being secured to the sternpost; the rudder-head runs through a trunkway on the stern, and is controlled by a wheel on the poop.

The Baghlah is decked fore and aft, fitted with a poop usually cut with ports; a boat is usually carried across the stern and hoisted to davits projecting over the stern. It usually has three hatchways. The larger Baghlahs have regularly fitted compasses, some of which are very old, most having been taken from wrecked or captured merchant vessels. A cross-piece is fitted on the stem-head, over which the anchor cables usually run when being hove in; it serves also to secure the cable to. In some cases the cable is hove in through a block fixed on the stem-head. The Baghlah has two masts of the usual type, and the sails and rigging common to all in the Gulf and before described.

It is a cargo-carrying craft and carries a crew varying from 20 to 50 men, now-a-days.

II.—Ghunchah (عنچه).

Belongs to the same ports as the Baghlah. It is merely a small Baghlah, to which it is in all respects similar, excepting that it generally has only two hatchways. It carries a crew of from 15 to 20 men, and from 20 to 80 tons of cargo. It is used for cargo.

III.—Batīl (بتيل).

Belongs to the same ports as the Baghlah, and is a vessel with a long, overhanging, fiddle-headed bow. The stem slopes rapidly to the keel, which is in length roughly about one-third the total length of the vessel; the after part slopes gradually upwards from the keel and ends in a broad thin stern-board, the head of which towers over the poop and is carved with a peculiar device. The stern is pointed, sometimes fitted with a poop; only the larger ones are completely decked, otherwise the Batīl is similar to the general type first described. It is of various sizes and is steered by means of a balanced rudder, actuated by a wheel; the smaller ones are propelled both by oars and sails. The larger ones only use oars when pearling.

The Batīl of the Arab Coast has two masts, that of the Persian Coast only one; the usual native sails and rigging are fitted. The Batīl is used for trading but often engages in pearling, and carries a crew of from 10 to 20 men; when pearling the crew are increased to about 30 men. It carries from 15 to 60 tons of cargo.

IV.-Baqārah (بقاره).

Belongs to all Arab Coast ports from Masqat to Abu Dhabi, Bahrain and Kuwait; on the Persian Coast to Lingeh, Qishm, Bandar 'Abbās and Tangistān; none have belonged to Büshehr for eight or nine years.

The Baqārah is similar in all respects to the Batīl excepting that the ornamentation of the stem and stern-head differ. On the Arab Coast this craft has two masts, with the usual sails and rigging; but on the Persian Coast it sometimes only has one mast. Baqārahs vary in length from 30 to 60 feet and are employed for cargo-carrying on the Arab Coast; they are also used for pearling. They carry ordinarily a crew of from 10 to 15 men, but when pearling the complement is increased up to 30 men. The Baqārah is impelled by oars as well as sails, and carries a cargo of from 10 to 30 tons.

V.—Sambūk (سنبوك).

This type of craft belongs to the same parts of the Gulf as the Baqārah, excepting Tangistān. The Sambūk is similar in all respects to the Ghunchah or small Baghlah excepting in one particular, the stemhead being plain and not decorated with a small block of wood as in the case of the Baghlah and Ghunchah.

The Sambūk carries a crew of from 15 to 20 men. It is usually employed in carrying cargo, and contains from 15 to 60 tons according to size.

VI.—Būm (بن).

Belongs to the Arab Coast ports from Rās-al-Khaimah to Abu Dhabi, Bahrain and Kuwait, and, on the Persian side, Būshehr. The Būm is of various sizes, of which the largest is somewhat bigger than the Ghunchah; they are from 40 to 80 feet long. The stern is pointed with a rail round; the bow is long and overhanging, rounded off (but sometimes carved) at the stem-head; and the vessel is steered with an ordinary rudder and wheel, excepting on the Pirate Coast where a tiller is often used. The Būm is usually completely decked, with suitable hatchways; it sometimes has a slightly raised poop. Būms carry crews varying from 15 to 40 men, and are used chiefly for cargo; but the small are used also for pearling; they carry from 20 to 200 tons of cargo and, as a type, they appear to be the most numerous in the Gulf.

VII.—Dangi (دنگى).

Belongs only to Kuwait, and it is believed that only one is at present known there; it was built at Kuwait and is similar in all respects to the Būm, excepting at the stem-head which has peculiar device, belonging to the Kūtiyah, rather like a bird's head with the beak pointing aft; this peculiar ornament belongs strictly to the Kūtiyah, a type of Indian craft found at Karāchi and in the Gulf of Cutch. In respect of size, complement, nature of employment, etc., the Dangi is similar to the Būm. The name is probably a native adaptation of the English "dinghy".

VIII.—Kūtiyah (كوتيه).

An Indian native type of vessel recently adopted in parts of the Gulf; it really belongs to Karāchi, Gulf of Cutch, etc.

The Kūtiyah is found in Būshehr, Khārag Island, Bahrain, and Kuwait, one or two at each place.

The Kūtiyah is in all respects similar to the Ghunchah or small Baghlah, excepting that it has a peculiar birdlike device on the stemhead instead of the square block of wood; this is its particular characteristic and has been borrowed by the Dangi. In every other respect regarding complement, size, rig, employment and tonnage it is similar to the Ghunchah. It is sometimes built at Kuwait, Bahrain and Būshehr.

. شوعی) IX.--Shū'ai (شوعی).

Belongs to the Pirate Coast, Bahrain and Kuwait.

The Shū'ai is a small Sambūk propelled by oars and sails, used principally by fishermen; it is generally from 15 to 20 feet long, with a crew of from 6 to 10 men. The larger Shū'ai is used for pearling on the Pirate Coast. Nearly all are decked; they have one mast with the usual sails and fittings.

X.—Zārūqah (زاررقه).

Belongs to Arab Coast ports from Masqat to Abu Dhabi. It is a small Baqārah used for fishing and pearling close to the coast. Has only

one mast, and is impelled by oars and sails; is usually from 15 to 20 feet in length; and carries a crew of from 7 to 8 men.

XI.-Māshuwah (مانشوة).

Belongs to the Arab Coast ports from Rās-al-Khaimah to Kuwait and Persian Coast from Būshehr to Jāshk.

In length the Māshuwah varies from 20 to 40 feet; it is broadbeamed and square-sterned, with plenty of sheer, sometimes completely decked, the smaller ones being usually half-decked. The larger ones have two hatchways for cargo. They are steered with a rudder and wheel, but the small ones use a tiller only. As a rule they have only one mast, but on the Arab Coast the larger ones sometimes have two. They have the usual sails and rigging, are fitted with a bowsprit, and have, in addition to the ordinary sails, a kind of combined jib-staysail. The larger Māshuwah is used for cargo (8 to 10 tons), the smaller ones for fishing; they carry a crew of from 6 to 12 men, and are a very common type in the Gulf.

XII.—Badan (بدن).

Belongs to the Arab Coast ports from Masqat to Kuwait.

The Badan is a much smaller vessel than, but is similar to, the Baqārah excepting that where the keel runs in the Baqārah is flat-bottomed in the Badan, which enables the latter vessel to stand upright when beached or aground. The Badan has only one mast and is rigged as usual; some have bowsprits, and all have the jib-staysail; the larger ones are decked, the smaller ones half-decked or open; they range from 10 to 20 feet in length and have crews of from 4 to 8 men. They are propelled by oars or sails; the larger ones are used for cargo, and the smaller ones for fishing.

XIII.—Jālī or Jālībōt (جاليبوت).

Belongs to all ports on the Arab and Persian Coasts; the name is probably borrowed from the man-of-war Jolly-boat.

The Jāli is a small square-sterned passenger-carrying craft, from 20 to 30 feet long, shaped rather like the Māshuwah excepting in the stem; usually open, but those belonging to Kuwait and Bahrain are

sometimes half-decked; has one mast with usual sails and fittings, also bowsprit and jib-staysail; it is propelled both by oars and sails, is steered with a rudder and tiller, and carries a crew of from 4 to 6 men.

XIV.-Shāshah (شاشه).

Belongs to the Arab Coast ports from Rās-al-Khaimah to Abu Dhabi and on the Persian Coast is found at Qishm and Bandar 'Abbās. Generally about 10 feet long, peculiarly constructed of date-stalks alone connected together in a solid body, no attempt being made to make the craft water-tight, the flotative properties of the date-stalks being utilized.

In form it follows out the lines of an ordinary boat and is pointed at the stern as well as the bow. It is strengthened by date-stalks laid athwartships between the layers of longitudinal stalks, the whole being sewn together with a kind of raw cotton twine. They are impelled by two oars; sometimes a primitive sail is used, hoisted to two small spars lashed together at their heads, with the lower ends separated and resting on the gunwales on either side of the boat amidships, and stayed as necessary. They have no rudder, and are used only for fishing close to the shore; they carry 1 to 3 men.

[Notes.—Full information about the river boats of Turkish 'Irāq, covering also those of Persian 'Arabistān, is given in the article on the former province in Volume II of this Gazetteer, pages 829-832.

On the Persian Coast occur two kinds of boats not described in this Appendix, viz., the 'Amileh علمه and the Varji ورجه or Varjeh ورجه of these the former appears to be a sort of small fishing Baqārah, while the latter is perhaps the Persian equivalent of the Shāshah. The Varji is also found at Zor on Failakah Island, where it is called Wahriyah وهرية. The Zārūqah (No. X above) occurs on the Persian as well as on the Arab side of the Gulf; see article "Qishm Island" in Vol. II, page 1550.

Statistical tables of the sailing craft of parts of the Persian Gulf thirty years ago will be found in the Gulf Administration Report for 1878-79, pages 40 to 42; the figures at the present day, so far as ascertainable, are given passim in the Geographical Volume of the present Gazetteer, and in the Appendix on Pearl Fisheries in this Volume.]

ANNEXURE NO. 1.—SUPPLEMENTARY INFORMATION RECEIVED BY COMMANDER A. ROWAND FROM NATIVE MERCHANTS AND BOAT OWNERS AT BUSHEHR.

 The large class of Baghlah has ceased to exist in the Gulf; there are none of 1,000 tons burden, and it is probable that none exceed 500 tons, if as much.

The complement of a large Baghlah is composed of the following ratings, but the number of seamen cannot be strictly laid down:—

Nakhuda	or	Captain.
Mu'allim	**	Principal officer and navigator.
Karrāni		Clerk.
Sarhangs		Boatswains.
Sukkānis		Helmsmen
Fauli		Butler.
Tabbākhs	-	Cooks.
Walads		Bovs.
Jāshus	,,	Boys. Sailors.
	Nākhuda Mu'ailim Karrāni Sarhangs Sukkānis Fauli Tabbākhs Walads Jāshus	Mu'allim ,, Karrāni ,, Sarhangs ,, Sukkānis ,, Fauli ,, Tabbākhs ,, Walads ,, Tabba

The earnings of a Baghlah are distributed as follows: suppose the freight of the cargo carried is Rs. 100; from this is deducted the vessel's expenses, say, Rs. 12, balance Rs. 88, of which the owner takes half, Rs. 44; the remaining Rs. 44 is distributed amongst the crew as follows:

								Rs. As.	Ρ.	
The Nākhuda								4.0	0	
The Mu'allim				•		•		2 0	0	
The Suk k ānis		•	•	•		•		20	0	
The Sarhangs						-		18	0	
The Cooks								18	0	
The Butlers								14	0	
The Boys					•	•	•	0 8	0	
•								,		
				\mathbf{T}	otal	•		12 12	3 0	

The remaining Rs. 31-4 is equally distributed amongst the sailors.

Freight is charged on each bale or package.

Baqārah		(1) Length 20 to 60 feet. (2) Carries from 10 to 50 tons cargo. (3) Costs, to build, Rs. 500 to Rs. 3,000.
Būm	•	(1) Length 30 to 80 feet. (2) Carries from 20 to 150 tons cargo. (3) Costs, to build, Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 8,000.
Batīl	•	(1) Length 30 to 60 feet. (2) Carries from 15 to 60 tons cargo. (3) Costs, to build, Rs. 800 to Rs. 4,000.
Sambūk	•	(1) Length 40 to 80 feet. (2) Carries from 50 to 200 tons cargo. (3) Costs, to build, Rs. 500 to Rs. 12,000.
Zārūqah		(1) Length 12 to 25 feet. (2) Carries from 3 to 5 tons cargo. (3) Costs, to build, Rs. 200 to Rs. 500.
Māshuwah	•	(1) Length 20 to 40 feet. (2) Carries from 5 to 50 tons cargo. (3) Costs, to build, Rs. 800 to Rs. 3,000.
Badan	•	(1) Length 12 to 25 feet. (2) Carries from 5 to 30 tons cargo. (3) Costs, to build, Rs. 600 to Rs. 3,000.
Dangi		(1) Length 30 to 70 feet. (2) Carries from 30 to 150 tons cargo.
Kūtiyah	٠	(3) Costs, to build, Rs. 2,000 to Rs. 8,000. Particulars same as Dangi.

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ANNEXURE NO. 2. -FURTHER

The following table contains information, supplied by a native expert it applies to Kuwait in the year

			DIME	nsions				
		Mixim	١.			MINIMA		
Name of class.	Length from stem to stern (in feet).	Length of keel (in feet).	Beam (in feet).	Depth (in feet).	Length from stem to stern (in feet).	Length of keel (1 n feet).	Beam (in feet).	Depth (in feet).
Shū'ai Saffār	90	52	19	734	75	45	171	6
Shū'ai Ghawwās	52	31	16불	6	35	$22\frac{1}{2}$	111	41/2
Sambūk	37½	28½	12	63	311/3	24	1114	4.
Baghlah	112	67	27	12	102	52	21	94
Baqārah	48	21‡	12	6	36	13½ ‡	114	41/2
Batīl	60	31½ ‡	181	64	521/2	28½ ‡	12	5 5
Māshuwah	30	24	61	21/4	25½	191	4 1	1 ½
Būm	75	551	21	93	67 <u>1</u>	49 <u>1</u>	18	81/4
						* Furni		

^{*} Furnished by Captain
† One Qusarah is
In each of these four cases the measurement given is that of Bis or horizontal keel;
stern post is exactly half that of the Bis. The Bis and Kösiyah

INFORMATION FROM A DIFFERENT SOURCE.*

which it may be useful to compare with that already given; in strictness 1905, not to the whole Gulf.

Pri	CES.			CARGO C	APACITY.	
Highest (in dollars).	Lowest (in dollars).	Number of masts.	Number of crew.	Maxi mum (in Qu- sārahs).		Remarks.
3,5 00	2,000	2	20-25	2,500	1,200	The Shuai Saffar is a cargo vessel.
1,400	600	2	20-45		•••	The Shū'ai Ghawwās is used for pearling only.
2,000	1,400	2	20-35		•••	The Sambūk is a higher grade vessel than the Shū'ai; it is used for pearl fishing and never carries cargo.
10,000	6,000	2	36-45	4,000	2,000	The Baghlah is used for trade and runs from the Gulf to Bombay, Aden, etc. There is on essential difference between a Shū'a and a Baghlah, except that the latter carries a small boat suspended at the stern. Now-a-days Baghlahs are not built of more than 4,000 Qusārahs or 320 tons capacity, but formerly some had a capacity of 6,000.
2, 0 0 0	1,500	2	24-36	•••	•••	The Baqarah is used for pearl fishing; it never carries cargo.
3,000	2,500	2	36-45		••	The Batil is the fastest and, according to Arab ideas, the most elegant of all craft. It was formerly used for war, but is now confined to pearl fishing; it never carries cargo.
250	180	1	12-20	•••	•••	Large Māshuwahs are used for pearling and have as many as 7 pairs of oars, small ones are carried by other vessels of greater size as shore-going boats.
8,000	3,500		20-35	3,000	2,200	The Būm is a type of cargo boat which runs all over the Gulf and to India. It is also used as a lighter in port; and by pearl merchants visiting the banks, but not for actual pearling.

S. G. Knox, Political Agent, Kuwait.
equal to 180 lbs.
and in each case the length of the Kōsiyah or inclined keel between the Bīs and the
added together make the whole keel.

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ANNEXURE NO. 3.—TECHNICAL TERMS FOR THE PARTS OF A NATIVE VESSEL IN THE PERSIAN GULF.*

Term.	Meaning.
'Amār عبار	Strong cable attached to the heavy anchor of a merchant vessel.
'Arshah عرشه	Screen erected over the poop to give shade.
'Atād عتاد	Ordinary cable used with the light anchor of a merchant vessel.
Bairasht بیرشت	Tiller rope.
Bassah Çamb	Yard halyard.
Batānah بطانه	Backing or internal covering of the ribs, made of date sticks.
Bāwrah بارزة	Heavy anchor; perhaps from the English "bower" anchor.
Bild باد	Sounding lead.
Bindār بندار	Room under the poop, used for storing provisions, etc.
Bīs بیص	Horizontal part of the keel, amidships.
Burd بره	Vessel's quarter; the plural is Burūd برود.
Dāman دامني	Sheet.
Daqal دقل	Mast.
Dāsi داسي	Boltrope.
Dastūr دستور	Apparently a sort of bowsprit.
Dhāla' ضلوع	Bibs.
Dîyirah ديرة	Compass.

^{*} From a report by Mr. In'am-al-Haqq of the Bahrain Political Agency.

Term.	Meaning.
Dūlāb درلاب	Steering wheel.
Fannah ei	Poop deck.
Farārīs فراريس	Bamboos, for poling.
Farman فرصن	Yard.
Fils فلس	Step of the mast.
Halq حاق	Bousing-to rope.
Jandîl جندیل	Women's latrine, on either side of the Bindar.
Khādim خادم	Wooden prop supporting the mast up to the level of the Suwar.
Khammāri خباري	Rope attached to the lower border of the sail at the middle; it passes over the yard and is used to pull up the lower edge of the sail a little when the wind is light.
Kharāb خراب	Cable used with the anchor of pearl fishing craft.
Khinn خن	Hold.
ت Kõsiyah گرسیه	Sloping part of the keel, between the horizontal part and the sternpost.
Mijdāf مجداف	Oar; plural is Majādīf مجاديف.
Qubait تبيت	Stem-head; also called Ras.
Rakan رکن	Rope with which the Dastur is lashed to the stem- head.
Rās راس	Stem-head ; also called Qubait.
Rub ū sh رپوش	Railings surrounding the poop.
Ruwaisi ررپسی	Rope led from the after end of the yard to the poop.

Terms.	Meaning.		
Sadar صدر	Bow.		
Sat-h ———	Deck.		
Shirā سراع	Sail.		
Sukkān س سکان	Rudder.		
Suwar onec	Thwart through which the mast passes; plural is Suwārah موارة.		
Tafar تفر	Stern.		
Tarīk تریک	Gunwale.		
Wānis وانس	Bindar of a pearling vessel.		
Yūsh يوش	Tack of the sail.		
Zāli زولي	Men's latrine, at the stem or attached to the poop railing.		

APPENDIX G.

TRANSPORT ANIMALS AND LIVESTOCK OF THE PERSIAN GULF REGION.*

Transport animals in the countries surrounding the Persian Gulf are principally camels, horses, mules and donkeys; the other livestock are cattle, buffaloes, sheep and goats, among which the cattle, in some places, are used for transport purposes. We shall devote a section to each of the animals mentioned.

Camels. †

Camels are abundant in all the countries on the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf, where nearly all the Bedouin tribes possess them in considerable numbers and consider them among their most valuable property: on the Persian coast also, especially where the country is open, camels exist and are to some extent utilised.

^{*}Some detailed information regarding transport animals and livestock will be found in the principal geographical articles in Volume II of this Gazetteer, of which an enumeration follows, and also in a number of minor articles. The passages in the principal articles are "Omān Sultanate", pages 1388-9; "Trucial 'Omān", pages 1438-9; "Qatar", pages 1532-3; "Bahrain Principality," pages 242-3; "Hasa Sanjāq," pages 665-6, supplemented by "Hasa Oasis," page 656, and "Qatif Oasis," pages 1543-4; "Kuwait Principality," page 1074; "Turkish 'Irāq," pages 798-9, 804-5 and 826-7; "Arabistān," page 129; article on the district of "Lirāvi" and separate articles on the districts of the "Persian Coast" from "Hayāt Dāvud" to "Jāshk District," inclusive; "Persian Makrān," pages 1138 and 1141; and "Gwādar District," page 588. To these may be added the article on the tribe "Mutair," page 1289. In regard to the export trade in animals of all kinds the annual Administration and Commercial Reports of the Persian Gulf Political Residency, Mr. H. W. Maclean's Report on the Conditions and Prospects of British Trade in Persia, 1903, page 15, and Mr. A. H. Gleadowe-Newcomen's Report on the Commercial Mission to South-Eastern Persia during 1904-05, printed in 1906, pages 82-3, are the principal authorities. The livestock of 'Irāq are described in Cuinet's La Turquie d' Asie, Volume III, pages 44-55. Captain C. M. Gibbonn's Note on the Transport of Southern and Eastern Persia (Division of the Chief of the Staff, Simla, 1908) contains much information on the subject indicated by its title. Some additional reports on particular kinds of animals are cited in footnotes to the titles of paragraphs below.

[†] The writings of Mr. Doughty and Colonel Miles contain some information in regard to camels, and Baron Nolde has devoted a chapter to the subject (*Reise nack Innerarabien*, 1895, pages 123-32). See also the articles quoted in the footnote to his Appendix, especially the article "Mutair" in the Geographical Volume of this Gazetteer. A note entitled "Camel Supply from Koweit, North-East Arabia" by Major G. H. Arbuthnot, dated 21st April 1905, is among the records of the Army Remount Department, Simla,

Distribution and characteristics of camals in Arabia. In the 'Omān Sultanate the chief camel districts are Sharqīyah and Bātinah; the Dalūls JJJ or riding camels of 'Omān are the best in Arabia, and are much prized in the other parts of the peninsula. In Trucial 'Omān many camels are owned by the Bedouin tribes, and in Qatar they are bred by the settled as well as by the nomad population; but in the Bahrain Islands there is little use for camels and only a few are owned. In the Hasa Sanjāq camels are plentiful, and the Dalūls are inferior to those of 'Omān only; the Kuwait Principality also is well stocked with camels. In all the three divisions of Central Arabia the camel is of supreme importance and is used not only for transport purposes but also, by the settled population, to raise water from wells; the milk, as everywhere in Arabia, is drunk by Bedouins. The camels of Southern Najd are smaller and darker in colour than those of Jabal Shammar in the north and they are considered to be of a higher class; they are, however, worse tempered and less tractable.

Distribution and characteristics of camels in Turkish 'Iraq. Camels are obtainable, in fair quantities, throughout the whole of Turkish 'Irāq; a proportion are very light in colour. Those of the Bani Lām tribe are reputed particularly good.

Distribution and characteristics of camels in Persia and Makrān. In the drier districts of 'Arabistan there is no scarcity of camels; but in this province they are only used for transport and are not ridden. Camels are found, though not abundantly, along the whole Persian coast, and the numbers in a few of the districts have been returned as follows:—

Līrāvi	100	Lingeh	500
Havāt Dāvud	259	Shamil	700
Tangistān	850	Biyābān	300
Dashti	1,250	Gwadar	200

For the majority of the districts no precise statistics are available. The camels of Persian Makrān are small, carry a load of about 400 lbs. and march 2½ miles an hour; here females are not generally worked unless they are barren.

Prices.

Prices vary within very wide limits according to locality and class of animal. In Hasa a good riding camel costs £18 or more; among the Mutair prices of good Dalūls range from £6 for a female to £10 for a male, while the best Ba'īrs are or male baggage camels can be obtained for £6 and the best females for £5 each; and in Persian Makrān an ordinary camel may be bought for £3-10-0 to £7-0-0.

Exportation of camels.

Camels do not appear to be exported from the Persian Gulf except by land from Kuwait, from Turkish 'Irāq, and probably from Najd, to Syria. Droves of 300 to 500 camels are occasionally marched to Syria from Kuwait, and there is a more regular export in the same direction from Turkish 'Irāq, where the chief collecting centres are Samāwah, Dīwānīyah and Najaf; the ultimate destination of most of these, which are sent vid Mūsal to Aleppo, is believed to be Egypt. A few good riding camels go from 'Omān as rarities to other places, and in this way a few have been sent by the Sultān as a gift to the Sharif of Makkah. The Persian Gulf appears not unworthy of consideration as a source of camel supply in case of extensive military operations by the army in India.

Horses.*

Horses are scarce in the 'Oman Sultanate; and in Trucial 'Oman very few are kept on account of difficulty in feeding them. In Qatar a few of the settled population and the Bedouins generally both own and breed horses. In the Bahrain Islands there are only a few horses, about 50 in number, owned by the ruling family; they are of Najdi breed, but have deteriorated in consequence of the climate and the conditions in which they are kept. In the Hasa Sanjaq the horses owned by the settled population are few, there being only about 100 in the Oasis of Hasa and 50 in that of Qatif; but the Bedouins of the surrounding deserts are well provided with horses, and from them serviceable animals of some breeding may be obtained at prices ranging from £18 to £36. In the Kuwait Principality horses are possessed, as they are elsewhere, by the Bedouins. Najd or Central Arabia is the principal horse-breeding country in the Persian Gulf and the only one in the world, except the adjacent Syrian desert, where the genuine Arab is produced on any considerable scale. Here horses are most numerous in northern Central Arabia or Jabal Shammar, nearly all persons of consideration in that district possessing a larger or a smaller number; but the export trade depends largely on the more central district of Qasim, where the towns of 'Anaizah and Buraidah are the principal markets. 'Anaizah, supplied principally by the Qahtan, furnishes as a rule animals of higher caste, while at Buraidah, provided chiefly by the Mutair, the number of animals is usually larger.

The horses of 'Irāq have a high reputation and the supply of them is considerable, but they are not equal to those of Najd; some really good horses are bred, however, in the neighbourhood of Hillah and Diwānīyah, and the horses of the Bani Lām tribe, to the east of the Tigris, are reputed excellent. A certain number of passable riding horses are available at Baghdād.

Horses in Turkish 'Irāq.

Horses, in some cases of fairly good quality, exist in considerable numbers in 'Arabistān; nearly all are mares, as colts are intentionally destroyed. In the districts of the Persian Coast horses are found, but not in the same excellence or abundance as in Arabia; statistics are not available except for the following districts:—

Horses in Persia.

Lirāvi	200	Zīra .	90
Hayāt Dāvud	350	Dashtistān	200
Rūd-hilleh	250	Tangistān	150
Angāli	100	Dashti	250
Shabānkāreh	50	Bandar 'Abbas	10

^{*}The principal authorities on horses are Colonel W. Tweedie's Arabian Horse; Lady Anne Blunt's Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates, 1879, and Pilgrimage to Najd, 1881; and Major R. D. Upton's Gleanings from the Desert of Arabia. To these we may add Baron Nolde's Reise nach Innerarabien, 1895, pages 183-144, Colonel L. Pelly's Report on a Journey to the Wahabee Capital of Riyadh, 1866, paragraphs 15 and 78 and Appendix XII, and his Report on the Tribes, etc., 1874, paragraphs 46 (footnote) and 129; also the works Guarmani, Doughty and Palgrave, but the last is an indifferent authority. See also Messrs. Maclean's and Newcomen's reports and the geographical articles quoted in the footnote to the title of this Appendix. For facts relating to the horse supply and trade in Persia, vide a report by Colonel B. Williams, Director of Armyl Remount Operations for India, dated 1st Fequuary 1887; remarks on ponies by Captain H. R. Tate in a report dated 15th June

Both in 'Arabistan and on the Persian Coast horses are used, among other purposes, for ploughing. In Persian Makran horses exist, but hey are scarce and of small size.

Export trade in horses. Exportation of horses from Arabia. Bombay is the market to which nearly all horses exported from the Persian Gulf region are sent.

At the present day there is practically no direct exportation of horses from Eastern Arabia, though a few leave the country by Bahrain and Kuwait; nearly all Arabs for sale abroad are now shipped at Basrah; but in special circumstances, as will be explained later on, they are sometimes put on board at Muhammareh. Informer days a considerable number of horses were embarked at Kuwait; it was estimated in 1863 at about 600 animals yearly, of an average value of Rs. 300 each.

The following are the figures of the small export (or rather reexport) trade from Bahrain in horses brought from Eastern or Central Arabia:—

Yes	ır.	Number of horses.	Estimated value in Bahrain in £ sterling.	Year.	Number of horses.	Estimated value in Bahrain in £ sterling.
1896		13	379	1902	23	616
1897 1898	•	21	743	1903	54	1,083
1899	:	28	792	1904	47	1,115
1900		59	1,343	1905	23	592
		70	1,631	and		
1901		72	1,725	1906	19	618

Exportation of horses from 'Iraq.

Basrah is the natural place of shipment for the horses bred in 'Irāq, mostly in the Baghdād Wilāyat, and also for a large proportion of those reared in Najd and in the Persian districts around Kirmānshāh; the course of the trade however, as will appear from what follows, is liable to be affected by Turkish regulations in 'Irāq, by which it is at times partially diverted to Muhammareh in Persia and to Kuwait in Arabia.

1887.

In 1887 the export of Arab horses from 'Irāq had been prohibited by the Turkish Government for many years; but the onleffect of this interdict was to promote smuggling, for animals intended for the foreign market were simply sent in contraband to Persia and shipped at Muhammareh instead of at Basrah. The number of horses leaving 'Iraq for places abroad in this year was estimated at 2,500, as against an annual average in preceding years, of about 2,000.

1888.

The prohibition on the export of horses was removed by the Ottoman Government in 1888; but the exportation of Arab mares continued to be strictly forbidden.

1889.

In 1889 it was reported from Baghdad that an inborn spirit of speculation seemed to drive hundreds of Arabs of the Mūsal and Baghdad neighbourhoods to adopt the profession of Jambaz or horsedealer, in

1889; Resources of Arabistan—Remount and Transport by Lieutenant W. J. R. Wickham, dated 24th June 1890; Report on the Arab Horse Supply through Hilleh, by Major G. H. Arbuthnot, 1st June 1905; and Report on the Arab Horse Supply, Baghdad, by Lieutenant V. P. B. Williams, dated 30th June 1907; these are among the records of the Army Remount Department, Simla.

which there seemed to be but little profit to the bulk of those engaged. Shipments were at this time divided between Basrah, Muhammareh and Kuwait.

In 1889-90 it was stated that the exportation from Basrah varied little in value from year to year, but that the quality of the animals exported was steadily deteriorating in consequence of the drain upon the sources of supply, which was excessive.

1889-90.

In 1891 the Bombay market for Arabs was overstocked; but in the following year, the number sent being smaller while the demand in India remained constant, good prices were obtained, and the season was a profitable one to dealers.

1891-92.

In 1893 the number of horses exported to India was considerably larger than in 1892, but prices continued to be good; and in 1894, though a slight decrease in the volume of the trade occurred, it was due to short supply and not to a bad market, and the dealers still had reason to be satisfied with the results of their operations.

1893-94

In 1895 a strong demand in India was anticipated, and the exportation from 'Irāq was unprecedentedly heavy; the shipments also were made earlier in the season than usual.

1895.

The number of horses exported to Bombay was below the average. This was due to dearness of fodder in India and to the appearance of bubonic plague at Bombay, in consequence of which the usual late-season shipments did not take place.

1896.

In 1897 there was further falling-off in the trade, due to the continuance of plague and scarcity of fodder in India, and to the purchase of horses for military purposes by the Turkish Government.

1897.

The season of 1899 was expected to be unusually profitable in India; but an export duty of 5 Līrahs or £4-10-0 sterling per horse was imposed by the Turkish Government, which checked the operations. Considerable numbers of animals were however smuggled from 'Irāq into Persia and shipped from Muhammareh, where the Shaikh was content to realise an export duty of 5 per cent. ad valorem.

1899.

In 1900 direct trade from 'Irāq practically ceased in consequence of the export duty; but horses continued to leave the country as usual, being shipped, as in the previous year, at Muhammareh instead of Basrah. 1900.

The prohibitive export duty of 5 Līrahs per head having been removed, the trade began to resume its normal course, and 945 horses of an average value of £6 were shipped from Basrah in 1902.

1902.

Good prices obtained at Bombay in 1902 encouraged exportation, and 3,845 horses left Basrah for Bombay in 1903; but the market was unfavourable, and dealers suffered heavy loss. Many of the animals shipped were inferior and remained unsold at Bombay until the following season.

1903.

In 1904 the animals sent from 'Iraq to Bombay were of better average quality than in the preceding year; but the Indian market was overstocked, and some small dealers, it was stated, were unable to dispose of their horses there or to pay their way back to their native country

1904,

An epidemic of glanders also occurred at Bombay, and a number of animals died or were destroyed there.

1905.

In 1905, in consequence of the misfortunes of the previous year, shipments were not large; but the horses sent found a good market at Bombay, in consequence, it is believed, of the visit of His Royal Highness the Prince of Wales to India.

1906.

In 1906 there was again a considerable decrease in the horses exported; it was attributed to the competition of Australian horses in the Indian market.

Statistics of exportation of horses from Basrah, 1887—1906. The following table shows the number and estimated value of the horses exported from 'Iraq in each year from 1887 to 1906 inclusive:—

Year.	Number of horses.	Estimated value at Basrah in £ sterling.	Year.	Number of horses.	Estimated value at Basrah in £ sterling.	
1887 *	(2,500) 2,206	(62,500)	1897	1,311	19,665	
1889	2,200 2,815	51,150 61, 930	1899†	1,9 3 6 1,5 2 8	29,040 27,504	
1890	3,193 3,149	63,860 73,23 0	190 0* 1901 *	(=,=.0)	(45,580) (49,100)	
1892 1893	2,268 3,432	37,50 <u>4</u> 50,480	1902 1903	945 3,845	5,670 46,140	
1894 1895	3,218	48,270	1904	2,682	53,640	
1896	4,581 1,704	68,715 25,560	1905 1906	2,262 1,741	49,764 43,525	

Exportation of horses.

The export of horses from Persia takes place chiefly by way of Büshehr and Muhammareh; but those embarked at the former port nearly all come from the interior of Persia, and those embarked at the latter port are, when their numbers are large, chiefly of 'Irāqi origin. To speak generally: the Persian horses collected by dealers at Shīrāz, Isfahān and Tehrān leave the country vid Būshehr, while those shipped at Muhammareh come both from the adjoining districts of 'Arabistān and from the remote districts of Hamadān and Kirmānshāh.

1829-34.

In 1829-30 the number of horses exported from Büshehr was 91 and their aggregate value was estimated at Rs. 29,025; in 1832-33 the

^{*}In these three years the horses exported were smuggled to Muhammarch and shipped there.

[†] In this year other horses of 'Iraq origin were smuggled into Persia and shipped from Muhammarch.

number was 272 and the estimated value Rs. 81,600; in 1833-34 the number was 266.

In 1862-63 no horses were exported from Büshehr. In 1863-64, 350 animals of an estimated value of Rs. 87,500 left that port, but about 100 perished at sea in native craft in consequence of bad weather, and the profits among dealers were small and the losses heavy.

1862-64.

In 1892 the horses exported from Muhammareh were of more than 1892. average quality.

In 1894 there was a slight decrease, in comparison with former years, in the number of horses leaving Muhammareh for India; the prices obtained at Bombay were not good, nor was the season profitable.

In 1895, when the export of horses from Basrah was large, the 1895. demand for Persians at Bombay declined, and the number shipped at Muhammareh again decreased.

Unfavourable conditions prevailed in India in 1896, and the number 1896. of horses sent from Muhammareh fell still lower.

In 1897, chiefly in consequence of plague at Bombay, the market was extremely dull, and again very few horses left Muhammareh.

1897.

In 1898 plague and famine in India still affected the Bombay market, and the exportation from Muhammareh continued slight.

1899-01.

In 1899 there was a very large increase in the number of horses shipped at Muhammareh; it was due to an export duty in 'Iraq, mentioned above, which caused many 'Iraqis to be smuggled into Persia for shipment. In 1900 and 1901 the whole horse trade of Basrah was diverted to this port.

In 1902 the trade at Muhammareh declined again, in consequence of 1902-03. the removal of the export duty in 'Iraq; and after this it apparently continued on a purely local scale. Exact figures are not, however, available.

The numbers and values of the horses exported from Bushehr, in the years for which they are available (1885-1906) were these :-

Statistics of exportation of horses from Bushehr, 1885-1906.

Year.	Number of horses.	Estimated value at Büshehr in £ sterling.	Year.	Number of horses.	Estimated value at Büshebr in £ sterling.		
1885	602	7.332	1890		•••		
1886	393	4,447	1891				
1887	366	3,866	1892	487	4,561		
1888	402	. 4,115	1893	480	4,364		
1889	177	1,833	1894	472	3,848		

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Year.	Number of horses.	Estimated value at Būshehr in £ sterling.	Year,	Number of horses.	Estimated value at Būsh ehrin £ sterling.	
1895	402	3,427	1901	231	3,078	
1896			1902	314	4,187	
1897	11	122	1903	468	6,259	
1898	78	779	1904	499	6,672	
1899	144	1,446	1905	122	2,641	
1900	132	1,669	1906	362	4,143	

Statistics of exportation of horses from Muhammareh, 1891-1901. Statistics of the number and value of the horses exported from Muhammareh in each year are not available except for the years 1891 to 1901 inclusive, for which they are as follows:—

Year.	Number of horses.	Estimated value at Muhammareh in £ sterlung.	Year.	Number of horses.	Estimated value at Muhammareh in £ sterling.	
1891	200	1,600	1897	62	1,240	
1892	210	3,880	1898	50	1,000	
1893	160	2,500	1899*	1,315	16,300	
1894	142	2,288	1900*	2,279	45,580	
1895	118	3,300	and			
1896	73	1,300	1901*	2,455	49,100	

Purchase of horses in Persia by the Indian Army Department. On one occasion horses for the Indian Army were purchased in Persia by Colonel B. Williams, Director of Army Remount Operations for India, who visited the country in 1886 accompanied by Veterinary Surgeon Rayment. In the course of these operations, which covered the period June to November, only 240 suitable animals were obtained; the majority of these were bought at Shīrāz, Isfahān, and Tehrān and in the Hamadān and Kirmānshāh districts.

Mules.†

Mules in Persia. Mules are not found on the Arabian side of the Persian Gulf; but throughout Turkish 'Irāq the supply is fair and a proportion are of

^{*}In these three years the great bulk of the horses shipped at Muhammarch were animals smuggled into Persia from Turkish 'Iraq.

[†] The chief source of information in regard to the Persian mule is an article by Lieutenaut I. McIvor, Assistant Political Resident, in the Persian Gulf Residency Administration Report for 1879-80, pages 15-35; it is entitled Notes upon the Breeding, Treatment, etc., of the Persian Mule, and upon Persia as a Source of

excellent quality. In Southern Persia mules are abundant, and serviceable animals can be purchased in considerable numbers at convenient centres on the main trade routes, such as Shīrāz, Isfahān and Shūshtar. In 'Arabistān, however, mules are confined to the drier parts of the province; and in the Persian districts upon the coast of the Gulf they are not apparently numerous, the only definite estimates for littoral districts being these:—

Hayāt Dāvud		150	Dashtistān		350
Rūd-hilleh .		200	Tangistān		60
Shabānkāreh	•	100	and		
Zīra		30	Dashti .		2 50

The reports cited in the footnote to the title of this Appendix make any further observations in regard to the Persian mule superfluous in this place.

Mules are not ordinarily, it would appear, exported from Persia by sea; but a number, as will be seen from the next paragraph, have been at times specially procured from that country, by the agency of British officers, for the use of the Indian Army. The Annual Administrative Reports of the Persian Gulf Residency only show that from Būshehr 22 mules worth £211 were exported in 1897, 2 worth £20 in 1899, and 161 worth £1,396 in 1901; and that at Muhammareh there were shipped 235 mules worth £1,827 in 1900 and 144 worth £1,080 in 1901.

In October 1879 Major Probyn arrived from India in the Persian Gulf to purchase mules for the use of the Indian Army in Afghanistan and remained until May 1880; he visited Shīrāz, Baghdad and Shūshtar and was successful, with the co-operation of Mr. Preece at Shīrāz and Dr. Brereton at Baghdad, in obtaining 1,715 mules, of which a proportion were battery mules. Between September and November 1880, under orders from the Government of India, 174 battery mules were purchased by the Persian Gulf Political Residency through Mr. Preece, and in December 57 more through a Persian banker; these appear to have been all collected at Shīrāz. On their tour in Persia in 1886, already mentioned above under the section on horses, Colonel Williams and Mr. Rayment obtained 212 mules; between January and June 1889 Captain H. R. Tate, who landed at Bushehr and visited Shiraz and Isfahan as a purchasing officer, collected 318 mules; and in 1890 Lieutenant W. J. R. Wickham, an officer similarly sent, purchased 267 transport and 29 ordnance mules in 'Arabistan between the months of January and Major E. Bruce, who was deputed to Persia to buy mules in 1890, June.

Exportation of mules from Persia.

Purchase of mules in Persin and Turkish 'Irāq by the Indian Army Remount Department.

Supply for Mules, and it covers all points of importance, including Major Probyn's mule-purchasing operations in Persia in 1879-80 during the Afghān War. Similar operations in 1880-81 are described in the Persian Gulf Residency Administration Report for 1880-1881, pages 11—12. Regarding later purchases of Persian mules for military purposes in India, the following reports, which are among the records of the Army Remount Department, Simila, will be found useful; they also contain much information regarding Persian mules generally:—a report by Colonel B. Williams, dated 1st February 1887; a report by Captain H. E. Tate, dated 15th June 1889; a report by Lieutenant W. J. R. Wickham, dated 24th June 1890; a report by Major E. Bruce, dated 17th November 1891; a report by Major G. H. Arbuthnot, dated 1st December 1905; and a report by Lieutenant V. P. B. Williams, dated 14th December 1907. The last includes a monograph on the Mule Supply of Mesopotamia.

spent November of that year in 'Arabistan and then went to Isfahan where he remained until September 1891; this officer examined in all 10,953 mules, of which he purchased 64 for artillery and 1.727 for transport work: of the whole only 46 were obtained in 'Arabistān. The two latest deputations of officers from India to Persia for the purchase of mules have been those of Major G. H. Arbuthnot and Lieutenant V. P. B. Williams; the former of these made Isfahan his principal centre and between April and October 1904 collected 953 mules; while the latter, who devoted his attention chiefly to the districts adjoining Kirmanshah and to Pusht-i-Küh, obtained 85 ordnance and 156 transport mules during the period from June to October 1907.* The exportation of the animals purchased by these representatives of the Army Remount Department is not traceable in the annual statistics for the ports of Bushehr and Muhammareh; it may perhaps have been intentionally omitted as an official transaction. The result of these deputations has been to show that there are difficulties in the way of the establishment of an ordinary trade in mules from Persia to India, the demand at Bombay and Karachi being at present chiefly military, and that, in order to obtain mules from Persia, it may probably continue to be necessary to send purchasing officers from India.

Donkeys. †

Donkeys are found, in fair numbers and of average quality, throughout the whole region of the Persian Gulf; on the Arabian side they are employed exclusively as transport, but in the Persian districts they are used also for ploughing. Donkeys are of little use as transport animals in the sandy tracts of Arabia, where the going is heavy to them on account of the smallness of their hoofs: and in such districts camels only are used.

Donkeys in Eastern and Central Arabia. Except in the Hasa Sanjāq and, to a limited extent, in the Bahrain Principality, the donkeys of the Persian Gulf are of ordinary size and quality. In the Hasa Sanjāq, however, an excellent kind of white donkey is bred, which is now found also—and perhaps in its greatest perfection—in Bahrain; in both of these districts, however, ordinary donkeys predominate over the special breed. In the Hasa Sanjāq the number of fine white donkeys is estimated at 3,200 in the Oases of Hasa and Qatīf,

^{*}Full details of the proceedings of these officers and of the cost, measurements, etc., of the mules purchased by them will be found in their reports, cited in the footnote to the heading of this section.

[†] For particulars, in addition to those given in the text below, the reader is referred to the Geographical Volume of this Gazetteer, especially the articles "Bahrain" and "Hasa Oasis." Vide also remarks on donkeys by Colonel B. Williams in his report of the 1st February 1887 and by Captain H. R. Tate in his report of the 15th June 1889, both of which are among the records of the Army Remount Department, Simla. Captain Tate purchased 30 donkeys in Persia for the Government of India.

and in Bahrain at 200, as against 10,650 and 2,000 ordinary donkeys respectively in the same districts. The white donkeys of Bahrain attain a height of 12 to 13 hands, while the larger of the common sort range from 10 to 12 hands. The donkeys of the Saluba,* in Central Arabia and Kuwait territory, are of exceptionally good quality, and by their means the owners are able to perform remarkable journeys in the desert. In the 'Omān Sultanate donkeys are plentiful in the hilly tracts, particularly in the districts of Western and Eastern Hajar and in Dhāhirah. The Bedouins of Trucial 'Omān, also, possess a number of donkeys. In Central Arabia donkeys are fairly abundant; in Jaba Shammar, the northern part of that division, they are frequently white, and are used to a considerable extent for short journeys.

In Turkish 'Irāq donkeys exist in fair numbers and are of average quality, as also in 'Arabistān. In Persian Makrān the donkeys, like the other animals of the country, are ordinarily of small size.

Donkeys in Turkish 'Iraq and Persia.

The following estimates will serve to indicate roughly the extent to which donkeys are kept in the districts of the Persian Coast:—

Līrāvi .		2,000	Dashtistān			2,500
Hayāt Dāvud	•	2,000	Tangistān			2,500
Rūd-hilleh	•	1,300	Dashti		,	3,500
Angāli		500	Lingeh			400
Shabānkāreh		3,000	Shamīl			1,000
Mazāra'i		70 0	Bandar 'Abbās		•	350
Zīra	•	900	Biyābān	•		500

Cattle.

Horned cattle are found, more or less, in all the divisions of the Persian Gulf region; but in most places there is nothing noteworthy about their quality, and their size is generally small. In Arabia they are kept chiefly for the sake of their milk and flesh; but in Persia they are also used as transport (especially among the Sagwand Lurs, whose breed is small in size), for ploughing, and in some places to raise water for irrigation purposes. The cattle of the 'Oman Sultanate are very frequently humped; along the coast they are fed on fish refuse, boiled up with date stones, date bags and other remnants. In Qatar the number of cattle possessed by settled villagers is small, but a good many are owned by Bedouins. In Bahrain a local breed exists, to the number of about 850 head, which are small in size but excellent milk givers: these are all stall-fed, and butcher's meat in Bahrain is furnished by stock specially imported from Persia. In the Hasa Oasis, it is estimated, there is on the average one cow per house among the village population. In Southern Najd cattle of a small-limbed humped breed are fairly abundant, especially in the Kharj district; but in Northern Najd, or Jabal Shammar, stock are few and poor. In Turkish 'Iraq cattle are fairly plentiful, the best being found in the neighbourhood of

^{*} Vide article "Saluba" in the Geographical Volume, page 1659.

'Amārah on the Tigris, which is the ordinary centre of collection for exportation. A number are marched from this region up the Tigris to Mūsal and so to Syria, and the ultimate destination of a proportion of those so exported is Egypt. The cattle of Persian Makrān, like the other animals, are small.

Buffaloes.

Buffaloes, in the region of the Persian Gulf, are hardly found outside the marshy districts of Turkish 'Irāq and 'Arabistān; there are a few in Persian Makrān, but they are small. The buffaloes of 'Irāq are of excellent quality, and among them those owned by the Al Bū Muhammad tribe have high reputation. Numbers are collected at 'Amārah, on the northern border of the Al Bū Muhammad country, and are marched by the Tigris line to Mūsal, and thence to Syria, for disposal. In 'Arabistān buffaloes are confined, as already mentioned, to the moister tracts; the majority are consequently found in the districts of Fallāhīyeh and Hawīzeh, and in parts of Dizfūl and Hindīyah districts. In this province buffaloes are used for ploughing as well as for other purposes.

Sheep and goats.

Both sheep and goats are found in considerable quantities in all the countries adjoining the Persian Gulf.

Sheep and goats in Eastern Arabia. The sheep, in 'Omān, occur mostly in the possession of Bedouins or among the inhabitants of hilly tracts, while goats are general; in Qatar the sheep and goats belonging to the settled population are tended by Bedouins, and there is some exportation of both to Bahrain; in Bahrain only about 500 sheep and 700 goats are kept, but there is a large importation by butchers from Persia and Hasa and a small one from Qatar and Kuwait,—so many as 14,000 sheep and goats being brought over from Persia, and 2,000 from Hasa, in the year.

Sheep and goats in Central Arabia.

On the Arabian side of the Gulf, sheep are most numerous and of the best quality in Najd; they belong to a special breed yielding a fine wool, and they are distinguished, outside their own country, as "Nijad' Among the Harb tribe the sheep are generally black. Among the Mutair both the sheep or Dhān wi and the goat or Ma'az we sell at \$4 to \$6 per head, the price of females being higher than that of males.

Sheep ir Turkish Irāq. In Turkish 'Irāq also the sheep are fat-tailed and of excellent quality, the mutton being almost equal to that of Europe; those of the Bani Lām tribe are highly reputed. There is some exportation of sheep from Turkish Irāq to Syria; it takes place vid the Tigris line and Mūsal

the animals being first collected in the neighbourhood of 'Amarah. The Arab sheep of the 'Iraq plain has a fine curly wool; but a crossbreed between it and the hill sheep of Kurdistan exists, of which the wool is coarser and straighter.

In 'Arabistān goats are less numerous than sheep, and in parts of Sheep and that province there is only a sprinkling of goats. Persian sheep and goats in goats are fully described in the Annexure to this Appendix, and no Persia. remarks on them are therefore required in the present place. The sheep and goats of Persian Makrān are small, like the other domestic animals of that country.

ANNEXURE No. 1.—PERSIAN SHEEP AND GOATS.*

Persian sheep.

Generally speaking there are only two distinct breeds of sheep in Varieties of Southern Persia and Arabia, viz., the 'Arabi عربي and the Turki تركي Persian or Luri بري ; but in some localities a third, a crossbreed between sheep. these two, may be added.

Persian sheep are very hardy little animals, which can thrive on General almost next to nothing, finding food where other animals would die of characterstarvation; and, despite their slender build, they are well able to stand istics. the inclemencies of the weather, particularly the heat and scorching winds which are so prevalent along the low lands of Southern Persia and Arabia. The 'Arabi is of lighter build, and has a more drooping tail; it is better adapted to plains and scorching winds, and its wool is finer and of higher value. The Turki is of heavier build, more suitable to the hills and the migratory habits of its owners; its wool is much coarser; and its fat tail is rounder and better set up.

A certain amount of attention is given to the breeding of the sheep, Breeding. more particularly to keeping the different breeds apart, and in the districts most noted for lambskins great care is taken to prevent the introduction of any other colour than black; it is no doubt mainly due to this that black is the prevailing colour, although, where the wool is the chief requirement, whites and greys are sought after. The rams get into the rutting humour twice a year; but, as a rule, they are only allowed to come into contact with the ewes once a year, and that in the autumn. The skins of lambs born in the autumn are considered, by some people, to be superior to those born in the spring; but, as a rule, the ewes are made to lamb in the spring, when grass and food generally are plentiful.

^{*}The whole of this Annexure on Persian sheep and goats was kindly supplied by Mr. H. A. Richards, His Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consul at Bushehr, in 1905. (It has been altered in parts so as to omit matters of temporary interest.)

Pasturage.

In spring there is usually a good supply of green grass and other kinds of food; and in summer, when the country is parched and dry, the sheep are still able to find wild grass, wheat and barley stubble, wild shoots, and fallen leaves from trees and shrubs, etc. During spring, when sweet grass is plentiful, the sheep, to keep them in health, are taken twice a week to graze on marshy ground or on soils where herbs of saline character exist. This is also done to a certain extent in the summer, the flocks being occasionally led over salty ground.

Water.

For water, in spring and the rainy months, the flocks are generally taken twice a day to the nearest stream or pool; but in summer, when these are day, they have to be content with brackish water from wells, wherever it can be obtained, and this, as a rule, only twice a day.

Work of the shepherd.

The tending or looking after flocks of sheep is not now a very arduous task. In olden days, when wolves and wild animals were plentiful, the duties of a shepherd were by no means light; but, since the introduction of the Martini and other rifles into the country, wolves and other wild animals have practically disappeared, and the shepherd can now allow his flock to roam about at pleasure, while he spends most of his time sleeping in a shady corner behind a rock, trusting to his dog to wake him should it be necessary, and to his goats to lead the sheep to grazing grounds near by.

Diseases.

The Persian sheep may be described as fairly immune from disease but Gar or scab exists, which is most prevalent in years of scarcity; the cure for this affection is, along the sea coast, the application of fish or shark oil and, inland, of linseed and other oils. There is also another disease of rather a formidable character, known amongst the natives as Abu Tabr of "father of the axe," which they take no means to prevent or cure, as they believe that a sheep suffering from it is struck by a devil; it generally appears when grass is plentiful. The sheep to all appearances may be in the best of health, when suddenly it will take to coughing, whirl round frantically, and, in most cases, drop down dead in a few minutes. There is less disease amongst sheep which are occasionally washed in the sea than amongst those which are not.

Wool.

On an average a sheep will yield $1\frac{1}{2}$ to 3 lbs. of wool. There is a distinct difference between the wool of the 'Arabi and that of the Turki or Luri. The 'Arabi wool is the finer in quality, being long-stapled, very elastic, and of a silky texture; this wool finds a fairly ready market in England and on the Continent of Europe, where it is mostly used for the manufacture of the coarser kinds of woollen goods. The Turki or Luri wool is very coarse and locky, the staple being very straight and shorter than the 'Arabi; it has little or no elasticity and in fact partakes more of the nature of hair. This class of wool has hardly any market in Europe, as it is not used for manufacturing woollen goods and will not even serve for carpets; it generally finds its way to Bombay, where it is said to be mixed with other wools. By far the greater part of the wool produced in the districts on the Karun is of the Turki or Luri variety. The difference in the quality of the wools is attributed by some to the different pastures and mode of living of the two classes of sheep. The Arab sheep, living on the plains, gets better food and has not to be constantly on the move; whereas the Turki is always marching with its

migratory owners and has to pick up what pasturage it can get on the road, while its food consists chiefly of oak leaves and lichen, found on the mountain sides. As regards the wool of the crossbred sheep, this is inferior to that of the 'Arabi, but superior to that of the Turki. It can be used for carpet making and is exported largely to America, where it enters under a low duty scale, while the better class 'Arabi wool has to pay a higher duty. A demand for this quality of wool has thus been created and is no doubt inducing the rearing of crossbreeds.

The shearing season commences in March and continues till May. White and grey wools are the least obtained, and black and dark shades are the most plentiful.

Persia is famous for its lambskins, which find a large outlet into Russia: these more generally come from the sheep of the highlands. As the essential feature of the lamb's wool is the fineness and compactness of the curl, an indiscriminate slaughter is effected of lambs of ages varying from the moment of birth to about a fortnight old. In some places the barbaric system still exists of killing the ewes just a day or so before they should give birth, in order to get the lamb without the damage caused to the curl by parturition; in such cases the skin is worth twice the average price. The destruction of lambs in Persia, until a short time ago, was so great that an appreciable decrease in the number of sheep was felt all over the country, affecting even the carpet-weaving industry. Government legislation has since been introduced to arrest this wholesale slaughter, but it is doubtful whether it has had much effect.

Lambskins.

Sheepskins in an untanned state are regularly exported to India, Sheepskins. where they are used to make up cheap country leather; and a certain number go to the Continent. The tanned skins generally find their way north, and are considered by some to be of very superior quality; they are largely used in the country itself, but a fair number are exported to Russia.

One sheep will produce from 1 to 1 lbs. of milk a day; this is Dairy progenerally made into cheese or into Mast ,—the latter a kind of curds duce. and whey -, both of which are greatly appreciated by natives and by some Europeans, Mast being a very refreshing drink after a hot and dusty journey.

After pigeon manure that of the sheep is the most prized in Persia Manure. by agriculturists, who utilize it especially for the cultivation of melons and other vegetables and of fruits.

It is a matter of opinion which kind of sheep is the better for Meat. eating; the 'Arabi, when ready for the butcher, weighs from 20 to 50 lbs., and the Turki or Luri from 30 to 70 lbs.

These are largely exported to the Continent, principally to Hamburg, Entrails. where they find a ready market.

These also are exported to the Continent, but not in very great Bones. quantities.

Generally speaking, the rearing of sheep is a lucrative business. Prices. The average price of a ewe is from 25 to 30 Qrans. The wool and dairy products of a ewe bring in form 10 to 15 Qrans per annum, and a

lamb fetches from 8 to 12 Qrans, against which the expenses of tending are practically nothing.

Exportation.

Exportation on a large scale would probably lead to the imposition by the Persian Government of an embargo; the measures which they have taken to prevent the destruction of lambs have been mentioned above. The Persian ports from which sheep might be shipped are Bandar 'Abbās, Lingeh, Būshehr and Muhammareh; the prices of ewes would range from 25 to 30 Qrāns and of rams from 25 to 40 Qrāns. The duty on the export of live sheep from Persia is one Qrān per head. A few sheep were sent from Persia to South Africa in 1905.

Persian goats.

In passing from the subject of sheep, it may be as well to say a few words as to their guide, philosopher, and friend,—the goat.

Kind of goats.

There is only one type of goat in Persia, which possesses long horns and is generally black in colour. Goats breed as a rule once a year, in September and October, but sometimes they have been known to kid twice.

Use of goats.

As a rule a number of goats are to be found in each flock of sheep; they are trained to lead the latter just in the same manner as the horse called Pīshāhang بيش اهدى is trained to lead a caravan of mules. The goats have better homing instincts than the sheep, and not only do they lead flock to the desired pasture land, but, as they are much less prone to taking fright, they also prevent it from shying or stampeding. They also act as safe guides in mountainous districts.

Produce.

Ropes, rough Gilīms ملل or rugs, and saddle bags are made from the hair of which the goats yield from 1 to 1½ lbs.; and their milk is treated in the same way as that of the sheep, that is to say, it is made into cheese or Māst. In villages alongside rivers, where no boats exist, goat skins are blown out and used by the natives, either singly or joined together after the manner of a raft; by this means goods, passengers, etc., are ferried across rivers and mountain streams over which there are no bridges and in which no boat could live. The skins are also extensively used to make bags for containing and carrying water.

APPENDIX H.

RELIGIONS AND SECTS OF THE PERSIAN GULF REGION.*

In the present Appendix we propose to deal with the indigenous religions of the Gulf only, leaving the subject of Western Christianity and Missions to be discussed in another place.

Religions and their distribution.

In all the countries of the Persian Gulf region, Islām, in one or another of its forms, prevails almost to the exclusion of other religions. The only other faith with numerous adherents is Judaism, which is strongly represented in Turkish 'Irāq, but outside the limits of that province is not professed by more than a few hundred persons. After Jews, in order of numerical importance, come Oriental Christians belonging to various churches, who number several thousands in Turkish 'Irāq but are hardly found in any other part of the Gulf.

^{*}This Appendix has been compiled chiefly from information collected for the Geographical Volume of the present Gazetteer by officers whose names appear in the footnotes on authorities in that Volume, from the general records of the Government of India in the Political Department, from the annual Administration Reports of the Persian Gulf Political Residency, and from the sources of information indicated below. The leading authorities used by the writer in matters relating to Shi'ahs are a special report on prevailing sects by Agha Muhammad Khalil, 1905; a special report by Mr. J. C. Gaskin on holy places and pilgrimages, 1905, in regard to which Cuinet's La Turquie d'Asie, Volume III, 1894, and Niebuhr's Voyage en Arabie, 1780, may also be consulted; reports on the Mujtahids of Najaf and Karbala by Major L. S. Newmarch, Political Resident at Baghdād, contained in the Proceedings of the Government of India for September 1903, and information supplied by Major Ramsay (Major Newmarch's successor) in 1906; reports by Captain D. L. R. Lorimer, Vice-Consul in 'Arabistān, on the Mujtahids of Shūshtar and Dizfūl; and, with reference to the movements in India of suspicious Shi'ah travellers from the Persian Gulf, the records of the Criminal Intelligence Department, Simla. Regarding Sunnis the chief sources of information are a report on the Naqib of Baghdād and the Qādiriyah family by Muhammad Hasan, Muhsin, with a covering letter by Major Newmarch, contained in the Proceedings of the Government of India for February 1904, and, for the relations of the same family with India and Afghanistan, various papers among the records of the Criminal Intelligence Department, Simla, and a report by Mr. F. W. Johnston, I.C.S., Secretary to the Government of the North-Western Frontier Province. In relation to the Ibādhiyah has been described by Major W. Grey, Political Agent at Masqat, in a special report dated 1905. For information regarding the Wahhābis of Arabia the reader is referred to the list of authorities given in a footnote

The Sabians, who follow a religion of their own, are now few in number and are confined to Turkish 'Irāq and to 'Arabistān; but the race or tribe of the Saluba, whose beliefs seem to have an affinity with Sabianism, are somewhat widely distributed over Arabia. Hindus are not many and scarcely occur except on the coasts of the Gulf of 'Omān and of the lower Persian Gulf.

Matters relating to the Muhammadan religion generally.

Muhammadan denominations in the Persian Gulf.

The Muhammadans of the Persian Gulf region belong to the following denominations: Sunni, Shī'ah, Ibādhi, Wahhābi, Khōjah and Zikri; among these the Wahhābis should perhaps, in strictness, be regarded as a branch of the Sunnis, and the Khōjahs as a branch of the Shī'ahs. To the position and interests of each of these denominations a separate notice will be devoted; but it will be convenient first of all to dispose of matters that are common to all.

Distribution and proportionate numerical strength of Muhammadan denominations.

The provinces of Turkish 'Irāq (population, 1,500,000) and of 'Arabistān (population, 349,000), co-extensive with the alluvial plains at the head of the Gulf, are predominantly Shī'ah; 'Irāq, or rather the part of it with which we are principally concerned, contains about 546,000 Shī'ahs as against about 175,000 Sunnis, but the Sunni element has political influence out of proportion to its numerical strength, chiefly in consequence of its connection with the Government; the population of 'Arabistān, however, is almost exclusively Shī'ah.

On the eastern coast of the Persian Gulf proper (population, 284,000) there is a considerable predominance of Shī'ahs except in the districts of Rūd-hilleh, Shībkūh, Lingeh, Bastak, Biyābān and Jāshk, in the town of Bandar 'Abbās, and on the islands of Qishm, Hanjām and Lārak, where Sunnis apparently preponderate: the Sunni element on this side of the Gulf may be very roughly estimated at 100,000 souls. On the western coast of the Persian Gulf proper (population, 307,000) Sunnis, including nominal Wahhābis, predominate in every territorial division; but in Hasa and Bahrain strong Shī'ah minorities exist of about 56,000 and 40,000 souls, respectively; and the total number of Shī'ahs on the Arabian side may be taken as approximately equal to the number of Sunnis on the Persian side.

In the Gulf of 'Omān Shī'ahs are few in number. Persian Makrān (population, exclusive of the Jāshk district, 92,000) on the northern shores of that sea is entirely Sunni, while the Gwadar enclave (popu-

^{1878 18 °}C. The Khōjahs are exhaustively dealt with in Sir J. Arnould's judgment of the 12th November 1866 in the "Agha Khān Case", vide Bombay High Court Raiors, Volume XII, 1875, pages 323-363; and there is also an article on the sect by Sir Bartla Freie, which appeared originally in Macmillan's Magazine. A note on the Livis was written by Colonel E. C. Ross in 1868, but the principal authority on that sect is now the District Gazetteer of Makran. The Sabians are discussed in the books mentioned in a footnote to the paragraph on their religion: see page

[.] The writings of Professor E. G. Browne of Cambridge are the chief source of information in regard to the Babis. Hughes' Dictionary of Islam, 1895, will be found useful in many technical and historical connections. (N. B.—The matter contained in the special reports mentioned above has been incorporated in the text, and the reports themselves have not been preserved.)

ation, 5,000) is Sunni, Zikri, Khōjah and Ibādhi; the Sultanate of 'Oman on the Arabian side (population, including Dhufar and the South-Eastern Coast of Arabia, 500,000) is in the main Ibadhi and Sunni, chiefly it would appear the former, with a small proportion of Wahhābis.

On the whole it may be said that the populations of Persian race are exclusively Shī'ah and that those of Arab descent are generally Sunni; but, as we have already seen, the Arabs of Turkish 'Iraq and of 'Arabistan constitute a large exception to the general rule. Again, the Persian Gulf is predominantly Shī'ah, chiefly on account of the countries at its head, while the Gulf of 'Oman is almost altogether Sunni and Thādhi.

Almost the only matter concerning all Muhammadans of the Muhamma. Persian Gulf alike is that of the annual pilgrimages to the holy cities of dan pilgri-Makkah and Madinah. There are three principal routes across Arabia mages to by which pilgrims from the Persian Gulf reach Hijāz; the first runs Nakalı and from Hofuf in Hasa viá Riyādh in Southern Najd, the second from Madīnah. Kuwait vid Buraidah in Qasīm, and the third from Najaf in Turkish 'Iraq vid Hail in Jabal Shammar.* Of these the last, by which pilgrims from Persia generally travel, is the most important and the most regularly used, the extent to which the other two are frequented varying with the security or insecurity of the regions that they traverse in the interior. About 1897 annual caravans used also to leave Samāwah and Zubair on the borders of 'Iraq; the former consisted entirely of Arabs, but the latter contained some Persians; both were accustomed to march by Hail. The Najaf caravan is said to consist, by the time it reaches Makkah, of 8,000 to 10,000 pilgrims, or even more, of whom 1,500 or 2,000 may be Persians.

The passage of these pilgrim caravans through their territory is a matter on which the rulers of Central Arabia lay much stress, chiefly on account of the revenue derived from the pilgrims in fees paid for protection against Bedouins. Various references to the pilgrim caravan question will be found in the history of Najd; and in the history of Turkish 'Iraq it is related how, in 1903, an attempt was made by some leading Persian ecclesiastics to prohibit the use of the Najaf-Hail route during the continuance of war in Central Arabia, and how this was viewed by the Porte as a deliberate effort to benefit the ruler of Kuwait at the expense of their own vassal, the Amīr of Jabal Shammar.

Historical events explaining the existence of Muhammadan denominations.

It will probably be convenient to the reader if we give in this place a brief résumé of the events to which the existence of the principal

^{*} These three routes are described in the article on "Najd" in the Geographical Volume of this Gazetteer, with full detail of stages and dates of starting of the annual caravans. Some general information regarding the pilgrimages from the Gulf will be found in a report by Dr. Cassim Izzedine, dated 14th November 1897, which is contained in the Proceedings of the Government of India in the Foreign Department for June 1898. There is not any direct pilgrim route, though some maps show one, from 'Oman to Hijaz.

Muhammadan denominations may be traced. Most of these historical occurrences took place in the countries of the Persian Gulf, and for this reason, and also because they make more intelligible the subject of Shī'ah holy places and pilgrims with which we shall deal further on, a short notice of them appears desirable.

Khalifates of Abu Bakr, 'Umr and 'Othman, 632-56 A. D.

On the death of the prophet Muhammad-bin-'Abdullah in 632 A.D., Abu Bakr, the father of Muhammad's favourite wife 'Ayishah, obtained the Khalifate; he ruled until his death in 634.

Abu Bakr was succeeded by 'Umr, another father-in-law of Muhammad, under whom, between the years 635 and 642, 'Irāq was completely conquered from the Sassanians of Persia by the Arab hosts of Islām. The important Muhammadan towns of Basrah and Kūfah in the new province were founded about the year 638. In 644 the Khalīfah 'Umr was assassinated.

'Umr had appointed before his death a board of six, who were to nominate from among themselves the next Khalifah; these were 'Alibin-Abi Tālib, the cousin and adopted son of Muhammad, whose daughter Fātimah he had married; Talhah-bin-'Obaid Ullah and Zubair-bin-al-'Awwām, the latter a cousin of Muhammad, both of whom were early and distinguished adherents of Islām; 'Othmān-bin-'Affān, who belonged to the family of the Banu 'Omaiyah but became the husband of the prophet's daughters Ruqaiyah and Umm Kulthūm; and two others. The choice of the board fell upon 'Othmān, who thus succeeded to the Khalifate; but his appointment was unwelcome to many, especially to his disappointed rivals 'Ali, Talhah and Zubair, and in 656 he was murdered, having reigned for twelve years.

Khalifate of 'Ali, 656-661 A. D.

'Ali was then raised to the Khalifate; but Talhah and Zubair, who had been associated with him in opposition to 'Othmān, at once went into rebellion and were joined by 'Āyishah, the prophet's widow. In the Battle of the Camel, however, fought near Old Basrah where their tombs are still shown, Talhah and Zubair were defeated and slain; and 'Āyishah, the "Mother of the Faithful", became the prisoner of 'Ali. War was next declared against 'Ali by Mu'āwiyah, governor of Damascus, a member of the Banu 'Omaiyah and a cousin of the murdered Khalīfah 'Othmān; and an encounter took place at Siffīn, near Raqqah on the Euphrates, after which, in deference to the wishes of a majority of 'Ali's supporters, the claims of the leaders were submitted to arbitration. The proceedings were practically inconclusive, for 'Ali remained in possession at least of 'Irāq, while Mu'āwiyah obtained the nominal Khalifate.

Rise of the Khawārij.

Meanwhile a sect known as the Khawārij, having for their ideal a theocratic state in which all other interests should be subordinate to religion, had arisen in 'Irāq. At first these enthusiasts supported 'Ali against Mu'āwiyah, whose pronouncedly secular policy was repugnant to them; but, having been convinced by the negotiations after the battle of Siffīn that 'Ali was at heart no less a worldling than his competitor, they subsequently rebelled against him in 'rāq. The political power of the Khawārij was, however, completely broken by a defeat which 'Ali inflicted on them in 658 in the vicinity of the Nahrwān canal, near the modern Baghdād.

Assassination After this, three of the Khawarij conspired to remove by assassination of the Khalion a single prearranged date in the month of January 661, not only

'Ali at his capital Kufah, but also Mu'awiyah at Damascus and 'Umr-fah 'Ali by ibn-al-'As at Cairo, -all of whom they regarded as disturbers of the the Khawarij peace of Islam. 'Umr escaped entirely unhurt; Mu'awiyah was wounded 661 A. D. but recovered; and the plot succeeded only in the case of 'Ali, whom 'Abdur Rahmān-bin-Muljam cut down with a sword in the great mosque at Kufah. 'Ali's wound, which was on the forepart of his head, was not severe; but the sword with which it was inflicted had been poisoned. and he expired a day or two after, at the age of 63.

'Ali left three sons, named Hasan, Husain and Muhassin. Of these Khalifate of Hasan was elected by his father's subjects to be their ruler; but he Hasan shrunk from a conflict with the superior forces of Mu'awiyah, who had his not ceased to encroach on 'Iraq; and by a treaty with the 'Omaiyid he tion, 661 A. obtained in consideration of his and by a treaty with the 'Omaiyid he D. obtained, in consideration of his renouncing his claims to the Khalifate, an amnesty for all his relations and a handsome pension for himself. Under this arrangement Mu'āwiyah took possession of Kūfah in the summer of 661. Hasan retired to Madinah, where he died eight or nine years later, poisoned by his wife, it was said, at the instigation of the 'Omaivids.

Mu'awiyah remained in undisputed possession of the nominal Husain's in-Khalifate until his death in 680; but his son and successor Yazīd had vasion immediately to cope with a movement headed by Husain, the second Traq, 680 A. son of 'Ali, encouraged by 'Abdullah, an ambitious son of Zubair, D. whose devotion to his cause does not appear to have been altogether sincere. Husain, not without hesitation, accepted an invitation from the inhabitants of 'Iraq to become their ruler and sent his cousin Muslimbin-'Aqīl to prepare the way for him. Yazīd, to meet the danger, transferred the energetic 'Obaid Ullah, son of his own uncle Ziyad, from the government of Basrah to that of Kufah; and the capture and execution of Muslim quickly followed. Meanwhile Husain had advanced from Makkah to the borders of 'Iraq; here he was met on the 1st of Muharram by a troop of horse under one Hurr, who had orders to conduct him to Kufah but did not do so; and on the 3rd of Muharram a body of 4,000 troops, despatched by 'Obaid Ullah from Kufah, established themselves between the Euphrates and Husain's camp at Karbala, cutting him off from the river. Negotiations ensued, which lasted until the 9th; but no settlement could be reached, for 'Obaid Ullah insisted on the unconditional surrender of Husain and his party, and to this Husain would not agree. On the morning of Saturday the 10th of Muharram 61 A. H., corresponding to the 10th of October 680 A. D., Hurr, the leader first sent against Husain, deserted to his side; and soon afterwards fighting, chiefly in the form of single combats, began in front of Husain's camp, which he had caused to be entrenched during the night. The attacking force was commanded by Shimr. The battle was prolonged into the afternoon; but in the end numbers prevailed, and Husain was slaughtered with his entire armed following of more than 70 persons*; among the slain were Husain's half-brother 'Abbās and Husain's son Ali Akbar. The head of Husain was sent to

^{*} The number of the Shuhada or martyrs is given as 72, but the writer has not been able to ascertain whether the chiefs (Hussin, etc.) are included in this number.

Kūfah and thence to Damascus, and his body lay unburied until the next day*.

Origin of the Shi'ah schism. †

The occurrences described above gave rise to the principal schism by which Islam is divided. It was maintained by the partisans of 'Ali and his sons, who afterwards came to be known as Shi'ahs, that 'Ali and his descendants possessed an indefeasible and exclusive right to the Khalifate: and the Shi'ahs consequently regard all those who have actually presided over Islam, with the exception of 'Ali and Hasan only, as usurpers. The Shi'ah list of the true Khalifahs, or, as they term them. of the Imams. runs as follows: (1) 'Ali, son-in-law of the prophet Muhammad; (2) Hasan, the eldest son of 'Ali by Fatimah, the daughter of Muhammad; (3) Husain, the second son of 'Ali by Fatimah, the daughter of Muhammad; (4) 'Ali, surnamed Zain-ul-'Abidin, son of Husain; (5) Muhammad-al-Bāqir, son of Zain-ul-'Abidin; (6) Ja'faras-Sādiq, son of Muhammad-al-Bāqir; (7) Mūsa-al-Kādhim, son of Ja'far; (8) 'Ali-bin-Mūsa, known as Ar-Ridha, son of Mūsa-al-Kādhim: (9) Muhammad-at-Taqi or Muhammad-al-Jawad, son of Ar-Ridha; (10) 'Ali-an-Naqi, son of Muhammad-at-Taqi; (11) Hasan-al-'Askari, son of 'Ali-an-Naqi; and (12) Muhammad-al-Mahdi, son of Hasan-al-'Askari‡. With the last named, whom the Shi'ahs believe to be living in concealment and whose reappearance they await, ends the series of the twelve Imams; and from this number the general body of Shi'ahs are described in common parlance as Ithnah-'Ashariyah, or "Followers of the Twelve," in contradistinction to Shi'ahs belonging to various minor sects.

Origin of the Ibadhi denomination.

The terms
"Saiyid"
"Tabatabāyi"
and
'Sharīf".

The Ibādhi form of the Muhammadan religion is said to have been introduced into 'Omān by two of the Khawārij, who escaped from the slaughter of their fellow believers by 'Ali at Nahrwān.

The descendants of 'Ali and Fātimah through males are universally distinguished as Sādah or Sādāt, that is Saiyids, and at some places in the Gulf region, as in many other parts of the Muhammadan world, whole communities of these persons exist: such are the Sunni Sādah of Bahrain and the Shī'ah Saiyids of Gumārūn in the Hayāt Dāvud district of the Persian coast. The Saiyids or ruling family of 'Omān are,

†It is not intended to imply, by what is stated in the text, that the basis of Shi'ism, as it now exists, is merely historical.

The tombs of these Imams, are, as we shall see further on, situated in 'Iraq, except those of the second, fourth, fifth and sixth Imams, which are at Madinah, and that of the eighth, which is at Mashhad in Persia, while the last Imam has of course no tomb,

^{*}Though the fate of Husain excites commiseration, it is difficult to regard him, as Shi'ahs do, in the light of a Shahid or martyr. In the first place there appears to be no real reason for holding that descendants of Muhammad had an exclusive right to the Khalifate; in the second, it seems that any right which they might have possessed was renouced by Hasan during his headship of the family; and, in the third, it is clear that Husain lost his life, not in vindicating a moral or religious principle, but merely in an attempt to wrest the temporal power from Yazid. It should be remembered, however, that the title Shahid is very lightly bestowed in some Muhammadan countries; e.g., in places on the Indo-Afghan frontier, upon an ordinary traveller who has been killed by highwaymen. Those who fell with Husain have perhaps a better claim than he to be considered martyrs; and so possibly has his father 'Ali, who was murdered by a religious fanatic while actually ruling over 'Irāq.

however, not Saivids by descent from 'Ali; they are Saivids only in the ordinary sense of "princes". Persons who can trace their descent from Ismail-bin-Ibrahim (surnamed Tabataba owing to his pronouncing ilike b) the great great grandson of 'Ali are styled" Tabatabāyis." Ashrāf or Shurafa, Anglice Sharifs, are, apparently, the descendants of Muhammad or of his daughter Fatimah otherwise than through an unbroken line of males*: examples are the Sunni Ashraf of Najd and, possibly, the Shī'ah Shurafa and the Sharifat of 'Arabistan.

Shī'ah sects in the Persian Gulf region.

The following information about Shi'ah sects relates primarily to Usulis, Bushehr and the Gulf Ports, and the extent to which it is of general Akhbaris and application is uncertain.† The three principal Shī'ah sects in the Shaikhis. Gulf are the Usuli, the Akhbari and the Shaikhi, of which the first is said to enjoy at the present day a great predominance everywhere in Persia and Turkish 'Iraq, while the second is the oldest, and the third is the most modern as well as the least numerous of the three. The main differences between Usulis and Akhbaris appear to be that the former admit more recent Hadith or traditions than the latter, and that they allow the validity of decisions reached by means of Ijma', or the assembling of learned men, even at the present day. The Akhbaris holdspecial Friday prayers like the Sunnis, and some of their Mullas do not forbid to associate, or even to eat and drink, with Jews and Christians; in both of these respects they are apparently at variance with the Usulis and the Shaikhis. The differences between the Akhbaris and the Usulis seem to have become acute for the first time under the Safavi dynasty, which preceded that of the Qajars; and now they are so accentuated that the members of the two sects will not pray in each other's mosques.

The Akhbāris are said to date from the earliest days of Islām, the History Usulis from about 350 A. H.; and, until comparatively recent times, the the Akhbaris. Shi'ahs of the Gulf appear to have been mostly Akhbaris. The principal Mujtahid or divine of the Akhbaris in the 18th century was the still famous Shaikh Yusuf-al-Asfur, who died about 1770 A. D.; he was succeeded by Shaikh Husain-bin-Muhammad, who is said to have been a prolific writer and to have settled at Büshehr about the time that the 'Utūb conquered Bahrain (1783 A. D.). After Shaikh Husain came, about the year 1845, his son Shaikh Hasan; and the next head of the Akhbaris in the Gulf was Shaikh Khalif, whose death took place about the year 1857 at Sarkuvardān in Dashtistān. Khālif was followed by his son Shaikh 'Abdul 'Ali, who died about 1886. To 'Abdul 'Ali succeeded the present Imam Jum'eh of Bushehr; he is said to have over 2,000 followers at that place, besides a number in Bahrain. These

^{*} In a report received from Bahrain, however, the term Sharif is stated to mean only a descendant through males of Hasan, the son of 'Ali and Fatimah.

[†] It should be added that the reports on which this paragraph is based, though founded on the statements of Mujtahida Büshehr, are far from clear; and the information given must therefore be accepted with reserve. The subject is not one that any but an expert in Muhammadan theology and ecclesiastical history could deal with satisfactorily. 158 A

successive chief Mujtahids of the Gulf Akhbāris seem all to have belonged to the same Asfür family as the celebrated Shaikh Yūsuf; but their influence has greatly declined during the last few generations.

History

The Shaikhis take their name from Shaikh Ahmad-bin-Zain-ud-Dīn, the Shaikhi: who flourished in Hasa between 1785 and 1825; Shaikh Kadhim, his successor, died at Karbala about 1843; and after Shaikh Kādhim a certain Shaikh Muhammad Karīm Khān became prominent, who was born about 1810 and died about 1871. Another leading Shaikhi was Hāji Muhammad Khān, whose son, also named Hāji Muhammad Khān, is said to be the principal expounder of the Shara' at the present time at Kirman and to belong to the royal Qajar family. There is strong opposition between the Usulis and the Shaikhis, but the nature of their differences has not been satisfactorily explained. On the Persian coast of the Gulf there are only about 50 Shaikhis at Bushehr and a very few at Bandar 'Abbas and Lingeh, but they are understood to be more numerous in other parts of Persia.

Shī'ah shrines in 'Irāq.

The Shi'ah shrines of 'Iraq may be divided into three groups: first, those connected with the death of 'Ali; second, those connected with the battle of Karbala; third, those connected with Imams later than Husain.

Sacred places connected with the death of 'Ali.

The spot where 'Ali was mortally wounded is shown in the great mosque of Kufah; and his reputed tomb is the sole object of interest at the town of Najaf, which has grown up around it in the midst of inhospitable deserts. These sacred places are described in the articles on Kūfah and Najaf in the Geographical Volume of this Gazetteer.

Sacred places connected with the battle of Karbala.

The tombs of Husain and his party are shown at Karbala, and their authenticity is not disputed. Of the buildings there, fully described in the geographical notice of the town, the most important is the Bargah Hazrat Husain; it contains the grave of Husain and it is the burial place of most of his companions. 'Abbās has a sepulchre of his own. The tomb of Hurr is situated 7 miles to the north-east, and that of 'Aun 31 miles to the north-west of Karbala. Here may be mentioned also, though not immediately connected with the Karbala incident, the tombs of Muslim-bin-'Aqīl, Husain's emissary to Kūfah, and of Hasan-bin-Amwah who harboured him, both at Kūfah. Muhammad-bin-'Aqīl and the Aulad Muslim, who are buried to the east of Hillah, were probably of Muslim's family.

Sacred places connected with the

At Kadhimain, in the geographical article on which a description will be found, is the burial place of Mūsa-bin-Ja'far and Muhammadbin-'Ali, the seventh and ninth Imams; the title of Kadhim, "the Selflater Imams. restrained," has been extended to both, but originally it belonged to the former alone. The tombs of the tenth and eleventh Imams, 'Ali-bin-Muhammad and Hasan-bin-'Ali, are to be seen at Samarrah, where also is exhibited a well, situated in a subterranean apartment and protected by a silver grating,—the scene, according to tradition, of the disappearance of Muhammad-bin-Hasan-al-Mahdi, the twelfth Imam. The Mahdi is said, however, to show himself at intervals at the Masjid-as-Sahlah,

a mosque in the vicinity of Najaf. Other shrines of minor importance associated with the names of members of the Imam family are those of Abul Qāsim, a son of the Imām Hasan, and of Saiyid Ibrāhīm, a son of the Imam Musa, both near Musaivib; also those of Hamzah and Jāsim, a son and grandson respectively of the Imām Musa, situated some miles to the eastward of Hillah, and those of Ibn-al-Hasan, the Banāt-al-Hasan and Ibn-al-Hamzah, in the neighbourhood of Tawairīj.

The management of the Shī'ah shrines in 'Irāq is vested in the Administra-Auqāf or Turkish Department of Religious Endowments, by whom the tion, estab-custodians and attendants are paid and, it would seem, appointed. At revenues of each of the principal shrines, viz., that of 'Ali at Najaf, those of Husain the shrines. and 'Abbas at Karbala, that of Kadhimain and, apparently, that of Sāmarrah, there is a Custodian, called the Kilīddar كليددار or Key Keeper, a Sarkhidmah سرخامه or Chief Attendant and a variable number of Khadims خادم or Attendants; the staff at Samarrah are reported to be Sunnis. The salary of a Custodian is 500 gold piastres (about £4-10-0) a month, of a Chief Attendant 80 gold piastres (about 14s. 5d.) a month, and of an Attendant (if paid) 25 gold piastres (about 48. 6d.) a month; but the Kiliddar of Najaf is one of the richest men in Turkish 'Iraq. Paid Attendants number 15 at each of the great shrines of Karbala and at the shrines of Najaf and Kadhimain; and there are also 950 Attendants at Karbala, 250 at Najaf and 30 at Samarrah, whose existence, though they are unpaid, seems to be officially recognised. For the finances and accounts of the shrines, which are supported partly by large endowments in the shape of lands, houses and shops, and partly by special donations and contributions, the Auqaf are responsible; and the sacred treasures of the shrines also, consisting largely of jewellery and objects made from the precious metals, of which the items and value are not known even approximately to outsiders, are in charge of the officials of the Department, by whom they are periodically checked and examined. Registers of donations are kept by the Kilīddars under the supervision of the Auqaf. It is stated that the treasures of the shrines may be drawn on for a defensive war against infidels, but only under a general agreement of the Mujtahids, or by order of the Sultan of Turkey. The Persian Government make an annual grant of 3,000 Tumans to the Kiliddars of Karbala for lighting, another of 2,000 Tumans to the Kiliddar of Najaf for the general maintenance of 'Ali's tomb, and a third of 1,250 Tumans to the Kilid-

Shī'ah shrines in the Gulf outside 'Irāq.

dar of Kadhimain.

In the Gulf region, the interest of Shi'ahs being almost altogether monopolised by the sacred places in 'Iraq just enumerated, there are few other Shi'ah shrines of importance; but mention may be made of Shāh Abul Shāh in the Hindiyan district on the Persian coast, which is dedicated to Shaikh 'Abdullah, a brother of Ar-Ridha, the eighth Imām. Petty shrines are numerous and are generally either Imāmzādehs or Qadamgahs, the former being apparently actual tombs, and the latter cenotaphs, of members of the family of the Imams.

The Shī'ah pilgrimages to 'Irāq.

Conditions of making the pilgrimage. The Shī'ahs consider their pilgrimages to the shrines of 'Irāq to be highly meritorious, more especially because they are voluntary, instead of being obligatory like the Hajj or general pilgrimage of all Muhammadans to Makkah and Madīnah. It is incumbent on a Shī'ah pilgrim, before he leaves his home, to make his will, to pay his debts, and to appoint trustees to take charge of his property and perform the necessary rites in case of his death on pilgrimage. The funds taken by the pilgrim for his expenses on pilgrimage must have been honestly obtained; and, if there is any doubt on this head, or if they are contaminated by having reached him from a Government department, they must be purified by a process known as Radd-al-Madhālim they are consists in distributing one-eighth of the whole in charity to deserving poor, or in handing the whole to a pious Mujtahid or divine, who returns it after deducting a trifle.

Routes and movements of the pilgrims.

The pilgrims from north-western Persia mostly cross the frontier at Khānagīn; those from Southern Persia, from the Persian Gulf, and from India mostly enter 'Iraq by sea, landing at Basrah. There being no fixed time of year for the Shi'ah pilgrimages, the cold weather is generally chosen in order to make the journey less arduous. The richer pilgrims by land ride horses or are carried in litters, while women and children are conveyed in Kajāvas or panniers. Each band of pilgrims is guided by a Chaush or conductor, who carries a red or green flag inscribed with a text of the Quran or with the names of the Imams, and is preceded by a caparisoned horse hung with bells of different tones and sizes. Pilgrims coming by land from the Persian frontier ordinarily visit Kadhimain first and then proceed by stage-coach to Karbala and Najaf; this too is the course followed by the generality of pilgrims from the Gulf, who take the river-steamer from Basrah to Baghdad; but a few of the pilgrims arriving by sea travel up the Euphrates from Basrah to Kufah and see Najaf before they reach Karbala. All or nearly all pilgrims visit Najaf, Karbala and Kādhimain, but it is estimated that only about one-fourth of them go to Sāmarrah; those who do make the journey by stage-coach from Kādhimain, by a road west of the Tigris running direct to a place opposite Samarrah. The only minor Shi'ah shrines in 'Iraq at all commonly visited by pilgrims from abroad are those of Hamzah and Jāsim near Hillah. The stay of the pilgrims in 'Irāq is said to average about two months, and it is estimated that in this period the poorer sort spend from Rs. 60 to Rs. 100, and the rich in some cases very large sums, partly on the maintenance of themselves and their animals, partly in the purchase of ordinary and sacred articles, and partly in donations to the shrines and in presents to officials and guides.

Annual number of pilgrims. The winter influx of pilgrims, while it sometimes introduces disease, stimulates internal and in a lesser degree external trade, and brings a large amount of money into the country. According to Turkish official statistics the number of Shī'ah pilgrims entering 'Irāq from all directions was 23,990 in 1889 and 57,567 in 1890, from which it would appear that the pilgrimages fluctuate considerably from year to year. In both

the years cited about three-fourths of the pilgrims arrived $vi\acute{a}$ Khānaqīn and most of the remainder $vi\acute{a}$ Basrah. In the cold weather of 1904-05 the pilgrims from abroad arriving at Basrah were as follows:—

October 1904								•	579
November "								•	352
December "						•		. 1	1,139
January 1905			•					. 1	,709
February "	•		•	•	•		•	. 1	L,204
March "	•	•	•	•	•	•	•	.]	1,526
					!	F otal		. 6	5,509

Very few pilgrims from abroad land at Basrah during the other months of the year. In 1877-78 the Persian pilgrims embarking at Būshehr for 'Irāq numbered about 2,500. The number of Indians included among the pilgrims arriving annually at Basrah is large, and a very considerable proportion of them are Bohrahs.

A pilgrim, at his visit to one of the great Shī'ah shrines in 'Irāq, first Ceremonies purifies himself by means of certain prescribed ablutions; he then performed by enters the sacred precincts, generally under the guidance of an Attendant. Pilgrims. At the threshold of the shrine proper he asks the permission of the saint to approach. Having passed in, he recites some prayers and circumambulates the grave three times, kissing the railings and repeating prayers; finally he prostrates himself twice before the tomb. Those pilgrims who are rich enough, and who desire to obtain additional merit. engage Mullas to read the Quran and to recite the story of the martyrdom of Husain, etc.; they also distribute alms and food to the poor, and make offerings of money and jewellery to the shrine. Such at least is the procedure followed at the shrine of Husain at Karbala. The prayers said in the precincts are both Du'a, or voluntary prayers, offered here in the name of 'Ali or of Husain, and Namaz or the ordinary fixed prayers which are prescribed for particular times of the days. The act of visiting the shrine is called Ziyārat زيارة. The pilgrims provide themselves, especially at Karbala, with rosaries, with Turbahs قربه or the tablets of sacred earth on which Shī'ahs press their foreheads in prostrating themselves at prayer, and with shrouds for the future use of themselves or their friends, stamped or inscribed with texts from the Quran. After visiting the holy places a pilgrim is entitled to use the title of "Karbalāi."

Although, as already mentioned, there is no stated time or season for Auspicious the performance of the Shi'ah pilgrimages, certain days of the days for Muhammadan year are accounted more auspicious than others for the visiting the shrines of purpose.

Auspicious days for visiting the shrine of 'Ali at Najaf are the Karbala. following:—

7th Safar, the anniversary of the death of Hasan, the eldest son of 'Ali.

27th Safar, the anniversary of the death of Ar-Ridha, the eighth Imām, believed by the Shī'ahs to have been poisoned.

28th Safar, the reputed anniversary of the death of the prophet Muhammad.*

9th Rabī'-al-Awwal, the day of the assassination of the Khalīfah 'Umr.

17th Rabi'-al-Awwal, the reputed birthday of the prophet Muhammad.†

13th Rajab, the birthday of 'Ali.

27th Rajab, the day on which the prophet Muhammad is supposed to have received his mission.

21st Ramadhan, the anniversary of the death of 'Ali.

27th Ramadhān, the day of the execution of 'Abdur Rahmān-bin-Muljam, the murderer of 'Ali.

18th Dhul Hijjah, known as the 'Id-al-Ghadīr عند الغدير, the day on which, according to the Shī'ahs, the prophet Muhammad nominated 'Ali to be his successor.

28th Dhul Hijjah, known as the Mubāhilah مباهله , the day on which 'Ali gave a costly emerald ring to a beggar, who was an angel sent in disguise to try him.

21st March or Naurūz, the Persian New Year's Day.

Auspicious days for visiting the shrines at Karbala are the following:—

8th, 9th and 10th Muharram, known as the Aiyām-at-Tarwiyah القام الترويد, the day of the massacre of Husain and his companions and the two days preceding it; on the 8th the archangel Gabriel is supposed to have shown the martyrs their appointed places in paradise.

20th Safar, known as the Arba'īn (i.e., Forty Days) or the Maradd-

ar-Rās مرد الراس (i.e., the Return of the Head), the day on which the head of Husain was brought back to Karbala from Damascus.

1st Rajab, the day on which Ar-Ridha, the eighth Imam, performed the pilgrimage at Karbala.

15th Rajab, a day appointed for the Ziyārat by Ja'far-as-Sādiq, the sixth Imām.

1st, 2nd and 3rd Sha'bān, one of these being the birthday of Husain; the general public perform the Ziyārat on the 1st, but the Mujtahids generally regard the 3rd as the proper day.

15th Sha'bān, on the night of which, known as the Lailat-al-Barāt بلية البرات , events for the coming year are predestined by God; the birthday also of the Mahdi or twelfth Imām.

23rd Ramadhān, on the night of which, known as the Lailat-al-Qadar بيلة القدر, the Qurān was sent down from heaven; the exact date of this, however, is uncertain and the 1st, 19th, 21st and 27th of the month are also mentioned.

1st Shawwal, the first day after the close of the fast of Ramadhan.

† The date of Muhammad's birth appears, however, to be generally given as 12th Rabi'-al-Awwal.

^{*} Muhammad's death, however, seems to have occurred on the 12th or 13th of the month of Rabi'-al-Awwal.

- 9th Dhul Hijjah, known as 'Arafah عرفه, the day on which pilgrims to Makkah visit the Mount of 'Arafat.*
- 10th Dhul Hijjah, known as the 'Id-al-Adhha عيد الاضعى, the anniversary of the attempted sacrifice of Ishmael—for so Muhammadans hold—by Abraham.

Consecrated Shī'ah cemeteries and burial of Shī'ahs in Irāq.

Every Shi'ah desires to repose after death in sacred ground at one of the holy places in 'Iraq, for he believes that he will receive, in the Day of Judgment, the protection of the saint whose tomb his own grave adjoins. The principal consecrated cemeteries of 'Iraq-outside the precincts of shrines themselves in which also burials take place—are, in order of importance, the following: the Wādi-as-Salām or "Vale of Peace," at Najaf; the Wadi-al-Aiman or "Vale of Security," at Karbala; the Maqabir-al-Quraish, at Kadhimain; and Tarmah فارمة at Samarrah. The last is little used. The bodies of Shi'ahs dving in Persia are often placed in a bricked-up room or vault until they become desiccated, and are then sent to 'Iraq by caravan, in wooden coffins covered with thick felt, for interment at one of the places mentioned above. On arrival at their destination the bodies are publicly washed before burial,—a proceeding very dangerous to the public health and one which may in part explain the frequency of severe epidemics in 'Iraq, especially at Najaf. A pack animal with a coffin slung on each side is one of the commonest objects encountered by a cold-weather traveller on his way from Karbala to Baghdad; and he will be fortunate if he has not to share the caravansarai where he halts with some relics of mortality. The expense, including fees payable to the Turkish Government, of transporting a Shī'ah corpse from Kirmānshāh to Karbala varies from 35 to 70 Tumans or, at present rates, from £6 to £12 English. Dishonest muleteers are said sometimes to throw bodies committed to their care into the river Divālah and to embezzle the funds with which they have been entrusted for burial expenses; and various pecuniary extortions are practised by the Kiliddars and other officials at the holy places in connection with the interment of bodies. A few Shī'ah corpses for burial are brought from India by sea. The number of Shī'ah bodies buried at the holy places in 1889 and 1890 was officially estimated as below:--

Year.	Bodies of Persian subjects.	Bodies of Ottoman subjects.	Total.		
1889	5,620	4,0 00	9,620		
1890	9,754	4,6 00	14,354		

^{*}According to an enthusiastic Shi'ah, if a man purify himself in the Euphrates on this day and walk to Karbala before noon, he gains merit, for every step taken by the way, equal to that acquired by 60,000 or 70,000 pilgrimages to Makkah.

Fiscal and other arrangements of the Persian and Turkish Governments in connection with Shī'ah pilgrimages and burials.

Fees on the importation of bodies.

Persian pilgrims by land to the holy places are required by the Persian Government, if they travel mounted, to obtain Persian passports at a cost of 20 Qrans, or about 6s. 8d. each, and these are vised at the Turkish Consulate at Kirmānshāh on payment of 20 gold piastres, or about 3s. 7d.; but pilgrims on foot, also all women and children. are exempt from the operation of the passport system. A further fee of 10 gold piastres or about 1s. 10d. per head is collected by the officials of the Turkish Department of Public Health from pilgrims crossing the frontier, chiefly at Khanagin. Passes for the importation of corpses of Persians for burial in 'Iraq are issued by the Turkish Consulate at Kirmānshāh at half a Līrah or nine shillings each, an additional sum of half a Līrah being collected by the Turkish sanitary officials at Khānagīn and other frontier posts. Corresponding fees, but on a lower scale, are levied on the transportation of the bodies of Ottoman Shī'ah subjects. Many corpses are smuggled into 'Iraq by unauthorised routes to avoid payment of the Turkish dues; and coffins are sometimes opened by the Turkish authorities as a precaution against fraud by the inclusion of two bodies in one coffin. The introduction of bodies from countries where epidemic diseases prevail is from time to time interdicted by the Porte, and after 1897 the importation of bodies from India has been prohibited on account of the prevalence of bubonic plague in that country.

Fees on the inhumation of bodies.

In addition to the fees levied on the importation of bodies into 'Iraq, special charges are made by the Turkish Government for their burial in the precints of the shrines and in consecrated cemeteries. The following is a table showing the scale of these charges:—

Holy place.	Particular place of burial.*	Amount of charge (in Turkish gold piastres).	Amount of charge (in English money).				
Najaf.	Ruwāq.	5,000	£ 40	s. 0	<i>d</i> . 0		
Do.	Īwān Dhahab.	2,500	20	0	0		
Do.	Hijrat-as-Sahn.	25 0	2	0	0		
Do.	Ardh-as-Sahn.	200	1	16	0		
D_{0} .	Wādi-as-Salām.	50	0	9	0		
Karbala.	Ruwāq.	50 0	4	0	0		
Do.	Īwān Dhahab.	150	1	7	0		
Do.	Hijrat-as-Sahn.	100	0	18	0		

[#] In this column Ruwāq رواق means "Portico", آwān Dhahab ايوان فهب means "Golden Vestibule", Hijrat-as-Sahn حجرة الصحى means "Chamber in the Courtyard" and Ardh-as-Sahan رض الصحى means "Ground of the Courtyard"; these are all apparently within the precincts of the shrines. Wādi-as-Salām, Wādi-al-Aiman and Tārmah are the cemeteries already mentioned in the text.

Holy place.	Particular place of burial.*	Amount of charge (in Turkish gold plastres)	Amount of charge (in English money).				
Karbala.	Wādi-al-Aiman.	30	£	s. 6	ď.		
Kādhimain.	Ruwāq.	200	1	16	0		
Do.	Īwān Dhahab.	100	0	18	0		
Do.	Hijrat-as-Sahn.	21	0	3	9		
Do.	Ardh-as-Sahn.	21	Ŋ	3	9		
Sāmarrah.	Ruwāq.	70	0	12	7		
Do.	Hijrat-as-Sahn.	40	0	7	2		
Do.	Ardh-as-Sahn.	40	0	7	2		
Do.	Tārmah.	40	0	7	2		

The revenue of the Turkish Government in 'Iraq from all the sources Revenue of described above was officially estimated at 6,009 Lirahs or £4,807 in the Turkish 1889 and at 11,554 Līrahs or £9,243 in 1890; it is not, therefore, very Government considerable. These figures do not appear, however, to include the pilgrimages amounts collected by the Turkish Consulate at Kirmanshah.

and burials.

The Shī'ah Mujtahids of the Persian Gulf region.

The term Mujtahid + was originally applied, throughout all branches Mujtahids of Islam, to a Muhammadan divine who had attained to the highest and Shi'ah eminence in his profession. The founder of the four principal schools of Mujtahids in the Sunnis were known as Mujtahids; but at the present day the term general. is in use only among the Shī'ahs, whose ecclesiastical leaders are still called by this name. The modern Shī'ah Mujtahid combines in himself several functions; he is a lecturer on Muhammadan theology and law, a judge of ecclesiastical suits—that is of nearly all civil causes—, and a registrar of wills and other documents. The ascendancy of the Mujtahids over Persians of all classes; is very remarkable; among Shī'ahs their word is law; they disburse large sums received from their co-religionists for sacred and charitable purposes; and in Persia, and even

is literally a striver, sc. after scholarship. The degree

itself is called Ijtihad اجتهاد.

In this column Ruwaq ايراك ذهب means " Portico ", Twan Dhahab ايراك دهب means "Golden Vestibule" Hijrat-as-Sahn حجرة الصحي means "Chamber in the Courtyard" and Ardh-as-Shan ارض الصحي these are all apparently within the precincts of the shrines. Wadi-as-Salam, Wadi-al-Aiman and Tarmah are the cemeteries already mentioned in the text.

I Since these Words were written the importance of Mujtahids in the general opinion has greatly declined. This appears to be a result of constitutionalism in Persia (1912).

in Turkish 'Iraq, they exercise strong political influence, sometimes in opposition to the established government of the country. The recognition of an individual as a Mujtahid is unregulated by any fixed principle: the chief factor seems to be public opinion. Diplomas of أجازة are conferred on اجازة are conferred aspirants by Mujtahids who have already received recognition; but the mere possession of such a document is not enough to establish the holder as a Mujtahid in the general estimation.

The Muitaand Karbala.

The Mujtahids of Najaf and Karbala are the most distinguished; hids of Najaf and their influence predominates, throughout Persia and the entire Shi'ah world, over that of all other Mujtahids; collectively they are sometimes spoken of as the 'Atabah air or "Threshold," though the term refers properly to the Shrines at which they reside. Instances in which the political power of this body has been felt, one of which occurred in 1903-04, will be found in the history of Turkish 'Iraq, and will help to explain why the Mujtahids of Najaf and Karbala are regarded by the Turks with dislike and distrust. With some of the Mujtahids the Government of India, through their Political Resident at Baghdad. have relations, arising from a fund known as the Oudh Bequest, of which an account is given in the history of Turkish 'Irāq. In connection with a reform of the Oudh Bequest arrangements the circumstances of the Mujtahids were very carefully investigated by Major Newmarch. Political Resident at Baghdad, in 1902-03; and after thirteen months of enquiry Major Newmarch arrived at the conclusion that the Mujtahids of Najaf and Karbala then numbered in reality not more than 41 persons, as below:

Place.	Mujtahids of the first rank.	Mujtahids of the second rank.	Mujtahids, of the third rank.	Total.
Najaf	12	2	6	20
Karbala	1	8	12	21

Major Newmarch remarked that even the list compiled by himself, from which these figures are taken, appeared to be too comprehensive; and that in reality only those Mujtahids enjoyed an undisputed authority and title as such whom he had shown as of the first rank. It was stated by some petitioners, in addressing the Government of India about the same time, that there were at Najaf over 2,000 and at Karbala over 200 persons holding diplomas as Mujtahids; and, however exaggerated this statement may have been, it serves to show, in conjunction with the Resident's investigations, that the number of individuals holding certificates as Mujtahids is at least far in excess of the number generally recognised as such.

The following are the names of the Mujtahids at Najaf and Karbala who in April 1906 were in receipt of allowances from the Oudh Bequest:-

Najaf.

Hāji Shaikh 'Abdullah, Mazandarāni (I). Saiyid Muhammad Hasan, Sāhib Jawāhiri (III).

Muhammad Kādhim, Khurāsāni (I). Saivid Muhammad, Bahr-al-'Ulum (II). Shaikh 'Abdul Hasan (III). Shaikh Fat-h Ullah, Shari'at, Isfahani (I). Saiyid Abul Qāsim, Ishqāwari (I). Akhūnd Mulla 'Ali Khonsāri. Saiyid Abu Turāb, Khonsāri. Agha Shaikh Mahdi.

Karbala.

Saiyid Muhammad Hāshim, Qazvīni (II). Shaikh 'Ali, Yazdi (II). Murtaza Husain, Indian. Saivid Muhammad, Kāshāni (II). Saivid 'Ali, Tangabūni (III). Saivid Muhammad Bāqir, Tabatabāyi. Saivid Muhammad Bāqir, Behbehāni. Kalb-i-Bāqir, Indian (III). Saiyid Husain, Qumi.

The figures (I), (II) and (III) opposite some of the names indicate that the individuals so marked had been classed by Major Newmarch as Mujtahids of the first, second, and third rank respectively. The appearance of other names in the list is due to the fact that many of the persons regarded by Major Newmarch as the only genuine Mujtahids declined to accept allowances from the Bequest, some from religious scruples, some on account of the annoyance from beggars to which they would become exposed, and some because they had already all the money that they required; partly, also, it may be due to the appearance of new Mujtahids between 1902 and 1906. The most prominent of all the Mujtahids, before his death in 1904, was Muhammad-al-Garāwi-ash-Sharbiyani of Najaf, who politely declined to receive an allowance from the Bequest on the ground that he had no need of one.

The town of Shushtar in Northern 'Arabistan is the seat of two The Mujta-Mujtahid families of great local importance. The chief Mujtahid of hids of Shūshtar in 1905 was Hāji Saiyid 'Abdus Samad, a large landowner,* Shūshtar. whose attitude towards the British Government was then friendly; he had two sons, Hāji Agha Muhammad Ja'far and Hāji Ahmad. The former of these was a middle-aged man, who had a considerable part in the management of his father's affairs, and who, though he did not seek intercourse with Europeans, was civil to those whom he met second family was that of Shaikh Muhammad 'Ali, who died in 1904 leaving three sons, Muhammad Jawad, Muhammad Karim and Murtaza, and a sister's son named Saivid 'Abdullah. These all enjoyed the title of Agha Shaikh; and of the three Muhammad Jawad was the most influential, while the youngest, Murtaza, aged 21 in 1905, was open-minded and interested in foreigners, knew some English, had visited Bombay and Moulmein-at both of which places the family owned property—and was popular in the town. The internal affairs of Shushtar, before the arrival of a strong Persian Governor in 1905 in the person

^{*} Some of the villages owned by him are specified in the articles "Gargar" and " Miyanab" in the Geographical Volume of the Gazetteer.

of the Sardār-i-Mukarram, were almost entirely managed by the Mujtahids. Between 1905 and 1907 the influence of the family of Shaikh Muhammad 'Ali was completely destroyed by a combination between the Sardār-i-Mukarram and the family of Saiyid 'Abdus Samad; but it is expected that it will revive in course of time.

The Mujtahids of Dizful.

Dizful, the largest town of Northern 'Arabistan, is also the residence of some Mujtahids, but they are less influential than those of Shushtar. The principal Mujtahid family in 1905 was one headed by Agha Shaikh Muhammad Hasan, Hujjat-ul-Islam, who was then 70 years of age and was regarded as the chief Mujtahid; he had a son Agha Shaikh Muhammad Baqir, then aged 45, and a grandson, Sadr-ud-Din, aged 17, a son of the last. The next Mujtahid family in importance was that of Shaikh Muhammad Hasan, who was disand was himself 70 years of انصار and was himself age; he had a son Agha Shaikh Muhammad, aged 46. A third family at this time was that of Agha Shaikh Muhammed Riza, a nephew of the chief Mujtahid, who had a son, 18 years of age, named Shaikh Muhammad. Shaikh Muhammad Hasan, the chief Mujtahid, was generally liked and respected and was uniformly pleasant and polite in his dealings with the British Vice-Consul in Arabistan. In 1905 the influence of the Ansar family was on the wane. Only the third family were possessed of private wealth, and the other two subsisted chiefly on the offerings of the devout. The Mujtahids are in Dizful the dispensers of public charity and collect for that purpose the Zakāt or alms prescribed in the Quran; most of them, however, having little private property, are supposed to act upon a familiar proverb to the detriment of the destitute and the distressed. Several schools are kept by the Mujtahids at their private houses; and that of the chief Mujtahid was attended in 1905 by 150 to 200 pupils. Before the advent of the Sardar-i-Mukarram in 'Arabistan in 1905 the political importance of the Dizful Mujtahids was very considerable; the Persian authorities then could only make themselves obeyed when they had bought, or otherwise secured, the countenance of the predominant Mujtahid faction of the day; and Lur and Arab chiefs of the neighbourhood who had cause to distrust the intentions of the Persian Governor would only comply with his summons to appear if it were accompanied by a safe-conduct from the chief Mujtahid.

Other religious leaders of the Shi'ahs.

There are Mujtahids also at Büshehr. 'Ulama of different sorts are found at various places, such as Muhammareh; and ordinary Mullas are numerous everywhere.

Relations of the Shī'ahs of the Persian Gulf with India.

Shi'ah religious visitors to India.

Notwithstanding the Shī'ah pilgrimages from India to Najaf and Karbala and the existence of a domiciled Indian community in Turkish 'Irāq, * the connection between the two countries is a slighter one than might have been supposed; and it has not, apparently, any political signi-

^{*} Pide article "Turkish 'Iraq" in the Geographical Volume of this Gazetteer.

ficance. Shī'ah visitors to India from Persian Gulf, other than merchants, are generally religious beggars, and their proceedings sometimes attract the attention of the Indian Police *; they are accustomed, besides asking for contributions, to quarter themselves upon Shi'ah householders, who

have often difficulty in getting rid of them.

About the end of 1896 Shaikh Riza, a Khādim of the Kādhimain Shaikh Riza, shrine, arrived in India, apparently to collect subscriptions; and during 1896-97. the next nine months he visited a number of places in India, including Lucknow, Haidarabad (Dakkhan), Bombay, Karachi and Khairpūr. At Karachi he was countenanced by the Turkish Consul, who tried to obtain for him an interview with the Mir of Khairpur. The body of the late Mir had passed through Kadhimain on the way to Karbala, and the Shaikh averred that those accompanying it had promised a good reception at Khairpur to any visitor from Kadhimain; but the Mir persisted in refusing the desired interview, and at the end of September Shaikh Riza returned to Bombay.

A better-known Shī'ah visitor was Saiyid Sālih of Karbala, who Saiyid Sālih. several times came to India to beg subscriptions for the shrine of 1897 and Husain; this individual, who had a claim of some sort at Karbala. 1899. was known to the British Resident at Baghdad, between whom and the Turkish authorities he had more than once tried to make mischief. One of the Saivid's journeys was made in 1897, when, after visiting Upper India, he came down in September from Muradabad to Bombay and thence returned home by sea vid Karāchi and Muhammareh. In 1899 Salih was again in India; landing at Karachi in April he visited Multan, Rampur, Lucknow and Simla; in June he was again at Lucknow; from Lucknow he removed to Murshidabad; and in August he reached the port of Bombay.

Sunni sects in the Persian Gulf region.

The four ordinary Sunni sects, the Hanafi, Hanbali, Māliki and Shāfi'i, are all found in the Persian Gulf; but on the subject of their distribution, etc., no useful generalisation appears to be possible. The sects to which particular tribes belong are generally specified in the Geographical Volume of this Gazetteer. Some of the Hanafis are practically indistinguishable from Wahhābis.

Sunni shrines in the Persian Gulf region.

The only important Sunni shrine in the whole region of the Persian Shrine of Gulf is that of Shaikh 'Abdul Qadir, Gilani, at Baghdad. 'Abdul Shaikh 'Ab-Qādir, who was born in the province of Gīlān near the Caspian Sea dul Qādir, about the year 1077 A. D. and died at Baghdad about 1165, was a Sufi Baghdad.

^{*} Probably many escape observation. Those mentioned below were probably noticed only on account of a supposed pan-Islamic propaganda in India, in 1897 and the following years, which was being carefully watched.

preacher of renown in his day; he is credited with having possessed miraculous powers, and many extraordinary and even blasphemous stories are related concerning him. The mosque and tomb of Shaikh 'Abdul Qādir, honorifically described as "Janāb Ghauth-al-A'dham, Dastgīr", not only form one of the principal sights of Baghdad, but are also a centre of great religious importance and are visited by Sunni Muhammadans from all parts of the world, especially from Afghanistan and India: poor pilgrims and sojourners who cannot pay their way are supported as long as they care to stay at the shrine; and it is said that as many as 4.000 loaves of bread are sometimes issued daily from the kitchen of the "Pīr-i-Dastgīr". The shrine was once a focus of political intrigue and a sanctuary from the law, but the Turkish authorities have now brought it under control. The revenues accruing to the shrine from endowments and pious bequests are stated to amount to £T12,000 per annum.

Other Sunni shrines.

There are some other shrines, respected by Sunnis, in 'Iraq and in other parts of the Persian Gulf; but none of them is comparable in importance with that of Shaikh 'Abdul Qadir. Among the minor Sunni shrines are, in 'Iraq, the Maqam Yunas at Kufah and the tomb of Ezekiel at Kifl, regarding which the geographical articles on the two towns may be consulted; the tomb of Ezekiel, however, is more venerated by Jews than it is by Muhammadans.

The Sunni Naqib of Baghdad.

The Naqib of Baghdad.

The most influential of all Sunnis in the countries adjoining the Persian Gulf is the Naqib of Baghdad, the official head of the Arab community there. The appointment to the Niqabat, a dignity which exists in other places also in the Ottoman empire, is made by the Sultan of Turkey on the recommendation of the local authorities; but in practice the succession is treated as hereditary. From the derivation of the word Nagīb, which seems to imply that the holder of the office was originally an elected chief, it may perhaps be inferred that the Niqabat is older than Turkish rule; and, whatever the case may be in this respect, it is certain that the importance of the Naqib at the present day depends, not upon Turkish recognition, but upon his descent and upon the sacredness of the shrine of Shaikh 'Abdul Qadir, Gīlani, of which he is custodian. The Naqib, in fact, possesses enormous religious influence and social prestige apart from his relations with the Turkish Government; and the Ottoman officials, from a consciousness that he could thwart or at least seriously obstruct any of their measures to which he might be opposed. always* endeavour to stand well with him. The Nagib was till lately an ex-officio member of the Administrative Council of the Wali of Baghdād.

The Oadiriv-Baghdad.+

The family of which the Naqīb of Baghdad is head enjoy a high ah family of reputation for sanctity as the descendants of Shaikh 'Abdul Qādir, Gīlāni,

† A genealogical table of the Qadiriyah family will be found in Part III of this Gazetteer.

^{*} This has ceased to be true since the party of Union Progress came to power in Turkey. It is now the Naqib who cultivates the favour of the Government.

and as the keepers of his shrine; but their claim to Siyadat, that is to the rank of Saivid, depending on an assumption that the original Shaikh was descended from Hasan-bin-'Ali-bin-Abi Talib, is not undisputed. Shaikh 'Abdul Qādir, Gīlāni, had, it is said, three sons, of whom one, 'Abdul 'Azīz, was the progenitor of the Qādirīyah family of Baghdād, while his brothers 'Abdul Wahhab and 'Abdur Razzāq, who migrated to India and Syria respectively, founded Qādirīyah families which still exist in those countries. The Qadiriyah of Baghdad pay much attention to the education of their children; and the members of the family, who in general appreciate the importance of Muhammadan learning to persons holding a position such as theirs, sometimes voluntarily continue their studies in later life. The present Naqib, Saivid 'Abdur Rahman Effendi, is considered to be one of the greatest Muhammadan scholars of his time; but he is represented as vain and pompous-characteristics which the adulation that he receives from almost all Sunnis must certainly tend to foster; and he is certainly timid. The Naqib and his relations own large private estates, which are distinct from the lands attached to the shrine of Shaikh 'Abdul Qādir.

Extreme attention and deference are paid to the Naqib and his Relations of family by many of the most influential and wealthy, as well as by the the Naqib's humblest and poorest, among Indian and Afghān Muslims. The tomb family with of Mu'in-ud-Din, Chishti, at Ajmīr in India, is much venerated by Afghānistān. Afghans and Pathans of the Indo-Afghan frontier from a belief that the individual buried there was a nephew of Shaikh 'Abdul Qādir, Gīlāni.

The Nizām of Haidarābād in the Dakkhan is among the adherents of the Naqib of Baghdad and used to send him annually a gift of money and some gold embroidered shawls. In May 1905 a sum of Rs. 5,000 and a box of valuable cloth was despatched from Haidarābād to Baghdad in charge of an officer of His Highness's Irregular Troops; and one of the Nizām's Begams, it was said, accompanied the presents, taking with her a few personal attendants.

Sardar Ayub Khan, the Afghan refugee in India, and his followers are said to remit some two thousand rupees every year to the Naqib of Baghdad. In passing through Baghdad on their way from Persia to India in 1888, Sardar Ayub Khan and his party made presents of the value of Rs. 3,000 to the Naqib, then Saiyid Salman Effendi; and the Sardar received in return, nominally from the Naqib's brother Saiyid Mustafa Effendi, a fine horse worth Rs. 1,200; but the Naqib personally avoided showing him favour lest he should give offence to 'Abdur Rahmān Khān, the ruling Amīr of Afghanistān. At a later date the elder daughter of Sardar Muhammad Hashim Khan, a relation of Sardar Ayub Khan, was betrothed to a son of Saiyid Salman, but she died about 1904 before the marriage could take place. The Sardar has named one of his sons 'Abdur Rahmān Jān after the present Naqīb. A brother of Sardar Muhammad Hashim Khan, in writing to Saiyid Mahmud, the eldest son of the present Naqib, once used the following curious expressions, remarkable for their humility: "If you will "condescend to accept me as the dog of the meanest dog of your "threshold, be sure that my head will reach the heavens because of " pride and honour."

Proceedings of members of the Naqib's family in India, 1895-1905.

Visits of 1895-1900.

A short account of tours which have been made in India in recent years by members of the Naqib's family may be given here to illustrate the extent and degree of their influence in that country.

After Sardar Ayūb Khān's arrival in India he was visited at Rāwalpindi by Saiyid Hasan, a younger brother of the present Naqīb, who remained with him for some months and returned to Baghdad in 1895. A year or two later Saivid Hasan sent a servant to India with Saiyid Hasan, a horse, valued at Rs. 700, for Ayub Khan; the Sardar dismissed the servant with a donation of Rs. 200 and with presents worth Rs. 500 for the shrine of Shaikh 'Abdul Qadir. In 1897 Saiyid Hasan was reported to have come to Rawalpindi, but it is not certain that he did. 1899 Saiyid Hasan was again with Sardar Ayub Khan at Rawalpindi, having come, it was stated, for an eve operation; at the end of August he visited Peshawa, where the Zakha Khel Afridi Maliks Khawas Khān and Wali Muhammad Khān were said to have had an interview with him; in February 1900 he returned to Rawalpindi, and in April he passed through Lahore on his way to Haidarābād in the Dakkhan, where he remained for some time. He seems to have complained of the proceedings in India of swindlers who passed themselves off as belonging to his family.

Visits of Saivid Muhammad and Saiyid 'Abdus 8 alām, 1896-1900.

In December 1895 Saivid Muhammad, a nephew of the Naqib and only son of Saiyid Zain-al-'Abidin, left Baghdad on a journey to India; but he did not apparently arrive in Bombay until the beginning of May 1896. He was followed by his uncle Saivid 'Abdus Salam, the youngest brother of the Naqib, whose departure from Baghdad took place in July 1896. It was believed at first that Saivid Muhammad was the bearer of a message from the Sultan of Turkey to the Amīr of Afghanistan, relating to the attitude of the European powers in respect of the Armenian atrocities; but subsequent events tended to discredit this theory. It was also stated that Saivid Muhammad had quarrelled with his uncle the Nagib, had been deprived of his property, and had therefore found it advisable to leave Baghdad; but this was never verified. The Government of India, after due consideration, decided that no obstacle should be thrown in the way of either Saiyid, should he wish to proceed from India to Afghanistan. Saiyid Muhamad, having collected some money from the Memon community at Bombay arrived, towards the end of August 1896, after visiting Ahmadābād, Jaipūr, Ajmīr and other places, at Hasan Abdāl, between Rāwalpindi and Peshawar. Meanwhile Saiyid 'Abdus Salām had reached Karāchi, and in July he made an excursion to Las Bailah, where the Jam received him with honour, presented him with three camels, two horses and Rs. 400 in cash, and provided him with an escort for his return to Karāchi. At Karāchi Saiyid 'Abdus Salām declined, probably because he hoped to be summoned to Kabul, to call on the Sardars of the Afghan refugee colony; but he was himself interviewed by a number of Peshawaris and Kachis and by a few Memons. In August

^{*} These Maliks-to the writer's recollection, who was Political Officer in the Khaibar in 1899-were then both in disgrace with the British Government and were not residing in British territory, this being a result of the Tirah expedition of 1897-98.

Saiyid 'Abdus Salām visited Quetta; and in September he made a journey to Bahāwalpūr, but the Nawwāb of Bahāwalpūr refused to see him; from Bahāwalpūr he travelled by Lahore to Rāwalpindi. arrived at Rawalpindi at the beginning of October and thence made a flying excursion to Murree, where he met Sardar Ayub Khan and extracted from him Rs. 300. Immediately after this he joined his nephew Saiyid Muhammad at Hasan Abdāl, where the latter, assisted by the refugee Sardār Muhammad Ibrāhīm Khān, eldest son of the late Afghān Amīr, Sher 'Ali Khān, had been engaged in attempting to get permission from the Amīr 'Abdur Rahmān for a visit to Kābul; the Amīr's answer, which arrived on the 25th of September, was unfavourable. Later it transpired that the Amīr suspected the Saivid's relations with his uncle the Naqib to be unsatisfactory, or at least that he found this a convenient excuse for declining to receive him; apparently, however, he sent him a present. On the 8th of October 1896 the two Saiyids arrived at Peshawar together and were received with much respect by a number of local Muhammadans. Saivid Muhammad lodged with Mufti Muhammad Ibrāhīm, and Saiyid 'Abdus Salām with Ghulām Samdāni, contractor. At Peshawar Saiyid Muhammad had a meeting with Khawās Khān, Zakha Khel Malik of the Khaibar, and was said to have asked him for Rs. 2,000; but the astute Afridi only paid him Rs. 10 in cash and offered him a daughter in marriage,-a proposal which Saiyid Muhammad evaded by representing that he had already two wives. Saiyid 'Abdus Salām remained at Peshawar for about a fortnight and then returned to Rāwalpindi, where he spent a month with Sardar Ayub Khan; towards the end of November, on his way back to Karāchi, he visited Dera Ismail Khan, where large numbers of Afghan Powindas came out to meet him and presented him with Rs. 700; but the Saiyid's health was at this time delicate; and, finding the crowding of the devotees unpleasant, he shut himself up closely, during his stay, in the house where he lodged. After further futile attempts to obtain an interview with the Nawwāb of Bahāwalpūr he finally left Karāchi for Baghdād at some time in December 1896. Meanwhile Saivid Muhammad had not relaxed his efforts to induce the Amīr to let him come to Kābul; but that ruler was inexorable, and early in December the Saiyid quitted Peshawar for Rāwalpindi, where he enjoyed the hospitality of Sardār Ayūb Khān for more than a month, and accepted at his departure a gift of Rs. 2,000. In January 1897 Saivid Muhammad visited Lahore, where he lived for three weeks with Nawwab Fat-h 'Ali Khan; engaged in a correspondence with the Bahāwalpūr State, which apparently had no result: and obtained Rs. 200 from Muhammad 'Ali Khan, a son of the late Nawwāb Nāsir 'Ali Khān, besides various sums, it was believed, from others of the Lahore Nawwab fraternity. Before the middle of February 1897 Saiyid Muhammad reached Haidarabad in the Dakkhan, where, on the 18th of September, he had a night interview lasting till 2 A.M. with His Highness the Nizām; but it seems doubtful, though he was entertained by the dignitaries of the state, whether he received much financial assistance at Haidarābād. Throughout 1897 and 1898 Saiyid Muhammad remained at Haidarābād. In December 1897 and January 1898 letters were written by Saiyid 'Abdus Salām at Baghdad to a native of Kalat residing at Quetta; they were of an

ordinary character, but pointed to the existence of a correspondence between the writer and Sardār Sir Naurōz Khān, Naushīrwāni.

Subsequent proceedings of Saiyids Hasan and 'Abdus Salam in India.

After the travels above described in India Saiyid Hasan appears to have settled down at Quetta, and Saiyid 'Abdus Salām at Haidarābād in the Dakkhan.

Saiyid Hasan in 1904 succeeded in obtaining permission to visit Kābul from the Amīr Habīb Ullah Khān and left India for the Afghan capital on the 6th of December in that year; in 1908 he was believed to be still at Kābul. In 1907 Saiyid Muhammad, son of Saiyid Ahmad and (?) nephew of the Naqīb, went to Jalālābād in Afghānistān and thence returned to Baghdād intending to fetch the mother and sister of Saiyid Hasan.

Saivid 'Abdus Salām on his part opened relations with the Nawwab of Dir on the North-Western Frontier of India, who from time to time made him presents in money, aggregating, it is believed, about Rs. 10,000, and also sent offerings to the shrine at Baghdad through the Turkish Consul-General at Bombay. Subsequently the Nawwab of Dir proposed to give one of his daughters in marriage to Saivid 'Abdus Salam, but it was apparently arranged that the Nawwab should first pay a visit to the Naqib at Baghdad, where it was suggested that he should build himself a house and acquire a graveyard for the burial of Pathans dving at Baghdad. In December 1904 Saiyid 'Abdus Salam arrived at Peshawar, apparently for the purpose of conducting the Nawwab to Baghdad; but the sudden death of that ruler put an end to the scheme. Nothing has been heard since of the proposed matrimonial alliance; and the present Nawwab does not appear to have the same personal regard as his father for the members of the Naqib's family. In 1908 Saivid 'Abdus Salām was reported to be at Quetta.

The journeys of these individuals in India have been ostensibly begging tours; but it is believed that they have also conduced to intrigues of a political tendency; and more than once reason was found for suspecting that 'Abdul Hamīd, Sultān of Turkey, utilised the Naqīb of Baghdād as a medium of communication with the Amīr of Afghānistān.

The Naqib of Basrah.

Position and At Basrah also, in Turkish 'Irāq, there is a Sunni Naqīb; but his property of religious influence is small as compared with that of the Naqīb of the Naqīb of Baghdād, and his importance depends chiefly on his wealth and on the employment of himself and his family by the Turks in political matters. The usual residence of the Basrah Naqīb is at Sabīliyāt on the Shatt-al-'Arab, but he has also a large residence at Basrah town and a country house at Rāfidhiyah near Zubair. Besides these he owns agricultural estates at Nahr 'Umr, Jazīrat-al-'Ain, Muhaijarān, Yūsifān, Hamdān, Kūt-ash-Shaikh, Nahr Khōs, Abū Ibgai' and other places on the banks of the Shatt-al-'Arab, and possesses property on the island of Baḥrīyah

and the whole of Ziyadiyah Island in the same river. In 1904 about 200 boats at Basrah and in the neighbourhood belonged to the Naqib.

The Naqib of Basrah immediately before 1874 was 'Abdur Rahman, Family who died in that year and was succeeded by his brother Saiyid the Naqib of Muhammad Sa'īd; on the death of the latter, in 1896, the Niqābat Basrab. passed to his son Saiyid Rajab, the present Naqib, by whom the active duties of the Niqabat had been discharged during the last six years of his father's life. The most prominent * members of Saivid Rajab's family were, until lately, his brother Saivid Ahmad and his son Saivid Talib. Saivid Ahmad, however, died in 1906.

The last Naqib, Saivid Muhammad Sa'id, received a decoration from Political emthe Sultan of Turkey for assistance given by him, probably in 1871 and playment of certainly before his succession to the Niqabat, in persuading the Al Thani the Shaikh of Qatar to declare himself a dependent of the Porte. In 1900, family as related in the history of Kuwait, the late Spirid About and Spirid Basrah as related in the history of Kuwait, the late Saiyid Ahmad and Saiyid the Turks. Talib were employed to mediate in an imbroglio between the Amīr of Jabal Shammar and the Shaikh of Kuwait, which occurred on the borders of Turkish 'Iraq; and towards the end of 1901 the Naqib himself, Saiyid Rajab, was twice sent to Kuwait to recall the Shaikh of that place to a sense of his duty towards the Sultan of Turkey. In June 1902 Saiyid Talib was appointed Mutasarrif of Hasa; he was recalled in 1903 on account of an incident of his administration which is described in the history of Hasa, but he seems to have retained the appointment, in name at least, until 1905. At one time he was considered a likely candidate for the Wāliship of Basrah. Saiyid Tālib was apparently, at this time of his life, an ardent pan-Islamist.†

The Ibadhi denomination of Islam in the Persian Gulf region.

We have already seen that in the Sultanate of 'Omān, which has a Origin of the ulation of about half a million souls a denomination of Muhammadan population of about half a million souls, a denomination of Muhammadanism known as the Ibādhi اباضى (or Biyādhi بياضى) enjoys an ascendancy, or is at least as powerful as any other. The principles of the Ibadhis or Ibādhīyah are said to have been introduced into 'Omān by individual Khawārij who survived the destruction of their sect, as a political party, by 'Ali-bin-Abi-Tālib at the battle of Nahrwan; and this much at least is certain, that the Ibadhi denomination is of Khariji origin. The regular Ibādhi school, which did not, apparently, at any time attain to

* Saivid Rajab has two sons, Saivids Talib and Yusuf. Saivid Ahmad has feet one son, Saiyid Hashim. The father of Saiyids 'Abdur Rahman and Muhammad Sa'id was named Saiyid Ahmad.

⁺ The proceedings of the Government of India for February 1905 contain a remarkable memorandum on Turkish policy in Arabia written by Saiyid Talib for the Grand Wazir of Turkey on the 3rd of August 1904; it was obtained by the British Embassy at Constantinople. The memorandum betrays an intense distrust of Great Britain and dislike of Persia, and the suggestions which it contains may have contributed to bring about the disastrous Turkish invasion and occupation of Najd in 1904-06. Saiyid Talib is now (1913) the leader of the Arab "nationalist" and Anti-Turk movement in 'Iraq.

importance outside of 'Omān, was founded at some time between 685 and 750 A. D. by 'Abdullah-bin-Ibādh, Tamīmi, from whom its name is most probably derived.* The Ibādhi principles were rapidly adopted by the population of 'Omān, and it is related that by the 18th century of the Christian era they had become not only predominant but almost universal.

Principles of We are not concerned here with the theological doctrinest of the Ibadhis: the Ibadhis. but we must take account of their views on the subject of religious government.—the matter on which they themselves appear, in the beginning, to have laid the most stress. The early Ibadhis differed from both Sunnis and Shi'ahs in rejecting the opinion that Islam needed a permanent and visible head; and, while they allowed that an Imam or spiritual leader might lawfully be appointed when circumstances so required, they insisted that he should be specially elected in every case, and that the Imamate or Khalifate should not be hereditary. They agreed with the Sunnis in regarding the Khalifahs Abu Bakr and 'Umr as regularly appointed, and therefore as entitled to respect; but they were at variance with both Sunnis and Shi'ahs in their repudiation of all the later Khalifahs as usurpers. These were the original opinions of the Ibadhis, and they have been maintained without change to the present day.

The Ibādhīyah are a denomination by themselves and must not be confounded with Muhammadan or quasi-Muhammadan sects such as the Ismā'īlīyah, Murjīyah, Mu'tazilah, Qarāmitah, Sifātīyah, etc.; the mere fact that they are neither Sunnis nor Shī'ahs is perhaps principally accountable for the mistaken opinions on this point that have sometimes been entertained, even among Muhammadans in the Persian Gulf.

History of Persistent efforts were made by the Sunni Khalīfahs of Islām, during the Ibādhi some three centuries, to reduce the Ibādhis of 'Omān to subjection and conformity; and in the course of the conflict, probably in the year 751 A.D., the Ibādhis proceeded, in accordance with their own tenets, to elect an Imām whose duty it should be to direct their religious, their military, and their political affairs. The designs of the Khalīfahs were ultimately frustrated; but an elective Imamate continued to exist in 'Omān, though increasingly threatened with extinction by the principle of hereditary succession, until the year 1783, when an Imām of 'Omān was elected for the last time. The ordinary functions of administration have been carried on since 1784 by members of the family from which the Imāms were drawn at the time when the Imamate ceased; but these later rulers have possessed no religious attributes, and they have governed under the purely secular titles of "Saiyid" or "Sultān."

The Mutāwi'ah مطارعه (singular ab or Mutawa' مطارعه (singular awwa' sect of Mutawwa') have come into existence among the Ibādhis and have the Ibādhis. played a considerable part in the domestic politics of 'Omān. The word

† These are described by the Rev. Mr. Badger and Colonel Ross in the writings

cited in the footnote on page 2349.

^{*} It has been suggested that the word Ibādhi is connected with the root meaning "white," but this view is controverted by the Rev. Mr. Badger, the principal authority on the Ibādhīyah. It is noteworthy however, in this connection, that the Mutawiah, who are the most extreme sect of the Ibādhīyah, use a white flag in war.

Mutawwa', used apparently in the sense of "pledged to obedience," seems to have been borrowed from the Wahhabis, who applied the term to their propagandists; but the Mutawi'ah, though they resemble the Wahhabis in proscribing tobacco and requiring the punishment of those who smoke, are genuine and even fanatical Ibadhīyah. The Mutawi'ah hold that the Khalīfah 'Ali was not a Muslim at all, but a Kāfir; and they consider the re-institution of an elective religious Imamate in 'Oman to be necessary, especially for the purpose of reforming public morals. Two points of morality emphasised by the Mutawi'ah are that marriages should not be contracted without the ceremony of Nikāh and that the veiling of women ought to be more rigidly practised.

The Mutawi'ah first attracted notice about the year 1841, when Mutawwa' Saivid Hamud of Sohar placed some of their leaders in charge of his movements principal forts to hold them against the Wahhābis; and again, in 1845, in 'Oman, some of the Mutawi'ah took part in the opposition which was offered to the proceedings of a Wahhabi agent at Baraimi. The revolution of 1868, which carried Saiyid 'Azzān-bin-Qais into power at Masqat, was essentially Mutawwa' in its character; and the fanatical proceedings of the sect from 1868 to 1871 are noticed in the history of the 'Oman Sultanate. The short-lived regency of 'Abdul 'Azīz, in 1875, was distinguished by a Mutawwa' attempt to reform public morals at Masgat; and the rebel attack on Masqat in 1877 was primarily a Mutawwa' enterprise. In 1883 a Mutawwa' rising against the Sultan's authority took place, of which one object was understood to be the supersession of the reigning Sultan by an Imam; and in 1895 the town of Masgat was captured, and for a time held, by the leaders of the Mutawi'ah and their adherents, whose professed purpose it was on this occasion to remove the de facto secular head of the state. In 1903 an actual attempt was made by the Mutawwa' party to set up an Imam in the Rustag valley, in competition with the ruling Sultan; but the movement collapsed for want of support. The political ambition of individuals, the desire for change, and the hope of booty had probably as much effect in producing these disturbances as any religious motive properly so called.

The Mutawi'ah, whose numbers it is impossible to estimate, are most Leaders of numerous in the turbulent district of Sharqīyah, where most of the the Mutamovements above mentioned have originated. Their religious head, until wi'ah, 1841his death in 1871, was the priest Sa'id-bin-Khalfan, Khalīli, who 1907. first emerged from obscurity in the Mutawwa' government of the Sohār principality about 1841 and afterwards became the chief adviser of 'Azzān-bin-Qais; and the most influential tribal leader on the Mutawwa' side was Sālih-bin-'Ali, head of the Hirth tribe, who took a conspicuous part in all the Mutawwa' movements between 1868 and 1896, in which latter year he was killed. The principal 'Ulama of the Mutawi'ah in were 'Abdullah-bin-Hamad, Sālimi, and Muhammad-bin-1905 Shaikhan, Salimi, both of Sharqiyah; and the place of Salih-bin-'Ali was filled by his son 'Isa.

^{*}Mutawwa' has also the meaning, in ordinary Arabic, of "a military volunteer." It is not quite plain whether the term Mutawwa' is applied to every member of the sect here dealt with, or only to the leaders of the same.

The Wahhabi denomination of Islam in the Persian Gulf region.

The origin of the Wahhābis or Wahhābīyah مايه, , the character of their religion, and their political history are sufficiently explained in the historical chapter on Najd, to which the reader may refer; it is therefore unnecessary to dwell here on their principles and position.

Confusion at day between Wahhabis and Hanbali Sunnis.

At the present day it is extremely difficult to distinguish, in the the present neighbourhood of the Persian Gulf, between the Wahhabis proper and some Muhammadans of the Sunni persuasion whose views approximate very closely to those of the Wahhabis. 'The Bani Bū 'Ali and Bani Rāsib tribes of the 'Omān Sultanate appear to be still Wahhābis in the full sense of the word and to call themselves so; but the Ghāfiri tribes of Trucial 'Oman in general, who were once undoubtedly Wahhabis, now claim to be Sunnis of the Hanbali sect; and in practice they have declined, and even departed, from the strict Wahhābi standards of conduct. The position of some Bedouin tribes of Eastern Arabia, such as the 'Ajmān, Bani Hājir and Al Morrah, who call themselves Hanābilah, is similarly doubtful. A portion of the Ma'adhīd of Qatar have recently become Hanbali Sunnis of a somewhat extreme type, have held close relations with the Wahhābi Amīr, and may, perhaps, be reckoned Wahhābis.

Absence connection Wahhābis of Arabia those of India.

We may refer here to the Wahhābi movement which took place among Muhammadans in India during the 19th century; by some it has between the apparently been assumed to have been instigated from Arabia, but the evidence available does not favour any such assumption.* The movement was initiated by Saivid Ahmad Shah of the Rai Bareli district, who visited Makkah in 1822 and there imbibed the principles of the Wahhabi faith, yet without, so far as is known, forming any permanent connection with the Wahhābis of Arabia. Another prominent figure among the Indian Wahhabis was Titu Miyan, who visited Makkah in 1822 and returned to India in 1827, but did not apparently enter into any relations with Najd. Saiyid Ahmad Shāh declared a Jihād or holy war against the Sikhs in 1826 and maintained it, not altogether without success, until his death, at the hands of the Sikhs, in 1831. Since then the Wahhābis have occasionally given trouble to the British Government in India, especially between the years 1860 and 1870, upon the North-Western Frontier and in the Lower Provinces; but it does not appear that they have ever maintained any correspondence with Central Arabia, that they themselves have ever visited Najd, or that any Wahhābi propagandists have been sent from Arabia to India.† The movement, in

^{*} It is therefore to be feared that Sir Alfred Lyall's stirring poem, A Sermon in Lower Bengal (1864), must be regarded as devoid of historical foundation. The exordium of the preacher,-" Men of the Indian cities who call on the Prophet's name "-seems inappropriate also in the mouth of an Arabian Wahhabi, who would necessarily reject the intercession of any prophet or saint.

[†] The records of the Foreign Department of the Government of India, of the Criminal Intelligence Department and of the local Governments of the Panjab, the United Provinces, Bombay and Bengal, so far as it has been possible to examine them, contain no hint of communications between the Wahhabis of India and those of Arabia. Nor has the writer met with a reference to any such supposed correspondence in the entire records of the Persian Gulf Political Residency.

India, even from its initiation, seems to have been purely indigenous; and its extremely un-Wahhābi character is shown by the facts that Saiyid Ahmad Shāhwas early declared to be the Mahdi, and that efforts were made to induce Shi'ahs to join without changing their religious beliefs and usages. By 1865, at latest, it had degenerated into mere political sedition against the established Government.

The Khōjah sect in the Persian Gulf region.

We come next to the Khōjahs, a body of Muhammadans whose religious headquarters are at the present time in India, but of whom a number reside in the Persian Gulf. The true Khōjahs have been authoritatively defined* as follows: "a sect of people whose ancestors were Hindus in origin, which was converted to and has throughout abided in the faith of the Shī'ah Imāmi Ismā'ilis, and which has always been and still is bound by ties of spiritual allegiance to the hereditary Imāms of the Ismā'ilis." This definition of the Khōjahs, however, as we shall see further on, does not apply in its entirety to all who at the present day are styled Khojahs in the Persian Gulf.

A short notice of the Ismā'īli division of the Shī'ah denomination of Islām will make the term Khōjah more intelligible.

It has been shown, in an earlier paragraph, that ordinary or Ithnah-Origin and 'Ashari Shi'ahs believe twelve "revealed" Imams to have presided over the principles of Muhammadan faith, of whom the last, the Mahdi, will one day re-appear. the Isma'ilis. At an early period, a body of Shi'ahs who had arrived at a different theory regarding the succession of the Imams separated themselves from

the majority; these were the Ismā'īlis or Ismā'īlīyah الساعيلية, who held that the seventh Imam was not Musa-al-Kadhim, but another son of Ja'far-as-Sādiq, whose name was Ismā'īl and who predeceased his father. The theological doctrines of the Isma'ilis differed in a great degree from those held by other Shi'ahs, and they were even subversive of some of the leading principles of Islam as originally inculcated by Muhammad; but on this aspect of the question we cannot dwell. In the opinion of the Ismā'īlis, a line of "unrevealed" Imāms. who have continued ever after in an unbroken succession, descended from their seventh Imam.

The political history of the Isma'ilis is very remarkable. From History 1090 to 1258 A. D. their leaders occupied the mountain stronghold of the Isma'ilis. Alamut in northern Persia, whence they waged war against the more orthodox Muhammadan powers adjoining them and replied to persecution by "assassination," - a word that actually owes its origin to

^{*} This was the definition finally reached by Sir J. Arnould in a monumental judgment cited in the footnote to the title of the present Appendix.

their proceedings during this period.* In 1258 A.D. their political power was broken by the capture and destruction of Alamut; but they continued to exist as a religious sect under the direction of their "unrevealed" Imāms, the descendants or supposed descendants of the last "revealed" Imām, Ismā'īl. About the beginning of the 16th century of the Christian era the Isma'iliyah ceased to be persecuted in Persia; and early in the 19th century their head enjoyed great political influence. At length in 1838 the Ismā'īli Imām of the day, Muhammad Husain, Husaini, otherwise Āgha Khān, revolted against the Persian Government and seized the province of Kirman, where he had many adherents; but he was defeated by the Shah and retired to India, where, after 1845, he generally resided at Bombay. His grandson, His Highness Sultan Muhammad, Husaini, also styled Agha Khān, is the present head of the Ismā'iliyah throughout the world and has his head quarters at Bombay.

Origin and

The present Khōjah sect are descended from Hindus of Sind and principles of Kach, who, in the 15th century of the Christian era, were converted from the Khōjahs. Hinduism to the Ismā'īli form of the Shī'ah faith. 'Ihe Ismā'īli Dai or missionary by whom the ancestors of the Khōjahs were converted was one Pīr Sadr-ud-Dīn, who is said to have been sent from Khurāsān to India by Shāh Islām Shāh, an ancestor of the present Agha Khān and sixteenth from him in the ascending line; the tomb of this missionary is shown at Uch in the Bahāwalpur State in the Panjāb. From its original seat in Sind and Kach the Khōjah faith spread, or was carried by emigrants, to Gujarat, Bombay, East Africa and the shores of the Persian Gulf: but this process cannot be assigned to any particular period. Khōjahs differ to some extent from the Isma'ilis of Persia and other countries in ritual, and possibly in dogma; but those among them who adhere to their original tenets still regard the Agha Khan as the unrevealed Imam and as the head of their faith.

> The word "Khōjah", in the present application, is understood to mean "honourable or worshipful convert".

Recent history of the Khojahs.

The principal event in the recent history of the Khojahs is a schism, which became serious after the settlement of the Agha Khān in India in 1845; it culminated in 1862 in the institution of legal proceedings by a dissident minority against the Agha Khān, whose headship and authority over the Khojah sect they denied. The suit was finally decided on the 12th of November 1866 by Sir Joseph Arnould, a judge of the Bombay High Court; in his judgment the rights claimed by the Agha Khan were affirmed, and his opponents were declared to have been lawfully expelled from the Khōjah community. The dissident or unorthodox Khōjahs of Bombay, who contended—in opposition to all historical evidence—that the Khōjahs were properly Sunnis and not Shī'ahs, on ceasing to be Imāmi Ismā'īlis apparently became ordinary Sunni Muhammadans.

^{* &}quot;Assassin" is from Hashishin مشيشين, meaning those who committed political murders at the order of the Isma'ili chief under the influence of the drug Hashish.

At the present time the persons styled Khōjahs in the Gulfs of The Khōjahs Persia and 'Omān, who are all of Indian origin or extraction, number of the Pernearly 2,000 souls and are distributed as follows:—

Territorial division.				F		Number of souls.			
Omān Sultanate		•	Quryāt			•			5
Do.			Matrah						1,050
Do.			Barkah				•		A few.
Do.			Masna'ah						A few.
Do.			Suwaiq						30
Do.			Khābūrah						125
Do.			Sohār .						15
Trucial 'Omān			Rās-al-Kha	imah	t				33
Do.			Shārjah				•		158
Do.			Dibai .						23
Persian Coast .			Lingeh		٠	•	,		56
Do.			Bandar 'A	b bā s					67
Do.			Mīnāb						17
Persian Makrān			Chahbār				•		140
'Oman Sultanate			Gwādar		•	•	•	•	250
									Total, over 1,969

An account of the Khōjahs of the Persian Gulf region will be found, in an article under the name, in the Geographical Volume of this Gazetteer. Wherever they are settled, they are generally accompanied by their wives and children.

The schism which occurred among the Khōjahs of Bombay was Recent reproduced among those of the Persian Gulf; and it is stated that, at history of the present time, not more than half of those in the Gulf are Imāmīyah of the Khōjahs and acknowledge the authority of the Āgha Khān. In 1885 the Persian Gulf. Government of India declined to interfere on behalf of the Imāmī Khōjahs of Matrah, who had been dispossessed of the original Khōjah Jamā'at or holy place; they were perhaps entitled to possession under the Bombay High Court decision of 1866, but on the other hand they numbered only 20 families, they had not been excluded from worshiping in the old building, they possessed a new building of their own, and they had delayed greatly in bringing their claim. In 1886 a complaint was received by the Government of Bombay that some Khōjah women at Matrah were being ill-treated by their husbands in order to make them join in the

secession from the Agha Khan, and that these proceedings were countenanced by the Sultan of 'Oman; enquiry, however, showed that the complaint referred to the case of one Khojah woman only, who was a subject of the Sultan, and the matter was dropped. At Gwadar the Khojahs are said to be still for the most part or altogether Agha Khānis, that is, Imamiyah; but at Matrah, which is their principal place. it is reported that nearly all have seceded and have become ordinary Ithnah-'Ashari Shi'ahs, not Sunnis as at Bombay. The seceders at Matrah have preserved some of their ancient social and other usages. and the term Khojah continues to be applied to them, there and elsewhere. on account of their antecedents. In Oman, as a whole, about 90 per cent, of the Khōjahs are now Ithnah-Asha-rīyah. The Agha Khan maintains regular communication, through agents in the Gulf, with the Khōjahs who have remained faithful to him; and at one period he paid a visit to Gwadar every second year in order that they might have a convenient opportunity of paying him their respects.

Non-Khōjah Ismā'ilis in the Persian Gulf. It should be added that the Agha Khān has many thousands of non-Khōjah adherents in Eastern and South-Eastern Persia, who openly profess to be Shī'ahs of the orthodox type but in secret cherish the Ismā'īli doctrines; their conduct in this respect is in accordance with the Ismā'īli principle of Takiyah as or mental reservation, under which they are permitted, for the purpose of escaping persecution, to conceal and even to disguise their religion. Some of these non-Khōjah Ismā'īlīyah possibly reside in districts of the Gulf littoral; but nothing can be stated as to their location and numbers.

The village of Baghu near Bandar Abbas is the property of His

Highness the Agha Khān.

Other Muhammadan or quasi-Muhammadan denominations and sects in the Persian Gulf region.

Zikris.

in the district ذكرى There are a few of the sect called Zikri ذكرى attached to Gwadar town; these are the Balüchis of Nigwar, who number only 500 to 600 souls. The Zikri sect is said to have originated in India about three hundred years ago. The Zikris are reported to believe that, on the expiration of a thousand years from the Hijrah, the dispensation of Muhammad came to an end and was superseded by the dispensation of the Mahdi, who appeared at Attock on the Indus and subsequently vanished somewhere in Makran. Zikr, from which the Zikris take their name, consists in pronouncing certain formulas six times in the day instead of saying the regular Muhammadan prayers, and is believed by them to have been prescribed by the Mahdi; they read the Quran and call themselves Muhammadans; but they reject the Ramazan fast, and they hold that 'Ushr should be paid at the rate of one-tenth instead of Zakat at the rate of one-fortieth. The Zikris are most numerous in the eastern parts of Makran, and they have at Kaij a place of pilgrimage which they call Koh-i-Murad

It is reported that there are no Sūfis in the districts of the Persian Sūfis and coast, but that a few members of the sect of Ni'mat 'Ali are met with at Ni'mat 'Alis. Būshehr.

According to information supplied by His Highness the Agha Khān in Baktasis. 1901, some itinerant preachers, belonging to a pantheistic (sic) Muhammadan order known as the Baktasis, who were said to be numerous in European and Asiatic Turkey, had in recent years visited northern Central Arabia; but they had obtained little success among the people and were suspected to be in reality political emissaries of the Porte.

Jews in the Persian Gulf region.

The characteristics of the Jews of Turkish 'Irāq are described in the Turkish article on that province in the Geographical Volume of the present 'Irāq. Gazetteer; they are distinguished, perhaps not unnaturally, by their bigotry in religious matters. Their distribution appears to be somewhat as in the following table, few of them, however, it should be remarked, being found outside towns:—

Wilayat.	Qad	Souls.				
Baghdad Do.	 'Azīzīyah Baghdād Hillah Hindīyah Jazīrah Karbala Kūt-al-Amārah Samāwah 'Amārah Basrah Hai Nāsirīyah Shatrat-al-'Amārah Shatrat-al-Muntafik Sūq-ash-Shuyūkb	•	•	•	•	A few. 55,000 500 500 A few. 300 100 200 1,000 2,000 500 150 50 A few. 300
		•	Cotal a	bout	•	61,000

On the Arabian coast of the Persian Gulf there are between 100 and 200 Jews at Kuwait, about 50 in Bahrain, and several at Masqat. On the Persian coast Jews are not numerous, there being only a handful at Muhammareh, about 600 at Büshehr, and a few in the Gābandi valley. In all there are probably less than 62,000 Jews in the Persian Gulf region. Jews have of recent years been badly treated in Persia, and a number have emigrated to other countries. There are three Jewish shrines of importance in the countries adjacent to the Persian Gulf, namely the tombs of Ezekiel and Ezra in Turkish 'Irāq at Kifl and 'Azair respectively, of which the former is greatly venerated and is the scene of many Jewish burials, and the tomb of Daniel near Shūsh in 'Arabistān.

Oriental Christians in the Persian Gulf region.

Oriental Christians in the Persian Gulf region number less than 11,000 altogether; and hardly any are found outside of Turkish 'Iraq, there being only about 40 in Bahrain a score at Būshehr, and a very few at Muhammareh. In 'Iraq they are scarcely found except in towns, and are distributed as follows:—

Baghdad C	la dha		•		•	•	•	8,000
Basrah	do.	,	•	,		•		2,500
Nāsirīvah	đo.							A few

The divisions and ecclesiastical organisation of the Christians of 'Irāq are described in the article on Baghdād City in the Geographical Volume of this Gazetteer.

Sabians in the Persian Gulf region.

The Geographical Volume of this Gazetteer contains a general article on the Sabians or Subba of 'Irāq and Arabistān,* beyond the borders of which two provinces none are found in the Persian Gulf region; a slight account of their religion, leading characteristics and distribution will be found in the same place. There are over 2,000 persons of this persuasion in 'Irāq and about 400 in 'Arabistān——in all about 2,500 souls; but their numbers appear to be decreasing. The Saluba, a wandering tribe or race who are found all over Central Arabia, in Kuwait territory, and also in Turkish 'Irāq, but whose number is altogether uncertain, have a religion which is believed to present features of resemblance to that of the Sabians.

Hindus in the Persian Gulf region.

Numbers and distribution. Hindus in the Persian Gulf region are confined to the shores of the Gulf of 'Omān and those of the lower half of the Persian Gulf; they are nearly all immigrants from Sind and Gujarāt and in a large number of

^{*} The following authorities may also be consulted: Pietro Della Valle's letter from Basrah No. X, para. 9; Tavernier's Persian Travels, Book II, chapter 8; and Baron de Bode's Travels, II, pages 172-179,

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cases their domicile must still be regarded as Indian. Their distribution at the present time is as below:—

Territorial division.	Port.	Number of souls.	Remarks.			
'Omān Sultanate	Barkah	11				
Do.	Masna'ah	10	•••••			
Do.	Masqat	253	About one-fifth of these are women and children.			
Do.	Matrah	37	Includes a few women and children.			
Do.	Quryat	9	••• ••			
Do.	Saham	10	in' and			
Do.	Shinās	9				
Do.	Sohar	8				
Do	Sūr	28				
Do.	Suwaiq	7	*****			
Trucial 'Oman	Abu Dhabi	65	Includes some women and children.			
Do.	Dibai	67	Exclusive of about 20 visitors in the pearling season.			
Do.	Umm-al-Qaiwain	11	Includes women and children.			
Do.	Shārjah	51	Includes some women and children.			
Bahrain	Manāmah	69	In the pearling season the number rises to as many as 175.			
Turkish 'Irāq	Basrah	6	•••••			
Coast of Fars and Gulf Ports.	Būshehr	A few.				
Do.	Qais Island	12	Exclusive of a few visi- tors in the pearling season. No women or children.			
Do.	Lingeh	16	Includes no women or children.			
Do.	Qishm	10	Includes women and children.			

Territorial division.	Port.	Number af souls.	Remarks.
Coast of Fars and Gulf Ports.	Bandar 'Abbās	66	Includes no women or children.
Do.	Mīnāb	14	******
Persian Makrān	Chahbār	60	Includes some women and children.
'Omān Sultanate	Gwādar	200	Do.
	Total over	1,029	

These numbers do not include the military guards of the British political officials, which sometimes consist, in whole or in part, of Hindus.

Political questions.

Political difficulties arising out of the Hindu religion are not common. In 1885, however, a Brahman boy went on board the Sultān of Zanzibar's steamer "Avoca" at Masqat, intending to become a Muhammadan and to vist Makkah; the Hindu community at Masqat were indignant, but the other pilgrims on the ship, mostly well-armed Afghans and Persians, refused to surrender the intending proselyte. H. M. S. "Ranger," however, detained the "Avoca" until the boy was given up, when he renounced the idea of becoming a Muhammadan. In the same year a Hindu Faqīr at Bandar 'Abbās was converted to Islām and was accused of having stolen valuables from the Hindu temple at that place; the conduct of the Persian authorities in the case was unsatisfactory, but they ultimately caused the Faqīr to be removed from Bandar 'Abbas. In 1904 some money was extorted from Hindus at Abu Dhabi as the price of permission to dispose of the body of a Hindu, who had died there, in the usual way; but the amount was subsequently refunded on a requisition from the Resident.

Bābis in the Persīan Gulf region.

The new Bābi religion in Persia, of which the institution may be dated from 1844, the year in which Mīrza 'Ali Muhammad, commonly known as the Bāb, declared his mission, does not appear to have obtained as yet much hold on the coast of the Persian Gulf, notwithstanding that the Bāb visited Būshehr at an early stage in his public career. It was reported that at Būshehr there were in 1905 only about 50 Bābis, chiefly employed in the Customs Department or in the Artillery; a very few others were found at the ports of Bandar 'Abbās and Lingeh, and possibly at Shehr-i- Vīrān in the Līrāvi district; but at Baghdād, which was the headquarters of the Bābi religion from 1853 to 1864, it did not appear that there are any. It is, probable, however, that Bābis are to be found in places where their existence has not been ascertained. To

dwell on the principles of Babiism would be out of place here, as the religion is not at present of any political importance within the geographical limits of our enquiry; but the fact may be recalled, as being of general significance, that on the 15th of August 1852 an unsuccessful attempt on the life of Nāsir-ud-Dīn Shāh was made by Bābi* fanatics. The actual assassination of that monarch on the 1st May 1896, however, does not appear to have been the work of a Babi, though the contrary has been alleged.

External religious movements affecting the Persian Gulf.

In 1883-84 numerous copies of proclamations issued in the name The Mahdi of of Muhammad Ahmad, the soi disant Mahdi of the Egyptian Sudan, the Egyptian were brought across Arabia to the Persian Gulf and attracted much 1883-85. attention there; but the sympathy shown for his cause appeared to be political and not religious in its character. In 1884-85 some Dibai men left for the Red Sea, giving out that they would join the Mahdi "if he were shown to be a prophet," and a Mulla at Sharjah began to interest himself on behalf of the impostor, making it necessary for the British authorities to address a warning to the Shaikh of Sharjah. This appears to be the only external religious movement that has made any stir in the Persian Gulf in recent years.

Pan-Islamic ideas seem to have obtained little or no hold in the The Pancountries of the Persian Gulf. The Arabic newspapers of Egypt, which Islamic are the chief organs of Pan-Islamism, are read by a few persons at Kuwait, Masqat, etc.; but it does not appear that any local Pan-Islamic propaganda exists. In Persia, and wherever the people are Shi'ahs, the pretensions of the Sultan of Turkey to the headship of the Muhammadan world are rejected and even ridiculed; and a somewhat similar obstacle is present in the 'Oman Sultanate, where the bulk of the population belong to the Ibadhi sect. Ignorance and indifference are also, in the Persian Gulf, serious factors in preventing the progress of the movement.

^{*} The principal sources of information in regard to the Babis are the writings of Professor E. G. Browne of Cambridge and of the authors whom he quotes.

APPENDIX I.

WESTERN CHRISTIANITY AND MISSIONS IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION.*

The subject of Oriental Christianity is dealt with in Appendix H; here we shall treat only of Western Christianity and its missions in the Persian Gulf region. The missions in question belong, at the present time, to two classes only; these are, first, Roman Catholic missions, of which the aim is now principally if not exclusively pastoral, and secondly Protestant missions, of which the sole object is the extension of Christianity. The Roman Catholic missions, which are much the older, may be taken first.

History of Roman Catholic missions in the Persian Gulf region.

The history of Roman Catholic missions in the countries bordering on the Persian Gulf can be given most conveniently in the form of a chronology.

1604. Three Carmelite Fathers, named Paul-Simon, Jean Thadée and Vincent, left Rome for Persia in the twofold character of missionaries and ambassadors from Pope Clement VIII to Shāh 'Abbās the Great.

1608. A convent was founded at Isfahan "under the auspices of

Shāh 'Abbās the Great," who provided a site.

1612. A Carmelite convent was founded on the island of Hormuz, then a Portuguese possession, by Father Vincent, a Spanish Carmelite. (During the Portuguese occupation of Hormuh some Augustine Fathers laboured there with much success and also preached on the opposite coast of Arabia; the heir apparent of the native ruler of Hormuz took their habit and the name of Hierome Jaete and preached with much zeal,

^{*} The principal authorities from which this Appendix has been compiled are the Rev. Mr. S. Zwemer's Arabia, the Cradle of Islam, 1900, and reports by several missionaries, especially the Rev. Father Pierre de la Mère de Dieu of the Carmelite Mission at Baghdād and Mr. J. E. Moerdyk of the Arabian Mission in Bahrain. The records of the Government of India in the Foreign Department, information supplied by Maj. P. Z. Cox, Resident in the Persian Gulf, and an article by Mr. A. D. Dixey in The Panjab Mission News for 20th August 1907 have also been utilised.

⁺ With the exception of a few sentences enclosed in brackets, the entire chronology given in this paragraph was courteously supplied in 1906 by the Superior of the Carmelite Mission in Mesopotamia and Persia, the Rev. Father Pierre de la Mère de Dieu. The matter in brackets is chiefly from Pietro della Valle's Travels, 1665; Steven's translation of Manuel de Faria v Sousa's Portugues Asia, 1695; Hamilton's Account of the East Indies, 1739; Ives's Journey from Persia to England, 1773; Niebuhr's Voyage en Arabie, 1780; and Cuinet's La Turquie d'Asie, 1894.

and Alfonso Nūr Dîn and Philippa Murādah, the latter a woman, belonging to the same family, were converted to Christianity.)

1623. After the loss of Hormuz by the Portuguese, a Carmelite convent was founded at Basrah by Father Basil de St. François,* a Portuguese Carmelite, (under orders from the Archbishop of Goa to attempt the conversion of the Sabians of Basrah, a task that had previously been undertaken without success by Father Matthew, an Englishman, and by Father Nicholas de la Vega, who erected a house and chapel at Basrah with the consent of the Pāsha).

- 1624. A Carmelite foundation came into existence at Shīrāz under Father Jean Thadée and Father Peter of St. Thomas; and in the same year Gativanda, the mother of a Georgian Prince, was, after an imprisonment lasting 11 years, cruelly put to death at Shīrāz for refusing to abjure Christianity.
- 1625. (The Carmelites of the Persian Mission and the Augustines of Goa had each an establishment at Basrah and received subsidies from the Turkish Pāsha; there was some friction between the two. On the 13th of April a church built by the Carmelites was dedicated with much ceremony; the Pāsha sent a guard of honour of 500 men, and himself afterwards visited the building, where he gave a money donation.)
- 1632. The first Latin Bishop of Isfahān received consecration, in the person of Mgr. Jean Thadée, a Spanish Carmelite.
- 1638. The first Bishop of Babylon (i.e., of Baghdad) was appointed, viz., Mgr. Bernard du Val, a French Carmelite.
- 1639. The traveller Tavernier arrived at Basrah bringing news of the birth of Louis XIV, and the happy event was celebrated by the Carmelite fathers there with religious observances and rejoicings.
- 1652. There was printed at Rome a celebrated work by Father Ignace de Jésus, Carmelite missionary at Basrah, entitled Narratio originis, rituum, et errorum Christianorum Sancti Johannis, (i.e., of the Sabians).
- 1666. Father Ange de St. Joseph, a French Carmelite of Toulouse, missionary to Shīrāz and Basrah, became celebrated throughout the country for his skill in medicine, especially by his successful cure of a severe wound sustained by a Persian General, 'Ali, in the defence of Basrah against the Turks. In recognition of his services the Persian Governor of

^{*} According to Manuel de Faria y Sousa, however, the founders were Father John de los Santos and Joseph, of the Presentation; the Pāsha gave them power over all the Christians, Chaldaeans, Nestorians, and Jews; and many Chaldaeans were baptised. Basrah was after this the chief religious station of the Portuguese; and their success, for a time, in converting even Muhammadans was such as to cause consternation among the Qādhis. Father Basil, who apparently succeeded the original founders, had much success among the Sabians, and was able, after only six months' study, to preach in Persian, Arabic, and Turkish.

- Basrah, before burning the rest of the town to prevent its falling into the hands of the Turks, allowed the Carmelites of Basrah to remove to Rig in the Persian Gulf, taking with them their library and their apparatus of worship. Father Ange subsequently published at Paris, in 1680, a Pharmacopea Persica, ex idiomate persico in latinum translatum, which was commended by several members of the Faculty of Medicine at Paris.
- 1669. Three ships of the "Noble Compagnie Française" visited Basrah; on board one of them, "La Force," an Armenian interpreter, died, having received the sacrament.
- 1670. A Carmelite foundation was opened at Kung near Lingeh, and another at Bander 'Abbās, by Father Matthieu de St. Joseph; of this Father, who also was a skilful physician, Father Ange above mentioned wrote in his *Pharmacopea* "ad stuporem usque medecinae scrutatus est arcana."
- 1674. In July of this year the Carmelites of Basrah entertained a Mgr. Paitës de la Croix, "son of the King's Interpreter" and a friend of the French Carmelites in Persia. This gentleman wrote a little later "J'ay esté témoin pendant les deux années que j'ay demeuré à Ispahan des conversions qu'a faites le R. P. Ange de St. Joseph, Carme Déchaussé, Tholosain, à quoi la medicine qu'il y exerçait charitablement et religieusement n'a pas peu contribué."
- 1675. François Pecquet, ex-Consul of France at Aleppo, having entered sacred orders, was appointed Bishop of Babylon and French Consul for Persia; he took up his residence at Hamadān.
- 1678. Father Ange de St. Joseph went to Constantinople, where he presented three Sabian manuscripts to the Marquis de Nointel, the French Ambassador to the Porte; these were sent to the Bibliothèque de Colbert and are now in the Bibliothèque National.
- 1679. By a decree of Louis XIV the Superior of the Carmelites of Basrah was appointed ex-officio French Consul at Basrah, to whatever nationality he might himself belong. Under this decree, between 1679 and 1739, eleven Fathers discharged the duties of Consul at Basrah.
- 1680. In this year Father Frussanus de Jésus and Brother Cyrille were at Bandar 'Abbās.
- 1682. In this year Father Jean-François was at Lingeh or Kung.
- 1684. In this year Father Ludovic de Ste. Thérèse was at Shīrāz; and an ex-Patriarch of the Gregorian Armenians at Constantinople, who had been converted to Roman Catholicism by the Fathers at Basrah, died at the latter place and was buried in the Roman Catholic cemetery.

1686. On the 3rd of June Father Agathange, a Carmelite of Aquitaine and very zealous missionary, died at Bandar 'Abbās

of a heat stroke.

- 1691. Father Charles died of plague at Basrah.
- 1694. Father Élie de St Albert, a Belgian Carmelite of Antwerp, was appointed Bishop of Isfahān by Pope Clement X.
- 1698. Father Pierre-Paul, a Barefoot Carmelite of a noble Neapolitan family, was appointed Vicar Apostolic of India and Ambassador on the part of the Pope, the Emperor of the Romans, and the Venetian Republic to the Shāh of Persia.
- 1699. The prelate of Isfahān, appointed in 1694--see above, was sent by Shāh Husain as an Ambassador to the Pope and the Emperor.
- 1700. In this year Father Basile de St. Charles was prior of the convent at Isfahān.
- 1703. The Carmelites were expelled from Basrah by a fanatical Turkish Governor; but 18 months later they returned, to the great joy of their flock.
- 1708. Mgr. Maurice de Ste. Thérèse, a Barefoot Carmelite, Vicar Apostolic in the territories of the Great Mughal, passed through Basrah on his way to India; he founded a Carmelite mission at Rombay, which has since been replaced by one of the Jesuits.
- 1712. Mgr. Gatien de Galliézan, coadjutor of the Bishop of Babylon, died at Isfahān.
- 1721. The present Carmelite mission at Baghdad was founded by Father Joseph-Marie de Jésus, a Burgundian. (This Father had the rank of Pro-Vicar Apostolic; his life, while at Baghdad, was repeatedly in danger from the Muhammadans and the Gregorian Armenians.* In 1721 there was a Portuguese church at Kung, and one or two priests resided there who subsisted on alms and perquisites.)
- 1728. Father Urbain de Ste. Élisée, as Provincial Vicar of Persia and Arabia, visited the convents in both countries.
- 1733. Father Jean-Joseph de St. Antoine, of Avignon, died at Bandar 'Abbās.
- 1735. Father Antoine, a Carmelite missionary died at Bandar 'Abbās.
- 1737. On the 16th of June M. Matthieu de Villeneuve of the French ship "St. François," died at Basrah, "assisté par nos Pères et muni des sacraments." On the 29th of July M. Claude Granger, of Burgundy, sent by the King of France, "à la recherche d'antiquités, ou de monuments, ou de plantes inconnues," died of sunstroke in the desert at two days' march from Basrah, (but apparently without the rites of the Church).

^{*}About this time, according to Hamilton, the Basrah mission was in bad hands. He says of three Carmelite priests there: "These sanctified Rascals were a Scandal to Christianity, by making a Tavern of their Church; for having more Indulgence from the Government than the Mahometans, in moral Matters, they abuse it to the vilest Uses, in selling Arrack, which they distil from Dates, and procuring Birds of Paradise for the use of their Customers." He describes a raid made by the Pāsha of Basrah upon the Carmelite distillery.

- On the 30th of July a Father named Augustin, who was returning to Europe, died near Masqat of the extreme heat. On the 23rd of October M. de Kerjean, a nephew of Dupleix, died at Basrah and was buried in the choir of the Roman Catholic Church.
- 1738. M. Ludovic de la Touche of Pondichéry died on the French ship "L'Entreprenant" in the Basrah river. A few days later the marriage took place at Basrah of M. Joseph Gueniois, a French subject of Chandernagore, with Mlle. Margarite Benezet of Aleppo.
- 1740. M. Aloys Belghard and M. Boulemond, the latter the head of the French factory at Bandar 'Abbās, died at that place "assistés par nos Pères."
- 1741. "Mort édifiante de M. Pierre de Mortainville d'Orléans, premier consul de France laïque a Bassorah."
- CircaFather Emmanuel Baillet, a Barefoot Carmelite, was appointed first French Consul at Baghdad, and afterwards Bishop 1742. of Babylon. (This Father brought a letter from the French Governor of Pondichéry and was well received by Ahmad Pāsha, the Turkish Governor; at the first he was cordially supported by the English Agent Mr. "Feensch"apparently Mr. Martin French, Resident at Basrah, who died in 1737, is meant—and obtained leave to build a house and church and to establish a mission. He founded a chapel of St. Thomas, in which mass was celebrated for the first time on the 14th of July 1734, also the first Carmelite school at Baghdad. Subsequently, having converted some Armenians to the Roman Catholic faith, he was put in prison by the Turks and obliged to pay heavily for his release. He then went to France, where, apparently as a safeguard against future ill-treatment, he was invested with the character of French Consul at Baghdad; and in 1742 he was made Bishop of Babylon by the Pope.)
- 1749. In this year occurred the death of Mgr. Philippe-Marie, Barefoot Carmelite, Bishop of Isfahān.
- 1750. From the register of masses at Basrah it appears that at this time masses were also celebrated at Būshehr, which was the port used by missionaries travelling from Persia to Mesopotamia or to places in the Persian Gulf, "et vice versa."
- 1752. M. Sébastien de Ste. Marguerite, having been consecrated Bishop of Isfahān by Mgr. Baillet at Baghdād, proceeded to his diocese, into which he made "une entrée solennelle."
- 1754. The Fathers at Basrah began to pay regular visits to the island of Khārag, in order to minister to the Dutch settlement established there by Baron von Kniphausen, who was himself a Catholic.
- 1755. Father Urbain de Ste. Élisée, ex-Superior of the foundation at Bandar 'Abbās, died at Khārag in the month of May; and on the 22nd of June of the same year Mgr. Sébastien

- de Ste. Marguerite, Barefoot Carmelite, Bishop of Isfahān, died at Basrah and was buried in the choir of the church.
- 1758. (Dr. Ives and his companions had "an opportunity of conversing with several Padrees or missionaries, who are settled in a convent at Bassora, with a view to propagate the Christian faith. A very odd scheme! since they dare not attempt the conversion even of a single Mussulman. These good men paid us several visits afterwards, gave us many benedictions, and a letter of recommendation to the Roman nominal Bishop of Babylon." The personality of Mgr. Baillet, who was still Bishop at this time, is described by Ives.)
- 1765. (In February of this year, when the traveller Niebuhr visited Büshehr, he found two monks there, one of whom styled himself Bishop of Isfahān; this latter was Mgr. Corneille de St. Joseph, Barefoot Carmelite, an Italian. At Basrah Niebuhr found the priests rebuilding their church. He remarked on the presence at Baghdad, in 1766, of two Carmelite monks, one of whom was Bishop of Babylon; and he observed that their principal function was not to convert Muhammadans to Christianity, but to induce Armenians to acknowledge the Pope, that they had succeeded in bringing most of the Oriental Christians at Baghdād into the Roman communion, and that the Nestorians had been obliged to surrender their church to the Latins.)
- 1773. The plague, which raged in this year throughout Turkish 'Irāq, carried off in a few months no less than eight Roman Catholic missionaties; viz., two at Basrah, four at Baghdād (including Mgr. Baillet, the Bishop), one at Mārdīn, and one at Diyārbakr.
- 1774. Mgr. Charles de St. Conrad, Barefoot Carmelite, Vicar-Apostolic in the territories of the Grand Mughal, paid a canonical visit to the Roman Catholic missions in Turkish 'Irāq.
- 1780. In this year Father Aloys-Marie, Barefoot Carmelite, became Vicar-General for Persia.
- 1782. (Mgr. Mirodot du Bourg, a French Benedictine, was appointed Bishop of Baghdād; but instead of going there himself he sent his nephew, the Abbé de Beauchamp, as Vicar-General. This Abbé was a learned astronomer and was said to have studied under Lalande.)
- 1787. Mgr. Angelinus de St. Joseph was chosen to be Vicar-Apostolic in the territories of the Great Mughal. At this time the Carmelites had several stations in the northern part of western India, forming a mission known as the Great Mughal's Mission, with headquarters at Sūrat.
- 1794. The Abbé de Beauchamp left Baghdād, and Father Fulgence, a Barefoot Carmelite, became Vicar-Apostolic of Baghdād

(The Abbé de Beauchamp was among the learned men who subsequently accompanied Bonaparte to Egypt.)

The subsequent history of the Roman Catholic missions in Persia and 'Irāq may be given in the actual words of the compiler of the above chronology. "A partir de cette époque, nos stations de Perse n'ont plus d'histoire; elles sont abandonnées insensiblement. La grande révolution française avait tari la source des vocations apostoliques. Nos stations de Mésopotamie ont été toujours desservies directement ou indirectement jusqu'à present par les Carmes; mais parfois avec l'aide de prêtres orientaux. Maintenant, avec l'aide de Dieu, nous tâchons de rétablir, du moins en partie, notre ancienne mission de Perse sur les côtes du Golfe. Depuis 1899 nous visitons Bouchir."

Present position of the Roman Catholic missions in the Persian Gulf region.

At the present day the Roman Catholic Church has only three permanent stations in the countries with which we are concerned, one at Baghdād, one at 'Amārah, and one at Basrah; but arrangements exist for occasional ministrations at Būshehr. The staff and work of the missions are chiefly concentrated at Baghdād.

Baghdād.

At Baghdād there are about 1,200 Roman Catholics, 1,400 Syrian Catholics, 1,000 Catholic Armenians, and 2,000 Chaldaean Catholics; the first three of these bodies are subject in common to the Archbishop of Babylon and therefore form, in a sense, a religious unit; but each of them has its separate church. The Chaldaean Catholics are an independent communion. The Roman Catholic institutions at Baghdād are described in detail below; the church and principal school were last rebuilt in 1868 under Father Marie-Joseph de Jésus.

Basrah.

There are at Basrah a church and a school under the direction of Carmelite Fathers. The Christians of Basrah number about 2,500, but the proportion belonging or attached to the Roman communion has not been ascertained.

Roman Catholic educational and charitable institutions at Baghdād.*

The following is an account of the Roman Catholic institutions maintained at Baghdad, about 1905, chiefly by the Fathers of the Carmelite mission; it is taken from materials supplied by one of themselves.

High school for boys.

The Carmelites had at Baghdad a high school for boys, both day pupils and boarders. The teaching staff in this school consisted of

^{*} The information given below relates to the year 1905.

five Carmelite Fathers, of whom three were French, one was Irish, and one was a Baghdadi; of two Marist brothers, both of whom were French; and of seven lay teachers, all Baghdadis. In 1905 there were on the rolls of the school 119 Chaldaeans, 33 Syrians, 23 Armenians, and 3 Greeks, all Turkish subjects; also 7 French, 4 Austrian, 2 Italian, 1 English, 1 Jewish and 3 Turkish boys, Roman Catholics; in all 196 boys. In 1904 there were three Muhammadan pupils, but the Inspector of Public Institution objected to Muhammadan boys attending a Christian school, and their parents were obliged to withdraw them. The curriculum was the same as in French Lycées, with modifications suitable to the East. The French and Arabic languages were obligatory, and instruction was given exclusively through the medium of these; but English and Turkish were taught to the pupils of the three highest classes. The hostel for boarders was under the management of the Carmelite Fathers and was attached to their mission house; it was intended for the sons of parents who do not live in Baghdad. In 1905 there were six boarders, and the boarding fee was £T2 per mensem. received an annual subsidy from the French Government, and the remainder of its revenue was derived from pupils' fees and from the donations of individuals; but only about one-fourth of the pupils paid full fees, one-fourth being free and the remainder paying half fees. In 1904 the total income of the school was £425 and the expenditure £449; the Fathers who taught in the school had no salaries.

The majority of the pupils on leaving school become clerks in mercantile houses; and many of them, after some years, are able to start in business on their own account. Some join departments of the Turkish administration, such as Public Debt, Customs, etc.; some enter the Ottoman Bank; some proceed to Bairūt or Europe to study medicine; some embrace the ecclesiastical state; others learn handicrafts. Evening classes are held by the Carmelite Fathers for former pupils who wish to continue their studies in history, French literature, English, physics, and mathematics; and sometimes as many as twenty youths take advantage of

these courses.

A school for Catholic girls was founded at Baghdad in 1877; it School belongs to the Roman Catholic Archbishop of Babylon, His Grace the girls, Most Reverend John Drure, C.D.; and it is worked by Sisters of the Presentation of the Third Order of St. Dominic (Tours). The staff consisted in 1905 of six sisters, all French, and five lay teachers. The school was attended by about 340 girls, all natives of Baghdad, and all Roman Catholics with the exception of one Armenian and one Muhammadan. Reading and writing in Arabic, also the rudiments of arithmetic, grammar, and geography, were taught in the morning, and needlework, knitting, etc., in the afternoon. French and music were extra subjects; about 40 girls took the former and 30 the latter, and only these paid any school fees. The school received a yearly grant from the French Government, and expenditure not covered by this subsidy was defrayed by the Archbishop of the Diocese. The Sisters, whose work was done entirely gratis, had daily work classes for former pupils, at which the attendance was about 80 and needle-work, embroidery, etc., were taught.

Close to the Carmelite church was a large infant school, into which Infant children of both sexes were received up to the age of seven or eight years. school.

for

The teaching, which was entirely free, was conducted by two Sisters and two mistresses; and the number of children was about 250.

School for poor children. The Roman Catholics had also a school for poor children; it was in charge of a Carmelite Father, who was assisted by three lay teachers, Baghdādis. The pupils numbered, on the average, about 100; all were Turkish subjects. Reading and writing in Arabic and the elements of arithmetic and geography were taught; the children not only did not pay fees, but were in every case clothed, and in many cases fed also. The expenditure in 1904 was £60, which was met entirely from charitable donations; and besides this a quantity of food and clothing was contributed by benefactors.

Most of the pupils on leaving become servants; some learn handicrafts; and a few find employment in business houses.

Orphanage

These was also a Roman Catholic orphanage, into which boys left destitute were received up to the age of eight, and were fed, clothed, and educated until they were able to support themselves. In 1905 there were sixteen inmates of the orphanage, all without parents and absolutely in want. The orphanage was supported by charitable contributions, eked out by means of such expedients as lotteries, penny collections in families, etc. The orphans are taught reading and writing, the rudiments of arithmetic, etc.; and, as soon as they are strong enough, they begin to learn a craft; some become carpenters, others silversmiths, others book-binders, and so on.

Home for the aged and blind.

An institution for the aged and blind was attached to the Carmelite Mission; old men who were poor and feeble were received and cared for till their death, and the blind were taken in and taught reading, writing, basket and mat-making, etc. In 1905 there were fifteen inmates of the institution, the funds at the disposal of the Fathers not admitting of the reception of a larger number. This home depended entirely on charitable subscriptions.

Dispensary.

In a house left for the purpose by a deceased Catholic of Baghdād, a dispensary was maintained by the Carmelite Fathers for the benefit of the sick poor; a doctor attended for three hours every morning; and consultations and medicine were given gratuitously. About 1,000 patients visited the dispensary every month. The salary of the doctor and the cost of medicines were met from charitable donations.

General history of the Protestant missions in the Persian Gulf region, 1811-91.

Martyn's The history of the Protestant missions may be said to begin with a Cruise in the cruise in the Gulf made in 1811 by Henry Martyn, the Indian Gulf, 1811. missionary, on board a vessel of the old Bombay Marine; the Arabic New Testament, translated by Martyn with the assistance of Sobat, appeared in 1816.

Mission of In 1829 Mr. Anthony Groves, a dentist of Exeter, sold all that he Graves at possessed and personally endeavoured, but without success, to found a

mission at Baghdad. His "Journal of a Residence at Bagdad" con-Baghdad, tains a graphic description of his melancholy experiences in the great 1829. plague there.

After this, Bible colporteurs were more than once sent to the Persian Proceedings Gulf by Dr. John Wilson, a missionary of the Church of Scotland at of Dr. John Bombay, and a scheme for missionary operations, including a mission Wilson, to the Jews of Basrah, was drawn up; but the Disruption of the Church circa 1840. of Scotland in 1843 prevented the execution of what had been planned.

In 1878 the British and Foreign Bible Society sent Anton Gibrail Foundation from Bombay to Baghdād on a colporteur journey; and about the same of a Church time Persia and Baghdād were visited by Mr. J. Watt, an agent of the Mission Society, who brought the state of matters there to the notice of the mission at Committee. Mr. Watt's recommendations were supported by the Baghdād, Rev. R. (now Canon) Bruce, a missionary of the Church Missionary 1880. Society in India; in December 1880, after an exchange of views between the two societies, a Bible dépôt under Mr. Bruce was opened at Baghdād; and two years later Baghdād was occupied as an outpost of the Church Missionary Society's Persian Mission.

In 1886, at the instance of the Committee of the Church Missionary Tour of Gene-Society, who desired information in regard to the openings for ral F.T. missionary effort in Arabia, a long journey of enquiry was undertaken by Haig, 1886. General F.T. Haig. After devoting his attention chiefly to the parts adjoining the Red Sea, General Haig returned home by way of the Persian Gulf, Basrah, Baghdād, and Syria, and reported on the whole situation; but, though operations on the western side of Arabia followed, it does not appear that in the Persian Gulf his tour had any direct results.

In 1888 an appeal was issued by Alexander Mackay, a missionary Mission of in Uganda, for the establishment of a mission at Masqat, which he Bishop regarded as "in more senses than one the key to Central Africa"; and in French 1891, as will be related below, Bishop French of Lahore, an English at Masqat, churchman, influenced by this appeal, endeavoured unassisted to found a mission at Masqat.

In the meantime, on the 1st of August 1889, an "Arabian Mission" Establishhad been set on foot in America by Mr. James Cantine and ment of the Mr. Samuel M. Zwemer, students, and Dr. J. G. Lansing, Professor of Arabian Mission in the Hebrew and Arabic, in the Theological Seminary of the Reformed Gulf, 1891. (Dutch) Church at New Brunswick, New Jersey, one of the Presbyterian Churches of America; and in 1891 the first representative of this Mission arrived in the Persian Gulf.

The proceedings of the American and English missionaries on the spot since their arrival demand short separate notices.

The American Arabian Mission.

The Arabian Mission, instituted as described in 1889, was managed History of at first by the founders with the assistance of a Committee of Advice the Arabian selected from among contributors. This arrangement continued in force Mission in

the Persian Gulf. until 1894, when the Mission was transferred to the management and care of the Board of Foreign Missions of the Reformed Church, its distinct existence as a corporation being, however, preserved.

1891.

The first agents of the Mission to reach the Gulf were the Rev. J. Cantine and the Rev. S. Zwemer, two of the original founders, who before going there examined, with reference to their suitability for mission work, various places in the western and southern districts of Arabia. Mr. Cantine eventually sailed from Aden for Masqat towards the end of May 1491, and, after spending a fortnight at that port and visiting Bahrain and other places in the Gulf, made a tour to Basrah and Baghdad. A little later he was joined by Mr. S. Zwemer, and Basrah was selected as the local headquarters of the Mission. Persistent hostility had to be encountered from the first on the part of the local Turkish authorities; and the early experiences of the mission were by no means fortunate.

1892.

On the 24th of June 1892 Kāmil 'Abdul Masīh, a Syrian Christian who had attached himself to the Mission, died in suspicious circumstances indicative of poisoning; colporteurs of the Mission were arrested; the Bible shop was sealed up and various books were confiscated; a guard was placed at the door of the house occupied by the missionaries; and a petition for their expulsion was sent to the Porte. In the course of the year, however, arrangements were successfully made for carrying on the work of the British and Foreign Bible Society in the region occupied by the Mission; and, in December 1892, the Mission itself was reinforced by the arrival of the Rev. Peter J. Zwemer, a brother of the Rev. S. Zwemer, from America.

1**8**93.

In 1893 a second station was established in Bahrain in charge of Mr. P. Zwemer; and, after the first difficulties had been surmounted, the situation in those islands appeared not unpromising. Before the end of the year over 100 portions of Scripture had been sold, and the first visit of a Christian missionary to Hasa on the adjoining mainland had been paid. At Basrah evangelistic work and the circulation of the Scriptures made progress; but no medical work could be undertaken, as there was no doctor.

1894.

In 1894 Dr. James T. Wyckoff, a medical missionary, was added to the staff at Basrah; but after a very short space of time, on a visit to Bahrain, he became seriously ill and was obliged to return to America, leaving the Mission again without any physician. Meanwhile several journeys of exploration were made by the Rev. P. Zwemer in the 'Omān Sultanate; and it was decided, on the information so obtained, that Masqat should be occupied by him as a third station.

1895.

In 1895 Mr. Cantine went on furlough to America, and Mr. S. Zwemer, who had meanwhile assumed charge of the station in Bahrain, temporarily took his place at Basrah. The staff was strengthened by the addition of a medical missionary at Basrah in the person of Dr. H. R. Lankford Worrall. At the end of the year an out-station was opened at the town of 'Amarah on the Tigris.

1896.

In 1896 work among Muhammadan women was begun by Mrs. S. Zwemer at Basrah and was continued by her in Bahrain and Qatīf. Distant tours, extending to Wadi Samāil, Rustāq, and Jabal Akhdhar, were made in 'Oman by Mr. P. Zwemer and his colporteurs; and by

one of the latter more than 100 portions of Scripture were sold in Trucial 'Oman.

In February 1897, soon after the return of Mr. Cantine from 1897. America, Mr. and Mrs. S. Zwemer proceeded on leave, and work in Bahrain came to a standstill; but in the same year good progress was made at Masqat, where Mr. P. Zwemer took charge of eighteen rescued African slave boys, opened a school, and began the printing of religious tracts. The medical relief provided at Basrah attracted many hearers; and Dr. Worrall founded a new out-station at Nāsirīyah on the Euphrates. At the end of the year the Rev. F. J. Barny was added to the staff of the Mission.

In 1898 the number of the missionaries was considerably increased 1898. by the arrival of the Rev. G. E. Stone and Miss M. Rice after the middle of the year, and of Dr. S. J. Thoms and Dr. Marion W. Thoms in December. Meanwhile, however, the death occurred in America of Mr. P. Zwemer, whose health had been undermined by his labours and experiences in 'Omān.

On the 26th of June 1899 Mr. Stone, who had arrived in the 1899. country in the previous year, died of heat apoplexy at Barkah.

The mortality among members of the Mission continued to be 1905-06. deplorable; in Bahrain Mrs. Thoms died in April 1905 and Mrs. Bennett in January 1906.

In 1906 the principal stations of the Mission were still Bahrain, Stations and Basrah, and Masqat, and the out-stations at 'Amārah and Nāsirīyah had staff of the been maintained. The total staff in January of that year amounted to Arabian 5 clergymen, 3 medical men, 3 lady workers, 5 married ladies, and 18 Mission, native assistants.

The seat of the Mission in Bahrain is Manāmah town. The regular Institutions staff in Bahrain consisted in 1906 of two missionaries, four lady and work in missionaries, and seven Arabic-speaking assistants; but there were Bahrain. generally present, in addition to these, a few recently arrived missionaries engaged in the study of the language. Evangelistic work was conducted from the Manamah station, not only in the Bahrain islands, but also on the coasts of Hasa and Trucial 'Oman. The principal feature of the Mission in Bahrain was the "Mason Memorial Hospital" of 21 beds; it consisted of a main ward, two special wards, and a female ward, and had a well-equipped operating room. The superior medical staff of the Hospital comprised an American doctor, an American lady doctor, an American trained nurse, and three assistants; the building was the property of the Mission. In 1905 there were 14,013 out-patients and 126 in-patients, and 87 operations were performed. Advice and medicine were given only to those attending (but not necessarily participating in) the morning prayers with which the work of each day was begun. A day school for boys and another for girls were maintained; the instruction in these was given partly by the missionaries and partly by native teachers; and the number of enrolled pupils in 1905 was 85. There was also a dépôt for the sale of the Bible and other Christian literature printed in the languages of the Gulf. A Mission building, the property of the Mission, was under construction in 1906.

The Mission premises at Basrah were situated on the south side of Institutions and work at the 'Ashar creek above Muqam; and a small hospital and a free dispen-Basrah. sary were maintained in a rented house near the English club. There was also a school; but the Turkish authorities did not recognise its existence and had endeavoured to compel its closure.

Work Masgat.

No hospital or other public institution belonging to the Mission existed at Masqat. The staff there consisted of only one missionary. who had his residence in the Dallalin suburb and made it his duty to cultivate the friendship of influential Arab residents and visitors and with their assistance to travel from time to time in the interior. When the missionary himself was at Masqat, a native Christian colporteur was generally engaged in distributing Christian literature in one of the more settled districts of the 'Oman Sultanate.

General work obtained to 1905.

The objects of the Arabian Mission are primarily evangelistic; but and results the missionaries also attach much importance to their medical work; and in Bahrain, at Basrah, and on tours made from those centres, over 30,000 sick persons are annually treated by the medical representatives of the Mission. With the assistance of the British and Foreign and of the American Bible Society, circulation of the Scriptures is vigorously carried on; and the number of Christian publications sold in the year increased steadily from 620 in 1892 to over 4,000 in 1905. the missionaries to all places within reach of their headquarters are a special feature in the methods of the Arabian Mission. It is admitted that baptisms of native converts have not been numerous; but a number of persons who have come in contact with the missionaries have confessed to the truth of Christianity and are reported to be living a Christian life, and the way is thus being prepared for future generations of workers.

Political position the Arabian Mission.

Political complications arising out of the work of the Arabian of Mission have been singularly few,—a happy circumstance which must be attributed chiefly to the discretion of the missionaries themselves, and none have been serious. Some slight difficulties occurred in Bahrain after 1899, which are noticed in the history of that principality; but they were easily surmounted, and they have not recurred. The relations of the missionaries with the British Political authorities have been uniformly friendly and even cordial; and the support of the latter has not been withheld in any case in which it could properly be granted. The hostility of the Turkish Government officials in Iraq has been a cause of trouble; but otherwise, apart from the ordinary difficulties incident to a new enterprise, "scarcely any personal opposition has been met with," and the general opinion of the missionaries themselves, based on several years' experience, is that, "for a Muhammadan country, Eastern Arabia is peculiarly free from religious fanaticism."

Missions and missionaries of the Church of England.

A mission of the Church Missionary Society, as already mentioned, The Church Missionary was founded at Baghdad in 1880. It still exists; and the number of Protes-Society's tants at Baghdad, for whom no other church than that of the Mission

exists, is now about 200. Much good work is done by the Society's mission Hospital at Baghdad; in 1904 there were 17 beds and on the average Baghdad. about 12 in-patients and 70 out-patients were daily under treatment, besides whom 1,076 persons were attended at their houses; those who could not afford to pay were treated gratis. The staff consisted of a doctor of the Society, a dispenser, two dressers, and two servants; and a lady, who was a trained hospital nurse, was giving her services to the institution. As the doctor, who received only a small salary from the Society, transferred all the fees which he earned to the Hospital, that institution, of which the expenditure was about £300 a year, actually cost nothing to the Society; and the lady nurse's services, it should be mentioned, were also given gratuitously. The work, however, was carried on under serious financial restrictions.

After 40 years of missionary and religious work in India, the French's Right Rev. Thomas Valpy French, Bishop of Lahore, resigned his mission to bishopric to travel among Arabic-speaking peoples with a view to the Masqat. propagation of Christianity among them. His attention was directed to Masqat by the appeal of Mr. Mackay of Uganda, to which we have already referred, and in 1891 he proceeded to Masqat, having met in the Red Sea, as a fellow-traveller, Mr. S. Zwemer of the Arabian Mission, whose ultimate destination was at that time still unsettled. It was Bishop French's intention to start a mission at Masgat on his own account, in the hope that it might be taken over afterwards by the Church Missionary Society. He arrived at Masqat in February 1891, began work in the town, and had made arrangements for a journey into the interior; but, having received a sunstroke in travelling by boat from Masqat to Matrah, he died at the former place on the 14th of May 1891 at the age of 66 years. He was buried in the European cemetery at Shaikh Jabir, a small cove adjoining Masqat town on the east, but separated from it by rocky hills and practically inaccessible otherwise

Bishop French's grave was visited in December 1900 by the Right Rev. G. A. Lefroy, Bishop of Lahore, by whom the Consecration Service was read at the Shaikh Jabir cemetery and also at another cemetery near the American mission house, then recently granted by the Sultan of 'Oman for the burial of native Christians; but no English successor to the veteran pioneer has as yet made his appearance at Masqat.

than by sea.

The members of the Arabian Mission, on their arrival at Basrah in Other Eng-1891, found there a Dr. M. Eustace, who was engaged in dispensary lish missions work among the poor; he co-operated cordially with them until his transfer to the hospital of the Church Mission Society at Quetta. In the allocation of missionary spheres among Christian bodies, the Makran and Persian coasts have fallen to the Church Missionary Society; but the Society has not as yet found means to occupy these districts effectively.

APPENDIX J.

THE TELEGRAPHS OF THE PERSIAN GULF IN THEIR TELEGRAPH SYSTEMS RELATION TO THE PERSIA AND TURKEY.*

Origin of the Persian Gulf Telegraphs.

The inception of the Persian Gulf Telegraphs, which formed from the

first links in an intercontinental chain, was dictated not by local interests.

but by broad considerations of national advantage. The Crimean war of

1853-56 brought home to the Porte the slowness of communication

between Constantinople and the outlying provinces of the Turkish

Empire, while the Mutiny of 1857 taught the British Government a

similar lesson in regard to India, and two of the principal Governments concerned were thus predisposed in favour of projects conducing to

Perhaps the first practical scheme for establishing telegraphic communi-

cation between Europe and Asia was that of Dr. (afterwards Sir W.)

O'Shaughnessy, Superintendent of Electric Telegraphs in India, who proposed that a cable should be laid from Karāchi to Masqat, Bāsīdu, and finally Qurnah, a place at the junction of the Tigris and Euphrates: that it should be continued by means of a subfluvial line in the bed of the Tigris from Qurnah to Baghdad; and that the remaining distance from

greater rapidity of communication between West and East.

Interest of Britain and Turkey in promoting telegraphic communication in the Middle East.

Dr. 0' Shaughnessy's scheme.

Baghdad to Scutari should be spanned by an ordinary land line. Dr. O'Shaughnessy also suggested that a branch line should be carried for some distance along the bottom of the Euphrates, and thence, subterraneously, across the desert to Suwaidiyah on the Syrian coast. A little later, in August 1856, the European and Indian Junction Telegraph Company applied to the Court of Directors of the East India

The Junction Company's scheme. 1856.

^{*} The principal authorities dealing specifically with the subject of the Persian Gulf Telegraphs are the following: Col. Sir F. J. Goldsmid's Telegraph and Travel, 1874; Mr. J. Possmann's Official History of the Persian Gulf Telegraph Cables, 1889; Col. H. A. Mallock's Report on the Indo-European Telegraph Department, 1890; the Official History of the Mekran Telegraph Line, 1895; Mr. J. A. Saldanha's Précis on Commerce and Communication in the Persian Gulf, 1906; and, finally, the annual reports on the working of the Indo-European Telegraph Department. The political records of the Government of India and the Administration Reports of the Persian Gulf Residency also contain much information; and from these, and from the foregoing authorities, the present Appendix has been mainly compiled. The acknowledgments of the writer are also due to H. B. M.'s Legation in Persia, to the Director-in-Chief of the Indo-European Telegraph Department (Mr. H. A. Kirk), to the Director-General of the Indian Telegraph Department (Sir S. Hutchinson), and to the Director of the Persian Gulf Section (Mr. H. Whitby-Smith) for further information and for revision of this Appendix.

Company for a financial guarantee on account of an ordinary land line of telegraph which they proposed to construct at a cost of about £200,000 from Suwaidīyah, already mentioned, to Qūrnah. Some negotiations with the Turkish Government ensued, but the Porte were averse from granting a concession to a commercial company; instead they gave assurances,—which they had neither the means nor the intention of fulfilling—that a line of the sort in question would be constructed by Turkey out of her own resources.

Meanwhile work was in progress upon a rival route between Europe and India. In 1859, Egypt being already in telegraphic communication with Europe via Tripoli, Malta and Italy, a cable to India was laid by way of the Red Sea, which, starting from Suez, touched at Sawakin, Aden, Hallaniyah (an island of the Kuria Muria group) and Masqat, and finally reached India at Cape Monze (Rās Munazi) near Karāchi. This enterprise was undertaken by the Red Sea and India Telegraph Company on a guarantee of 41 per cent. from the British Government. The cable was opened on the 1st of November 1859; but the Sawakin-Aden section failed in February, and the Aden-Karāchi section in May 1860; and the whole enterprise was abandoned. The failure of the cable was due to the insufficiency of the marine surveys by which its course was determined, to its having been too tightly laid, and to technical faults in construction, for the art of manufacturing and laying submarine cables was then still in its infancy. One consequence of this fiasco was to deter investors from the support of projects that involved sea cables of any considerable length; and a further result was to concentrate general attention, for a time, on land routes towards the Persian Gulf which might contribute towards establishing reliable communication with India. Extensive enquiries and surveys followed with a view to the establishment of a Persian Gulf line.

Inauguration and failure of the first Red Sea cable, 1859-60.

Establishment of telegraphic communication between Europe and Baghdad, 1857-1861.

In 1857 the Turkish Government, while maintaining their objections to the construction of telegraphs in Turkish Arabia by a foreign company, consented that the work should be carried out by officers of the British Government on the behalf and at the expense of the Porte; but only upon a distinct understanding that the whole line in Turkish territory should, when completed, be placed under the management of the Ottoman Department of Telegraphs. In pursuance of this arrangement the services of Lieutenant-Colonel Biddulph, R.A., were lent to the Turkish Government; in August 1858 work between Baghdād and Scutari was commenced under his orders, and by October 1859 some 325 miles of the line had been completed. About this time ill-health and Turkish obstruction brought about Colonel Biddulph's resignation; but work on the line was continued by the remainder of the party, of whom a proportion were retired non-commissioned officers of the Royal Artillery.

Anglo-Turkish Agreement, 1857. Anglo-Turkish draft Convention, 1860.

Negotiations were continued meanwhile at Constantinople with the object, on the part of the British Government, of ensuring the ultimate efficiency of the line as a means of communication between England and India. In September 1860 a draft Convention embodying the result of the discussions that had passed was prepared, but it was not signed; and the position remained unregulated by any formal agreement until 1864. In the draft Convention a wire for Indian traffic along the whole length of the Turkish line from a point on the Austrian frontier to a point on or near the Persian Gulf was conceded to the British Government, and the term of the whole arrangement was fixed at 50 years. A principal cause of the non-execution of the agreement was a difference of opinion which arose between the contracting powers in regard to the line between Baghdad and the Persian Gulf: this the Porte contended should be subfluvial for the sake of security from damage by Arab tribes, while the British Government preferred an aërial line as being less expensive to construct and more easy to maintain.

Completion of the Constantinople-Baghdad line, 1861. In the meantime construction of the northern section of the line, between Baghdad and Constantinople, had been steadily proceeding; and by June 1861 through communication had been opened between the two cities. In the spring of 1861 Colouel A. B. Kemball, British Political Resident at Baghdad, marched from Constantinople to Baghdad, inspecting by the way the entire line of telegraph between those places; and his report fully justified the adoption of the aërial system in this region.

Extension of the line in Turkish 'Irāq from Baghdād to Fāo and from Baghdād to Khānaqīn, 1861-65.

Selection of a route between Baghdad and the Persian Gulf, 1861-63.

The work of connecting Baghdad with the Persian Gulf, which was the next step towards the establishment of direct communication between Europe and India, was not immediately undertaken, as it was uncertain what route would be the best, below Baghdad, for a great intercontinental line to follow. At one time it was considered that a line through Turkish territory from Baghdad to the Gulf would be exposed to perpetual interruption by the Arabs through whose country it passed; and the authorities were disposed, in case it should be decided to rely on a single route, to prefer one reaching the Gulf by means of a détour through Persia. Colonel Patrick Stewart, however, whose views with reference to the scheme as a whole will be described further on, regarded a direct line from Baghdad to the head of the Persian Gulf as an indispensable part of any general system and recommended that the political arrangements with the tribes in Turkish 'Iraq should be made through British officers. It was ultimately resolved to construct a line connecting Baghdad with the head of the Gulf by way of Basrah, and it was arranged that this land line should meet a cable from India which it had been decided to lay in the Persian Gulf. In the spring of 1863 Colonel Kemball, by arrangement with Namiq Pāsha, the Turkish Wāli, made a reconnaissance from Baghdād to Basrah, which resulted in a decision that the telegraph should run from Baghdād to Hillah, follow the left bank of the Euphrates from Hillah to Qūrnah, and at Qūrnah cross to the right lank of the Shatt-al-'Arab. A more convenient route could have been obtained by crossing and recrossing the Euphrates at more than one point between Hillah and Qūrnah; but the Turkish officials were anxious to remove the line as far as possible out of the reach of the Arab tribes upon the right bank, and the route adopted was a concession to their fears. The total length of the line from Baghdād to Basrah was estimated at 313 miles.

The Porte were unwilling that this Baghdad-Basrah line should be constructed by British agency and professed readiness to construct it themselves. Eventually the discussions resulted in an engagement, dated the 20th October 1863, between Great Britain and Turkey, by which the Ottoman Government undertook to construct an aërial line at their own expense from Baghdad to Basrah and another from Baghdad to Khanaqin near the Persian frontier, while the Government of India on their part assumed the responsibility of carrying a submarine cable to Basrah or to some point near the mouth of the Shatt-al-'Arab to meet the Baghdad-Basrah land line. It was further agreed that the necessary materials and a skilled staff for the construction of the land line should be supplied by the Government of India, and that the * cost of the materials should be repaid by the Ottoman Government out of the Turkish share of the revenue from messages sent by either line from India to Europe. The Khānaqīn line was not to be commenced until through communication by Basrah had been established, and certain principles were to be followed in the distribution of long-distance traffic between the two lines. Two of the clauses had for their object to expedite the completion of the Baghdad-Basrah line and of the submarine cable.

Anglo-Turkish Agreement for construction, 20th October 1863.

A basis of operations having thus been arranged, construction was begun at the Baghdad end in November 1863; and in the same month, on the arrival of Lieutenant Murdoch Smith and a detachment of Royal Engineers at Basrah together with the necessary stores, work commenced at the southern end also. The difficulties encountered proved, in spite of centrary anticipations, to be of a physical rather than of a political nature; and by the end of March 1864 the wire from Faothe point finally selected for the landing of the cable, which was now rapidly approaching it-had reached Qurnah. Above this, in consequence of trouble between the Turks and various Arab tribes, chiefly the Muntafik, there remained for some time a gap of 170 miles; but on the 27th of January 1865 the two sections were successfully joined up in the neighbourhood of Qurnah, so linking Fao to Constantinople. The clause in the Anglo-Turkish engagement of 1863 relating to the postponement of the Baghdad-Khanaqin line appears to have been disregarded, for we find that it was actually in operation by the 13th October 1864, if not at an even earlier date.

Progress and completion of the work, 1863-65.

The sums advanced on this account aggregated £26,266, which amount was finally paid off by Turkey in 1875-76.

Anglo-Turkish Convention for working the whole line, 3rd September 1864.

In connection with the Turkish land lines it only remains to summarise a Telegraphic Convention concluded between the British and Turkish Governments on the 3rd of September 1864, largely through the exertions of Colonel P. Stewart at Constantinople.

Junction of telegraph at Fao.

This document, which superseded the Agreement of 1863, provided for the construction and maintenance by the Indian and Ottoman Governments respectively, at their own expense, of (1) a submarine cable from British India to Fāo, touching at Būshehr and (2) of land lines from Baghdād to connect with the cable at Fāo and with the Persian telegraph system at Khānaqīn. At Fāo a joint Anglo-Turkish office was to be established under the general control of the Ottoman administration; but the British section of the office was to be exempt from Turkish interference in internal matters. The British staff, the strength of which was not to exceed 50, were to inhabit the same building as the Turkish; but the space and apparatus allotted to the two were to remain entirely distinct, and telegrams for transmission were to be exchanged through a window. The general expenses of the station were to be divided equally between the two governments, and the British staff were to be paid by the British Government.

Conditions intended to secure efficiency.

To ensure punctuality in working, the Turkish Government was to establish a permanent service, i.e., a continuous night and day service, at Baghdād and Fāo and at a majority of the stations on the line between Constantinople and Fāo; and a staff possessing a knowledge of the English language was to be appointed to these. An office devoted exclusively to the transmission of Indian messages was to be established at Constantinople and manned by employés thoroughly conversant with English. One wire between Constantinople and Fāo was to be reserved for Indian traffic; and, in case of a breakdown, its place was to be temporarily taken by the other, subject to certain conditions. Messages to and from India might be forwarded indifferently by the Fāo or the Khanaqīn route.

Matters of account and representation. Tariff and methods of account were fixed by the Convention; and the Indian Government were empowered to appoint a delegate to reside at Constantinople, the Turkish Government on its part being similarly entitled to a representative at the headquarters of the Indian Telegraphs,—a stipulation under which the Indo-European Telegraph Department now maintain an Agent at Constantinople, but of which the Porte have not taken advantage*.

^{*} From 1865 to 1869, when the traffic accounts with the Turkish Government were settled at Constantinople, the British telegraph representative there was a Commissioner; but in 1870, the settlement of accounts having been transferred to London, an Agent was substituted for the Commissioner and the establishment at Constantinople otherwise reduced.

Construction of an alternative land line through Persia, 1862-64.

It is now necessary to revert to a period immediately preceding the extension of the Turkish line from Baghdad to the Gulf. The desirability of a double connection between the Persian Gulf cable and Baghdad had been foreseen; and negotiations with the aim of providing an auxiliary land line through Persia were set on foot in 1861, but at first remained unsuccessful. In May 1862, Colonel P. Stewart, already mentioned, who was now in charge of the whole Indo-European scheme in so far as it depended on the British Government, arrived at Tehran to assist in the discussions; and, though nothing was settled during his visit to the Persian capital, which lasted only a month, a report by him gave clearness and force to the project of duplication. The most serious obstacle was the attitude of the Persian Government, who at one time appeared disposed to support the scheme, but early in 1862 began to vacillate and to exhibit, probably under Russian influence, a preference for a line to run from Tehran to Rasht and be connected with the telegraphic system of European Russia. The British Legation at Tehran did not however relax their efforts; and in December 1862, Mr. Eastwick was successful in obtaining a draft convention which provided for the construction of a line from Bushehr via Tehran to Khanaqin on the Turkish frontier.

Negotiations with the Persian Government, 1861-62.

The arrangement thus reached was embodied in a formal engagement, which was accepted by the British Government on the 6th of February 1863. The chief provisions of this document were that the line in question should be constructed without delay by the British on behalf of the Persian Government; that the British Government should be entitled to make use of the line through the Persian Telegraph officers on payment of the ordinary rates; that the materials required to be imported should be supplied by the British to the Persian Government at reasonable prices; that the new line should be placed under the superintendence of a British Engineer officer to be paid by the British Government; and that the Persian authorities should assist in the work of construction by supplying such materials as were locally available. engagement also included certain stipulations of which the object was to give the Persian Government a voice in matters of expenditure and account. The materials purchased in England were to be paid for by the Persian Government within a period of 5 years, reckoned from the date of delivery at the Persian frontier, by annual instalments.

Anglo-Persian Agreement for construction and management, 6th February 1863.

Preparations were immediately made for the despatch from England of the stores to be imported, and for the collection in Persia of the materials locally obtainable, chiefly timber. The distance from Khānaqīn by Tehrān to Būshehr was estimated at 1,102 miles and materials were in the first instance provided for a single line 1,200 miles in length. The operations were placed in charge of Lieutenant Champain, R.E., assisted by a staff of civilian experts and of officers, non-commissioned officers and men of the Royal Engineers; Lieutenant Champain received

Field operations 1863-64.

the local rank of Major, and his headquarters were fixed at Tehrān, where he arrived on the 20th of October 1863. On the 17th of November he reached Būshehr to meet a construction party sent from England; and shortly afterwards work was commenced in five sections, two of which lay between Tehrān and Khānaqīn and three between Tehrān and Būshehr. Extraordinary difficulties, due to the apathy and in some places to the opposition of the local Persian authorities, were experienced in obtaining labour and local materials; and Major Champain was driven to take the extreme step of authorising his principal subordinates to make payments out of their own funds for necessary labour and stores in supplying which the Persian officials had made default. But the ardour and determination of the British constructors were such as to surmount all obstacles, and on the 26th of September 1864 the whole line stood completed between Būshehr and Khānaqīn. It was not however opened for traffic until April 1865.

The troubles, however, with which the new telegraph had to contend, were as yet by no means at an end.

Obstacles arising from Turko-Persian jealousy, 1864-65.

In particular the junction of the Persian and Turkish systems in the neighbourhood of Khānaqīn was attended by serious embarrassment. From the first the Ottoman Government had regarded with no friendly eye the participation of Persia in the great Indo-European telegraph undertaking and its advantages; but to outward seeming the Turkish objections had been overcome when the Anglo-Turkish engagement of October 1863 was signed, providing for the construction of the Baghdad-Khanaqin line and for the distribution of through traffic between it and the Baghdad-Basrah line. Persia too, as we have seen, inclined to a scheme for separate communication with Europe by way of Russia; but, in adhering to the engagement of February 1863, she had apparently abandoned her opposition to the rival project. Both powers, moreover, by means of a Turko-Persian treaty dated the 28th of November 1863, had agreed to the execution of the Khanagin scheme, with or without modification, and had amicably regulated a number of the details connected with it. When however the junction at Khānagin became an all but accomplished fact, both states, and specially Persia, evinced a disposition to withdraw from their engagements; and the difficulty was accentuated by a dispute which arose as to the ownership of the country, and consequently as to the control of the telegraph line, between Khanaqın in Turkish 'Iraq and Qal'eh-i-Sabz in Persia. Discussions between Mīrza Husain Khān, Persian Envoy Extraordinary to the Porte, who happened to be passing through Baghdad, and Namiq Pasha, Wali of Baghdad, resulted in a temporary settlement of the question, and a junction was effected in October 1864 at the point agreed on between these two authorities; shortly afterwards, however, the Governor of Kirmanshah, under orders from Tehran, again destroyed communication by causing the line to be cut at the point of junction. At length Colonel Kemball, the British Resident at Baghdad, suggested a happy solution of the frontier difficulty; it consisted in the use, within the limits of the disputed tract, of alternate iron and wooden poles, the former of the pattern employed in Turkish 'Iraq and the latter of the type identified with

the Persian telegraphs. By the end of January 1865 direct communication had been established between Tehrān and Baghdād; but the Turkish operators at first refused to receive messages coming from the Persian side.

On the Tehran-Bushehr section the working of the new line was for some months obstructed, and at one time altogether prevented, by the opposition of Persian officialdom. The Persian Minister of Public Works at Tehrān caused an instrument at Shīrāz which was under the control of British operators to be disconnected in order to prevent their holding communication with Büshehr, and on a protest being made by Major Champain, the British Director, against the issue of such orders without any reference to himself, the wire between Shīrāz and Bushehr was actually cut under the orders of the Minister, and at Isfahān the Persian authorities attempted to take forcible possession of the apparatus in charge of the British employés at that place. The Director thereupon ordered the removal of the instruments from Shīrāz and Isfahān, caused those at Tehrān to be disconnected, and referred the whole dispute for diplomatic settlement. The result was satisfactory. The Persian Government apologised for the action of their officials at Isfahan, and agreed that, while the Persian Minister of Public Works should continue to be regarded as the head of all telegraphs in Persia, he should issue no instructions affecting the Tehran-Bushehr and Tehran-Khanaqin lines without the cognisance and consent of the British Director. It was arranged that from the date of resumption of communication with India the control of the telegraph offices and the working of the lines should remain in the hands of the British staff for a period of 5 months, on the expiration of which it should be transferred to the Persian staff, only one British Engineer officer and two assistants being thereafter retained at Tehran, in a consultative capacity, for a further period of 10 months.

The political difficulties were thus finally removed; but it was now found that, in the interval during which communication between Shīrāz and Būshehr had been suspended, very serious damage had been done to that section of the line by villagers and travellers, and by the Iliyat (or nomadic Persian tribes) in migrating from their summer seats in the hills to their winter quarters near the coast. Over a space of 20 miles between Shīrāz and the Kutal-i-Dukhtar the line had been almost totally destroyed; many of the poles had been removed and used for firewood; the wire itself had been cut into pieces or thrown down; and out of 600 consecutive insulators only 20 remained intact. Part of the damage was attributed to the misbehaviour and bad example of a Kāshkai chief named 'Ali Khān Baig, who himself broke an insulator by a shot from his gun. The Persian Government, whose misunderstanding with the British telegraph officials had by this time been adjusted, ordered the condign punishment of the offenders; and the measures taken resulted in the arrest of 'Ali Khan Baig, who was kept in durance for two months and was not released until he had disgorged 1,000 Tumans by way of fine and 1,500 Tumans more in bribes to the persons employed for his punishment. Before this salutary example had been made, however, the amount of damage done

Friction with the Persian Government, 1864-65.

Wanton mischief by nomads, 1864-65. to the line had been nearly doubled, and the Shaikh of Chāh Kūtāh had destroyed, or permitted to be destroyed, some 15 miles of the line—the mischief in this case extending to a point only 5 miles from the town of Būshehr. The work of repairing the damaged line was arduous, as the country was rugged and some of the spans were very long; but communication between Shīrāz and Būshehr was restored by the middle of March 1865, after the interruption—due at first to the interference of the Persian Government and subsequently to the mischief done by the nomads—had lasted for five months. The Shāh was now thoroughly interested in the success of the telegraph, and on the 21st of January 1865 he had personally visited the telegraph office at Tehrān, where he remained for two hours conversing over the wires with the Governors of Shīrāz, Isfahān, Kirmānshāh, Hamadān, Kāshān and Qum; he expressed himself as pleased with the arrangements made and impatient to be able to communicate with Europe and India.

The Tehrān-Būshehr line however continues, even at the present day, to suffer in an extraordinary degree from wilful damage; and in the year 1904-05 no less than 536 cases of wanton mischief were reported.

Connection of the Turkish and Persian lines with the Indian system by way of the Gulf, 1863-68.

The history of the principal and most striking section of the great Indo-European line of telegraph yet remains to be traced. Without it the Turkish and Persian sections would have remained mere provincial telegraphs, without general importance, and its construction was a necessary part of the Indo-European programme; but its commencement was postponed until the actual progress of the land lines in Turkey and Persia and the removal of political obstacles had reached a point such as to make ultimate success appear certain. The work in the Persian Gulf was one of great magnitude, but the difficulties to be overcome were here almost exclusively of a material and mechanical nature.

The Rev. Mr. Badger's scheme, 1860-61.

In 1861 the mode of connecting the Turkish line to Europe—when it should have been finished—with the Indian telegraphic system was already under consideration. Under instructions from Government a scheme for an aërial line from Karāchi to Basrah had been propounded in 1860 by that versatile scholar, the Rev. G. P. Badger; and when his project was referred for opinion to the Commissioner in Sind and to the British political representatives at Kalāt, Masqat and Būshehr three out of those four authorities pronounced in favour of its adoption. In 1861 Mr. Badger was deputed to enquire into the political status of Makrān; but in the end his scheme was found to involve great political difficulties and was therefore set aside.

Colonel Stewart's scheme, 1862.

In 1862 the general conduct and control of the Indo-European telegraph operations were entrusted to Lieutenant-Colonel Patrick

Stewart, an officer of the Bengal Engineers, at the time only thirty years of age, who thus became the first Director-in-Chief of the Indo-European Telegraph Department. The nebulous alternatives which he found under consideration were by him rapidly brought to a focus. A scheme which had found favour with a committee appointed to examine it, for establishing communication through the Gulf by means of a series of short submarine cables laid from island to island, did not commend itself to Colonel Stewart. He had no difficulty in deciding that from Karāchi to some point in Makrān communication should in the first instance be established by land line; but the choice between a land line and a submarine cable in the section between Makran and the head of the Gulf presented greater difficulties, largely on account of the risk inseparable from cables at the stage which the science of submarine telegraphy had then reached. From the first Colonel Stewart recognised and emphasized the desirability of duplicating the entire Indo-European system as a safeguard against interruptions. His final recommendations made to the Secretary of State for India were in favour of erecting a land line from Karāchi to Gwādar or some point further westward in Makrān, and of laying a cable thence to Fao, which he had selected as a more suitable landing place than Kuwait, the point originally proposed. Colonel Stewart added a recommendation that the section between Karāchi and Gwādar should be duplicated from the commencement by means of a submarine cable.

Colonel Stewart's proposals having been approved, the construction of the Karāchi-Gwādar land line was taken in hand, under political arrangements concluded in 1861-62 with the Khān of Kalāt, the Jām of Las Bailah, and the chiefs of Pasni and Kaij by Major F. Goldsmid, Assistant Commissioner in Sind, which had been confirmed by the Government of India. Despite great physical and climatic difficulties this section, begun before the end of 1862, was completed in May 1863 under the direction of Mr. H. I. Walton, in the form of a single-wire line. The construction parties aggregated 25 Europeans and about 600 natives; and water for man and beast was so scarce that ablutions had sometimes to be prohibited, and guards with drawn swords posted even over dirty pools.

Construction of the Karāchi-Gwādar land line, 1862-63.

In 1863 preparations were made for laying the cable from Gwadar to The sea route from Gwadar to Jashk had been exhaustively surveyed by Lieutenant Stiffe, I.N., under the orders of $_{
m the}$ Government of India in the years preceding 1863; and at the beginning of 1863 the bottoms from Jashk to Fao, and especially the marine approach to Fao, were surveyed by Lieutenant Stiffe in the steamer "Johnston Castle" with reference to their suitability for the reception of the cable. The cable itself, 1250 knots in length, was despatched from England in October 1863 in the sailing-ships "Marian Moore," "Kirkham," "Tweed," "Assaye" and "Cospatrick," while about 35 miles of shore-end pieces, more heavily made than the deep-sea sections, were brought by the "Amberwitch," a small steamer which was to be retained permanently in the Gulf for the telegraphic service. Colonel Stewart, accompanied by Sir C. Bright, the celebrated electrical engineer, by Major Goldsmid and by Dr. Esselbach—the last in the

Laying of the Gulf cables, 1863-64. capacity of Chief Electrician, left Karāchi on the 27th of January 1864 on the steamer "Coromandel" of the Bombay Marine, which had been placed at his disposal.

Gwadar to Maqlab, February 1864. On the 4th of February, a shore-end having been landed at Gwādar, active operations commenced; the cable was payed out at the rate of 5 miles an hour from the "Kirkham," towed by the steamer "Zenobia" and piloted by the "Coromandel"; at Rās Maidāni the "Kirkham's" load of cable was exhausted and her place was taken by the "Marian Moore." Jāshk was reached on the 8th of February.

The expedition then crossed the Gulf of 'Omān and entered Ghubbat Ghazīrah or Malcolm Inlet, where a shore-end was landed on the* 9th of February upon the isthmus of Maqlab, and communication with Jāshk was established; it had originally been intended to locate the station between Gwādar and Būshehr on the island of Lārak; but a site in the neighbourhood of Maqlab had appeared preferable to Colonel Stewart, probably as giving a shorter and more direct line. Thus was completed the first section of the work, which so far had proceeded without a hitch.

Delay at Maqlab, February-March 1864.

At this stage a month's delay intervened, due to political difficulties with the uncouth Dhahūriyin of the villages adjoining Maqlab. Colonel Disbrowe, Political Agent at Masqat, had visited the Malcolm and Elphinstone Inlets in January 1864 and had spent a fortnight in making a reconnaissance of the country and in opening relations with the tribesmen. On the arrival, however, of the telegraph party, it was found that no honest work could be got from the local Arabs at fair rates; their cupidity was intolerable; and disorderly scenes occurred between the inhabitants of rival villages, especially of Maqaqah and Film, who were competitors for employment. On the 15th of February Colonel Disbrowe joined Colonel Stewart at Maglab, and, after some days spent in fruitless negotiations with the Dhahūriyīn, the two officers proceeded to Masqat to invoke the good offices of the Sultan of 'Oman. There was some uncertainty as to the jurisdiction in which the district concerned was situated, for some of the natives, repudiating the authority of the Sultan, professed to be subjects of the Shaikh of Sharjah, while others claimed absolute independence.

After a week's absence Colonel Stewart and Colonel Disbrowe returned from Masqat on the "Coromandel." The Sultān had asserted his claim to Maqlab and the adjoining country in unequivocal terms, and had furnished the telegraph party with authority to continue their operations and to deal with the tribesmen in his name; but he gave no material assistance, and the British officers had still to rely chiefly on their own prestige and tact for the conclusion of a working arrangement. Meanwhile, however, the Dhahūriyīn had grown more accustomed to the presence of the construction party, and various preliminary difficulties had gradually settled themselves.

A land line was now carried across the narrow Maqlab isthmus dividing the head of Malcolm Inlet from that of Khor-ash-Sham or Elphinstone Inlet, on which neck of land, had the conduct of the

^{*} Or, perhaps, one the 13th.

Dhahūriyīn been more satisfactory, the telegraph station also would have been erected. A section of cable continued the telegraph from the west shore of the isthmus to a small unnamed island in Elphinstone Inlet, selected for the sake of a security which the mainland did not afford and thenceforth known as "Telegraph Islet."

Telegraph rights were conceded to the British Government by the Sultān of 'Omān in two treaties, the first dated 17th November 1864 and the second 19th January 1865; they related not only to his possessions proper in Arabia and Makrān, but also to territories which he then held on lease from the Persian Government. In the former of these treaties the sovereign rights of the Sultān of Masqat over territory traversed by the telegraph were expressly reserved. As the title of Masqat to the isthmus of Maqlab and its neighbourhood was not undisputed, an Agreement for the protection of the telegraph "in or near" their territories was obtained also from the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān.

Telegraph
Treaties with
Masqat, and
Agreement
by the
Shaikhs of
Trucial
'Omān,
1864-65.

On the 12th of March the steamer "Zenobia" brought the "Tweed" with a heavy cargo of cable into Elphinstone Inlet; and on the 18th, after the "Tweed's" cable had been connected with the instruments on Telegraph Islet, a start was made for Büshehr, the steamer "Coromandel" accompanying.

Laying of the Gulf cables (continued), 1864.

On the morning of the 19th the ships were abreast of Tunb Island, which lay about 4 miles to the south of them; a slight détour had been made to avoid a place where the soundings were known to be irregular. At this point the "Coromandel" was detached to pick up the cable ship "Assaye," then anchored off Lingeh, as a portion of her cable was required to complete the distance to Bushehr, and a messenger was sent in a native boat to summon the towing-steamer "Semiramis" from Bāsīdu, where she was then coaling. Shatvār islet was passed on the forenoon of the 20th; and on the evening of 21st the vessels had reached a point 35 miles south of Bushehr. The following day was spent in transferring staff and apparatus from the "Tweed," whose cable was now expended, to the "Assaye;" and in the early morning of the 23rd progress was resumed, the time of departure being so arranged as to ensure arrival off Bushehr by daylight. An anchorage 3 miles off Rishehr was reached at 9 A.M. on the 23rd, where, with the able assistance of Colonel Pelly, Resident in the Persian Gulf, the political and other arrangements on shore were completed during the time occupied in landing the cable; the special steamer "Amberwitch" conveyed the shore-end of the cable from the anchorage to within quarter of a mile of the beach. On the evening of the 24th of March communication was opened between Rishehr and India.

Khor-ash-Sham to Bushehr, March 1864

As fair weather prevailed and its duration was uncertain, no time was lost, after reaching Būshehr, in undertaking the continuation to Fāo. On the 25th of March 1864, one end of the cable remaining on board the "Assaye" was landed at Rīshehr with the assistance of the "Amberwitch," while the steamer "Victoria" proceeded direct to the neighbourhood of Fāo carrying Lieutenant Stiffe, I N., who, as already mentioned, had made a special survey of the waters there about a year previously. It would have been a simple matter to carry the cable

Būshehr to Fāo, March-April 1864. over the bar of the Shatt-al-'Arab and so up the river to Fāo; but the shallowness of the water on the bar would have exposed it to the risk of injury from passing vessels and from the anchors of native craft, and it was accordingly determined to deflect it for a short distance up Khor 'Abdullah and to carry it thence over or through the great mud flats to Fāo.

This proved to be the most difficult operation in the whole work of laying the cable. The "Assaye," which had left Rishehr on the afternoon of the 26th March, arrived soon after dawn on the following day at the entrance of Khor 'Abdullah and was towed up that inlet paying out her cable in a depth of water considerably greater than would have been obtained had the Shatt-al-'Arab route been adopted. On the evening of the 27th the vessels anchored, in 5 fathoms, at a point in Khor Abdullah due south of Fao. Daylight revealed terra firma at a distance of some 10 miles to the northward, and subsequent observations showed that 3 or 4 miles of the intervening belt consisted of level. semi-liquid mud to which a further extent of 1½ or 2 miles was added at low water, while off the foreshore the water was so shallow that not even small boats could approach, in any state of the tide, within half a mile of the uncovered portion. At the first arrival of the vessels the weather was favourable, but before the operations were completed a strong south-east wind arose, which drove the sea inland for a considerable distance over the flats and greatly increased the difficulty of the landing operations. On the 28th of March Colonel Stewart, Sir C. Bright and Colonel Goldsmid left Khor 'Abdullah in the "Victoria" and, crossing the bar of the Shatt-al-'Arab, entered the river and steamed up to Fao where the R.I.M.S. "Comet," with Mr. Consul Johnstone from Basrah on board, was found at anchor.

After an inspection of the ground between Fao and Khor 'Abdullah it was decided to dig a trench 21 feet deep from Fao for upwards of 31 miles to the landing place on Khor 'Abdullah and to lay the cable in it. For this purpose the requisite amount of cable was cut into lengths and brought ashore from the "Comet" at a place on the bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab, a mile to the south of Fao, whence it was dragged by dint of great exertions to the trench that had been prepared. labourers were Arabs from both sides of the Shatt-al-'Arab, a wild and somewhat unmanageable crew, but under Colonel Goldsmid's skilful guidance this portion of the work was completed in ten days between the 30th of March and the 8th of April, the number of the workmen increasing from about 200 at the commencement of operations to over 350 upon the last day. On the 5th of April a cable was brought ashore from the "Amberwitch," lying as close inshore as she could in Khor 'Abdullah, was carried as far as possible landwards in small boats, and was stretched by manual labour over the remainder of the distance. The "Amberwitch" then steamed off, paying out the rest of the cable as she went, to the spot where the end of the cable from Bushehr had been dropped by the "Assaye;" and the two were spliced together.

A fault which occurred between Khor 'Abdullah and Büshehr on the 29th of March had been located on the 1st and remedied on the 2nd of

April; and so, on the 8th of April 1864, communication was opened between Fāo and India. The gaps, however, which existed in the alternative Turkish and Persian lines in the neighbourhood of Qūrnah and Khānaqīn respectively, still prevented direct communication between India and Europe.

A cable supplementary to the land line between Gwādar and Karāchi was successfully laid under the superintendence of Mr. Webb, between the 28th of April and the 15th of May 1864, from Gwādar to Cape Monze (Rās Munazi), whence a land line, 24 miles in length, had been constructed to Karāchi. The cable ships employed on this duty were the "Assaye" and "Cospatrick" assisted by the steamers "Zenobia" "Amberwitch" and "Sind." Here we may add that in November 1864, the cable having been chafed through in rocky ground off Cape Monze, the land line was abolished and the cable was carried direct to Manorah, whence it was prolonged by a short land line to the Karāchi office; and that finally, in June 1866, this short line was replaced by a harbour cable.

Auxiliary cable laid from Gwādar to Karāchi, April-May 1864.

The Gulf cable of 1864 was probably one of the best ever manufactured: its guttapercha was found to be in excellent preservation after 20 years of submersion. Interruptions have been due for the most part to friction on bad ground, to decay of the iron guards, to the attacks of teredos, to stabs of sword-fish and to the bites of other fish, and one was occasioned by the struggles of a whale which became entangled in the cable between Gwādar and Karāchi and was drowned. The total cost of this cable was £411,751 or about £358 per nautical mile.

Quality of the 1864 cable.

Completion of the Indo-European system of telegraphs, 1864-65.

After finishing his work in the Gulf, Colonel Stewart visited Baghdad in hopes of accelerating the completion of the land line between Basrah and Baghdad, which, as before related, was delayed by political complications; but his visit had no immediate result. Colonel Stewart returned to India from Baghdad in April 1864, and soon afterwards left Bombay for Constantinople, where he arrived in July. He was joined there in August by Colonel F. Goldsmid, already mentioned, who had come from the Persian Gulf by way of Turkish 'Iraq and Asia Minor, inspecting the Turkish land line by the way. Colonel Stewart remained at Constantinople, engaged in promoting the interests of the Indo-European telegraph, until the end of the year, when he was taken seriously ill. He passed away on the 16th of January 1865 at the early age of 32, worn out by the mental and physical strain of the preceding two years and by the effects of numerous illnesses and accidents. Colonel Stewart was an officer who commanded in the highest degree the confidence of his superiors and affectionate loyalty of his subordinates.

Death of Colonel Stewart at Constantinople, 16th January 1865.

On the 27th of January 1865, or less than a fortnight after Colonel Stewart's death, the Indo-European line was completed and a message

Opening of the line, 27th January 1865. was successfully despatched from the point of final junction, near Qurnah, to England on the one side and to India on the other. In the course of the next month a few telegrams struggled through from India to England, one of which was sent by the Duke of Brabant, then travelling in the East; but the line was handicapped by the inefficiency of the staff on the Turkish and Persian sections; and the wretched state of telegraphic communication between Constantinople and the rest of Europe was an additional bar to successful working. At this time a message ordinarily took not less than 5 days to reach London from Calcutta. Colonel Stewart, when overtaken by illness, was engaged in impressing upon the Ottoman Government the necessity of a double wire for the Indo-European service across the Turkish dominions, and of an improvement of the staff employed upon the Turkish sections of the line.

Colonel Stewart succeeded by Colonel Goldsmid, 1865. On Colonel Stewart's demise Major Champain, British Director of Telegraphs in Persia, succeeded temporarily to the headship of the Indo-European telegraphs; and Major Champain's place at Tehrān was taken by Captain Murdoch Smith. Major Champain proceeded to Europe viā Baghdād and Constantinople and reached London on the 20th of April. A month later Colonel Goldsmid was summoned to England from Constantinople, where he had been employed on telegraphic business for a considerable period beginning before Colonel Stewart's death, and was permanently appointed to the "Chief Direction of the Government Indo-European Telegraphs" in succession to Colonel Stewart, Major Champain thenceforward holding the post of Assistant Director-in-Chief and being in charge of the current duties during Colonel Goldsmid's frequent absences from London.

Anglo-Persian Telegraph Convention of 1865 and doubling of the Būshehr-Tehrān-Khānaqīn wire.

Need for a regular Convention. The first incident of Colonel Goldsmid's Directorship-in-Chief was his mission to Persia to assist in negotiating a regular Telegraph Convention. On the one hand, the agreements which governed the situation in Persia were of a merely provisional nature, and the Persian Government were displaying some impatience to do away with British agency and control and to assume charge of the entire arrangements; on the other, in view of the unsatisfactory working of the Turkish telegraphs, there was a prospect that part at least of the through traffic might be diverted to the Perso-Russian systems which were now connected at Julfah; and for both of these reasons it was imperative that the telegraphic rights of Britain in Persia should be placed on a clearer and more permanent basis.

Conclusion and terms of the Convention, 23rd November 1865. Colonel Goldsmid reached Tehran on the 1st of August 1865, and, during his stay of four months there, a satisfactory Convention was concluded, which was signed on the 23rd November 1865.

This Convention provided for the addition of a second wire on the line connecting Bushehr and Khānaqīn vid Tehrān upon terms, as regarded

the supply of imported materials and technical assistance, similar to those contained in the agreement of 1863. The new wire was to be reserved exclusively for international messages sent in European languages, and, should the amount of through traffic at any time exceed its capacity of transmission, the old wire – ordinarily to be used for the internal service of Persia—might be requisitioned to supplement it.

The employment of a British Telegraph Officer with a staff of not more than 50 members, exclusive of families, was sanctioned for the purpose of opening communication by the new wire and of instructing Persian signallers in telegraphy. A Persian official was to be nominal head of the new, as well as of the older line; but the authority of the British officer in executive charge was carefully safeguarded in all essential particulars.

The line was divided for purposes of protection into six sections, each of which was to be placed in charge of a Yāvar with horsemen under his orders; the Yāvar was to comply so far as practicable with the suggestions of the British Telegraph Officer. *

Rules were prescribed for the keeping and adjustment of the accounts; a tariff of rates was fixed; and it was agreed that, should the receipts in any year exceed the sum of 30,000 Tūmāns, the surplus should be handed over to the British Government as a contribution to the cost of the establishment paid by them. The working of the line should be governed by the Paris Telegraph Convention of 1865, except in so far as the regulations thereby established might conflict with the customs of Persia, or with the terms of the Convention itself.

Finally the Convention was to remain in force for 5 years only from the date on which a telegram was first despatched by the new wire; and it might be terminated even earlier, on its being proved to the satisfaction of the Persian chief of Telegraphs and the British Telegraph Officer, that the Persian staff had become thoroughly proficient in their duties. On the termination of the Convention the new line was to be made over in toto to the Persian Government.

The hopes of the British Government, who had aimed at acquiring the Persian sections of the Indo-European line by purchase, were thus disappointed; but for immediate and practical purposes something had been gained.

On the 2nd of September 1866 the "Hastings" carrying the material for the erection of the second wire arrived at Büshehr, and operations were started at once; but, in consequence of the physical and still more of the administrative obstacles by which it was retarded, the work was not finished until the summer of 1867. An instructive commentary upon the expressed desire of the Persian Government to keep the entire undertaking in their own hands was furnished by the fact that, in the end, the entire current expenses were "defrayed by Her Majesty's Government in the first instance, the amount thus expended being

Doubling of the wire, 1866-67.

^{*} This system may have been tried under the Convention, but it no longer exists. The wires are now (1905) looked after by mounted and unmounted Ghulams, who are specially trained to telegraph work and are altogether under the orders of the British staff.

recognised as a debt by the Persian Government to be paid in instalments or otherwise from the receipts of the international traffic ".

Duplication of the Indo-European line between Gwadar and Bushehr by means of a land line and a cable, 1865-69.

Reasons for duplication.

The operation of doubling the means of communication between Gwādar and Būshehr—the only portion of the line under British control which now remained single—was retarded by political difficulties and attended by an extraordinary series of natural mishaps. Attention had been drawn to the unreliability of a single line by a temporary interruption of the Gulf Cable in 1865; and the necessity of a second cable in order to cope with the increasing traffic had also been felt. It was moreover indispensable to prepare for the additional strain about to be thrown on the Persian Gulf lines by the completion of the Indo-European Company's line, to which we shall presently refer.

Alternative schemes considered.

The question of duplication first arose at Tehran during the progress of the negotiations which resulted in the Convention of 1865; and Colonel Goldsmid, in leaving the Persian capital for Bombay at the end of the year, arranged to travel by land as far as Gwadar and to make a telegraphic reconnaissance of the country on his way. He was accompanied on this journey by Major Murdoch Smith, who had now permanently suceeded Major Champain as Director of the Indo-European telegraphs in Persia. The two officers journeyed together as far as Kirman, where they separated to meet again at Chahbar, Colonel Goldsmid taking a route by Bampur, and Major Murdoch Smith one by Bandar 'Abbas, No insuperable obstacle to the construction of a telegraph line between Gwadar and Isfahan by either of these routes was found to exist; but it was suggested that a route preferable to either might be found by way of Bandar Abbās and Shīrāz. No one of these alternatives, however, was destined to be carried into execution; and, in the end, the object in view was attained by a different means.

Anglo-Persian Convention for execution of the scheme, 2nd April 1868. To assist in the conclusion of a fresh Convention for a telegraph between Gwādar and some point on the Būshehr-Tehrān line, Colonel Goldsmid, who had meanwhile returned to England by way of India, was again deputed to Tehrān and arrived there in February 1867. No agreement with the Persian Government was reached during his stay at Tehrān; but the negotiations continued after his departure for India and thence for England; and eventually, on the 2nd of April 1868, a Convention binding the parties for a period of 20 years was signed on behalf of Britain and Persia. It provided for the construction and efficient working by the British Government of a land line from Gwādar to a point between Gwādar and Bandar 'Abbās, for the lending by the Persian Government of their good offices and authority in support of the enterprise, and for the annual payment of a sum of 3,000 Tūmāns by the British to the Persian Government on account of the facilities granted by the latter within Persian territory. It was decided to utilize the

concession thus obtained by constructing a land line from Gwādar to Jāshk which should be continued by a new cable from Jāshk to Būshehr.

The cable required was ordered from England, but delay occurred in manufacturing and despatching it; and the "Calcutta" and "Tweed," on which it was shipped, were not ready to sail until January 1869. On the 8th of February 1869 the "Calcutta" came into collision with a Russian barque off the Lizard and was so severely damaged that she was abandoned by her crew and was brought back to Plymouth in a sinking condition. The "Tweed" was delayed while the "Calcutta" was under repair, and the two vessels did not reach Bombay until the 21st of September 1869. Meanwhile the Peninsular and Oriental Company's steamer "Carnatic," carrying the members of the cable-laying staff, was totally wrecked in the Red Sea; and, though the party escaped with their lives, one of their number, Mr. Latimer Clark, met with a severe injury and all their instruments and papers were lost. A start was finally made from Bombay on the 19th of October 1869, the "Tweed" being towed by the British India Company's steamer "Dacca," and the "Calcutta" by the Bombay Marine steamer "Earl Canning." The expedition was headed by Major Champain, Assistant Director-in-Chief, who was accompanied by Lieutenant Stiffe and Mr. Latimer Clark. On the 27th of October one end of the "Tweed's" cable was brought into an office which—as will subsequently be explained—had been opened at Jashk in 1868; and by the night of the 29th all the cable on board the "Tweed" had been submerged and had completed the line to a point nearly opposite Qais island. The "Calcutta" was then brought up from Lingeh, and operations were resumed under favourable conditions on the 31st. But the ill-fortune which clung to the second Gulf cable was not yet at an end, and on the 1st of November the "Dacca," "Calcutta" and "Amberwitch" were struck by a sudden squall and were for some time in difficulties; a steam cutter was lost, the crew however being saved; and a steam barge which accompanied the ships nearly shared the fate of the cutter. On the 2nd of November another violent gale was encountered, and the "Calcutta" was struck by lightning but suffered no damage. Before sunset on the 3rd of November Bushehr was reached; and on the 6th communication was established between that place and Jashk.

> Character of the 1869 cable.

Laying of a

second cable from Jashk

to Bushehr.

The cable of 1869 was of indiarubber and cost £223,194 or about £429 per nautical mile. It has not resisted decay so well as the guttapercha cable of 1864; but this is partly due to the accident to the "Calcutta," in which 70 knots of the cable were thrown overboard and damaged, and to its having been laid too tightly. In places where it was stretched across submarine hollows instead of being allowed to reach the bottom, it became coated with barnacles to the thickness of a man's body and was eventually ruptured by its own weight.

It remains to describe the construction of the land line between Gwādar and Jāshk, which was the necessary complement of the new cable. The country to be traversed was examined in the winter of 1868-69 by Colonel Goldsmid, who came from Europe for the purpose; and political arrangements for the protection of the line, involving the payment of subsidies, were concluded by him with the local chiefs and

Construction of a land line from Gwadar to Jashk, 1869 were approved by the Government of Bombay on the 8th of June 1869. The actual work of construction was carried out in the summer of 1869 by a body of 400 native employés directed by Mr. Walker, a Superintendent of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, and was completed on the 15th of August. Water was scarce, the heat was terrific, and the natives of the country gave some trouble; but the whole distance of about 330 miles was covered in 69 working days.

Diversion of the Gwādar-Būshehr cable from Telegraph Islet to Jāshk and Hanjām in 1868.

Objects of the transfer.

It is now necessary to revert to an important change in the course of the first Gulf cable which had been carried out while the arrangements for laying the second were in progress. It had early become apparent that Telegraph Islet in Khor-ash-Sham was a most ineligible site for a station, partly on account of the extreme heat to which two members of the small staff succumbed within two years, and partly on account of the hostile attitude of the neighbouring tribesmen, which necessitated the constant presence of a gun-boat of the Bombay Marine. Telegraph Islet was at the time of its abolition an important repeating station, while Gwadar, in consequence of its pestilential climate which rendered the maintenance of a large staff there inadvisable, was used as a station of observation only.* In doing away with the Telegraph Islet station it was found necessary to substitute for it two new offices at Jashk and Hanjam on the opposite side of the Gulf, the office on Hanjam taking the place of Telegraph Islet as a repeating station; these were required because the instruments of the day were not sufficiently sensitive to work direct between Jashk and Bushehr, a distance of over 500 knots.

Execution of the work.

The difficult task of substituting the new line for the old without serious interruption of traffic was carried out with remarkable expedition by Mr. Walton, Director of the Persian Gulf Section, assisted by Captain Stiffe, late of the Indian Navy, as engineer. Between the beginning of October and the end of November 1868 the cable to form the new insertion was laid, and the points at which the old cable was to be cut for junction with it were marked by means of buoys. A small diversion of the old cable to a temporary office at Jāshk, which it passed at a distance of only 2 miles to seaward, was effected on the 3rd of December

^{*} A "repeating" or "translating" station is an office in which messages are taken down by clerks and re-transmitted by them, or in which the original currents of electricity act rpon an instrument called a "repeater" or "translator" and cause it to transmit onward, automatically, currents similar in direction and equal in duration, but greater in strength, than the currents reaching it. Intermediate repeating stations are required when, owing to distance or climatic conditions, the loss of strength in the original currents is so considerable as to make direct working between the termini impossible. A "station of observation" or "control station" is an office which is, as a rule, disconnected from through wires, but is joined up at stated times daily to observe the state of communication; such offices, however, as also repeating offices, accept any local traffic that may be tendered.

with an interruption to traffic of only 12 hours. The old cable was then brought to the surface to the eastward of Tunb Island, where on the 9th of December it was cut and the portion of it running towards Bushehr connected with the new length. The "Amberwitch" then hastened to a point off Kuh-i-Mubarak where the other juncture was effected in a similar fashion, traffic having been suspended upon this occasion for 521 hours only, of which 21 were occupied by the "Ambermitch" in steaming from the one end of the new section to the other. Meanwhile the staff and materials at Telegraph Islet were smartly transferred to Jashk; and by noon on the 11th of December 1868 Jashk was in full communication with Bushehr through the new cable, as well as with India through the old.

At first there was no office on Hanjam and the two ends of cable landed there were, as a temporary measure, directly united. Subsequently however a station was established at the north end of the island, and the teakwood house which had sheltered the staff at Telegraph Islet was re-erected there. The island of Hanjam was claimed by the Sultan of 'Omān, but the British authorities of the day regarded it as belonging to Persia, and on the 29th of March 1868 an authorisation for the establishment of a telegraph station on Hanjam had been accepted by them from the Persian Government.

Persian authorisation of the Hanjam station, 29th March 1868.

The boundaries and status of the telegraph station at Jashk were first formally defined in an Agreement between the British and Persian Governments dated 25th February 1887, which appears to have been modified, in so far as the boundaries were concerned, by a local arrangement made in the following year. The telegraph officials and their "true, positive and salaried servants" were expressly exempted from payment of customs dues, whether on goods from abroad or on supplies from the interior, and they were debarred from affording sanctuary to Persian subjects unconnected with them.

Anglo-Persian Agreement relating to the Jashk station, 25th February 1887.

Provision of an Indo-European line entirely through Persia, alternative to that through Turkey, 1865-1870.

Soon after the establishment of communication between India and Bad working Europe by way of Baghdad it became evident that the working of the Turkish sections, that is of the lines from Fao to Baghdad, from Khanaqin to Baghdad and from Baghdad by Constantinople to the Austrian frontier, was hopelessly inefficient and was likely to remain so. In 1866 messages for India sometimes did not reach Constantinople until more than 10 days after their despatch from London; and a two months' visit paid by Colonel Goldsmid to the Turkish capital in 1866, while on his way to Tehran for the second time, was productive of no good results; indeed the working of the Turkish lines was never more deplorable than it became at the end of 1866 and beginning of 1867, and the irregularity of the line was even more fatal to commercial success than

of the

its slowness. Through telegrams were delayed for uncertain periods in the interests of purely local traffic, and messages frequently arrived in a much mutilated form after being received and retransmitted 12 or 14 times by signallers of different nationalities. These considerations had moved Major Champain, who, as already mentioned, remained in virtual charge of the Indo-European telegraphs during Colonel Goldsmid's absence from headquarters, to recommend in 1865 the establishment of an alternative main route through Persia and Russia, and to press in 1867 for direct wires through Turkish territory to facilitate the Indo-European traffic.

The Siemens Concessions, 1868.

In the project for a Russo-Persian line between Europe and India the Indo-European Telegraph Department were supported by the British firm of Messrs. Siemens Brothers, London, who were prepared to take an important share in the enterprise, and the scheme was also favourably regarded by the Russian and Persian authorities; the Russian system, it should be observed, had been linked with the Indo-European by means of a line between Julfah and Tehran, constructed by Persia towards the end of 1864 and improved, with the assistance of the Russian Government, in 1866. A proposal to develope the Persian line, which was then in a very inefficient state and inferior in working even to the Turkish line, so as to meet the requirements of international traffic, was first broached in 1865, and in 1867 it began to assume practical shape; but the matter was one of some delicacy, and the British Government were anxious not to give umbrage to Turkey, with whom a telegraphic convention had but lately been concluded. In April 1867 Major Champain was authorised to discuss matters at St. Petersburg with the Russian and Persian Directors-General of Telegraphs and with representatives of the German firm of Siemens and Halske, Berlin and St. Petersburg, and of the Electric and International Telegraph Company; he did so, and on the 1st of May, only four days after the assembling of the conference, he was able to telegraph to Colonel Goldsmid at Tehrān—"Affaire Siemens arrangée." The agreement reached was of a most comprehensive kind. It included a concession from the Prussian Government, dated the 26th August 1867, for the construction and working of telegraph lines from London to the North German coast and thence to the Russian frontier; a concession from the Russian Government, dated 1st September 1867, for the Russian sections of the work; and a concession from the Persian Government, dated 11th January 1868, for the erection and working of a line of telegraph between Julfah on the Russian frontier and Tehran: the concessionaires were Messrs. Siemens Brothers and Messrs. Siemens and Halske. The route arranged was from London by Lowestoft, Emden, Berlin, Warsaw, Odessa, Kertch, Tiflis and Tabriz to Tehran. Twenty-five years was the term of each of these three concessions; and in the case of the Persian grant this period was to be reckoned from the date on which the line was opened for traffic. It is not necessary to notice here in detail the terms even of the Persian concession, for they had little direct bearing on the telegraph system of the Persian Gulf; suffice it to say that, in the event of the Anglo-Persian Telegraph Convention of 23rd November 1865 not being renewed on its expiration, the Tehran-Bushehr line was to be transferred to the concessionaires. In the summer of 1868 the

Tehrān end of the Perso-Russian line was transferred from a Russian to a British staff.

On the 24th of May 1869 a fresh agreement was concluded between the Persian Government and the Indo-European Telegraph Company, incorporated on the 8th of April 1868, which had now, as permitted by an article in the original concession, taken the place of the firms of Siemens. This second agreement, which was due to resolutions adopted by the Vienna Telegraphic Conference of 1868 in favour of a reduced tariff, altered the financial arrangements between the Company and the Persian Government. It also conveyed to the grantees a monopoly for the construction of a line for international traffic between Shīrāz and Bandar 'Abbās, a privilege of which no advantage was taken and which was annulled in a subsequent agreement dated 12th August 1882.

The Indo-European Telegraph Company's Persian Concession, 1869.

Through communication between London and Tehran by means of the Indo-European Telegraph Company's line was opened on the 31st of January 1870.

Opening of the all-Persian route to Europe, 31st January 1870.

International telegraphic service in the Turkish domininons, 1867-68.

In 1867 persevering efforts were made by the British representatives at Constantinople to secure some amelioration in the working of the Turkish sections of the Indo-European line, particularly on the side between Constantinople and Europe. The exclusive use of one wire between Constantinople and Vienna was requested, but was refused; and the negotiations ended with a promise by the Ottoman Government that two wires between Constantinople and Vienna,—one by Bosnia, the other by Servia,—would be especially affected to the international service, and that absolute priority would be given to Indo-European messages upon whichever of the two happened to be at the time in the better order.

Attempts to improve the working of the Turkish line, 1867.

The line from Fāo to Baghdād having proved adequate for as much traffic as could pass over the other sections in Turkish territory, the alternative line between Tehrān and Baghdād viā Khānaqīn was abandoned, for international purposes, about March 1868. In 1869 the portion situated in Persia was found to have been to a great extent mischievously destroyed; and some time elapsed before its adoption as a local line by the Persian Government.

Abandonment of the Tehran-Baghdad line, 1868.

The Vienna Telegraphic Conference of 1868 and its results.

The Telegraphic Conference which assembled at Vienna on the 12th of June and sat till the 22nd of July 1868 was attended by Colonel

^{*} It may be noted here that the Indo-European Telegraph Company is practically a Bussian Company, its original concessions having been obtained through the Russian Minister, as also all renewals and extensions of those concessions.

Goldsmid and Colonel Glover, R.E., on behalf of the Indo-European and the Indian Telegraph Departments respectively.

The principal results of the Conference, so far as the Indo-European Telegraph Department and Company were concerned, were a marked reduction of the Indo-European tariff and the application of that tariff to eight recognised routes, five of which were "Indo-Ottoman" passing through Fāo, and three "Russo-Persian" passing through Būshehr. Of the first group, one route traversing Turkey, Servia, Austria, Switzerland and France was recommended by the Conference for Indo-European business; and the countries interested accordingly entered into a Convention among themselves for its special utilization.

In 1869, the state of through communication being still far from perfect, the Director-in-Chief of Indo-European telegraphs moved the Director of the Telegraph Office at Berne, who had been nominated by the Vienna Conference to be referee and secretary in such matters, to circularise the different powers adhering to the Vienna Convention. Satisfactory replies were received from a majority of the governments addressed; but Turkey, the real defaulter, while making many fair professions and attempting to cast the blame of her own shortcomings upon other governments, continued to block the way of reform.

With effect from the 1st of January 1869 the tariff, which in 1868 was £5-0-0 per 20 words by the Turkish and £4-2-6 by the Persian route, was reduced to £2-17-0 per 20 words and £1-10-0 per 10 words upon both lines.

Political and general history of the Indo-European Telegraph Department and Company, 1868-1904.

Control of the Department transferred to the Government of India, 1871.

Virtual abandonment of the Turkish route, 1871. In 1863 the Government of Bombay had been invested with full responsibility for the telegraph operations in Turkish 'Irāq and the Persian Gulf; and this arrangement continued until 1871, when the control of the Indo-European Telegraph Department was, with the sanction of the Secretary of State, transferred from the Government of Bombay to the Government of India.

The Convention of 1864 with Turkey was not made for any fixed period and is still in force. The working of the Turkish line continued inefficient after 1868; and from 1871 the Turkish route was practically abandoned for international service, the bulk of the traffic being thereafter divided between the competing Red Sea and Russo-Persian systems. Between 1865 and 1873 the average time taken by messages between Lonuon and Karachi decreased on the Russo-Persian line from 17 days 5 hours and 5 minutes, to 3 hours and 9 minutes, whereas on the Turkish line the improvement was from 6 days 8 hours and 44 minutes to 19 hours and 12 minutes only. So lately as 1904-05 the interruptions on the Turkish line between Fāo and Constantinople amounted in the course of the year to more than 65 days, against a total of 1 day 5 hours

and 50 minutes on the Indo-European Department lines between Karachi and Tehran.

The Anglo-Persian Convention of 1865, which expired on the 12th of August 1872, was prolonged for a period of three months by an Agreement executed on the 19th of June 1872; and, on the expiration of the extended period, it was replaced by a new Convention, dated 2nd December 1872. Major Champain, now Director-in-Chief, assisted in the negotiations at Tehrān, whither he had proceeded for the purpose.

Anglo-Persian Telegraph Convention, 2nd December 1872.

Among other matters the new Convention provided for the erection by the British Government of a third wire between Tehrān and Būshehr; and it was arranged that, after the completion of this wire, the first wire, set up in 1864, should be reserved for local use and be worked by employés of the Persian Government occupying rooms provided by the Persian Government and separate from the rooms used by the staff of the British Department. In accordance with the recommendations of Major Champain, who had personally visited Persia in 1870-71 to satisfy himself of the necessity for a change, iron standards were to be *substituted between Tehrān and Būshehr for the existing wooden posts.

As regards receipts from the Indo-European through traffic, it was agreed that the Persian Government should receive either a fixed subsidy of 12,000 Tūmāns per annum or a royalty of two francs per 20 words, the remainder of the profits being shared by the Indo-European Telegraph Department and the Company of the same name in such manner as they might arrange between themselves. In respect of receipts from messages originating or terminating in Persia a different mode of distribution was arranged.

The maintenance of the line, in which were included repairs and the appointment, control and payment of line guards, was to remain in the hands of the British Director; but the Persian Government were to pay 1,000 Tūmāns a year as a contribution under this head, and in case of wilful damage the cost of the repairs was to be defrayed by the Persian Government. The debt of the Persian to the British Government on account of telegraph construction and services, which now amounted to £47,217, was to be undertaken by the Indo-European Telegraph Company and discharged by them in 24 equal instalments.

The new Convention should apply primarily to the Tehrān-Būshehr line; but, in event of the British Director desiring at any time to resume charge of the Tehrān-Khānaqīn line, it should apply equally to the same, the questions of tariff and method of account upon that section remaining however a matter for special arrangement. The Convention itself was to hold good until the 1st of January 1895, when it was to cease, and the whole of the wires were then to be made over absolutely to the Persian Government.

On the 3rd of July 1887, by virtue of an Agreement, the term of the Convention of 1872 was prolonged to the 31st of January 1905. On the 7th January 1902, a further extension to the 31st January 1925 was

Extension of the term of the Convention to 1905 and 1925.

^{*} The Persian Government undertook to pay 10,000 Tumans in ten annual instalments for the new iron posts. This item was included in the amount finally paid off by the Indo-European Telegraph Company—see below in the text.

obtained, also by an Agreement; and on this occasion the Convention of 1868, relating to the Gwadar-Bandar 'Abbas land line, was renewed to the same date.

Renewal of the privileges of the Indo-European Telegraph Company, 1882, 1891 and 1906. Tehrān-Mashhad line.

Fresh Agreements were made between the Persian Government and the Indo-European Telegraph Company on the 12th of August 1882 and the 10th of January 1891, by the latter of which the concession enjoyed by the Company was extended to the 31st of January 1925; and by yet another Agreement, concluded on the 14th of June 1906, the term of the Agreement of 1891 was extended by 20 years, viz., to 1945.

Since the 14th of December 1885 the Indo-European Telegraph Department have been responsible for the maintenance of a line. constructed by the Persians at some earlier period, between Tehran and Mashhad. The arrangement does not depend upon any formal agreement and is understood to be terminable at the wish of either the Indian or the Persian Government, both of which pay annual contributions towards the expenses of maintenance.

Observance of the Convention of 1872 and subsequent agreements.

With a few modifications only, introduced when agreements were renewed or at other times by the consent of the parties, the Convention of 1872 was observed to the end in its original form. As the share of the Persian Government in the proceeds of the through traffic, an annual sum of 12,000 Tumans was at first paid; but later the amount was fixed by agreement at the equivalent of 120,000 francs; and on each occasion of the Indo-European Telegraph Company's concessions being extended, in 1882 and 1891, this amount was enhanced by 10,000 francs. The gross receipts from through traffic, after deduction of the annual sum of 120,000 francs which is payable to the Persian Government, are shared between the Indo-European Telegraph Department and the Indo-European Telegraph Company; and the Company is responsible for the payment to Persia, out of its own share, of the two annual increments of 10,000 francs imposed in 1882 and 1891. For three years from the conclusion of the Convention, the Persian share in the income from international messages originating or terminating in Persia was leased to Great Britain at a fixed rate of 2,000 Tumans per annum; but thereafter Persia was credited instead, as permitted by the Convention, with two-thirds of the actual income from this source. After 1887 the payment by Persia of 1,000 Tumans a year towards the pay of lineguards was remitted for special reasons.

The debt undertaken by the Indo-European Telegraph Company was finally discharged in February 1884.

With effect from the 1st April 1899, direct control of the Indo-European Telegraph Department was assumed by the Secretary of State for India, in place of the Government of India by whom it had been exercised since 1871. During the period from 16th February 1888 to 31st March 1893 the Department was under the Director-General of State, 1893. Telegraphs in India; at all other times it has been under the direct management of a Director-in-Chief of its own.

> The extension of the Gulf telegraphs to include Bandar 'Abbas in 1904-05 and the construction of a central Persian line from Kashan to Karāchi in 1902-04 are dealt with further on.

Control of the Department transferred to the Secretary of

Financial and administrative history of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, 1868-1907.

In 1869 the principal objects of the Indo-European Telegraph Department were economy and retrenchment. Colonel Goldsmid, desiring to further these ends and considering that the head of the Department, now that all initial difficulties had been overcome, no longer required an Assistant, resigned his appointment in favour of Major Champain, who thereafter conducted the affairs of the department single-handed.

Reduction of expenditure, 1869.

On the 26th of March 1870 the British Indian Submarine Telegraph Company's cable connecting Bombay and Suez was completed, and communication with England by way of Malta, Marseilles and Paris was immediately opened. On the 14th of June 1870, the Falmouth, Gibraltar and Malta Telegraph Company having also finished their work, cable communication between India and England viâ the Red Sea became continuous but for a short section in Egypt, where there was a land line from Suez to Alexandria. The Indo-European traffic was thus distributed among three instead of between two main routes; and a reconsideration of the tariff fixed by the Vienna Conference in 1868 was demanded, on the ground that its lowness might oblige the commercial companies interested in the Russo-Persian and Red Sea routes to withdraw from the field, leaving the inefficient but state-aided line across the Turkish dominions to cope with the whole of the traffic. The companies had in the meantime raised their rates to £4-10-0 per 20 words; but the Turkish line still secured 18 per cent. of the traffic on account of its greater cheapness, and the companies' lines continued to work at a loss.

Effect of completion of the Red Sea and Mediterranean cables, 1870.

A Telegraph Sub-Conference, attended by Major Champain and by Colonel Robinson, R. E., Director-General of Indian Telegraphs, was accordingly held at Berne in September and October 1870, by which it was recommended that the rate by the Turkish line should be increased to 112.50 francs or £4-10-0, a change to which the Ottoman Administration were induced to agree. A Telegraph Conference which sat at Rome in December 1870 and January 1871 was attended by the same British delegates, Major Champain on this occasion appearing for Persia also; and on the advice of this body the rate for the unit message of 20 words was reduced from 112.50 francs to 100 francs or £4-0-0. After an informal Conference held at Vienna in 1873, at which the Directorin-Chief of the Indo-European Telegraph Department met the Directors-General of the Russian and Prussian systems, the rate was again altered with effect from the 15th of November 1873, to 50 francs for 10 words with a special charge for each word over ten. After a Conference at St. Petersburg in 1875, and with effect from the 1st of January 1876, the rate was made 5.50 francs per word vid Tehran or Suez and 5 francs viâ Turkey; from the 1st of April 1880 it was raised to 5.60 francs

Modifications of tariff.

per word on the non-Turkish routes; from the 1st of July 1886, after a Conference at Berlin in 1885, it was reduced to 5.00 and 4.50 francs per word; from the 1st of March 1902 it was still further reduced to 2s. 6d. per word; and on the 1st of August 1905 it underwent a final reduction to 2s. by the Suez or Tehrān and 1s. 10d. by the Turkish route. The two last reductions were made under a guarantee that the Government of India would bear a share in such loss of revenue as might result during a period of 10 years.

Growth of competing systems and distribution of traffic.

After the completion of what may be called the first through cable between India and Europe in 1870, second and third cables were provided, a section at a time, between Suez and Bombay, the whole triplicate system being finally perfected in 1902.

The table below explains the distribution of the Indian traffic over these lines by percentages taken at three different periods:—

Route.	1 871-7 2.	1887-88.	1905-06.
Red Sea	52.81	64 ·01	50.88
Persian	2 9 ·1 1	34·5 0	47.99
Turkish	18.08	1.49	1.13

Of trans-Indian traffic, 97.53 per cent. is now carried by the Suez line, 2.08 by the Tehrān line, and only 0.39 by the Baghdād line.

Persian telegraph line opened from Burăzjān into 'Arabistān, 1891. It may be noted here, though the enterprise was a purely Persian one and had no direct connection with the operations of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, that a system of telegraph lines connecting Ahwāz in 'Arabistān with Dizfūl, Shūshtar and Muhammareh in the same province, was completed in August 1891, and was connected, early in 1892, with Burāzjān on the Būshehr-Shīrāz line of the Indo-European Telegraph Department by a wire from Ahwāz passing viā Rāmuz, Behbehān, Dīlam and Rīg. An attempt had previously been made by the Persian Government, in 1878, to connect Shushtar telegraphically with Tehrān by way of Dizfūl. In May 1892 the Persian Telegraph Office at Muhammareh was undermined by the tide and collapsed. The 'Arabistān system of Persian Telegraphs is maintained, however, to the present day; but the working is inefficient, and long interruptions of communication are of frequent occurrence.

Modifications of the telegraph system in the Gulf, 1869-1907.

Alterations and extensions of the Persian Gulf telegraphs, since their general completion in 1869, have not been many; but some of them have been important.

Removal from Būshehr to Rīshehr, 1877. The telegraph office at Büshehr was at first in the town, and was connected with the landing-place at Rīshehr by an aërial line 7 miles in length. In February 1865 a double-cored shore-end was substituted between Büshehr and Rīshehr, but the insulation was defective, and it

was replaced in November 1865 by a single-cored shore-end landed at Büshehr. Finally, in November 1877, the cable was once more landed at Rishehr and the telegraph office was removed to that place from Büshehr.

In January 1877 the cable-house on Hanjām was shifted from its original site, at some distance inland, and brought down to the water's edge. In 1880 the station on Hanjām, having become superfluous for technical reasons through the introduction of more sensitive instruments, was closed on the 11th of December; and early in 1881 the cable was replaced in the fair-way of the Gulf to the south of the island, the ends having been during the interim directly connected in the cable-house.

Abandonment of Hanjām, 1880.

The first Persian Gulf cable having, in 1884, become unserviceable between Jashk and Bushehr, and the second cable, that of 1869, having at the same time shown signs of deterioration, it was resolved to replace the former by a new cable. The material arrived at Jashk on the 13th and 14th of November 1885 on board the steamers "Dacia" and "International" belonging to the Company by which the cable had been manufactured. The work of laying began from the "International" on the 15th of November 1885 under the supervision of Sir John Bateman Champain, Director-in-Chief, and early on the 17th the whole of the cable carried by the "International" had been submerged. Operations were resumed by the "Dacia" on the afternoon of the same day, and the final connection was made at Rishehr on the evening of the 20th of November. The cable-laying steamers were piloted in their course by the Indo-European Telegraph Department's vessel "Patrick Stewart"; but, through an error in the charts, several knots of cable were laid from the "Dacia" on the 18th of November across a 17 fathom patch, from which they were subsequently removed into deeper water on the 29th of March 1887.

Relaying of the cable of 1864 between Jāshk and Būshehr in 1885.

The new Jashk-Bushehr cable was of guttapercha and cost £76,702 or about £145 a knot.

In September 1893 Gwādar was abolished as a telegraph station and the cable was joined up at sea between Karāchi and Jāshk. In October 1894 the Gwādar station was re-established, but only as an office on the land line. In the interim telephonic connection had been maintained for the benefit of the British Agent at Gwādar, with Ormārah and Chahbār; but the substituted service proved unsatisfactory, and this was the main reason for the re-opening of the telegraph office.

Abandonment of Gwadar as a cable station, 1893.

The inadequacy of communication between Masqat and the outside world had more than once formed the subject of official discussions in India; but it was reserved for Lord Curzon to take, as Viceroy, the first practical steps for remedying the situation.

The Jāshk-Masqat cable laid, 1899-1901.

In 1879 Saiyid Turki, Sultān of Masqat, had expressed a desire that his capital should be brought into connection with India by telegraph, and the matter was considered by the Government of India; but their decision, in view of the expensiveness of the project and the slenderness of the naval and military advantages then to be derived from it, was adverse.

In 1898, when steamer communication with India was fortnightly only, 129 British Indian traders at Masqat petitioned Government for a weekly steamer service and for the establishment, if possible, of telegraphic communication between Masqat and India. Arrangements were made to satisfy the first and principal wish of the petitioners; but the second was not granted.

In 1899 a further memorial was received from the same community, suggesting that the weekly mail steamers, inward and outward, should call at Jashk for the purpose of despatching and receiving Masqat telegrams. The Government of India thereupon directed that the question of a cable to Masqat should be reconsidered from the political and commercial point of view; and a number of facts were elicited which placed the need for a cable in a very clear light. The nearest telegraph station to Masqat being at Jashk, vessels of the Royal Navy were frequently diverted from their proper duties and employed as despatch vessels to carry official messages between Masqat and Jashk: nevertheless communication between the Political Resident at Büshehr, the Political Agent at Masqat, and the Government of India did not possess that rapidity which the crisis of February 1899 at Masqat had shown to be essential in an emergency. The course of trade also at Masqat was impeded, no less than the conduct of public business, by the want of telegraphic facilities; for it was generally impossible that merchants should place their orders in Indian markets at the moment when a favourable opportunity presented itself. Captain Cox, Political Agent at Masqat, further pointed out that telegraphic communication at Masqat might be a valuable weapon against the trade of smuggling arms to Persia, which was then rife, more especially if the port of Bandar 'Abbās were also brought within the telegraphic system. The receipts at the British Post Office at Masqat during 1899 on account of telegrams sent to Gwadar, Jashk and Bushehr for transmission amounted to Rs. 4,329, and it was estimated that the revenue of a telegraph office, if one were established, might amount to Rs. 10,000 a year, and that there would be a saving of Rs. 13,500 per annum to the Royal Navy

In 1900 the scheme was referred to Her Majesty's Government and was approved in principle; but the British Treasury declined to contribute to the cost of execution, and the time also was financially unfavourable, inasmuch as important extensions of telegraphic communication were in progress in the Far East and there was a strong demand for submarine cable. The whole cost of the enterprise was ultimately undertaken by the Government of India, who were convinced of its great importance; and the work, after it had been sanctioned by the Secretary of State in May 1901 at an estimated cost of £49,000, was commenced without delay. It had originally been intended either to divert the existing Karāchi-Jāshk cable so as to touch at Masqat or to lay an additional cable between those places passing viâ Masqat; but ultimately, for technical reasons, connection between Jāshk and Masqat was made by means of a new and direct cable, carried some distance to westwards of the straight line in order to avoid excessively deep water. Landing rights at Masqat being already secured by the Telegraph Treaty of 1865 no special arrangement with the Sultān was necessary; but his

co-operation was requested and was obtained. The work was finished and communication established on the 26th of November 1901. From the first the gross receipts of the Masqat office exceeded the estimate which had been formed and in the first four months after the opening of the line they amounted to about Rs. 6,000, while they are now on the average about Rs. 14,600 per annum. The actual cost of the enterprise was Rs. 6,21,453.

In accordance with Captain Cox's suggestion, the Government of India, at the same time that they recommended the laying of a cable to Masqat, proposed the extension of the Gulf Telegraphs to Bandar 'Abbās by looping one of the existing cables between Jāshk and Rīshehr into the Bandar 'Abbās bay. As in the case of the Masqat cable Her Majesty's Government approved of the scheme, but were unable to give any financial assistance; and the Government of India, partly in the hope that this unfavourable decision might be modified, and partly on account! of technical doubts as to the best mode of effecting the junction with Bandar 'Abbās, temporarily laid the project aside. It may be noted that in 1893-94 the Persian Government had themselves been anxious that Bandar 'Abbās should be brought into the telegraphic system, and that a survey for a land line from Jāshk was attempted, but was abandoned owing to obstruction in Bashākard.

The Hanjam diversion and connection with Bandar 'Abbas, 1904-05.

Early in 1902 the Naval Commander-in-Chief on the East Indian station suggested the opening of a telegraph station at Basidu; and in 1903 the Government of India approached the Secretary of State with fresh proposals regarding an extension to Bandar 'Abbas. They now recommended that telegraphic communication should in the first instance be restored with the old station on Hanjam, in order to secure a point of communication situated on the fair-way of the Gulf, at no great distance from its mouth and easily accessible to the ships of the Royal Navy. At the same time they suggested various modes of linking Hanjam with Bandar 'Abbas, giving the preference to one which involved a land line across Qishmisland; the existence of this line would, it was argued, increase the influence of the British Government in Qishm, where the station of Bāsīdu was already a British possession. It was estimated that an all-cable connection would cost £18,539, while one including a land section on Qishm could be constructed for £11,835. Some delay occurred through the Admiralty expressing a preference for Basidu, as the site of the new station, over Hanjam; and the question was not finally decided until after Lord Curzon's visit to the Persian Gulf at the end of 1903, in the course of which the Viceroy personally investigated upon the spot the relative merits of the two places. While at Bandar 'Abbas, His Excellency received a request from the Indian mercantile community for an extension of the telegraph to that place; and the Sālār-i-Mu'azzam, the Persian Governor of the Gulf Ports, privately supported the suggestion. On his return to India Lord Curzon advocated the claims of Hanjam as being superior for general purposes to Basidu, and this view in the end obtained universal acceptance.

It remained to devise means for overcoming the opposition to the scheme which was anticipated on the part of Persia. After some discussion it was decided to re-open the station on Hanjām without

consulting the Persian Government, upon the strength of the authority granted in 1868 and not subsequently revoked, and thereafter to negotiate for the desired extension to Bandar 'Abbas. The cable-ship "Patrick Stewart" was accordingly despatched from Karachi on the 9th of April 1904, and telegraphic communication with Hanjam was restored on the 19th of the same month after an interval of 13 years, at a cost of only Rs. 36,500. On the 10th of April Sir A. Hardinge, the British Minister at Tehran, on being apprised of these proceedings, informed the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs of the intention of the Government of India to reopen the Hanjam station and intimated that he would shortly approach the Persian Government with a request for the institution of a provisional Persian postal service between Hanjam and Bandar 'Abbas and with proposals for an extension of the telegraph line to Bandar 'Abbās. The Minister's note appears to have been mislaid or carelessly read by the Persian official to whom it was addressed, and it was not until some time in May that the Persian Government became aware, through a report by the Governor of the Gulf Ports, of what had occurred at Hanjam; they were disagreeably surprised, but confronted with the accomplished fact, agreed to arrange for a temporary postal Meanwhile the British telegraph officials had instituted both a weekly and an express service for the delivery of Hanjam telegrams at Bandar 'Abbās; and some friction occurred when, in August 1904, the Belgian Director of Customs at Bandar 'Abbās established a rival Persian post between Hanjam and the mainland and insisted that it should be exclusively used and that the bags sent by it should not be sealed.

The further proposals for the extension of the telegraph from Hanjam to Bandar 'Abbas were at first resisted by the Shah of Persia, who was at this time in a peculiarly uncompromising mood on the subject of concessions to foreigners, and seemed to be endeavouring by all means in his power to stifle the growth of European enterprises in the country. For a time the representations of the British Legation were staved off by a pretence that the Bandar 'Abbas extension would be constructed by the Persian Government themselves; but the British Minister continued to press the point and resorted to the argument that, under Article No. 2 of the Persian Telegraph Convention of 1868, the British Government were entitled to construct a land line from Jashk to the neighbourhood of Bandar 'Abbas and might avail themselves of this old concession if permission to connect Hanjam with Bandar 'Abbas were At length the desired extension was sanctioned by the Persian Government, but on conditions somewhat unfavourable to the British Government, who had hoped for permission to construct and work the new branch as an integral part of the system of the Indo-European Telegraph Department. By an agreement executed on the 13th of May 1905 by Sir A. Hardinge and the Mushīr-ud-Dauleh, Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, it was settled that a line across Qishm, to connect Hanjām with Bandar 'Abbās, should be constructed on behalf of the Persian Government by two engineers of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, placed temporarily at their disposal; and that the line, when the cost of its construction—subject to a maximum of Rs. 75,000 had been refunded by the Persian Government, should be handed over to

the Persian Ministry of Telegraphs to be worked by a Persian staff. The objections of the Shāh to control of the Hanjām end of the new line by British telegraphists proved insuperable, and it was found necessary to include in the agreement a stipulation that there should be a separate Persian office at Hanjām and that telegrams should be transferred at Hanjām between the two offices; it was, however, settled that, if the British Government desired it, a British signaller should be allowed to deal at Bandar 'Abbās with all British state messages received at or despatched from that place. With the exception of this signaller and of the employés of the Indo-European Telegraph Department whom it might be necessary to engage for the maintenance and repair of the line, the Persian Government bound themselves to employ none but Persian subjects on the staff.

The extension was forthwith carried out in accordance with the terms of this agreement, and communication between Hanjām and the shore at Bandar 'Abbās was established on the 31st of December 1905; but, in consequence of difficulties as to the position of the cable-house and office raised by the Persian Government on the advice of M. Stas, the Belgian Director of Persian Customs at Bandar 'Abbas, the line had not as yet in April 1907 been opened for public business. Meanwhile the shore-end remained under the control of the Indo-European Telegraph Department.

The Central Persian land line, 1898-1907.

In June 1898 a scheme was proposed in London by Mr. B. T. Ffinch, Director-in-Chief of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, which, having been adopted in principle by Her Majesty's Government, promised shortly to revolutionise the existing Indo-Persian system of telegraphs and to render obsolete the achievements of the past, particularly in the Persian Gulf.

In 1883, when the first cable laid between Jāshk and Būshehr began to wear out, the substitution of a land line was suggested between Jāshk and Shīrāz; and a reconnaissance was accordingly made in January-March 1884 by Mr. J. R. Preece, an officer of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, of the whole route from the latter to the former of these two places. Eventually it was decided to negative the scheme; and the old cable was, as we have seen, replaced by a new one in 1885.

In 1898, both the cables in the Gulf now approaching the period at which their reliability might be expected to fail, the same problem arose again in an altered shape and on a more important scale. Experience had proved that the ordinary life of a cable in the Persian Gulf was about 15 years only; the maintenance of the land line between Karāchi and Jāshk was difficult and expensive, because of its proximity to the sea and the consequent extreme dampness of the atmosphere; and the line to Europe through Turkish 'Irāq, which the first Persian Gulf cable had been mainly intended to serve, was still so inefficiently worked in the

Bearing and scope of the project.

Turkish dominions as to be practically useless. On the other hand British Balüchistän had been greatly developed during the preceding 20 years, and recently a direct trade route had been brought into existence between Quetta and Sīstān. These circumstances, taken together, indicated the desirability of transferring telegraphic business from the submarine Persian Gulf route, circuitous in relation to Persia though not to Turkish 'Irāq, to some more northerly and direct land line between India and Persia.

Mr. Ffinch's proposal was, in effect, that the land line from Karāchi to Jāshk and one of the cables from Jāshk to Būshehr should be abolished on communication being established between Europe and India by way of Central Persia; that the material of the abandoned cable should be used for the repair of the remaining one from Karāchi viā Jāshk and Būshehr to Fāo; and that ultimately cable communication in the Gulf might be done away with altogether, as also the Jāshk station and the telegraph steamer, the line between Būshehr and Isfahān being afterwards maintained and worked as a branch of the Central Persian line. It was estimated that a line from Kāshān to Karāchi would be about 1,400 miles in length, and one from Kāshān to Quetta about 1,300 miles.

Anglo-Persian Convention for construction and working, 16th August 1901.

Negotiations for the execution of Mr. Ffinch's project were immediately opened with the Persian Government through the British Minister at Tehrān. During 1899 and 1900 the objections of the Shāh and his ministers continued insuperable, the former laying stress rather on the uncivilised character of the Balūchi country to be traversed, where incidents similar to the recent murder of Mr. Graves might be expected to occur, * while the latter suggested that a telegraph concession to Britain in the south might provoke the Russians to ask a similar favour in the north,—a demand which it would be impossible to refuse. In reality the Persians seem at first to have suspected that the new telegraph project concealed some political design on the part of Britain, and even that it was intended to utilise the troubles to which it might give rise as a pretex for introducing Indian troops into the country.

At length on the 16th of August 1901, these apprehensions having with difficulty been removed, a Convention for the extension of telegraphic communication between Europe and India through Persia was signed at Tajrīsh near Tehrān on behalf of the British and Persian Governments. Ratification took place in January 1902. By this new Convention it was settled that, in addition to the present line of telegraph from Tehrān to Būshehr and the submarine cable thence to India, a three-wire line of telegraph should be carried by the Persian Government from Kāshān viā Yazd and Kirmān to the Balūchistān frontier. Construction was to take place under the supervision and direction of the Indo-European Telegraph Department in Persia, the pay of the workmen employed being in the first instance advanced, and the necessary stores supplied, by the British Government as a loan repayable without interest. The line, which on completion should become the property of the Persian Government, was to be leased to the Indo-European

^{*} Vide the history of Persian Makran, page 2195. Mr. Graves was killed on the Rapch river in Makran on the 2nd of December 1897.

Telegraph Department at an annual rent equivalent to one-twenty-fifth of the total cost of construction; but of this amount three-fourths should be retained year by year by the British Government until they had been fully reimbursed for the amount of their advances; this condition was subject, however, to the proviso that the share of rent actually accruing to the Persian Government in any year should not be less than 25,000 francs. The payments of rent should be half-yearly. The maintenance of the line (including repairs) was to be in the hands of the British telegraphic staff, and the cost of the same was to be defrayed by the British Government; the line guards also, who must be Persian subjects, should be appointed, controlled and paid by the British telegraph authorities. For the protection of the British officials and of the line itself the Persian Government assumed full responsibility; but the task was to be rendered as simple as possible by the location of the officials at large centres of population and by an obligation on their part to apply for escorts before proceeding into districts scheduled as dangerous. Of the three wires composing the line, one should be at the disposal of the Persian Telegraph Administration for local work, while the other two were to be reserved for international traffic.

Provision was further made in the Convention for the allocation of the revenue of local, terminal and transit messages; and certain articles of the Convention of 1872 were declared to be applicable to the Central Persian line. The term of the Convention was till the 1st of January 1925, or such longer period as might be necessary for the discharge of the debt due for construction by the Persian to the British Government; but power was reserved to the British Government to abandon the line at any time, after giving six months' notice, on condition of forfeiting any balance of undischarged debt which might still be due from Persia.

One article, the Tenth, provided for the placing of an additional wire on the existing line between Tehrān and Kāshān; but this article, as will appear further on, it was subsequently found necessary to modify in practice.

The construction of the new line, which consisted of three iron wires carried upon iron poles, was begun at Kāshān on the 2nd of December 1902; and on the 21st of January 1904 a point 25 miles to the east of Bam had been reached. It was originally intended that the line should pass onwards to British Baluchistan by way of Bazman; but an alternative route was now suggested; and, after a pause for consideration, work was resumed on the 24th of February, not in the direction of Bazman but across the desert to Kōh-i-Malik Siyāh, the meeting point of British, Afghan and Persian territory. This prolongation was completed and connected with the British Indian system of telegraphs in the neighbourhood of Koh-i-Malik Siyah on the 9th of May 1904; and direct communication by land was thus established for the first time between India and Tehran. The extension across the desert was, at first, a temporary single-wire line; but it is now understood that this will be made permanent, and that it may ultimately become a section of the main line between India and Persia.

Advantage was taken of the construction of the new Central Persian line to improve the alignment of the existing line south of Kāshān.

Construction.

This was done by abolishing the direct line between Kāshān and Isfahān, which crossed a pass 8,760 feet high, and by connecting Isfahān with Ardistān, a station on the Central Persian line between Kāshān and Yazd. By this means a lower level route was obtained; and various economies, some of a permanent character, were effected.

Karāchi branch, 1905-06. At the end of 1904 it was recommended by Mr. H. A. Kirk, who on the 1st April 1902 had succeeded Mr. Ffinch as Director-in-Chief of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, that a new line of telegraph should be constructed from Karāchi viā Las Bailah to Panjgūr, and be connected, eventually, with the Central Persian line. This proposal, as the main part of it affected British territory only, was readily sanctioned; work was begun on the 14th of September 1905; and on the 25th of June 1906 the line stood completed to Panjgūr. On the 3rd of August following a survey party left Panjgūr to examine the various routes by which communication between Panjgūr and a station on the Central Persian line might be * established.

Duplication of the Tehrān Kāshān section, 1905-07.

In the Tenth Article of the Convention of 1901 it was laid down that an extra wire should be added to the existing line between Tehran and Kāshān to carry such additional traffic as might be thrown on it by the new Central Persian line. Examination of the old line however showed that, partly on account of the age of the materials and partly on account of faults of alignment such as irregular length of spans, the erection of an additional wire on the same set of posts would be dangerous, and that a new line of posts was required. With the assent of the Persian Government it was accordingly arranged that a new line of posts should be erected to carry in the first instance two wires only, one for the local service of the Persian Telegraph Administration and the other for international purposes. This work it was expected to complete by the end of June 1907.

ANNEXURE NO. 1.—GENERAL ACCOUNT OF THE PERSIAN GULF SECTION OF THE INDO-EUROPEAN TELE-GRAPHS IN 1906.

Cables and land lines. The following are the cables and land lines at present controlled and worked by the Indo-European Telegraph Department in the Persian Gulf or its approaches:—

- A cable from Karāchi to Jāshk, opened in 1868; length 528 knots; stations at Karāchi and Jāshk.
- 2. A two-wire land line from Karāchi to Jāshk, opened from Karāchi to Gwādar in 1864 and from Gwādar to Jāshk in 1869; length 699.85 miles; stations at Karāchi, Ormārah, Pasni, Gwādar, Chahbār and Jāshk. There was formerly a station at Sōnmiyāni, between Karāchi and Ormārah, but it was closed in 1871

^{*} The route eventually chosen was from Panjgūr to Nok Kondi, a point on the Indian Telegraph Department's line between Nushki and Robāt. A line was constructed to Nok Kondi; and connection was made at Robāt with the Central Persian line by a wire added to the Indian line from Nok Kondi to Robāt. The line from Panjgūr to Nok Kondi was completed on the 4th November 1907, and through telegraphic working between Tehrān and Karāchi was established on the 5th November 1907.

3. A cable from Jashk to Masqat, opened in 1901; length 219 knots; stations at Jashk and Masqat.

4. A cable from Jāshk to Hanjām, opened in 1904; length 136 knots; stations at Jāshk and Hanjām. This cable was originally laid in 1869 as part of a direct cable between Jāshk and Būshehr.

5. A cable and land line from Hanjām to Bandar 'Abbās, crossing Qishm Island; completed in 1905; aggregate length of cables 17.491 knots and of land line 30.75 miles; stations at Hanjām and Bandar 'Abbās. The management of this line, which was constructed on behalf of the Persian Government, is at present temporarily vested in the Indo-European Telegraph Department

as the cost of construction has not yet been repaid.

- 6. A cable from Hanjām to Rīshehr, opened in 1904; length 378.5 knots; stations at Hanjām and Rīshehr. This cable originally formed part of the direct cable between Jāshk and Būshehr which was laid in 1869. From the Rīshehr office short local land lines run to the British Residency and Persian Telegraph Office in Būshehr town and to the Resident's country house at Sabzābād. Rīshehr is connected with Tehrān viâ Shīrāz and Isfahān by a three-wire line, of which one wire is in possession of the Persian Telegraph Administration; this is at present the Department's main line between India and Europe. Signalling is carried on direct between Karāchi and Tehrān, the electric current being automatically reinforced at the intermediate stations of Jāshk and Rīshehr.
- 7. A cable from Jāshk to Rīshehr, opened in 1885; length 521.6 knots; stations at Jāshk and Rīshehr.
- 8. A cable from Rīshehr to Fāo, opened in 1864; length 152 knots; stations at Rīshehr and Fāo.

The following table shows the staff and function of each station, on the above cables and land lines, which is permanently under the management of the Indo-European Telegraph Department:—

	Time I am a series of the seri	
Station	Number of the Staff	Function
Karāchi	19	Transfer office. *
Jāshk	10	Translating station. †
Ormārah	3	Station of observation.
Pasni	1	$\mathbf{D_0}$.
Gwadar	ĺ	Do.
Chahbār	3	Do.
Masqat	${f 2}$	Terminal office.
Hanjam	3	Station of observation till the
		line to Bandar 'Abbās is
		open, when it will become a
		transfer office.
Rishehr	14	Translating station.
Fão	4	Transfer office.

A "transfer office" is an office in which traffic is transferred from one administration to another; thus at Karāchi traffic is transferred to and received from the Indian Government's telegraph system, and at Fāo it is transferred to and received from that of the Turkish Telegraph Administration. Such offices have no dealings with the public and consequently no cash transactions.

7 See footnote on page 2418.

At all these stations the British flag is flown.

Cable ship and plant. In July 1879 the original cable steamer "Amberwitch" was replaced by the "Patrick Stewart", a vessel of greater speed—7 knots—and capacity. In September 1881 complete plant for the manufacture of cable was erected at Karāchi, rendering the Department independent of Europe in regard to the supply of new cable for repairs. About one knot of cable per diem can be manufactured at the Karāchi works.

Establishment. The total staff of the Persian Gulf section of the Indo-European Telegraphs, including the officers and subordinates already mentioned in the paragraph on stations above, is composed as follows:—

0	1			,		•				
G٤	zetted Offic	ers								13
M	edical estab	lishmer	ıt*							4
Ge	eneral servic	e clerk	s (inclu	ıding	staff	of	cable	steamer)		54
L	cal service	signalle	ers					• ′		2 L
D	esk clerks	•								5
	fice establis									23
II	strument w	orksho	p empl	oyés						4.
\mathbf{L}_{i}	and line esta	ablishm	ent							110
Ca	ble factory	employ	rés							37
C	mplement o	of the	cable s	teamer	r					64
M	enials in of	fices								86
									_	
								Total		421

Finances.

Gazetted officers are occasionally transferred from the Indian to the Indo-European Telegraph Department, signalling clerks being frequently so transferred, and are occasionally translated in the opposite direction; but there is no connection between the two Departments, and the bulk of the staff of the I. E. T. D. is independently obtained.

The whole expenditure of the Persian Gulf section of the Indo-European Telegraphs in 1904-05 was Rs. 6,78,651; and the "Gulf proportionate share of the total departmental receipts" was assessed in the same year at Rs. 14,75,957. The capital expenditure of the whole Department in 1904-05 was Rs. 2,71,783, raising the expenditure on capital account to Rs. 1,39,71,578; and on this sum a net profit of Rs. 6,15,924 for the year was obtained, giving a return to outlay at the rate of 4.4 per cent.

ANNEXURE NO. 2.—SUBSIDIES PAID IN PERSIAN MAKRAN FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE LAND LINE OF THE INDO-EUROPEAN TELEGRAPH.

Below are statements showing the amount and distribution of the British political subsidies, exclusive of that paid to the Persian Government, which are disbursed annually in connection with the land line of telegraph through Persian Makran.

Jāshk district. The subsidy in the Jāshk district amounts to Rs. 840 per annum and is payable to the Mīrs of Jāshk jointly.

^{*}There is an Assistant Surgeon at each of the stations of Jashk, Rishehr and Fao

The allocation of the subsidies in the Gaih district is as follows:-

						Rs.
The Chief of Gaih						1,000
M īr Dōst of K ā rwān						200
Mir Alai of do						200
Mīr Shāhsuwār of do.						100
Mīr 'Isa Shair Khān of			•			100
Mir Gul Muhammad of	do.	•				100
Mir Saidullah of Bir						200
Mīr Bhāi Khān of Kair	r					150
Mīr Shair Muhammad o	of Si	rgān				200
Höt Fagir Muhammad						150
Mīr ' Abdu-bin-Haidar	of B	alak				100
Mīr Shaih Muhammad-	bin-1	Iīru of	Band	lani		100
Not disbursed .		•				400

The Balak and Bandani subsidies were first granted with effect from the 1st of January 1904; the others are of older standing.

In the Dashtyāri district the whole subsidy of Rs. 1,000 a year has, since the 1st of January 1904, been divided equally between district. Mir 'Abdi Khān and Mir Mahmūd Khān, the joint chiefs; and payments formerly made to petty headmen have been discontinued.

Dashtvāri

To the end of 1901 the whole subsidy in the Bahu district was Bahu district. paid to the Chief. Since the 1st of January 1902 it is divided between the Chief (Rs. 600) and Mir Ahmad Khan of Bahu (Rs. 400).

It will be seen that the total annual amount of the subsidies in Total. Persia is Rs. 5,840 a year, of which more than half is allotted to the Gaih district. Subsidies are paid, besides these, in British Balüchistän.

ANNEXURE NO. 3.—CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF DIREC-TORS-IN-CHIEF OF THE INDO-EUROPEAN TELE-GRAPH DEPARTMENT.

	Name,	Term.				
1	Colonel Patrick Stewart, R.E.	March 1862 to 16th January 1865.				
2	Major J. U. Champain, afterwards Colonel Sir J. U. Bateman Champain, K.C.M.G., R.E.	17th January to 31st March 1865, in temporary charge.				
3	Colonel F. J. Goldsmid, afterwards Major-General Sir F. J. Goldsmid, K.C.S.I., C.B.	1st June 1865 to September 1870.				
4	Colonel Sir J. U. Bateman Champain (See No. 2).	September 1870 to 1st February 1887.				
5	Colonel R. Murdoch Smith, afterwards Major-General Sir R. Murdoch Smith, K.C.M.G., R.E.	2nd February 1887 to 15th February 1888.				

(From 16th February 1888 to 31st March 1893 the Department was under the Director-General of Telegraphs in India.)

	Name.	Term.			
6	B. T. Ffinch, Esq., C.I.E.	1st April 1893 to 31st March 1902.			
7	H. A. Kirk, Esq.	Since 1st April 1902.			

ANNEXURE NO 4.—CHRONOLOGICAL LIST OF DIRECTORS OF THE PERSIAN GULF SECTION OF THE INDO-EUROPEAN TELEGRAPH.

	Name.	Term.				
1	H. I. Walton, Esq. (with the title "Director, Mekran Coast and Submarine Telegraph").	1st August 1864 to 7th April 1875. (Mr. Walton had been employed on construction work from September 1861.)				
2	B. T. Ffinch, Esq. (with the title of "Deputy Director" till 1883, and after with that of "Director").	8th April 1875 to 31st March 1893.				
3	J. Possmann, Esq.	1st April 1893 to 18th February 1897.				
∆ i	G. W. Sealy, Esq.	19th February 1897 to 31st July 1898.				
5	LieutCol. H. L. Wells, R.E.	1st to 31st August 1898, when he died.				
6	G. W. Sealy, Esq.	1st September 1898 to 14th January 1900.				
7	H. Whitby-Smith Esq.	Since 15th January 1900.				

APPENDIX K.

MAIL COMMUNICATIONS AND THE INDIAN POST OFFICE IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

The Persian Gulf line as an overland route between India and Europe.

The purely commercial factories of the Hon'ble East India Company in the Persian Gulf were dependent, for communication with the outer world, upon visits of the Company's ships from India; and the semipolitical Residencies and Agencies by which they were succeeded, inherited, generally, their position in this respect. From an early period in the 18th century, however, Basrah enjoyed the exceptional advantage of direct though irregular communication with Europe by way of Aleppo; and when, towards the end of the century, fortnightly intercourse between Bombay and Basrah was established by means of the Company's cruisers, a line of camel post in connection therewith was organised under the supervision of the Company's representative at Basrah between that place and Aleppo, and was prolonged by a line of horse post to Constantinople. The Persian Gulf route was at this time the most rapid between Europe and India, and it was freely used by the British Government during the Napoleonic wars. With other thrilling intelligence of that period the news of the battle of the Nile was received through Basrah by the British authorities in India; and in 1801 Mr. Samuel Manesty, Resident at Basrah, received the thanks of the Governor-General of India for his "exertions in facilitating the communication between this Government and the British army serving in Egypt."

nance of the Persian Gulf route at the end of the 18th century.

Predomi-

During the first quarter of the 19th century the East Indian official mail, or so much of it as was not conveyed by sea round the Cape of Good Hope, continued to follow the Persian Gulf line; but not long afterwards that line was abandoned for the Red Sea "overland" route, upon which was inaugurated a service of the Company's

Supersession of the Persian Gulf route by the Red Sea overland route, 1833.

[•] The only complete authority on this subject is a Memorandum on the British Indian Post Offices in the Persian Gulf and Turkish Arabia, 1888, by Mr. F. B. O'Shea (revised edition by Mr. F. Whymper, 1905); and from that work, and from the political records generally of the Government of India, the present Appendix has been compiled. A History of the British Indian Overland Mail by M. Loeper, Postal Director of Markirch, appeared in the international postal journal L'Union Postale in 1883, and a translation is in the Library of the Foreign Department, Simla. Capper's Observations, 1785, contain some interesting information regarding the mail route in his day between Europe and Basrah. The writer is indebted for numerous corrections and amplifications of the draft to His Britannic Majesty's Legation at Tehran; to Major J. Ramsay, Political Resident at Baghdad; to Major P. Z. Cox, Political Resident at Bushehr; and to Mr. F. E. Crow, His Britannic Majesty's Consul at Basrah. Information in regard to specific points was kindly supplied by Mr. C. H. Harrison, I.C.S., Deputy Director-General of the Post Office of India, through the courtesy of Sir A. Fanshawe, Director-General, and also by Mr. W. Maxwell, I.C.S., Officiating Director-General.

cruisers running between Bombay and the Egyptian port of Qusair. The "desert post" from Basrah to Aleppo was abolished in 1833; but its place was taken in 1837 by a camel post between Bairut and Muhammareh, viá Damascus and Hit, of which the portion west of Hit was under the management of British Consul General in Syria and the rest under that of the British Political Agent in Turkish 'Iraq. The result of Parliamentary Committees which sat in 1834 and 1837 was the final adoption of the Red Sea route. When Colonel Chesney, after his survey of the rivers Tigris and Euphrates, tried to induce the Government of India to institute a fortnightly steamer service between Bombay and Basrah and to reopen the desert route, his views were not accepted; and in August 1837 the first monthly mail via Suez left England for Bombay. The Government of Bombay, indeed, proposed that the Red Sea and Persian Gulf routes should be used for official correspondence in alternate months; but the Court of Directors of the East India Company ordered that the Gulf line should be employed only for the carriage of duplicate despatches; full use of it for this purpose was, however, to be made. The Red Sea route had a great advantage over that by Basrah in that it was equally well adapted for passenger and for mail traffic.

Communication between the Persian Gulf and India, 1833-1862.

Communication in abeyance for some years preceding 1862.

In 1839 interest in the Persian Gulf route was partially revived. The Court of Directors of the East India Company sent three specially constructed river steamers to Basrah for use on the Tigris, and a letter post was instituted by their means between Basrah and Baghdad. 1843 or 1844 the camel post between Mesopotamia and Syria was reestablished, but under altered conditions; for the point of departure was now Baghdad and the terminus Bairut, Damascus forming an intermediate stage. The route thus opened, though it served the interests of Turkish Iraq, no longer secured a share of the Indo-European traffic; and the fact is instructive as illustrating the melancholy state into which direct communication between India and the Persian Gulf had now fallen. From this time onwards, until 1862, letters for India from Baghdad, from Basrah and even from Bushehr usually took a circuitous way by Damascus, Egypt and the Red Sea; and, what is more extraordinary still, the correspondence thus sent from Bushehr appears to have been forwarded to Baghdad by land via Tehran. Occasionally the return of a vessel of the Indian Navy from the Gulf to Bombay afforded an opportunity of more direct communication. British merchant vessels were at this time rarely seen in the Persian Gulf.

Resumption of regular and direct communication, 1862.

The year 1862 set a term to the extraordinary state of inaccessibility into which the Gulf had fallen, and ushered in a new political and commercial era*; it marked in fact the real commencement of the modern

^{*}Telegraphic enterprise was no doubt largely responsible for the revival of interest in the Gulf: See Appendix on Telegraphs, page 2400.

period in the Persian Gulf region. The beginnings were modest. The establishment "for postal purposes" of a line of steamers to run between Bombay and the Persian Gulf, and to call at Karāchi on the way, was sanctioned by the Secretary of State for India in 1862; but the number of annual trips was at first limited to eight. The contract was undertaken by the British India Steam Navigation Company; and in the same year the Secretary State for India accepted an offer by the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company to run, in consideration of a subsidy of £2,400 a year, a monthly or six-weekly steamer between Basrah and Baghdād, connecting at Basrah with the new ocean service from Bombay.

Mail steamer service in the Persian Gulf, 1862-1907.

Since its establishment in 1862, the mail service in the Persian Gulf has been repeatedly improved. In 1868 it became fortnightly and finally, in 1874, weekly communication was established.*

acceleration, 1866-1878.

Progressive

The most recent improvement in steamer communications and postal arrangements in the Gulf was effected by an indenture, made on the 10th of November 1903, between the British India Steam Navigation Company and the Secretary of State; it consisted in the establishment of a double mail service under the names of "Line No. 11" and "Line No. 12". Line No. 11 provided weekly communication between Karāchi and Basrah via the Persian Gulf ports, and back by the same route, at an average speed of 8 knots an hour; and line No. 12 supplied weekly communication between Karachi and Basrah via the principal Persian Gulf ports, and back by the same route, at an average speed of 13 knots. A right was reserved to the Company to make the communication by Line No. 11 fortnightly, at times when they did not themselves require a weekly cargo service in addition to the fast weekly mail service (Line No. 12); but it was at the same time arranged that, in the weeks in which communication by Line No. 11 was omitted, the ports which were due to be served by the steamers of that line should be visited by the steamers of Line No. 12, except in so far as they could be served by Line No. 11 in the alternative weeks, the intention being that the number of due calls should not be reduced. The Company were also excused from running the steamers of Line No. 11 beyond Bushehr, subject however to a proviso that the steamers of Line No. 12 should not be delayed for cargo considerations.

Latest mail contract, 1904.

The ports of call fixed for the slow cargo line (No. 11) were Karāchi, Pasni, Gwādar, Masqat, Jāshk, Bandar 'Abbās, Lingeh, Bahrain, Būshehr, Kuwait, Fāo, Muhammareh and Basrah. Of these Pasni, Gwādar and Jāshk were to be ports of call on each alternative voyage and return voyage while Lingeh and Bahrain were to be visited on every outward and every alternate inward trip and only every alternate

Ports of call under the contract.

^{*}A table of the contracts preceding that of 1904, which is described in the next paragraph, will be found in Annexure No. 1 to this Appendix.

inward steamer was to call at Kuwait*; the rest were to be regularly visited on every journey outward or inward. In the event of this slow line, being made at any time a fortnightly service, Bahrain might be treated as a port of fortnightly call in both directions. The minimum stay of vessels of the slow line at each port was fixed at 3 hours of daylight. The ports of call prescribed in the case of the fast mail line (No. 12) were Karāchi, Masqat, Būshehr, Fāo, Muhammareh and Basrah, all of which (except Basrah, the turning point) were to be visited on both voyages.

Powers of Government under the contract. Line No. 11 is worked in connection with a slow, and Line No. 12 in connection with a fast line between Bombay and Karāchi; and no change can be made in this respect without the sanction of Government. Government, by their chief political representative in any province of which the ports are concerned, may direct the Company's steamers to call at any port, or ports, in the Persian Gulf in addition to those mentioned; but, in the case of the slow line, the limit of duration of the wnole voyage must then be extended proportionately; and, in the case of the fast line, the exercise of this power is subject to the condition that additional working expenses be not entailed on the Company. This last proviso does not, however, apply to additional calls made in consequence of any intermission in the weekly running of Line No. 11. Government has also power, through the same officers, to detain vessels and alter the ports of call; but this does not include the power to cause any vessel to turn back, or deviate, from her regular voyage.

Term of the contract and subsidy thereunder.

The new contract came into force on the 1st of May 1904 and was to continue in force until the date of termination of the next Eastern Mail Contract, subject however to a minimum term of 7 years and to a maximum term of 10 years and 9 months from the date of its commence-The total annual subsidy under this contract payable by ment.t Government to the British India Steam Navigation Company for its services in the Persian Gulf is Rs. 4,26,124, and of this the sum of Rs. 3,00,000 is on account of the fast mail service. The Company are at liberty, on expiry of the first three years of the term of the contract and provided that notice in writing of the intention to do has been given by the end of the second year of that term, to determine the contract in so far as it relates to the fast Persian Gulf line; and, in the event of their exercising this right, the Government of India have the option of continuing the rest of the contract on a total subsidy to the Company of Rs. 7,00,000, as against a present total subsidy of Rs. 10,00,000, or of determining the contract altogether.

Improvement of the service at particular ports since 1898. The round voyage from Karāchi and back is now made, under the conditions as to speed laid down in the contract, in about twelve days by the fast, and in about three weeks by the slow steamers. Masqat, which

^{*} For subsequent changes in the Kuwait service, see next page.

[†] The Eastern Mail Contract of 1897, which was due to expire on the 31st of January 1905, was extended for three years, viz., to the 31st January 1908; and in August 1907 a new contract was concluded with the Peninsular and Oriental Steam Navigation Company, which came into force on the 1st of February 1908 and will terminate on the 31st of January 1915. The object of the peculiar maximum term arranged with the British India Steam Navigation Company was to secure a simultaneous falling-in of the contracts with both Companies.

until 1898 was served only by one fortnightly steamer in either direction. has now a weekly fast and a weekly slow steamer both ways; the improvement began with the institution in 1898, on a request from the Indian mercantile community, of a visit by the weekly slow steamer returning to India, and at the beginning of 1899 the call on the upward journey was made weekly also. Arrangements were made, subsequently to the execution of the latest contract and without modification thereof, for the inclusion of Kuwait, with effect from the 1st of December 1904, in the fast weekly service; but in July 1905, at the desire of the Company, the Kuwait service was reduced to a fortnightly slow mail; and again, in October of the same year, a weekly mail by alternate slow and fast steamers was substituted at the instance of the Government of India. Dibai has been a fortnightly port of call for the slow steamers on the outward voyage since the 10th June 1904, and is also visited on the return voyage when inducement offers. The fast service in the Gulf was maintained for a few months, in the winter of 1904-05, by new turbine steamers able to run 18 knots an hour; but these were subsequently withdrawn as they were unable to push their way through the mud on the bar of the Shatt-al-'Arab, their small rapidly-revolving screws being quickly clogged.

Mail steamer service on the Tigris, 1863-1907.

This service began in 1863, in accordance with an agreement 1863-66. between the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company and the Secretary of State for India; under the first contract* the subsidy was £2,400 a year and the service was six-weekly, being carried on in connection with the six-weekly calls of the British India Steam Navigation Company's vessels at Basrah, arranged in 1862. The subsidy was paid, from the first, entirely by the Government of India. For several years the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company enjoyed a virtual monopoly of the river traffic; their only competitors were native boats, taking sometimes 30 or 40 days to perform the voyage from Basrah to Baghdad, which was made by the steamers in 4 or 5 days. In 1866 the Tigris subsidy was raised to £4,800 a year in consideration of the service being made fortnightly; and the Company of their own accord began to run three steamers a month, calling at 'Amārah, Kūt-al-Amārah and other places intermediate between Basrah and Baghdād, in order to take advantage of the growing freight and passenger traffic.

In 1867 a Turkish official concern, known as the Oman-Ottoman line, established a rival service on the Tigris with the avowed object of running the British steamers off the river; but it was badly managed,

1867-70.

^{*}A table of all the contracts for this service, up to date, will be found in Annexure No. 2 to this Appendix.

and it hovered during the greater part of its existence upon the verge of dissolution. In 1869-70 the Turkish line made overtures, in spite of their notorious shortcomings, for obtaining the contract, held by the British Company since the 1st of July 1863, for the carriage of the British mails; but their proposals were rejected on practical considerations as well as for political reasons.

1875-83.

In 1876 the subsidy of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company was reduced to £3,600 a year, the Company binding themselves nevertheless to maintain a service of three steamers in the month. The Company were now extremely desirous of obtaining a concession to add a third steamer to the two which they already possessed upon the Tigris; and in the contract of 1876 they even undertook to provide a weekly service at a further reduced subsidy of £2,400 in case the British Government should succeed in persuading the Porte to grant the necessary authorisation. In 1878, without any alteration of the contract or the addition of a third steamer to their flotilla, the Company established a weekly service in both directions between Baghdad and Basrah which has continued without intermission until the present day. A third steamer was sent by the Company to Basrah in 1883; but its use was not, before 1905, permitted by the Turkish Government except as an occasional substitute for one of the other two, and till then it was employed chiefly on the Company's Kārūn line.

1884-98.

In 1884 a fresh contract for the carriage of the mails was granted to the Euphrates and Tigris Company, and under the new indenture the Company were expressly relieved of the liability to carry, free of charge, specie and other valuables sent by post; the change was highly advantageous to the Company, especially as the subsidy was maintained on a somewhat liberal scale, being fixed at Rs. 36,000 per annum. In 1894 the contract was again renewed; but the annual subsidy was reduced to Rs. 24,000, an amount which appeared sufficient in view of the services performed and of the prosperous condition of the Company's business.

Latest contract and conditions, 1904.

In 1905 the mail contract between the Secretary of State for India and the Euphrates and Tigris Company was renewed for 10 years with effect from the 1st of May 1904, the subsidy being continued at the rate of Rs. 24,000 per annum. The principal conditions were that the Company should run a weekly steamer in both directions between Basrah and Baghdad; that His Majesty's mails and Government specie should be carried free, in consideration of the subsidy; and that the vessels of the line should be placed at the disposal of Government, at a rate fixed in the contract, if required at any time for the transport of troops or stores, for towage, or for any other purpose. Provision was also made for regulating the times of arrival and departure and the places of call of the steamers. Failures to perform the contract were made condonable in case they arose from accident, insufficiency of water in the low season, or other circumstances over which the Company had no control, or when the strict fulfilment of the contract might be incompatible with the reasonable requirements of the Company's ordinary trade; but the Company were made liable, in case of delays not excusable under these rules, to a penalty of Rs. 15 for every hour lost.

Establishment of Indian post offices in the Persian Gulf, 1864-92.

The re-opening in 1862 of direct communication between India and the Persian Gulf gave rise to a demand for properly organised post offices. For a time letters were forwarded in packets from Bombay and Karāchi to Basrah and other ports in the Gulf, and were distributed by the agents of the British India Company, who also collected letters for despatch; but the methods of distribution and posting were primitive and unsatisfactory. Some of the letters were prepaid with Indian postage stamps; but the majority were either unpaid or insufficiently paid, and no attempt was made to realise the proper postal dues.

The need of a better system of postal communication having become apparent, the Government of India, on the recommendation of the local political officers, decided that it should be supplied. Post offices were opened at Masqat and Bushehr, on the 1st of May 1864; at Lingeh and Bandar 'Abbas, on the 1st of April 1867; at Basrah and Baghdad, on the 1st of January 1868; and at Gwadar, on the 12th of April 1868. Supplementary post offices, completing the system, were added at Jashk, on the 1st of September 1880; at Bahrain, on the 1st of August 1884; and at Muhammareh, on the 19th of July 1892.

Discipline, control and inspection of the Persian Gulf post offices, 1864-1907.

From the first a tacit understanding prevailed that the postal Discipline. employés in charge of the Gulf offices should be subject, in non-departmental matters, to the authority of the political officers having jurisdiction at their stations, and in some cases the offices were at first worked by members of the political officers' establishments; but no principle was expressly laid down and some regrettable friction occurred, especially at Masqat and Basrah where the postmasters for a time succeeded in shaking off the bonds of departmental discipline as well as of political control. Since 1879, the Postmaster-General of Bombay has consistently treated the Gulf offices as dependent on the political or consular establishments to which they are attached; but even this did not prevent the occurrence of some trouble at Basrah in 1882-83. In 1884, however, a distinct ruling was given by the Government of India as to the position of the Postmasters at Basrah and Baghdad, since which year there has been no insubordination.

The post offices in the Persian Gulf were at first included in the Control. Bombay Postal Circle; but in 1869 they were transferred to the Sind Circle and placed under the Chief Inspector of Post Offices, Sind; in 1879 they were re-transferred to the Bombay Circle and came again under the authority of the Postmaster-General of Bombay. In 1892 the post

offices of the Persian Gulf, including those of Turkish, 'Irāq, were constituted a divisional charge; and it was ordered that, in view of the peculiar character of the duties connected with the appointment, it should always be held by a European. The first Superintendent of the Persian Gulf division was Mr. O'Shea, appointed in September 1883; he made several visits to all the offices under his control, and under his auspices a post office was established in Bahrain and a postal service was provided for the town of Qishm. In 1879 the headquarters of the Superintendent. which had hitherto been at Bombay, were transferred for the greater part of the year to Bushehr; but during the months of June, July and August he was to be at Bombay. In 1892 the arrangements were again altered, and the Superintendent was replaced at Bombay with orders to spend four months of the year on tour inspecting the offices of his division. From 1893 to 1899 the Superintendent, Persian Gulf, held collateral charge of the town sub-offices in Bombay; but in the latter vear he was relieved of this duty; and in 1900 he was provided with a personal clerk.

The first inspection of the Persian Gulf postal arrangements was made by Mr. Vears, an officer of the Bombay circle, in 1867, when no regular offices as yet existed except at Masqat and Bushehr, but letters were informally distributed and collected for despatch at various places by the political staffs or by the agents of the British India Company. Mr. Vears's tour brought to light a number of abuses and irregularities, especially in the non-regulation offices, which steps were taken to remove: and the establishment of regular post offices at Bander 'Abbas, Lingeh, Basrah and Baghdad,—at first on an experimental footing,—were among its principal results. The next inspection was carried out by the Chief Inspector of Post Offices, Sind and the Persian Gulf, in 1869. was no further inspection of the offices till 1879 when Mr. Carter, the officer deputed for the purpose, died in the course of his tour, and was buried at Jashk. In 1880 it was arranged that the Gulf offices should. for the future, be inspected once a year by a qualified postal superintendent or other officer; but departmental supervision was not fully introduced until 1883, since which year it has been thorough and continuous.

General working of the Persian Gulf post offices, 1864-1907.

The Gulf post offices, from the date of their foundation until 1903, were treated as belonging in every respect to the Indian inland system; certain changes made in 1903, which will be described hereafter, were only partial, not affecting internal procedure; and the offices still deal with one another, and with offices in India, on practically the same footing as if they were situated in India.

In the present place we shall mention only questions of working which are more or less general to the whole division; and those which affect single offices, or offices of a single political jurisdiction only, will be dealt with separately further on.

In 1877-79 a number of official letters addressed to officers in the Foreign Department of the Government of India by the Residents at Bushehr and Baghdad failed to reach their proper destinations, while others were greatly delayed in transmission, one from Bushehr being received in 61 instead of 20 days, and one from Baghdad in 49 instead of 28 days, after despatch. In more than one case duplicates specially sent to the Foreign Department in place of lost originals also disappeared; and in all 47 Persian Gulf letters and 5 Baghdad letters of the years 1877 and 1878 were missed. In 1879 there were two fresh cases of non-receipt. Some of the lost documents were important, others unimportant. The correspondence of the Resident in the Persian Gulf with the Government of Bombay, however, continued to arrive with perfect regularity, and in one instance a registered letter reported missing was proved by means of the receipt to have reached the Foreign Department, from which circumstances it may be suspected that the correspondence in question was not really lost or delayed in the Post office, but mislaid after receipt (??).

Loss of Foreign Department correspondence from the Persian Gulf and Baghdād, 1877-79.

One of the special features of the Gulf postal division is a system of personal letter bags, which has been arranged by the postal authorities for the convenience of the British Consuls-General at Bushehr and Baghdād and of the Consuls at Masqat and Basrah. The system began on a request, made in 1882 by the Colonel Ross, Political Resident and Consul-General in the Persian Gulf, for a special bag which could be removed from the ship at the port most convenient for rapid delivery, and which should be treated in the same manner as the bags arranged for Her Majesty's ships in the Gulf. Colonel Ross's request was granted, and the bag for the Resident in the Persian Gulf was at first made up at Bombay. In 1884 the Post Office, of its own motion, provided similar bags for the other officers who at present enjoy the same privilege; and these special mails are now made up both by the Bombay-Karachi sea post office and by the post office at Karachi.

Personal letter bags, 1882-1907.

Postal insurance was introduced in India from the 1st of January 1878 and was extended at the same time to the Persian Gulf offices; but the peculiar conditions under which trade is carried on in the Gulf led to unforeseen uses (and indeed abuses) of the insurance system, and ultimately necessitated its withdrawal. The facilities offered for the despatch of specie insured by post were taken advantage of by the Jewish and Armenian merchants of Baghdad, and to a lesser extent by those of Basrah, for sending money to Bombay - chiefly to Jewish firms—in payment for the drafts by means of which the remitters' debts to foreign creditors were settled. The total value of the postal insurances effected at Baghdad rose from Rs. 27,000 in 1878-79 to over 24 lakhs of rupees in 1882-83. In 1884 the Tigris and Euphrates Steam Navigation Company protested against this development of postal operations, on the ground that it not only robbed them of a large part of their income from the carriage of a specie but also saddled them with obligations more onerous than had been contemplated in the contract which they held for the carriage of the British mails. In 1884 the same question arose in a slightly different form in Bahrain, where the pearl merchants, immediately upon the institution of a post office there,

Postal insurance, 1878-1907.

availed themselves of the insurance system for the despatch abroad of large quantities of valuable pearls. By this practice the British India Steam Navigation Company were the principal losers, and they too protested against the competition of the Post Office with their legitimate carrying trade. As the contentions of the two companies appeared to the Government of India to be reasonable and as there was considerable risk of loss of specie, especially in transhipment at Basrah or while deposited there in the unprotected post office, the faculty of insurance was abolished. with effect from the 1st of July 1885, in regard to articles despatched to. from or between the post offices of the Persian Gulf division. The abolition of insurance stimulated the demand for money orders; but there was a loss of revenue to the post office which was estimated in the years immediately following the change at over Rs. 18,000 per annum and something like consternation at first prevailed among the native merchants of Bachdad, whose established method of doing business totally upset.

Indian Customs requirements, 1894-1907.

In 1894, in consequence of the passing of the Indian Tariff Act, it was ordered that all parcels despatched from the post offices of the Gulf division should thenceforward be accompanied by customs declarations.

Histories, in brief, of the various Indian post offices and postal stations in the Persian Gulf, 1864-1907.

Before we pass on to consider political questions that have arisen in connection with British Indian post offices in Persia and Turkish 'Irāq it will be convenient to summarise separately the history of each of the Gulf offices.*

Masqat, 1864-1907. The post office at Masqat was opened on the 1st of May 1864, and the duties of Postmaster were at first carried on, under the supervision of the Political Agent, by a subordinate of the Indian Medical Department, who was in medical charge of the British Agency; the postal work was then transacted at a rented building in the town. In 1866, during the disturbances which accompanied the accession of Sālim to the Sultanate of 'Omān, no steamers called at Masqat between March and July, and the post office was temporarily closed.

In 1869 it was found necessary, in consequence of the increase of postal business, to appoint a regular postmaster from India; but the change gave rise to trouble which continued until 1872. The first Postmaster under the new system assumed independent powers vis à vis of the Political Agent and in 1872 accepted the local agency of the Oman Ottoman line of steamers—a Turkish interest; he was ultimately removed from the Masqat appointment and dismissed from the Postal Department. His successor proved corrupt and disrespectful and was transferred to another post. In 1871, during the struggle between Turki and 'Azzān in the neighbourhood of Masqat, the post office was

^{*} A table of the existing offices in the Gulf, with particulars of staff, etc., forms Annexure No. 3 to this Appendix.

located in the harbour for a few days on the barque "Belle Isle" from Sunderland.

In 1873, to obviate the administrative difficulties which had arisen, accommodation was found for the post office on the ground floor of the British Agency, and the postal staff was amalgamated with that of the Political Agent's office.

In 1880, in consequence of an increase in the regular work of the Agency establishment, as also in the postal work, the latter increase being due partly to the introduction of the money order system, a separate official existence was once more given to the post office at Masqat; but it continued to be located in the Agency, and the Postmaster remained subject to the authority of the Political Agent except in departmental matters,—an arrangement which still continues. In 1886 the Masqat office was deprived of the status of a head office, which it had hitherto enjoyed, and was reduced to that of a sub-office.

At Masqat parcels arriving by post have from the beginning, in order to prevent smuggling, been delivered to the addressees at fixed times in the presence of a member of the Sultān's Customs Department. Newspapers which are considered objectional by the Sultān of Masqat have been, since March 1902, intercepted by the post office and consigned to the Dead Letter Office at Pombay.

A post office was opened in Bahrain on the 1st August 1884 under Mr. O'Shea, the first Superintendent of the Persian Gulf division; it was located, until the appointment of a European political officer in Bahrain, in the house of the Residency Agent at Manamah, the commercial capital of the islands. Before this, from 1875 to 1884, the native agent of the British India Steam Navigation Company in Bahrain had received a small allowance from the Postal Department in consideration of his discharging some of the functions of a post office; but his duties, though simple, were not satisfactorily performed. The abolition of postal insurance in Bahrain and the resultant increase in the money order business have already been mentioned. Commission on money orders in Bahrain was raised to two per cent. about 1890, on a complaint from the British India Steam Navigation Company that very large sums in specie were being carried in the mail bags between Bahrain and Bûshehr, causing a loss to themselves in freight and a great increase in their responsibilities.

The Shaikh of Kuwait in 1901 solicited the establishment of an Indian post office at his port; and when, in August 1904, a British Political Agent was posted to Kuwait, he was accompanied by an Assistant Surgeon, who was to attend, inter alia, to postal business. No regular post office has as yet been inaugurated, on account of political difficulties; but private and official letters are both despatched and received for distribution. In 1904 an Agreement, of which the text will be found in Annexure No. 4 to this Appendix, was obtained from the Shaikh of Kuwait, that he would not allow the establishment of a post office at Kuwait by any foreign power except the British.

There is not, and has never been, an Indian post office at Fāo; but bags made up by the Bombay-Karāchi sea office and by the offices, at

Bahrain, 1884-1907.

Kuwait 1904

Fão, 1867-1907.

Karāchi, Būshehr and Basrah for the staff of the British telegraph station at Fāo, are regularly delivered there by the mail steamers in passing. The Bombay-Karāchi sea office and the Karāchi office bags were instituted in 1904 to prevent delay at Būshehr; only paid unregistered correspondence is enclosed in them, other articles being still bagged at Būshehr. The postal service at Fāo began in 1867, in which year the place was made a port of call for the mail steamers. Until 1886 letters, both paid and unpaid, for the Turkish officials at Fāo and occasional letters for residents of Arab villages on the opposite bank of the Shatt-al-'Arab were included in the bag sent from Basrah to Fāo; but, as the telegraph officials had no means of distribution at their command and difficulty was experienced in recovering postage on unstamped letters, the practice was discontinued, except in the case of letters and packets for Turkish officials and departments entitled under agreement to free postage.

Basrah, 1868-1907. The establishment of the office opened at Basrah on the 1st of January 1868 was among the results of Mr. Vears's tour in the preceding year; it was not however made permanent until July 1869. The management of the Basrah office was at first undertaken by the British Vice-Consul, with the assistance of a native clerk; but by the end of 1870 public confidence had been attracted, and the work had increased to such an extent that a regular postmaster with a sufficient staff was appointed from India.

In 1872, the Vice Consulate, which had hitherto been located at Kūt-al-Farangi, was removed to its present site lower down the Shattal-'Arab, and the post office was transferred with it; but a branch office, which the Postmaster had opened without sanction at his private residence in the native quarter, continued to serve the town of Basrah. On the arrival of a mail the letters for the European settlement, adjoining the new Vice-Consulate, were distributed first, and the remainder were carried by the Postmaster to his office in the town for distribution: the outgoing mail also was dealt with in a similar fashion. The existence of the post office in the town was not apparently discovered by the Postal Department until 1882, in which year an inspecting officer from Bombay, oblivious of the consular character of the post office, caused a pillar box for letters to be set up in the Suq Kadhim Agha and so further complicated the situation. The Turkish Government were at this time trying to obtain the suppression of the British post offices in Turkey and specifically requested the abolition of the Basrah town office; as, however, the office had existed for 15 years without objection, it was deemed inexpedient that it should be closed on the mere demand of the Turkish Government; but the pillar box was removed in 1883 by the Vice-Consul of his own motion.

In 1882-83, the Consul having to some extent dissociated himself from the affairs of the post office, the postmaster assumed airs of independence, corresponded direct with Turkish officials, and for some time carried a red ensign at the stern of the boat which he employed; these proceedings led to his summary removal and to the passing of orders by the Government of India in 1884, which we have already described elsewhere. In 1887, suitable quarters for the postmaster having been found in the neighbourhood of the Consulate, the town-office was closed

without reference to the Turkish demands; but the change, though satisfactory to the British political and postal authorities, was unwelcome to the native merchants of Basrah, who even presented a petition for its restoration.

At Basrah quarantine against India is now chronic, and, except when it is temporarily suspended, the mail from India is taken to the Bureau Sanitaire to be fumigated before being sent to the post office; the Bureau is at a place about quarter of a mile from the British Vice-Consulate.

The post office at Baghdād also owed its origin to Mr. Vears; it was opened experimentally on the same day as the office at Basrah—the 1st of January 1868—and became permanent in June 1869. It was placed at first in charge of the senior clerk of the residency staff, and this arrangement lasted until 1879, when, in consequence of the heavy work entailed by postal insurance, then recently introduced, and by the money order system which was to come into force from the 1st of January 1880, it was found necessary to appoint a trained Postmaster from India; but until 1884 one of the residency clerks continued to draw an allowance for assisting in postal work.

The introduction of postal insurance at Baghdad in 1877 and its abolition in 1885 have already been noticed in the paragraph on the general working of the offices of the Persian Gulf division.

With effect from the 1st of July 1904 the Baghdad office was raised from the status of a sub-office to that of a head office, and from the same date the accounts of the office began to be kept in Turkish instead of in Indian currency*, the rate of exchange between Līrah and rupee being altered, as necessary from time to time, by the British Political Resident; one object of this arrangement was to defeat the manœuvres of Baghdad speculators, who were accustomed to make a profit out of the post office by sending money orders in one direction or the other according to the state of exchange; and another reason was the prohibition by the Turkish Government of the importation of foreign silver coin.†

Muhammareh remained for a long time without steamer communication or proper postal arrangements.

In 1889 the opening of a British post office at Muhammareh was suggested by the British Vice-Consul at Basrah; in 1890 Muhammareh became a port of call for the steamers of the British India Company on their return voyage to India; and, in October of the same year, as no special restrictions were then imposed by the Turks in consequence of a visit to Muhammareh, a call upon the outward voyage also was introduced.

Baghdād, 1868-1907.

> Muhammareh, 1892-1905.

^{*}The logical order of events is the opposite of that given: Baghdad was made a head office because its accounts, being now in a different currency, could no longer be included in those of the Büshehr head office.

t In 1901, when Major Melvill, the British Resident at Baghdad, imported Rs 65,000 in specie from the Bushehr Besidency Treasury, the Turks objected, and the money had to be returned to Bushehr.

Steamer communication on the Kārūn River between Muhammareh and Ahwz having been opened by the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company, letters addressed to Muhammareh began to be posted at Basrah. The British Vice-Consul at Basrah arranged at first for their distribution at Muhammareh through the agents of the steamship company; but the necessity for a regular post office at Muhammareh soon became evident, and one was instituted on the 19th of July 1892. A Persian Post Office had been opened there in February 1892, and in 1892-93 a Persian postal service between Muhammareh, Shūshtar and Dizfūl was established; this service collapsed in November 1894 for want of funds, but it was subsequently re-established.

The Indian post office at Muhammareh has been from the first under purely departmental management; but it is located in the British Consulate building, and the Consul exercises a general supervision and decides questions that are referred to him.

Nāsiri, 1904-07. There is no regular British post office at Nāsiri, but, since the opening of a British Vice-Consulate there in 1905, the Vice-Consul's mails are carried overland between Muhammareh and Nāsiri, and vice versā, by couriers who are maintained as a part of his official establishment.

Būshehr, 1864-1905. The Büshehr post office shares with that of Masqat the honour of priority in the Persian Gulf; it was opened on the same date, the 1st of May 1864. There was then no Persian post office, and the delivery of letters, not only in Büshehr but also in some of the adjoining villages presumably only those of the peninsula, was undertaken by the Indian post office, and in 1869 a special postman was added to the staff for the better performance of this duty. The Büshehr post office was established within the precincts of the British Residency, where it has since remained; and it has been subject from the first to the control of the Political Resident.

At Büshehr occurred one of the very few discreditable incidents belonging to the history of the Indian post office in the Persian Gulf. In 1886 the postmastership was held by an Asiatic who had served the British Government for upwards of 20 years, first as an interpreter in the Indo-European Telegraph Department and then for about 15 years in the Postal Department. A serious accumulation of unadjusted accounts having been observed, the removal of the postmaster was directed and a departmental enquiry was ordered, though there was as yet no suspicion of fraud. The enquiry, however, showed that the posmaster had been guilty during several months in 1886 of misapplying Government money, and that he had committed defalcations amounting to upwards of Rs. 5,000. He was subsequently tried by the Sessions Court of Bombay and sentenced to six years' rigorous imprisonment.

Lingeh, 1867-1905.

The office at Lingeh was established on the 1st of April 1867, on the recommendation of Mr. Vears; it was located at first on the sea-front, later at the back of the town, and finally, in 1871, in a house engaged by the Residency Agent upon the seashore about 100 yards from the Customs house. So long as the British occupation

of Bāsīdu was maintained, a boat was sent from that station to meet each mail steamer, and, although there was no post office at Bāsīdu, an exchange of mails was carried on; these arrangements ceased with the abandonment of the Bāsīdu station in May 1853.

The most notable event in the history of the Lingeh post office is a burglary which occurred on the night of the 21st of April 1898; the post office safe was broken into, and cash amounting to more than Rs. 3,000 was stolen. In consequence of this robbery, for which the Persian Government declined to acknowledge any responsibility, the rate of commission on money orders was raised at Lingeh to two per cent., in order to check the accumulation of money, and a permanent guard of three Persian soldiers was obtained on payment.

General supervision of the Lingeh sub-office, which is under Būshehr, is exercised by the Political Resident at Būshehr through the Residency Agent at Lingeh.

The post office at Bandar 'Abbās was opened, concurrently with that at Lingeh, on the 1st of April 1867; not only the mercantile community but also the Persian Governor of Bandar 'Abbās had begged for its establishment; and it was from the first in every respect a success, the income largely exceeding the expenditure.

Bandar 'Abbās, 1867-1905.

From a station of the Indo-European Telegraph Department which existed on an islet in Khor-ash-Sham (Elphinstone Inlet) on the opposite or Arabian coast from 1864 to 1868, a boat used to be sent to Bandar 'Abbās to meet the mail steamer. There was no post office at "Telegraph Islet", but the Postmaster of Bandar 'Abbās received for despatch the mails sent from the telegraph station, and despatched in return such articles as were received in his office addressed to "Telegraph Islet."

In 1882 a Persian post office was established at Bandar 'Abbās and a system of Anglo-Persian co-operation was arranged, in regard to mails for the interior, which is described further on in the paragraph on political questions.

In 1884, to avoid the consignment to the Dead Letter Office of numerous letters addressed to Qishm vid Bandar 'Abbās, a letter box was set up in Qishm town near the residence of the Shaikh and was visited thrice a week by a postman from Bandar 'Abbās; this measure was pecuniarily a success and was a great boon to the traders at Qishm who had relations with Bombay and Karachi. The Qishm service was discontinued in 1902, in consequence of the delivery of letters by Indian post offices in Persia being restricted to the precincts of post offices.

Informal postal arrangements existed at Jāshk from the foundation of the telegraph station at that place in 1868 until the 1st of September 1880, when a regular post office was established. Previously to 1880 the Assistant Superintendent in charge of the telegraph station had discharged the duties of postmaster; and since 1880 the work has been performed by one of the telegraph clerks, on an allowance provided by the Postal Department. The Jāshk office has little business besides that which depends on the presence of the telegraph staff and of the Indian military detachment. For the sake of simplicity in working it is classed

Jāchk, 1880-1907. not as a sub-office but as a branch office; it is authorised, however, to transact British postal order and Indian money order business through the head office at Karachi.

Gwadar. 1863-1907.

The post office at Gwadar was established on the 12th of April 1868, and has undergone many vicissitudes of management; before its establishment postal work had been carried on in an informal way by the Assistant Political Agent posted to Gwadar in 1863, who received mails made up by the Karachi and Masqat offices and in return made up mails for those offices.

The Gwadar post office was at first worked as a sub-office by departmental agency and occupied a separate shed; but in 1873-74 the management was made over to the Indo-European Telegraph Department, the duties of postmaster being thereafter performed by one of the telegraph clerks and the office itself being transferred to a room in the telegraph buildings. This arrangement only lasted a year, for the unhealthiness of Gwadar necessitated frequent transfers of the telegraph clerks, and the postal work suffered from the repeated changes of personnel.

In 1884, however, the working of the office was re-transferred to the Indo-European Telegraph Department, with whom it remained until the abolition of the sub-post a telegraph station in 1893 on account of its unhealthiness; a sub-postmaster from India then took charge.

On the 5th of April 1895 telegraphic communication by land line having meanwhile been re-established at Gwadar, a combined post and telegraph sub-office which had existed on an experimental footing since October 1894, was made permanent, and this office still remains. Owing to the insalubrity of the station and the frequent illness or absence of the individual in charge it was found necessary, in 1899, to revise the terms of the appointment in such a manner as to improve the pay of acting substitutes.

Duty is not levied at Gwadar on parcels addressed to employés of the British Government; but it is collected on all other parcels by the customs officials of the Sultan of 'Oman.

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Political and semi-political questions connected with the Indian offices in Persia, 1864-1507.

Until 1877, the year in which Persia established a postal system of her own, there were no post offices at all in the interior of Persia, nor any, except those maintained by the Indian Government, upon the Persian coast. The British Legation at Tehran and the British Agencies at Isfahan and Shīraz, however, discharged some of the functions of post offices by collecting letters for despatch to Büshehr and India, and by distributing letters, received from or through the Bushehr office, for the benefit of British officials and subjects and a few other persons—including Persian officials—known to and favoured by the British authorities.

At this period two services between Bushehr and the interior, initia-

ted apparently in 1864, were maintained by the British authorities; the

first was a weekly or fortnightly line between Bushehr and Shīrāz,

passing through the stations of the Indo-European Telegraph Department; the second, generally known as the Legation Chapar, was a fourweekly line between Bushehr and Tehran, running via Shīraz and Isfahān. From Būshehr to Shīrāz (180 miles) the mail bags, partly on account of the difficulty of the track and partly for the sake of economy, were carried by Qasids or foot-runners, borne on the establishment of the Bushehr Residency; but from Shīraz to Isfahān (300 miles) and from Isfahān to Tehrān (250 miles) they were conveyed by Ghulāms of the Tehran Legation, who were mounted on horses hired from the Persian Chāpār service. No charge was made for carriage by the Legation Chāpār even of letters totally unpaid; but after 1870, in consequence of an agreement between the authorities concerned, prepayment at Indian inland rates by means of Indian stamps was required in the case of letters posted in India for places in Persia or in Persia for places in India; and at the same time unpaid letters arriving in India from Büshehr or at the Büshehr post office from India were made subject to the ordinary rules of the Indian Post Office. A small delivery fee, which had always been recovered at the places in the interior served through Bushehr, was maintained to cover the cost of carriage in India and between India and Bushehr, but letters for telegraph stations were delivered free, and Persian officials who were permitted to use the line enjoyed the privilege of franking their correspondence. The Legation Ghulams were not prohibited from carrying letters, otherwise than in the Legation bag, for other employers; and the Ghulams between Tehrān and hīrāz sometimes earned as much as Rs. 100 by this means in a single journey. It should be mentioned that there existed, side by side with the Legation Mail, a Chapar or horse post irregularly worked by the Persian Government between Shīrāz and Tehrān; the raison d'être of this line was the carriage of Persian Government despatches, but specie, parcels and letters were also accepted from private individuals for transmission. Special fees were charged on this Persian line for valuables; but the rates for letters were fixed and ranged from 1 to 2 Qrāns. In 1875 it was announced that the Persian Government intended to establish a postal administration of their own, and that they had improvised a postage stamp and engaged an Austrian postal official. In July 1876 this employé, who had meanwhile succeeded in instituting a postal service

Inland services from Bu-hehr before 1877.

In 1875 it was announced that the Persian Government intended to establish a postal administration of their own, and that they had improvised a postage stamp and engaged an Austrian postal official. In July 1876 this employé, who had meanwhile succeeded in instituting a postal service between Tehrān and Europe viā Tabrīz, was appointed to the Directorship-General of Persian Posts. In August 1817, after the Government of India had been consulted by the Director of the International Office at Berne and had agreed to the proposal on certain conditions, Persia was admitted to membership of the International Postal Union with effect from the 1st of September 1877. In February 1878 an agreement for the interchange of closed mails was concl. ded between Persia and the Government of India, of which the following were the principal provisions:—

Establishment of a Persian Postal Department, 1875-1877.

(1) that on the Indian side the post office at Bombay and the Indian post office at Büshehr should be offices of exchange;

(2) that all correspondence for India, and for countries served through India, should be placed by the Persian post office in

a closed mail for Bombay;

(3) that all correspondence for places in the Persian Gulf and for Basrah and Baghdād in Turkish 'Irāq should be sent in a closed mail to the Indian post office at Büshehr for sorting and despatch to the Indian post offices at those places; and

(4) that correspondence between India and Persia should be subject

to certain special Union rates of postage.

The first Director-General of Persian Posts organised an efficient system and placed it in a good working order; but he was dissatisfied with his position and resigned it at the end of his three years' contract. A Russian, who had been his assistant, succeeded him and maintained the efficiency of the postal system but was wrongfully* dismissed on a charge of peculation, which was not established; and in 1880 the management fell into the hands of unqualified persons—French, Armenians, Persians, and others. The immediate result was disorganisation, which at one time threatened a total collapse; but eventually, in 1892, the services as Inspector-General of M. Arnold, a German accountant, were secured, and a state of comparative efficiency was restored.

Abolition of the Indian service between Bushehr and the interior, 1877.

An early result of the foundation of a Persian Post Office was the abolition of the quasi-public mail service maintained by the British and Indian Governments between Büshehr and the interior.

In 1876, after the appointment of the first Director-General of Persian Posts, a proposal was made, apparently at his instance, that the British Indian postmaster at Bushehr should be placed in charge also of a Persian post office at the same place, and that the British arrangements for the carriage of mails between Bushehr and Tehran should be utilised to supplement others which the Persian Postal Department was about to introduce; both requests were however courteously declined by the British authorities. At the beginning of 1877, before the entry of Persia into the International Postal Union, the Persian Government notified to the British Legation at Tehran that they had instituted a weekly post between Bushehr and Tehran, and at the same time they asked that the Persian and British mails should be interchanged at Bushehr, and that all postal matter transmitted to or from the interior should in future be sent by the Persian mail; these proposals, as will be seen from the agreement of February 1878 already quoted above, were accepted in so far as they related to the interchange of mails at Bushehr; and, though the British official up-country mail was continued, private correspondence was no longer allowed to be sent by its means, and the quasi-public postal service of the British and Indian Governments in Persia ceased.

Establishment of a In 1882 a Persian post office was opened at Bandar 'Abbās, and direct postal communication was opened by the Persian Government

^{*}The Persian Government had, in the end, to compensate him by paying him the amount of his salary for the unexpired period of his contract.

between that place and Yazd, Tehrān, Mashhad and other towns of Persia. Interchange of mails on the same principles as at Būshehr was immediately after this arranged between the Indian and the Persian post offices at Bandar 'Abbās. At Bandar 'Abbās addresses not written in Persian are translated by the Indian office before the mail is handed over to the Persian postmaster.

Persian service between Bandar 'Abbas and the interior, 1882.

Restriction of the privileges of the Indian post offices in Persia, 1901-07.

Notwithstanding the organisation of a Persian Postal Department, the British Indian post offices on the coast of the Gulf continued to exist; and for a number of years no changes were made in their working, except such as naturally resulted at Bushehr from the abolition of the quasi-public service to Shīrāz and beyond; at each office mails were still collected for despatch to the other offices of the Persian Gulf division and to India, and mails were received from the same quarters and were distributed locally. In all cases postage was charged at Indian inland rates and was paid by means of Indian stamps. There were thus anomalies of procedure which it was not likely that the Persian Post Office. under European management, would long tolerate without protest; but no complaints appear to have been received until 1901, by which year the successful development of the Persian Imperial Customs under Belgian management had suggested to the Shah's ministers the advantage of restricting, so far as possible, foreign privileges which trenched upon the revenue or the authority of Persian Departments.

Discontinuance of the Indian service between places in Persia, 1901-02.

In 1901, M. Arnold, who was now described as Administrator General of Persian Posts, called in question the propriety of a public mail service between places in Persia being carried on, as it was in part, by the Indian Post Office; his complaint referred to the interchange of Indian mails between the ports of the Persian Gulf at which there were Indian offices. Persian mails were interchanged between the same 02. places; but the Persian offices received less patronage, even from the Persian public, as their rates were higher; and the Persian offices in the Gulf were at this time worked at a loss. The justice of M. Arnold's objections having been recognised by the Government of India, it was arranged that the Indian post offices at the ports of Muhammareh, Büshehr, Bandar 'Abbas and Lingeh should not in future accept postal matter intended for delivery at any place in Persia, and that articles posted at the Indian post office in contravention of the new orders should be treated as unpaid and transferred to the local Persian offices for disposal. Early in 1902, on receipt of information that Persian offices had been opened at Jashk and Chahbar, the same regulation was applied to the Indian post office at Jashk. Articles franked by British political and consular officers were, however, exempted from the operation of these orders, and remained subject to the old régime.

In 1902, apparently by way of assimilating the practice in Persia to that followed in Turkish 'Irāq, orders were issued to all the Indian post offices in Persian territory to discontinue sending letters for delivery out of the post office, except such as were addressed to high officers of the British or Fersian Governments or to foreign consular officers. The abolition of the delivery at Qishm and of the town and suburban delivery at Būshehr was necessitated by this prohibition Since 1902 all deliveries have been effected within the precincts of the

Abolition of Indian mail deliveries in Persia outside the precincts of the Indian post offices, 1902. British offices, except in the case of non-local letters, which are handed to the Persian post office for disposal; local letters not called for within three weeks are returned to the Dead Letter Office.

Substitution
of foreign
for inland
rates in the
Invita post
offices in
Persia, 1903.

The first practice of the Indian Post Office in Persia to be called in question by the recently reformed Persian Post Office, of which the management had been transferred to the Persian Imperial Customs in 1902, was the carriage of correspondence to and from India, and between the offices of the Persian Gulf division, at Indian inland rates. The point was raised by M. Naus, the Belgian Director-General of Posts and Customs, who represented that, in consequence of the Indian inland rates being lower than the Union rates adopted by Persia, the Persian post office was being subjected to unfair competition. To meet the wishes of the Persian Director General, and to put an end to an anomaly which might have compromised the position of the Indian Post offices in Persia, the demand was conceded; and from the 1st of June 1903 the correspondence in question was made subject to the foreign rates and rules of the Indian Post Office. Parcels and British official covers were still, up to 1907, allowed to pass at the old rates; but no express or permanent concession was granted in this respect.

Controversy regarding the use of Indian stamps in Persia, 1904-05. The habitual use of Indian stamps in Persian territory was a delicate matter, which could not long, in the circumstances, remain out of controversy. As early as 1890 objections had been raised by the Persian Post Office to the franking with Indian stamps at Bandar 'Abbās of letters addressed to places in Persian territory on the Persian Gulf; and the use of Indian stamps for this purpose has now been forbidden.

In 1904 M. Dambrain, Director-General of Customs and Post Offices on the Persian Coast, forwarded to the British Indian Postmaster the cover of an official letter sent him by the British Consul at Bandar 'Abbās through the Indian post office, and claimed payment of postage on the ground that the letter had been prepaid with Indian instead of Persian stamps. The claim was referred to the British Legation at Tehrān, but up to 1907 no decision on the point had been reached.

In 1905 the question of the stamps to be used on letters sent abroad was suddenly raised at Muhammareh. Hitherto letters posted at other places in Persia and stamped with Persian stamps had been accepted by the British Indian Post Offices for transmission abroad; but the use of Indian stamps on foreign letters posted at places where an Indian office existed had been rigorously insisted on, and by a tacit understanding the Persian post offices at such places had hitherto declined to receive any letters for abroad. It was this system which the Persian post office now sought to upset; but their demands were resisted by the British diplomatic and consular authorities in Persia, and in 1907 the matter was still unsettled.

Conflict in regard to the treatment of the Indian parcels mail in Persia, 1904-05.

The question of the parcel post, to which we have not as yet had occasion to allude, has, since the transfer of the Persian postal system to the management of the Customs Department, engendered differences more acrimonious than those arising from the letter post.

The first arrangement for an exchange of parcels between India and Persia was introduced on the 1st of July 1893. The British Indian and persian post offices at Būshehr were constituted offices of exchange, the former receiving Re. 1 for every parcel sent from Persia, and the latter Rs. 2-8-0 for each parcel sent to Persia. From the 1st of November 1893, the German Post Office began to exchange closed parcel bags with the Persian post office through the intermediacy of the Indian post office, which received a transit fee at the rate of 2 francs per parcel for its services. The interchange of both parcels and letters was only once interrupted at Būshehr in the spring of 1897, when the Persian Post Office, from fear of plague, for a few days refused to accept any mails from the Indian office; an assurance however that the mails were thoroughly disinfected sufficed to remove their scruples.

When Persia joined the Parcel Post Union in 1903 the former arrangements were brought to an end; and from the 1st of October in that year a parcel service on the ordinary international lines was instituted. Its operations were restricted—in the part of Persia with which we are concerned—to Muhammareh, Büshehr, Lingeh, Bandar 'Abbas, Jāshk and Chahbār; but the Persian post offices at those places undertook to convey the parcels to the interior of Persia and to recover the charges for conveyance inland from the addressees. The Indian post offices at Muhammareh, Lingeh, Bandar 'Abbas and Jāshk were constituted offices of exchange, at first for parcels received from the Persian post office and subsequently for parcels exchanged in both directions. Parcels from India intended for delivery at the places named above can now be prepaid either at Indian inland or at union rates at the option of the sender; those prepaid at union rates are transferred on arrival to the Persian post office for disposal.

Trouble in connection with the parcel post arose at Būshehr in 1904; it was due to an intemperate onslaught by the Imperial Persian Customs on an established practice whereby, at that place, the Indian parcel mails were conveyed direct between the ship and Indian Post office. The dispute was not confined to the parcel mail but related also to the letter mail, which, so the Persian Customs and Persian postal officials contended, ought on landing to be handed over to the Persian Post Office. The claim was based upon certain clauses of the Règlement Douanier of 1904; but the British authorities refused to admit it, and argued that the old established privileges of the Indian Post Office had a political origin and history, and could not therefore be abrogated by a merely commercial arrangement such as the Règlement.

The progress and final settlement of this contest at Būshehr, and of a similar but less important one at Muhammareh, are related in the Appendix on the Imperial Persian Customs and need not be described again in this place. In the end it was arranged that the Indian parcels should be conveyed direct, as formerly, between the mail steamers and the Indian post office; but increased facilities were given to the Persian authorities for satisfyin, themselves that dutiable articles were not smuggled into Persia by the Indian post.

Hardly had this matter been settled when the Persian Customs raised a fresh difficulty by claiming that samples arriving by post should be treated as parcels and submitted for their examination. On the one

Dispute concerning the Indian sample post in Persia, 1905. hand the demand was in accordance with a clause of the Règlement Douanier of 1904; on the other, as the letter mail was not subject to inspection by the Customs, compliance would have involved the elimination of sample packets from the letter mail, a procedure which could not be demanded in accordance with Union rules. M. Naus, Minister of Customs and Posts, represented that there was considerable danger of the sample post being abused for purposes of trade, and he pressed hard for a revised classification of mails in this respect; but in face of the British opposition he was unable to carry his point.

Suggested postal convention between India and Persia, 1904.

The failure of the Persian Ministry of Customs and posts to get the better of the Indian Post Office in the three disputes with which we have dealt seems to have convinced them of the necessity for a new and more conciliatory policy. In May 1905, M. Naus expressed a strong desire to conclude with the Government of India a postal convention which should settle all doubtful points and remove every cause of friction; he suggested that an officer of the Indian Post Office should be deputed to Tehran for the purpose. The idea was favourably received by Sir A. Hardinge, British Minister at Tehran, and in June 1905 he was authorised by His Majesty's Government to make, in consultation with the Government of India, a postal arrangement with Persia which should follow the lines of procedure observed by the British post office at Constantinople. The Government of India, on being consulted, declared their reluctance to engage in any negotiations which might result in the abrogation or curtailment of the privileges enjoyed by the Indian Post Office in Persia; they suggested the postponement of the discussion; and they urged that its scope should be confined to the question of the parcel post. The matter is still pending.

Articles prohibited in Persia.

Newspapers forbidden by the Persian Government have been liable, since 1899, to be intercepted by the Indian post offices and sent to the Dead Letter Office; but at the present moment there is no prohibited journal.

Political and quasi-political questions connected with the Indian Post Office in Turkish 'Iraq, 1868-1907.

Having completed the history of the Indian Post Office in Persia, we return to the period during which its arrangements took shape in Turkish 'Irāq. In 1867, at the time of Mr. Vears's tour, a rudimentary mail service of a very unsatisfactory character already existed, under the management of the British political officials, at Basrah and at Baghdād. A mail bag containing letters for Basrah and Baghdād was made up at Bombay and closed for Basrah; and this, along with letters placed in the ship's letter-box at intermediate ports in the Gulf, was simply handed over to the Vice-Consul at Basrah for disposal. The arrangements in the reverse direction were of a similarly haphazard character, and nearly all the letters carried were unstamped, with the exception of those posted in India itself.

The scheme for the establishment of regular British Indian post offices at Basrah and Baghdad received, in 1868, the cordial support of Sir A. Kemball, Political Resident in Turkish 'Iraq. Its execution was facilitated by the non-existence of a Turkish postal service, and by the consequent absence of political opposition on the part of the Turks; and the mail boxes and bags were landed, without objection or interference on the part of the Turkish customs officials, at the Vice-Consulate at Basrah and at the Residency at Baghdad. On the 25th of January 1868, Sir A. Kemball informed the Wali of Baghdad of the new arrangements and promised that the public correspondence of certain Turkish Government departments and officials should be carried free by the British post between Baghdad, Basrah and even Bombay, on condition that the official covers should be franked with the seal of the despatching department and should not contain private letters. These conditions were accepted both by the Wali and by the Indian Post Office, and the understanding, presumably, still holds good; but the Turkish Departments do not now exercise the privilege accorded to them.

Original acquiescence of the Turkish Government in the arrangements, 1868.

For some time after 1868 Indian postage stamps were sold on board the steamers of the Euphrates and Tigris Company, and letters were delivered by the steamers at Qūrnah, 'Amārah, 'Ali-al-Gharbi and Kūt-al-Amārah. as well as at other places where they touched. Stamped letters were also received on board the steamers for delivery at, or despatch through, Baghdād and Basrah.

Various postal agencies and lines were maintained or established in connection with the two British Indian post offices in Turkish 'Iraq. A regular delivery of letters was undertaken in the town of Baghdad, and letters for Kadhimain were kept in deposit until fetched by the addressees.

Letters from India for Karbala, where a number of Indian Muhammadans are settled, were at first sent monthly from Paghdād to the care of the Honorary Native Political Agent at Karbala, who arranged for their distribution; under this arrangement, which seems to have begun about 1866, the mail was carried by two messengers, who were entertained from the Oudh Bequest Fund for the purpose of maintaining official communication. In 1878 the Karbala mail was made weekly; but afterwards the service became irregular, and letters were sent out only as opportunities occurred; and in 1887, at the request of the Turkish authorities the Residency ceased to forward private letters to Karbala.

While dealing with the subject of Karbala, we may mention that after May 1894 correspondence received from abroad for Karbala. Najaf, Mūsal and other places in Turkish 'Irāq was, for a time, transferred for distribution to the Turkish Post Office and that correspondence from those places for abroad has since then been received from the Turkish Post Office for transmission under Union rules; but in 1898, in consequence of several registered letters for Karbala having been tampered with in the Turkish post, arrangements were made for the retention of registered letters for Karbala and Najaf in the Indian post office at Baghdād until the addressees could appoint agents to take delivery at Baghdād. At the present time lists of the registered letters received at Baghdād are sent unofficially to the British Vice-Consul at Karbala in order that the

Service at Paghdad and between Baghdad and other places in Turkish 'Iraq, 1866-1898.

addressees may be informed; and the letters are not returned to India as unclaimed until the expiry of a month.

Service between Baghdad and Tehran, 1864-1907.

A mail line very similar to that between Būshehr and Tehrān existed from 1864, or earlier, until about 1880 between Baghdad and Tehran: it passed through Kirmānshāh and Hamadān, and the principal stage was Kirmanshah, corresponding in some respects to Shīraz upon the Bushenr-Tehran line, Between Baghdad and Kirmanshah (210 miles) the mail was carried by footmen, and between Kirmanshah and Tehran (290 miles) by a mounted couriers belonging to the establishment of the British Legation in Persia. At the beginning of 1870, as on the Bushehr-Tehran line, postage at Indian rates between Baghdad and Tehran was imposed; but letters forwarded by the British Legation at Tehran and those exchanged between "Persian Princes and Notables residing at Tehran and Baghdad" were carried free. Some 25 years later the British Bachdad-Tehran line was abolished; and since then correspondence by this route has been carried on, within the Turkish frontier, exclusively by the Turkish Post Office. In 1904, nevertheless, the British Consul at Kirmanshah having pointed out that communication with India was more rapid through Baghdad than through Tehran, it was ordered that correspondence for Kirmanshah should in future be sent vid Baghdad unless specially superscribed for transmission via Tehran.

The "Desert" or "Dromedary" post from Baghdad to Damascus and Bairūt, which existed before the installation of any regular post office at Baghdad, was never incorporated with the Indian postal system; but it survived the development of modern postal arrangements for a time, and its later history calls for notice. In 1848 the Political Resident at Baghdad, by whom the line was managed, was permitted to levy "postage" at fixed rates on articles sent by it; and a grant of Rs. 200 a month was sanctioned by the Government of India to supplement the receipts from this source, and to enable the line to be efficiently worked. In 1868 the mails by the desert route were carried on camels over the 500 miles between Baghdad and Damascus and by special horsemen over the 100 miles between Damascus and Bairūt; they reached Syria on the average in 9 days, Egypt in 13 or 14, and Europe—vid Egypt and Smyrna—in 24 to 27 days; and the monthly cost of the service was Rs. 489. In 1869 the Ottoman authorities demanded that the Baghdad mails should be conveyed between Damascus and Bairūt on a line then lately established by means of a subsidised French deligence; but the British Consulate at Damascus, in view of the unreliability of the new Turkish post, preferred the old arrangement, and it was for some time In 1881, in the course of a campaign which they maintained. had then begun to wage against the British mail service Turkey, the Ottoman Government established a camel post of their own between Baghdad and Damascus; it ran side by side with the British consular post and carried letters at a loss at Union rates. Already in 1871, the Government of India, for purely financial reasons, had withdrawn their subsidy; and, partly for this reason and partly because of the competition of the Turkish camel post, the Baghdad-Bairut line fell into difficulties: its finances by 1885 had sunk to a low ebb. In July 1886 the British desert line was finally abolished; and in March 1887 the Turkish Government, perhaps as having achieved what was their real purpose at the time, closed their own line also. In 1889, however, the Turks re-opened the post route by Damascus and Bairūt, a dromedary thereafter leaving Baghdād every Thursday; and in May 1906 Aleppo was substituted for Damascus as the principal Syrian station. The courier on this line is occasionally robbed, or dies of intense cold or heat, by the way; but the mail, in such cases, is generally recovered after a time; and this post is now habitually used by the mercantile community at Baghdād. A Tatar post for Constantinople viá Mūsal and Diyārbakr also leaves Baghdād every Monday.

We come now to a series of persistent endeavours, made by the Porte between 1873 and 1887, to oust the Indian Post Office from Turkish Irāq.

These begna at the International Postal Conference held at Paris in 1878, where the Ottoman delegates urged the suppression of all foreign post offices in the Turkish dominions; the proposal was one which affected Great Britain, France, Germany, Austria and Italy; and the Conference declined to entertain it on the ground that it involved diplomatic considerations and therefore lay beyond their scope. By adhering to the Paris Postal Convention of 1878 Turkey succeeded in acquiring a more respectable, but entirely undeserved international status in postal matters.

In 1881 the latent antipathy of the Turks to the Indian Post Office was translated into action and showed itself in official competition with the British Baghdād-Damascus service, to which allusion has already been made, and in a small matter connected with the delivery of parcels at Baghdād. In the same year the abolition of the British desert post was requested by the Porte, both at Baghdād and through the British Ambassador at Constantinople; but the demand was successfully resisted. In 1882 the Ottoman Minister for Foreign Affairs recurred to the subject and pressed for the abolition not only of the desert post but also of the Indian post offices at Baghdād and Basrah; the demand was however withdrawn for the time, and a promise was even given that it would not be urged.

In 1883 the Turkish Minister for Foreign Affairs attempted to renew the discussion on the subject of the British desert post, but the British Embassy took their stand on the promise given in the previous vear and the matter dropped. The Turks about the same time resorted to local obstruction and made a half-hearted attempt, which was not successful, to detain at Qurnah the Euphrates and Tigris Company's steamer "Khalifah" proceeding with mails from Basrah to Baghdad; a crisis and negotiations followed, during which H.M.S. "Woodlark" was kept at Basrah in readiness for emergencies. On the 20th of August 1883, while those negotiations were still pending, the Wali of Baghdad demanded the abolition of the town office and letter box maintained by the Indian Post Office at Basrah, both of which have already mentioned in the history of the Basrah post office; and he caused a notice to be posted up, forbidding the use of any but Turkish post offices and ordering the exclusive use of Turkish stamps under penalty of a fine of one to five Līrahs. The penalty was in one or two instances actually enforced, and some consternation was caused among the merchants and Turkish officials

Attempt by the Turkish Government to obtain the abolition of the Indian post offices, in Turkish 'Iraq, or the curtailment of their privileges, 1878-1907.

1881-82.

1883.

who had been accustomed to make use of the Indian Post Office for the transmission of valuables and letters of importance. On the 29th of August 1883 the Wali of Baghdad complained of the refusal of the Indian post office at Basrah to accept from the Turkish Post Office letters for India and other foreign countries unless stamped with Indian stamps. On the 11th of September 1883 the contest was renewed at Constantinople by a futile demand on the part of the Ottoman Government "for suppression of the service with regard to the transport of letters and correspondence between Basrah and Baghdad by Messrs. Lynch & Co.'s steamers." A partial concession was made to Turkish objections by the discontinuance of house-to-house distribution of letters from the Indian post offices at Baghdad and Basrah and by the substitution of a window delivery; but the carriage of letters of Turkish subjects from Baghdad and Basrah to various river-bank places on the Tigris continued until February 1886, after which it ceased and such letters, when received by the British, were transferred to the Turkish Post Office.

1884.

In 1884 the Porte returned to the charge with a Memorandum drawn up by their Director General of Posts and Telegraphs; this manifesto laid stress on the equality of the postal position of Turkey with that of the other nations which had joined the Postal Union; proclaimed the ability of the Turkish Post Office to cope with the entire mail arrangements of Turkish 'Iraq; demanded the cessation of the British desert post: and asserted a liability on the part of the Euphrates and Tigris Company's steamers to carry the Turkish mails free of charge between Baghdad and Basrah. The last contention, though a paragraph of the Paris Convention was quoted in its support, was ill-founded; and the Ottoman demands were rejected in their entirety on the broad ground that they would entail a loss of facility in postal communication between India and Turkish Trag. Also in 1884, a system of searching passengers who disembarked from British steamers on the Tigris for letters not bearing Turkish stamps was introduced, but it was soon discontinued in consequence of diplomatic representations made at Constantinople.

1885-87.

In 1885 and 1887 fresh efforts were made by the Turkish Government to obtain the abolition of the Indian post offices at Baghdad and Basrah, but, like those which had preceded them, they were abortive.

1893-1901.

From 1893 onwards local letters posted at Baghdād for Basrah and vice versā were transferred to the Turkish post office for disposal; formerly a quantity of correspondence between those and intermediate places had been carried free, in an irregular manner, by the steamers of the Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Company. A scheme of procedure suggested by the Turkish Post Office in 1894, which would have resulted in the virtual closure of the British Office at Baghdad, was successfully thwarted. "Ship's letters", i.e., letters containing bills of lading, etc., or relating to cargo on board, continued to be carried unstamped by the Company's vessels until 1901, when portable letter-boxes were provided on board by the Ottoman Post Office for the reception of such covers; no use however was made of the boxes, and after some months they were withdrawn. In 1901, in consequence of a difficulty made by the Turkish post office at Jiddah

regarding the delivery of a registered letter posted at the Indian post office at Basrah, the Indian postmasters at Baghdād and Basrah were directed not in future to accept for registration letters addressed to places in Turkish territory, if deliverable through a Turkish office.

In 1903, when the Indian post to and from Persia was made subject to the rates and rules for foreign correspondence, the Indian post offices in Turkish 'Irāq were brought under the same régime; but British official correspondence and parcels continued to be charged at the Indian inland rates.

What has gone before relates chiefly to letter mails, and we may now deal separately with the political history of the Indian parcels post.

Soon after the foundation of the Indian post office at Baghdād in 1868, it was discovered that native traders were making use of the British parcel post to evade the payment of customs duty. The parcel service was thereupon temporarily suspended, and, on resumption, two new regulations were introduced: (1) that parcels should not be received for despatch unless accompanied by a pass from the Turkish Customs House and (2) that parcels arriving from elsewhere should only be delivered to the addressees in the presence of a Qawwās of the British Residency, by whom the addressees were to be at once conducted to the Customs House.

In 1881, at the request of the Turkish authorities, a trifling alteration was made in the procedure; and delivery to addressees thereafter took place in the presence of a messenger of the Turkish Customs House.

In 1882 a change in the management of the Baghdād customs led to complaints by Turkish officials against the established parcel post usage, and it was modified. The parcel bags were still landed with the letter bags at the Indian post office; but from that place they were now conveyed by the Indian postmaster to the Customs House and made over to the Customs authorities, a list signed by a Customs official being taken by way of acknowledgment. Delivery was made by the Customs House on production by the addressees of certificates signed by the Indian postmaster. The procedure at Basrah before 1892 is not ascertainable, but it was probably much the same as at Baghdād.

In 1892 the procedure was once more revised, and since then it has not been changed. The offices of exchange at Bombay, Karāchi and Būshehr now prepare detailed parcel invoices, one copy of which is sent in a closed cover to the head of the Turkish Customs House at Basrah or Baghdad, as the case may be, and another to the Indian postmaster. The parcel bags are opened in the Indian post office, in the presence of a Turkish Customs officer who takes charge of them, conveys them to the Customs House, and signs the postmaster's copy of the invoice by way of receipt; afterwards the parcels are delivered to the addressees by the Turkish Customs on presentation of delivery orders obtained from At Baghdad, since the abolition of insurthe Indian postmaster. ance, attempts are frequently made to smuggle precious stones and jewellery into the country by means of registered letters; and to prevent this suspected letters are now opened at the post office in the presence of the addressees, and, if found to contain dutiable articles, are either made

1903.

Questions specially affecting the Indian parcel post in Turkish'Irāq, 1868-190.

1881.

1882.

1892.

over to the Turkish Customs or returned to the senders. The time-honoured privilege of landing the British mails direct at the British post office has been maintained both at Basrah and Baghdad; but it is regarded with disfavour by the Turks.

Turkey adhered to the Universal Postal Conventions of Vienna (1891) and Washington (1897), but she is not a party to any Convention or Agreement relating to the Parcels Post Service. Parcels for Turkey are accepted in India since the 1st of January 1896.

Difficulties connected with money orders in Turkish 'Iraq, 1883-1889. The matter of money orders at Baghdad is a somewhat difficult one, chiefly on account of the remoteness of the place and of a prohibition issued by the Turkish Government in 1883 against the importation of foreign silver into the country. In order to obtain funds for the payment of money orders drawn on the Baghdad post office, the Political Resident, with whom the responsibility for the arrangements rests, is from time to time obliged to issue bills. These are sometimes accepted at a discount and sometimes at a premium, and special regulations have been found necessary to meet both cases.

1886.

In 1886, when discounts prevailed, it was decided that commission should be levied at a rate of one per cent. in excess of the rate of discount in order to maintain the rate of net commission at one per cent., and that when discount exceeded two per cent. the issue of money orders should be discontinued.

1889.

In 1889, when the Resident's bills were saleable at a premium and money accumulated too fast in the Residency treasury, the Resident was empowered to raise the commission on money orders, both at Baghdād and Basrah, to two per cent. when bills on India were selling at a premium of one per cent., and to stop the issue of money orders at both places when the premium rose above one per cent.

Articles prohibited Turkish 'Irāq.

In 1894 it was ascertained that the importation into Turkish 'Iraq of the following objects was prohibited:—arms and ammunition, poisonous drugs, worn clothes, articles likely to carry disease, and figures (other than simple portraits) of royal personages or other notabilities; to these have now been temporarily added a number of other articles considered capable of conveying plague. The exportation of antiquities is illegal; but it was carried on to some extent through the Indian post offices until 1895, when the practice was discovered and stopped by means of stricter rules regarding the acceptance of parcels. Books imported, except those obtained by foreign consular officers for their personal or official use, are subject to examination by the Turkish Director of Public Instruction in the capacity of censor; and in 1896 all book parcels received by letter mail were regularly sent him for scrutiny. Subsequently the custom fell into desuetude; but at some time before 1903, when it was discovered by the Indian postal authorities that objectionable publications were entering Baghdad by the Indian book post, the British Political Resident assumed the responsibility of examining the mails and of returning unapproved books to the senders through the Dead Letter Office. Newspapers and other publications prohibited by the Turkish Government are regularly consigned to the Dead Letter Office; in the black list of these there are nearly 200 names inserted between the years 1899 and 1903 alone.

ANNEXURE No. 1.

TABLE OF MAIL CONTRACTS
PERSIAN GULF DIVISION (EXCEPT
BASRAH-BAGHDĀD LINE).

ANNEXURE NO. 1.—TABLE OF MAIL CONTRACTS, PERSIAN GULF DIVISION (EXCEPT BASRAH-BANNEXURE NO. 1.—TABLE OF MAIL CONTRACTS, PERSIAN GULF DIVISION (EXCEPT BASRAH-BANNEXURE).

_	e of Ports of call.	Gwādar, Masqat, Bandar 'Abbās, Būshehr aud Basrah.	Masgat, Bandar 'Abbās, Musandam, Būshehr and Basrah.	Complete trip to Rarāchi, Gwādar, Masqat, be made in not Bandar 'Abbās, Lingeh, more than 38, or Būshehr, Fāo, Basrah, less than 33 and back by the same days, from route, with an optional	Marie Mari
	Contract rate of average speed.	i		Complete trip to be made in not more than 38, or less than 38 days, if r o m days, if r o m	Bombi Basrah back. 7½ knots.
	Frequency of service.	8 vojagos a yeat.	Twice a month (increased to once a fortnight in	74	Weekly.
	Annual amount of subsidy.	India Rs. 80,000.	India Rs. 1,60,000 (appa- Twice a month (in- Naviga- rently increased in a fortnight in pany.	Rs. 7,666% per complete trip.	Total subsidy to the Company Rs. 7,25,000, but proportion on account of the Persian Gulf service not ascertainable.
	Contractors to whom granted.	British India Steam Naviga- tion Company	(then the Burmah Co.). British India Steam Navigation Company.	Do.	దే
	Period for which granted.	For 1 year.	For 6 years.	To the end of 1872 (or longer, if notice not gither party)	party). To the 30th of April 1884.
	Date of commence- ment of contract.	1st October 1862 (An agreement	force of a contract tract 1866 (Modified in 1867).	1st July 1870	Jst May 1874

2409		
(optional); Fão (weekly; Muhammareh (optional, Basrah (weekly); back by the same route. A service every four weeks from Aden to Basrah and back, with calls at intermediate ports, was arranged. Gwädar (fortnightly); Masqat (fortnightly); Bandar Abbūs, Lingeh, Būshehr, Fao, Basrah; back by the same route. Government might direct steamers to call at any port or ports in addition to these; the detention at such port to be 3 hours of daylight, and the time allowed for the voyage to be increased	proportionately. Do.	See page, 2444 ante.
8 knots; the average duration of the journey, including at ports, not to exceed 8 days on the up and 9 days on the down voyage.	Do.	13 knots for the fast, and 8 knots for the slow
Ö	Do	A separate fast and slow service, both weekly.
Total subsidy to the Company for service of 7 lines, including the Persian Gulf, Rs. 4,89,000; but proportion on account of the Persian Gulf service not ascertainable. Some extra subsidies were also granted.	Total subsidy to the Company for service of 12 lines, including the Persian Gulf, Rs. 5,05,500; but	proportion on account of the Persian Gulf service not ascertainable. Rs. 4.26,124 on account of Persian Gulf services, of which Rs. 3,00,000 was on account of a new fast line.
Do.	Ď.	D o.
To the 30th of April 1894.	To the 30th of April 1904.	To the expiration of the current Eastern Mail Contract, subject to a minimum of 7 and a maximum of 104 years.
1st May 1884	1st May 1894	1st May 1934

2470

ANNEXURE NO. 2,—TABLE OF MAIL CONTRACTS, BASRAH-BAGHDÁD LINE.

Date of commencement of contract.	Poriod for which granted.	Contractors to whom granted.	Annual amount of subsidy.	Frequency of service.
lst July 1863	For 5 years.	The Euphrates and Tigris Steam Navigation Com- pany.	£3,400	Six-weekly in both directions, or eight times during the year.
1866	Till the termination of the current contract for the Persian Gulf mail.	. Do.	£4,800	Fortnightly in both directions, but actually three steamers were run each way in the month.
1st January 1876	Till the 30th of April 1884.	Do.	£3,600	Three times a month in both directions, but the steamers were run weekly after 1878.
1st May 1884	Till the 30th of April 1894.	Do.	Rs. 36,000	Weekly in both directions.
1st May 1894	Till the 30th of April 1904.	Do.	Rs. 24,000	Do.
1st May 1904	For 10 years.	Do.	Rs. 24,000	Do.
)			

ANNEXURE No. 3.

TABLE OF THE BRITISH-INDIAN POST OFFICES OF THE PERSIAN GULF DIVISION, BOMBAY CIRCLE.

ANNEXURE NO. 3.—TABLE OF THE BRITISH INDIAN POST OFFICES OF THE PERSIAN GULF DIVISION (BOMBAY CIRCLE).

Name of post office.	Date of institution,	Grade.	Staff,	Special* fanctions.	Steamer communications.	Annual receipts. (in Rs.)	Annual expendi- ture (in Re.).
Masgat	1st May 1864.	Sub-office.	Sub-postmaster, Munshi, and 2 postmen.	Money order ard savings bank busi- ness trans-	Weekly fast and slow mails in both direc- tions.	3,690	1,560
Bahrair	let August 1884.	Do.	Sub-postmaster and 1 postman.	Do.	Fortnightly slow mail towards India and weekly slow mail in the opposite direction.	2,106	924
Basrah	let January 1868 (Made permanent in July 1869).	Ъо.	Sub-postmaster, 1 Munshi and 1 post- man.	Do.	Weekly fast and slow mails in both directions.	1,762	1,776
Baghdád	1st January 1868 (Made permanent in June 1869).	Head office.	Head postmaster, 1 Munshi and 1 postman.	Do.	Weekly mail in both directions by river.	1,645	2,196

Muhammareh	19th July 1892.	Sub-office.	Sub-postmaster and 1 postman.	Do.	Weekly fast and slow mails in both directions.	1,357	1,140
Bushehr	1st May 1864.	Head office .	Head postmaster, 1 clerk, 2 probationary clerks, † 1 Munshi, and 2 postmen.	Do.	Do.	3,930	4,560
Lingeh	1st April 1867 (Made permanent in 1868).	Sab-office.	Sub-postmaster, 1 postman and 3 Per- sian guards.	Do.	Fortnightly slow mail towards India and weekly slow mail in the opposite direction.	450	1,308
Bandar 'Abbās	Do.	D o.	Sub-postmaster and 1 postman.	Do.	Weekly slow mail in both directions.	1,750	1,188
Jashk	lst September 1880.	Branch office.	Branch office. Telegraph clerk in charge; 1 postman.	Do.	Fortnightly slow mail in both directions.	255	516
Gwadar	12th April 1868 (Made permanent from 1st January 1869).	Comb i n e d sub-office.	Sub-postmaster and I postman.	Money order busi n e s s tiansacted.	Fortnightly slow mail in both directions.	781	756
					Totals .	17,719	1.50.94

*Postal insurance is not undertaken by any of the offices. Since April 1902 these two probationary clerks have been maintained at Büshchr to fill casual vacancies in the offices of the Gulf Division.

ANNEXURE No. 4.—UNDERTAKING GIVEN BY THE SHAIKH OF KUWAIT NOT TO PERMIT THE ESTABLISHMENT OF A FOREIGN NON-BRITISH POST OFFICE AT KUWAIT, 28TH FEBRUARY 1904.

As the British Government has agreed, in accordance with my desire and for the benefit of traders, to establish a post office at Kuwait, I on my part agree not to allow the establishment here of a post office by any other Government. I accordingly write this undertaking on behalf of myself and my successors.

Seal of SHAIKH MUBARAK-AS-SUBAH.

KUWAIT:

The 11th Dhul Hajj 1321. (The 28th February 1904.)

APPENDIX L.

THE SLAVE TRADE IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION.*

Evolution of the anti-slavery policy of Great Britain, 1772-1838.

In dealing with the question of the slave trade in the Persian Gulf, or in any other part of the world, it should be remembered that the attitude of the British Government, which during the last century has played a principal part in the repression of the traffic, and nowhere more so than on the East African Coast and in South-Western Asia was formerly different. On board of the fleet which in 1626 conveyed Sir Dodmore Cotton, a British Ambassador, with his staff from Surat to Bander 'Abbas there were more than 300 slaves bought by Persians in India, and the only remark which this circumstance suggested to Sir T. Herbert, the chronicler of the Embassy, was that "ships, besides the transporting of riches and rarities from place to place, consociate the most remote regions of the earth by participation of commodities and other excellencies to each other." In 1772, however, it was decided by the English courts that a slave, as soon as he set his foot on the soil of the British islands, became free; but the slave trade and the owning of slaves continued abroad under the British flag until a much later date, and it has been calculated that about 1790, out of some 74,000 slaves exported annually from Africa, not less than 38,000 belonged to British merchants. At length, in 1807, an Act was passed whereby it became illegal for any vessel to clear for slaves from a port in the British dominions after the 1st of May 1807, or to land slaves in a British colony after the 1st of March 1808; the penalties for disobedience of this Act were at first only pecuniary, but in 1811 the traffic in slaves was declared to be felony and was made punishable with transportation. So far it had only been endeavoured to prevent commercial dealings in slaves by British subjects; but the movement against slavery as an institution continued; and at length, in 1833, proprietary right in slaves was abolished throughout the British dominions. The final liberation of all slaves took place in August 1838, the transition having been effected, in most places, by means of a period of indentured apprenticeship.

^{*} The following are the principal authorities in connection with the slave trade to and in the Persian Gulf: Bombay Selections, XXIV, 1856; Captain P. D. Henderson's Précis of Correspondence relating to Zanzibar Affairs from 1856 to 1872; Lieutenant H. L. Ramsay's Précis of Zanzibar Affairs, 1872 to 1878; the Administration Reports of the Persian Gulf Political Residency, from 1871 to 1907; Mr. J. A. Saldanha's Précis on Slave Trade in the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf, 1873—1905; Aitchison's Treaties; and Mr. R. N. Lyne's Zanzibar in Contemporary Times, 1905.

Repression of the slave trade in the Persian Gulf.

Division of the subject.

The general position of the British Government in regard to slavery being such as we have described, it remains to enquire by what means and to what extent their policy in recent times -uncompromisingly hostile to the slave trade and adverse also to slavery as an institution—has been carried out in the Persian Gulf. In doing so we shall take account, firstly, of the British agreements with foreign powers and of the British internal enactments by which action in the Gulf has been mainly governed; secondly, of certain questions, relating to the meaning and application of agreements and enactments, which from time to time have come under discussion; thirdly, of subsidiary matters connected with British anti-slavery proceedings in the Gulf; fourthly, of the history of the external slave trade of the Persian Gulf and of British preventive operations; fifthly, of the history of the internal slave trade of the Persian Gulf; sixthly, of domestic slavery in the Persian Gulf; and, lastly, of the general results of the British anti-slavery policy in the Gulf.

In dealing with the legal elements of the situation it is necessary to proceed by jurisdictions, and a general view of the legal position in the Gulf will be possible only after the separate agreements and enactments have been analysed in detail.

Agreements with the Saiyids and Sultans of 'Oman, 1822-1907.*

Treaty of September, 1822.

The first treaty with the ruler of Masqat for the suppression of slavery was concluded on the 4th of September 1822 by Captain Moresby of H.M.S. "Menai", under instructions from Sir R. Farquhar, Governor of Mauritius, and was signed by Saivid Sa'id; it prohibited the sale of slaves to Christian nations by the Saivid's subjects, it made punishable the buying of slaves by the same for the purpose of sale to Christians, and it empowered the British Government to establish an agent in the Saivid's dominions in East Africa to watch the trade and to seize, after the expiration of four months, any 'Omani vessels found carrying slaves to Christian countries. An additional clause, signed on the 9th of September, authorised the seizure by British Government ships of offending vessels found beyond (i.e., to the east or south of) a line drawn from Cape Delgado in Africa through a point 60 miles from Soqotrah to Diu in India, unless driven across it by circumstances over which they had no control. The provisions of this Treaty were confirmed in a subsequent Treaty of Commerce, concluded on the 31st of May 1859.

^{*} The Agreements, etc., mentioned in this paragraph will be found in Aitchison's Treaties.

By the treaty just described means were provided for the extinction Pecision not of the slave trade between Africa and India; but a wide belt within to press for which the traffic continued to be lawful was intentionally left, connecting tion of the the east coast of Africa with 'Oman. In 1837-38 the practicability of traffic, 1838. inducing Saivid Sa'id and the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Oman to forbid all trade in slaves within their dominions was discussed; but it was found that such a prohibition would entail payment of heavy compensation to the signatories—among whom the Saivid complained of having already lost \$100,000 a year by the treaty of 1822—not to mention a very large expenditure on preventive arrangements; that the Muhammadan populations affected, by whose religion slavery was lawful and whose convenience had come by long custom to depend on a regular supply of slaves, would be greatly exasperated by so drastic a change; and, finally, that no beneficial result was to be anticipated, inasmuch as the trade would merely be deflected to Turkish and Persian territory and to the jurisdiction of independent rulers, such as the Shaikh of Qatif, with whom no agreements had been formed in restraint of the traffic.

In 1839, apparently in connection with fresh arrangements which Amplification were then being made with the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān, the Saiyid of the Treaty of Masqat consented to an amplification of the Treaty of 1822; the December principal new provisions authorised the detention and search by British 1839. government cruisers of 'Omāni vessels found beyond the restrictive line and suspected of being engaged in the slave trade, also the confiscation of the same if shown to contain slaves intended for sale beyond the restrictive line, provided that the presence of the offending vessels beyond the line was not involuntary. At the same time the sale of Somālis as slaves was declared to be, for the future, punishable as piracy, on the ground that Somālis were by nature "Hurr" or free, that is, that they belonged to a race regarded as unenslavable by Muhammadan jurists. The restrictive line was modified by being made to pass from Cape Delgado two degrees seaward of the island of Sogotrah and thence to Puzim on the coast of Persian Makran; by this change, it will be observed, the Saiyid's ports of Gwadar and Chahbar on the Makran coast were closed to the slave trade.

On the 18th of August 1845 Saiyid Sa'id agreed on behalf of him-Saiyid's self, his heirs, and his governors, to assist in apprehending British undertaking subjects who might be engaged in the slave trade. This was apparently August 1845. Treaty of 1822.

Before the end of the same year a step further was taken Further Agin the conclusion of a further Agreement, dated 2nd October 1845, reement by which the Saiyid undertook to prohibit, under the severest penalties, 2nd 1845. the export of slaves from his African dominions; to prohibit, also under the severest penalties, the importation of slaves from any part of Africa into his possessions in Asia; and to use his utmost influence with all the chiefs of Arabia, the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf to prevent in like manner the introduction of slaves from Africa into their respective territories. Saiyid Sa'īd in this same Agreement, which was to come into effect on the 1st of January 1847, authorised ships of the Royal Navy

and East India Company to seize and confiscate 'Omani vessels engaged in the slave trade, except such as might be found carrying slaves between certain ports on the eastern coast of Africa.

Act of 15th September 1848.

Provision was made for giving effect to the Agreement thus concluded by an Act (11 and 12 Vic., Cap. CXXVIII), dated the 15th September 1848, which authorised British officers to take action in accordance with its terms, and which regulated, at the same time the rewards that the captors of slave vessels under the Agreement should receive.

Masqat Order ber 1867.

A Masgat Order in Council of 4th November 1867 empowered the in Council, British Consul at Masqat himself to try, with the aid of assessors, any 4th Novem British subject accused of engaging in or heing accessory, to the pur-British subject accused of engaging in, or being accessory, to the purchase or sale of slaves, or of having slaves illegally in his possession, or otherwise to send such British subject to India for trial by the High Court of Bombay.

Sohār Engagement 22nd 1849.

On the 22nd of May 1849, Sohar and the district around it forming at that time a principality independent of Masqat, an Engage-May ment was obtained from Saivid Saif-bin-Hamud, the chief of Sohar, by which he bound himself to prohibit, with effect from the 21st June 1849, the exportation of slaves from the coast of Africa and elsewhere in vessels belonging to himself or his subjects and agreed to the detention and search by British cruisers of such vessels, when suspected of taking part in the slave trade, and to their confiscation in event of the suspicion being found justified.

Act of 9th May 1853.

As in the case of the Agreement of 1845 with the Saivid of 'Oman, legislative action was taken in Great Britain to give effect to the Engagement of the Sohar chief; this was done by the passing of an Act (16 and 17 Vic., Cap. XVI), dated 9th May 1853, of which the provisions resembled those of the Act of 15th September 1848.

Treaty April 1873.

Saivid Sa'id, in whose reign all the agreements as yet mentioned 14th were formed, ruled over both Zanzibar and 'Omān; but after his death in 1856 these two territorial divisions became separate Sultanates. With the Sultan of Zanzibar we are hardly concerned, except to remark that the provision in the Agreement of 1845 which permitted the shipment of slaves between ports in East Africa was abused in such a way as to cover a continuance of the slave trade between East Africa and the Persian Gulf, and that this circumstance eventually necessitated a revision of the Agreement of 1845. Colonel Rigby, the Political Agent in Zanzibar, reported in 1861 that the Agreement had been a dead letter since its execution, and that in 1860-61 no less than 10,000 slaves had been exported northwards from East Africa. A change was really required in the Agreements with the Sultan of Zanzibar only; but advantage was taken of the mission of Sir Bartle Frere to Zanzibar in 1873 to obtain from the Sultan of 'Oman also a Treaty more appropriate to the altered circumstances of that ruler than the Agreement of 1845. On the 12th of April 1873 Sir B. Frere and his staff arrived at Masqat, where, the obstacles to an understanding being less considerable than at Zanzibar, matters were quickly adjusted with the assistance of Colonel Pelly, the Political Resident; and on the 14th of April a new Treaty was signed. By this instrument the importation of slaves from

abroad into the Sultan's territories was absolutely interdicted; vessels engaged in carrying slaves were declared to be liable to confiscation by British officers and courts; the closure of all public markets for slaves in his dominions was promised by the Sultan; the Sultan undertook to protect all liberated slaves to the utmost of his power; and Her Britannic Majesty engaged that natives of Indian States under British protection should be prohibited at once from acquiring fresh slaves and, after a date to be fixed, from possessing any. But the most remarkable provision of the Treaty was one to the effect that all persons thereafter entering the Sultan's dominions and dependencies should be free. The Sultan of Zanzibar also gave way, though not till after the departure of Sir B. Frere from Zanzibar, and signed a Treaty for the complete abolition of the Slave Trade on the 5th June 1873.

Agreements with the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Oman, 1820-1907.*

The first + agreement of all in restraint of the slave trade in the General Persian Gulf was one embodied in the General Treaty of 1820 which Treaty of followed the British operations against the Qawasim in 1819-1820: 1820. it was laid down by the 9th Article of that Treaty that the carrying off of slaves from the coasts of Africa or elsewhere and the transporting of them in vessels was plunder and piracy, and that the subjects of the signatories should do nothing of such a nature. This article appears to have been inserted in the Treaty at the instance of Captain J. P. Thompson of His Majesty's 17th Light Dragoons, who was Interpreter to Sir W. Grant Keir, the General commanding the expedition, and afterwards distinguished himself as a slavery abolitionist; and it was specially reported, at the time, that "no persuasion was necessary to induce the acceptance of this stipulation".

In 1837-38 it was decided, as already noted in the paragraph on Decision not 'Oman Sultanate agreements, not to put pressure on the Trucial to press for Shaikhs or on the Saiyid of Masqat to abolish the slave trade in their total abolidominions entirely. The reasons for this resolve were partly financial traffic, 1838. and partly political,

In 1837 there were complaints of slave raids by Qawasim on the Agreement East African and Somāli coasts: and a Qāsimi agent, who happened to of 1838. be at Bushehr at the time, though he denied the more serious allegations of the principal informant, a certain 'Abdullah-bin-'Iwaz, admitted that the Qawasim had bought as slaves a number of prisoners of war taken from one another in Somaliland by two hostile tribes. On the 17th of April 1838, in consequence of these revelations, an Agreement was

* The agreements, etc., mentioned in this paragraph are given in Aitchison's

[†] With one trifling exception (1812) mentioned in the paragraph on agreements with Turkey.

obtained from the Qasimi Shaikh of Shariah, authorising the detention and search of vessels belonging to his subjects, when suspected of carrying off or embarking slaves, and the confiscation of the same on proof of slaves having been carried off or embarked. Similar agreements were signed also by the Shaikhs of 'Ajman, Dibai and Abu Dhabi, but not, apparently, by the Shaikh of Umm-al-Qaiwain.

Agreement of 1839.

In the following year this Agreement was remodelled so as to authorise the detention and search of suspected, and the confiscation of guilty vessels and their cargo by British cruisers, only if found outside a restrictive line running from Cape Delgado to a point two degrees seaward of Sogotrah and thence to Gwadar Head; and confiscation was not to be enforced if the line had been crossed under stress of weather or otherwise involuntarily. It was added, this being a result of inquiries to which the reports regarding the enslavement of Somalis had given rise, that Somālis were "Hurr" or free, and that traffic in Somāli slaves should therefore, after the expiry of four months, be punished as piracy. The modified Agreement of 1839, was executed by the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi on the 1st of July 1839, by the Shaikhs of Dibai and Umm-al-Qaiwain on the 2nd, and by the Shaikh of Sharjah on the 3rd of the same month. Apparently no Agreement was secured, on this occasion, from the Shaikh of 'Ajman. The Resident in the Persian Gulf, Captain Hennell, was warmly commended by the Governor-General of India in Council for obtaining these Agreements, which, it was believed, would make possible the extinction of the African slave trade upon the coasts of India.

Agreement of 1847.

In 1847 a further and more stringent Agreement was obtained from the five Trucial Shaikhs, whereby they engaged to prohibit the exportation of slaves from any place whatever on board vessels belonging to themselves and their subjects, and consented to the detention and search, and—in case of guilt—to the confiscation, of such vessels by British cruisers. The new Agreement was signed by the Shaikhs at various dates in April and May of 1847, and it took effect from the 10th of December of the same year.

Act of the 1st 1849.

To enable British officers and ships to take action upon the August Agreement of 1847 an Act (12 and 13 Vic., Cap. LXXXIV), dated 1st August 1849, was passed; its terms resembled those of the Acts of 1848 and 1853 relating to Masqat and Sohar.

Engagement of 1856.

To further the objects of the Agreement of 1847 a fresh Engagement was secured in 1856 from each of the Trucial Shaikhs, by which the signatories bound themselves to seize and deliver up to the British authorities any slaves who might be shown to have been brought into their territories or into places subject to their authority, also to place an embargo on any boat which might have been used in the commission of a slaving offence and to hold it at the disposal of the British Political Resident.

Assurances of In 1873 assurances of adherence to existing agreements in respect 1873. of the slave trade were furnished by the Shaikhs of Sharjah and Abu Dhabi.

Agreements with the Shaikh of Bahrain, 1820-1907.

The Shaikh of Bahrain subscribed to three of the agreements Treaty of accepted by the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Oman, viz., those of 1820, 1847 and 1820, En-1856. On the 31st of May 1861 the Shaikh of Bahrain further agreed, gagements of in consideration of protection to be afforded him by the British 1856, and Government, to abstain from slavery and other unlawful practices by Convention

Agreements with the Shaikhs of Qatar, Hasa and Kuwait.

No agreements on the subject of the slave trade have been obtained from the Shaikhs of Qatar or Kuwait, or from those of Hasa. Until 1871 the latter province was, except for two brief intervals during which it was held by the Egyptians, a dependency of the Wahhabi Amirate of Najd.

Agreements with the Turkish Government,* 1812-1907.

But for an order obtained from the Pasha of Baghdad in 1812, in which Order of the it was directed that natives of India kidnapped and brought to Basrah Pasha of for sale as slaves should be handed over to the British Agent at Basrah Baghdad, for sale as slaves should be handed over to the British Agent at Basrah, 1812. no arrangements for the suppression of the slave trade were made with the Porte until 1847.

At the end of January in that year, at the instance of the British Imperial Government, a decree was promulgated by the Sultan of Turkey whereby Decree of merchant vessels under the Turkish flag were prohibited from engaging in the slave trade and were made liable, in case of disobedience, to confiscation, and the masters of the same to punishment; it was agreed that offending vessels might be captured by British as well as by Turkish men of war, and in the former case the vessels seized were to be delivered over by the captors to the Turkish authorities in the Persian Gulf. The Wali of Baghdad was at the same time instructed to publish the new orders, which were to take effect four months after the 27th of January 1847; and slaves coming into the hands of the Turkish authorities were to be repatriated. The Wali of Baghdad was warned to confine himself, in the case of vessels belonging to independent Arab chiefs which might contain slaves, to repelling them from Turkish ports. Finally it was ordered that slaves released should, according as

^{*} The agreements mentioned in this paragraph are contained in Aitchison's Treaties. Full information regarding the Turkish slavery laws will be found in Young's Corps de Droit Ottoman, Volume II, pages 166-206.

they themselves preferred, either be handed over to the British authorities for repatriation or allowed to remain in the Ottoman dominions under sufficient precautions against their re-enslavement.

Treaty of 1880.

These arrangements were made regular and authoritative by a 25th January treaty concluded at Constantinople on the 25th of January 1880 between the British Government and the Porte. By this agreement the Turkish Government undertook to prohibit the importation of African slaves into any part of the Ottoman dominions, and not to allow the exportation of such, except as domestic servants accompanying their masters or mistresses, in which case they should be provided with certificates. Arrangements were made for bringing to justice persons other than Ottoman subjects who might commit slavery offences in Turkish territory: and it was laid down that all slaves found in possession of dealers should be liberated, after which the Porte should take adequate measures to ensure their remaining free and being properly cared for. British cruisers were authorised to visit, search, and, if necessary, detain, merchant vessels proved to be or suspected of being concerned in the African slave trade, these rights to be exercised only in the Red Sea, in the Gulf of Aden, on the Coast of Arabia, in the Persian Gulf. on the East Coast of Africa and in Ottoman maritime waters where there were no constituted authorities; and vessels detained were to be handed over to the nearest or most convenient Ottoman authority for trial, the slaves being delivered to the nearest Ottoman or other authorities with a view to securing their freedom. On the requisition of a British naval or consular officer the authorities at an Ottoman port should be obliged to search, and deal with according to the results of the search, any vessel which such British officer might denounce as engaged in the African slave trade. Merchant vessels under the British flag were made liable, in analogous circumstances and in the same localities, to search and detention by Turkish authorities or cruisers: but vessels seized, with the cargo and crew, were to be transferred to the nearest British authority for disposal, while the slaves captured remained at the disposal of the Turkish authorities. In cases of wrongful seizure suitable compensation was to be paid by the one Government to the other. To prevent undue interference by British cruisers with Turkish vessels manned wholly or in part by slaves, such vessels were to be provided with papers showing the number of slaves carried; and, if a greater number of slaves than that certified were found on any vessel, the latter should be liable to detention.

Order in Council. 26th August 1881.

This Treaty was brought within the operation of the Slave Trade Act, 1873, by means of an Order in Council dated 26th August 1881.

Agreements with the Persian Government, 1848-1907.*

On the urgent representations of Colonel Farrant, the British Shāh, 12th Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran, the matter having then been for a long June 1848.

^{*} The agreements mentioned in this paragraph will be found in Aitchison's Treaties.

time under discussion, the Shah of Persia in an autograph note, dated 12th June 1848, agreed to prohibit the importation of negroes into Persia by sea; and instructions in this sense were at once issued by the Persian Government to the Governors of Fars and 'Arabistan. The exportation as well as the importation of negroes by sea was prohibited by the orders given; but both governors were informed that it was not intended to interfere with the traffic by land.

In order to make these orders operative, a Convention, to take effect Convention from the 1st of January 1852 and to remain in force for eleven years only of August from the date of the Convention, was concluded in August 1851 between 1851. the British and the Persian Governments through Colonel Sheil, the British Minister at Tehran. It provided that ships of war belonging to the Royal and Indian Navies should be at liberty to search Persian merchant vessels for African slaves, the Persian Government at the same time undertaking that none should be imported in Persian Government vessels; but no search was to be undertaken without the participation of Persian officials who were to be carried on the British war vessels. If slaves were found they were to be removed by the British authorities, who should dispose of them; but guilty vessels were to be handed over to the Persian authorities. Slaves in Persia, when about to travel by sea, should be provided with special passports by the Persian authorities at Bushehr; and they should not, if this were done, be interfered with.

The Convention of 1851 was renewed by Article 13 of the Treaty of Treaty of Peace between Britain and Persia, signed at Paris on the 4th of March Peace, 4th 1857; and it was agreed that the period of its operation should be March 1857. extended by ten years, viz., from August 1862 to August 1872, after which it should continue to be in force until the expiration of one year after a formal declaration of annulment by either party.

The Convention of 1851, as extended by the Treaty of 1857, Convention remained in force until the 1st May 1882, when it was superseded by a of 2nd Convention concluded at Tehran on the and March 1882. The new March 1832. Convention made it lawful for British cruisers to visit and detain Persian merchant vessels engaged, or suspected of being or of having been engaged, in carrying slaves, apparently without the co-operation of Persian officials; if slaves were found on board, the vessel and all in it were to be taken before the nearest Persian authorities for trial; a duly authorised British officer was to be present at the adjudication; and, if the vessel were condemned, the proceeds of its sale were to go to the Persian Government, any slaves taken being delivered over to the British authorities. His Majesty the Shah undertook to punish severely any of his subjects or any persons subject to his jurisdiction who might be found engaging in the slave trade by sea, and to manumit and guarantee the safety and proper treatment of slaves imported by sea in violation of the Convention. Persons proceeding on pilgrimage and taking slaves with them were to be provided with a special Persian passport countersigned by a British Resident or Consul; and, if at their return they were not accompanied by a greater number of negroes than was mentioned in the passport, they should not be liable to interference.

Order in This Persian Convention of 1882 was brought within the operation Council, 18th of the Slave Trade Act, 1873, by an Order in Council passed on the August 1882. 18th of August 1882.

General position and enactments, 1812-1907.

Early restrictions, 1812-44.

Before going further we may briefly review the stages by which the present legal position as regards slavery in the Persian Gulf has been reached. In 1800 there was no legal obstacle to the slave trade in any form in any part of the Gulf. From 1812 the enslavement of Indians was treated as illegal by the Turkish authorities in 'Iraq. In 1820 the carrying off and transporting of slaves were stigmatised and made punishable as plunder and piracy by the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Oman and Bahrain: but, as we shall see further on, the expressions used were interpreted in practice in a sense narrower than that of which, possibly, they were capable. In 1822 the Saiyid of Masqat undertook to prevent the supplying of slaves by his subjects to those of Christian nations and agreed to the seizure of slaving vessels outside a certain line. In 1839 the Masgat restrictive line was modified, and the Trucial Shaikhs agreed to the seizure outside an almost identical line of vessels carrying slaves; this last agreement superseded a more general one into which the Shaīkhs had entered in 1838. The above were the only repressive measures brought into force up to 1844, and it will be seen that they were of a very partial character in so far as they concerned the Persian Gulf; for, while they made it possible to destroy the trade in slaves between Africa and India, they left the trade from Africa to Persia, Turkey, Kuwait, Hasa and Qatar totally unaffected, and they permitted of the continuance of a trade in purchased slaves from Africa to 'Oman, Trucial 'Oman and Bahrain, provided the slavers did not cross to the Indian side of an imaginary line.

Later restrictions, 1845.

The progressive restrictions imposed after 1844 were aimed at the extinction of the trade from Africa to the Persian Gulf itself. In 1845 the Saiyid of Masqat and Zanzibar prohibited the importation of slaves into his Asian territories and made illegal all carriage of slaves by his subjects at sea, except in certain African waters. In 1847 the Trucial Shaikhs interdicted the carriage of slaves at sea in vessels belonging to their subjects; and in the same year the traffic was rendered illegal for vessels under the Turkish flag. In 1848 the importation of African slaves by sea into Persia was prohibited. Various subsidiary arrangements followed at intervals up to 1882; but by the end of 1848 the present legal position had virtually been attained, viz., the carriage of slaves from Africa to the coasts of the Persian Gulf in vessels belonging to their subjects had become contrary to the laws of all rulers (except those of Qatar, Hasa and Kuwait) in the countries surrounding the Gulf; and various means of enforcing those laws, principally by British naval co-operation, had been provided.

It is impossible to deal here with the subject of the legislation of General Act European countries in its bearing on the slave trade in the Persian of the Brussels Gulf; but mention must be made of the General Act of the Brussels Conference, Conference of 1890, which had for its object the repression of the 1890. African slave trade. Two important provisions of the Act were those contained in the 27th and 28th Articles; under the former, a slave taking refuge on board a war-vessel of one of the signatory powers must be immediately and definitively liberated, and, under the latter, the liberation of a slave detained against his will on board a native vessel might be pronounced by any agent, duly empowered for the purpose, of one of the same powers. By the 42nd Article of the Act, war-ships of the signatory powers were authorised to stop, and, if necessary, to arrest, on the high seas, vessels of less than 500 tons suspected of being engaged in the slave trade. The Act was ratified by Great Britain, France and Turkey, the three powers chiefly concerned in Persian Gulf waters, on the 2nd of January 1892; and it actually came into force on the 2nd of April 1892. By France certain important reservations were made in regard to the right of search by foreign war-vessels of craft under the French flag.

Questions relating to the meaning and application of agreements and enactments.

Having concluded this slight survey of the laws of Persian Gulf states with reference to the slave trade, and taking for granted all British legislation on the same subject, we proceed to refer to several questions of law which have arisen in practice. Legal doubts, arising chiefly from the complexity of the subject, from the insufficiency of the best-devised rules to meet every case, and from confusion of law or jurisdiction, have been frequent; and the feeling among British officers that slavery of every kind is morally wrong, not to mention the pecuniary rewards decreed by British law for the liberation of slaves, has tended to multiply legal difficulties.

One of the earliest points to come under discussion was the meaning of Meaning of Article 9 of the Treaty of 1820 with the Trucial Shaikhs and the Shaikh Article 9 of of Bahrain, whereby the carrying off of slaves and the transporting of the Treaty of 1820. them in vessels were declared to be plunder and piracy and were interdicted. The intention of the framers of the treaty can be gathered only from General Sir W. Grant Keir's contemporaneous comment, that the article "abolishes the slave trade of the subscribing Powers, and must show distinctly the abhorrence in which it is held by the British Government." The point whether this article should be held to prohibit the transporting in vessels of slaves purchased, as well as of slaves raided, was first raised by Lieutenant McLeod, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, after a visit to the Trucial Coast and Bahrain in 1823; Lieutenant McLeod held that it would be extremely inadvisable, and even dangerous, to attempt to enforce the article in the wider sense,—a sense in which, moreover, it did not appear to have been understood by the Arabs;

and he further pointed out the practical uselessness of stringent action upon one stretch of coast so long as the rest of the Gulf littoral remained opened to the slave traffic. In answer to this reference the Bombay Government ruled that the article referred to the carriage by sea of raided slaves only, inasmuch as the mere transportation of purchased slaves from one place to another could not, except by an abuse of language, be described as "plunder and piracy.", The principle thus laid down was strictly observed in practice, and no action against slave dealers has ever, it is believed, been taken under the article; but the meaning continued to be debated so late as 1841, when the Government of India held that, having remained a dead-letter for twenty years, the article could not in justice or prudence be enforced suddenly and without warning in the wider interpretation. By the conclusion of the Engagements of 1847, relating to Trucial 'Oman and Bahrain, the question was deprived of its practical importance.

Reception of fugitive slaves 1884.

The question of the reception of fugitive slaves on board British vessels, especially in territorial waters, and of their subsequent emancion pation was a delicate one of which a solution was not reached without board public difficulty; its settlement depended not on the agreements with local vessels, 1856- powers, none of which dealt with the subject, but on considerations of international law and usage.

1856.

In 1856 a slave, not of recent importation, took refuge on board H.M.S. "Clive," at the time lying off Bahrain, and was restored by Lieutenant Disbrowe, Assistant Political Resident, who happened to be on board, at the request of the owner; and the Assistant Resident's action was held by the higher authorities to have been correct.

1871-73.

In 1872 two slaves made their way on board H.M.S. "Magpie" while at anchor in the inner roads of Bushehr, and their surrender was claimed from Colonel Pelly, the Political Resident,—in one case by the Persian Slave Commissioner at Bushehr, and in the other by a British protected subject; Colonel Pelly, on the ground that the incident had taken place in Persian territorial waters, handed over the slave demanded by the Slave Commissioner, but in the other case, as the claimant was not a Persian subject and did not appear to be the actual owner, he liberated the slave. In August 1872 a somewhat similar case happened on the B.M.S. "Hugh Rose", again in Persian territorial waters; but in this instance Colonel Pelly refused to give up the slaves, though claimed by their masters, and caused them to be sent to Bombay. On the night of the 31st August 1873 a more important case than either of the preceding occurred, through the swimming off of a slave to the B.M.S. "May Frere", near the uninhabited island of Zirko, from a fleet of 73 pearl boats anchored in the vicinity; the slave sought and received protection with the result that all the pearl boats near weighed and prepared to leave, lest their slaves should desert and be freed.

1876.

This case led to a reference to Her Majesty's Government, and a discussion followed which resulted, though not until August 1876, in the issue by the Admiralty of definite instructions as to the reception

of fugitive slaves on board British war-vessels. The gist of the orders was:—

- (1) that, when a fugitive slave had once been received on board a vessel of the British Navy and taken under the protection of the British flag, whether within or beyond territorial waters, no demand for his surrender on the ground of slavery should be admitted or entertained.
- (2) that, in receiving a fugitive slave on board a British war-vessel, the Commander should be guided by considerations of humanity, to which full effect must be given whether the ship were on the high seas or within the territorial waters of a state in which slavery was recognised; but, in the latter case, conduct which might appear to be in breach of international comity or good faith was to be avoided.
- (3) that if any person, within territorial waters, claimed protection on the ground that he was kept in slavery in contravention of treaties with Great Britain, he should be received on board until the truth of his statement had been examined into; that the examination should be made, if possible, after communication with the nearest British Consular authority, and that the British Commander should be guided in his subsequent proceedings by the result.

The consequence of these instructions was apparently to invest Commanders with considerable discretion as to the reception or non-reception of applicants on board their ships; but a person received, unless provisionally received for the purpose of enquiring into an alleged breach of treaty, might not subsequently be given up as a slave.

Similar instructions were issued by the Government of India in 1884. 1884 for the guidance of officers of the Indian Marine. In these it was added that slaves should not be removed from shore and then treated as fugitives; and that, if in exceptional circumstances the removal of a slave should seem to be required by considerations of humanity, the Commander receiving him on board his ship should be prepared to compensate the owner. It was also added that the reception of a slave as a fugitive in territorial waters on the ground of alleged ill-treatment by his master should, in the first instance, be provisional only, pending an enquiry into his case.*

On the 25th of November 1899, on the occasion of a visit to 1899. Wakrah in Qatar by Colonel Meade, the Resident in the Persian Gulf, a slave belonging to a relative of the Al Thāni Shaikh waded off in the dark to the Residency launch and succeeded in getting on board the R.I.M.S. "Lawrence." He was accordingly liberated, and the Resident was authorised to make a present of corresponding value to the Shaikh, but not expressly by way of compensation.

^{*} The conditions as to provisional reception in the |Admiralty instructions of 1876, and still more so those in the Indian instructions of 1884, appear in a great degree to nullify the principal order regarding the non-rendition of fugitive slaves when once received on board.

1902. On the 29th of April 1902 a difficult case occurred at Abu Dhabi through the escape to H.M.S. "Redbreast" of a slave belonging to a relation of the Shaikh. The "Redbreast" had brought Captain Cox, the Political Agent at Masqat, to Abu Dhabi for the purpose of making an arduous and somewhat dangerous journey by land from that place to Masqat; and it was highly inadvisable that Captain Cox's enterprise should be prejudiced at the outset by an act so unpopular as the manumission of a slave,—especially of a slave who appeared to have been in all respects perfectly well treated. The slave was accordingly landed, and Captain Cox arranged to purchase him with a view to giving him his freedom; but in the end the man spontaneously decided to remain at Abu Dhabi.

Meaning of Article 1 of the Masqat Treaty of 1873.

In 1892 a question arose as to the exact effect of the direction contained in Article 1 of the Masqat Treaty of 1873, that "persons hereafter entering the Sultan's dominions and dependencies shall be free," the occasion being an application for protection to the British Consulate at Masqat by a slave, born at Arbaq near Masqat, whose parents were slaves lawfully imported into the Sultan's dominions before the Treaty of 1873; the doubt in this case was due to the fact that the slave, along with his father, had more than once visited Calcutta in recent years and might therefore be said to have "entered" the Sultan's dominions after 1873. The ruling of the Government of India was to the effect that the slave in question, by entering British territory, had ipso facto become a free man, and that, had he been forcibly carried back to Masqat, he might have been regarded as imported into 'Oman after 1873 and therefore as entitled to his freedom; but they considered that, by voluntarily returning to Masqat, he had abandoned the privileges acquired by visiting British territory and had reverted to his original status of a lawfully owned slave. The Government of India added that this principle would apply in the case of all slaves lawfully imported into the Sultan's dominions before 1873 and also to the cases of the children of such borne in the Sultan's dominions: but they explained that all slaves brought to Masqat for the first time and otherwise than voluntarily, after the date of the treaty, were entitled to their freedom.

The "Rokeby" case, 1977.

In 1877 a case occurred at Büshehr, giving rise to several difficult points which were not finally settled until 1881. The presence of slaves on board the British steamer "Rokeby" having been reported, that vessel was searched under arrangements made by Captain Clayton commanding H.M.S. "Rifleman," and seven imported slaves were discovered, who were seized, landed, and made over to Captain Prideaux, the officiating Political Resident. The surrender of an eighth imported slave, landed from the "Rokeby" by a Persian subject, was also obtained by Captain Prideaux through the Persian Kārguzār at Būshehr. The proceedings in the case were held before Colonel Miles, Consul at Masqat, whose was the "consular East African court" nearest to Būshehr; it resulted in the forfeiture of the eight slaves, who were at the time at Būshehr, to Her Majesty the Queen. Doubts having arisen as to the validity of the proceedings, a reference was made to the Home Government; and it was held by the Law Officers to the Crown that the seizure of

slaves on board a British private vessel lying in a foreign harbour was not justifiable without the intervention of the authorities of the country to which the port belonged, that failure to bring the slaves to be adjudicated on within the jurisdiction of the adjudicating court was a serious error, and finally that a slave did not absolutely obtain his freedom by having been on board a British private ship, and that, if such a slave returned to the country of his master, where slavery was recognised, the British Government could not properly insist upon his being liberated or held to be free. No clear decision was reached as to the jurisdiction of the Masgat court in the case; but the Law Officers apparently inclined to the view that, under the then recent Slave Trade (East African Courts) Act of 1879, the jurisdiction of the Masqat Consul need not be called in question.

In May 1887, a British armed naval camp having been formed near Res Madra-Ras Madrakah on the South Eastern Coast of 'Oman in support of anti- kah case, slaving operations, an African slave was received there as a fugitive by 1887. the Commander of H.M.S. "Osprey," carried to Masqat, and finally liberated. The Government of India ruled, with reference to this case, that the grant of protection to a fugitive slave at such a camp, without the cognisance of the Sultan of 'Oman or of the British political authorities, was irregular.

In May 1896 Lieutenant Beville, Political Agent at Masqat, having Case of a received information that a Sur vessel carrying slaves was in the seizure by vicinity of Masqat, and there being at the time no British vessel of war the Political upon the station, put to sea in a boat and captured her himself with 28 Masgat, slaves on board; the dealers and crew were handed over to the Sultan 1896. of 'Oman, by whom they were punished, and the slaves were variously disposed of. The opinion of the legal authorities on this case was that the seizure was irregular, inasmuch as it had been made neither by an officer commanding a vessel of the British Navy and so empowered under treaty to take action, nor by an officer otherwise specially empowered

In 1897, a question having been asked in the House of Commons General pracregarding the surrender of slaves to their owners by British officers at tice as to the Masqat and elsewhere, the existing practice in the Gulf was investigated manumission under the orders of the Government of India. The result showed that of slaves by slaves imported into Trucial 'Omān or Bahrain after 1847* or into the political au-Oman Sultanate after 1873 were treated as entitled to their freedom thorities in and were granted manumission certificates by the British authorities, the Persian but that those imported at earlier dates, or subsequently born in slavery Gulf, 1897. in the countries mentioned, were returned to their masters; at Masqat, however, slaves imported before 1873 were occasionally liberated, when it was shown that they had been badly treated, or when no master appeared within a reasonable time to claim them; and both in Bahrain and at Masqat, in returning a runaway slave to his owner, the latter was required to sign an agreement binding himself to treat the slave

^{*} It seems doubtful however, as recently pointed out by Major Cox, the Political Resident in the Gulf, whether British officials are really entitled, conformably with treaties, to insist on the liberation of slaves imported into either of these regions before the Engagement of 1856; vide text of that Engagement and of the Agreement of 1847.

with kindness. In Persia slaves were not manumitted by the British authorities otherwise than in accordance with the Treaty of 1882, or, in other words, only slaves imported by sea after the signature of that Treaty were released. All slaves taking refuge on British war vessels were released under Article 28 of the General Act of the Brussels Conference of 1890. From a communication received in 1899, from the Secretary of State for India, it may be gathered that the practice followed in 1897 was approved by Her Majesty's Government, subject to an understanding that the Sultan of 'Oman, whose concurrence it had been customary to obtain, did not unreasonably refuse his consent to manumission when that course was recommended by the British Consul at Masqat.

In 1899 the Government of India authorised the Political Resident in the Gulf to inform the various Shaikhs in his political charge, at such time and in such manner as he might see fit, that the British Government would welcome the extension of a system favourable to the liberation of slaves.

Subsidiary questions connected with British operations in the Persian Gulf for suppression of the slave trade.

Incidence of pecuniary charges.

All charges in connection with the liberation of slaves in the Persian Gulf were in the beginning met from their Indian budget by the officers through whom they were disbursed; but in 1883 the Government of India, having then for the first time become aware of this fact, informed the Political Resident in the Gulf that, as the suppression of the slave trade was a matter of purely Imperial concern, they could not in future authorise any expenditure on slavery proceedings from Indian revenues. After 1883 the expenditure incurred was apparently debited to Her Majesty's Government; but none of the bills presented were apparently paid, and in 1883 the propriety of the debit was formally contested by Her Majesty's Treasury on the ground that an alteration of the practice followed during 14 years was involved and that the expenditure in question had no direct connection with the slave trade, the slaves for whose benefit expenditure had been incurred not being "captured negroes." The Government of India in reply pointed out that the charges* at Masqat—the only port at the time in question were entirely the outcome of the Treaty of 1873, and that the duties of the Political Agent in regard to the liberation of slaves were performed by him exclusively in his consular capacity and under the authority of the Home Government The view of the Government of India in the end prevailed, and the charges incurred at Masqat up to date were defrayed in 1890 by Her Majesty's Government. In 1896, in a curious case in which-for the purpose of ascertaining the fate of another slave—it became necessary to ransom a slave from an owner in

The expenditure was chiefly on food for slaves detained under the protection of the Consulate, and for repatriation, etc., after liberation.

the interior of 'Oman, the necessary sum of \$180 was advanced by the Government of India and was debited to Her Majesty's Treasury with the approval of the Home Government.

Until 1889 it seems to have been the custom to deport liberated, Disposal of slaves, if unwilling to remain in the Persian Gulf, to Bombay; but emancipated at length, in the year mentioned, the Bombay Government animadverted slaves. on the constant increase, in consequence of this procedure, of an excitable and turbulent element in the population under their charge. Efforts were accordingly made to discover an outlet in some other direction; but the Government of the Straits Settlements, Sarawak and the Fiji Islands were unwilling to receive emancipated Africans, and the reply of the Government of British North Borneo was not entirely favourable. Matters remained as they were until 1897, when the Government of India themselves began to entertain objections to the importation of liberated negroes into India and suggested to Her Majesty's Governments an arrangement by which freed slaves should instead be sent to East Africa. The authorities in Zanzibar having signified their approval of the scheme and held out a prospect of employment for emancipated slaves in the Sultan's plantations in Zanzibar and Pemba, the Residents at Büshehr and Baghdad were also consulted; the former, Colonel Meade, replied that the proposal was unobjectionable, unless on the ground of expense; while the latter, Colonel Loch, reported that the slaves released in Turkish 'Iraq almost always belonged to the domestic servant class and were unwilling to leave the country after emancipation, and that, from the Baghdad point of view, no arrangements were necessary. The scheme was accordingly sanctioned by Her Majesty's Government in 1889 and has been continuously enforced ever since. Manumitted slaves are now ordinarily sent by native sailing vessels from Masqat to Zanzibar at a cost of about Rs. 15 a head; but in some cases, when vessels under trustworthy masters are not available, it has been found necessary to despatch them by steamer at a cost of about Rs. 160 each. Between February 1900 and May 1902, 35 manumitted slaves were despatched from Masqat to Zanzibar, of whom only 7 were sent by steamer. These arrangements have received the approval of His Majesty's Government, by whom the cost of the slaves' passages is borne.

Until 1900 it was the invariable practice that fines levied on the Dispesal subjects of Arab Shaikhs in the Persian Gulf on account of offences fines recoverconnected with the slave trade should be recovered from the chiefs and ed ou account credited to the British Government, by whom all the charges connected trading with the suppression of the slave trade and the liberation of slaves were offences in defrayed. In 1900, however, on the recommendation of Mr. Gaskin, the Gulf. Assistant Political Agent in Bahrain, and of Colonel Kemball, Political Resident, the Shaikh of Bahrain was permitted to retain a fine, on condition of not returning the money to the person fined; and the Secretary of State for India and the Lords Commissioners of the Treasury agreed that a similar procedure might be followed, for the future, in the case of the Shaikh of Bahrain and the Trucial Shaikhs, and that the proceeds of fines need no longer be credited to the British Exchequer. The question of the disposal of the money in each case has

been left, however, to the discretion of the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf: and the sums realised are still withheld from the local authorities when there is reason to think that their return to the Shaikh might indirectly render the punishment nugatory.

History of the external slave trade of the Persian Gulf and of British preventive operations, 1852-73.

Commencement of systematic operations, 1852.

We now pass on to consider the manner in which the agreements obtained and the enactments passed by the British Government have been utilised for the suppression of the slave trade in the Persian Gulf: and in doing so we need not go further back than 1852, one of the earliest years in which the legal position in the Gulf, in consequence of the arrangements then recently made with the Turkish and Persian Governments, was such as to admit of general action. With the first operations of all, about to be described, though they did little more than demonstrate the magnitude of the evil, the names of Captain (afterwards Colonel Sir) A. B. Kemball and of Captain Felix Jones, Indian Navy, two successive Political Residents at Bushehr, are honourably associated.

Operations of Captain Kembali, 1852-55.

In the summer of 1852 the steam vessel "Tigris" of the Indian during the Navy, Lieutenant Tronson, was placed on slave duty in the Gulf with Residentship orders to watch the Batinah coast and other suspected localities; but her equipment was unsuitable for the duties that she had to perform, and the results of her cruise were inconsiderable. It was at once realised by Captain Kemball, the Political Resident, that no assistance was to be expected from natives of the Gulf; and, even at this early stage of the operations, the Resident suggested that preventive measures would probably be more efficacious if they were taken on the African coasts from which the slaves were exported. In 1853, the slave trade having been shown to prevail in the Gulf to an appalling extent, Captain Kemball recommended naval surveillance of the Batinah and East African coasts; but there was a serious deficiency of ships, and the Government steamship "Queen," which was made available for a short time, apparently effected nothing; some slaves were captured, however, by the H.E.I. Company's Schooner "Constance." months later, at the beginning of 1854, Captain Kemball renewed his representations and advised that a steamer, with a small sailing vessel to assist her, should be sent to cruise off the South Arabian coast in the latitude of Makalla from the 15th of March to the 1st of June; but again there was difficulty in providing a suitable vessel, and none was sent until 1855, when the "Queen," in the month of July, began to cruise off the 'Oman coast between Ras-al-Hadd and Masqat, and was relieved later in the season by the corvette "Falkland." The operations of 1855 were absolutely barren of results. From 1852 to 1855 inclusive, the number of slaves liberated by the British authorities in the Gulf was 78, of whom only 15 were rescued at sea.

In 1855 Captain Kemball was replaced by Captain Felix Jones, Operations who quickly came to the conclusion that slaves for the Persian Gulf during the were chiefly landed in southern 'Oman and who recommended, of Captain as his predecessor had done, that cruising against slavers should be con-Felix Jones, ducted outside, rather than within, the limits of the Gulf; he suggested 1855-62. the formation of a slave squadron of specially equipped steam vessels, to patrol chiefly in the neighbourhood of Masīrah Island and of Zanzibar; and he pointed out that serious political difficulties in the Persian Gulf would be avoided if the traffic could be dealt with at a distance and prevented from reaching the Gulf. The virtual legalisation, by the Agreement of 1845 with the ruler of Masgat and Zanzibar, of the slave trade upon a section of the East African Coast was now found to afford in practice great facilities for a trade in slaves between those shores and the Persian Gulf. In the summer of 1856 the corvette "Falkland" cruised against slavers in the outer Gulf between Jashk and Sohar, with moderate success, but slaves continued to reach the Persian coast higher up in large numbers. In Trucial 'Oman, under the Engagement of 1856 by which the Shaikhs undertook to surrender imported slaves after landing, something was at length achieved in the liberation of a number of slaves. In 1859 the "Tigris" and "Falkland" were employed to intercept, if possible, slavers known to be returning from East Africa to Trucial 'Oman: but only one considerable seizure was effected. The number of slaves captured at sea in 1856 and 1857 was 15, while the total number manumitted by British officers in the Gulf during the same two years was 96. No slaves at all were liberated in 1855 and, the figures for 1858 to 1862 are not ascertainable. In 1860 Captain Jones's proposals of 1855 were adopted, almost in their entirety, by Brigadier General Coghlan in reporting upon the East African slave trade.

There is a deficiency of information in regard to the slave trade in Period 1862 the Persian Gulf during the years 1862 to 1873; but it would appear that, in the beginning at least, the trade was almost as active as ever. In 1834 Mr. Blane, the British Resident at Bushehr, placed the number of slaves exported in the preceding season from the East African coast in the direction of the Persian Gulf at about 12,000; but this number, depending on native statements only, must be regarded as conjectural. Calculations and observations made about ten years later showed the number imported by sea into the countries surrounding the Persian Gulfexclusive, apparently, of the 'Oman Sultanate, Persian Makran, Qatar and Hasa-to be about 3,500 annually. In 1860 it was estimated by Brigadier General Coghlan that about 4,000 slaves were carried away every year from Africa to Arabia and the Persian Gulf; but in the following year Colonel Rigby, the Political Agent at Zanzibar, was inclined to place the annual exportation from Fast Africa northwards at a figure so high as 10,000. In the circumstances it cannot be doubted. especially as British preventive action had not yet been made effective, that in the years immediately following 1862 the slave trade to the Persian Gulf still flourished with almost unabated vigour. Towards the end of the period under consideration however, the cruises against slavers making for the Persian Gulf began to yield better results. In June 1871 H.M.S. "Magpie" captured three slave ships off Ras-al-Hadd, 62

slaves thus obtaining their freedom; and in September 1872 H.M.S. "Vulture" took possession of a large Baghlah, in which were 169 slaves. mostly women and children. In the latter case the Nakhuda of the vessel and his son were imprisoned by the Sulvan of 'Oman, and the vessel itself was condemned and destroyed. In 1872 all chiefs having treaties with Great Britain relating to the traffic in slaves were reminded of their obligations under the same; and numerous other steps were taken for combating the trade.

Conditions of

It has been stated above that domestic slavery in the Persian Gulf the traffic bet- is of a mild type, but mildness was not a characteristic of the conditions East under which the Gulf was at this time supplied with slaves: on the the Persian contrary the methods of the exporters from Africa appear to have been characterised by a barbarity equal to that of their compeers in any part of the world. A number of the "Times of India", appearing in October 1872, contained the following description of the slave vessel taken by the "Vulture":-

> "The number of slaves it was impossible at the time to estimate; so "crowded on deck, and in the hold below was the dhow, that it seemed "but for the aspect of misery, a very nest of ants. The hold, from "which an intolerable stench proceeded, was several inches deep in the "foulest bilge-water and refuse. Down below, there were numbers of "children and wretched beings in the most loathsome stages of small-pox "and scrofula of every description. A more disgusting and degrading "spectacle of humanity could hardly be seen, whilst the foulness of the "dhow was such that the sailors could hardly endure it. When the slaves "were transferred to the Vulture the poor wretched creatures were "so dreadfully emaciated and weak, that many had to be carried on "board, and lifted for every movement. How it was that so many "survived such hardships was a source of wonder to all that belonged to "the Vulture. On examination by the surgeon, it was found that there "were no less than 35 cases of small-pox in various stages; and from "the time of the first taking of the dhow to their landing at Butcher's "Island, Pombay, 15 died out of the whole number of 169, and since "then there have been more deaths amongst them. But perhaps the "most atrocious piece of cruelty of the Arabs was heard afterwards "from the slaves themselves; viz., that at the first discovery of small-"pox amongst them by the Arabs, all the infected slaves were at once "thrown overboard, and this was continued day by day, until, they said, "forty had perished in this manner. When they found the disease "could not be checked, they simply left them to take their chance, and "to die. Many of the children were of the tenderest years, scarcely more than three years old, and most of them bearing marks of the brutality of the Arabs in half-healed scars, and bruises inflicted from the lash "and stick."

The exporters of slaves from Africa to the Persian Gulf were mostly Arabs, who were accustomed to proceed to Zanzibar for the purpose of legitimate trade during the north-eastern monsoon, that is between November and February, and who generally returned, bringing slaves, either just before or just after the south-west monsoon, viz., in the months of April, May and June or in those of September and October. The distance from Zanzibar to Sūr is about 2,500 miles, and the voyage generally occupied 16 to 25 days.

History of the external slave trade of the Persian Gulf and of British preventive operations, 1873-1907.

The attention of the public at home had now been attracted by the East African slave trade. In 1871 a Select Committee of the House of Commons was appointed to enquire into the subject; and in 1873 Sir Bartle Frere was despatched on a mission to Zanzibar and Masqat, at the latter of which places he succeeded in arranging a Treaty already described, with the Sultan. In 1874 H.M.S. "London" arrived on the Zanzibar station, where she had been sent for the express purpose of preventing the exportation of slaves from the East African coast; she remained at Zanzibar for nearly ten years and was instrumental, largely by means of her steam launches, in reducing the traffic to unprecedentedly small proportions.

During the ten years which followed Sir Bartle Frere's mission to Almost com-Zanzibar and Masqat the trade in slaves from Africa to the Persian Gulf plete repres-Zanzibar and Masqat the trade in slaves from Africa to the rersian Guil seemed to have been practically suppressed. In 1873 proclamations were import trade issued by the British authorities in the Gulf, warning British subjects from Africa, there of the penalties which they would now incur by engaging in the 1873-83. traffic; and in the years following, until the attitude of the British Government had become well known, these were periodically republished. In 1873-74 very few slaving vessels from abroad arrived in the Persian Gulf, and no captures were effected. In 1874-75 the position continued to be satisfactory. In 1875 H.M.S. "Daphne" and H.M.S. "Rifleman", under Captain Foot, R.N., were specially employed in patrolling against slavers but none were captured. In 1876 it was reported that the wholesale importation of slaves had been abandoned by dealers, and that the slaves now arriving were brought in very small lots; but the dealers had begun to conceal their operations by use of the French flag, which secured them against search by British vessels; and in one case a batch of 15 slaves was landed at Matrah from a vessel flying British colours, when no British war-vessel, unfortunately, was at hand to undertake pursuit of her. From 1876 to 1883 the operations of importers apparently continued to be on a very small scale, and hopes even began to be entertained that the trade would shortly die a natural death. In 1881 three native vessels were captured by H.M.S. "Dryad" off the southern coast of Arabia, and of these one was subsequently condemned as a slaver.

In 1884 a sudden and serious increase in the importation of slaves Revival of from Africa to the Gulf was remarked. By the British officials in the the trade, Gulf it was attributed to the removal of the "London" from Zanzibar, 1884. an event which took place in 1883, and there was much force in their contention that strict surveillance of 500 miles of the African coast would

be both easier and more effective than to watch 2,500 miles of the Arabian coast from Makalla to Basrah; but reports from East Africa showed that other reasons for the increase also existed. The principal of these was a severe famine upon the mainland of Africa, which had brought down the price of slaves there to six shillings a head; but an impression also prevailed at Zanzibar that the British Government, in consequence of reverses in the Soudan, had at last withdrawn their opposition to the slave trade. Importations having become frequent, captures by British cruisers also commenced.

Captures by H.M.S. "Philomel", 1884.

In October 1884, when H.M.S. "Philomel", Captain Lang, was lying at anchor off Ras-al-Hadd, a native vessel was sighted coming up from the south-west and was pursued by the "Philomel" under sail only: on a gun being fired across her bows as a signal to heave to she made straight for the coast, but she was intercepted by the "Philomel", which had meanwhile got up steam. The Nakhuda of the Arab vessel and five slave dealers succeeded in escaping to the shore in a small boat, but three dealers were captured by the "Philomel's" boats and three on board of the vessel. The ship was found to contain 128 male and 26 female slaves of the Wazaramo tribe, all of whom were in a wretched condition, having been without food or water for two days; and correspondence was discovered on board which threw considerable light upon the slave trade. The prize, of which the destination was shown to be Khadhra in Bātinah, was condemned, with her cargo, in the Vice-Admiralty Court at Masqat; and the slave traders captured were imprisoned by the Sultan of Oman in Fort Mīrāni.

At Masqat Captain Lang received a telegram from the Admiral, directing him to proceed at once to Aden; and on the 18th of October. on his way there, he fell in with a suspicious Sambuk a little to the northward of Masīrah Island. On boarding her she was found to be the "Fatah-al-Khair" of Sur, bound for a port in Batinah; she had on board 30 male and 21 female slaves; and besides the Nakhuda, who was also owner, she carried four passengers and a crew of eight men, the passengers being the proprietors of the slaves. The slaves were removed to the "Philomel" and the Sambuk was at first taken in tow; as, however, she proved to be unseaworthy, the crew and passengers with their effects were transferred to the "Philomel" on the 23rd of October and the vessel itself was burned. On the 26th of October the "Philomel" reached Aden, where the slaves and cargo were disposed of according to law and the destruction of the prize was confirmed by the Vice-Admiralty Court. The Nakhuda and the slave dealers were afterwards sent to Masqat and imprisoned there by the Sultan of 'Oman in Fort Jalāli.

Captures by H.M.S. "Osprey" and H.M.S. "Ranger", 1885. In the early part of the ensuing season no vessels of the Royal Navy could be spared for cruising against slavers. Later on three ships were sent, and of these H.M.S. "Osprey" succeeded, on the 19th of September 1885, in capturing a vessel with 73 slaves; and, ten days after, H.M.S. "Ranger" seized a fishing boat off Sūr, in which were two slaves recently disembarked from a slaver. In the former case the vessel was condemned in the Vice-Admiralty Court at Masqat and the dealer punished with imprisonment by the Sultān of 'Omān.

It was remarked in this year by Captain Dowding, R.N., the Senior Sur an Naval Officer in the Persian Gulf, that Sur was one of the chief emporia important seat of the of the traffic from Africa; and he suggested that steps should be taken, African slave apparently by the British Government, to strengthen the authority of trade, 1885 the Sultan at Sur. The political authorities, however, whose information led them to believe that Sur was not an obligatory port of call for slavers and that such vessels frequently ran direct from Murbat in Dhufar to their final destination, which was generally in Batinah, did not support the proposal, and no action was taken.

In 1886 operations against slavers entering the Gulf were undertaken Extensive on a large scale; H.M.S. "Reindeer," "Woodlark," "Kingfisher" and British operations, "Sphinx" were employed on this duty from the 25th of April to the operations, 1886. 18th of June, and the "Woodlark" and "Kingfisher" from July to the 28th of October. About 200 Arab craft were stopped and searched, but of these only one, captured by the "Woodlark" on the 16th of June, contained any slaves; they numbered 21. Most of the vessels examined were found in ballast, and the masters explained that they had landed ordinary cargoes on the southern coast of Arabia. It was certain, however, that many slaves had been shipped for the African coast in this year, and subsequently, in a manner not fully ascertained, considerable numbers of "raw" slaves began to reach Batinah and other parts of 'Oman, from which it was concluded that the trade had not been suppressed but only diverted into some new channel.

Systematic cruising against slavers in the Persian Gulf and adjacent Course of waters was continued after this from season to season, but for a time events, 1887. successes; in 1890, however, H.M.S. 1891. there were no further "Cossack" took and destroyed near Ras Jumailah an Arab vessel which had fired on her boats. The trade, in some unaccountable manner, was still actively carried on and even appeared to increase, the inhabitants of Batinah being, as before, very deeply implicated; and in 1890 the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Oman were formally reminded by the British authorities of their treaty obligations in regard to the

The use of the French flag by slave traders to protect their vessels Use of the from seizure by British cruisers had begun, as we have seen, about 1875; French and by 1891 it had become somewhat common among the subjects of the and growth and by 1891 it had become somewhat common among the subjects of the slave Sultan of Oman. In 1892 the practice appeared likely to be present the slave emporium at the vessels of Trucial 'Oman, and in the same year slave cargoes began Sar. to reach Basrah under French colours. It should be mentioned, how- 1896. ever, in extenuation of the responsibility of the French Government, that the use of their flag by slave traders was often unauthorised and fraudulent. The whole matter of the French flag is discussed, in its political aspect, in the histories of the 'Omān Sultanate and Trucial Omān. Here it is enough to mention that the Sultan of 'Omān was early assured, on the authority of the Government of India, that his subjects could not be removed from his jurisdiction by the acceptance of a foreign flag; but the precariousness of that ruler's position at Sur and his fear of the French Government deterred him from taking action, and the evil steadily grew.

Inquiries made by Major Hayes Sadler, Political Agent at Masqat. in 1894 showed that African slaves were being brought to Sur in vessels belonging to the port, most of which flew French colours, and that the slaves were ordinarily landed at Sur itself; but the owners of the vessels had sympathisers at Ras-al-Hadd and other places, and, when British cruisers were in the neighbourhood, they were accustomed to receive timely warning and to disembark their cargoes at Jumailah or Lashkharah on the south-eastern coast, whence the gangs were then marched overland to Sur. At this time the cargoes of slaves ordinarily consisted of only five to ten negroes each, but they occasionally amounted to 50: and the total number of slaves imported at Sur was estimated at 300 per annum. The demand in the interior behind Sur was not great, for the system of irrigation in the Ja'alan and Sharqiyah districts did not demand slave labour; and the majority of the slaves were consequently re-exported in small vessels to the Batinah district of 'Oman, where irrigation is mostly from wells, and where some of them were retained. The balance were distributed from Batinah to Trucial 'Oman by land and to the coasts of the Persian Gulf by sea. The Jannabah tribe, who were deeply involved in the trade, now proclaimed openly that their object in taking the French flag was to protect their slaving operations; and it had become clear that the only way to put an end to the trade was to break up the Sur depôt, and that the chief obstacle in the way of such a step was the attitude of France in regard to her flag and the indifference of her local representatives to the operations which it sheltered. Subsequent events thus corroborated is a striking manner the opinion formed by Captain Dowding in 1885; and Sür quickly attained a disreputable prominence in connection with the slave trade, not unlike that which Masqat about the same time began to acquire as a principal emporium of the arms traffic.

In 1896 the traffic was in full swing at Sur and the slaves re-exported thence were being sent chiefly to the port of Wudam in Batinah and that of Kalba in Shamailivah, from the latter of which they were frequently smuggled by Bedouin dealers across country into the territories of the Trucial Shaikhs.

Seizures

In 1896 seizures by the commanders of British war-vessels and British war other authorities were resumed. In May, as related in an earlier vessels, etc., paragraph, Lieutenant Beville, the Political Agent at Masqat, himself captured a vessel with 28 slaves. A few days later H.M.S. "Lapwing" took another carrying 14 slaves; and, on information supplied by the British Consulate at Masqat, the Sultan's officials rescued two recently imported slaves from a boat off Bandar Jissah. Two seizures were next made by Commander Baker of H.M.S. "Sphinx," a very energetic officer of the Royal Navy, which cast fresh light upon the modus operandi of the Sur dealers and the extent to which the protection of the French flag was being abused. Cruising down the South-Eastern Coast of 'Oman the "Sphinx" fell in, on the 23rd of September 1896, with a Sambūk of suspicious appearance named the "Salāmah"; she possessed French papers, but they were out of date, and about 30 slaves were seen on board. Commander Baker accordingly towed the Sambuk to Ras-al-Hadd and thence despatched

her, in charge of a British officer, to the British Consul at Masqat, where she arrived on the 28th of September. Again proceeding down south-eastern coast Commander Baker stopped two more native vessels off Ras Madrakah. One of these was obviously full of slaves under hatches; but her papers, which were French, were in order and she was allowed to proceed. The other was the "Sa'ad," carrying about 140 slaves, and, a flaw having been discovered in her papers, which were French also, she was towed by the "Sphinx" to Masqat and arrived there on the 29th of September. The "Salamah" and the "Sa'ad" were handed over at Masqat to the French Vice-Consul for verification of their papers, and this official—the well-known M. Ottavi was not slow to declare that both vessels were entitled to French protection. He also hastened to impugn the vigorous action of the British Commander; but it is understood that he found himself compelled. nevertheless, to hold that over 80 of the Africans on board were slaves. The Nakhudas of both vessels seem to have been subsequently sentenced to imprisonment by a French court at Bourbon; but the sentence was carried out at Masgat, and they languished in the dungeons of the Sultan until January 1898. The vessels themselves, which though according to their French papers they belonged to ports in Madagascar and the Grand Comoro, were in reality owned at Sur and Bu 'Abāli in 'Omān, lay beached at Masqat, apparently until the release of the masters.

Probably on account of the political difficulties created by Commander Importations Baker's seizures in 1896, slave cruising by British men-of-war in 'Omān at Šūr, 1896. waters was after this virtually discontinued for three years; and the 1902. question of the importation of slaves into the Persian Gulf through Oman received little attention until 1900, when it was re-examined by Captain Cox, Political Agent at Masqat, in connection with the political problem of the French flag in Oman. In June of 1900, during a visit to Sur, Captain Cox ascertained by inquiry among the Indian community that during the season just over about 1,000 African slaves had been imported at Sur. Of this number 850 had arrived in five large vessels, of which three carried the French flag and had come into harbour during a visit of M. Ottavi, the French Vice-Consul, to the port; but M. Ottavi, it was observed, delegated the duty of boarding these arrivals to his dragoman 'Abdul 'Azīz, Ruwāhi. It was probable that the slaves carried had been disembarked shortly before reaching Sur, but the circumstances made it impossible to believe that M. Ottavi could have been altogether ignorant of the facts. The majority of the slaves imported at Sūr in 1900 changed hands there; but a proportion were gradually distributed northwards by land, and the demand was good, children fetching \$120, male adults \$150, and girls \$200 to \$300 each. These revelations were interesting, but they led to no practical result, for the French flag question was still unsettled and the danger of offending French susceptibilities made direct measures against the Sūr slave-traders impossible: even a friendly appeal to France was considered to be out of the question. In the season of 1901 about 1,000 slaves were again landed at Sūr, and six vessels brought large cargoes, three of them under the French flag; in this year the selling price of strong youths was \$130 to \$175 and of slave girls \$150 to \$200. In 1902 it

was reported that slaves were abundant both in the interior and on the coast of 'Oman, and that the trade was in a flourishing condition. The Sultan, however, disregarding the odium, gave all reasonable assistance within his power for the suppression of the traffic; and, with his co-operation, a considerable number of slaves were released at Masqat between 1898 and 1902.

At this juncture sudden retribution overtook the slave dealers of tures of Sur 'Oman in an unexpected quarter, at nearly 3,000 miles distance from slave traders their homes. In the middle of February 1902 information reached the by the Portuinguese Governor of Mozambique, through a Portuguese explorer, Africa, 1902, that a flotilla of Arab vessels of suspicious appearance was anchored in a small inlet of Samuco Bay, less than 100 miles to the north of Mozambique, in a position such that they were screened from the view of ships passing at sea. The fact was that a body of 'Omani Arabs' had formed a large camp at this place and established, virtually, an armed occupation of the district, where, with the assistance of Nampuita Muno, Shaikh of Samuco, they were actively engaged in the purchase of slaves. An expedition from Mozambique against the Arab camp was immediately organised. On the 8th of March the Portuguese war-vessels "San Rafael." "Liberal." and "Chaimite," under the command of Captain Leima, met at a rendezvous outside Samuco Bay; and on the following day a contingent was landed from the ships and effected a junction with a land force of armed natives commanded by Senhor d'Almeida. Arabs were surprised in their camp, and terms of surrender were offered them, but were refused. The position was then attacked and captured with little or no loss on either side, the Arabs flying with their arms at the sight of the artillery which accompanied the column; they were, however, pursued and captured to the number of 114. Almost all were in possession of breech-loading rifles; and quantities of ammunition fell. along with the camp, into the hands of the Portuguese. The vessels belonging to the 'Omanis twelve in number, were also taken. On board of them was discovered a mass of correspondence written in the Arabic character and Kiswahili language, which afforded ample documentary proof of old established slave-dealing relations between most of the prisoners and the Shaikh of Samuco. In the camp 725 slaves were found, who had been collected by Nampuita Muno from various sources, chiefly in the interior, and sold to the 'Omanis at an average rate of £3 a head. Owing to the enormous number of the prisoners and of the witnesses against them, and to the non-availability for a time of a competent judge, the case was not finally disposed of until the 3rd of October 1903, by which time nearly a third of the accused had died in confinement. Of the survivors 54 were sentenced to transportation for 25 years to the Portuguese province of Angola on the west coast of Africa; and the Shaikh of Samuco also was brought to justice.

> At the end of February 1902, a few days before the Samuco affair, an 'Omāni vessel named the "Fatah Salām," belonging to the same gang, was seized by the Portuguese Commandant of the district of Moma on suspicion of slave-trading and was found to contain arms and ammunition, but no slaves. The crew were brought to trial on the 18th of May 1903, and thirteen of them, who survived long enough, were

transported for 17 years to Angola. The thirteen vessels taken in both affairs were all destroyed.

It is interesting to notice that in the Samuco case four of the prisoners were shown to be natives of Sūr, while all of them were subjects of the Sultān of 'Omān, and that the prisoners in the Moma case were all Jannabah, and therefore presumably belonged to Sūr or its neighbourhood; in fact the tendency of some inquiries made at Masqat was to show that, with the exception of a few 'Awāmir of the Bātinah district and five or six others, all the captured Arabs were Bani Bū 'Ali or Jannabah of Sūr. The news of the catastrophe reached Sūr about the middle of May 1902 and converted the town into a scene of wailing and lamentation. The number of the captives who might have claimed French protection was never ascertained; but it was admitted by one of them before the Portuguese authorities that two of the vessels captured, including that commanded by himself, flew the French flag.

This disaster to the slave traders of Sūr led to a serious increase in a Subsequent trade in Balūchi slaves which had for some time been carried on, in an course of the intermittent manner, from the coast of Persian Makrān to the Bātinah trade, 1892-coast of 'Omān; but the facts, though of some general importance, will 1907. be more appropriately described in local paragraphs further on. The Portuguese seizures of 1902 appear to have had a very depressing, and it is to be hoped permanent, effect on the trade in slaves, from East Africa to the Persian Gulf; but it is believed that it still, to some extent, continues.

History of the internal slave trade of the Persian Gulf, 1873-1907.

Having disposed of the slave trade of the Persian Gulf from 1873 to 1907 in its external aspects, we may now view it from an interior standpoint, with reference chiefly to the distribution of the slaves imported from abroad and to the local traffic in slaves. A division of the subject according to political jurisdictions will here be the most convenient for our purpose.

Local history of the slave trade in the Sultanate of 'Omān, 1873-1907.

The course of events in the 'Omān Sultanate has been, to some extent, described in reviewing the history of the import trade from Africa, and it is unnecessary to repeat in this place facts already given.

- 1873-75. In April 1873, after the conclusion of his Treaty with Great Britain, a proclamation abolishing the slave trade in all his territories was published by the Sultān of 'Omān; his attitude in regard to the Treaty also had been highly satisfactory, contrasting strongly in this respect with that of his brother Barghash, the Sultān of Zanzibar. For a time, partly in consequence of the fear inspired by Sir Bartle Frere's mission, the traffic in 'Omān almost ceased; and in 1875, so far as could be ascertained, only 40 or 50 African slaves were imported, most of whom arrived under the French flag.
- 1876-77. In 1876 or 1877 several slaves, shipped as passengers, were detected at Masqat on board the British steamer "Korsia" from Jiddah; they were landed, condemned as fresh importations, and sent to Karāchi by the British Consul. About the same time a cargo of 80 Abyssinian slaves was reported to have been landed in 'Omān; but the circumstances of the case were such that it was impossible for the Sultān to take action.

Liberation of In 1878 or 1879 two Indians were released from slavery in Rustāq; Indian slaves, and at the end of 1879 three Indian children were recovered from the possession of a gang of Hadhramaut Arabs, who had brought them from Haidarābād in the Dakkhan and had offered them for sale at Sūr. In the latter case the children were sent back to India and the Sultān was left to punish the Hadhramis as he saw fit.

- 1884. In connection with the revival of the import trade from Africa the Sultān, in June 1884, issued a fresh anti-slavery proclamation in his dominions; and in October of the same year he not only repeated the proclamation but wrote letters to the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān, requesting them to seize slaves who might be brought to their ports by his subjects. Saiyid Turki, with whom the Treaty of 1873 had been made soon after his accession and who continued to rule until 1888, showed throughout his whole reign a praiseworthy disposition to support the anti-slavery policy of the British Government; and more than once he received the formal thanks of the Government of India for his efforts in the good cause.
- 1890.93. In 1890 or 1891 an attempt was made to introduce 25 slaves at Masqat from a French mail steamer on a voyage between Aden and Karāchi; it resulted in the imprisonment of six Arabs by the Sultān. Similarly the British India steamer "Kistna," on arrival at Masqat in September 1891, was found to contain 25 African slaves in charge of Arabs; and the slaves, after being liberated with the assent of the Sultan were sent to Bombay,—a proceeding that elicited a strong protest from Sālih-bin-'Ali, a turbulent political leader of the Sharqīyah district in the interior. In 1892 there was a marked increase in the slave trade in 'Omān, especially upon the Bātinah coast; but Saiyid Faisal, the ruling Sultān, whose attitude in slave trade as in other matters was less satisfactory than his father Turki's had been, made light of the question and did nothing beyond issuing a fresh proclamation based on the Treaty of 1873.
 - 1894. In February 1894 an African freeman who had taken a passage on a Baghlah at Lingeh, on his way from Basrah to Zanzibar, was landed by

the Nākhuda on the Bātinah coast and there sold into slavery; but, information of this outrage having reached Masqat, steps were taken which resulted in the recovery of the negro, the confiscation of the boat, and the imprisonment of the Nākhuda by the Sultān.

In February 1896 an armed party of the Yāl Sa'ad kidnapped 17 men 1896, from the south Arabian coast, carried them by boat to Bātinah, and sold them into slavery in the interior; the affair did not come to light until some time later, when it was reported at Masqat by one of the slaves who had escaped. The Shaikh of the Yāl Sa'ad principally concerned was then imprisoned by the Sultān of Masqat and died in confinement, but of the persons abducted only one other could be traced; this individual was ransomed by the British Government from the Bedouins in whose possession he was found.

At the end of 1896 a gang of slave dealers in Bātinah, who had for some years been dealing with impunity in Balūchi slaves kidnapped from the opposite coast of Makrān, were at length brought to book, as was also the Shaikh of Wudām, a port bearing the same relation to the Balūchi slave traffic as Sūr to the African. The Shaikh of Wudām was said to be too ill to be brought to Masqat, but the Sultān was prevailed on—not without difficulty—to order the arrest of six of the gang, themselves apparently Balūchis. The accused were tried by a tribunal consisting of Lieutenant Beville, the British Consul at Masqat, and of a representative of the Sultān upon no less than 34 charges of slave dealing, with the result that five of them were convicted and were sentenced by the Sultān to fines varying from \$100 to \$500 and also to imprisonment.

In 1900 a case came to light which pointed to the occasional 1900. exportation of children from famine-stricken districts in Western India, as slaves, to the Persian Gulf. In August of that year a Hadhramauti Arab, arriving at Masqat in the British steamer "Simla," was found to be in possession of three Hindu children from Baroda, whom inquiry showed that he had either purchased or kidnapped and was holding in slavery. The children were sent back to India, and the Arab was extradited and made over to the Baroda State, by one of whose courts he was condemned to two years' rigorous imprisonment. Precautions were also taken by the police of the Baroda State against the recurrence of similar incidents.

In 1904 'Abdullah, the Sultān's Jama'dār or military commandant 1904. at Sohār, was shown to have bought slaves exported from Makrān to Sohār by the Persian Governor of Bashākard and was sentenced by his master, on the representations of the British Political Agent, to three months' imprisonment. It transpired that two of the slaves bought by the Jama'dār had been presented by him to the Sultān himself, who had accepted them.

In 1905, in consequence of an unfavourable award by the Hague 1905. Tribunal in regard to the French flag in 'Omān, the local representative of the Republic began to exercise a closer supervision over the proceedings of native vessels entitled to use the French colours.

Local history of the slave trade in Trucial 'Omān, 1873-1907.

- 1880.81. In 1880 or 1881 a British Indian subject residing in 'Omān was convicted of a slave trading offence and was punished with fine and imprisonment.
 - 1884. In 1884 a freshly-run cargo of 54 African slaves was landed at Dibai, and the Shaikh of that place, disregarding a protest by the British Residency Agent at Shārjah, permitted them to be sold. The Agent was thereupon instructed to demand the surrender of all recently imported African slaves in Trucial 'Omān; and a letter was addressed by the Resident to all the Trucial Shaikhs, reminding them of their obligations under treaty in respect of the slave trade. Later in the year Mr. Robertson, the Assistant Political Resident, visited the coast in H.M.S. "Dragon" and was successful in recovering 21 of the slaves who had been landed at Dibai, while the Shaikh produced four others; for each slave not recovered the Shaikh was obliged to pay a fine of \$70. One slave boy was released at Shārjah, and another at Umm-al-Qaiwain.
- 1890-91. In 1890 or 1891 fresh reminders as to their duty were addressed to the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān and resulted in the liberation of a few slaves.
 - In 1892 complaints become frequent of slave dealing in Trucial 1892. 'Oman, and in November of that year Colonel Talbot, the Resident, found it necessary to visit the coast in the R.I.M.S. "Lawrence." accompanied by H.M.S. "Sphinx" and H.M.S. "Cossack." In one instance 33 slaves were shown to have been brought—in a Sur vessel under the French flag-from Zanzibar to Ras-al-Khaimah, whence they had been carried to Khor Fakkan in the same jurisdiction and disposed of. In this case Colonel Talbot authorised a reduction of the customary fine of \$70 for each slave, on the ground that the slave dealer and the Shaikh directly in charge of Khor Fakkan were mainly responsible; but the fine was nevertheless a heavy one. Five slaves having been recently landed at Hamriyah, the Shaikh of Sharjah was compelled to pay a fine of \$550 on account of his feudatory, the local Shaikh; and at Dibai, where two slaves had been imported by a Bahrain subject and a demand by the British Residency Agent for their surrender had been refused, a fine of \$250 was exacted.
 - 1894. In 1894 the Shaikh of Rās-al-Khaimah was fined \$195 on account of one slave sold at that place, and of five slaves brought there for sale by a native of Khadhra in Bātinah, but not sold.
 - 1896. In February 1896 the Political Resident visited the Trucial Coast in the R.I.M.S. "Lawrence," accompanied by H.M.S. "Lapwing," to enquire into the alleged importation of about 40 slaves at Abu Dhabi. The Shaikh could not deny the facts, though he tried to minimise them and to extenuate his conduct by alleging a general prevalence of the traffic and even connivance on the part of the British

Residency Agent; accordingly, after he had produced nine of the slaves in question, he was compelled to pay a fine of \$2,100 on account of the estimated balance, most of whom were believed to have been shipped to Qatar and to other places. Subsequently it was reported that the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi, in consequence of this affair, had formed a design against the life of the Residency Agent at Shārjah; and, as the belief appeared to be not altogether unfounded, a warning was conveyed to him. There was reason to think that the assertions of the Shaikh of Abu Dhabi in regard to prevalence of the trade along the whole Trucial Coast had a considerable substratum of truth, but no definite proofs could be obtained. In the same year a party of Balūchi slaves brought from Wudām were sold in Dibai, and two who escaped from that place fell into the hands of Arabs at Khān; proceedings however were taken which resulted in the conviction, as already mentioned above, of a number of slave dealers in Bātinah.

In December 1899 Colonel Meade, the Political Resident in the ¹⁸⁹⁹. Persian Gulf, visited the ports of the Trucial Shaikhs and urged them to take steps for more effectively suppressing the slave traffic; the Shaikhs, however, were deaf to his exhortations, and with one voice denied that there was any importation of slaves into their territories by sea. The Shaikh of Shārjah alone went so far as to admit that slaves were imported by Bedouins from 'Omān into Trucial 'Omān by land. It was generally alleged on the Trucial Coast that large number of slaves were being imported into Qatar by sea; but no means existed of verifying the statement, which was considered to be in itself highly probable.

In August 1901 a slave girl was imported by sea from Rās-al-1901. Khaimah to Shārjah; she was manumitted and a fine of \$70 was recovered. In 1904 two cases came to light of the sale at Umm-al-Qaiwain of Persian boys kidnapped by Balūchis from the opposite coast; in each case the buyer was fined \$100 and was sentenced to imprisonment. On the 5th of September 1901 two slaves obtained their freedom on board H.M.S. "Sphinx" at Dalmah Island. They stated that they had been kidnapped from Africa three years before and brought to Sūr, whence, two years later they had been re-exported to Shārjah. This last case illustrated the well-known fact that the condition of slaves in the Persian Gulf is not a hard one, except in so far as they are employed by their masters for pearl-diving, and that on the Arabian coast it is generally the fear of being sent to sea that drives slaves to abscond.

Local history of the trade in Bahrain, 1873-1907.

In October 1889 the British Residency Agent in Bahrain reported 1889. that more slaves than usual had been brought home by pilgrims returning from Makkah; the Shaikh however, in this case, showed loyalty to his engagements, and 15 of the new slaves were traced and set at liberty with his co-operation.

In the autumn of 1895, during the presence of British warships off Bahrain in connection with the Zubārah crisis, a number of slaves took refuge at the British Agency in Manamah and claimed their freedom: a number were found to be entitled to it, and on one occasion so many as 31 individuals were liberated. Three of the slaves emancipated belonged to the refractory colony of Dawasir Arabs at Budaiya, and Zallaq, who expressed great dissatisfaction and threatened to emigrate from Bahrain; and the example of the Dawasir was followed by some of the Sādah of Hadd and of the Al Bū Falāsah tribe. The movement for liberty among slaves in Bahrain seems at this time to have assumed serious proportions; and the British authorities apparently found it necessary to give an assurance to the leading men of Bahrain that the emancipation of all slaves was not contemplated; it was added, however. that all cases of fugitive slaves would continue to be investigated, and that "recent importations and ill-treated slaves" would be freed. In November 1895 it was reported by the Commander of H.M.S. "Pigeon" that the Arab slave owners of Bahrain had volunteered to give a written undertaking to the Shaikh that they would not in future buy, sell or give away slaves; but no advantage, apparently, was taken of this offer. After these arrangements had been made the Arabs again settled down; some Al Bū Falāsah who had left the islands returned to their homes; and slaves ceased for a time to apply for manumission.

1900. In 1900 Ahmad-bin-Sa'ad, a native of Kuwait residing in Bahrain, was convicted of re-enslaving a boy who had received papers of manumission from the British Consul at Basrah, and was fined \$100 by the Shaikh of Bahrain,—a penalty to which the Government of India took exception as inadequate.

Matters continued on the footing of 1895 until ten years later, 1905. when Captain Prideaux, the Political Agent in Bahrain, brought it to the notice of the Government of India that the importation of slaves. chiefly Africans, steadily continued in Bahrain, the principal offenders being the Sādah of Hadd and the Dawāsir of Budaiya' and Zallāq; he estimated that the number of the slaves in Bahrain who had been imported since 1847, and were therefore in his view entitled to freedom, might now be reckoned in thousands. Captain Prideaux recommended that steps should be taken to deal with the evil by the gradual extinction of the institution of slavery in Bahrain on principles which had been adopted in Zanzibar in 1891, and he made also some alternative suggestions; but the Government of India considered the objections against the Political Agent's proposals to be insuperable and directed, instead, that no effort should be spared to detect and suppress fresh importations of slaves; that every facility for obtaining manumission papers should be afforded to newly imported slaves; that encouragement to apply for their freedom should not be offered to slaves who had been long domiciled in the islands; and that, in the event of long domiciled slaves applying of their own accord for manumission, each case should be considered on its merits with especial reference to the treatment of the slave, past and prospective, by his master. The Political Agent was also authorised for the future, on the analogy of the practice at

Masqat, to issue certificates of manumission himself without reference to the Political Resident at Būshehr; in doing so he was to consult the Shaikh of Bahrain, but he was not, in practice, to give the Shaikh any option of withholding his consent. We shall have occasion to return to this correspondence further on in connection with the question of domestic slavery in the Persian Gulf.

In 1906 or 1907 the Shaikh of Bahrain, at the instance of the 1906-07. Political Agent, recovered a fine of Rs. 500 from an Arab who was proved to be in possession of a freshly imported African slave and to have acted cruelly towards two other slaves in his possession.

Local history of the slave trade in Qatar, Hasa and Kuwait, 1873-1907.

The records of Government contain few references to the slave trade 1896-99. in Qatar, Hasa and Kuwait, where however it is undoubtedly no less prevalent than elsewhere in the Gulf. In 1896 reason was found for believing that there was some exportation of slaves from Trucial 'Omān to Qatar; and in 1899 it was stated in Trucial 'Omān that many slaves were being brought to Qatar by sea.

In 1904 a female slave, who had been left for sale with an inhab-1904. itant of Bahrain by a native of Qatar, took refuge at the British Agency and was manumitted. A fine of \$100 was recovered from the Bahrain subject, and it was intended that the Qatari should be similarly punished; but in the case of the latter no means of enforcing the penalty could be found.

Local history of the slave trade in Turkish 'Iraq, 1873-1907.

It does not appear that the importation of slaves into Turkish 'Irāq has ever, at least in recent years, been carried on upon any considerable scale. About 1890, however, Colonel Tweedie, the British Resident at Baghdād, who was satisfied that the trade existed to a certain extent, requested the Consul at Basrah to persevere in urging the Wāli of Basrah to do his utmost for its suppression. Reports were received from time to time of the passage of slave cargoes up the Shatt-al-'Arab, but in no instance were they fully substantiated. In 1891 or 1892 a proclamation, drafted in accordance with the terms of the Treaty of 1880 between Great Britain and Turkey, was received from his Government by the Turkish Consular Agent at Lingeh, for the information of Turkish subjects residing at that place. In 1892 the Assistant Political Agent reported the existence at Basrah and in

the neighbourhood of a small trade in slaves, managed with great secrecy and care. At the present day, so far as can be ascertained, the importation of slaves by sea into the Basrah Wilāyat has fallen to negligeable proportions.

Local history of the slave trade in 'Arabistan, 1873-1907.

The attention of the Government of India has not, apparently, ever been drawn to any importation of slaves into 'Arabistan.

Local history of the slave trade on the coast of Fars and at the Gulf Ports, 1873-1907.

- 1876-77. In 1876 or 1877 it was reported that slaves were being introduced into Persian territory through Qishm and Bandar 'Abbās, but the local Persian authorities declined to discuss the matter. The "Rokeby" case at Būshehr in 1877 has already been described above; and here it may be added that, though it was clear that other slaves besides the boy recovered through the Kārguzār had been landed from the steamer, the Persian authorities took no action upon very definite information which was supplied to them by the British Residency. The remissness of the Persian officials at Bandar 'Abbās and Būshehr having been reported to the British Legation at Tehrān, a special Commissioner was nominated by the Persian Government to enquire into their conduct; but nothing seems to have resulted from this measure.
- 1881-82. In 1881 it was discovered that some Indian lads had been sold as slaves at Shīrāz by Persian horse dealers, and action was taken by the British Legation at Tehrān; in the result one of the slaves was recovered and several of the dealers were punished. In the following year another Indian boy was rescued from slavery at Shīrāz.
 - 1884. In 1884 three Africans, residing in the British settlement of Bāsīdu, were kidnapped near Lingeh; but the Residency Agent at the latter place succeeded in obtaining their release through the Shaikh of Mughu.
 - 1888. In September 1888 information was received that seven fresh African slaves from Sūr had been imported at Lingeh, and efforts were made by the British authorities to secure the release of the slaves and the punishment of those concerned in their importation; but the action and attitude of the local Persian officials completely frustrated their endeavours in both respects. Curiously enough, however, the Dallāl who imported the slaves died from the sting of a hornet immediately after the institution of enquiries. Subsequently the Governor of the Gulf

Ports issued a notification to the effect that persons engaging in the slave traffic would be punished, and the customs farmer was enjoined to bring all cases of importation to the notice of the authorities.

In 1890 two slaves swam off to the British steamer "Calder" at ¹⁸⁹⁰⁻⁹¹. Lingeh and claimed protection as British subjects from Aden. The trade in slaves was now brisk at Chārak and on Qais Island, at neither of which places would the inhabitants suffer the Persian Deputy-Governor of Lingeh to hold any investigation; but an order prohibiting the traffic was published by the Governor of the Gulf Ports at the request of the British Political Resident. In 1891 there were reports of importation of fresh slaves as Qishm, and an enquiry was held by the Governor of the Gulf Ports, who eventually declared the statements to be without foundation.

In 1896 an attempt made on the Persian coast to re-enslave a free-1896. man was defeated by his recovery at Lingeh, where he was taken on board H. M.S. "Sphinx."

At Hanjam in 1904, shortly after the reopening of the British 1904. telegraph station on the island, a Baluchi slave boy escaped from an Arab Baghlah belonging to the village of Suzeh on Qishm Island and took refuge in the telegraph station, complaining that he had been subjected to ill-usage, and that attempts had been made to sell him at Lingeh and on the coast of Trucial 'Oman. This slave was liberated; but no steps were taken, on account of technical difficulties, for adjudication of the vessel from which he had escaped. One consequence of the case was the extension to Hanjam of certain instructions, to be noticed further on, which had been issued by the Government of India in 1885 regarding the treatment of fugitive slaves seeking refuge at British telegraph stations on the Persian mainland; and notice was also drawn to the fact that the registration, naming, and numbering of native vessels were not carried out at Persian ports in accordance with the terms of the General Act of the Brussels Conference, and that crew and passenger lists were not maintained on Persian vessels as required by the Act. The attention of the Persian Government was directed by His Majesty's Legation to their neglect of these important provisions; and instructions were issued from Tehran, but without any visible result, to the local Persian officials in the Gulf. It was further suggested by Sir A. Hardinge, the British Minister at Tehran, that steps might be taken to obtain a transfer of the responsibility for enforcing the provisions in question from the local governors to the Imperial Persian Customs; and M. Naus, the Persian Minister of Customs, privately signified his readiness to agree to such an arrangement; but the Government of India deprecated the proposal on the ground that it would lead to indiscriminate detention and search of all native vessels by the Customs, and it was not proceeded with. It should be observed that the Persian Governor of the Gulf Ports at this time raised a contention that the Brussels Act was only applicable to African slaves.

In 1907 it was reported by the British Resident at Büshehr that 1907. there were certainly in Shīrāz, and probably throughout Fārs, large numbers of slaves who must have been imported into Persia by sea since

1882, in defiance of the Convention concluded that year for the suppression of the traffic in slaves. It was said that since 1903 the Persian authorities at Shīrāz had exerted the most ingenuity to avoid carrying out the stipulations of the Convention, and that strong local pressure and frequent references to the British Minister at Tehran had been necessary.

Local history of the slave trade in Persian Makran, 1873-1907.

- 1884-85. In 1884 or 1885 an Indian Khalāsi, who had at some previous time been a slave but had succeeded in escaping to Karāchi, was kidnapped at Chahbār by his former master and carried off to Pārag. The Persian authorities were addressed on the subject, but with what result does not appear.
 - 1896. In 1896, as already mentioned in the paragraph on the slave trade in the 'Omān Sultanate, a gang of Balūchis on the Bātinah coast, who dealt chiefly in slaves purchased or kidnapped from Makrān, were brought to justice. At the time of its being broken up, the gang in question had been carrying on its operations with impunity for several years.
 - 1903. The traffic in slaves from Makrān to Arabia again came to notice in 1903, when it was reported that some men of the Jāshk district and some Jadgāls of Bāhu and Dashtyāri were purchasing slaves, from the inhabitants of Bāhu and from Kalāt subjects in Dasht, and were selling them to merchants from the 'Omān coast, who came over to buy. The principal places of export were then Tank and Wank in the Bīr district; but slaves were also shipped at Gālag and Sadaich. Many of the slaves exported were Africans, but among them were now some low class Balūchis who had been sold by petty headmen. Attention was first drawn to this trade by a sudden influx of fugitive slaves into the free port of Gwādar, as mentioned further on.
 - 1901. In 1904 the trade, in its new form, was greatly stimulated by the lawless proceedings of Said Khān, Chief of Gaih, who scoured the country with an armed retinue, reducing poor Balūchis to slavery and selling them; the profits of his misdeeds were mostly invested in rifles and ammunition. His example was quickly followed by Mīr Barkat of Jāshk, who formed a gang for slave-dealing operations and refused to desist, though frequent remonstrances were addressed to him by Mullas and influential Balūchis of Jāshk. The victims of the traffic were now drawn not only from the districts already mentioned, but also from the Gaih and Bint neighbourhoods, and even from Bashākard. The enslavementof free Muhammadans is contrary to the law of Islām; but Said Khān and Mīr Barkat nevertheless found many imitators on a smaller scale. One of those was a ruffian named Shāi-bin-Sha'bān who at first made his headquarters at Jāshk; and it was estimated that, from this port clone. 450 slaves were exported to Arabia during the three years ending in 1904,

In 1904 Shāi-bin-Sha'bān came to a violent and well-deserved end in conse quence of a quarrel with Mir Barkat, whom he had offended by transferring his operations from Jashk to Sadaich, a step by which Barkat was deprived of his former half-share in the proceeds of Shai's business. Shai, having been decoyed to Jashk on a pretext of negotiations, was there treacherously attacked at night by the Mir's men and lost 12 of his followers killed; he fled to Jagin, but was pursued thither by Barkat and slain with 25 more of his men; 27 others of his gang and the whole of his property next fell into the hands of the hardly less infamous Mir. Shortly before his death Shai had sold 49 slaves at an average of \$150 each, and it was said that the plunder taken by Barkat from his camp was worth \$4,000. Of Shai's followers only 11 escaped, but these were desperate men, and it was expected that they would afterwards give trouble in the Jashk district; up to the present, however, though there have been several scares, they have not succeeded in committing any outrages. In 1904 there was also another smaller, but active, gang of nine slave-dealers, established at Gabrig. About this time 'Ali Raza Khan, the chief of Bashākard, with his sons Muhammad Khān and Alak, raided Jagin Balad, a place on the Jagin River about 45 miles north or north-east of Jashk, and captured a number of women and children whom he exported as slaves to Sohār in 'Omān. It was the purchase of some of these by the Jama'dar of Sohar which brought that functionary into trouble, as already mentioned. Of 95 slaves manumitted at Masqat in 1904-05 no less than 60 were Persians or Balüchis who had been exported from Makrān to the Bātinah coast. In 1905 the export trade from Makrān had again apparently ceased.

Local history of the slave trade at Gwadar, 1873-1907.

The course of events at Gwādar, a dependency in Makrān of the Sultanate of 'Omān, deserves a short separate notice.

By a clause in the Treaty of 1873 the Sultān of 'Omān had bound 1875-91. himself to treat as free all persons entering his dominions after that date, and the British Assistant Political Agent at Gwādar frequently insisted on the liberation of slaves owned by the troublesome Rind tribe in the vicinity, who had escaped from their masters and taken refuge at the port. These manumissions, aided by other causes, occasioned, after 1875, some difficulties with the Rinds, which are fully described in the history of Gwādar, and by which the British telegraph establishment, as well as the Sultān's government, were from time to time sufferers.

In May 1892 the Rinds demanded the surrender of 70 absconded 1892-94. slaves by the Gwādar authorities; but it was refused, and, during the winter of 1892-93, fugitives continued to arrive at Gwādar, where by May 1893 they had collected to the number of several hundreds. At this point, in order to avert serious trouble, the refugees were persuaded to leave Gwādar for British India, some of them being even provided with the means of doing so by the British authorities. The situation, however,

continued critical until the beginning of 1894, when, as related in the history of Gwadar, an agreement was obtained from the Rinds by which they bound themselves to make no more disturbances at Gwadar on account of fugitive slaves, while the British Government, on their part. undertook that released slaves should not be allowed to remain at Gwadar for more than 15 days after their release.

1903. In 1903 there was a considerable influx into Gwadar of slaves who believed that their owners intended to sell them into slavery abroad; it was by this influx that the attention of the British authorities was first directed to the trade in Balüchi slaves which had then recently sprung up in Makrān.

Domestic slavery in the Persian Gulf.

Policy of the ernment in regard to domestic slavery.

We have dealt, thus far, almost exclusively with the slave trade to British Gov- and in the Persian Gulf as carried on by sea; and, as there is no importation of "raw" slaves from abroad by land, it only remains to add a few remarks on the subject of domestic slavery and the traffic in domestic slaves. Domestic slavery, as practised in the Persian Gulf is of a comparatively harmless character; and, among the rulers and inhabitants of the countries surrounding the Gulf, there is a strong social and even religious prejudice in favour of its continuance. For these reasons, and on account of the difficulty of intervening with beneficial effect in the internal affairs of independent and quasi-independent states, the British Government have generally found it necessary to abstain from active interference with domestic slavery in the Persian Gulf; but their officers, as will be apparent from what follows, have none the less steadily exerted themselves to discourage slavery in all its shapes and forms.

Manumission of domestic slaves at Masqat.

At Masqat, as has already been mentioned incidentally, it has been the custom for ten years, and probably for longer, occasionally to manumit, with the consent of the Sultan, domestic slaves who are proved to have been badly treated or whom no owner appears to claim, and to require a guarantee of kind treatment from every master to whom a fugitive slave is returned.

Basidu case. 1877.

In 1877 Hāji 'Abbās, the British coal agent at Bāsīdu, was found to be in possession of several slaves, and the Political Resident, considering his conduct to be incompatible with his position under the British Government, dismissed him from his appointment. The Government of India, however, in view of the facts that the man was a Persian subject, that slavery was recognised by the religion and law of Persia, and that his duty as an employé of the British Government was "to supply coal and not to regenerate society," questioned both the justice and the expediency of his dismissal; and in 1878 Hāji 'Abbās was reinstated.

Question of telegraph stations in Persia, 1884.

In 1884 four runaway slaves took refuge in the British telegraph runaway sla- station at Jashk; and, their restoration having been demanded by the ves at British local authorities, they were delivered up by Mr. Patten, the Assistant Superintendent in charge, on a written guarantee that they would

not be ill-treated. The Resident in the Persian Gulf, Colonel Ross, thereupon ordered that runaway slaves should not in future be admitted to premises owned in Persia by the British Government, as the result would be a great influx of slaves, leading to political complications, into the British stations. These instructions were approved by the Government of India, with the proviso that exception should be made in cases where, owing to the slaves being placed in imminent danger or otherwise, considerations of humanity might dictate an opposite course. In 1904, in consequence of a case, described above, which occurred there, the Jashk order was expressly made applicable to Hanjām.

On the 1st August 1890 a decree was promulgated by the Sultan Proposal to of Zanzibar, putting an end to the traffic in domestic slaves in his restrict dominions, setting various classes of domestic slaves immediately at domestic liberty, and making it easier for the remainder to obtain their freedom. Sul-It was suggested that the adoption of a similar measure should be pressed tanate rejectupon the Sultan of 'Oman; but the local political officers, to whom this ed, 1891. proposal was referred, criticised it adversely, pointing out that in the peculiar circumstances of 'Oman any attempt to deal with domestic slavery would be altogether ineffectual on account of the extent and lawlessness of the country, while at the same time it might provoke a dangerous insurrection against the Sultan's authority. Eventually as it appeared that the Sultan, who declined to issue the decree suggested, could not fairly be urged to do so unless he were also assured of British support in case of untoward results, the project was abandoned.

When the British Resident, at the end of 1899, visited Trucial Failure of an 'Oman to enquire into slave trade questions, he suggested that, as attempt was done at Masqat, manumission papers might in some circumstances be introduce granted to slaves taking refuge at the British Agency; but even the of domestic Shaikh of Sharjah, who was the least obdurate, declined to entertain the slaves in Truproposal, on the ground that his subjects would demand compensation cial 'Oman, of him for every slave released.

We have already seen, in examining the question of the local slave Proposal to trade in Bahrain, that Captain Prideaux, the Political Agent there, restrict suggested in 1905 the application to the Shaikhdom of the policy which domestic had been adopted in Zanzibar in 1891. The Government of India, Bahrain rehowever, while they declared that it was their object "now, as always, jected, 1905. to discourage slavery under any terms, and to move steadily in the direction of its abolition," considered that there was, as matters stood, no real analogy between the situations existing in Zanzibar and in Bahrain, and that a mistake would be committed if, by precipitate or sentimental action, a slavery question were gratuitously raised in the Persian Gulf. As already mentioned, however, in an earlier paragraph, they authorised the manumission of slaves in the future by the Political Agent, acting on his own responsibility with the consent—which might not be withheld- of the Shaikh of the islands; and the instructions were so worded as to permit the emancipation even of domestic slaves, in cases in which they had been badly used or in which no sufficient guarantee was offered for their subsequent good treatment. An attempt was also made, under the orders of Government, to obtain from the

leading tribal chiefs in Bahrain the written agreement which they had volunteered to hand to the Shaikh in 1895, to the effect that they would not buy, sell or give away slaves; but the chiefs were not amenable to persuasion, and the endeavour had to be abandoned. It will be remembered that, in Bahrain, it has been the custom for more than ten years to exact a written guarantee of good treatment from every owner to whom a fugitive slave is unavoidably restored.

Bandar 'Abbās report, 1905. In 1905 it was reported by the Consul at Bandar 'Abbās that, during the preceding year, slaves had frequently sought protection at the Consulate because their masters wished to sell them to strangers: this appears to be principal grievance of domestic slaves in Persia, corresponding to the objection against being sent to sea which prevails among those upon the Arabian side. Parents and relations were, it was stated, selling children into slavery on account of the scarcity then generally prevailing. The report referred, perhaps, chiefly to the country eastward of Bandar 'Abbās.

General results of the British anti-slavery policy in the Persian Gulf.

It cannot be questioned that the results of the policy pursued by Great Britain in the Persian Gulf have been highly beneficial. The importation of slaves by sea, whether from abroad or from one country of the Gulf into another, has been greatly restricted; and, in this branch of the trade, slaves are now smuggled with difficulty in small numbers instead of being, as formerly, conveyed openly in large cargoes. Domestic slavery has been greatly mitigated in the 'Omān Sultanate and in Bahrain by arrangements for the manumission of domestic slaves by the British Political Agent, in the former principality with the concurrence of the Sultān and in the latter virtually without the consent of the Shaikh; and domestic slaves are, in special circumstances, protected at British telegraph stations in Persia. The actual number of the slaves emancipated is obviously a most inadequate criterion of the good effected; but the figures are of interest and are given below, so far as ascertainable.

Year.	Number of slaves cap- tured at sea and released.	Number of fugitive, * recently imported, or domestic slaves released.	Total.
1852 1853 1854 1855 1856 1857 1858	 15 Nil. 15 	3 48 12 Nil. 57 24 2	3 63 12 Nil. 72 24 2†

[&]quot;Fugitive" here means "taking refuge on board a British vessel or at Bāsīdu."

[†] This figure is manifestly incomplete, for between 1st May and 31st October 1858 at least 24 emancipated slaves passed through Basidu.

Year.	Number of slaves cap- tured at sea and released.	Number of fugitives,* recently imported, or domestic slaves released.	Total.
1859 }	Figures not	ascertainable.	
1870	rigures not	ascertainable.	
1871-72	62		62
1872-73	169	•••	169
1873-74	•••	***	
1874-75	•••		•••
1875-76	•••		
1876-77	7	Several.	More than 7
1877-78	•••	2	2
1878-79	•••	5	5
1879-80	100	1	J
1880-81		1	1
1881-82	A number.	1	A number.
1882-83	•••	i	1
1883-84	•••	l	·
1884-85	205	39	244
1885-86	75		75
1886-87	21	5	26
1887-88	•••	28	28
1888-89	•••		
1889-90	•••	53	53
1890-91	•••	34	34
1891-92	•••	54	54
1892-93	•••	53	
		(and many at Gwadar.)	Many more than 53.
1893 94	•••	More than 26.	More than 26.
1894-95		46	46
1895-96	Over 124.	About 68	Over 192
1896-97		77	77
1897-98		46	46
1898-99		91	91
1899-1900	,,,	51	51
1900-01	•••	5 8	58
1901-02		66	66
1902-03		64	64
1903-04	•••	10 0	100
1901-05	•••	141	141
1905-06	•••	240†	240
1906-07		201‡	201

From 1900 to 1905, inclusive, 158 domestic slaves received manumission through the British Consulate at Basrah, of whom a large proportion elected to return as freemen to their masters.

From this table it appears that, at the lowest computation, over 698 slaves have been rescued at sea and more than 1,853 otherwise released

^{* &}quot;Fugitive" here means "taking refuge on board a British vessel or at Pasidu."

[†] Including 93 slaves manumitted by Persian officials at the instances of the British authorities.

[‡] Including 7 slaves manumitted by Persian officials at the instance of the British authorities.

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by the exertions of the British authorities since 1852; these figures do not include liberations for the period 1859 to 1870, nor the large numbers of domestic slaves belonging to Rinds who have from time to time been released at Gwādar. It may safely be conjectured that at least 3,000 slaves have obtained their freedom with British assistance in the last 55 years, either on their way to or in the Persian Gulf; and to these must be added the vast but uncertain number whose exportation from their native countries has been altogether prevented by British naval and other measures.

If the broad distinctions between (1) slaves released on account of their having taken refuge on a British public vessel, (2) slaves released under treaty as "recently" imported by sea, and (3) domestic slaves released otherwise than under treaty should be more clearly realised in the future than they have sometimes been in the past, the result will certainly be greater consistency and effectiveness in preventive action.

APPENDIX M.

EPIDEMICS AND SANITARY ORGANISATION IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION.

It is now more than fifty years since the problem of opposing the spread of epidemic disease westwards from Asia began to engage the attention of the European powers; and within that period the Persian Gulf, as a possible avenue of infection leading from the eastern to the western continent, has acquired a considerable importance in the eyes of experts. In consequence of the multiplicity of jurisdictions existing in the Gulf and of the rivalries which prevail there between Turkey and Persia and between various European powers, the question of the sanitary precautions to be taken—a question in itself purely scientific and administrative—has become in part political; and it is necessary, therefore, to give its history at some length in this Gazetteer.

The subject, inasmuch as we are concerned with the movement of two distinct diseases—cholera and plague—in two continents, is somewhat complicated. We shall endeavour to simplify it as much as possible by dealing first with the history of cholera up to the present time and of precautionary measures against cholera up to the year 1894, when the

In relation to schemes for international sanitary control of the Persian Gulf, several authorities may be mentioned. The principal sources of information are the Procès Verbaux of the Conferences, and the texts of the Conventions, of 1894, 1897 and 1903. Dr. Cassim Izzedine's Rapport sur l'organisation projetée des services sanitaires du littoral de Nedjd, dated 14th November 1897, and a Projet de création d'une station quarantenaire avec lazaret dans l'archipel persan, 1897, by Drs. Camposampiero and Izélépis are apparently the reports of the flying Commissions despatched to the Gulf by the Constantinople Board of Health in 1897:

^{*}The general history of cholera and plague is given in the appropriate articles in the Encyclopædia Britannica, 9th Edition, and new volumes. Notices of early epidemics of plague in Turkish 'Irāq will be found in the First Connection of the Honourable East India Company with Turkish Arabia, 1874, while accounts of more recent epidemics in that country are contained in the following communications of Dr. W. H. Colvill, Residency Surgeon at Baghdād:—letters on Plague in the Marshes of the Hindieh, in the Proceedings (Political) of the Government of India for August and October 1867; Report on the Plague in Mesopotamia, Proceedings for September 1875; and Report on the Plague at Baghdad, Proceedings for September 1876. The cholera epidemic of 1865 in the Persian Gulf is described by Dr. Colvill, in a report forwarded to the Government of Bombay by the Resident in the Persian Gulf with his letter No. 46 of the 4th May 1866. An article entitled Notes on Cholera in Persia, by Surgeon-Major T. Ffrench-Mullen in the Persian Gulf Administration Report for 1889-90 has a wider scope than its name suggests and gives a general account of the movements of cholera, especially in Western Asia, beginning in the year 1821. The outbreak of cholera in the 'Omān Sultanate in 1899 is discussed in Lieutenant-Colonel A. S. G. Jayakar's Report on the Recent Epidemic of Cholera in Maskat and Matrah in the Administration Report for 1899-1900. The general political records of the Government of India, especially the annual Persian Gulf Administration Reports, contain numerous scattered notices of epidemics.

danger to Europe from plague suddenly became, in the general estimation, greater than the danger from cholera; then with the history of plague up to 1894; and finally with the general course of events subsequently to 1894, that is since the necessity became apparent of a comprehensive scheme to protect Europe from both diseases.

A short note will be added giving the history, so far as it is known, of smallpox in the Persian Gulf.

The early history of cholera.

In Asia, and particularly in India, cholera may have existed in the 18th century or earlier, and the Hardwar and Travancore epidemics of 1783 are generally believed to have been choleraic; but the first perfectly authenticated outbreak of the disease is one which originated at Jessore in Bengal in 1817 and in the course of the next three years overran the length and breadth of the Indian continent, as well as Ceylon, and other islands of the Indian seas. In 1821 this epidemic attacked Omān, Bahrain, the Persian Coast, and Turkish Irāq in a very virulent shape, and by 1823 it had spread across Persia to Asia Minor and Asiatic Russia; but, though Astrakhan was affected in September 1823, it can hardly be said to have entered Europe proper. It gradually died out except in India, where fresh outbursts continued to occur.

The first epidemic of cholera in Europe, 1831-37.

In 1830 cholera reappeared in Persia and upon the Caspian Sea, whence it spread across Russia and Northern and Central Europe in a

the former will be found in the Government of India's Political Proceedings for June 1898; the latter has not been obtained by the writer. There is also a Report on Jashk, dated 17th July 1897, by Drs. Camposampiero and Izélépis. The views of Dr. Borel, ex-Sanitary Officer at Basrah, are expressed in his report on The Sanitary Defence of the Persian Gulf and of the Shatt-al-Arab, dated 4th January 1901; and the results of the tour of Dr. T. Thomson, who visited the Gulf as an expert on behalf of the British Government in 1906, are stated in his exhaustive Report on the Sanitary Requirements of certain places in or near the Persian Gulf, dated 12th July 1906. These and an Account of the Persian Sanitary Gouncil, communicated by Dr. Schneider, the President, to the British Legation at Tehran in June 1907 are available among the political records of the Government of India.

Climate is discussed, but without reference to sanitation, in a separate Appendix; and some references to matters of public health will be found in articles in the Geographical Volume, especially "Turkish 'Irāq," p. 766; "Baghdād City," p. 203; "Bushehr Town", p. 343; "Bandar 'Abbās', p. 9; "Jāshk" (I), p. 915, and "Gwādar Town," pp. 586—7 and 589.

The original draft of the present Appendix, printed in May 1906, was communicated to several authorities for examination. The writer is indebted for numerous additions, corrections and improvements to Dr. T. Thomson, Medical Adviser to the Local Government Board, London; to Dr. F. G. Clemow, British Delegate on the Board of Health, Constantinople; to Major P. Z. Cox, British Political Resident in the Persian Gulf; and to Mr. F. E. Crow, British Consul at Basrah.

westerly direction. In 1831 it was reported for the first time in the Hijaz province of Arabia; and in the same year it passed from the continent of Europe into the British Isles, where it occasioned over 50,000 deaths in England and Wales alone, and subsequently travelled to France, Spain, Italy and Northern and Central America. This was the first epidemic of cholera in Europe, and it continued intermittently till 1837.

The second epidemic of cholera in Europe, 1847-49.

The second European epidemic originated in India or China in 1841. It soon reached Turkish 'Irāq, Baghād suffering in 1846 and 1847, and the Hijāz province of Arabia, and lingered in both for some time; but its arrival in Europe was delayed until 1847, when it swept across Russia, Germany, the British Isles and France, extending at a later period to America and the West Indies. Būshehr was visited by the disease in the autumn of 1851. This epidemic was more (deadly in Britain and France than the preceding one, and in England alone over 55,000 deaths were registered. The International Sanitary Conference which met at Paris in 1851 discussed, among other subjects, both cholera and plague.

The third epidemic of cholera in Europe, 1853-59.

In 1853 cholera for the third time assumed epidemic form in the Occident. On this occasion it was not imported from the east but spread from existing foci in several parts of Europe, where there had been no interval of entire freedom from the disease since 1849. This epidemic was less destructive of life in the British Isles than its predecessors, but it fell heavily upon the armies engaged in the Crimean war.

The fourth epidemic of cholera in Europe, 1862-67.

The fourth European epidemic occurred in 1865-67 and was remarkable for the rapidity of its progress; it seems to have travelled from Bombay by way of the Hijāz province, Suez and Alexandria, and, though mild in the United Kingdom, its ravages were serious in North and South America.

Cholera and Turkish quarantine in the Persian Gulf, 1865.

Progress of the epidemic.

In the Persian Gulf this epidemic made great havoc at Masqat in the summer of 1865. On the Persian side the disease advanced from India along the coast of Makran to Mīnāb, which it reached in May 1865, and spread to Bandar 'Abbās, but died away inland at Dārāb, Fasa and Jahrum. From Bandar 'Abbās the cholera travelled along the northern coast of Qishm Island and arrived at Lingeh in August; then it extended along the coast to Kundarūn near Mughu, Chārak, Chīrū, Nakhīlu and 'Asalu; at 'Asalu it ceased to advance. In the meantime a separate stream of infection, originating in Hijāz, crossed Arabia in a north-easterly direction, visiting the towns of 'Anaizah and Dara'īyah, and reached the Persian Gulf at Jahrah near Kuwait, where it broke out in encampments of the Mutair and Bani Khālid tribes. Kuwait escaped, but on the 25th or 26th of August the disease appeared in the Dawasir tract on the Shattal-'Arab, and on the 8th of September at Basrah. In the autumn of 1866 there was a slight epidemic of cholera at Baghdād.

Turkish quarantine arrangements.

Quarantine had already been informally instituted by the Turkish authorities at Basrah on the 25th of May 1864, and it was formally notified there for the first time with effect from the 1st of January 1865. It is interesting to observe that so early even as 1864 the Turks appear to have contemplated the establishment of a quarantine station at Fāo; but their intention was not, apparently, carried out until later.

The Constantinople Cholera Conference, 1866.

The necessity of sanitary arrangements for the defence of Europe against Asiatic cholera was now recognised, and an International Conference, proposed originally by the French Government, met in Constantinople in February 1866 to consider the question. Representatives of Turkey and Persia, as well as of Great Britain and other European powers, took part in the deliberations.

Technical findings.

The origin and propagation of cholera were fully discussed for the first time in their scientific aspects, and the Conference finally arrived at the following principal conclusions—that India, where it was permanently endemic, was the prime source of Asiatic cholera; that intercourse, between countries, especially maritime intercourse, was the chief means of propagation; and that great deserts constituted the most effectual barrier to the progress of the disease.

General recommendations.

The Conference recommended that no efforts should be spared to extinguish the disease at its source in India, and that a scientific system of quarantine by land and sea should be established to prevent its progress westwards, especially in the countries most nearly adjoining India, for it

was assumed that sparseness of population, comparative infrequency of intercourse, and the existence of deserts and other physical obstacles would contribute to make precautions taken in those regions particularly effica-Rigorous quarantine against arrivals from an infected locality was to be restricted to a period of 10 days after entering the lazaret, and, in the case of ships fulfilling certain conditions, the days of the voyage up to a maximum of 9 might be reckoned days of quarantine.

The question of direct communication between the Persian Gulf and Recommend-India appears to have been overlooked; and the Conference, treating that ations affectsea only as a route by which cholera might pass from Persia into Turkish 'Irāq, was content to prescribe that arrivals in 'Irāq from the Persian Gulf Gulf. should be closely supervised at Fao and Basrah, while suspicious arrivals should be subjected to suitable quarantine. A recommendation was however added that all vessels sailing in the Gulf should be provided with bills of health.

The various countries adhering to the Convention proceeded to bring their legislation into harmony with its terms; and the Turkish Règlement Quarantenaire of 1867 continues to be, in substance, the law of the Ottoman Empire in sanitary matters at the present day.

The fifth epidemic of cholera in Europe, 1869-74.

Not long after the Constantinople Conference Europe was affected by a fresh visitation of cholera, the fifth of the series. The disease entered Europe via Persia and Russia; but whether Persia had been infected from India across Afghanistan or from Turkish 'Iraq, which cholera had recently invaded both from the Mediterranean and from the Persian Gulf, or whether two separate streams of infection converged in Persia, cannot be determined. This epidemic did not become general in the west; but severe outbreaks took place in Europe, among which was one at Munich in 1873.

Cholera epidemic in Arabia and Persia, 1871.

About the same time the conclusions of the Conference of 1866 as to the virtual impassability of deserts (or tracts which they assumed to be such) by cholera were partially invalidated by the diffusion of the disease in 1871 from Najaf across Arabia to the Red Sea coast: it reached Hāil in June, Madīnah in September, and Makkah in October of the same year. This Arabian epidemic seems to have started from Bushehr in the Persian Gulf, where it appeared in February 1871 and whence, besides spreading to Turkish 'Iraq, it was carried to Kuwait, to Bahrain, and to the pearl fleets at sea, Kuwait being apparently the point from which it penetrated to Hail.

Cholera Conference at Vienna, 1874.

It was now felt that the time had arrived for a reconsideration of the question of cholera epidemics, and an International Conference charged with this duty assembled at Vienna in 1874.

Technical conclusions.

The proceedings of 1866 were made the basis of discussion, and a number of the conclusions formerly accepted were re-affirmed. Among them were the opinion that India was the sole source of cholera and the view that cholera was transmissible by wearing apparel, and in a lesser degree by air, and that it might be conveyed by goods, animals and human corpses; special stress, however, was now laid on the importance of water as a medium of transmission.

Practical recommenda-

At the same time a new departure of a great importance was taken by this Conference in recommending the abandonment of land quarantine, as being not only prejudicial to commercial interests, but also impracticable and useless; and the Conference, while agreeing with its predecessor as to the desirability of sea quarantine being maintained outside of Europe, advised that in Europe a system of medical inspection should be substituted.

The sixth epidemic of cholera in Europe, 1884-87.

For ten years after the Conference of Vienna Europe remained immune from cholera, but in 1884 the south of the Continent was invaded by a sixth and very serious epidemic, which, so far as could be ascertained, had begun in Egypt in 1883; the quarter from which it arrived in Egypt has never been determined. In 1884 this epidemic caused 8,000 deaths at Naples and in the following year a mortality of 120,000 in Spain; it subsequently passed on to South America, and it did not entirely disappear even from the Mediterranean until 1887. The total deaths due to this epidemic were estimated at 250,000 in Europe and 50,000 in America.

Cholera Conference at Rome, 1885.

Another International Conference on cholera took place at Rome, in 1885 while the sixth European epidemic was actually in progress; Great Britain and Turkey, but not Persia, were among the powers represented in the proceedings.

General Conclusions. In most respects the conclusions of this Conference were in advance of those of the Conference of Vienna. It was now clearly recognised

that amelioration of local conditions unfavourable to health and the effective isolation of the sick were the principal safeguards against cholera; the inutility of land quarantines was reasserted; and it was distinctly laid down, for the first time, that articles need not be regarded as infected merely because they came from countries where cholera prevailed and that, unless there were evidence of their having been exposed to infection, such articles need not be disinfected.

The period of detention to which persons arriving in infected vessels Treatment should be subjected was reduced to 5 days from a previously established prescribed minimum of 7; for Mediterranean ports, however, a period of 3 to 6 days, for ships. detention was recommended in the case of arrivals by "suspected" vessels, that is by ships free from suspicion of cholera on board but coming from infected or suspected places. The precautions recommended by the Conference consisted, in the case of suspected ships at ordinary ports, in a medical inspection to be made with the object of ascertaining that all was well on board and that measures of disinfection and cleanliness had been carried out at departure and during the voyage, as required by other findings of the Conference; and this inspection was to be followed, if the voyage had been of less than 10 days' duration, by 24 hours' detention and by disinfection of dirty linen and articles of personal use. As no special reference was made in the findings to India or to the Persian Gulf, the procedure in both of those regions was probably intended to be regulated by the ordinary rules.

Turkish quarantine in the Persian Gulf, 1881-88.

In this connection we may observe that since 1881 the Turkish sanitary authorities at Basrah had persistently disregarded clean bills of health in the case of vessels from Bombay and had subjected all ships from India, on the pretext that India was constantly a "lieu contaminé." to 24 hours' detention and observation irrespective of the length of the voyage. At one time in 1888 this period of detention was increased to 3 days.

Epidemic of cholera in the Persian Gulf, 1889.

In 1889 cholera broke out in Turkish Iraq for the first time, so far Movements in as can be ascertained, since 1871. It first appeared at the end of July Turkish or the beginning of August in the Muntafik country; on the 2nd of Traq. August it was at Nāsirīyah; on the 6th it had reached Basrah, on the 13th Baghdad and on the 31st Karbala; and it ultimately completed the circuit of the entire province by arriving at Najaf on the 7th of September. The mortality was considerable, amounting probably to over 1,500 at Baghdad and to more than 400 each at the towns of Nasirīvah and Karbala. At Basrah, where the disease lingered until October, and

where deaths in the town and its neighbourhood were said to have reached a total of 3,000, the victims included Mr. Robertson, the British Consul, and his two children; and at Baghdad, also, more than one casualty was sustained by the European community.

Turkish sanitary measures. Before the epidemic had appeared at Basrah the Turkish authorities endeavoured to prevent its importation into Baghdād by prohibiting the river-steamers on the Tigris from touching at intermediate points; and after the outbreak at Basrah they insisted on the journey to Baghdād being broken at Kūt-al-Amārah, where the infected steamer from below was met by a clean vessel from above; but these measures, as might have been expected in a country which presents no obstacles to movement by land, proved ineffectual. When cholera, notwithstanding these precautions and preventive posts at Musaiyib and Mahāwīl, gained a footing in Baghdād, the Turkish officials still tried to save Karbala, Hillah and Najaf by means of sanitary cordons between those places and the capital; but the result justified the conclusions of the Conferences of Vienna and Rome in regard to land quarantine, and the disease took toll of the western towns as it had done of the others in the province.

Extension to Persia.

In August 1889 the epidemic extended from Turkish 'Irāq into Persia; and in the course of the succeeding two months outbreaks occurred in 'Arabistān (especially at Muhammareh and Shūshtar), in Behbehān, and at various places upon the coast of Fārs. Some cases occurred at Būshehr before quarantine was established; but suitable measures were taken by the British Residency Surgeon, and there the disease did not spread.

Cholera Conference at Venice, 1892.

Early in 1892 another International Sanitary Conference assembled at Venice; it was convened, not on account of any prevalence of cholera in Europe at the time, but in consequence of certain proposals which had been advanced by Austria in 1890.

The principal objects of the Conference were, in large measure, attained; they were to remodel the Sanitary, Maritime and Quarantine Board of Egypt, to obtain a diminution of the quarantine restrictions imposed on vessels entering the Mediterranean from the Red Sea, and to secure for certain classes of infected or suspected vessels the privilege of passing the Suez Canal "in quarantine." By this Conference ships were still classified in three categories as "infected" "suspected" and "healthy"; but the class formerly "infected" had now been subdivided (according to the date of occurrence of cholera on board) into "infected" and "suspected", while the formerly "suspected" class had become "healthy"; further it was adopted as a principle by this Conference that restrictions on vessels should for the future depend upon actual disease on board ship, rather than upon a constructive contamination according to the health of the port of departure.

The Convention framed by the Venice Conference of 1892 was ratified Ratifications by Great Britain on the 2nd of August 1892 and by Turkey on the 13th of the Conof February 1893. The Turkish ratification took place subject to the remarkable condition that the Convention should not affect the ordinary Sanitary Regulations of the Ottoman Empire nor any exceptional measures which the Turkish Government, in accordance with the resolutions of the Board of Health, might see fit to adopt in time of epidemic disease. Persia did not participate in the Conference nor did she adhere to the Convention.

The seventh epidemic of cholera in Europe, 1892-95.

In the year of the Venice Conference a severe epidemic of cholera broke out in India and was carried by land with remarkable rapidity to Europe, its progress being undoubtedly accelerated by the recently finished Trans-Caspian railway. The stages by which the disease travelled are not without interest. Starting from the fair held at Hardwar in India in March 1892, it reached Kabul on the 19th of April, Herat on the 1st of May, Mashhad on the 26th of May, Baku on the 18th of June, Hamburg on the 16th of August, Grangemouth in Scotland on the 19th August, and New York on the 31st of August. Outside Russia, where 150,000 persons are known to have perished, and Germany, where a mortality of over 8,500 was registered at Hamburg, its ravages in Europe were not serious, and in America it never gained a footing.

Epidemic of cholera in the Persian Gulf, 1893.

The year 1893 witnessed a fresh outbreak of cholera in the Persian Turkish Gulf: it began, apparently, in Turkish 'Iraq, but in that country it was not so severe as the epidemic of 1889. The disease made its appearance at Basrah in May and continued there till August, yet the whole number of deaths at Basrah was estimated at 750 only. About the end of August the cholera reached Baghdad, bringing the trade of the city temporarily to a standstill; in October it again disappeared from the place.

Meanwhile, however, the infection had spread from Basrah down both Persian shores of the Persian Gulf. On the Persian side 'Arabistan was attacked coast. in the month of June, and some loss of life occurred at Muhammareh and on the upper Kārūn: nevertheless, during June and July, quarantine against Basrah was maintained by the Persian authorities of the province. Cholera appeared also in various parts of Fars, especially upon the Büshehr-Shîrāz road, and the village of Ahmadi in Dashtistan suffered severely; but at Bushehr, quarantine having been imposed by sea in June and by land in September and the wells of the town having been secured, there was no mortality.

Arabian coast.

Bahrain was affected in July and August, and it is stated that 7,000 cases occurred in the islands, but this is believed to be an overestimate; about the same time the disease was prevalent in Qatīf also. At the end of the summer a severe outbreak took place on the coast of Trucial 'Omān, but by November it had spent itself.

It is not clear whether this epidemic in 1893 was connected with the Indian and European epidemic of the preceding year.

Cholera Conference at Dresden, 1893.

At a fresh Conference on the subject of cholera which met at Dresden in 1893 Great Britain and Turkey were as usual represented, but Persia again took no part in the proceedings. The conclusions of the Dresden Conference, which related rather to the control of cholera by land and sea after it should have succeeded in entering Europe, may be regarded as in the main supplementary to those of the Venice Conference of 1892; but some of them are of general interest.

Recommendations.

The Dresden assembly vetoed land quarantines, continued the therefold classification of ships as "infected", "suspected" and "healthy", and laid down the principle that even passengers arriving by "infected" ships should not be detained under observation for more than five days after arrival. Certain articles of commerce were declared to be "susceptible"—that is especially capable of conveying choleraic infection—and were consequently made liable to exclusion or disinfection, but not to detention, on arrival at a frontier. The most important innovation, however, was the imposition of an obligation upon Governments to notify to one another the formation of "foci of cholera" within their respective territories.

Non-adherence of the Government of India. On account principally of this last obligation the Government of India abstained from adhering to the Dresden Convention, but it was ratified by Her Majesty's Government and by the other principal powers of Europe on the 1st of February 1894. It cannot be doubted that the article relating to notification of "foci" would have been found difficult of application in India, or that under it the frequent prevalence of cholera in India would have been emphasized in a manner likely to mislead the sanitary authorities of Europe and to affect prejudicially the commerce of the country.

Turkish and Persian Quarantine in the Persian Gulf, 1872-1894.

Turkey and the Fão station. While the Conferences of Venice and Dresden were taking place in Europe, the Turkish Government were trying to overreach Persia politically

by enforcing upon all vessels navigating the Shatt-al-'Arab recognition of a sanitary station which they had established at Fao about 1872. A subsidiary object of the Turks was probably to secure the quarantine fees which they lost through passengers disembarking at Muhammareh and proceeding thence to Basrah by land. Early in 1892 the Turkish Government openly urged the necessity of a station such as Fao in order to prevent the evasion of sanitary control by passengers for Basrah who might disembark at Muhammareh; but their suggestions, aiming at international recognition of the Fao station, were opposed by the representatives of Great Britain and Russia upon the Constantinople Board of Health and were for the moment dropped. At the beginning of 1894, however, the Board of Health, yielding doubtless to Turkish representations, advised that a quarantine station should be established at Fao for the reception of arrivals from India, also a floating lazaret in the Shatt-al-'Arab above the mouth of the Kārūn to deal with passengers from Muhammareh to Basrah.

The sanitary proceedings of the Persians in connection with the Persia. Gulf epidemic of 1893 have already been noticed above.

Cholera Conference at Paris, 1894.

Early in 1894, at the invitation of the French Government, there assembled in Paris another International Sanitary Conference; on this occasion Persia as well as Turkey and Great Britain was a party. This Conference, which was supplementary to the Conferences of Venice and Dresden, confined its attention to precautions against cholera in connection with the Makkah-Madinah pilgrimage by Muhammadans and to the introduction of a system of sanitary control in the Persian Gulf,— a region of which the circumstances had not before received separate consideration.

Ships in the Persian Gulf were treated by the Conference under Treatment the three heads, now well established, of "healthy" "suspected" and recommended "infected", and the maximum period of detention for arrivals by an the Persian "infected" ship was fixed at 5 days after arrival, while it was recom- Gulf. mended that the passengers and crews of "suspected" ships—such, namely, as had had cases of cholera on board but not within 7 daysshould be subjected to 5 days' observation reckoned from the time of quitting the port of departure. Various other precautionary measures of a reasonable character were also prescribed in the case of "infected" and "suspected" ships.

It was further resolved that the sanitary management of the entire Sanitary Persian Gulf should be centred in a large quarantine station near Fāo, to be established on terra firma and completely equipped in every respect. The Persian The existing sanitary post at Basrah was to be maintained, but it was Gulf. to be supplemented by a small lazaret on an island near Basrah for the supervision of passengers who had escaped examination at Fao; and

new sanitary posts were to be created at Muhammareh, Büshehr, Bandar 'Abbas and Gwadar on the Persian, and at Kuwait, Bahrain and Masqat on the Arabian side.

Opposition of to the latter.

This scheme was opposed by the British delegates on the grounds that Great Britain its necessity had not been justified; that the numerous stations created would be subject to at least four different governments; that the governments of Turkey and Persia would be unable, owing to distance. to exercise effective control over the posts for which they were responsible; that the expense would be great and would fall exclusively on British shipping; and finally that trouble and delay, as as expense, would be entailed on British vessels. exception was taken by the British Government to the detention of ships at Fao or Muhammareh, at neither of which places was it possible for the Basrah cargoes constituting the bulk of the trade to be discharged or shipped,—operations, that it had hitherto been permissible to carry out in quarantine at Basrah itself.

Partial acceptance of the Convention by Great Britain and Turkey.

The objections of the British delegates however having been overruled. a Convention in the sense explained above was adopted by the Conference and was signed by the representative of the British Government on the 3rd of April 1894, subject to a declaration that Britain did not accept such of the provisions as related to the Persian Gulf.

At the sixth sitting of the Conference the Turkish delegates had. under instructions from the Porte, unexpectedly announced that a 5 days' quarantine of observation would, nowithstanding the recommendations of the Conference, be imposed on all Indian vessels with effect from the date of their arrival at a Turkish port in the Persian Gulf; and the signature of the Convention on behalf of Turkey was accompanied by a declaration that the Porte accepted only those articles which were in harmony with the sanitary regulations of the Ottoman Empire.

Peculiar features of the Conference.

It is difficult to understand precisely in what manner or by whom the Conference intended that the Persian Gulf scheme should be carried out, but its execution appears to have been left to the government of Turkey in consultation with that of Persia, and from Annexure IV of the Convention it may be gathered, though the point is not absolutely clear, that it was also the intention of the Conference to entrust the management of all the sanitary stations in the Persian Gulf to a committee of the Board of Health at Constantinople. In the light of later events it is interesting to observe that, in the course of the discussions, the Austro-Hungarian delegates proposed that an International Board of Health should be created at Tehran; while the American representatives suggested that an international quarantine station should be brought into existence at the mouth of the Gulf near Ras Musandam: neither of these proposals, however, was accepted by the Conference.

Ratification of the Convention by Great Britain and Persia.

The Convention was ratified by Great Britain and Persia on the 20th of June 1898, by Great Britain with the reservation mentioned above relating to the Persian Gulf; its duration was fixed at 5 years in the first instance, but it was to be considered as tacitly renewed at the end of that time, and at the expiration of each succeeding period of 5 years

except by such powers as might give notice of withdrawal six months before the end of a quinquennium.

No separate acceptance of the Convention by India appears to have been deemed necessary on this occasion as it was, apparently, after the Dresden Conference of 1893; and a strong protest was made by the Government of India against the action of Her Majesty's Government, who in this instance committed them, without previous consultation, to a Convention some articles of which they disapproved. The Government of India also considered it their duty to warn Her Majesty's Government of the probability that any sanitary authority which might be delegated to the Turks in the Persian Gulf or on the Shatt-al-'Arab would be abused for political ends, and especially for the purpose of promoting the unwarrantable claims of Turkey to sovereignty over Bahrain and Muhammareh; and they also laid stress on the undesirability of the Turks being allowed to interfere in the affairs of Arab principalities subject to British influence.

Objections of the Governnon-ratific-

Turkey herself did not ratify the Convention of 1894.

As might have been expected from the jealousy prevailing between the Turkish and Persian Governments, from the non-acceptance by Great Britain of the Persian Gulf articles of the Convention and from the sweeping reservations made by the Turkish Government at the time of signature, the scheme of the Conference, in so far as it concerned the Persian Gulf, remained entirely inoperative. The reduced precautions recommended by the Conference were not adopted by the Turks; and at Basrah, which continued to be the sole sanitary station in the Gulf, quarantine was regulated as before by political prepossessions rather than by scientific principles. The power to obstruct foreign interests that could not be excluded was too valuable in the eyes of the Ottoman Government to be lightly surrendered.

The Convention inoperative in the Persian.

Cholera in the Persian Gulf, 1894-1907.

We may here conclude the subject of cholera with a short notice of the movements of that disease in the Gulf since 1894.

In 1899 the Sultanate of 'Omān suffered from a severe epidemic of cholera, the disease having been imported from Karāchi by way of Gwadar; over 700 deaths from cholera took place in the towns of Masqat and Matrah alone, and the mortality in the interior of the country is believed to have been very serious, certainly exceeding 12,000. In October the disease manifested itself in epidemic form on the Shatt-al-'Arab in Turkish 'Irāq and spread northwards as far as the town of 'Amarah. The filthy camps of the date packers in the Basrah neighbourhood usually fall an easy prey to cholera; and it has been noticed that at Basrah the disease is generally most rife during the date season, while these camps are in existence.

Epidemic of 1899 in 'Omān the Sultanate and Turkish

In 1902 cholera again appeared at Gwadar, where over 500 deaths from the disease occurred between the beginning of July and the end of 1902-03 on

the Persian coasts.

October; and in December it occasioned about 30 deaths at Jāshk. In the course of the year it also reached Mīnāb, where it did not die out until January 1903 and where it unexpectedly revived for a time in the month of September.

General epidemic of 1904.

Early in 1904 cholera prevailed at Basrah, and from Basrah it made its way to Bachdad, where it assumed a serious form and caused trade to cease for about three months. From Turkish 'Iraq the disease seems to have spread into Persia by two lines meeting at Isfahān; the first was by Kirmanshah, the other was by sea to the coast of Tangistan and thence by the Büshehr-Shīrāz road. At Shīrāz over 7,000 persons are said to have died, but the town of Bushehr escaped. It is probable that the infection also reached the centre of Persia vid 'Arabistan and the Bakhtiyāri road; for at Muhammareh, where over 200 deaths occurred cholera was already prevalent in May, and between July and October its ravages at Ahwaz, Shushtar and Dizful were considerable. The Bahrain Islands were attacked in May, and by September over 1,200 deaths were said to have resulted; many of the inhabitants fled to other parts of the Gulf. In July the disease arrived in Trucial 'Oman, where, at the time of its cessation in September, 8,000 fatal cases were believed to have occurred. It also visited the 'Oman Sultanate, spreading from one large place to another and causing great havor in the interior. In Wadi Samāil, Wādi Fara' (or Rustāq) and the ports of Bātinah the deaths were estimated at 14,000; but at Masqat there were only 43, and at Matrah only 12 deaths,—a happy result which may perhaps be attributed to the sanitary measures enforced in those towns under the advice of the British Agency Surgeon.

The early history of plague.

We turn now to the subject of bubonic plague,—a disease of which it may be said that, as a matter of intercontinental importance, it is more ancient as well as more modern than cholera; for, while cholera is in Europe of recent introduction, and even in Asia cannot be traced back with certainty to an epoch more remote than the second decade of the 19th century, plague on the other hand comes down from a high antiquity and was in the middle ages so prevalent in Europe that the western continent may even be considered to have been at that time its principal seat.

In Libya plague seems to have existed as early as the 3rd century B. C., and Europe suffered in the 6th century A. D. from a visitation of what must almost certainly have been bubonic plague. In the 14th century A. D., under the name of the Black Death, plague ravaged the countries of Europe after a fashion almost unparallelled in the history of epidemics, and destroyed (it has been estimated) not less than one-fourth of the entire population. The Black Death was believed to have been imported into Europe from the East, through Genoa; but, if this were the case, it soon became acclimatised in a remarkable degree, and it remained during the 15th, 16th and 17th century a very common and

destructive scourge in western lands. The Great Plague of London in 1664-65 was one of the last severe manifestations of the disease in the more civilised countries of the west; in the 18th century plague gradually retreated towards the shores of the Mediterranean; and at the beginning of the 19th century central and north-western Europe had become almost exempt from its ravages.

Bubonic plague in the Persian Gulf, 1773-1877.

But while plague relaxed its hold on Europe it continued to recur at intervals in the Persian Gulf, or at least in Turkish 'Irāq; there, too, it was in all probability a disease of ancient standing, but its ravages did not attract much notice until after its decline in the Occident.

Early in April 1773 plague manifested itself at Basrah, and, according to information received by the members of the British factory, the mortality there from the disease soon rose to 1,000 deaths a day. Of the representatives of the East India Company some shut themselves up in the factory in the town, while others betook themselves to "Belvoir", a place about 4 miles off, in the hope that the violence of the disease would abate with the approach of the hot weather; but on the contrary it continued to increase, and on the 22nd of April the Agent in Council resolved to retire temporarily with his staff to Bombay. The party left Basrah the next day in the Company's ships "Drake" and "Tiger," of which the "Tiger" with her passengers—as elsewhere related - was captured at sea by the Persians; but the "Drake" reached Bombay in safety on the 14th of May and was sent to perform quarantine at Butcher's Island, where the four gentlemen who had arrived in her were detained until the 17th of June. On the 28th of October the staff of the factory again left Bombay for Basrah; and when, after a long voyage, they arrived on the 5th of January 1774 at their destination, they learned that the plague had ceased after causing in the town and neighbourhood a loss of life estimated at 200,000.* They themselves found the inhabitants "almost all dead, those few that are remaining dispirited."

Epidemic of 1773 in Turkish 'Iraq.

Again in April 1802 plague broke out at Baghdād and assumed alarming proportions; the Pasha fled at the first appearance of the disease without taking any measures to prevent its diffusion.

In 1831, plague having made its appearance in a severe form at Baghdād, the British Resident there (Major Taylor) considered it advisable to remove with his staff to Basrah; but in January 1832 the malady attacked Basrah with such violence that he thought it better to return to Baghdād. In this epidemic, which did not altogether cease until 1834, the city of Baghdād is said to have been to a large extent depopulated,—a circumstance which renders more intelligible the phenomenal increase of its inhabitants during the last half century.

Epidemic of 1802 in Turkish 'Iraq.

Epidemic of 1831-34 in Turkish 'Irāq.

^{*} In view of the present population of the Basrah Wilayat, this and the former estimate of 1,000 deaths a day both appear excessive.

Epidemic of 1867-1877.

For more than 30 years after the great Baghdād epidemic the countries surrounding the Persian Gulf seem to have remained free of bubonic plague, but in May 1867 the disease was again detected, under the name of Waba \$\begin{align*}\circ\$, in certain palustrine villages near the Shatt-al-Hindiyah in Turkish 'Irāq: this proved to be the commencement of a prolonged but not continuous epidemic which affected a large part of Turkish 'Irāq and at one time extended its ravages to Persian 'Arabistān. The outbreak was investigated on the spot by a Turkish sanitary commission precided over by Dr. Colvill, the physician of the British Residency at Baghdād, and the malady was declared to be plague; but its occurrence at this time was fitful and sporadic, and the total ascertained mortality did not exceed 300. In order to protect Baghdād city, quarantine was established at the Kharr crossing and at Qarārah on the Tigris, but almost at the same moment cases ceased to occur.

In Turkish 'Irāq, 1867.

In Turkish 'Irāq, 1874-1876.

In the spring of 1874, however, the disease, which had meanwhile been dormant or had at least escaped observation, reappeared on the Dagharah and at 'Afai, at Dīwānīyah town (where it occasioned 400 deaths), at Shinā. fivah and at Umm Nijris; during the summer following it was again quiescent, but in autumn it broke out afresh at Umm Nijris. In January 1875 it was reported on the Shatt-al Gharāf, and in March it was present at The outbreak was still confined to a triangular block of country, mostly marshy, of which the corners were at Kūt-al-Amārah, Sug-ash-Shuyukh and Shinafiyah, and in the rural districts it was restricted to permanent villages situated on low waterlogged ground. Within the limits described, however, it made serious havoc; and 13 per cent. of the population were estimated to have succumbed in two years, the heaviest mortality occurring at Sūq-ash-Shuyūkh, Qal'at Šikar and Hai town, where the deaths from plague amounted to 200, 450 and 500 respectively. In November 1875 plague began again in the neighbourhood of Hillah town and, emerging at last from the region of the marshes, attacked not only Hillah, Najaf and Karbala but eventually Baghdad and Kadhimain as well; and this time the deaths attributable to plague amounted in Baghdad alone to at least 2,800.

In Persian 'Arabistān, 1876.

In March 1876 the disease was carried by pilgrims, returning from Karbala, to the village of Jallākān on the Kārūn river, where more than a fourth of the population perished; and it quickly spread to the towns of Shūshtar and Dizfūl. About 2,500 deaths in all are believed to have occurred in Persian 'Arabistān, of which about 1,800 were at Shūshtar.

In Turkish 'Irāq, 1877. By the end of July 1876 plague was extinct for the season both in Turkish 'Irāq and Persian 'Arabistān; but in April 1877 the former province experienced a fresh visitation in which Sāmarrah, Paghdād and 'Azīzīyah on the Tigris and Hillah on the Euphrates were involved. At Baghdād, as proved by accurate statistics obtained from the Chief Rabbi, 1,130 Jews out of about 18,000 died in the epidemic and the total plague mortality in the town was calculated at about 4,500. With the advent of the hot weather the disease, as usual, again disappeared.

Turkish sanitary measures, 1876-1877. Preventive measures on any considerable scale do not appear to have been introduced by the Turks in Mesopotamia until 1876. When instituted they consisted chiefly in the isolation and disinfection of houses where cases had occurred and in attempts to stop communication between infected

localities and the rest of the country. Recourse was had to sanitary cordons, the removal of bridges and similar precautions, but the measures adopted proved equally futile and oppressive. House quarantine in particular gave rise to gross abuses, as poor families were shut in to be destroyed by the disease, while the rich were able to purchase exemption and carried infection with them in their movements. In July 1876, after plague had spread to Persian 'Arabistān, the Turkish authorities reduced the period of their internal quarantines, which had hitherto been longer, to five days; but at the same time they very unreasonably imposted a severe quarantine of fifteen days by land and sea against the whole Persian kingdom, of which a small portion had been infected from their own territory. A small sanitary post which the Turks appear to have established at Fāo in 1872 first came to notice at this time.

In 1877 the people of Baghdād spontaneously abandoned the city for the open country, and at the end of April about two-thirds of the entire population were encamped outside the walls. The movement was attended by immediate good results, and a sanitary cordon was withdrawn which had been established upon the Diyālah river to prevent the disease from spreading southwards.

As a rule, in Turkish 'Irāq, the preventive measures were unintelligently and inconsiderately worked, and symptoms were even perceptible of their being regarded and treated as a profitable source of revenue. The quarantine fees paid by the British river steamer "Blosse Lynch" amounted on the average to Rs. 871 for the journey between Baghdād and Basrah.

The attitude of the Persian Government, by whom the epidemic was ignored until the spring of 1876, was different. In March the Governor-General of Fars directed that vessels from Turkish 'Iraq should be carefully inspected at Bushehr and that the advice of the British Political Resident should be followed in regard to the precautions necessary; these instructions were in accordance with an established custom by which, from 1864 if not from an earlier period, the sanitary control of the port of Bushehr had been practically vested in the British Political Resident. In April the Persian Government added a request for the assistance of all the British agents and vessels in the Gulf in maintaining quarantine by sea. In May the Persian Government established a quarantine station on 'Abbādan island, opposite to Muhammareh town and were anxious that all ships leaving the Shatt-al-'Arab for Persia should be detained there for fifteen days; but this arrangement does not appear to have been rigidly carried into effect. In June a Persian Sanitary Commission was created at Tehran, which assumed charge of affairs and immediately imposed a fifteen days' quarantine by sea and land against arrivals from Turkey; and a steamer was sent by the Government of India to assist in the enforcement of quarantine at Bushehr, where Dr. Wall, the British Residency Surgeon, controlled operations. the temporary subsidence of the epidemic all restrictions were removed in the autumn of 1876, but they were reimposed in 1877, in which year preventive posts were established in Persia at Qasr-i-Shīrīn and Muhammareh and between 'Amārah and Shūshtar.

Persian sanitary measures, 1876-1877.

Sanitary measures of the Government of India, 1876. Action was taken by the Government of India also in connection with this epidemic of plague, but it was not spontaneous. In 1876 they imposed at Karāchi, Bombay, and Aden a strict quarantine of 15 days (reckoned from the time of leaving the last infected port or from the last case of plague on board) against arrivals from the Persian Gulf; but mail steamers were exempted unless plague had actually occurred on board. The object of the measure was simply to avoid the application to Indian vessels at Suez, of a 15 days' quarantine which would otherwise have been enforced by the Egyptian Government. A suggestion by Dr. Colvill, the British Residency Surgeon at Baghdād, that vessels bound for India should be detained in quarantine at the mouth of the Persian Gulf was negatived by the Government of India; but, in view of recent international projects in a converse sense, the fact that it should have been made is interesting.

Proposed Vienna Plague Conference, 1877.

In 1877 an International Commission of Inquiry, in the form of a Medical Commission to visit the spot, was proposed by Austria for the purpose of studying bubonic plague in Turkish 'Irāq. The preliminary meeting of the Commission should have taken place at Vienna on the 20th of April 1877, and the British Government were about to appoint Dr. Colvill their representative, but difficulties connected with the personnel of the Commission arose, and the Conference was postponed sine die by the Austro-Hungarian Government.

Plague in the Persian Gulf, 1877-1894.

Epidemic in Turkish 'Irāq, 1881. Epidemic in Turkish 'Irāq, 1892. In 1881 plague revisited Turkish 'Irāq and was sufficiently severe to carry off, it is said, half of the inhabitants of the town of Najaf.

Again in 1892 the disease made its appearance in Turkish 'Irāq, beginning apparently at Nāsirīyah on the Euphrates, and spreading thence to Basrah and from Basrah to Baghdād. Four hundred deaths from plague are said to have occurred at Basrah on the worst day of this epidemic.

Great epidemic outbreak of plague, 1894-1907.

The year 1894 marked the beginning of a new era in the sanitary history of Asia. In May 1894 bubonic plague appeared in a virulent form at Hong Kong, imported probably from Yunnan in China, where according to some accounts it is endemic. In 1896 the disease declared

itself at Bombay, its existence there being officially notified for the first time on the 2nd of August; and soon after it began to spread over the whole of India with calamitous results which have become a matter of common knowledge and still continue. Since 1896 this epidemic of plague has extended to various countries and to other continents besides Asia; but, except in India, it has not obtained a firm hold nor have its ravages been serious. The earliest cases in Europe were detected at Oporto in 1899: it is not known by what route the disease reached that place.

Plague Conference at Venice, 1897.

The first event of importance which followed the outbreak of plague in India was the meeting at Venice in 1897 of an International Sanitary Conference to deal with the problems created by the unfamiliar disease. The resolutions passed by the Conference,—though only partially accepted and still less completely carried out by the powers concerned,—are important and demand examination; for they inaugurated new methods of preventive procedure and conferred the imprimatur of science upon an administrative scheme for the Persian Gulf which was, and still remains, diplomatically impossible.

But first it is necessary to understand the constitution and status of the Board of Health at Constantinople,—a body which has already been mentioned and which will hereafter claim frequent notice, both as an instrument of Turkish sanitary policy and as a mandatory of European opinion. The Constantinople Board of Health, more correctly known as the Conseil Supérieur de Santé, was created in 1840 by the Ottoman Sultan of the day to facilitate measures for combating plague. Without restrictions on personal liberty and the imposition of special dues nothing could be effected; and without the concurrence of the leading Christian powers, whose subjects enjoyed rights of extra-territoriality in Turkey, the executive and financial ordinances of the Ottoman Government would have remained a dead letter in respect of foreigners. For the purpose, then, of associating the principal European Governments in the scheme and of securing their support, the Board of Health was called into existence by an Imperial Irade; it consisted (and still consists) of a Turkish President (the Minister, namely, for Foreign Affairs), of eight ordinary Turkish members, and of one delegate each of the 13 nationalities which are diplomatically represented at the Porte. The Board deals with all questions relating to the protection of the Turkish Empire against the introduction of disease from other countries. The decisions of the Board depend on a majority of votes of the members; they are not operative. except in an emergency, until confirmed by the Turkish Government. The funds at the disposal of the Board are derived from dues levied according to tonnage on all vessels entering Turkish ports; from taxes on pilgrims, and on the corpses of Shi'ahs brought into Turkish 'Iráq for burial; and from quarantine and other sanitary fees. The position of the Board in relation to the Turkish Government is undefined and has

The Constantinople
Board of
Health.

frequently been disputed, and contests between the Board and the Turkish Department of Public Health have been not infrequent. The Board, from the circumstances of its creation, is indisputably an Ottoman institution, but at the same time it possesses, as an advisory body, a quasi-international authority. The British Government have always resisted undue extensions of the power of the Board because of its irresponsible character and the preponderance in its councils of the representatives of non-maritime nations; and they have also at times had to insist on the responsibility of the Turkish Government for the sanitary policy of the Ottoman Empire and to protest against attempts by the Porte to shelter itself behind resolutions of the Board.

The Mixed Commission for Revision of the Turkish Sanitary Tariff. There is also another international body at Constantinople, called the Mixed Commission for Revision of the Turkish Sanitary Tariff, which stands in close relations to the Board of Health and consists partly of the same members; it apparently exercises a general control over the income and expenditure of the Board.

The Conference which met at Venice in 1897 was the first, since that of 1851, to deal with the subject of plague; its functions were to devise measures for preventing the introduction and spread of the disease, and to arrange for systems of sanitary supervision with this object in the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf. Great Britain, Turkey and Persia were among the powers represented by delegates. The Conference took the conclusions of its predecessors of 1892, 1893 and 1894 as a basis, but, in view of the longer incubation period of plague as compared with cholera and of modifications which had recently taken place in scientific opinion, the regulations adopted by the Conference of 1897 necessarily differed in some respects from those enacted by the earlier Conferences.

General resolutions of the Conference.

The Convention framed by this Conference was signed on the 19th of March 1897; among its leading provisions was one by which the Governments of the countries adhering to the Convention were bound to notify to each other by telegram the occurrence of plague within their territories. Another important result was that land quarantine was prohibited for plague, as it had been in 1893 for cholera, power being however reserved to non-European countries, should they find it difficult to protect their frontiers, to close them absolutely to passengers and merchandise. The list of articles declared capable of transmitting infection was more comprehensive than that which had been adopted in the case of cholera. For the regulation of the Persian Gulf traffic vessels were divided as before into the three categories of "infected," "suspected" and "healthy": an "infected" ship was defined as one with plague on board, or on which plague had occurred within 12 days before arrival; a "suspected" ship as one on which plague had been present, but not within 12 days; a "healthy" ship as one on which, though coming from an infected port, plague had not manifested itself. Precautions to be observed in the case of "infected" and "suspected" ships were laid down by the Convention, and it was directed that "healthy" ships should receive free pratique immediately on arrival, whatever the nature of the bill of health, provided that they must in all cases have completed a period of 10 full days after the date of departure from the last infected port.

These were for the most part changes of detail rather than of principle. But the proposals of the Conference in regard to the executive apparatus required in the Persian Gulf were of a novel and revolutionary type, not foreshadowed in any earlier Conference unless by the suggestion of the American delegates at Paris in 1894. A sanitary station was to be created at the entrance of the Gulf on the island of Hormuz or on Qishm, or at some place in that vicinity, and was to be provided with a small hospital, disinfecting appliances, and at least two doctors besides sanitary inspectors and guards, while, in the neighbourhood of Basrah, a station equipped with a large lazaret and disinfecting plant was to be brought into existence under a medical staff consisting of several doctors. All vessels visiting the Gulf were to call first at the outpost near the entrance of the Gulf and were there to be treated according to the rules; but, on condition of taking a sanitary inspector and two guards on board, they might continue their voyage in quarantine up the Gulf to be dealt with finally at Basrah. Ships carrying passengers or goods for Persian ports might, after suitable sanitary arrangements had been instituted at Bushehr, disembark them at that place; but in the absence of such arrangements they should have no option, and must land them either at the Hormuz station or at Basrah. The sanitary posts at Hormuz and Basrah were to be subject to the control of the Board of Health at Constantinople, and the political arrangements regarding the Hormuz station were to be settled by an agreement between the Turkish and Persian Governments; in the meantime, however, a temporary post was to be established by the Constantinople Board of Health upon one of the islands at the entrance of the Gulf. These remarkable proposals appear to have been of French origin. Their effect was somewhat modified by a declaration which the British delegates made at the Conference, that it must be understood that the measures in the Persian Gulf should be applicable to arrivals from Indian ports only so long as those ports were infected with plague.

Scheme of the Conference for the Persian Gulf.

The Convention of 1897 was ratified by Great Britian on the 30th of December 1898 and by Persia on the 31st of October 1899; the British ratification, apart from the declaration made during the sitting of the Conference, was unconditional. The Persians were anxious that the sanitary station at the mouth of the Gulf should be located on the Persian mainland, and soon after the dissolution of the Conference the Persian delegate on the Board of Health at Constantinople urged the suitability of Jashk (which however he described as an island!) for that purpose; but the point was not pressed, and the Persian ratification was accompanied merely by a declaration that it "remained understood" that the flag flown and the armed guards employed at the Hormūz station should be Persian.

Ratification of the Convention by Great Britain and

The attitude of the Turkish Government was characteristic. They professed a desire to ratify the Convention, but only subject to a preposterous declaration which substituted Kuwait for Hormuz in the Persian Gulf scheme, postulated the subjection of the entire sanitary system of the Gulf to the Constantinople Board of Health and enhanced the period of observation for plague from 10 to 12 days, power being further reserved to the Ottoman Government to extend it ad libitum in their own ports.

Non-ratification by Turkey. These conditions were not such as the other powers could accept, and the Convention therefore remained unratified by Turkey. Before the final refusal of the Turkish Government to ratify, the Persian Government appeared to entertain an idea of forestalling the Board of Health by constructing a Persian sanitary station on the island of Hormūz, and they even went so far as to enquire whether a guard-ship for the use of the station, to fly the Persian flag, could be lent them by the Government of India; on becoming aware, however, of the failure of the Turkish Government to adhere to the Convention they allowed the project to drop.

Failure of the scheme for the Persian Gulf. The scheme of the Venice Conference of 1897 for the Persian Gulf was in conformity with the pet theories of certain French scientists, who wished to stretch a "net" for sea-borne cholera and plague between the continents of Asia and Europe and to deal with the Persian Gulf on a false analogy with the Red Sea, making Hormūz a kind of second Kamarān. The conclusion should therefore be avoided that the proposals of the Conference, though politically disadvantageous to Great Britain and Persia and very favourable to Turkey, had a political origin. The Constantinople Board of Health however, as we shall presently see, immediately seized the opportunity to extend the sphere of their activity in the Gulf; but in face of the apathy of the powers chiefly concerned, except Turkey, the Board were unable to achieve anything and the project of the Conference for the Gulf was not realised.

Plague in the Persian Gulf, 1899-1907.

For more than two years after its appearence in India there was no manifestation of plague in the Persian Gulf; and, though since 1899 the disease has shown itself at intervals in various ports of the Gulf, its movements there have been fitful and unprogressive, giving ground for the hope that it has not acquired a permanent foothold.

Masqat and Būshehr, 1899. Two imported cases of plague which were observed at Masqat in April 1899 were followed by no others; and the arrival at Basrah in April 1899 of the Indian steamer "Patna" from Bombay with one case of plague on board, and in the following month of the Indian steamer "Haidari" with a suspected case of plague, produced no untoward results on shore. In June, however, the disease was discovered at Büshehr, where it possibly continued until July; but by August it had certainly become extinct without any considerable mortality having occurred. The actual number of cases at Büshehr was impossible to ascertain as the disease was carefully concealed, but two deaths from plague were fully authenticated.

Matrah, Masqat and Qishm, 1900. In January 1900 plague appeared at Matrah near Masqat on a small scale, and its progress was at first very slow; in March it began to assume more serious proportions and spread to the neighbouring town of Masqat; finally in the month of May it disappeared after a total mortality had been reached which was officially estimated at 434 souls.

In May, the month in which it died out at Masqat, plague was found to exist on the island of Qishm; but still none was present in Turkish 'Iraq, though a second steamer on which plague had occurred during the voyage from India had arrived at Basrah in February, and a third, the "King Arthur," in May 1900.

Turkish 'Irāq, 1901-02.

In April and May of 1901, however, a few cases of plague, ten of which were fatal, occurred at Basrah; and in May 1901 and January 1902 small outbreaks took place at Baghdad.

In March 1903 two steamers arrived at Basrah on which deaths from plague had recently occurred, but the port remained unaffected; in April and May, however, an outbreak at Masa'idah in the Zubair Qadha, not far from 'Amarah on the Tigris, was accountable for the deaths of some 40 persons. In April 1903 a mild epidemic of plague was said to have occurred in the Turkish Sanjaq of Hasa; and in May and June a smart outbreak took place in the Bahrain islands, off the Hasa coast, which is supposed to have claimed some 300 victims out of about twice that number of persons attacked.

Turkish Trāq, Hasa and Bahrain,

In May and June 1904 plague was present at Lingeh on the Persian Lingeh and coast, 146 cases being reported, and was carried from there into Lar; but the resulting mortality in that district is unknown. The disease suddenly disappeared on the arrival of an epidemic of cholera in the same neighbourhood.

The only other outbreak of plague in the Gulf remaining to be Bahrain and recorded is one in Bahrain, which continued from the beginning of May to the end of June 1905. This epidemic was practically confined to the towns of Manamah and Muharraq, in each of which about 400 cases -half of them fatal-occurred; but there were also a few cases on board the fleets then engaged in pearling operations upon the banks of the Arabian side.

the pearl fleets, 1905.

Plague and Cholera Conference at Paris, 1903.

Meanwhile the problem of preventing the ingress of Asiatic epidemic diseases had been discussed once more in Europe. The scope of the Paris Conference of 1903 was more ample than that of its predecessors, and its work included not only "the revision and completion of the Conventions already in force" but also "the definition, under one single agreement, of the measures necessary for safeguarding the public health against the invasion and propagation of both plague and cholera." At this Conference all the principal countries of the civilised world were represented, among them Great Britain, Turkey, and Persia; and Egypt for the first time took an independent part in the proceedings. The points considered by the Conference were partly of a technical and partly of an administrative order, and a number of them which had no bearing on the Persian Gulf fall beyond our scope.

On the technical side a notable relaxation was made in the defini- General tion of vessels "infected" with and "suspected" of plague, none results and

recommendations.

now coming within either of these classes which had been free from plague for seven days before arrival in port. The obligation of the signatories to notify at once to other Governments the first appearance of certified cases of plague within their territories was maintained. and cholera was now included in this provision; but it was specially provided that the occurrence or a first case of either disease should not involve the treatment of the country concerned as infected. The Conference recognised that no kind of merchandise is in itself capable of transmitting either plague or cholera, and that articles can only become dangerous through contamination with the products of plague or cholera; the result of this conclusion was a marked reduction in the number of articles rendered liable to exclusion or disinfection in time of epidemic. It was also laid down that an epidemic should be considered to end five days after the isolation, death, or cure of the last case. These changes were mitigations of the existing rules; but the instrumentality of the rat as a disseminator of plague having by this time been fully established, the Conference found it necessary to insist upon the destruction (in certain circumstances) of rats on shipboard: the measures of rat destruction prescribed by the Conference were however less stringent than those which had already been adopted by certain countries on their own initiative. The system of surveillance permissible in other regions was still not extended to the Persian Gulf, where detention for purposes of observation continued to be the rule.

Recommendations concerning the Persian Gulf.

The administrative scheme devised for the Persian Gulf by the Conference of 1903 resembled that of the Conference of 1897, but was not precisely similar. It was decided, as before, that a large sanitary station should be established near Basrah and a smaller one at the entrance of the Gulf, but the island of Hormuz was now definitely selected as the location of the latter, and apparatus should be provided there for rat destruction. Pending the installation of this permanent station a sanitary post should be opened on Hormuz. The provisions for the continuance of the voyage up the Gulf from Hormuz to Basrah in quarantine were maintained; but the landing en route at Bushehr of passengers and cargo was now unconditionally sanctioned. All healthy ships should receive free pratique at Gulf Ports after five days' absence from the last infected port, and none were to receive it earlier at any place.

Recommendations concerning the Constantinople Board of Health. Important recommendations moreover were made affecting the constitution of the Constantinople Board of Health, which was destined by the Conference to be charged with the management of the Hormūz sanitary station, whether temporary or permanent, and with the financial responsibility for the same. The number of Turkish members should be reduced to four, and every foreign country entitled to representation should have one delegate on the Board. The funds for the outlay to be imposed upon the Board in connection with the Hormūz post were to be allotted by the Mixed Commission for Revision of the Turkish Sanitary Tariff from the reserves at the disposal of the Board.

Reservations by Great Britain and The Convention embodying these and the other conclusions of the Conference was signed at Paris on the 3rd of December 1903, and the conditions of renewal were the same as those attached to the Venice

Convention of 1897. The representatives of Great Britain signed subject to certain reservations, and the representative of Persia ad referendum; but the representatives of Turkey, who desired to qualify their signature by reservations which virtually annulled the whole Convention, were not permitted to sign; and the representative of India abstained from signing as the Government of India had not The reservations decided to adhere to the Convention. Britain were as follows:—(1) that the consent His Majesty's Government to the assembling of the Mixed Commission for the Revision of the Turkish Sanitary Tariff—one object of which would be to authorise the advance of funds for the Hormuz station—was conditional on a prominent position being given by the Commission in its programme to the reduction of the sanitary dues at Turkish ports: (2) that the decisions of the Commission in voting funds for the Hormuz scheme must be unanimous; and (3) that no steps should be taken for the construction of the Hormuz station until the Constantinople Board of Health had been reorganised in the manner agreed upon by the Conference. The further views of His Majesty's Government having first been stated, viz., that it had been proved by recent experience that no sanitary station at Hormuz was necessary for the sanitary defence of the Gulf and that in view of the collapse of the 'Ogair station it was doubtful whether climatic conditions would admit of the maintenance of a post at Hormuz, the Conference allowed the British reservations to be registered.

Persia and abstention of Turkey and India.

The Convention has not yet (1906) been ratified by Great Britain, for reasons which will appear below.

Non-ratification of the Convention by Great Britain.

The Mixed Commission, already once referred to in connection with the Constantinople Board of Health, was convened early in 1905 for the fifth time in its history, and in 1906 its sittings still continued; the principal objects which it had in view were to obtain payment of a debt due by the Turkish Government to the Board of Health, to regulate the pay and pensions of the employés of the Board, to provide funds for the repair of Turkish lazarets, and to obtain-if possible-a reduction of the sanitary dues payable at Turkish ports. The proceedings showed that the Board of Health had accumulated a reserve of more than £T 268,000 and that the Ottoman Government were in debt to the Board to the extent of £T150,000,—an obligation regarding the discharge of which, however, there were serious difficulties. In view of this superfluity of funds the British representative on the Commission, Dr. Clemow, pressed for a reduction of the Turkish Sanitary Tariff by 25 per cent., and on his motion a number of useless or nearly useless sanitary posts were suppressed; none of these, however, were in the Persian Gulf. A sum of £T 20,000 was also allotted for the improvement of the existing sanitary establishment at Basrah, a measure to which the British delegates at the Paris Conference had drawn attention as being of greater utility than the establishment of a new post at the entrance of the Gulf. No grant at all was made for the proposed station at Hormuz, and a motion by the Russian delegate that

Persian Gulf scheme frustrated by the Mixed Commission, 1905-06. funds should be provided for a post "at the entrance of the Gulf" was not accepted by the Commission.

Obstacles to execution of the scheme.

The obstacles in the way of the Hormuz project were in fact insuperable, for the Turkish Government refused to assent to the reorganisation of the Board of Health, which was a condition of the adherence of Great Britain to the Convention; and deadlock also prevailed between the Governments of Turkey and Persia, each of which claimed that their flag should fly over the sanitary station of Hormuz.

Mission of M. Faivre, 1905.

The French Government, however, who were extremely desirous that the resolutions of the Paris Conference of 1903 should be carried out in their entirety, did not drop the matter. In Europe they continued to urge the powers that had made reservations to withdraw them; and in the meanwhile, at the beginning of 1905, they sent M. Faivre, Inspecteur Adjoint des Services Sanitaires under the French Ministry of the Interior, to the Persian Gulf to study the sanitary problem on the spot.

It is most likely that the motives of the French in supporting the Hormūz scheme were other than political, for the plan was in accordance with the French "net" theory of protection, and the object of M. Faivre's mission was probably to discover a means of inducing the British Government to withdraw its objections, but M. Faivre relied for his information chiefly upon the Russian Consul-General and the French doctor (M. Bussière) at Būshehr, and in the end he reported in favour of establishing the station upon the island of Hanjām instead of upon Hormūz. Such a course may well have been recommended by both the advisers of M. Faivre in the hope that such a station might act as a political counterpoise to the British telegraph station on Hanjām.

Inasmuch, however, as the new proposal involves a modification of the text of the Paris Convention, it seems only to have complicated and intensified the difficulties by which the execution of the recommendations of the Conference of 1903 was already attended.

Mission of Dr. T. Thomson, 1906.

In 1905, subsequently to the tour of M. Faivre, His Majesty's Government decided that a British expert should visit the Gulf region to report on its sanitary requirements in relation not only to Persia but also to Europe, on the necessity for a sanitary station at the entrance of the Gulf, and on the suitability for such a station at Hormūz,

Hanjām and other sites: the principal object of the mission was to acquire data independent of those obtained by M. Faivre. Dr. Theodore Thomson, Medical Adviser to the Local Government Board, who was selected to carry out this mission, arrived in the Gulf in February 1906 and remained there for a month on tour, the R.I.M.S. "Lawrence" being placed at his disposal by the British Political Resident.

The conclusions at which Dr. Thomson arrived, and which he embodied in his report, were entirely unfavourable to the Persian Gulf scheme of the Paris Conference. He pointed out that native sailing boats, which being able to approach the shore are more dangerous as carriers of infection than steamers, would avoid a sanitary station at the entrance of the Gulf and, after they had passed it, would be safe from detection: in his opinion therefore the system proposed was even to be deprecated, as it would induce the masters of native vessels which had avoided the station and on which disease existed to conceal the facts after arrival at their port of destination. Dr. Thomson also remarked that, in case of plague or cholera obtaining a foothold, as had already more than once happened inside the Persian Gulf, it would apparently be necessary under the scheme to require vessels from the infected ports to call either at the "sentinel station" near the mouth of the Gulf or at Basrah, and that the enforcement of such an obligation in practice would be utterly impossible. The proposed system, he observed, would be more severe than that established in the Red Sea. where there was no general "sentinel station" at the entrance; and, in consequence of the detention of vessels and of their deflection from their course, would be prejudicial to commerce, especially to that carried on by sailing ships.

In case, however, a station at the mouth of the Gulf should be insisted on as necessary, Dr. Thomson was inclined to recommend Hanjām as the site for the same, partly because of the superior anchorage there, and partly because of the slight deviation (10 miles) from their natural route to which steamers would be subjected.

Dr. Thomson's own recommendations were that attention should be chiefly concentrated on the Kuwait-Basrah-Muhammareh line round the head of the Gulf, a fully equipped sanitary station being maintained at each of those places, and that Būshehr and Bandar 'Abbās on the Persian Coast should be similarly treated; from the standpoint of the security of Europe, he considered, Bahrain and the places on the Arabian coast south of Kuwait might be neglected.

Plague and Cholera preventive measures in the Persian Gulf, 1896-1907.

We may now take a brief retrospect of the prophylactic measures adopted since 1896 by the countries surrounding the Persian Gulf, and we shall find that they fall under two categories, viz., those

instituted by or under the advice of the British Government and those for which the Turkish authorities have been responsible. The regulations of the Venice Conference of 1897 were adopted immediately on their appearance by the Government of India at their own ports, and in 1897 the pilgrimage to Makkah from India was forbidden as a special precaution; similarly the measures observed in Persia, 'Omān and Bahrain, suggested as they were by the British Government, were governed in the main by the spirit of the Convention of 1897; but the sanitary policy of the Ottoman Government, which we shall describe first, was conservative and peculiar.

Sanitary regulations and arrangements of Turkey in the Persian Gulf, 1896-1907.

Rules at Basrah, 1896 to January 1897. In October 1896, after the appearance of plague in India, the sanitary authorities at Constantinople directed 10 days' quarantine, reckoned from the date of arrival, to be enforced on Bombay vessels at Basrah; the local authorities seem at first to have insisted on a period of 21 days, but it was never enforced. About the 11th of January 1897 quarantine was imposed at Basrah against Muhammareh as well as against Bombay; and an attempt was made to withdraw the faculty of discharging and loading cargo in quarantine, the export trade of Turkish 'Irāq being thereby immediately brought to a standstill. At the end of January 1897 the entrance of Shi'ah pilgrims and corpses from India was absolutely interdicted.

Proceedings in connection with Fao, January 1897.

On the 12th of January 1897 it was decided by the Board of Health at Constantinople that, pending the construction of a lazaret at * Fao, all ships having plague cases on board should be repulsed from Basrah; but this drastic resolution was rescinded after it had been enforced, in a single instance only, against a steamer of the Bombay and Persia Steam Navigation Company. A fortnight later it was announced that the Porte had decided on establishing a permanent sanitary station at Fao, -the existing post being in fact merely nominal, -and a Commission was appointed to select a site; but nothing more was done, and Fao remained as it had been since 1872 (and still is) a mere sanitary office in charge of a préposé and two gardes, devoid of a lazaret and of all sanitary apparatus. The Constantinople Board of Health further recommended that all ships from India should be examined at the mouth of the Persian Gulf, but nothing came of this suggestion which was opposed by the Government of India. Some of these developments seem to anticipate the results of the Venice Conference of 1897, which did not however close until about two months later.

^{*} From 1891 to 1894 the Turkish Government were anxious to transfer the Basrah quarantine station to Fao; but their scheme, of which the motives were purely political. was frustrated by the opposition of the British and Russian delegates on the Constantinople Board of Health.

On the 2nd of February 1897 the Board of Health at Constantinople, Designs in reverting to the proposals of 1894, decided to establish posts at Kuwait Bahrain and and Qatif and in Bahrain and Qatar; but the greater part of the scheme was successfully resisted by the British delegate, who stated that Kuwait was an independent Shaikhdom, that Bahrain was an independent principality under British protection, and that Qatar was not recognised by His Majesty's Government to be Turkish possession.

The proposals of the Board were carried into effect only at Kuwait Proceedings and Qatif, at each of which places one préposé and one garde were at Kuwait and Qatif. stationed. The post at Kuwait had a brief existence only, viz., from April 1897 till September 1901 when the préposé was withdrawn and was not replaced; and even during his presence it was admitted that "his rôle was purely platonic and his action nil."

The Board also decided that ships from infected ports arriving on Proceedings the coast of Hasa should be repulsed to Basrah,—a resolution very disconcerting to the local Turkish authorities in Hasa who feared that scarcity and rebellion would be the result; in the end, as a concession to the objections of the Turkish executive, a lazaret was by order of the Board established at 'Oqair. It was opened in March 1897, but it never served any useful purpose, and in six months' time it had disappeared; in the interval two of the staff had died, one had deserted, and the doctor with the remaining garde had withdrawn on his own responsibility to Basrah.

The Board of Health also created about this time a skeleton organisa- Commissions tion for the sanitary control of the whole Gulf. It consisted of a of the Board Commission at Basrah and of two flying Commissions for the eastern and western shores of the Gulf respectively; the two flying Commissions, which visited the most important points on both littorals and collected a quantity of useful information, appear to have been headed by Drs. Camposampiero and Izzedine whose reports are mentioned in the footnote at the beginning of this Appendix.

On the 12th of February 1897 the quarantine at Basrah against Changes in passengers from India was increased from 10 to 15 days, but about the the rules at middle of March it was reduced to 12 days. At the beginning of July there was another change, the quarantine at Basrah against the ports of the Persian Gulf being reduced to five days; and again, at the end of the 1897. month, this quarantine was further reduced or temporarily abolished, and the entrance of pilgrims and corpses from Persia, which had been prohibited, was again permitted. On the 5th of August quarantine against India was lowered to 10 days, the period being still calculated (as it always had been) from the time of arrival at Basrah, not from that of departure from India.

After this matters seem to have remained unchanged until 1899, on Designs in the 11th of April in which year the Turkish Governor of Hasa, in an official report, revived the proposal to establish a quarantine station in Bahrain; Bahrain was, of course, assumed to be Turkish possession, and the maintenance of quarantine in Hasa against Bahrain was strongly deprecated for very cogent reasons. The scheme, however, was thrown out at the instance of the British delegate on the Board of Health, who

Bahrain

repeated that Bahrain was an independent state under British protection; and an alternative proposal to re-establish the lazaret at 'Oqair was also vetoed. How the question of Hasa was finally settled does not appear from the records.

Dr. Borel's report, 1901.

In 1900 Dr. Borel, a Frenchman, was nominated to the post of Sanitary Officer at Basrah; and in January 1901 he reported to the Board of Health on the whole subject of the sanitary defence of the Persian Gulf. He commented strongly on the severity of the system in force at Basrah under which, between March 1896 and September 1900. no less than 409 steamers had been quarantined and 8,000 passengers and 20,000 members of crews had been subjected to isolation and disinfection without any useful result except that a net profit of about £4,000 sterling had accrued to the Sanitary Department from the A recommendation by Dr. Borel, to the effect that operations. quarantine against Gulf Ports not infected with plague or cholera should be reduced (except for ships from India) to 48 hours after arrival, appears to have been adopted. On the 26th of March 1901 the absolute prohibition of 1897 against the bringing of Shī'ah pilgrims by Indian ships was modified by the Board of Health, and such ships were permitted to bring in future a number of pilgrims not exceeding 5 per hundred tons register.

Relaxation of the rules at Basrah, 1903.

On the 29th of December 1903 the Constantinople Board of Health. on the motion of the British and Persian representatives, and influenced doubtless by the views of the Paris Conference of 1903, decided that the quarantine of 48 hours then in force at Basrah against Persian ports should be replaced by a medical visit and disinfection, and also that ships from Indian ports which had been more than 12 days absent from India and had received pratique at an intermediate port in the Gulf should receive pratique at Basrah after a medical visit and disinfection only; ships of the last mentioned class moreover, if they had been disinfected at Bushehr and had not touched at any place between there and Basrah, need not even be disinfected at Basrah. Effect was given without delay to this salutary decision; and further, on the 15th of June, the quarantine against ships from Bombay with clean bills of health but unable to benefit by the 12 days' rule was lowered from 10 to 5 days to be reckoned as usual from the date of arrival at Basrah: in the case of vessels from India carrying Shi'ah pilgrims it was ordered, however, that the 48 hours' rule should only apply if the number of pilgrims on board was 1 per cent. or less of the registered tonnage of the ship. Indian pilgrims, as a rule, now disembark at Muhammareh, proceeding subsequently by Ballam to Basrah, where they are admitted on the production of proof that they have duly performed quarantine at Muhammareh.

Characteristics of the Turkish system.

From the facts recited it will be apparent that Turkish quarantine has up to the present time remained, by reason of excessive stringency and constant variation of the rules, a serious impediment to commerce and travel in 'Iraq. It may be added that its protective value is at the same time very low. Many native passengers succeed in evading it altogether, and the equipment of the Basrah sanitary station was until lately very defective, there being indeed no hospital accommodation of any sort; but recently—as already mentioned—a considerable sum has

been voted for its improvement. After discussion it has been resolved to maintain the Basrah station at its present site on 'Ajairāwīyah island, where 10 Jaribs of land will be permanently acquired for the purpose by the Turkish Government.

Sanitary regulations and arrangements of Persia in the Persian Gulf. 1896-1907.

We turn next to the sanitary precautions taken at the ports of Persia since 1896.

In October 1896 the necessity of action became apparent to the Institution of Persian Government, and an effort was at first made by them to carry quarantine, out the necessary arrangements by purely Persian agency. After much 1896. discussion between the Persian Government and the British Legation in consultation with the Residency at Bushehr, an understanding was reached which involved the minimum of injury to trade compatible with adequate protection. For healthy vessels from India quarantine was fixed at five days from arrival in the ports of Bushehr and Muhammareh and at seven days in Persian ports nearer to India than Büshehr; and in the case of plague-infected vessels passengers and cargo were not to be landed, but the mails might be sent ashore without detention of the vessel. The Persian Government appear to have been conscious of their inability to carry out the regulations satisfactorily, and almost from the first the management was practically delegated to the British Residency at Bushehr: in the beginning, however, much obstruction was offered by the local Persian officials, who could not reconcile themselves to the loss of sanitary powers by which they might have grown rich very rapidly.

In January 1897, the Russian Government being then on the point Arrangeof despatching Russian doctors to the Gulf to study the question of ments plague prophylaxis, the Persian Government agreed to the deputation from the British India, at their expense, of two European Assistant-Surgeons to take authorities, charge of the sanitary arrangements at Bandar Abbas and Lingeh. These 1897. officers left India on the 9th of February 1897, and on the following day another Assistant-Surgeon of the Indian establishment was sent from Büshehr to take sanitary charge of the port of Muhammareh. The services of the Assistant-Surgeons at Büshehr and Jāshk also were requisitioned for sanitary work at their own stations. In March it was reported that the Persian Government had sent definite orders to Büshehr confirming the authority of the British Residency Surgeon in sanitary matters and that the friction with the local Persian authorities had been to a large extent removed. The Persian gunboat "Persepolis" at the same time received orders from the Persian Government to cruise at the mouth of the Gulf and to prevent coasting-vessels from entering; but her crew were at the time in a state of mutiny, and it does not appear that the action directed was taken.

In 1898-99 the quarantine at Persian ports against Karāchi was 10 days from the date of departure in the case of healthy, and 10 days from the date of arrival in the case of infected ships.

Plague disturbances at Būshehr, 1899.

The small outbreak of plague which occurred at Büshehr in Mav 1899 led to the deputation of Captain Rainier, I.M.S., from India for the purpose of devising a scheme to prevent the spread of plague in and from Bushehr. The activity of the British medical officers in investigating the epidemic at Bushehr and the expectation that drastic measures would be applied gave rise to an ebullition of popular feeling which at one moment threatened to become serious. The Darva Baigi, then Governor of the Gulf Ports, at first gave assurances that all necessary measures could and would be enforced; but he subsequently modified his tone and said that with the small garrison at his disposal nothing could be done in face of the general opposition. On the 31st of July a demonstration took place at Bushehr, in which the windows of the Persian Telegraph Office were broken and stones were thrown at the British Residency; but the crowd consisted mostly of juveniles, and the Mujtahids of the town voluntarily supplied escorts to protect Europeans from annoyance. There were rumours, however, that requests for aid in resisting plague precautions had been sent to the chief men of Dashtistan. and the British Resident was given discretion by the British Minister at Tehran to bring Indian troops to Bushehr, in case of necessity, from Jashk and Chahbar. While the crisis lasted feeling ran high, and large gatherings were held in some of the mosques; but on the 3rd of August the disturbance subsided, partly under threats from the Darya Begi who had obtained some men from Angāli, Shabānkāreh and Dashtistān; and on the 4th of August the bazaar, which had been closed, was reopened. In October some of the ringleaders were bastinadoed at the demand of Colonel Meade, the British Resident, and others were expelled from the town. As plague had meanwhile died out at Büshehr and did not subsequently reappear, the organisation of protective measures was discontinued, and in February 1900 Captain Rainier returned to India.

Partial substitution of surveillance for detention, but not maintained, 1899. In July 1899 the Government of India instructed Colonel Meade that surveillance for a fixed period after arrival might, at Büshehr and other Persian ports, be substituted for detention under observation in the case of all classes of persons whose daily inspection could be assured, and effect was given to the order by exempting first and second-class passengers and their servants from detention; this form of differential treatment, however, was badly received by the Persian Government, as it appeared to them to favour Europeans, and it became necessary to revert to wholesale detention without discrimination of status.

General results to 1903. The arrangements at all Persian ports worked smoothly, if we except the slight trouble at Büshehr in 1899, from 1897 to 1903; they were inexpensive; and they effectually preserved the country from infection. The cost to the Persian Government of the special staff and contingencies at Muhammareh, Lingeh and Bandar 'Abbās was less than £100 per mensem, and the expenditure in allowances and contingencies at Büshehr and Jāshk, which amounted to £20 a month, was borne by the Government of India. The Persian Government were also represented in the Gulf during part of this time by a physician of their own, whose real function was to keep a watch upon the proceedings of the British sanitary authorities at Büshehr and elsewhere. This individual was at first a certain Zain-ul-'Ābidīn, appointed in 1899; but he was succeeded in 1900

by another Persian doctor, known as the Sadr-ul-Atibba. The latter continued to accompany the British Residency Surgeon on board ships, etc., until May 1901, when he was withdrawn.

In 1903, however, difficulties arose, apparently in consequence of the Attempt to Russian Minister at Tehran having advised the Persian Government to transfer the transfer the control of sanitary operations on the southern coast from the control from British political officials to those of the Imperial Persian Customs—a authorities department which had hitherto had no connection with sanitary matters, to the except that they had been made responsible for the collection of all Imperial sanitary fees and that they disbursed the money spent on sanitation by Persian the Persian Government. The Russians had from the beginning shown or pretended much concern at the prospect of plague being introduced into Persia, and the appointment of British employés to the charge of the principal ports had excited their political apprehensions. Several Russian doctors had visited the Gulf, including Dr. Marc of the Russian Legation at Tehran and Dr. Ost in 1897, Drs. Rodzewitz and Kornajewski in 1898, and Dr. Paschkowski, who remained, chiefly at Bushehr, from 1898 to 1899. In July 1903 the Customs officials at Jashk and Muhammareh attempted to interfere in sanitary matters and even ordered the Assistant Surgeon at the former place to enforce detention on arrivals from Bahrain after those islands had been officially declared free of plague on the 15th of July; and in August it became known that M. Naus, the Belgian Minister of Customs, had been directed, in connection with the prevalence of plague at Bahrain, to institute an inquiry into the working of the sanitary arrangements in the Gulf. No action appears to have been taken by M. Naus under this order.

The British Minister at Tehran was immediately instructed by His Unsuccessful Majesty's Government to protest in strong terms against any alteration British proof the system introduced at the request of the Persian Government in 1897, and to inform the Persian Government that the Customs officials appeared to be unfitted by want of experience for the supervision of sanitary work, and that a change prejudicially affecting British trade and shipping in the Gulf, where they held a preponderating position, would be regarded by His Majesty's Government as uncalled-for and even unfriendly. To this protest the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs replied that there was no intention of ousting the British medical officers from the positions which they held, but that they had resorted to an objectionable form of differential treatment at Bushehr and had shown laxity in their precautions against the importation of plague from Bahrain.

A French doctor, M. Bussière, had meanwhile been attached to the Proceedings staff of the French Vice-Consulate at Bushehr and was understood to be of M. Bussiè in receipt of an allowance from the Customs Department; in February re and the 1904 he set out on an official tour in the Persian gunboat "Persepolis" Customs and visited Muhammareh, Lingeh, Bandar Abbās and Mināb. About the same time the Director of Customs at Bandar 'Abbās took it upon himself to issue peremptory executive orders to the Assistant-Surgeon in charge of the port; and in May 1904 the Sadr-al-Atibba, who after three years' quiescence now suddenly reappeared, began to intrude into the sanitary arrangements at Muhammareh. Under instructions from

officials, 1904.

the British Legation the Assistant-Surgeons met these attempted encroach. ments by declining in courteous terms to recognise the authority of the Customs. On the 16th of May an ingenious attempt was made to undermine the authority of the British Residency Surgeon by constituting a "sanitary council" at Bushehr, M. Bussière being appointed Secretary, to concert local measures in view of the prevalence of cholera in Bahrain and at Basrah and of plague at Lingeh; by this council the town of Bushehr was subsequently divided into three sanitary sections of which one was entrusted to the British Residency Surgeon, one to the Assistant-Surgeon and one to M. Bussière. The policy of the anti-British party was apparently to call in question the right of the Residency Surgeon to direct sanitary measures on shore, and to restrict his authority, if possible, to measures affecting the harbour and shipping. A test case occurred about the 20th of June 1904 when M. Bussière, without consulting Captain Condon, the Residency Surgeon, proceeded to visit some cholera-infected villages in the neighbourhood of Bushehr against which quarantine had been instituted by the Persian Governor of Bushehr at the instance of the Residency Surgeon. On his return from tour on the 24th of June M. Bussière was met at the town boundary by Captain Condon and brought in under a special exemption,—an act of politeness which he did not appear entirely to appreciate. At the end of July the Director-General of Customs at Bushehr caused some detention-sheds erected on the landward side of the town by the Residency Surgeon to be removed, and thereafter arrivals from the country were absolutely denied admittance; and in the beginning of August the Director-General even went so far as to order the detention of a native vessel in the harbour although it had received pratique from the British Residency establishment.

Successful British protest, 1904.

On a protest from the British Resident, Major Cox, the detentionsheds were re-established after a few days; but the reply of the Director-General to his communication was highly unsatisfactory, and a strenuous protest founded on these incidents was accordingly made on the 22nd of August by Sir A. Hardinge, the British Minister at Tehran. The attitude of the Persian Government, who ignored the wider aspects of the question and argued, not without plausibility, that the Shah retained his sovereign rights in sanitary matters and might therefore issue orders to the British medical staff through any medium including that of the Belgian customs administration, was obstinate; and the possibility of a British war-vessel being sent to Bushehr and a guard landed in support of the British Minister's protest was at one time contemplated. At the beginning of September, however, the Persian Government yielded, and instructions were sent to the Customs authorities to abstain from interference in sanitary matters; the precise terms of the orders are uncertain, and qualifications were probably introduced by the Director-General at Bushehr in repeating them to his subordinates, but the effect has been to put an end, since 1904, to the encroachments of the Customs on the duties of the sanitary staff. In 1905, however, a flagrant breach of quarantine was committed by M. Passek, the Russian Consul-General at Bushehr, but he with his whole house was placed in quarantine, and an explanation was demanded of him by the Governor of Bushehr acting on behalf of the Persian Government.

A so-called Conseil de Santé had been formed at Tehran in 1899, The Persian if not earlier, and placed under the Ministry of Public Instruction; but Sanitary it was rather a society for the discussion of medical subjects than a 1904. branch of the public service, and it soon ceased to meet regularly. At length in July 1904 a permanent Sanitary Council for Persia, such as had been suggested by the Austro-Hungarian representatives at Paris in 1894, was constituted by Imperial decree upon a quasi-international basis: it was to meet once a month or oftener; it was to discuss all sanitary questions affecting the country; it was to depend on the Persian Ministry of the Interior; and it might correspond directly with similar bodies in other countries, especially with the Constantinople Board of Health and with the Office Sanitaire International Central de Paris proposed by the Paris Conference of 1903, should the latter ever be created. At the time of its formation the Sanitary Council of Persia included (besides representatives of various Departments of the Persian Government) the European physicians of the court and the medical officers of the foreign Legations, and the members of British nationality were then four in number as against two French, two Russian, one German, one American and one Turkish. The new Council has directed its attention to questions of practical hygiene, but chiefly to the subject of epidemics; and some improvement of sanitary conditions generally, the foundation of a vaccination Institute and the opening of new hospitals at certain centres in the provinces are claimed as the fruits of its labours, but in the Persian Gulf there are not as yet many tangible evidences of its activity. The Council publishes a monthly report of its proceedings, and all consular and other European doctors in Persia are treated as corresponding members. Since the spring of 1905 the Council has, as a matter of courtesy, been supplied by the Residency Surgeon at Bushehr and the Assistant-Surgeons under his orders with information relating to the public health in the neighbourhood of the places where they are stationed; but it is reported to have shown, under the presidentship of Dr. Schneider, a French physician to the Shāh, an inclination to disregard the official reports of the British Residency Surgeon and to attach weight to the irresponsible communications of M. Bussière.

A charitable dispensary under the Assistant-Surgeon in charge of Government quarantine was opened at Bandar 'Abbas in March 1906 and has been the means of relieving much suffering among the very poor; this measure was undertaken by the Government of India.

of India dispensary opened at Bandar 'Abbas, 1906.

Preventive measures in the 'Oman Sultanate, 1896-1907.

The case of 'Oman next falls to be considered. The Sultan of Apathy of 'Oman did not agree, until considerable pressure had been placed upon the Sultan, him, to the adoption of any precautionary measures against plague at 1897-98. his ports of Masqat and Gwadar. Eventually, with effect apparently from the 13th of January 1897, rules drafted by a committee which consisted of the Foreign Consular officers at Masqat and a representative

of the Sultan were made applicable at both places to vessels arrivino from Bombay and Karāchi; by these rules the landing of persons or of articles other than mails from vessels infected or under suspicion of being infected with plague was prohibited, and it was provided that passengers by healthy ships should be detained under observation at Haramul, 11 miles from Masqat, till the expiry of a period of 9 days reckoned from the time of the vessel leaving the last infected port. The Sultan insisted on adding a vexatious condition that cargo should be worked by ships' crews and that coolies from the shore should not go on board vessels from India. The Government of India at this time considered that the period of observation ought to be 10 days, but the Sultan does not appear to have deferred to their opinion, for by the beginning of May 1897 the time had been reduced at Gwadar to 7 days calculated from the date of arrival; and in April 1899, when plague first showed itself at Masqat, detention as practised there was for 6 days only.

Independent action by the Sultan, 1899.

In his first alarm at the appearance of the disease in his capital in 1890 the Sultan increased the period of detention to 10 days from the date of arrival at Masgat; and at the same time he requested the Government of India to undertake the sanitary control of that port on his behalf. The British Agency Surgeon having intimated what staff was necessary for the purpose, two Hospital-Assistants were immediately despatched from India; but the Sultan, on their arrival, declined to be responsible for their salaries, and, though they remained at Masqat until September at the expense of the Government of India, their services, in consequence of the objections of His Highness, were not utilised. The Sultan also refused to accede to a wish expressed by the Government of India, that the detention period of 10 days from arrival at Masqat should be converted into one of 10 days from departure from an infected port; and on the 18th of July 1899, acting on the advice of the French Consul at Masgat, he rejected a fresh code of regulations which had been drafted by the British Agency Surgeon, Colonel Jayakar, and even abolished sanitary restrictions at Masqat altogether. In August, however, cholera broke out at Gwadar, and on the 25th of that month restrictions were reimposed at Masqat.

Arrangements handed over to the British authorities, 1900.

When in January 1900 cholera died out in 'Omān and was succeeded by plague at Matrah and Masqat, the Sultan obtained by private arrangement two native practitioners with plague experience from India, and it seems to have been his intention at first to combat the spread of the epidemic without other aid or advice. While the disease was still prevalent, however, a Hospital-Assistant intended for the British Vice-Consulate at Bandar 'Abbās was temporarily diverted to Masqat for plague duty by the Government of India, and inoculation was successfully introduced among the people, over 200 persons being treated by Colonel Javakar. The Sultan soon after this fell back on the good offices of the British Agency, now in charge of Captain P. Z. Cox; and at length, with effect from the 1st of October 1900, he handed over the entire protective arrangements at Masqat to the British Agency Surgeon, under whose orders he placed at the same time his own sanitary employés. This amicable arrangement still (1907) continues in force, and since its initiation all measures at ports of the 'Oman

Sultanate have been regulated by the principles of the Venice Convention of 1897. In July 1903, by means of a notification under the Masgat Order in Council of 1867, observance of the Sultan's sanitary regulations was made binding on British subjects residing in his territories.

Preventive measures in Bahrain, 1896-1907.

The only other principality of the Persian Gulf in which preautionary measures have been applied since 1896 is Bahrain.

In February 1897 the position in Bahrain was taken into con- Passive resideration by the British Political Resident in the Gulf, with the result sistance of that a non-medical agent was despatched from Bushehr to assist the the Shaikh, Shaikh in creating a simple system of sanitary protection; and a local representative of the Resident, subsequently appointed, was placed under the authority of the Residency Surgeon at Bushehr and ordered to see that measures prescribed by the Residency were carried out by the Shaikh. The services of an Assistant-Surgeon were offered to the Shaikh of Bahrain by the Government of India, but the proposal was unpalatable to him and was not pressed. The Shaikh's objection to receiving British assistance was founded ostensibly on the repugnance of his subjects to scientific plague precautions, and in support of his statement the Shaikh submitted a petition to which a number of signatures were attached; but the real reason of his refusal was probably that, like the Sultan of 'Oman, he disliked British interference in matters of internal government, and that he wished to retain control of the highly profitable institution of quarantine, the odium of which it was easy for him to cast upon the British authorities. His system however was perfectly valueless from the sanitary point of view, being in fact nothing more than a pretext for extortion; and ultimately in June 1900, the Government of India were obliged to insist upon its entire abolition.

1897-1900.

When plague brok eout in Bahrain in 1903 native craft were at Proceedings first prohibited from leaving the island; but, as Bahrain depends to a in 1903. certain extent on Persia for foodstuffs, this order could not long remain in force. The Shaikh did not permit any regular sanitary or precautionary measures to be taken on shore or in the harbour.

During the latest epidemic of plague in Bahrain, in June 1905, a Preparations Hospital-Assistant had been despatched from Karachi to take charge of in 1905. the new Victoria Memorial Hospital at Manamah; and, had the epidemic not subsided before his arrival, his services would have been utilised in connection with such measures as the Government of India might then have decided to enforce.

Sanitary matters at Kuwait, 1896-1907.

At Kuwait, where no occasion for sanitary intervention by the Government Government of India has as yet arisen, a charitable dispensary, estab- of India dispensary opened at Kuwait, 1904. lished in connection with the British Political Agency at that place in 1904, has rendered valuable services to the people of the town, who were otherwise without medical assistance.

Present Sanitary Organisation in the Persian Gulf, 1907.

The actual sanitary situation in the Persian Gulf may be summed up as follows:—

The administrative scheme propounded by the Paris Conference of 1903 for the sanitary defence of Europe in the Persian Gulf has not come into force; and the obstacles to its execution are of such a nature that their removal at present appears improbable.

In the absence of a general organisation, local systems under the management of Turkey and of Great Britain continue to exist. At the Turkish ports rules prescribed by the Constantinople Board of Health are in force, which are stringent in a degree not justifiable under the Convention of 1903 or even that of 1897, and which by their severity to a great extent defeat their own objects. Outside of Turkish territory, sanitary organisation, where it exists, is in the hands of the political representatives of the British Government and is worked in general harmony with the conclusions of the Conferences of 1897 and 1903, except that in Persia the procedure with respect to plague is regulated entirely by the Convention of 1897; but the rules, especially in regard to disinfection and the destruction of rats, are not as yet carried out in their entirety at all places.

Since January 1905, under the instructions of His Majesty's Government, the British Embassy at Constantinople has been kept informed by telegraph of the sanitary state of the Persian Gulf ports and has been supplied with detailed reports of local epidemics by the British political and consular staff in the Gulf.

Smallpox in the Persian Gulf.

In concluding our remarks upon sanitary matters in the Persian Gulf, we may draw attention to the frequent presence in that region of smallpox, which at times assumes an active epidemic form.

1802-1891.

In April 1802 vaccination was successfully introduced at Baghdād by the Civil Surgeon of the British Residency with vaccine matter obtained from Vienna; and in the following month the operations were extended to Basrah. At the middle of the 19th century smallpox was generally prevalent and much dreaded among the populations of the Persian Gulf, and applications for lymph were sometimes made by natives to the surgeons of British vessels.

Of recent smallpox epidemics one in 1891, accompanied by a serious 1891-1893. outbreak of influenza, caused considerable mortality in Bahrain and Qatif and on Qishm island. The disease was rife at Gwadar, where even Khöjahs and Hindus refused to let their sick be isolated or removed to hospital, from March to May in 1892; and from June to October 1893 it prevailed, concurrently with cholera and remittent fever, upon the upper Kārun.

In 1897 there was much smallpox in Trucial 'Oman; and the 1897-1903. cholera epidemic of 1899 in the 'Oman Sultanate was preceded by a virulent outbreak of smallpox in which 6,000 persons are supposed to have perished. In April 1900 the malady recurred upon the coast of Trucial 'Oman and caused, according to one report, some 500 deaths in the town of Sharjah alone. In 1901 smallpox was prevalent about Basrah and Muhammareh and was responsible for a considerable mortality in the latter neighbourhood; and in the winter of 1902-1903 it visited Büshehr.

The places of origin of these epidemics of smallpox and the connection of the epidemics with one another are in most cases not discoverable.

APPENDIX N.

THE ARMS AND AMMUNITION TRAFFIC IN THE GULFS OF PERSIA AND 'OMAN.*

The arms trade in the Gulf during and immediately after the Afghān War, 1879-1881.

During the Third Afghān War the trade in modern arms and ammunition in the Persian Gulf attracted the attention of the British and Indian Governments for the first time.

Precautionary measures in India. 1880.

In 1880, when it was placed beyond doubt that large quantities of percussion caps exported from India to Persia were reaching the Afghān troops at Herat and elsewhere, the Government of India, recognising the political and military importance of the question, instructed the Government of Bombay to abstain from granting licenses for the export of heavy consignments of arms and ammunition to Persian Gulf Ports, and to watch carefully the import of such articles at Karachi and on the coast to the westward. On the 1st October in the same year a notification was published by the Government of India to legalise the detention at Indian ports of cargoes of arms and ammunitions of war consigned to the Persian Gulf from other countries.

Prohibition of the trade in Persia, 1881.

Meanwhile the Persian Government had been persuaded to prohibit the exportation of percussion caps from Persia, and instructions in this sense had been issued by them to the local authorities at Bandar 'Abbās, Bampūr, Kirmān and Yazd, as well as to those in Khurāsān. The Persian Government appear soon after this to have developed an interest in the purely Persian aspect of the question; and in 1881, at the personal instance of the Shāh, the importation of arms and ammunition into the country was made illegal. The prohibitory edict came into force at Būshehr on or about the 1st of July 1881; and the principal firms doing business there under British protection were duly warned by the Political Resident of the change in the law.

^{*} This Appendix, compiled entirely from the records in the Political Department of the Government of India, was finished in its original form in May 1906, and was then revised on the spot by Major P. Z. Cox, Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, by Major W. Grey, Political Agent at Masqat, by Major S. G. Knox, Political Agent at Kuwait, and by Mr. F. E. Crow, Consul at Basrah. By the courtesy of His Majesty's Legation in Persia and, of the Government of the North-Western Frontier Province of India, the draft was also examined at Tehran and Peshawar.

Gradual development of the traffic, 1881-91.

No large or systematic trade, however, as yet existed in the Gulf; Commenceand for several years no marked symptoms of expansion were observable. ment at Muham-In 1881 a consignment of breech-loading rifles and ammunition was march and imported by French merchants at Muhammareh; it was at first seized Büshehr. by the local authorities, but was subsequently returned and sold off by the owners at very low prices.

At Büshehr the pioneers of the traffic were Messrs. A. and T. J. Malcolm, a Persian Armenian firm under British protection. Messrs. Malcolm began to import arms in 1884, and they were followed by Messrs. Fracis, Times and Co., a Parsi and English house, whose first agency was established at Büshehr in 1887.

On the East Coast of Africa the arms trade was an auxiliary of the Diversion of slave trade, and a blow was struck at it in the General Act of the the African Brussels Conference of 2nd of July 1890, which was formally adopted the Brussels by Great Britain on the 2nd of April 1892. The contraction of the Convention, African market compelled manufacturers and exporters to seek another 1890. outlet for their goods, and the unfortunate result was the diversion of the African arms trade to the Persian Gulf, which, lying altogether above the 20th parallel of north latitude, was not subject to the arms clauses of the Brussels Act. The diversion must have begun before the final closure of the African field; for we find that permission to tranship 1,477 guns, 44 pistols and 32,050 bullets at Zanzibar for Bahrain was refused by the Indian authorities at Bombay as early as 1888.

The importation of arms at Masqat was now considerable, and the Prohibition possibility of their introduction thence into the Native States of Western of the trade India was discussed; but inquiry revealed no real danger, and a slight at Gwadar, 1891. supervision to be exercised over the trade by the British Political Agent at Masqat was regarded as a sufficient safeguard for the time being. Attention was directed at the same time to facilities which were alleged to exist for the importation of arms and ammunition through Gwadar and Bandar 'Abbās into Afghānistān and the Indian frontier tract; and the facts were investigated by Sir Robert Sandeman, Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan, under the orders of the Government of India.

It was found that a number of guns and pistols were being imported at Gwādar and Chahbār, and to a lesser extent at Ormārah, from Masqat; but these were mostly smooth-bores of little value, received at Masgat from Zanzibar and said to be of American manufacture, and the number of them imported at Gwadar was only about 300 per annum. The existence of any regular trade with Afghanistan was not established, the dealers at this time confining their operations to Southern Baluchistan; but it was shown that some of the arms found their way inland as far as Khārān. There was also a considerable importation of lead, gunpowder and percussion caps on the Makran coast, chiefly from Bombay.

To meet the incipient danger in Makran the Sultan of 'Oman, at the instance of the Government of India, forbade by means of a proclamation dated the 3rd of March 1891 the importation and exportation of arms and ammunition at Gwādar.*

Renewal of the prohibition in Persia, 1891.

In Persia, in the same year, the Shah's prohibitory edict of 1881 was reiterated in stringent terms, apparently in consequence of infractions of the law having come to the notice of the authorities through the sale of arms by British and Parsi merchants at Tehran.

More rapid progress of the trade, 1891-97.

Direct shipments from Europe and growth of the Masgat market.

The stream of arms flowing from Zanzibar into Masqut continued to increase in volume, and it was estimated that, between April 1890 and June 1892, no less than 11,500 firearms were landed at the latter port. A large proportion of these were brought by the Sultan of Zanzibar's steamers, and the three principal Khōjah merchants at Matrah were now engaged in the trade. Direct shipments from Europe had also begun, and at the end of 1890 a consignment of 420 Enfields from Austria-Hungary for Khōjah merchants at Gwādar was stopped at Karāchi. More than half the arms received were, even at this period. re-exported from Masqat to Kuwait, Bahrain and other ports in the Persian Gulf: thus early was the development of Masqat into the chief arms emporium of the Middle East foreshadowed.

First interdict on exportation from 'Oman to

A few arms were carried also from Masqat to Sur and other places on the 'Oman seaboard, and complaints began to be received through Zanzibar of exportation from Masqat to the Somāli and Banādir coasts of Africa. The allegation was not clearly established; but the Sultan of Africa, 1892. 'Oman, to satisfy the scruples of the British Government, by an order dated 30th April 1892 prohibited the re-exportation from his territories to Africa of firearms received from that quarter. The Sultan, however, from a fear that his subjects might be led to seek French maritime protection in increasing numbers, would not consent to the search of 'Omani vessels by British men-of-war, and the order remained virtually a dead-letter.

Increase of the trade at Masqat.

Year by year the trade continued to expand at Masqat, where it was in all respects legal and was favourably regarded by the Sultan on account of the large profits that he derived from the import duty on arms. About 1895 it began to assume really formidable dimensions. importations of 1895-96 at Masqat were estimated at 4,350 rifles and 604,000 cartridges, and those of 1896-97 at 20,000 rifles with a proportionate number of cartridges.

Increase of the trade in Persia.

Nor were indications wanting of the progress of the trade in Persia, although in that country it had for 10 years been absolutely forbidden

^{*}This prohibition was inconsistent with certain of his obligations under commercial treaties. It is difficult to understand why its propriety has not even yet been questioned by any foreign power.

by law. In 1892 or 1893 about a thousand Martini-Henry rifles were imported at Bushehr by native merchants from Kuwait. In December 1893 a consignment of 220 Snider rifles, 40 Martini-Henry rifles and 4 cases of ammunition from London, ostensibly for transhipment to Masqat, was seized at Bushehr under the orders of the Persian Government; and again, in 1895, a large consignment of arms arriving at Bushehr by sea fell into the hands of the Persian authorities. Seizures were, however, the exception; as a rule contraband arms and ammunition found easy entrance into Persia, on payment of blackmail to Persian officials; and a number of firms, including several of British nationality, but not those of the highest standing, continued to be engaged in the trade. The appointment of a Persian preventive officer in January 1-96, under the title of Amin-i-Aslihah, made no difference to the traffic, and it soon became evident that his real function was to tap the stream of bribes paid by arms dealers for the benefit of high Persian officials, or even of the Persian Government itself. Bushehr had by this time developed into a great arms and ammunition port and it was estimated that in 1897 no less than 30,000 rifles were landed there, on which the Local Governor recovered illicit duty at a rate of from 8 per cent. to 10 per cent. ad valorem.* Shīrāz had become an important distributing centre dependent on Bushehr, and the Kāshkai tribe and the Tangistānis were now excellently armed. Bahrain, too, had grown into an emporium of secondary, but still considerable, importance for arms and ammunition.

At this time, with the exception of a good many Belgian rifles Particimade at Liège † and of a small number brought from France, the arms pants in the and ammunition imported at Masqat were entirely of British origin, and the trade was chiefly in the hands of Messrs. Joyce and Kynoch: about two-thirds of the shipments were received direct from the United Kingdom and the remainder viá Büshehr. Germany, it was understood, prohibited her subjects from joining in the Masqat arms trade, on the ground that the nearness of that place to the prohibited zone of the Brussels Convention endangered the efficient working of the Brussels Act; but precise information on this point is not available.

The arms in the Masqat market were now all breech-loaders, for Character muzzle-loaders had ceased to be saleable in either Arabia or Persia. Some of the traffic were disposed of locally to tribesmen from the interior of 'Oman, some to visitors from other parts of the Gulf, and some to Nakhudas of coasting vessels; but the greater quantity were re-shipped to Trucial 'Oman, Bahrain, Qatar and Kuwait, or were smuggled into Persian and Turkish territory in the Gulf concealed in bales of goods and cases of Halwa or dry limes; while a few were even despatched to minor ports in the Red Sea at which there were no customs houses.

^{*} Or even more. According to the statement of an ex-dealer, made later, the cost price of a rifle was at this time £3-10-0 to £4; the amount paid to the Governor on each was £3; and the selling price was £8 to £10.

[†] Some of these were distinguished by a gilt lion and sun on the barrel.

The attention of the Government of India attracted by the trade in the Gulf, 1896-97.

The importance to the Government of India of the arms trade in the Persian Gulf, perceived at the time of the Afghān War, had for a time been forgotten. At the end of 1896, however, the military authorities in India became desirous of knowing the destination of the enormous quantities of military material which were now being poured into the Gulf, and local enquiries were set on foot which showed that about 60 per cent. of these imports found their final market in Persian territory, while about 25 per cent. were absorbed by the Turkish possessions in the Gulf and the remaining 15 per cent. by non-Turkish Arabia.

In 1897 the Sultān of Masqat—on pretext of checking a trade dangerous to the stability of his government which had been severely shaken by a rebellion in 1895, but in reality only for the sake of increasing his customs-revenue—proposed to enhance the duty on arms and ammunition imported at Masqat to a rate above that of the 5 per cent. fixed in his commercial treaties with European powers. The British Government, in view of the check which, however slight, the measure might have imposed on the arms trade, suggested to the Government of the French Republic that the treaties might be modified to admit of a duty of 7½ per cent. being taken on arms, but the proposal was not favourably received and was abandoned. The Sultān however, acting on his own initiative, soon afterwards raised the rate of duty to 6 per cent., at which figure it has since been maintained without protest on the part of the dealers or of any foreign government.

Less than six months had elapsed after the investigation made at the instance of the Indian military authorities, when the tribal risings of 1897 on the Indo-Afghan frontier suddenly brought the question of the Gulf arms trade into great prominence, and the theory was propounded that a part of the tribal armaments might have been derived from the Persian Gulf. It was decided, however, without waiting for definite proofs that the frontier of India was affected, to take measures against the illicit trade in arms between England and Persia,—an evil in itself of no slight magnitude.

Attack by the British Government on the illegal trade in arms, 1897-98.

Preparatory steps in Persia. To this end the Persian Government were moved through the Hon'ble C. Hardinge, then British Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran, to take steps for enforcing the actual law and for confiscating the stores of arms which

had been illegally imported into Bushehr and were accumulated there. The British proposals were heartily welcomed by the Persian Government, themselves now thoroughly alarmed at the proportions which the trade had attained; nor were their fears without justification. In the neighbourhood especially of Bushehr, no grown man any longer enjoyed social consideration or could obtain a wife who did not possess a rifle; the Bushehr-Shīrāz road was frequently closed by the heavily armed tribes of Tangistan, who, if they had been united among themselves, might even have been able at this time to capture the town of Büshehr; and in fact, as aptly remarked by a Persian, "Martini Khān" was now Shah of the south of Persia. On the 11th of December the Persian Government announced that orders had been given for the confiscations to take place, and on the 15th of December they went so far as to agree that all mercantile vessels trading in the Persian Gulf under their flag might be searched for arms and ammunition by British men-of-war, any contraband found on board being handed over to themselves. They also associated themselves with the British Government in a request to the Sultan of 'Oman that he would warn his subjects of the illegality of exporting arms to Persia, and would authorise British war-vessels to search British, Persian and 'Omāni vessels in his territorial waters, and to seize and confiscate the cargoes of arms owned by British, Persian or 'Omāni subjects which might be found on board, if destined for illicit importation into Persia.

In pursuance of the Anglo-Persian understanding the Sultan of Preliminary 'Oman was approached by Colonel M. J. Meade, then Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, and the adherence of the Masgat Government to the arrangements was secured; not however without difficulty, for the Sultan apprehended that interference with the arms trade would result in a diminution of his customs revenue. A notification and proclamation in the sense required, applying equally to British, to Persian and to 'Omāni subjects and vessels, were issued by the Sultan on the 13th of January 1898.

At Büshehr the Persian Government had appointed the Malik-ut- Seizure of Tujjar, a former governor of the port, to be preventive officer, on the arms at curious condition that one-third of the arms confiscated by his instrumentality should be given him as a reward; and on the 7th of December Government. operations commenced with the seizure of 150 rifles and 149,000 cartridges belonging to Messrs. Fracis, Times & Co. Searches continued to be made intermittently at Bushehr until March 1898 and resulted in the seizure, altogether, of some 5,239 rifles and 1,241,253 rounds of ammunition, a small proportion of which were subsequently restored as having been landed at Bushehr by mistake, or as belonging to other than British or Persian subjects. Of the arms seized, 4,000 rifles and 933,294 cartridges, mostly belonging to Messrs. Fracis, Times & Co., were the property of firms under British protection; the remainder mostly belonged to Persian merchants. There was some excitement at Büshehr during the seizures, and, although the losses fell chiefly on foreign subjects, a certain risk of popular disturbances was incurred. The confiscated arms were sent by caravan to Tehran in April and June 1898. It was at first feared that in Persia the arms trade, after it had been considered impossible for the firms under British protection, would be

Büshehr by

permitted to continue in the hands of Persian subjects and foreigners of non-British nationality; but the Shāh issued an autograph order enjoining strict enforcement of the law against all nationalities alike, and this order seems to have been obeyed with an exactitude unusual in Persia.

Seizure of the "Balūchistān" in 'Omān waters by H. M. S. "Lapwing", January At Masqat, action was taken with even more striking success. The "Balūchistān", a vessel of 2,409 tons gross tonnage belonging to Messrs. F. C. Strick & Co. (the Anglo-Arabian and Persian S. S. Co.) of London, which had left Europe towards the end of 1897, was known to have on board a heavy cargo of arms and ammunition, partly consigned to Persian ports; and preparations were accordingly made for searching her in the territorial waters of 'Omān under the Sultān's proclamation of 13th January 1898. The "Baūlchistān" was stopped outside Masqat harbour, on the morning of the 24th of January 1898, by H. M. S. "Lawping", Commander Carr. The destination of the arms and ammunition originally intended for Persian ports had been altered in the course of the voyage to "Masqat"; but this was not considered to affect their liability to seizure, and they were accordingly landed, to the number of 7,856 rifles and 700,000 rounds of ammunition, and deposited in the British Consulate.

An unforeseen difficulty occurred through the refusal of the Sultān to convene a court to try the seizure, though made under his own authority in his own territorial waters, and he at first appeared anxious to throw the entire responsibility on the British Government; but his objections were in the end overcome, and the court which he appointed arrived without difficulty at the satisfactory conclusion that the arms and ammunition seized were intended for Persian ports, that the change of destination upon the voyage conferred no immunity from seizure, and that the seizure was in accordance with the Sultān's proclamation of the 13th January 1898 and was consequently legal in every respect.

The arms and ammunition taken remained in deposit at the British Consulate until the spring of 1900, when, all legal actions arising out of the matter having been decided, they were made over to the Sultān. By this time the rifles had suffered much from neglect, and their value was estimated not to exceed Rs. 25 apiece; but the concession of a claim on which he had laid much stress, and which at first had been treated by the Government of India as doubtful, gave great satisfaction to the Sultān.

Seizure of arms belonging to Messrs. Fracis, Times and Coby the Shaikh of Bahrain, 1898.

The growth of a secondary arms depôt in Bahrain has already been mentioned; and, shortly after the seizures of arms at Būshehr and Masqat, an important confiscation took place there under the orders of the Shaikh, in circumstances which it is now necessary to explain.

In 1895, when an attack on Bahrain by Arabs of the mainland was Monopoly of threatened, there were not a hundred rifles in the principality, and the arms the weakness of his position was forcibly brought home to the ruler of trade established in the islands. On the 21st of January 1806 the Sheibh issued in the islands. On the 21st of January 1896 the Shaikh issued an ambigu- Bahrain, ous proclamation, forbidding the importation of firearms into Bahrain 1896. under penalty of a fine (or special customs duty) equal to one-fourth the value of the arms; but, immediately afterwards, he granted a special exemption or monopoly in favour of his Wazīr 'Abdur Rahman-bin-'Abdul Wahhab. This concession was for the life of the grantee and included a special stipulation that arms should not be sold to inhabitants of Bahrain, Qatar, or the Arab coast except the coast of 'Oman; but its principal provision was one designed to secure a supply of arms to the Shaikh, by which the concessionaire undertook to pay an annual royalty of 30 Martini rifles and 6,000 cartridges in addition to customs duty in kind at the rate of three rifles in every hundred and 200 cartridges per rifle.

The Wazīr without delay transferred his concession to Agha Muham- Large mad Rahīm, a respectable Arab merchant who was also political representative of the British Government in the islands; and he in his turn, Fracis, Times on certain conditions as to division of profits, passed it on to the now & Co., 1895entirely Parsi firm of Fracis, Times & Co., a house of doubtful 98. reputation, whose profits from the Gulf arms trade were supposed to have amounted by the middle of 1897 to not less than £40,000.

This firm, as already mentioned, had established their first agency in the Gulf at Bushehr in 1887, and one of the partners took up his residence at that place in 1891; in 1895 they opened an agency under Agha Muhammad Rahim in Bahrain, and in 1896 another under Damodar Dharamsi at Masqat. In July 1896, after the creation of the Bahram monopoly, Messrs. Fracis, Times & Co. sought to obtain a letter of recommendation from the British Resident at Bushehr to the Shaikh of Bahrain; but as they failed to give an assurance that they would refrain from the traffic in arms, the British Residency withheld its good offices.

Want of official countenance, however, did not deter the firm from establishing a business; and, under the concession obtained by them, the arms trade at Bahrain increased with phenomenal rapidity, the value of the imports rising from Rs. 14,850 in 1894-95 and Rs. 95,400 in 1895-96 to Rs. 1,42,880 in 1896-97 and Rs. 4,67,790 in 1897-98. On several occasions shipments were made from Bahrain to Büshehr and even to Masqat; but the majority of the arms disposed of at Bahrain were sold to visitors from Bandar 'Abbās, Lingeh, Tāhiri, Kangūn, Bushehr and Muhammareh on the Persian side of the Gulf, to purchasers from Kuwait, Najd, and 'Oman on the Arabian side, and even, in defiance of the terms of the concession, to natives of Bahrain and Qatar.

In April 1897, the Shaikh became alarmed at the growth of the trade Confiscation and the Wazīr intimated to Agha Muhammad Rahīm that operations of their stock must be discontinued for four months. A little later a rupture occurred by the Shaikh between Agha Muhammad Rahim and Messrs. Fracis, Times & Co. over the division of profits; and in January 1898 the Shaikh, either in connection with this dispute or because the concession was being infringed by the sale of arms in Bahrain, attached the whole stock of the firm, amounting to 2,667 rifles and 637,500 cartridges. His action

was not in any way prompted by the British authorities, but it may have been instigated by Agha Muhammad Rahīm, who, besides having private claims against Messrs. Fracis, Times and Co., had recently become aware that the British Government, whom he represented, viewed the traffic with disfavour.

Colonel Meade, the British Political Resident at Büshehr, arrived in Bahrain on the 4th of February 1898, and partially examined the arms seized; but he declined to intervene in the matter, either by taking charge of the arms, as suggested by the Shaikh, or by pressing for their release, as desired by Mr. Fracis—one of the partners—who was then present on the spot. In September 1899 an attempt, noticed in the history of Bahrain, was made by a favourite of the Shaikh to tamper with the confiscated arms and gave rise, in consequence of an assault on Hindu British subjects which it involved, to some unpleasantness between the Shaikh and the British authorities; but it did not in any way affect the general issue of the disposal of the arms.

Eventually in April 1900, Agha Muhammad Rahim being then dead, the Shaikh became desirous of restoring the arms to Fracis, Times and Company, and on the 2nd of June 1906 they were handed back to the owners, in a much damaged condition, on the understanding that they should not be sold in Bahrain, or Qatar, or on the Arab Coast.

Consternation among dealers and litigation following the seizure, of 1897-98.

The seizures at Būshehr, Masqat and Bahrain made a profound sensation and excited much indignation and anxiety among the firms and traders in England, whose interests were involved. The Foreign Office in London was inundated with letters and besieged with representations from the manufacturers, exporters, ship-owners and underwriters, whose pockets had been touched in various ways. The nefarious business itself was even depicted in moving terms as an "honest trade, carried on for nearly twenty years, and now threatened with extinction by the action of the British Government."

Legal proceedings against Government officers followed. Messrs. Fracis, Times & Co. brought a suit against Commander Carr of the "Lapwing" for the value of their arms seized on the "Balūchistān", and they instituted another against Colonel Meade with reference to the confiscations at Būshehr and Bahrain, for which, they alleged, he, and not the territorial authority, was responsible. In both suits the defence was undertaken by the Treasury, and the final result in each case was favourable to the defendants and to Government. In the suit against Commander Carr it was finally ruled by the House of Lords on the 8th of July 1901 that a British jury could not go behind the decision of the Masqat court, which had held that the munitions seized were intended for Persia, that nothing had been done contrary to the law of Masqat, and that the seizure was legal. In Colonel Meade's case judgment was given for the

defendant on the 22nd of Way 1901 in the court of Mr. Justice Bigham from whom Colonel Meade received high credit for having "acted not only with great discretion and ability, but also with the strictest regard to the requirements of the law." By these proceedings Messrs. Fracis, Times & Co. were reduced to bankruptcy; and a salutary but temporary check was inflicted on the arms and ammunition traffic in the Gulf.

Part at least of the losses fell upon underwriters in London; and their efforts to obtain indemnification did not cease until 1906, when their claims were finally rejected by a Liberal, as they had been previously by a Conservative Government.

Partial repression of the trade, not with standing various obstacles, 1898-1905.

We now proceed to describe the course of the arms and ammunition traffic, subsequently to the seizures of 1897-1898, in the various districts of the Gulf. The attitude of the British Government was, during the period 1898 to 1905, one of vigilant attention, without the power to intervene directly or effectually.

By a notification under the Arms Act, dated 13th April 1900, the Tranship-Government of India prohibited the consignment of arms and ammuni- ment for the tion to the Persian Gulf through Indian ports without transhipment, prohibited at transhipment having been already made illegal in 1880; but the effect of Indian ports, the prohibition was small, inasmuch as the bulk of the traffic was already 1900. carried by vessels running direct between Europe and the Gulf, and there was no reason why the whole of it should not be so carried.

A new measure of repression was adopted by Her Majesty's Gov- Arms ernment in 1900, viz., the Arms Exportation Act, passed in that Exportation year, which empowered the Sovereign to prohibit by proclamation Act, 1900. the export of arms and ammunition from the United Kingdom to countries or places where they might be employed against British troops or subjects. It has since, however, been ruled by the Admiralty that British war-ships have no general power to search even British vessels for arms on the high seas, and that they may only take action in British territorial waters in virtue of special regulations, or in the territorial waters of Persia and 'Oman in virtue of the agreements formed with those countries in 1897 and 1898; thus the rôle of the British Navy in connection with the traffic is now somewhat closely restricted.

The trade at Masqat, 1898-1905.

At Masqat the importation of arms and ammunition continued to Establish. be legal; and the trade in arms and ammunition at this port, as ment of

French and Russian arms dealers at Masqat.

will be seen from Annexure No. 1 at the end of the present Appendix, soon recovered from the depression into which it had been thrown by the seizures of 1897-1898. In March 1899 M. Goguyer, a French merchant of whom mention will be found in the recent history of the 'Omān Sultanate, established himself at Masqat with a European assistant, and began to deal in arms. To the leading Indian traders, whom he interviewed, he explained that his operations would be exempt from British interference, as he would export arms purchased from him in native vessels flying the French flag. In May 1899 M. Goguyer proceeded on a voyage to Bahrain, which, although the trade had been interdicted there, was doubtless connected with the extension of his business. In 1901, the trade of M. Goguyer, at the outset retarded by his want of capital, began to increase rapidly; and in 1903 the Odessa firm of Messrs. Keverkoff & Co., and in 1905 the Jibuti house of Messrs. Baijeot & Co., were added to the list of arms-dealers at Masqat.

When the trade began at Masqat the arms and ammunition imported, though a proportion were of Belgian manufacture, were exclusively of British provenance; but in 1899-1900 about one-seventh of the imports were from France, and by 1905 the proportion of French arms had risen to four-tenths.

Growth of the trade.

During the five months ending on the 31st of October 1899 no less than 3,792 rifles were sold at Masqat by British subjects alone. An inquiry held in the same year showed that, of the arms and ammunition brought into Masqat, only about 5 per cent. now remained in the Sultanate of 'Omān, while 40 per cent. were forwarded to Trucial 'Omān and Kuwait, and 55 per cent. to the ports of Persia, especially Ma'shūr, Hindiyān, Lingeh and Bandar 'Abbās, in the proportion of 20 per cent. to Bandar 'Abbās and 35 per cent. to the other ports named. During the first six months of 1902 the total number of rifles that paid import duty at Masqat was 8,732 and of cartridges 726,110; and there is reason to believe that in the year 1904-1905 the number of rifles imported was not less than 20,000.

Loss of British Government ammunition. It may be mentioned in passing that in 1898 a leakage of ammunition from Her Majesty's ships was detected at Masqat, where 3,800 rounds of Martini-Henry and 100 rounds of Lee-Metford ammunition were recovered, chiefly from the bazaar. The offence was traced to a native interpreter, who was dismissed the service.

Impossibility of international action.

A proposal was pressed by the Government of India in 1902-1903 that France, the United States, and Holland should be approached with a view to the modification of the commercial treaties by which the Sultān of 'Omān was restrained from prohibiting the traffic, and they undertook to pay reasonable compensation to that ruler for any diminution which might ensue in his customs revenue; but, in view of the unpropitious relations of France and Britain in regard to the 'Omān sultanate, where the French flag question was still a cause of friction, no such action was considered possible by His Majesty's Government. Measures at Masqat were accordingly restricted to impeding by all possible means the export of arms to countries where their introduction was uniawful,—a category in which were included, by the end of 1902, not only India, Persia and the Turkish dominions in the Gulf, but also the states of Trucial 'Omān, the principalities of Bahrain and Kuwait, and

British and Italian Somaliland; in other words, the contest resolved itself into a crusade against smuggling from Masqat to all neighbouring countries.

It was at first thought that, if some degree of supervision were main. Counteractive tained at Masqat, the effect might be to retard the growth of the trade; measures at and on the 24th of September 1898 a notification was issued by the British Consul under the Masqat Order in Council, requiring British subjects to give information regarding arms or ammunition obtained or disposed of by them. In January 1900 the Sultan was induced to adopt a similar policy, and to supply the British Consulate with a weekly return of the transactions of the principal 'Omani arms-merchants; but the trade of foreigners necessarily remained unregistered, and the registration of British and Arab merchants' transactions was soon found to afford no practical advantage, while it rather hampered them in competition with their rivals.

Exportation in detail was carried on by native boats; and in 1899 it was reported that hardly a vessel left the harbour which did not carry arms for places abroad. In order to enable the preventive authorities, both in the 'Oman Sultanate and elsewhere, to discriminate between consignments lawfully exported to other places in 'Omān and illicit cargoes destined principally for Persia, the Sultan now insisted that permits should be taken out for removal from Masqat to other 'Oman ports. The result however was far from being satisfactory. The real arms port in Bātinah was Masna'ah, whence a caravan-route runs to Rustāg and Nizwa in the interior; but large numbers of permits were taken out for Sohar. and these were used merely to protect arms from seizure till they had reached the end of the Sultan's territory and could be carried over to Persia without danger of interception. Whenever Masqat harbour was left without a British man-of-war a general exodus followed of native craft carrying contraband arms. A few seizures were made of arms not covered by permits, perhaps the most important being that of a Kuwait Bum by H. M. S. "Sphinx" on the 1st of September 1898; this vessel was found to contain 56 Martini-Henry carbines and 5,596 cartridges, and the consignment was confiscated by the Sultan; but the Näkhuda escaped punishment, as he was able to prove Turkish nationality. In August 1903 some captures of smugglers by the Persian preventive vessel "Muzaffari" in Persian waters brought the trade to a temporary standstill, but the lull was of short duration.

The question of the exportation of arms from the 'Oman Sultanate to Supposed the East Coast of Africa was revived by the Italian Government in connection with the introduction of arms into Somaliland; but the existence of a regular trade was no more clearly established than on the former occasion, and it seemed evident that the arms reaching Somaliland were nearly all derived from Jibuti. In 1902, however, one Masgat vessel was captured in Aden waters in the act of conveying arms and ammunition to the Somali Mulla.

exportation of arms from Masqat to Somaliland.

The Sultan of 'Oman at length, in deference to the wishes of the Second British and Italian Governments, issued a notification on the 17th of interdict on October 1903 prohibiting the export of arms and ammunition from his exportation territories to the African coast and islands (including Soqotrah) under to Africa, British protection and situated to the north of Cape Guardafui, as also 1903.

to the Italian possessions on the East Coast of Africa, conferring power on British and Italian war-vessels to search suspected 'Omāni vessels on the high seas and in the territorial waters of 'Omān, and denouncing the penalty of confiscation against offenders. A corresponding notification was issued by the British Consul at Masqat to British subjects.

The trade in Trucial 'Oman, 1898-1907.

Progress of the trade. As shown by Annexure No. 1 at the end of this Appendix, the growth of the arms trade in Trucial 'Omān corresponded at first with its progress at Masqat, inasmuch as it attained its maximum in the years 1896-1898; but thereafter it showed symptoms of decline, due probably to the glutting of the local market and to the absence of communications with profitable markets in the interior. The chief dépôt on the Trucial coast was, in the beginning, at 'Ajmān; but, later, the trade became general and was carried on mostly at Dibai. In September 1902, 100 Martini-Henry rifles were imported at Shārjah, 120 at Dibai and 80 at Abu Dhabi; and in the next month 100 were landed at Rās-al-Khaimah and 200 at Dibai.

Agreement for suppression of the trade, 1902. In 1902 the traffic, of which the Trucial Shaikhs had become somewhat apprehensive for personal reasons, was brought to an end by a joint Agreement concluded between the Shaikhs and the British Resident, Colonel C. A. Kemball, on the 24th, 25th and 26th of November 1902 and by a Notification which the Shaikhs at the same time issued, forbidding the importation of arms and ammunition into their respective territories, as also exportation from the same. The intelligent chief of Dibailed the way in the matter. The text of the Trucial Shaikhs' Agreement and Notification forms Annexure No. 2 to the present Appendix.

The trade in Qatar and Bahrain, 1898-1905.

Question of Qatar. The peculiar political situation of Qatar, one of the principal entrances by which arms and ammunition reach Southern Najd, was an insuperable obstacle to the institution of preventive measures in that promontory; but in Bahrain, adjoining it, a satisfactory arrangement followed close on the seizure of Messrs. Fracis, Times & Co.'s arms.

Prohibition in Bahrain, 1898. During his visit to Bahrain, in February 1898, Colonel Meade had been able to persuade the Shaikh of the necessity for action; and, on the 30th of April following, the Shaikh signed an Agreement with Britain and issued a Proclamation and Notification whereby importation and exportation of arms were rendered unlawful in Bahrain and made punishable by

confiscation, and British and Persian vessels of war were empowered to search Bahrain vessels in British. Persian or Bahrain territorial waters, and to confiscate arms and ammunition on board if intended for India, Persia or Bahrain. Annexure No. 3 to this Appendix contains the text of the Agreement, Proclamation and Notification.

After this prohibition came into force small seizures of contraband arms were made from time to time by the Shaikh's officials.

The trade at Kuwait, 1898-1905.

The arms trade did not begin at Kuwait until after the accession of Beginning Shaikh Mubarak in 1896; it appears to have been prohibited by his of the trade. immediate predecessor from fear of the Turks. At Kuwait its development was probably slower than elsewhere, for it did not attract notice until 1899, when it was reported that fairly large quantities of arms were passing from Masqat to Kuwait. A duty of \$2 was at this time levied on each rifle by the customs contractor of Kuwait port, and a further royalty of \$4 apiece was taken by the Shaikh himself.

Shortly after this, though arms continued to be imported in small Nominal quantities only and not on a large scale, there were indications that Kuwait prohibition of was likely to succeed Bahrain as the principal arms mart of the upper the same, Persian Gulf. Measures were at once taken to prevent, if possible, such a result; and, on the 24th of May 1900, Colonel Kemball, the British Political Resident, was successful in persuading the Shaikh to execute an Agreement and to issue a Proclamation and Notification by which the trade was prohibited in Kuwait territory and powers of search and confiscation were conferred on British and Persian vessels of war, analogous to those secured from the Shaikh of Bahrain by the Agreement of 1898: the documents in question are reproduced in Annexure No. 4 to the present Appendix. Shaikh Mubarak entered into these arrangements with unexpected readiness; but the circumstance that Kuwait boats then flew the Turkish flag made it inexpedient for British war-vessels to exercise their right of search; British interference with the importation of arms at Kuwait was avoided also for the additional reasons that Ibn Sa'ud of Southern Najd drew his supply from this place, and that to cut it off would have been to influence materially the course of Central Arabian affairs. It is probable that, with the exception of those received through Qatar, nearly the whole of the arms and ammunition imported into Najd for use in the wars of 1900-1904 were brought into the country through Kuwait, the remainder of the Kuwait imports being divided at this period in almost equal proportions between the Turkish and the Persian dominions, into both of which they were smuggled.

In February 1904 the ubiquitous M. Goguyer paid a visit to Kuwait, Continued where he remained for some time, practically as the guest of the Shaikh; growth of and shortly afterwards the rate of importation became very rapid, M. the trade. Goguyer's consignments being introduced, it was said, as the Shaikh's private property. In the first week of August 1904, 12 cases of arms

were landed at Kuwait; about the 18th of the month 29 cases arrived and were placed in the Shaikh's godowns; and at the end of August 800 rifles were imported, chiefly for sale in Persia. At the beginning of 1905 it was estimated that importation was proceeding at the rate of about 1,000 rifles a month, of which about five-twelfths were received by steamer and seven-twelfths by native vessels, and that the Shaikh was deriving an annual income of \$50,000 from the trade which he had undertaken to suppress. Shaikh Mubārak, who at the time of the Agreement of 1900 had minimised the actual importance of the trade in terms that were considered suspicious, now denied its existence altogether; while M. Goguyer, on the other hand, asserted that he held written authority from the Shaikh to import arms into Kuwait, with which port he now appeared to trausact most of his business. In fact, except as regards importation by British vessels, the position at Kuwait in 1905 was hardly more satisfactory than at Masqat.

The trade in the Turkish dominions, 1898-1907.

Of the history of the arms and ammunition trade in Turkish territory, including Hasa, very little is known; but importation is prohibited, there at least in name. At the beginning of 1901 a consignment of 250 rifles and 12,000 cartridges, said to be of English manufacture, were brought to Basrah, having been seized, it was stated, by the Turkish gunboat "Zuhaf" on board a Persian sailing vessel near the coast of Qatar; these arms were said to have been intended for Shaikh Jāsim-bin-Thāni, who protested vigorously against their seizure. In 1904 and 1905 rifles were reaching Turkish 'Irāq both viâ Kuwait and from Persian territory; and occasional small seizures were made in the Basrah Wilāyat. The Turks seem to have done nothing to facilitate the obtaining of rifles and ammunition from the Gulf by Ibn Rashīd of Jabal Shammar, their nominal representative in Central Arabia, during the war in Central Arabia.

The trade on the Persian Coast, 1898-1905.

Continuance of the trade.

In Persia, in the provinces of 'Arabistān and Fārs and in the Gulf Ports, the importation of arms and ammunition seems to have continued virtually unchecked until the institution of the Persian Imperial Customs at Būshehr in March 1900; and, even then, the firms implicated were slow to give up the hope of continuing their operations by indirect means. In 1900, an Armenian dealer at Būshehr still undertook to dispose of 5,000 rifles annually for a Belgian firm in Europe, provided they were suitable for the Persian market and could be delivered at Masqat. Soon after the inauguration of the Imperial

Customs, however, the trade was in a great measure suppressed at Bushehr and at some of the other principal ports; the control of it, however, at less accessible points and upon the unwatched coast-line was attended by difficulties which could not be surmounted.

In 1900 the traffic was brisk at the northern ports of Ma'shur, Persian Dilam and Rig. Even at Büshehr indications of continued smuggling coast north still came to light from time to time. In November 1900 the British of Lingeh. firm of A. and T. J. Malcolm & Co. was found to be in possession of 380 Martini-Henry rifles and 183,000 rounds of ammunition, which were confiscated by the Persian authorities; and, at the end of January 1904, on the information of herd-boys who had seen some Afghans digging, 80 Martini-Henry rifles were discovered buried in the sand near the quarantine station at Būshehr. Small captures at outlying places were frequent, but large quantities of arms were successfully imported; thus it is known that, at the middle of May 1903, a consignment of 400 Martini-Henry rifles from Masqat was disembarked at Hasineh near Lingeh and scattered broadcast over Shībkūh, Lār and even the Shīrāz district, and that many similar shipments had before this reached Lar through the Shībkūh ports. Some trade in arms continued at Lingeh, but it was of a restricted and local nature.

At Bandar 'Abbas the arms trade, already in full swing in 1897, was Persian but little disturbed by the seizures of 1897-1898. From 1898 onwards coast south of contraband arms and ammunition for the Bandar 'Abbās market ceased Lingeh. to be carried by steamer, unless to a limited extent as passengers' luggage, or even to enter the town of Bandar 'Abbas; but the merchants engaged in the business, among whom was one Hindu British subject, continued to have their headquarters in the town. After 1898 the arms imported from Masqat into this neighbourhood were mostly landed at uninhabited places upon the coast, especially in Khūr Mīnāb; and, until the effectual extension of the Imperial Customs regime to this region, the town of Khamir and the islands of Qishm, Hanjam, Larak and Hormuz were regular dépôts of the trade. As lately as January 1904, a cache of three camel loads of Snider ammunition was discovered in a sand hill near the Bandar 'Abbas quarantine station, and was captured by Customs guards, after exchanging some shots with a gang of Afghans. The establishment of a British Vice-Consulate at Bandar 'Abbās in February 1900 had for one of its motives the suppression, by assisting the Persian Government and holding them to their obligations, of the arms trade between that region and the countries to the west of India.

Some good service had been done by the Imperial Persian Customs Activity of in checking the importation of arms and ammunition into Fars and the the Persian Gulf Ports; but in 1904, a year in which an unaccountable spirit of Customs. meddlesomeness possessed the department, their activity in this respect was pushed beyond proper bounds. In May 1904 the Director-General of Customs at Bushehr claimed the right to confiscate all arms found on board ship in Persian waters, whatever their destination; and an attempt was made to seize some arms belonging to Arab passengers from Masqat to Kuwait upon a British vessel, but it was frustrated. In September 1904, as noted in the histories of 'Arabistan and Kuwait, some seizures were made by the Customs steamer "Muzaffari", at the mouth of the Shatt-

al-'Arab which were of doubtful legality,* provoked much resentment at Kuwait, and led to a British protest. In November 1904 the captain of a British vessel, inexperienced in the work of the Persian Gulf, was prevailed on by the Customs authorities at Bandar 'Abbas to hand over some arms brought by native passengers for Kuwait in their personal baggage; his complacency was rewarded by the imposition of a fine of 25,000 Qrans on his ship, but it was not paid. Finally, in January 1905, the Bushehr Customs would have confiscated, on board a British ship, the military arms of a party of three Turkish officers and twelve Turkish soldiers belonging to the Hasa garrison, who were returning to headquarters at Basrah; but the British Resident was able to transfer the Turks with their arms to a mail steamer for Basrah, under the protection of a British military guard. The British Minister at Tehran was privately willing to concede that arms carried as cargo but not entered in a ship's manifest, as well as arms declared to be personal baggage but excessive in number, might be seized in Persian ports on suspicion of being intended for Persia; but he firmly resisted the claim to seize arms consigned to non-Persian ports, and he considered that even to place such arms under seal while in Persian waters was a vexations and unnecessary precaution.

The trade in Makran, 1898-1905.

Institution and growth of the trade.

The arms and ammunition trade in Persian and British Makran was, notwithstanding the proximity of the Makran coast to the Masqat market, of somewhat tardy development. The Persian expedition of 1897-98 against the Kārwānis, described in the history of Persian Makran, showed that modern rifles were at that time scarce in the country; but immediately after, or even during the operations, a more or less brisk traffic seems to have sprung up. In February 1898 twenty packets of Martini-Henry ammunition were found in the house of a headman of Pasni in British Makran, and, in the same month, three Pathans in possession of a Martini-Henry carbine were arrested at Ormarah in the same district; the offenders in the second case proved to be Powindas of the Dera Ismail Khan District in the North-West Frontier Province of India, who, after making a pilgrimage to Baghdad, had purchased twenty rifles at Masqat and, in attempting to carry them upcountry, had been robbed of all but one by Nausherwanis of Kolwa. At the end of 1901 the number of rifles in Persian Makran was found to have increased to a surprising extent; some of the chiefs possessed Lee-Metfords; and, about this time, a consignment of twenty rifles and ten boxes of ammunition destined for the chiefs of Gaih and Qasrkand was seen in transit between the port of Tank and the interior.

^{*} None of the vessels seized were Persian; two of them even belonged to the independent Shaikh of Kuwait personally; the seizures were made on the high seas; and, in one or more instances, the vessels were pursued into Turkish territorial waters.

of the arms entering Makran were landed at the port of Gwadar, where not a single seizure had as yet taken place under the Sultan of 'Oman's prohibitory edict of 1891. Some Afghan refugees settled at Bahu Qalat in Persian Makrān were now engaged in a regular trade in arms; and another Afghan arms-dealer, besides whom there were believed to be many others, had established himself at Dizak in Persian Makran.

The Persian authorities in the interior were at length awakened Ineffectual to a sense of the danger from the traffic to their own administration; Anglo-Perand, on the 8th of March 1902, the Farman-Farma, Governor-General of Kirman, entered into an agreement with Major H. L. Showers, the British Political Agent at Kalat, to prevent, within his own jurisdiction, the importation of arms and their possession by unauthorised persons. Arms continued nevertheless to be introduced, with increasing rapidity, at the small ports in Persian Makran, as yet uncontrolled by the Persian Imperial Customs. In 1904 about 1,500 Martini-Henry rifles from Masqat were believed to have been landed at Galag alone; and, on the 30th of January 1905, some 800 rifles with six cases of cartridges, and, on the 10th of February, 700 rifles and five cases of cartridges, were brought ashore at the same place.

sian arrangements for suppression.

Filtration of arms and ammunition from the Persian Gulf into Afghanistan, and towards the North-West Frontier of India. 1898-1905.

Although the importation of arms and ammunition into the Gulf region was a grave matter, even from a purely local standpoint, it was chiefly in its relation to Afghan and frontier problems that the traffic concerned the British Government and the Government of India.

The idea that the Persian Gulf was already, or might shortly become, Early conjeca source of military supply to the Indian frontier tribes appears to tures, 1897. have been originated by Mr. Lee-Warner in the India Office in London. An investigation of this theory, commenced by Colonel Meade in the Persian Gulf in October 1897, was discontinued to avoid alarming the owners of the contraband shipments of which the seizure was then contemplated, but not before it had been demonstrated that large consignments of arms and ammunition were being despatched from Masqat through Bandar 'Abbas to unknown destinations inland. the end of October 1897 Captain P. M. Sykes, British Consul for Kirman, left England with special instructions from the India Office to ascertain whether the suspected trade in arms between the Gulf and the North-West Frontier of India really existed, and, should such be the case, how it was carried on. From Captain Sykes' inquiries it appeared probable that there was a considerable trade in arms from the Bandar Abbas district to Afghanistan, and possibly to the Indian frontier; but conclusive evidence concerning the suspected trade was still wanting, and an examination in India of the arms surrendered by the frontier tribes in 1897 and 1898 yielded negative results. Among the

cartridges captured in the Afridi country however, were some manufactured by Messrs. Kynoch and the Societé Cartoucherie Belge, which may have been imported from the Persian Gulf.

Persian Gulf arms in Kurram, 1898.

At length, at the end of November 1898, a Martini-Henry rifle marked "Fracis, Times and Company, 27 Leadenhall Street, London", was purchased from a Ghilzai trader in Kurram by Captain G. O. Roos-Keppel, Political Officer of the valley, who reported that the Ghilzais had that season brought rifles for sale in unusually large numbers, and that almost any number of trade rifles corresponding to this and to another specimen obtained by him were available in the neighbourhood. Four other trade rifles of different patterns were subsequently bought by Captain Roos-Keppel in Kurram, which it did not appear could have reached the frontier from the Indian side.

Persian Gulf arms in Southern Wazīristān, 1901.

In 1901, in the course of the Mahsud blockade, overwhelming evidence was received of the arrival in Waziristan of Persian Gulf arms and ammunition in large quantities. A cartridge case dropped by a Mahsud raiding gang between Girni and Sarwekai in the summer of 1901 bore the letters F. T. C. and a double-headed eagle, the device of Messrs. Fracis, Times and Company *; large quantities of similar cartridges were found shortly after in the belts of the Darwesh Khel Wazīrs of Wana; and the Political Officer of Southern Waziristan reported his ability to purchase Messrs. Fracis, Times and Company's cartridges locally at the rate of 5,000 a week. On the dead body of $J\bar{a}n$ Khān, son of the chief Mahsu Malik, killed in action towards the end of 1901, was found a revolver with the stamp "Made for Fracis. Times and Company, London." During the winter of 1901-1902, the Powindas migrating into India by the Gumal route deposited, among others, 31 rifles which appeared to be of Persian Gulf origin in the armoury at Tank, Dera Ismail Khan. In short, it was clearly proved that arms and ammunition from the Gulf had begun to reach the Indian frontier; and the observations in Southern Waziristan in 1901 showed that the importations were becoming extensive. The Indo-Afghan border trade was for a time restricted by the strong demand for rifles, and by the high prices obtained for them in districts nearer to the Gulf; but, once the intervening markets had been glutted, the frontier market. in which rifles bought at Masqat for Rs. 40 or Rs. 50 sold for more than Rs. 300 each, began to secure an increasing share of the Gulf imports. This change seems to have come about gradually, and cannot be assigned to any particular year.

No established port for these arms before 1898.

It is uncertain by what routes the rifles and cartridges from the Persian Gulf first found their way northwards and eastwards to the frontier of India; and it seems clear that the trade was not, originally, in any sense a direct one. The disorders that prevailed in Makrān during 1897 and in subsequent years may have blocked, for a time, the most direct avenue from Masqat towards the Indian borderland; and the mishap in 1898 to a Pathan arms caravan travelling northwards from Ormārah, of which mention

^{*}By a peculiar coincidence this cartridge case was obtained and forwarded to Government by the present writer, who was then Political Officer in Southern Waziristan.

has been made above, had probably a salutary effect in deterring adventurers from experiments in that quarter. In 1898 it was stated by headmen of the Wazîrs that most of the Gulf rifles in the possession of their tribe—for even at that date there were some, though they had not as yet been identified by the local officers—were such as, drifting northwards from hand to hand, had reached the Helmand valley in Afghanistan, and had been brought thence by Pewinda traders to Waziristan: they added that attempts had been made to bring arms by direct carayan, meaning probably from the Makran coast, but had failed.

Up to the beginning of 1898 the Afghan traders in arms seem to Growth of an have resorted freely to Masqat and to have made their purchases in the person; but, during the next few years, their orders were placed for the at Bandar most part with agents at Bandar Abbās. Some of these Afghans habi- 'Abbās 1898. tually travelled to Bandar 'Abbas by steamer from Karachi, at the time of the annual spring migration of the Powindas from British to Afghan territory, while others were accustomed to proceed thither in the autumn months with large caravans of camels from the neighbourhood of Ghazni—a custom of ancient standing, dependent on considerations of general trade, but one which at this time lent itself to the development of the arms traffic. The leading spirit among the Afghans who went to Bandar 'Abbās by land bringing their transport with them was, at first, one Nur-ud-Din Khan, Lohani; but, by 1903, the chief place had been taken by a certain Ghulam Khan, Nasir. The success of the Afghans stimulated the Balachis of the Khanu neighbourhood in Rūdbār to compete, and in 1903 the latter had secured a considerable share of the traffic. The arms ordered from Masqat by the Afghan and Baluchi dealers were mostly smuggled in sailing craft to lonely places on the coast near Bandar 'Abbās and Mīnāb, where they were picked up by the purchasers, and on the journey inland they were carried concealed in camel-litters and in the framework of camel-saddles.

The bulk of the Afghan trade seems at this period to have passed Direction across the Narmashir district to the east of Bam; and, up to 1901, a very taken by the northerly route into Afghānistān by Sīstān and Mashhad appears to have been in favour. In the summer of that year, 26 rifles and a large quan- Abbas. tity of ammunition were captured through the efforts of Colonel G. F. Chenevix-Trench, then British Consul-General at Mashhad, from a single Afghan caravan, Ghulam Khan, the dealer, being arrested and sentenced to imprisonment in this case by the Consul-General; this incident, which made a great stir among the Afghan community at Mashhad, was probably one cause among others of the trade subsequently adopting a more southerly course.

At the end of 1901, as indicated in an earlier paragraph, there were Approaching symptoms of the opening out of new channels through Makran, and transference about this time two natives of Swat were seen at Sarbaz in Persian of the trade Baluchistan, whither they had come in quest of rifles. But it did not to the Makeappear that the westerly route through Narmashir had as yet been superseded.

General course of the trade in the Persian Gulf proper, 1905-1907.

From 1905 to 1907 the traffic in arms and ammunition continued and even increased, but it no longer followed the same lines as in the beginning. To its progress in the Sultanate of 'Omān and in Persian Makrān, the two countries now chiefly in question, we shall return later on, recording first only such facts connected with the trade as belong to the region of the Persian Gulf Proper.

Trucial Oman. In Trucial 'Omān the traffic apparently continued at a standstill, notwithstanding a visit paid by M. Goguyer, the French arms-dealer at Masqat, to Dibai and Umm-al-Qaiwain in December 1905 and January 1906. This state of affairs may have been due partly to the observance of their engagements by the Trucial Chiefs; but the absence both of further local demand and of facilities for exportation to the interior were probably factors of greater value.

Qatar.

In Qatar, towards the end of 1906, a flourishing trade was known to exist at Dōhah, where it was estimated that about 2,000 rifles per month were received from Masqat, entirely by native sailing boat. Several Shaikhs of the influential Al Thāni family were interested in the traffic, and six Arab merchants of substance were engaged in it; the price of a rifle was here higher by Rs. 15 than at Masqat, and a duty of Rs. 3-8-0 was paid to the Shaikh of Dōhah by the professional dealers on account of every weapon imported. Most of the arms and ammunition sold in Qatar were still destined for the Central Arabian market; but about a quarter of the whole was now exported to Bahrain for sale to Persians.

Bahrain.

In a memorial which the Shaikh of Bahrain submitted in October 1905 to the Government of India and to the British Government, he complained that he had been compelled to interdict, to his own loss, the sale of arms in his territories; but in reply he was reminded that he had himself shown signs of alarm at the growth of the trade in 1895 and 1898, and that his prohibition of it in the latter year had been voluntary.

In November 1906 it transpired, partly in consequence of information given by M. Heynssens, Director-General of Customs at Büshehr, to Major Cox, the British Political Resident, that Bahrain was being utilised as a dépôt for the export of arms to Persia, part of the material being brought secretly by steamer from Masqat and a larger quantity shipped over from Qatar in native sailing vessels; in this manner the Persian purchasers and the Qatari vendors, who did not willingly visit each others' ports, were brought into correspondence. A secret association including among its members some influential persons in the entourage of the Shaikh of Bahrain, existed for the exploitation of this business; it was ascertained that the Shaikh's son Hamad was in their pay; and the Shaikh himself, who may even have been an interested party, was at the best an apathetic spectator. By the activity of the British Political Agent in searching steamers the direct import from

Masqat was virtually stopped; but the indifference or covert opposition of the Shaikh prevented the application of any effectual check to the trade between Qatar and the coast villages of Bahrain.

Early in 1907 an allegation that British steamers were being utilised by persons engaged in the arms trade with Bahrain and Kuwait was brought by the Secretary of State for India to the notice of the head office of the British India Steam Navigation Company, and an immediate inquiry into the matter was undertaken by the latter.

A very brisk despatch of arms and ammunition from Masqat to Kuwait. Kuwait, partly by steamer and partly by native boat, was carried on during the period under consideration, notwithstanding the agreement signed by the Shaikh in 1900. In December 1905 the Russian steamer "Trouvor" landed 25 cases of arms at the port; in the same month a consignment, estimated at 3,000 rifles with ammunition, was discharged there by 2 Bums from Masqat; and in February 1906 the arrival by sea at Kuwait of 4,500 rifles and 1,500 cases of ammunition was reported.

In these circumstances His Majesty's Government, after consulting the British Ambassador at Constantinople, who regarded the free import of arms at Kuwait as open to misconstruction by the Turks, authorised a remonstrance with the Shaikh on the subject of the trade. The question was accordingly broached to him by Captain S. G. Knox, the Political Agent, in April 1906; but the Shaikh took the rebuke in bad part, denied the existence of any considerable trade, and showed such unmistakeable signs of displeasure that it was considered inexpedient, in view of the political importance of his friendship, to press further for a strict observance of the prohibition of 1900.

There was a slight lull in the trade at Kuwait during the progress of this incident; but, by the month of September 1906, it was once more in full vigour.

On the Persian side of the Persian Gulf something had already been Persian effected by the Imperial Persian Customs towards the suppression of Coast. the trade at the principal ports; but, in most cases, this merely signified a diversion into new and more obscure channels. On more than one occasion attempts made by Customs officers to take action, at a distance from their own headquarters, against smugglers of arms ended in ignominious failure.

By August 1905 it was reported the arms trade had been extinguished on the coast between Mīnāb and Lingeh; but the statement was at least premature, for, in March 1907, a heavy consignment of contraband goods was landed in Clarence Strait by a sailing vessel from Masqat which eluded a Customs launch sent to capture her, and on shore the smugglers, who had with them about 80 camels and were fully armed, handled the Customs guards of the Gachin post severely on their attempting to interfere, afterwards disappearing in the direction of Lar.

Even in the neighbourhood of Bushehr itself the state of affairs was hardly better. In October 1906 a boat from Masqat, chartered by the Shaikh of Chah Kūtāh and others and supposed to contain 1,200 Martini-Henry rifles and 10,000 cartridges, reached Bulkhair and successfully discharged her cargo near that place, notwithstanding that the Customs steamer "Muzaffari" was in the neighbourhood and that a Customs official with 8 armed guards had been posted in Bulkhair itself. In September 1907 the trade was particularly brisk at Büshehr, the principal smuggler being, apparently, the Persian Commandant of Artillery.

While the trade was thus but imperfectly checked at the two extremities of the Persian coast, arms were believed to be pouring in without let or hindrance through the intermediate Shībkūh ports, where the Customs had either no representatives at all, or only such as were dependent for their safety upon the local Shaikhs to whom they were accredited.

The trade in the Gulf of 'Oman and British endeavours to suppress the same, 1905-1907.

The subject of the arms trade in the Gulf of 'Omān, as distinguished from the Gulf of Persia, cannot be separated, after 1905, from the history of the measures by which the British Government sought to check it, and we shall accordingly treat of the two together.

Importation into Persian Makran, 1905.

In October 1905 it was found that the importation of arms into Makrān was taking place chiefly through the coast villages of Tank and Gālag; and it was observed that the number of arms in the interior had very greatly increased, especially in the neighbourhood of Dizak. Sardār Sir Naurōz Khān, Nausherwāni, of Khārān, was said to be an extensive purchaser of the newer kinds of rifles, among which were now some of German patterns.

Attempts to cope with the trade by naval means, 1905-1906.

The problem of preventing the despatch of arms from Masqat to the Persian coast, or otherwise of intercepting the consignments en route, was carefully considered by the British naval authorities in the Persian Gulf during the winter of 1905-1906. During the month of January 1906, H. M. S. "Redbreast," Commander H. B. T. Somerville, lay continually at Masqat,—an arrangement by which the trade was for the moment completely stopped, but at the cost of immobilising a ship. At the end of February and beginning of March 1906, under the orders of Vice-Admiral E. S. Poë, Naval Commander-in-Chief, the Makrān coast was carefully watched by H. M. S. "Fox," which kept in close touch with Chahbār; but no captures were effected.

Commander Somerville's report. After some experience of Masqat and the Makrān coast Commander Somerville reported, as the result of his observations, that the season of transporting arms across the Gulf extended from November to March; that a native vessel could make the passage in about 36 hours in a moderate Shamāl; that Friday, after general prayers, was a favourite time of departure from Masqat; that Gālag, on account of its proximity to the Kārwān district, was the chief port of entry on the Makrān side, but that Tank, and to a lesser extent the mouths of the Rāpch and Sadaich rivers and the western side of Chahbār Bay, were also frequented by smugglers of arms; and that it was the practice to store the imported arms at places

in the Karwan district until a sufficient number had been collected to load a caravan. Commander Somerville's principal suggestions were that a ship based on Jāshk, or preferably on Chahbar, should be employed to patrol the coast, and that the movements of Afghans trying to procure camel transport near the coast should be carefully watched by the employes of the Indo-European Telegraph Department.

A little later, Vice-Admiral Poë himself visited the Gulf and reported to the Lords Commissioners of the Admiralty on the subject of the traffic in arms. He thought that there was little hope of the trade being suppressed by the British war vessels on the station, which were too large and drew too much water for the purpose, especially as their whereabouts must always be well known and their movements were carefully watched by the Arabs. He anticipated good results, however, from the possession by the Persian Imperial Customs of some steam launches, which had recently been built for them at Bombay.

Vice-Admiral Poë's report.

The next event of importance in connection with the trade was the deputation of Captain F. McConaghey, Assistant Political Agent in McConaghey British Makran and Commandant of the Makran Levy Corps, to Persian to Persian Makran, to confer with the local officials and with a representative whom Makran the Persian Government proposed to send from Tehran. Captain April to June McConaghey marched along the coast from Pasni vid Gwadar to Chahbar, where he met with Mīrza Mahmūd Khan, the local Mudīr of Customs, who had in the meantime been substituted for the delegate from Tehran. The party left Chahbar on the 18th of April, and, after visiting Pārag, Kair, Bīr, Bandani, Tank and Gālag by the way, arrived at a camp near Balak on the Rapch river. As the Governor of Bampur, the Sa'ad-ud-Dauleh, who was then at Gaih, could not be induced to come down to the coast, Captain McConaghey and Mirza Mahmud Khan started on the 1st of May for Gaih, which they reached, vid Bint, on the 7th. With much difficulty, after 10 days' persuasion, the Governor consented to return with the delegates to the Karwan district on the Rapch river, which was clearly shown to be the principal seat of the trade. Here, on the 27th of May, the Sa'ad-ud-Dauleh held a public Darbar at which he informed the Chief of Gaih and the notables and headmen present that the importation of arms into Persia by sea was strictly prohibited between Chahbar and Sadaich, and that they would be held responsible for preventing it.

Deputation of Captain F.

A regular agreement also, dated 26th May 1906, was executed Karwan in acknowledgment of this obligation by 13 headmen of the district ment, 26th affected, was endorsed by Said Khan, Chief of Gaih, and was May 1906. attested by the Sa'ad-ud-Dauleh, by Captain McConaghey and by Mīrza Mahmūd Khān. A little later it was formally accepted at Chahbār by the Ittila'-ud-Dauleh, Karguzar of Muhammareh, whom the Persian Government had deputed as a second representative on their part to deal with the question of the arms traffic in Southern Persia. The text of this Agreement forms Annexure No. 5 to the present Appendix.

The investigations of Captain McConaghey threw much fresh light New facts upon the new conditions of the trade. He found that almost every Captain inhabitant of the Karwan district was armed with some sort of breech- McCons-

ghey's enquiry.

loading rifle; but up country the number of arms of precision seemed to be less than 30,000, the figure at which they had been estimated by the Persian Governor of Bampur. The weapon most prized was the Martini-Henry rifle or carbine of English manufacture; but the 303 carbine had begun to find favour with the well-to-do classes. The arms carried by the poor were generally obsolete military rifles of Russian. French and German models, and these were sometimes obtainable at a price so low as Rs. 12. With regard to the history and development of the trade in Persian Makran, it was ascertained that importation by sea had actually begun some eight years previously, but during the first four or five years it had been conducted on a small scale only, to meet a purely local demand. The persons engaged in it had been, and still were, Baluchis and natives of Masqat and of Qishm, who kept small shops at the harbours on the coast, or at central places in the interior such as Gaih, Qasrkand, and even Dizak and Bampur. The beginnings of an Afghan trade had first been noticed in 1903-1904; but in that year only a few Afghans visited the coast, and the caravans were small. In 1904-1905 the Afghan business became more organised, and two large arms caravans for the far interior left Galag, while one marched from Sadaich; the number of arms carried north by these was estimated at 3,000 rifles. In 1905-1906 operations had commenced in November and a brisk season was expected, but the advent of the Anglo-Persian commission somewhat marred its success. In December 1905 about 900 rifles were landed at Tank and about 400 at Darak, all of which were brought to Karkindar in the Karwan district; and, at the end of March or beginning of April, two separate consignments of 500 and 700 rifles respectively were safely brought ashore at the mouth of the Rapch river. These consignments were accompanied by unusually large quantities of ammunition. During this winter only one caravan for the north left Karwan; it was supposed to have conveyed away some 1,500 or 2,000 of the rifles accumulated in the district and a corresponding amount of ammunition. This caravan, which started early in April, was said to have consisted of about 100 Afghans with 150 camels and to have proceeded viá Raigan.

Impotance of the Persian authorities.

With reference to repressive measures, Captain McConaghey reported that the agreement of 1902 between the Governor-General of Kirman and the Political Agent, Kalat, had been disregarded by the Persian authorities, who, for want of material force, were in fact powerless to enforce it: their hold upon the country was already precarious, and they did not care to expose it to any additional strain. The local chiefs, among whom the principal were Said Khān of Gaih and Islām Khān of Bint, were pecuniarily interested in the traffic, inasmuch as they received from one to three dollars on each rifle in transit. In some cases these chiefs were in rebellion against the Persian Government, in others on bad terms with their own subjects; and anarchy consequently prevailed throughout the country. In such circumstances the excuse given by local headmen for their failure to prevent the traffic, riz., that they had not received any orders on the subject, either from the Persian officials or from their own chiefs, was one which it was difficult to dispute, and one object of the Karwan agreement was to remove it for the future. The existence at Karkindar in Karwan of a small Afghan

colony presided over by a certain Mulla Khair Muhammad, better known as the "Khalifah Sāhib", was noted as a circumstance calculated to assist the Afghan arms trade.

Various practical recommendations as to the best means of securing the observance of the Kārwān agreement were made by Captain McConaghey.

Not long after Captain McConaghey's tour in Persian Makran Receipt of reports began to be received from Afghanistan of the arrival of large Persian Gulf consignments of Masqat Martinis in that country. In September and arms and am-October weapons of this class were found to be plentiful in Qandahār, munition in and proof was obtained of the favourable attitude of the Governor of that district towards the trade. In November a balance of about 800 November of these arms had reached Kābul, and it was reported that 1,000 had 1906. been disposed of en route by the importers, who were Nasirs, in the Qandahār and Ghazni districts. The cartridges introduced into Afghānistan at the same time were estimated at 90,000. Another party of Nāsirs were said to have brought 1,500 Masgat Martinis and 70,000 cartridges into the districts of Qandahār and Ghazni alone; and it was stated that His Majesty the Amīr had remitted the customs duty on these importations. In this year considerable quantities of European-made rifles, said to have been brought from Masqat, were reported to have appeared in the Afghan districts of Ningrahar and Birmal adjoining the Indian frontier.

Afghanistan, September to

The appointment of a British Vice-Consul to Bam in the spring of Tour of 1906 was made partially with a view to ascertain whether anything could be done from that side, with the help of the Persian authorities to arrest the flow of arms northwards from the coast of Persian Makran pur, Magas to Afghanistan. In the following winter (November 1906 to January and Sarbaz, 1907) Lieutenant G. D. Ogilvie, the first Vice-Consul, made an November extensive tour, in the course of which he travelled 644 miles in 52 days, visiting Bampūr, Fahraj, Magas and Sarbāz, and was hospitably received by the Akram-us-Saltaneh, the Governor of Persian Baluchis-The result of this journey was to show that the route usually followed by smugglers lay to the east of Bampur, and that the vastness of the distances and the inhospitable nature of the country made it impossible to take action against them with any chance of success. An additional, and in itself sufficient, reason for not expecting any result from energy expended in this quarter was the weakness of the local administration, for the Persian officials were unable to obtain information of the approach of caravans and, with a force of only 400 inefficient troops at their disposal, they naturally shrunk from conflicts with the smugglers, who moved in large and heavily armed gangs. The sympathy of the local chiefs and of the populace, who were found to be well provided with every kind of modern firearm, lay with the smugglers; and they would do nothing to facilitate the arrest of the latter. In Lieutenant Ogilvie's opinion, restraint, in order to be effective, must be applied at the coast and not in the interior.

Lieutenant Ogilvie from Bam to Bam. 1906 to January 1907.

Importations into Persian Makiān, autumn of 1906.

Importations In the autumn of 1906, the following consignments of arms were into Persian reported to have reached the Persian Makran coast:—

Date of lauding,	Place of landing.	Number of rifles.	
18th October.	Gürdîm.	400	
26th do.	Pārag.	100	
1st November.	Gālag.	50	
5th do.	Sadaich.	300	
5th do.	Kunarak.	150	
10th do.	Kinj.	25	

The second of these consignments was seized, under pressure, by the Khān of Gaih; and the boat which brought the last was confiscated by the Customs Mudīr of Chahbār.

Increased but unsuccessful efforts of the Royal Navy to cheek the traffic, 1906-1907.

During the winter of 1906-1907, under instructions issued in December 1906 by Vice-Admiral Sir E. S. Poë, the efforts by sea to stop the importation of arms and ammunition into Persian Makran were resumed and redoubled. At least one gunboat was continuously engaged during the next three or four months in patrolling the coast between Chahbar and Jashk; ingenious expedients were adopted to defeat the watchfulness of the smugglers, who had, it was believed, a system of signals; and wireless telegraphy was utilized as a means of communication between ships: but the task proved impossible, and the only result was a heavy and unremunerative expenditure of coal. Successful elusions were of frequent occurrence, and it appeared that the destination of vessels carrying arms was now generally altered after leaving Masqat, -a precaution which frustrated every attempt to obtain useful intelligence through informers. On the 5th of January 1907 a vessel left Masqat for the Makran coast carrying 300 rifles, and on the 13th was followed by another with 400; but, though these departures were telegraphed to Jashk and H.M.S. "Lapwing" and "Redbreast" kept a sharp lookout along the Persian coast, both apparently succeeded in reaching their destination. Again, between the 3rd and the 5th of March, three Badans carrying arms purchased by Afghans at Masqat, left that port, and H.M.S. "Proserpine" on receipt of the news made vigorous search for them along the opposite coast and examined a number of sailing vessels, but without result; later, it became known that on the 7th of the month about 1,000 rifles had been landed at Jagin by a large vessel belonging to Dibai, to which, as subsequent inquiry showed, they had been transferred from the Badans off Masna'ah. At this time there were about 100 Afghans present in Masqat, more than half of whom appeared to be living there at the expense of M. Goguyer, the French arms merchant. On the 12th of March another vessel with arms left Masqat and on the 18th succeeded in discharging her cargo at Gābrīg, where H. M. S. "Redbreast" had examined four native boats only 48 hours before, and where H.M.S. "Proscrpine" arrived a few hours afterwards

to find the vessel empty and a watchfire still burning. On the morning of the 20th of March a further consignment was landed near Lash in the Jashk district. In each of the cases last mentioned the movement of a number of Afghans towards the coast had attracted attention towards the point where the arrival of the arms was expected by the consignees, but in both instances the necessary intelligence was received and communicated too late. In May the Nakhuda of a vessel believed to be carrying arms was reported to have thrown the cargo overboard on sighting H.M.S. "Sphinx" near Jashk; the true nature of the incident however, remained somewhat doubtful. By the end of the season the officers of the Royal Navy, among whom Commanders Hose and James had taken the largest share in the operations, were satisfied of the practical impossibility of checking the arms trade by sea; but, at their suggestion, Mr. R. New, Assistant Superintendent at Jashk of the Indo-European Telegraph Department, was officially thanked for the trouble he had taken in organising a system of intelligence along the coast by means of telephones and special watchmen.

Meanwhile preparations for striking a blow, if possible, at the Afghan Preventive arms trade had been made by Major F. C. Webb-Ware, Political Agent, British Chagai; and, on receiving news of the departure early in April 1907 of a Balüchistan, large consignment from Jagin, he caused the routes which lead from 1907. Persia across the extreme north-western salient of British Balüchistan into Afghan territory to be watched with special care.

On the 27th of April a caravan of 200 camels, accompanied by 80 Partially armed Afghans and headed by one Muhammad Jan, Kharoti, arrived successful from the south at Kacha Thana, where they halted for a few hours, intending to proceed viá the Kacha gorge to Gudar-i-Shah on the Shelag river, near Kacha, and so to Band-i-Kamal Khan on the Helmand. Major Webb-Ware, on 27th April being informed of the circumstances by telegraph, sent orders to the few 1907. levies at Saindak and Robat to delay the passage of the caravan through the Kacha gorge, by firing at the camels, while troops were despatched to their assistance. The Saindak levies reached the gorge about 10 P. M. the same evening, and an hour later the caravan made its appearance; but the number of the smugglers enabled them to force the passage,—not however without loss, as was proved by bloodstains and the abandonment of a case of 2,900 rounds of Kynoch ammunition. Meanwhile a party of 50 regular native infantry had marched from the Robat post; but although they covered a distance of 62 miles in 22 hours, in a temperature by day of 98° F. in the shade, they arrived too late; and on reaching the Afghan border, which the caravan had by this time crossed, they were obliged to retrace their steps. It was subsequently ascertained that the caravan carried about 1,500 rifles and 200,000 cartridges; that the members of it on entering Afghānistān refused to pay import duty on their goods, though demanded by the Afghan officials; and that the destination of the whole consignment was Ghazni. With the caravan were seen two Hindus who spoke Panjābi, and were not, apparently, Baniyas from Afghānistān.

Dispositions were at once made by the Political Agent, Chagai, for Large the reception of a second caravan which was following in the wake of the capture first; and, by the timely co-operation of 30 rifles of the Robat escort of arms and with the Saindak and Robat levies, it was effectually broken up in the near Kacka,

2nd May 1907. Kacha gorge on the 2nd of May, being driven by the levies from behind on to the regular infantry who lay in ambush at the exit of the gorge. This caravan consisted of about 100 camels, and it was accompanied by 40 or 50 armed Afghans, who scattered to the surrounding hills and maintained a stout fight from behind cover until the afternoon. In all 795 rifles and nearly 67,000 rounds of ammunition were abandoned by the smugglers, and over 70 of their camels were either killed or captured. A Baluchi guide who conducted the caravan was killed in the engagement, and a number of other casualties were believed to have been inflicted, The pecuniary loss to the owners, including two camel-loads of cartridges which were exploded by bullets striking them, was estimated at not less than Rs. 1,00,000 by local value, representing a very much larger sum in the Ghazni market. Examination of the captured arms showed that the majority were Snider rifles of private manufacture or Martinis which had been publicly sold by various Australian Governments, while the remainder were mostly Martinis of private manufacture or rifles of European Continental patterns, the last being probably condemned military arms. Some papers taken indicated that the Afghan Governor of Herāt was cognisant of the trade in arms, and that he befriended those engaged in it. Four months later the affair became a subject of correspondence between His Majesty the Amīr of Afghānistān and the Viceroy of India, the former complaining that certain of his Nasir subjects of the Qandahar district, lawfully engaged in the arms trade, had been waylaid and plundered by the servants of the British Government. letter dated 11th September the Amir stated that two of the traders had been killed and three wounded, while five were still missing; of all of these the actual names were given.

Request of the Persian Government for British military assistance, May 1907. This success of the British authorities encouraged the Persian Government to apply, at the end of May, through the British Minister at Tehran for the assistance of British troops, if required, on the Persian side of the frontier in order to capture a third Afghān arms caravan, which was believed to be moving northwards in the neighbourhood of the boundary. Chiefly on account of the disturbed state of general politics and of popular feeling in Persia, the request was declined; it had, indeed, almost immediately been withdrawn by the Persian Government themselves, in so far as it related to British co-operation in Persian territory; and subsequent enquiries made it somewhat doubtful whether the supposed caravan ever really existed.

Investigations by Major Kennion in Sistan, September 1907. Meanwhile the routes used by Afghān gun-runners in the neighbourhood of the Perso-Afghān frontier had been studied by Major R.L. Kennion, His Britannic Majesty's Consul for Sīstan and Qain. In September 1907 Major Kennion reported that north of Bazmān there were two groups of routes, viz., those leading to Herāt and those leading to Qandahār; and that travellers to Herāt generally entered Afghānistān near Lāsh-Juwain, while those whose destination was Qandahār made for Band-i-Kamāl Khān on the bank of the Helmand, or for some place in that vicinity. From Major Kennion's report it was clear that arms caravans proceeding to Afghānistān from the south were not obliged, in any circumstances, to enter British territory at all; also that in Persia there was no prospect of effective action being taken by the authorities against smugglers of arms. According to Major Kennion's information

five arms caravans for Afghānistān had started during 1907 from the Makran coast, of which only the two attacked at Kacha had passed through British territory: the first one and the last two of the series had travelled on Persian soil the whole way from the sea to the Afghan border.

By the failure of the means tried for the repression of smuggling- Undiminishexcept the measures taken in British territory, through which there was ed prosno necessity that importers should pass—the reader will have been perity of the no necessity that importers should pass—the reader will have been arms trade prepared to learn that the Afghan trade up to the end of 1907 continued with Afghain a flourishing condition. The arrival of the following consignments nistan, 1907. from Masqat on the coast of Persian Makran were reported during the months which followed the seizure at Kacha:-

Date of landing.	Place of landing.	Number of rifles		
1st May	Near Hūmdān.	76		
2nd do.	Rāpch.	100		
12th do.	Darak.	30		
23rd do.	20 miles west of Galag.	150		
25th do.	Kunarak.	100		
Do. do.	Tank.	200		
26th do.	Darak.	100		
29th do.	Do.	100		
30th do.	Tank.	10		
Do. do.	Gālag.	200		
23rd June	Kunarak.	30		
9th July	Sadaich.	50		
21st do.	Gürdim.	50		
28th do.	Kunarak.	5 0		
18th August	Gūrdīm.	100		
22nd do.	Kunarak.	1,000		

The importers of these rifles were in most cases subjects of the Balüchi Khāns of Persian Makrān, and the real consignees were stated. in some instances, to be the Khans themselves. In the month of October 1907 it was reported by the Political Agent at Masqat that rifles were being carried over by Balüchis to the Makran coast at the rate of 200 a week, a statement which, by the information reaching the telegraph officers on the Persian side, was fully confirmed.

Meanwhile it had been shown that Sir Nauroz Khān, Nausherwāni, Khārān Alms of Khārān in British Balūchistān, while preventing the passage of arms Agreement, caravans through his territory, was accustomed to purchase a number of 8th July Masqat rifles from Jalk and Dizak and to take others by way of fine 1907. from caravans crossing his border. As there was reason to fear that he

might in the future be tempted to import rifles on his own account from Masgat, he was induced on the 8th of July to execute an agreement that he would not do so without reference to the British authorities in Balüchistan. This was, however, a matter of internal administration and did not at all affect the arms trade in its wider aspects.

Present policy of the British Government and position of the trade, 1907.

Recommendations of the Government of India and orders of His Majesty's Government. 1907.

In February 1907, the inadequacy of local preventives and palliatives having become very apparent, the Government of India, in an exhaustive despatch to the Secretary of State which was supported by full evidence of the dangerous growth of the trade, reverted to their proposals of 1902-1903 and again recommended the closure by international agreement of the Masqat market as the only complete and satisfactory solution of the arms trade question. Various methods were also suggested by which, after agreement with Turkey, a check might be applied to the influx of arms and ammunition into Kuwait and the Turkish possessions on the Persian Gulf; but these were expressly declared to be of secondary importance. The reply of His Majesty's Government, received in the following April, indicated that the time was not propitious for the negotiations proposed by the Government of India, but that suitable instructions would be given to the British Plenipotentiaries at an international Arms Conference which was to be held at Brussels early in 1908.

Statement of

The present situation is therefore as follows. Since 1902 the arms the situation trade has been nominally prohibited at every port, except Masqat, in in 1907. the Gulfs of Persia and Oman; but smuggling and connivance at breaches of the law are so universally prevalent that arms and ammunition continue to be distributed from Masqat over the length and breadth of the Gulf region, and a brisk and regular trade in arms has sprung up between Masqat and Afghanistan. The importations at Masqat, though the small local demand of the 'Oman Sultanate must long since have been satisfied, are still on the same scale as before the general prohibition of the trade in 1902; but they now represent the whole, or nearly the whole, instead of a part only of the trade. It has been proved, at the cost of an immense expenditure of energy by British establishments, that the illegal dissemination of arms from the free port of Masqat cannot be prevented, or even appreciably hindered, by naval means; also that measures, however efficacious, taken in British Balūchistān do not and cannot influence the course of the Afghan traffic; while officers who have studied the question on the spot in Persia agree that the Government of that country are incapable, however much they may desire to do so, of putting down the trade across Persia between Masqat and Afghānistān.

> In the Middle East, where, besides intensifying anarchy and bloodshed in Central Arabia and in some of the smaller states, it has weakened the authority of the Persian and Turkish Governments and threatens

in the end to produce widespread and incurable disorder, the arms trade is at least as great a public evil as the slave trade; and, for this reason, it is much to be regretted that joint action by the civilised powers of Europe for its suppression, beyond the zone within which it is already prohibited by the Brussels Act, should have been so long delayed. In the interests of British India, also, it is very desirable that an end should be put to the supply of arms and ammunition via the Persian Gulf to the tribes of the Afghān frontier.

ANNEXURE No. 1.—STATISTICS OF THE ARMS TRADE IN THE GULF, 1883-1906.

Below is a statement of the value in rupees of the rifles and ammunition openly imported into the Gulf region during recent years. The figures for the earlier years in this table include a proportion of arms other than rifles; and it must be remembered that a quantity of the arms imported at Masqat figure a second time among the imports of other places, in the same or a following year Masqat dollars have been converted, for the purpose of this calculation, at the rate of \$3 to 4 Indian rupees, except in a few cases where the exact value in rupees was known.

Year.	Masqat.	Trucial 'Omān.	Bahrain.	Bushehr.	Lingeh,	Bandar 'Abbās,
1883-84	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.	Rs.
1884-85	tained.	18,220	13,550	30,700 55,800	400	Nil. Do.
1885-86	Do.	11,900	15,3 80	21, 90 0	2, 60 0	Do.
1 8 86-87	Do.	11,500	14,150	1,68,260	Nil.	Do.
188 7-8 8	Do.	16,100	13,500	34,940	Do.	Do.
1888-89	Do.	13,9 00	24,9 20	2 0, 0 50	16,75 0	Do.
1889-90	Do.	43,150	24,800	69,470	2 0 ,0 00	Do.
1890-91	Do.	56,000	26,300	43,320	25,000	Do.
1891-92	Do.	15,000	Nil.	39,640	Nil.	Do.
1892-93	Do.	10,000	Do.	3,120	Do.	Do.
1893-94	Do.	35,600	10,270	14,330	Do.	Do.
1894-95	Do.	25,000	14,850	6,78,200	Do.	Do.
1895-96	2,13,333	50,000	95,400	10,13,420	13,700	54,220

Year.	Masqat.	Trucial 'Omān.	Bahrain.	Büshehr.	Lingeh.	Bandar 'Abbās.
1896-97	Rs. 11,33,333	Rs. 1,20,000	Rs. 1,42,880	Rs. 19,90,325	Rs. 2,000	Rs. 54,81 0
1897-98	13,33,333	1,19,500	4,67,790	20,56,890	72,000	72,000
1898-99	3,44,666	70,000	Nil.	Nil.	6,000	Nil.
1899-0.)	5,93,533	46,920	Do.	Do.	Nil.	Do.
1900-01	13,30,306	40,000	Do.	Do.	2,520	Do.
1901-02	8,05,306	10,000	Do.	Do.	Nil.	Do.
1902-03	5,78,653	Nil.	Do.	Do.	Do.	6 " guns."
1903-04	11,49,186	Do.	Do.	Do.	Do.	3 "guns" and 1,500
1904-05	16,14,465	Do.	Do.	1,755	Do.	cartridges. 383
1905-06	10,74,380	Do.	Do.	14,745	Do.	75

ANNEXURE No. 2.—ARMS AGREEMENT BY THE SHAIKHS OF TRUCIAL 'OMAN, NOVEMBER 1902.

We, the undersigned Trucial Chiefs, agree to absolutely prohibit the importation of arms for sale into our respective territories, or the exportation therefrom, and, to enforce this, we have issued a notification to all concerned.

MAKTOOM-BIN-HASHAR (Debai).

SAGAR-BIN-KHALED (Shargah).

RASHID-BIN-AHMAD (Um-el-Kowain).

ABDUL AZIZ-BIN-HOMAID (Ajman).

ZAEED-BIN-KHALIFAH (Abu Dhabi).

Signed and sealed, in my presence, by the abovementioned Trucial Chiefs on board the R. I. M. S. "Lawrence" on the 24th, 25th and 28th November 1902.

C. A. KEMBALL, Lieut.-Col.,

Offg. Political Resident,

Persian Gulf.

Simultaneous Notification by the Shaikhs of Trucial 'Omān.

Be it known to all that, whereas it has become known to us that the traffic in arms in British India is prohibited, and as we are of opinion that the traffic, if continued, is likely to be prejudicial to the interests of our territories, we have, therefore, decided to do all that lies in our power to put a stop to this illegal traffic, and we hereby declare that, from the date of this notification, the importation of arms and ammunition into our respective territories and the exportation of the same are absolutely prohibited.

All arms and ammunition so imported or exported, in future, will be seized and confiscated.

ANNEXURE No. 3—ARMS AGREEMENT BY THE SHAIKH OF BAHRAIN, 30th APRIL 1898.

I agree to absolutely prohibit the importation of arms into Bahrain territory or exportation therefrom, and, to enforce this, I have issued a notification and proclamation to all concerned.

Simultaneous Proclamation by the Shaikh of Bahrain.

Be it known to all who see this that British and Persian vessels-of war have permission to search vessels, carrying their and our flags in Bahrain territorial waters, and to confiscate all arms and ammunition (weapons of war) in them, if those arms and ammunition are intended for Indian or Persian ports or the islands of Bahrain. Bahrain vessels, found in Indian and Persian waters by British and Persian vessels-of-war, suspected to contain arms and ammunition for Indian and Persian ports and the islands of Bahrain, are liable to be searched by the said vessels, and all such arms and ammunition found in them will be confiscated, as property of the State.

Simultaneous Notification by the Shaikh of Bahrain.

Be it known to all who see this that, whereas we have already forbidden the sale of arms and ammunition to our subjects in the islands of Bahrain, by our notification, dated 13th Safar 1313, January 1896, and whereas there is reason to think that, notwithstanding our prohibition, many arms and much ammunition are imported into Bahrain for the purpose of being exported therefrom to British Indian and Persian ports, where such importation is prohibited, and whereas we have resolved to do all that lies in our power to assist the British and Persian Governments in putting a stop to this illegal traffic, we hereby declare that, from the date of this notification, the importation of arms and ammunition into the islands of Bahrain, and the exportation of the same therefrom, is absolutely prohibited.

All arms and ammunition, in future, imported into the islands of Bahrain, or exported therefrom, will be seized and confiscated, as property of the State.

ANNEXURE NO. 4.—ARMS AGREEMENT BY THE SHAIKH OF KUWAIT, 24TH MAY 1900.

I agree to absolutely prohibit the importation of arms into Kuwait or exportation therefrom, and, to enforce this, I have issued a notification and proclamation to all concerned.

Dated this 24th day of Moharrum 1318. 24th day of May 1900.

Seal of

MUBAREK-BIN-SABAH.

Simultaneous Proclamation by the Shaikh of Kuwait.

Be it known to all who see this that British and Persian vessels-of-war have permission to search vessels carrying their and our flags in Kuwait territorial waters, and to confiscate all arms and ammunition in them, if these arms and ammunition are intended for Indian or Persian or Kuwait ports. Kuwait vessels found in Indian and Persian waters by British and Persian vessels-of-war, suspected to contain arms and ammunition for Indian, Persian and Kuwait ports, are liable to be searched by the said vessels, and all such arms and ammunition found in them will be confiscated.

Dated this 24th day of Moharrum 1318. 24th day of May 1900.

Seal of

MUBAREK-BIN-SABAH.

Simultaneous Notification by the Shaikh of Kuwait.

Be it known to all who see this that, whereas it has become known to us that the traffic in arms in British India and Persia is prohibited, we have, therefore, decided to do all that lies in our power to assist the British and Persian Governments in putting a stop to this illegal traffic, and we hereby declare that, from the date of this notification, the importation of arms and ammunition into Kuwait and the territory under my control, and the exportation of the same, are absolutely prohibited. All arms and ammunition imported into any parts of Kuwait territory or exported therefrom, in future, will be seized and confiscated.

Dated this 24th day of Moharrum 1318. 24th day of May 1900.

> Seal of MUBAREK-BIN-SABAH.

ANNEXURE NO. 5.—KĀRWĀN ARMS AGREEMENT, 26th MAY 1906.

(Names of the headmen and grey beards of the southern ports from Charbar to Sadich and the ports belonging to Sadich. Agreement regarding harbours from Gwetter to Charbar is separate.)

Headmen of :-

Galeg, Ballak, Rafch and Darak . Mir Abdoo.

Mir Shahsowar.

Mir Isa.

Mir Abyan.

Karwan . . . Mir Dost.

Mir Gul Muhammad.

Bir and Tank Bandar . . . Mir Sahib Khān.

Mir Shero.

Sorag and Sadich Bandar . Mir Allohi.

Mir Rahim Khan.

Sirgan and Parag . . . Hot Sher Muhammad.

Hot Lallah.

Khir and Gurdan Bandar . . Hot Bavan.

Dated 2nd Rabi-ul-Akhir, 324 (26th May 1906).

We, the abovenamed persons, were present this day at Karwan before Sa'ad-ud-Dowlah, Governor of Persian Baluchistan, Captain McConaghey, Assistant Political Agent, Makrān, and Mirza Mahmood Khan, Mudir of Customs, Charbar, and have received very strict orders

and instructions regarding the importation of arms along the sea coast from the harbour of Charbar to the harbour of Sadich and the ports belonging to Sadich. If hereafter any Persian subject, British Indian subject, Afghan or Masqat subject, etc., attempt to land breech-loading rifles, ammunition or firearms, we the undersigned hold ourselves responsible to stop the same. In case of default, we will be held responsible, and be liable to punishment by the Persian authorities and subject to the payment of Rs. 100 for each rifle and Rs. 50 for every 100 cartridges landed in our respective districts.

Thumb impressions of-

MIR DOST.

MIR GUL MUHAMMAD.

MIR ISA.

MIR ABDOO.

MIR ABYAN.

MIR ALLOHI.

MIR RAHIM KHAN,

MIR SHAHSOWAR.

MIR SAHIB KHAN.

MIR SHERO.

HOT SHER MUHAMMAD.

HOT LALLAH.

HOT BAYAN.

Endorsement by Sirdar Said Khan.

I, Sirdar Said Khan, agree that, as long as I hold the Nizamat of the Persian Makran from the Governor of Balūchistān, I will see that the above agreement is not disregarded. In the event of this agreement not being carried out, and my neglect being proved and established, I will hold myself responsible and answerable for same.

(Seal of) SIRDAR SAID KHAN.

This agreement has been made in my presence.

(Sealed) SADUD DOWLAH.

(Sd.) F. McCONAGHEY, Captain, Assistant Political Agent, Makran.

2593

Dated 2nd Rabi-ul-Sani 1324.

I was present in Karwan and this agreement was made.

Signature and seal of MIRZA MAHMOOD KHAN,

Mudir of Customs, Charbar.

This agreement, which has been made in the presence of Sadud Dowlah, Governor of Baluchistan; Captain McConaghey, British Representative; Mirza Mahmood Khan, Mudir of Customs, Baluchistan, and myself, is correct, and is accepted and signed.

(Sealed) ITILA-UD-DOWLAH,
Representative of the Persian Foreign
Office for Baluchistan and Seistan.

(Sd.) F. McCONAGHEY, Captain, Assistant Political Agent, Makran.

APPENDIX O.*

THE IMPERIAL PERSIAN CUSTOMS.

Control of the Bushehr customs by the Imperial Bank of Persia, 1898.

In discussing the recent reform of the Persian customs, it should not be forgotten that the customs of Bushehr town were once placed, for a brief space of time, under British management; this event proved to be the precursor, at a short interval, of a modernisation of customs methods through the whole of Persia. In April 1898, in accordance with the terms of a loan of £50,000 made by the (British) Imperial Bank of Persia to the Persian Government, the customs house at Bushehr came under the direct control of the Bank. Some local excitement was caused by a report that the goods of Persian merchants, which, in consideration of Rāhdāri and other internal duties paid by Persian but not by European traders, had hitherto been taxed at the rate of 2 per cent. or 3 per cent. only, would in future be liable to a uniform tariff of 5 per cent., and a few Mullas were even induced to stigmatise the transfer of management as contrary to the Muhammadan religion. outset a serious riot was only prevented by British bluejackets being stationed in a launch off the customs house; but the régime of the Bank quickly recommended itself to the people, and its popularity was still increasing when, by repayment of the loan in August 1898, the control of the Bank was suddenly brought to an end.

^{*}This Appendix has been compiled chiefly from the records of the Government of India in the Political Department; but the following sources of information have also been utilised: the annual Administration Reports of the Persian Gulf Political Residency; a summary of events in Persia during the year 1906, by Sir C. Spring-Rice, His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehrān; a report on the customs of the Persian Gulf, Fārs and Makrān, addressed by M. Naus to the Mushīr-ud-Dauleh on the 3rd February 1907; and a report on the customs of Persia, addressed by M. Naus to the Shāh on the 8th of February 1908. The Appendix was carefully revised by Major P. Z. Cox, Resident in the Persian Gulf, and by Mr. G. P. Churchill, Oriental Secretary of the British Legation at Tehrān, both of whom made important corrections and additions. The materials for Annexure No. 1 were supplied by Messrs. A. and T. J. Malcolm, Būshehr, and those for Annexure No. 2 by the courtesy of MM. Heynssens and Wagner, the Directors-General respectively of the customs of the South and of 'Arabistān. The situation of the customs posts from Dīlam to Jāshk is shown in a Rough Tracing of Map showing Customs Stations, Posts, etc., in Directorate General of the South, 1906, which is map No. 1394 in the Library of the Foreign Department at Simla.

The funds with which their obligations to the Bank were discharged appear to have been obtained by the Persian Government from a Russian source; and this, at least, is certain, that the Russian Government had regarded the arrangement with jealousy.

Reorganisation of the Persian customs as the Imperial Persian Customs.

Until 1899 the realisation of customs revenue in Persia continued to Former take place on old-fashioned Asiatic principles. In other words the system. duties were farmed to officials or local magnates, and there was no uniformity of system nor-except in the case of foreign traders-of tariff; while the proceeds which reached the Persian treasury were small in relation to the sums actually collected from the people, and the arbitrary powers of the farmers were highly unfavourable to trade.

The financial embarrassments of Persia, beginning about the year Reasons for 1892, were the instrument by which a reform of this wasteful and the change. pernicious system was at length brought about; for European loans could only be obtained on tangible security; and efficiently managed customs were the only such security which Persia had it in her power to create.

Early in 1898 the Shah obtained the services of M. Naus, a Belgian Employment customs expert, who was accompanied by two professional Belgian of Belgian customs officers, M. M. Priem and Theunis; and on Nauruz, the 21st experts. of March 1899, the management of the Customs of Persia was handed over to M. Naus. In this first year, which was devoted chiefly to observation, the customs of Azarbaijan alone were taken under direct management and entrusted to M. Priem; but the results were satisfactory and reform proceeded apace; M. Naus was shortly recognised as Minister of Customs at Tehran; and within the next two years every customs house in Persia was taken out of farm and placed under the direct management of a new department of Imperial Persian Customs, in which all the superior posts were held by Belgians.

The principal objects of M. Naus were, from the first, to establish a Main prinuniform and efficient system of collection by state officials; to obtain a ciples of readjustment and general enhancement of import duties; to stimulate reform. exports by a reduction of export duties and by a total abolition of transit dues - chiefly Rahdari and octroi-in the interior; and to put an end to the embargoes and arbitrary restraints on trade which were imposed, generally for corrupt purposes by local governors. In all of these objects, except the last, M. Naus was in the end successful; and, by insisting that customs duty should be taken in specie, he greatly increased the value of the collections, of which two-thirds had hitherto been paid into the treasury in Government bills that could not be cashed in the market unless at a discount of 30 to 50 per cent.

Extension of the new system to the Persian Gulf, 1900-02.

Būshehr, Lingeh and Bandar 'Abbās taken over, March 1900. On the 21st of March 1900 the Büshehr customs, which since the withdrawal of the Imperial Bank's agents had been indifferently managed by the Governor of the Gulf Ports as lessee, passed under the control of the new department, as did also the customs of Lingeh and Bandar 'Abbās. The first Director-General of Customs at Büshehr was a M. Simais, who had formerly been a commercial attaché in the Belgian Legation at Tehrān.

Native opposition to the change.

The change of management at the principal southern ports, accompanied as it was by an attempt to introduce a uniform 5 per cent. tariff applicable to native merchants, was met by strong and concerted opposition on the part of the Persian trading community, especially at Bushehr and Shīrāz, where no imported goods were cleared for a month. A lower scale of duties, which was substituted as a temporary concession to the agitators, was at first similarly resisted; but by August it had been successfully enforced; and not long afterwards the uniform 5 per cent. rate was brought into operation, octroi and Rahdari being however abolished by Imperial decree as compensation for the enhancement of tariff against Persian merchants.* Altogether about two months were lost to trade generally by this contest between the Persian Government and the Persian mercantile community; and the British Legation at Tehran, though in no way antagonistic to the policy of the Belgian Customs officials, were obliged to insist on the responsibility of the Persian Government for the detention by agitators at Shīrāz of the goods of British merchants which were on their way from Bushehr to the interior.

Increase of revenue, 1900-01.

The results obtained by the Imperial Customs during their first year in the Persian Gulf were remarkable, and the grand cordon of the Lion and the Sun, conferred on M. Naus at Naurūz 1901, was in every respect a well-merited honour. In spite of the two months' cessation of trade in 1900, the net customs revenue of the Gulf in 1900-01 was 319,742 Tūmāns as against 250,000 † Tūmāns—the amount for which they had last been farmed to the Darya Baigi, Governor of the Gulf Ports, but of which only a portion reached the Persian Government, the greater part having been expended—so it was alleged by the Darya Baigi—in payments chargeable to the Government.

^{*} The 5 per cent. import duty exigible from foreign subjects had been in some cases collected in two instalments, viz., $3\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. at the poit of entry and $1\frac{1}{2}$ per cent. at the place of destination. At times, however, the full 5 per cent. would be collected by the customs farmer at the coast and a further amount taken by the inland authorities, and in1891-92 the British Indian traders at Mashhad complained that the duties thus extorted from them aggregated 8 to 9 per cent. in all. The trouble was generally at Bandar 'Abbās; but sometimes customs were taken twice on the Kārun, once by the Shaikh of Muhammarch and again by the customs farmer of the Persian Government. Overlapping and double collection also occurred between the Khāns of Dīlam and Rīg on the one hand and the customs lessee of Būshehr on the other.

[†] Some particulars regarding former leases of the Gulf customs will be found in Annarura No. 1 to this Appendix.

Resistance to the establishment of Imperial control over the customs was attempted in the 'Arabistan province and in the Hayat Davud district, in both of which it was for the time successful; and elsewhere, except at the largest ports, the efforts of the new Department were in a great degree frustrated by obstruction of a more passive character.

The year 1901 was one of great activity on the part of the Imperial Other posts Customs in the Persian Gulf, and before it closed, posts had been established, established at Dīlam, Khūr Imām Hasan, Kung, Bandar Mu'allim, Birkeh Sifleh, Khamīr and Mīnāb, and upon the island of Qishm. The customs of Chahbar and Gwatar were, at the time of their being taken over in January 1902, farmed for two years to British Indian contractors under an agreement executed so lately as April of the previous year; but the lease was repudiated by the Customs on the ground that the official by whom it was granted had acted without authority. The farmers were accordingly advised by the British political authorities to relinquish the farm and lodge a claim for compensation with the Persian Government; this they did, and eventually obtained a portion of the indemnity sought. Posts were brought into existence during 1902 at Chārak, Mughu, Jāshk and Chahbār, and on Qais Island.

The struggle between the Shaikh of Muhammareh and the Persian Local resist-Government in regard to the customs of 'Arabistan is narrated in the ance to the history of that province; it involved large political issues and was reforms, closely watched by the British Government; and its termination, in September 1902, was favourable to the Persian Government in the matter of customs control.*

The abortive preparations made by the customs at Bushehr in 1902 for coercing Haidar Khan, Zabit of the Hayat Davud district, who refused to admit their posts at Rig and Ganaveh, are noticed in the history of the Persian Coast; and it only remains to add here that control of both these ports was eventually obtained by the customs in 1903 without resort to military compulsion.

Revision of the Persian Tariff, 1901-03.

We now enter on a new era in the fiscal history of Persia.

In 1901, the commercial relations of Russia and Persia were governed Position as by the Treaty of Turkmanchai, concluded in 1828, under which the regards custom duties on both sides of the frontier were restricted to a maximum of 5 per cent. ad valorem. Great Britain, by virtue of her Commercial tain. Treaty of 1841 and the Treaty of Peace of 1857, was entitled to the treatment of the most favoured nation, and she consequently participated in the benefits of the Treaty of Turkmanchai.

^{*} It may be mentioned that in 1883-84, before any question of reorganization had arisen, the Persian Government had sought to establish a customs house of their own at Muhammarsh; but the attempt was successfully staved off by the Shaikh of the day.

Position as regards Turkey and Egypt.

The only power besides Russia which had a customs tariff. as distinguished from a most favoured nation arrangement, with Persia was Turkey; and the situation, as between Persia and Turkey, was governed, in regard to customs duty, by the Erzeroum Treaties of 1823 and 1845. Under these Treaties the rate of duty payable by importers was fixed at 4 per cent. ad valorem; but the Persian Government claimed the right to levy an additional duty in case of the goods being subsequently sold in Persia; and they actually collected 6 per cent. upon goods imported from Turkey and 12 per cent. upon goods exported to Turkey, no stipulation in regard to export duty being contained in Treaties. The Porte retaliated with duties of equal amount; and the commercial régime thus established had existed, in 1901, since about six years.

The mutual obligations of Persia and Egypt were still regarded as defined by the Erzeroum Treaties, inasmuch as Egypt, which at a later date obtained independence in its commercial relations, was in 1848 an integral part of the Turkish Empire.

Principles and revision.

Such was the position when M. Naus, as Minister of Customs, began to press for revision of the Persian tariff. His plan, framed in accordance with his general ideas, on reform, was to substitute a specific tariff, yielding larger revenues, for the existing duty of 5 per cent. which applied to the goods of most foreign countries, and to abolish most export duties except those on opium and grain.

The Russo-Persian Trade Declaration of 1901.

Conclusion of Persian Declaration, 27th October 1901.

Negotiations were opened in the first instance with Russia alone; the Russo and, though His Majesty's Government became aware of their progress in 1900, the British Minister was not successful in obtaining admittance to the discussion. Assurances were given by the Persian Government that nothing would be finally settled by them with Russian without previous consultation of the British Government, but they were violated. The Declaration by which the new commercial arrangement between Persia and Russia was constituted was signed at Tehran on the 27th October 1901; but no copy of it could be procured by the British Legation, and it was only in February 1902 that Sir A. Hardinge was able to obtain, from a secret source, a statement of its principal conditions. The terms of the Russian Declaration need not be stated here; those of the British Convention of 1903, which we shall shortly have occasion to describe, were almost precisely similar.

Failure of an attempt by Russia to obtain permanent control of Persia's commercial relations.

The Russian delegates to Tehran, headed by M. Goluboff, made strenuous efforts, in negotiating the Convention, to obtain from Persia an engagement that she would conclude no fresh commercial arrangements with other foreign powers except after previous agreement with, and through the intermediacy of Russia; but their design was frustrated by the firmness of M. Naus, who pointed out to the Persian Government that the stipulation proposed involved all the inconveniences without the benefits of a Russian protectorate, and that it might debar Persia from entering into advantageous arrangements with other countries

The Turko-Persian Trade Convention of 1902.

Only one means of resisting the application of the new tariff to conclusion British goods remained in the Turko-Persian treaties of which of the Turko-Britain, as a most favoured nation, might claim the benefit, for the Persian validity of an argument founded on the rights of Egypt under the Treaties of Erzeroum was regarded as problematical; and this last obstacle to the universal application of the new Russo-Persian tariff was adroitly removed by the Persian Government. In April 1902, the Persian Ambassador at Constantinople proposed that the existing Turko-Persian commercial régime should be replaced by most favoured nation treatment on both sides; and the scheme was received not unfavourably by the Porte, as under it the duties to which Turkish exports-chiefly raw materials-were liable would be lighter than those actually in force, while Persian imports into Turkey would still pay duty at 8 per cent. ad valorem. The Grand Vazir of Turkey had assured the British Ambassador at Constantinople, Sir Nicolas O'Conor, that no arrangement modifying the commercial articles of the treaties of Erzeroum would be made without consulting the British Embassy; but the pledge was broken; and on the 5th of September 1902, during a visit of M. Naus to Constantinople, a most favoured nation agreement was concluded between Persia and Turkey by an exchange of diplomatic notes constituting a Convention. The Convention was made terminable on one year's notice given by either country,—a clause of which, as we shall see, Turkey afterwards took advantage, with the result that the régime of the Erzeroum Treaties was restored.

Convention, 5th September 1902.

The Anglo-Persian Trade Declaration of 1903.

The British Government were thus brought face to face with a serious situation. They were still in ignorance of the details of the new tariff; and a request for information in this respect, made in December 1902, was refused. Apprehension was felt not so much in regard to the initial amount of the duties under the new tariff as to the possibility of later enhancements being made without reference to His Majesty's Government. The ingenuity of Sir A. Hardinge, then British Minister at Tehran, provided an admirable expedient. He opened his case by suggesting that Britain, in virtue of the Treaty of Erzeroum coupled with her most-favoured-nation rights, might be in a position to contest the general application of the new tariff, an argument which was new

Negotiation and conclusion of the Anglo-Persian Declaration, 9th February 1903.

to the Persian Prime Minister and so alarmed him that he begged the British representative not to formulate it officially. Sir A. Hardinge went on to propose a special agreement, by which Britain should accept the new tariff and Persia in return should undertake not to alter it without the consent of His Majesty's Government. M. Naus was at first disinclined to subject the Persian tariff to British as well as to Russian control; but eventually, notwithstanding his opposition, it was decided to conclude a commercial treaty between Britain and Persia very closely resembling that between Russia and Persia. One secret article. attached to the Russo-Persian Declaration, was not reproduced,—an article that debarred Persia from granting a more favourable tariff to other countries without the consent of Russia, but at the same time empowered her to enhance the duties fixed by the tariff against countries refusing to grant her most favoured nation treatment. There were also several other differences of detail between the British and the Russian Declarations. The Anglo-Persian Declaration, drawn up in order to avoid delay in French and Persian instead of English and Persian, was signed at Tehran on the 9th of February 1903 and was sent to England by Lord Downe's Mission, which quitted the Persian capital upon the following day.

Principal articles of the Declaration.

The Declaration was a perpetual agreement; and it is therefore not open to modification at any future time without the assent of His Majesty's Government. It provided that certain fixed tariffs, detailed in special appendices, should be applied to imports into Persia; that imported goods should not pay any custom duties besides those levied under the tariff at their entrance into the country—this condition, however, not to preclude the levying of fees by the Customs for services rendered; that British traders and goods in Persia should continue to enjoy, under all conditions, most favoured nation treatment; that duties should not be levied on goods exported from Persia except in the case of a few articles specified in an appendix, namely certain articles of food, live animals, tobacco, opium, raw silk, and precious stones; that Rāhdāri and other road taxes should cease in Persia, except upon carriage roads constructed under concessions, and that upon such roads a certain fixed rate should not be exceeded; that the system of farming the customs should be discontinued throughout Persia and replaced on every frontier by an efficient organisation under the direct management of the Central Government; that bonded warehouses should be established in which imported goods might remain without payment of duty for 12 months from the day of arrival; and, finally, that a Règlement Général, defining the executive arrangements and procedure of the Persian Imperial Customs, should be established by the Administration in agreement with the British Legation at Tehran. The customs of every frontier of Persia were expressly declared to be included in the scope of the Declaration, which also contained an article providing for proportional modification of the duties in case of serious fluctuations in the value of the Persian Qran. By means of observations appended to the body of the Declaration it was agreed that customs duties might be paid in Bank of England notes, so long as repayment of such notes in gold continued to be guaranteed by the British Government; that cases of infractions of the rules should be adjudicated upon by the local Director of Customs in consultation with a British Consular

officer or his deputy; and that appeals from the decisions of Directors should be determined by the central Customs Administration at Tehran in consultation with the British Minister or his representative.

The terms of the Declaration were interpreted and amplified by an exchange of notes, which took place on the 12th February 1903, between Sir A. Hardinge and M. Naus. As a safeguard against accidental errors the tariff sanctioned by the Declaration was now expressly declared to be the same as that established under the Russo-Persian Declaration of 1901; the 14th of February 1903 was fixed as the date of the new tariff coming into force in Persia; and an undertaking was given by M. Naus that any reduction of tariff which might be granted to Russia would be simultaneously extended to Britain as a matter of course.

Supplementary agreement, 12th February 1903.

The Declaration had reference chiefly to British trade in Persia; but the interests of Persian trade in the British dominions were not overlooked. The principal stipulation under this head was that Persian merchants and merchandise should receive most favoured nation treatment in the British Empire, it being understood that a British Colony having a special customs tariff, which might cease to grant most favoured nation treatment to Persian imports, should forfeit the right to claim such treatment for its own imports into Persia.

Question of Pers ian trade in the British Empire.

In case of the United Kingdom establishing-otherwise than by Question of previous agreement with Persia-duties on goods liable to pay customs the future when imported from Persia into Russia, and in event of the duties so adoption of a established being higher than those provided for in the Russian Declaration of 1901, Persia should be entitled in her turn to impose correspond- Great ing duties on articles of the same class arriving from the United Britain. Kingdom; a special Convention would be negotiated for this purpose, and, in default of agreement, the Declaration of 1903 would become void and both parties would revert to the régime established by the Treaty of Peace of 1857. It was made clear, by means of the notes exchanged on the 12th of February 1903, that the special Convention just mentioned would become necessary only if the reciprocal augmentations of tariff should be contested.

The question whether the preferential tariff of a British Colony in Question of favour of the United Kingdom could be regarded as disentitling the Colony to most favoured nation treatment in Persia was raised, and was eventually settled in the negative. The Declaration was so framed as to apply in its entirety to Persia and the United Kingdom only; and the British Colonies, the separate circumstances of each of which would have required much time for consideration, were left provisionally under the most favoured nation régime. This arrangement was made possible by the courtesy of M. Naus, who, though at the beginning he had opposed the idea of an Anglo-Persian Declaration altogether, in the end did his best to expedite the negotiations in order that it might not be blocked by Russian interference. His attitude in the whole matter was unprejudiced and conciliatory; and it went far to clear his administration from the charge of Russian proclivities, and to prove that he was actuated by a single-minded regard for the interests of Persia.

The ratifications of the Dcclaration were exchanged at Tehran on the Ratification 27th of April 1903. Great displeasure with Persia was expressed by the of the Decla-

ration, 27th April 1903. Russian Government at the secret conclusion of an agreement conferring on Great Britain a control over future tariff revision, "which had hitherto belonged to Russia alone."

Working of the new tariff. The enforcement of the tariff, of the 14th of February 1903, was sudden; but it had been long foreseen in commercial circles, and various applications for refunds of duty made by British firms on the ground of insufficient notice were not supported by the Legation at Tehrān. The tariff was unpopular with native merchants, and there was agitation at Tabrīz, Būshehr, and Shīrāz; but disturbances, which were at one time anticipated, did not occur.

Question of enhancement of rates within the limits of the tariff.

This is not the place in which to discuss the commercial bearings of the tariff; but one such matter of importance deserves to be mentioned here, especially as it was the subject of a misunderstanding on the part of the British Government. The duty on tea was fixed by the Anglo-Persian tariff at 18 Qrāns per Batman on white, and at 12 Qrāns per Batman on black teas,* but it might be reduced by the Persian Government to 6 Qrans,—a form of expression borrowed from a declaration put in by M. Argyropoulo, the Russian Minister, in signing the Russo-Persian Declaration of 1901. The duty actually charged when the tariff was brought into force was 10 Qrans on white and 6 on black teas, to which a special rate of 7 Qrans on mixed teas was subsequently added. The British Government understood that these rates, having once been introduced in virtue of the power of reduction possessed by the Persian Government, could not be subsequently enhanced without the consent of the British and Russian Governments; but this construction of the Declaration and of the tariff was not admitted by the Persian Government, who explained that a low rate had been adopted in the first instance merely in order to avoid trouble with their own subjects, and asserted a right to enhance the duties at any time, subject to the maximum fixed by the tariff. The import of tea into Persia amounted at this time to about six and a half million pounds per annum, and the additional revenue to be obtained by even a trifling increase of the duty was thus large, making the Persian Government reluctant to forego the right of enhancement which they claimed.

In the end their claim was conceded by the British Government.

The Reglement Douanier of 1904.

It still remained to draw up and establish a code for the working of the customs; this code had been mentioned in the Declarations of 1901 and 1903 under the title of Règlement Général, but it was more frequently described in later negotiations as the Règlement Douanier or Règlement Légal.

Difficulty as to penalties for offences.

The treatment of offenders against the customs regulations originally proposed by M. Naus, the Minister of Customs, was exceedingly severe,

^{*} A copy of the Russo-Persian tariff sent to the Government of India showed the duty as 10 Qrans on white and 6 Qrans on black teas, but this was a clerical error.

and was objected to both by the Russian Government and by the Government of India. M. Naus was desirous that the importation of goods in contraband or by unauthorised routes should be punishable, on European analogies, with a fine equal to 10 times the value of the goods, with confiscation of the goods themselves and the means of transport, and, in some cases, with imprisonment. The opposition of the Russian Government to these penalties was uncompromising and prolonged; and M. Naus was at one time inclined to advise the Persian Government that they should appeal to the International Tribunal at the Hague and lodge a claim for damages on account of the loss of warehouse and other fees resulting from the delay. Eventually, at the instance chiefly of the Russian Government, the penalty of imprisonment was abandoned; and confiscation of transport and goods became the maximum punishment under the Règlement for importation in contraband or by unauthorised M. Naus was most unwilling to renounce the power of confiscating the means of transport, the only deterrent which, in his opinion, could be enforced against the carriers as distinguished from the owners of goods; in the end, however, in deference to the wishes of the British Government, he agreed that—except in the case of habitual offenders and in certain other circumstances—the option of a fine not exceeding £60 might be allowed when transport had become liable to confiscation, and the option of a fine not exceeding the value of the goods when goods were subject to forfeiture.

The Règlement was signed by the British Minister at Tehran on the Acceptance 29th of August 1904, a few days after it had been accepted by the of the Russian Government; and it came into force on the 1st of September Reglement following. The concession, due to British objections, of an alternative to Britain, 29th the confiscation of transport and goods was, instead of being incorporated August 1904. in the text of the Règlement, embodied in a special declaration made by M. Naus at the time of signature. Sir A. Hardinge accompanied his signature by an important declaration, to which we shall revert * in

connection with another subject.

The Règlement was, in substance, an elaboration of the Declarations Substance of of 1901 and 1903; and it is therefore unnecessary to enter in much the detail on its provisions. The liability of merchandise to import and Reglement. export duty was defined, and the various fees were particularised which might be recovered for clerical assistance, for seals, for warehouse and bonded-warehouse accommodation, for the use of cranes, for labour, and for surveillance, when provided by the Customs Administration. The introduction of goods into Persia, except at points where custom houses qualified to receive them existed, was forbidden; the importation of firearms and ammunition, of coin other than gold or silver, of aniline dyes, and of seditions, irreligious and immoral publications or objects was prohibited; the exportation of carpets dyed with aniline was also made illegal: and power was reserved to prevent the exportation of other articles, especially food-stuffs, upon public grounds. Confiscation was prescribed as the penalty for attempting to import or export prohibited objects. The diplomatic representatives of foreign powers conceding most favoured nation treatment to Persia in commercial matters were declared to be exempt from payment of customs duty on objects imported for their personal use; and their staffs also, comprising councillors, secretaries,

interpreters or dragomans, and student interpreters, were admitted to a similar privilege, along with professional Consuls and Vice-Consuls, and the interpreters and non-Persian secretaries of Consulates; the correspondence, including parcels, of foreign Embassies, Legations and Consulates was not to be subject to examination; and ordinary mail bags. containing letters only, were also to be passed free of scrutiny provided they had been regularly closed and sealed by a foreign post office, and that they were handed over to the agents of the Persian Post Office. Provision was also made for the establishment of warehouses and bonded warehouses; and the articles relating to frauds and contraventions were drawn up in the terms agreed on between Russia and Persia, to which reference has already been made.

Administrato the Règlement.

The Règlement was followed by a table which showed the location tive appendix and grouping of all the customs posts either established or proposed to be established in Persia, together with the status and functions of each. In the Persian Gulf two main divisions were constituted, styled respectively "'Arabistān" and " ! he South." 'Arabistān was given only one "principal" post-Muhammareh; the South had three -Bushehr. Lingeh, and Bandar 'Abbas. At the principal posts every kind of customs business might be transacted; but the numerous subsidiary posts were only authorised to deal with coasting craft running between one Persian port and another, and with sailing vessels engaged in foreign trade.

Progress of the Imperial Persian Customs in the Gulf, 1902-04.

بسط سا -

The tables of posts at the end of this Appendix are evidence of the unremitting industry of the Customs Administration in the Persian Gulf during the time that the Declarations of 1901 and 1903 and the Règlement itself were under discussion, and afterwards.

Creation of a separate customs division of 'Arabistān, 1903.

The customs of 'Arabistan, after the controversy with the Shaikh had been settled as described in the history of that province, were brought under direct management with effect from September 1902; and in February 1903, after they had been for some months managed by the Director-General at Bushehr, the 'Arabistan Customs were constituted a separate division under M. Waffelaert as the first separate Director-General.

Vessels provided for the preventive service, 1903-06.

Steps were also taken to improve the general efficiency of the preventive establishment. At the beginning of 1903 the Belgian steam yacht "Selika"—which in 1901 had * achieved a certain political notoriety in the Persian Gulf-was purchased from Europe and, under the name of "Mozaffer," was employed for the prevention of smuggling; she carried a couple of small Hotchkiss guns and was officered in the beginning by four Europeans, two of whom were engineers, but later the places of the European eugineers were taken by natives of Baghdad. In the autumn of 1903 funds were provided for the purchase of 5 armed sea-going steam-launches of 10 knots for the preventive service; in the following year the contract for their construction was placed by the Persian Government with the Royal Indian Marine dockyard at Bombay; and in June 1906 two of them had been completed and were ready for delivery after the monsoon.

In 1902 the Imperial Persian Customs received charge of the Persian Post Office postal system throughout the country; and in March 1904 they were and Treaentrusted with the control of all treasuries and with the payment of suries placed official salaries, etc., therefrom, subject to proper administrative sanction. Imperial In April 1904 M. Dambrain, Director-General of the Customs of the Persian South, was received at Lingeh and Bandar 'Abbas with salutes of 7 Customs, guns,-an incontestable mark of the prestige that now attached to 1902-04. his office.

Aggressive conduct of the Imperial Persian Customs, 1904.

In 1904 the Imperial Persian Customs, partly at the instigation of the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, who was believed to be acting on the advice of the Russian representative at Tehran, and partly impelled by professional zeal, embarked on a course of meddlesome activity that nearly provoked a political crisis.

In the spring of 1904, as related in the history of Trucial 'Oman, Jurisdiction they established posts on the Arab islands of Bū Mūsa and Tunb, where asserted over they lowered the Arab flag; and their occupation was only brought to an end by British threats of forcible intervention. An attempt, noticed Tunb and in the history of the Persian Coast, was made about the same time to Sirri. enforce complete control over the island of Sirri; but the opposition of Great Britain, by whom the claim of Persia to the island was not admitted, prevented the establishment there of a regular customs post.

the islands of Bū Mūsa.

In the course of the summer of 1904, a sustained effort was made Attempt to by the Department to obtain control of the sanitary administration of oust British the Persian Coast, especially at Bushehr, by gradually encroaching on sanitary the authority of the British officers employed in the Persian sanitary * control on the Persian service; but this endeavour, which is described in another Appendix, Coast. was frustrated by British diplomacy.

In September 1904, as related in the histories of 'Arabistan and Interference Kuwait, to the alarm of the Shaikh of Muhammareh, who considered with foreign his executive authority to be invaded, and to the annoyance of the people of Kuwait, who were the principal sufferers, the "Mozaffer" was posted at the mouth of the Shatt-al-'Arab and began to search vessels for rifles and ammunition and to seize those possessing any, even for self-defence against pirates; the methods employed were so vexatious that the Government of India were constrained to protest against them.

vessels car-

Towards the end of 1904 a customs post was established on Hanjam Establish-Island, apparently as a counter-move to the reopening of the British ment of a telegraph station there. This step it was clearly within the rights of customs post the Persian Government to take; but much opposition on the part of the Arab inhabitants of the island was provoked, and the local situation continued critical until 1905.

^{*} See the Appendix on Epidemics and Sanitary Organisation, page 2517.

Interference with British mails at Būshehr. The new anti-British policy of the Customs Administration culminated in an attack, in the autumn of 1904, on the privileges of the British Indian Post Office at Büshehr. The question appears to have been raised at Tehrān by M. Lavers, a young and indiscreet Secretary-General of Customs belonging properly to the Postal Department, during the absence of the more tactful M. Naus; it was made possible by certain articles of the new Règlement Douanier; and it may have been prompted by a desire on the part of Customs, who had now been for more than two years in charge of the Persian Post Office, to get rid of a rival institution.

In 1900, shortly after the introduction of the Imperial Customs régime at Bushehr, an arrangement had been reached by the British Political Resident and the Director-General of Customs at Bushehr in regard to the British post office there. Under this arrangement the contents of the mail bags were examined by the British postmaster and the parcels addressed to persons exempt from payment of customs duty were immediately delivered, after which a list of the parcels received for non-exempted persons was sent to the Director-General of Customs, who had them fetched from the Residency and arranged for their distribution to the addressees on payment of customs duty. The responsibility for preventing dishonest practices was thus thrown chiefly on the British postmaster. In 1900 the Director-General had agreed to recognise as exempted persons not only the Resident and his Assistants, the Residency Surgeon and officers of the Royal Navy and of the Royal Indian Marine, but also the Residency clerical staff "of superior service."

M. Lavers, in challenging these privileges, took his stand on the Règlement Douanier of 1904 and claimed that by virtue of Articles 51 and 27, to which as to the rest of the Règlement the assent of Great Britain had been given, he was entitled to require that mail bags containing letters only should be handed over to the Persian Post Office, and that the parcel post should be taken straight from the ship to the customs office. He also contended that, while diplomatic and consular immunities must be respected, exemptions of any other sort, e.g., of Hospital Assistants employed on quarantine, were not permissible. Mr. Grant-Duff, British Chargé d' Affaires at Tehran, argued that the ancient privileges of the British-Indian Post Office could not be withdrawn without the assent of the British Legation and the orders of the Persian Government; and he believed that he had succeeded, at an interview held on the 24th of November 1904, in persuading M. Lavers to await the result of a reference which had been made to the Government of India.

But such was not the case. On the 1st of December 1904, the sepoy guard at Būshehr, having been sent as usual to fetch the Residency mails, were detained at the customs house; Captain Trevor, the Assistant Political Resident, then went to the spot himself for the purpose of removing the mails; but M. Waffelaert, the Officiating Director-General, caused the gates to be closed and took possession of ten cases and six bags belonging to the Residency. Mr. Grant-Duff immediately applied to the Persian Government for restitution of the mails and informed the Mushīr-ud-Dauleh, Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs, that he had

instructed the Resident to resist by force any further tampering with the British mails. The mail which had been seized was returned on the 8th of December at the British post office by M. Wagner, the Assistant to the Director-General of Customs, in person. Eventually it was arranged at Tehran that an official of the Imperial Persian Customs should in future be present at the opening of the mail bags in the Residency post office, and that parcels for persons other than British exempted persons should be sent to the customs house for declaration and, if necessary, examination; and the privilege of exemption from customs duty was at the same time withdrawn from the Residency Surgeon and the Extra Assistant Resident. At Muhammareh, where also trouble had occurred, a similar régime was adopted by agreement. The subsequent course of matters is described in the Appendix on Mail Communications and the British Indian Post Office in the Persian Gulf.

Progress of the Imperial Persian Customs in the Persian Gulf.*

At the end of 1904 a customs post was successfully established on Establishe the island of Khārag in the jurisdiction of the recalcitrant Khān of ment and Hayat Davud: an earlier attempt, made in October 1904, had been removal of foiled by the expulsion of the customs officials by the Khan immediately posts. after the departure of the steamer in which they arrived. A number of new posts, as will be seen from the tables at the end of this Appendix. were opened in 1904 and 1905. In October 1905 a customs house was set up at Laz on the island of Shaikh Shu'aib, on which a provisional post had existed since the preceding February. Also in October 1905, inland examining posts which had been placed at Godar Balutak and Daliki on the Nasiri-Isfahan and Bushehr-Shīraz roads, respectively, were removed; the explanation given was that they were no longer required, but the real causes of their abolition were probably the complaints of merchants and muleteers, from whom the guards did not fail to extort money, and the representations of the British Legation at Tehrān.

The abolition of Rahdari and other harassing taxes, under a decree Abolition of obtained by M. Naus, known as the Law of 9th Zilhajjeh 1318,† and Rahdari and also under the Règlement of 1904, has now been partially carried out, other vexain spite of the covert resistance of Persian officials. In May 1904, however, Rahdari was still being forcibly levied on the road from Bandar 'Abbas to Bam; and in the following year the Shū'-as-Saltaneh, Governor-General of Fars, continued to derive large profits from illicit dues upon the Büshehr-Shirāz road. Other miscellaneous imposts prohibited by the Règlement were yet being collected, among them a tax called Bar, which was levied on goods from Bushehr landed at Shif, and fees for the protection of caravans by Tufangchi guards between Shif and Shīrāz. At Bandar 'Abbās, Dallāli or brokerage on the transfer of goods from up-country traders to exporting merchants in the town

tious taxes.

^{*} An account of the Persian Gulf Customs, as finally organised, will be found in Annexare No. 2 to this Appendix.

[†] This date corresponds to the 30th March 1901,

was still levied at the rate of 21 per cent. to 10 per cent. ad valorem. and was actually farmed by the Persian Government in 1904-05 for 1,200 Tumāns; Qapāndāri or weighment fees were taken at similar rates: Ardhiyah or wharfage was collected at 21 per cent. (there being however no pier worthy of the name); and Maidani, or exit dues on imports proceeding to the interior, was charged by the lessees of the same at a quarter of a Qran to two Qrans per package. A threat that compensation would be claimed on account of the exactions of the Shū5-as-Saltaneh resulted in the discontinuance of Rāhdāri on the Bushehr-Shīrāz road in October 1905; but other abuses continued. Caravans remained liable to the extortions of the Tufangchis or road guards, to whom the privilege of "protecting" the road was generally let for high sums by the Persian authorities, the amount obtained in this manner for the Burāzjān section of the Būshehr-Shīrāz road amounting in 1905 to 500 Tumans; and travellers were still compelled to purchase their supplies at extortionate rates from the official 'Alafdan or Ambar-i-'Alaf at each halting-place.

General results of the reorganisation of the Persian Customs.

The general results to Persia of the reorganisation of the Customs service have been, on the whole, highly creditable to M. Naus and his Belgian assistants.

Expansion of revenue.

From the fiscal standpoint the reforms were altogether satisfactory, for they resulted in a large increase of revenue to the state, due principally to an average enhancement of the rates and to more systematic collection, but partly also to other causes. Under the ancient method of leasing the customs of the country by provinces, a competitive reduction of dues sometimes took place in two adjacent customs divisions, e.g., Būshehr and Kirmānshāh, with the consequence that, when the contracts were again sold, lower bids for both had to be accepted by the Government. Again, payment of customs duty in specie was now obligatory, whereas formerly customs lessees hadbeen won't to discharge as much as two-thirds of their liabilities to Government in State bills, which in the open market only fetched from 50 to 70 per cent. of their face value. The following table will explain the growth of the customs revenue under the new Department:—

Year.	Net revenue from the Gulf customs (in Tü- mäns).	Net revenue from the customs of all Persia (in Tumans).	Remarks.
Before 1899	About 250,000	Less than 1,000,000	The figure for Gulf customs is an average one, and it does not include various inland dues which were farmed along with the sea customs.

Year.	Net revenue from the Gulf customs (in Tumāus).	Net revenue from the customs of all Persia (in Tūmāns).	REMARKS.
	,		The figure for all Persia includes octroi and Rahdari, abolished afterwards in 1901.
1899—1900		1,406,444	The customs of all Persia were farmed by the new Department, except those of Azarbāijān which had come under their direct management.
1900—1901	319,742	1,700,680	Octroi and Rāhdāri were abolished by law all over Persia.
1901—1902	453,823	2,008,568	Much progress was made in organising the Customs of the Gulf.
1902—1903	404,859	2,079,075	The Gulf receipts suffered, on account of cessation of business, from the imposition of the new tariff on the 14th of February 1903, to the end of the financial year.
1903—1904	1,064,651	3,037,8 9 4	The full benefit of the new tariff began to be reaped in this year.
1904—1905	820,170	2,607,000	Business generally was depressed by cholera in Persia and by the Russo-Japanese war; and receipts in the Gulf were reduced by the diversion of tea imports from the Gulf to the Caucasus route in consequence of operations by the Russian S. N. and T. Co.
1905—1906	740,526	2,550,000	There was an extensive failure of the opium crop in Persia, while in the Gulf the diversion of tea increased, and evasion of duty was general.

In 1906-1907, in consequence of the political troubles which agitated Persia during the year, the prestige and authority of the customs suffered, and the receipts for the first six months were less by 69.000 Tumans than those of the preceding year.

Notwithstanding the abolition of octroi and Rahdari, the general suppression of export duties, and unfavourable political conditions by which progress was retarded, the net yield of the Persian Customs during the first seven years of partial or complete reorganisation stood in a proportion of 31:14 to the receipts of the seven years immediately preceding.

Other econo-

Various other advantages of a non-fiscal character, but none the mic reforms, less real, were attained under the change of system. By the abolition of the arbitrarily collected octroi and Rahdari and by the consequent equalisation of customs duty to all, Persian merchants were placed for the first time on the same footing as their European rivals, and trade received a great impetus. The abolition of export duty on many kinds of merchandise still further stimulated commercial activity. In 1907 it was calculated that the foreign trade of Northern Persia had increased within the last few years by 80 per cent., while the actual, as distinguished from the apparent, increase, in Southern Persia between 1903-1904 and 1905-1906 was estimated at not less than 20 per cent. The growth of exports was specially remarkable, for while imports had increased by 683 per cent. exports had risen by no less than 99 per cent.; and, whereas in 1900-01 the proportion of exports to imports was only 36 to 64, in 1905-06 it stood at 44 to 56.

Unavoidable difficulties experienced by the Department.

The progress described above was achieved in the face of unusual difficulties,—chiefly the powerlessness of the Persian Government in parts of the country, defects in the administrative system, the interest of local authorities in contraband operations, and the existence of great geographical facilities for smuggling. All these unfavourable conditions were present in a high degree in the Persian Gulf region. In many places custom houses either could not be established at all, or, when established, were unable to fulfil their functions; and contempts of the authority of Customs officers, and even violent resistance to their proceedings, were of common occurrence. The coast districts of the Gulf were divided between the administrations of the Shaikh of Muhammareh, the Governor of the Gulf Ports, and the Governors-General of Fars and Kirman, which in some localities were intermingled; and the result was an almost entire absence of uniform and successful action along the coast from Muhammareh to Gwatar, for each administrator was indifferent to what happened in the jurisdiction of his neighbour. The Khāns of Rud-hilleh, Tangistan, Dashti and Gaih were deeply implicated in the contraband trade and even maintained customs houses of their own, especially the Khān of Rūd-hilleh, who was said to guarantee the safety of goods landed under his auspices against capture by the Customs until they should have reached Khushab. The results of these "frauds," as they were officially styled, or rather of this open defiance of the Customs, were often very marked; thus at Rig, where the Khans had been granted compensation for the loss of the customs at the rate of 5,000 Tumans a year, the amount collected never equalled this annual allowance; in Tangistan smuggling was so rife that tea there sold 40 per cent. cheaper than in the neighbouring town of Bushehr; at Minab

where a yearly indemnity of 7,000 Tumans was paid to the local authorities, the yield of the post was considerably less; and in Makran the Khāns derived a revenue estimated at 20,000 Tūmāns a year from a large illicit importation of rifles alone. From Masqat, Bahrain, and Kuwait, cargoes of the more highly taxed articles, especially arms and ammunition, tea, spices and indigo, were run over to the Persian side and were landed either clandestinely at ports where there were custom houses or openly at others where there were none; indeed, in the eyes of the Imperial Persian Customs, Bahrein and Kuwait, were simply large contraband depôts and by that Department the growth of their trade was regarded with deep suspicion.

In addition to these obstacles, for the existence of which the organisers of the Imperial Persian Customs were not responsible, there were others which arose out of their own methods. The rates of duty on certain articles were, under the tariff of 1903, pitched so high as to afford a positive inducement to smuggling; and the procedure established by the Règlement of 1904 was too complicated and inelastic for an Oriental state such as Persia. Latterly some of the officials of the Department have shown themselves disposed to admit that a simple universal rate of only 8 per cent. on all goods imported would probably increase the revenue, besides making the smuggler's trade unprofitable and removing many other difficulties; but much is expected, in regard to the suppression of contraband trade, from the sea-going launches which have been constructed or ordered at Bombay.

Incidental results of the reorganisation of the Persian Customs.

The régime of the Imperial Customs has borne somewhat hardly Decline of on the once flourishing port of Lingeh in consequence of its being a Lingeh as port of transit, to the conditions of which the regulations of the new a port of department are not well adapted. In 1900 and 1901 the trade of 1902-07. Lingeh was considerately handled; but about the beginning of 1902 a transhipment duty of \$\frac{1}{8} \ Qr\text{an} per package and a special duty of \$\frac{1}{4}\$ Qr\text{an on each package landed and re-exported within 20 days were imposed, and full export duty was levied when the period of 20 days was exceeded. The time allowed for re-exportation was too short and the duties to which food stuffs became liable on its expiration were crushing; thus, at the beginning of 1902, rice and ghee were subject to an export duty of 10 per cent., and wheat and barley to one of 15 per cent., although the bulk of these commodities, having been received from India, had already paid an import duty of 5 per cent. 1n March 1902, no less than 15,000 bags of Indian imports, destined for Arab ports, were lying uncleared at the Lingeh customs house, and already some steamers had accepted freights direct from India for Dibai and Lingeh merchants had sent orders for their sailing craft, then loading in India, to run straight to the Arab Coast without calling at Lingeh. Eventually the export of the 15,000 bags was permitted duty-free; but the confidence of merchants had received a shock from which it has

not since recovered; and the prosperity of Lingeh was, in 1907, still declining. The transit trade of Lingeh has now, in a large measure, passed to Dibai, notwithstanding the inferiority of both the climate and anchorage there, and the transference bids fair to be permanent; indeed Dibai may even be said to have become the port of transhipment—by smugglers—for Lingeh itself.

Inconvenience in regard to supplies for British Government vessels 1902-07.

The rules relating to the transhipment and exportation of provision have been a cause of some inconvenience to ships of the Royal Navy and Royal Indian Marine.

Since July 1902 duty at one per cent. ad valorem has been charged on coal placed on board ship from depôts on shore. No import duty being levied on coal, this tax is regarded by the Imperial Customs as one on transhipment rather than on re-exportation.

In December 1901 the Customs at Büshehr began, contrary to oldestablished usage, to levy a duty of 5 per cent. on all goods sent from shore on board British men-of-war in the harbour; many of these, being supplies imported from India, had already paid duty at 5 per cent. In March 1902 the rate was raised to 10 per cent.; and in November 1902, this duty of 10 per cent. on other supplies being still maintained, one of 20 per cent. was placed on livestock for ships. At length it appeared that these duties, were claimed not by way of customs, but as a "taxe de dispense" or the price of exemption from the prohibition—at this time almost permanent—against the exportation of food stuffs and livestock from Persia. The innovation was contested, without success, during 1903, and in 1904 the "taxe de dispense" was regularly established, its amount being fixed at 10 per cent. on both cattle and cereals; but the rightfulness of the charge has not been admitted by the British Government, and correspondence on the subject still continues (1907).

In June 1908 customs duty was claimed for the first time on rations imported from India for the British military detachment at Jāshk, and has since been paid under protest both there and at Chahbār; a refund has, however, been claimed by the British political authorities, and the matter is not yet settled (1907).

The British Government and the Customs of Southern Persia.

Of greater importance however, at least to the British Government, than the administrative success or failure of the reorganisation of the Persian Customs is the question whether those of the Gulf are liable to be hypothecated to a European power in return for a loan; and the position in this respect must now be stated.

British connection with the Customs of Southern Persia.

Great Britain has always possessed a special interest in the custom of Southern Persia; a loan of £500,000, raised in London in 1892, to enable the Persian Government to pay off compensation payable to the (British) Imperial Tobacco Corporation on account of the concellation of their concession, was secured upon them, and for that reason bore interest at the favourable rate of 6 per cent.; while, as we have seen, a

British bank, in connection with another loan, actually controlled the Bushehr customs for some months in 1898. Furthermore, in connection with a Russian loan proposed in 1892 for the purpose of enabling the Persian Government to discharge their liability to the Tobacco Corporation, the British Minister of Tehran, under orders from His Majesty's Government, informed the Persian Government that any act by which the Shah might hand over to a foreign Government his control over the customs revenue of the southern ports of Persia would be an alienation of his sovereign rights to which the British Government would be justified in objecting, and that a formal protest would be entered by them against any such proceeding.

In 1897, in the course of discussions relating to a proposed Persian Assurance loan in Europe, the Hon'ble C. Hardinge, the British Chargé d' Affaires at Tehran, acting under instructions from Lord Salisbury, was successful in obtaining a written assurance * from the Mushīr-ud-Dauleh, Minister in regard to for Foreign Affairs, that the Customs of Southern Persia (or rather, the Customs perhaps, certain of them only) would never be placed under foreign of Southern supervision or control; this pledge, which was dated the 23rd of October 1897 and was subsequently communicated by Mr. Hardinge to the Dutch Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran, has formed ever since a principal bulwark of British interests in Southern Persia against Russian designs. In the course of the negotiations which led up to the conclusion of the Russian Loan Agreement of 1900, repeated reference was made to this guarantee by the British Minister at Tehran, and a copy of it was formally communicated to the Sadr-i-Azam at his request in December Meanwhile, in March 1899, the question had been again 1899. discussed between the British Legation and the Shah's Government on the basis of its including all, and not only some, of the Customs of Southern Persia. Later, however, perhaps through inadvertence, the discussion had come to turn on the customs of "the ports on the Persian Gulf."

by the Persian Government Persia, 23rd

When the Russian Loan Agreement of 1900 was published, it appeared that the security for this first Russian loan consisted of the customs of the whole of Persia except those of "Fars and the Persian "Customs of Gulf", and that, in case of default in repayment of principal or in Southern payment of interest by due date, control might be assumed by the Persia" and Banque d'Escompte—an Agency of the Russian State Bank—over Fars and the the customs hypothecated. Immediately a doubt arose whether the Persian customs of "Fars and the Persian Gulf" must necessarily be regarded Gulf," 1900. as identical with those of Southern Persia; or whether the Persian Government, in violation of the pledge of 1897, had in effect agreed to the contingent control by Russia of the customs of a part of Southern Persia not covered by the phrase "Fars and the Persian Gulf."

The first place brought specifically to notice was Muhammareh, the Means taken customs of which it was proposed at the beginning of 1900 to place in the rights of charge of a Belgian officer. So far as could be ascertained, Muham-Britain march was not included by name among the custom houses pledged to unler the Russia, and M. Naus, the Minister of Customs, personally thought that Persian

Doubt as to

assurance of

^{*} The text of this written assurance is reproduced in Annexure No. 3 to this Appendix.

it must be considered a port of the Persian Gulf; but the Persian Government could not be induced to state definitely whether in their opinion the Muhammareh customs were, or were not, included in the security for the Russian loan. They sought in fact to avoid the discussion; and they obviously suspected that the object of the British Minister was to obtain an admission which would give the British Government a right of interference at Muhammareh, and which would create a recognised British sphere of influence in that region.

1902

In 1902, on the conclusion of a second Russian loan, the Persian Government were reminded that Britain could not recognise the inclusion of any of the customs of Southern Persia in the guarantee, but they did not reply to the British communication.

1903.

On the separation, in 1903, of the Customs of 'Arabistān from those administered by the Director-General at Büshehr, the British Minister at Tehrān, under orders from the Foreign Office, once more sought to obtain a statement from the Persian Government as to the inclusion or non-inclusion of the 'Arabistān Customs in those of Fārs and the Persian Gulf; but the answer obtained was evasive.

1904.

In 1904 the Persian Government expressed their inability to alter or even to interpret, the conditions of the two Russian loan contracts without the assent of Russia; but they formally admitted that in signing these contracts there was no intention on their part of prejudicing the assurance given to the British Government in 1897 regarding the Customs of Southern Persia. Note having been taken by the Foreign Office of this admission, the Persian Government were told that their reply was in other respects unsatisfactory, and that His Majesty's Government held them bound by the assurance of 1897, which was anterior to the Russian loan agreements; His Majesty's Government could not admit a solitary exception from the assurance in the case of Muhammareh and its dependencies, or of any of the ports of 'Arabistan, and they would take the necessary steps to ensure respect for their rights in the event of any attempt on the part of the Persian Government to ignore them. A note to this effect was handed to the Mushirud-Dauleh on the 31st of August 1904 by Sir A. Hardinge and was read aloud in his presence by the Persian Minister, who took no exception to its substance; no formal reply, however, was demanded, and none was received, by the British Government.

In signing the Règlement Douanier on the 29th of August 1904, Sir A. Hardinge was careful to put in a declaration, of which act was taken by M. Naus as Minister of Customs, on the subject of the Southern Customs. This declaration stated that the Règlement was signed on behalf of Great Britain subject to the reserve that the customs division now denominated "The South" should not be held to be alone subject to the assurance of the 23rd October 1897, and that the assurance in question should not be regarded as in any way affected or limited by the administrative distinction drawn in the Règlement between the customs of the South and those of 'Arabistān.

Question whether MuhamThat Muhammareh is a port of the Persian Gulf, and that its customs therefore cannot in any circumstances be pledged to Russia, appears to be indisputable. The Hydrographer of the British Admiralty

has stated that Muhammareh, being situated on a tidal river and being march, accessible to ships navigating the Persian Gulf, must be regarded as a Jashk, port of that sea. In a list of Persian post offices supplied by the Persian Gwatar are Government to the International Bureau at Berne in August 1903, the situated in post office of Muhammareh appears under the heading "Golfe Persique." the Persian Finally in the Règlement Douanier of 1904, framed by the Persian and Gulf. accepted by the Russian Government, in the remarks on the customs post at Muhammareh the words occur-"arriving from another post in the Persian Gulf." Jāshk, Chahbār, and Gwatar are similarly covered by the wording of the post office statement and of the Règlement Douanier. The immunity of the Customs of other places in Southern Persia from Russian control still depends, in cases where their situation within the limits of "Fars and the Persian Gulf" is doubtful, on the indefinite but comprehensive pledge given by the Persian Government in 1897.

In conclusion it may be mentioned that a loan of £200,000 by the (British) Imperial Bank of Persia, dated 4th April 1903, and a supplementary loan of £100,000, dated 1st September 1904, are both secured, in the first place, upon the revenues of the Caspian Sea fisheries; in the second, upon the revenues of the Posts and Telegraphs; and, finally, upon the customs of "Fars and the Persian Gulf."

Precarious position of the reorganised Persian Customs, 1906-07.

From the first the new Customs Department has had much prejudice Hostility and and interested opposition to encounter, while the mere fact of its indifference being controlled by Europeans has placed an effective weapon in the to the work. hands of its adversaries. Incredible as it may seem, moreover, the Persian Government have shown themselves almost indifferent to the brilliant results attained. In September 1904, M. Naus was actually in danger of losing his appointment, for which the Nizām-us-Saltaneh had offered £40,000; and in 1905 his position had become so difficult on account of the general unpopularity which he had incurred, that he tendered his resignation; but it was not accepted by the Shah. In 1905, in consequence of the strictness of M. Heynssens, the new Director-General of Customs at Bushehr, who insisted at first on consignees appearing in person to declare their goods, who visited with a penalty the slightest discrepancy between invoices and goods, and who tried to prohibit the use of private wharves, a serious agitation arose at Bushehr, in which Mullas as well as native merchants participated, while even European firms complained through their Consulates; but, on the necessary concessions being made, the trouble again subsided.

Early in 1906, with the development of the popular and national Proceedings movement which was now agitating Persia, the position of M. Naus began of M. Naus, to be threatened; and fears were even entertained for his personal safety. 1906. Early in the year he prudently retired on a mission to Constantinople and remained away until the autumn; during his absence a demand was made for his dismissal, but was not pressed. In August 1906, negotiations for a loan to Persia were in progress, in connection with which

M. Naus had already sounded the Belgian market, but unsuccessfully, under a Russian guarantee. Capable, energetic and ambitious, he had gradually brought the whole financial system of the country under his control; he made no concealment of his power; and it was expected that he would be employed, in September 1906, to represent Persia in certain financial negotiations at St. Petersburg. The Persian Government, however, made suspicious by the anxiety of Russia that he should be sent, declined to nominate him.

Campaign in the Persian Assembly against M. Naus and his Belgian Officials, 1906-07.

On the 7th of October 1906 the new Persian Assembly began its sittings at Tehran; and M. Naus and his subordinates were at once made objects of attack by a party headed by the Sa'ad-ud-Dauleh. The charges against M. Naus were, mainly, that he had been guilty of corruption and extortion and had amassed a large private fortune by improper means; that he had provided too many appointments, upon large salaries, for Belgians; and that, in the selection of native employés. he had favoured Armenians at the expense of Muhammadans. With regard to the first of these accusations it was subsequently stated, on the authority of a high Persian official, that there were no grounds for believing M. Naus to have committed malversations, but that for three years he had rendered no formal accounts, and that it was difficult to verify or arrange the papers which he had submitted. The Assembly, notwithstanding the opposition of a moderate section who were aware of the value of M. Naus's services, now yielded to popular clamour and opened a campaign against the Customs Department enquiring whether M. Naus was a responsible minister and pointing out that the Customs, Treasury, Post Office, and Mint were now under his contro but that, when information in regard to these branches of the administration was demanded by the Assembly, M. Naus did not appear, while the Minister for Finance professed himself merely an accountant and stated that M. Naus was not under his control. Finally the Assembly insisted that a list of responsible ministers should be furnished; the Sadr-i-A'zam complied; and the name of M. Naus was not found in the list.

Dismissal of M. Naus, 1907.

The Assembly were now in a position to require that M. Naus, not being a minister, should be deprived of his title as such and of his powers of control. The Shāh reluctantly submitted and removed M. Naus from the ministry, and M. Priem from the Director-Generalship of Customs. This change took place, apparently, on the 9th of February 1907, less than a month after M. Naus had been confirmed in his position and his powers extended by the new Shāh. No decided action was taken by any of the foreign Legations at Tehrān, not even by those of Belgium or Russia, and the future of the Persian Imperial Customs was plunged into uncertainty.

ANNEXURE NO. I.—TABLE OF LEASES OF SOME OF THE CUSTOMS OF SOUTHERN PERSIA BEFORE THE CREATION OF THE CUSTOMS DEPARTMENT.

In the table below are given in chronological order, with the date where known, the amounts for which some of the customs of Southern

Persia were leased during a series of years before 1900; the farmers and the amount of the farm in a number of cases remained the same for more than one year. More detailed information in regard to the customs of the same districts under the old régime, not agreeing in every case with that given in the present table,* will be found in the following Administration Reports of the Persian Gulf Political Residency:—

1873-74, pages 14-15; 1886-87, page 23; 1887-88, page 33; 1890-91, page 22; 1893-94, page 30; 1895-96, page 28; 1896-97, page 23; and 1898-99, page 57.

h date	Combination of customs, etc., farmed.†	Amount of the farm (in Tümāns)
Novāi	Customs and Governorship of Būshehr.	30,000 per annum.
	Do. Do	40,000 per annum.
'Ali,	Customs of Büshehr and Shīrāz.	70,000 per annum.
behalf k.	Customs of Büshehr.	48,000 per annum.
	Governorship of Būshehr and customs of that place and of Shīrāz.	90,000 per annum.
Mīrza.	Governorship and customs of Būshehr.	70,000 per annum.
nī.	Customs of Ispahān Yazd Shīrāz, Būshehr, Lingeh and Bandar 'Abbās.	140,000 per annum.
Bāqir	Governorship of Būshehr and customs of that place and of Isfahān, Yazd, Lingeh, Shīrāz, and Bandar 'Abbās.	170,000 per annum.
Khān,	Do. do.	180,000 per annum.
	Governorship and customs of Bushehr, Lingeh and Bandar 'Abbās.	190,000 per annum.
	Customs of Isfahān, Shīrāz, Būshehr, Lingeh, and Bandar 'Abbās.	140,000 per annum.
	'Ali, behalf k. Mīrza. nī.	Customs and Governorship of Būshehr. Do. Do 'Ali, Customs of Būshehr and Shīrāz. behalf Customs of Būshehr. k. Governorship of Būshehr and customs of that place and of Shīrāz. Governorship and customs of Būshehr. Customs of Ispahān Yazd Shīrāz, Būshehr, Lingeh and Bandar 'Abbās. Bāqir Governorship of Būshehr and customs of that place and of Isfahān, Yazd, Lingeh, Shīrāz, and Bandar 'Abbās. Khān, Do. do. Governorship and customs of Būshehr, Lingeh and Bandar 'Abbās. Customs of Isfahān, Shīrāz, Būshehr, Lingeh and Bandar 'Abbās.

^{*}Most of these passages, however, relate not to leases but to subleases of customs and include "customs" other than import and export duty.

[†] Where governorship as well as customs are mentioned, the emoluments of the lessee were probably not confined to import and export duty.

[†] The arrangement with Haji and Muhammad Baquir Khan lasted for seven years.

Name of the farmer (with date where known).	Combination of customs, etc. farmed.*	Amount of the farm (in Tümāns),	
The Sa'ad-ul-Mulk, by whom a sub-lease was granted to Mirza	Customs of Būshehr.	70,000 per annum.	
Nasrullah Khān. The Sa'ad-ul-Mulk, by whom a sub-lease was granted to Hāji Muhammad Mehdi, Malik-ut-Tujjār.	Do.	75,000 per annum.	
Hāji Vazīr.	Governorship of Būshehr, Lingeh and Bandar 'Abbās, and customs of those places and of Isfahān and Shīrāz.	190,000 per annum.	
Nauzar Mīrza.	Governorship and customs of Būshehr, Lingen and Bandar 'Abbās.	120,000 for six months only.	
Hāji Muhammad Mehdi, Malik-ut-Tujjār (1886- 87).	Do. do.	213,000 per annum.	
The Sa'ad-ul-Mulk.	Governorship of Bushehr, Lingeh, and Bandar 'Abbas, and customs of those places and of Shīraz.	180,000 per annum.	
The Nizām-ul-Mulk.	Do. do.	190,000 per annum.	
The Qawam-ul-Mulk.	Do. do.	240,000 per annum.	
The Hisām-ul-Saltaneh.	Do. do.	280,000 per annum.	
Iqtidār-us-Sultān.	Governorship and customs of Būshehr, Lingeh and Bandar 'Abbās.	90,000 for five months only.	
The (British) Imperial Bank of Persia (1898).	Customs of Büshehr.	90,000 for six months only.	
The Darya Baigi (1898-1900).	Governorship of Büshehr, Lingeh, and Bandar 'Abbās, and customs of those places and of Shīrāz.	200,000 per annum.	

^{*} Where governorships as well as customs are mentioned, the emoluments of the lessee were probably not confined to import and export duty.

ANNEXURE NO. 2.—PRESENT ORGANISATION OF THE IMPERIAL PERSIAN CUSTOMS IN THE PERSIAN GULF.

As explained in the body of the foregoing Appendix, the Customs are divided, in the Persian Gulf, into two main territorial groups—the South and 'Arabistān; and of these the former is from every point of view the more considerable.

The following is a table showing the organisation, establishment, receipts and expenditure of the customs of the South:—*

^{*} It is necessary to warn the reader that while posts are given as they existed in 1906, the other! columns of this statement refer to a somewhat earlier period; consequently the staffs shown appear to be insufficient in some places and excessive in others. A considerable rearrangement of posts took place in 1905 or 1906, of which one result is that the facts, as here described, do not agree with statements made in the Geographical Volume of this Gazetteer.

ANNEXURE

Main station.	Date of institution.	Detail of European officials at main station.	Detail of Persian officials at main station.	Watchmen, etc., at and under main station.	
Dîlam (Custom house and post, under Bûshehr).	September 1900		1 Director and 4 others.	5	
Rīg (Custom house and post, under Būshehr).	April 1903		1 Director and 4 others.	9	
Khārag Island (Post, under Būshehr).	December 1904	•••	1 Director.	1	
Bushehr (A principal post, as defined in the Règlement).	March 1899	1 Director- General, 1 Inspector and 1 Comptrol- ler.	30	45	
Daiyi (Custom house and post, under Lingeh).	March 1904.		1 Director, 1 Inspector and 4 others.		

NO. 2.

Armed guards at and under main station.	Estimated annual gross receipts (in tumāns).	Estimated an nual expendiure (in Tümäus).	Minor stations under main station in first column.	Dates of institution
	6,000	900	Khūr Imām Hasan (Observation post).	September 1900
•••	4,000	1,400	Ganāveh (Collecting post).	April 1903.
	230	210	•••••	
10	500,000	42,000	Halileh (Observation post).	January 1904
	6,500	4,500	Lāvar (Collecting post). Ziyārat (Observation post.) Khān (Observation post). Umm-al-Karam (Observation post). Batūneh (Observation post). Kangūn (Collecting post). Miyālu (Observation post). Tumbak (Observation post). Tābiri (Collecting post). Nakhl Taqi (Observation post). 'Asalu (Collecting post). Baidheh Khān (Observation post). Hālat Naband (Observation post). Tibin (Observation post).	March 1904.

ANNEXURE

Main station.	Date of institution.	Detail of European officials at main station.	Detail of Persian officials at main station.	Watchmen, etc., at and under main station.
Lingeh (A principal post, as defined in the Règlement).	March 189 9.	1 Director	18	12
Bandar 'Abbās (A principal post, as defined in the Règlement).	March 1899	1 Director	20	17
Hanjām Island (Custom house and post, under Bandar 'Abbās).	December 1904	•••	1 Director	2
uishm Town (Custom house and post, under Bandar 'Abbās).	March 1900	•••	1 Director and 4 others.	6
Mīnāb Town (Custom house and post, under Bandar 'Abbās).	February 1901		1 Director and 2 others.	6
Jāshk (Custom house and post, under Bandar 'Abbās).	January 1902	•••	1 Director and 1 other.	5
Chahbar (Custom house and post, under Bandar 'Abbas).	January 1902	•••	1 Director and 2 others.	9
Total .	•••	5	99	124

NO. 2

Armed guards at and under main station.	Estimated annual gross receipts in Tāmāns.	Estimated annual expendi- ture in Tümäns.	Minor stations under main station in first column.	Dates of institution.
	50,00 0	11,000	Bustānu (Observation post). Chīru (Collecting post). Mugām (Collecting post). Nakhīlu (Observation post). Mākehīl (Observation post). Kālāt (Collecting post). Gūrzeh (Post of Observation). Qais Island (Collecting post). Tāvuneh (Post of Observation). Chārak (Collecting post). Hasīneh (Observation post). Mughu (Observation post). Bustāneh (Observation post). Bustāneh (Observation post). Bustāneh (Observation post). Bustāneh	January 1904 Do April 1902 April 1902. January 1904. March 1901.
15	270, 000	15,000	(Observation post). Bandar Mahtābi (Collecting post). Khamīr (Collecting post).	February 1905. May 1901.
	50	300	Collecting post).	December 1904.
***	6,600	1,500		•••
4	4,300	1,400		
	1,400	500		•••
7	4,000	1,300	Gwatar (Collecting post).	January 1904.
51	853,080	80,010	·· ···	

The working expenses, it will be seen, amount to about 10 per cent of the gross receipts. The five highest posts in the South, namely the Director-Generalship, Inspectorship and Comptrollership at Bushehr and the Directorships at Lingeh and Bandar 'Abbas, are at present occupied by members of the Belgian Customs Service, who have been seconded and placed at the disposal of the Persian Government by the Government of Belgium: the initial contracts with the Persian Government of these and of the other Belgian Officers in the Department were for three years, and were renewable, at expiration, for either three or five years. All the other superior appointments in the South are held by Persians, who have the rank of Directors and are styled Mudirs. The subordinate grades of Farrash or civil orderly, of Mustahfiz or watchman, of Kashīkchi or night watchman, and of Tufangchi or armed guard are filled by natives. The Tufangchis fluctuate in number according to the season of the year, and are frequently changed; they are mostly recruited at Bushehr and in Baluchistan. The staff of each minor post consists of a Mudīr, lower in rank than a Director, having under him two or more subordinates. Mere observation posts are manned by one or more watchmen or Tufangchis, who are under orders of the nearest Mudir.

In some ports and on some stretches of coast—especially in the districts of Rūd-hilleh and Tangistān, and of Persian Makrān from Jāshk to Chahbār—the Customs have been unable as yet to establish their system, owing to the opposition of local chiefs who refuse to part with the farm of the customs and cannot at present be coerced. In these localities the customs duties are levied according to the ancient methods, and arms and other prohibited articles find their way into the country. Control of the coast line is maintained, so far as possible, by the Customs vessel "Mozaffar" and the Persian man-of-war "Persepolis," supplemented by the launches constructed at Bombay. An experiment was tried, in 1905 or 1906, of watching the coast between Lingeh and Bandar 'Abbās by means of mounted patrols; it was not successful on account of the unsuitability of the country to horses, but it was intended to repeat it with the substitution of camels for horses.

The organisation of the Customs of 'Arabistan is as follows:—

Posts.	Date of institution.	European officials.	Persian officials.	Guards.	Estimated gross annual receipts (in Tümäns).	Estimated annual ex- penditure (ini Tūmāns),
Muhammareh (A principal post, as defined in the Règlement.)	20th September 1902.	1 Director- General.	1 Director and 15 others.	65	55,000	16,000
Nāsiri	20th January 19 0 3.	•••	1 Director and 5 others.	12	40,000	2,800
Shūshtar	20th February 1903.		1 Director and 2 others.	13	10,000	1,800

^{*} The same remarks about changes apply to this table as to the last (customs of the South).

Posts,	Date of institutions.	European officials.	Persian officials.	Guards.	Estimated gross annua! receipts (in Tümāns).	Fstimated annual ex- penditure (in Tūmāns).
Dizfūl	20th January 1903.	•••	1 Director and 2 others.	13	1,000	500
Hindiyān	20th December 1902.		1 Director and 1 other.	7	9,000	900
Ma'shūr	20th April 1903.	•••	1 Director and 1 other.	5	11,000	400
Bnzi y eh	Do.	•••	1 Director and 1 other.	5	6,500	500
	Total .	1	34	120	132,500	22,900

ANNEXURE NO. 3—OFFICIAL COMMUNICATION ADDRESSED BY THE MUSHIR-UD-DAULEH, PERSIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, TO THE HON'BLE C. HARDINGE, C.B., HER MAJESTY'S CHARGE D'AFFAIRS, TEHRAN, ON THE 23RD OF OCTOBER 1897.

"You have written that there was a rumour that the Customs of "Southern Persia would be placed under foreign supervision and control "as guarantee for a loan. I therefore take this occasion of informing "the Legation that this rumour is without foundation, and that they "will never be placed under foreign supervision and control.

MUSHIR-ED-DOWLEH."

[More literally translated, however, the above assurance ran:

[&]quot;This that you had written—it has been rumoured that some (or "certain) South Persian customs are being placed under foreign super"vision and control against the amount of a foreign loan—has been been been to notice, and it has been deemed necessary to bring to the notice of the respected Legation that the rumour is completely without foundation, and under foreign supervision and control (they) never will be placed."]

APPENDIX P.

CRUISE OF HIS EXCELLENCY LORD CURZON, VICEROY AND GOVERNOR-GENERAL OF INDIA, IN THE PERSIAN GULF.*

The memorable cruise made by Lord Curzon in the Persian Gulf at the end of 1903 was undertaken for the purpose of inspecting the Indian establishments maintained there, of visiting the Arab Shaikhs in treaty relations with the British Government, and of testifying to the paramount political and commercial ascendancy exercised by Great Britain in Persian Gulf waters. The preliminary arrangements for the tour were begun in August 1903, and shortly afterwards the formal approval of His Majesty's Government was sought and obtained.

Departure from Karāchi and voyage to Masqat, 16th to 18th November 1903.

The R.I.M.S. "Hardinge", carrying the Viceroy, started from Karāchi harbour shortly before 5 p.m. on Monday, the 16th of November; as she passed Manorah a land battery fired a salute of 31 guns. Lord Curzon was accompanied by Her Excellency Lady Curzon. The East Indies squadron under Rear-Admiral Atkinson-Willes, specially strengthened for the cruise by the addition of H.M.S. "Argonaut", a first class cruiser of 11,000 tons then on her way from the China station to England, was lying in readiness off the entrance of the harbour; on the approach of the "Hardinge" it was formed in columns of divisions line ahead, the starboard division consisting of the flagship H.M.S. "Hyacinth", second class cruiser, with the third class cruiser, "Fox", two cables astern, while the port division was composed of H.M.S. "Argonaut" abeam of the flagship, followed by H.M.S. "Pomone", third class cruiser. The ships, which had dressed with masthead flags on the arrival of the

^{*}The principal authorities are the official records of the Government of India in the Political Department and the letters of newspaper correspondents which appeared in the English "Times" of the 28th and 29th December 1903 and of the 2nd, 5th, 11th, 12th and 18th January 1904, and in the Indian "Pioneer" of the 22nd and 26th November and of the 2nd, 6th and 9th December 1903. The writer has also drawn up his personal recollections of the cruise, and the article has been revised by Sir L. Dane who accompanied the tour as Secretary in the Foreign Department.

Viceroy in Karāchi, were now manned, guards were paraded, the bands played the National Anthem, and, as the "Hardinge" steamed to the front between the divisions, each vessel saluted her with 31 guns. The "Hardinge" preceded the squadron till nightfall and then took up a station astern, where she remained until Masqat was neared. The sea was smooth, and the relative positions of the ships were so admirably maintained that the lights of the squadron as seen by the night from the deck of the "Hardinge" presented an apparently stationary pageant. Throughout the cruise, both at sea and in port, the ships were dressed with masthead flags during the hours of daylight.

The visit to Masqat, 18th and 19th November.

Soon after sunrise on the 18th of November the coast of Oman was sighted,-"an apparently unbroken line of precipitous cliffs, rising diaphanous and opalescent out of the pale blue waters of the Indian Ocean." It had originally been intended to strike the coast in the vicinity of Ras-al-Hadd and follow it to Masqat, but time did not admit of this, and a direct course was accordingly shaped for Masqat, where the R.I.M.S. "Lawrence" with Colonel Kemball, British Resident in the Persian Gulf, and H.M.S. "Lapwing" were already lying. As the squadron entered the harbour at 10-30 A.M. the flagship greeted the port with a salute of 21 guns which was returned, gun for gun, by one of the Sultan's batteries; and, as soon as the ships had taken up their billets. a salute of 31 guns was fired by the land batteries as a welcome to His Excellency the Viceroy. The white town in gala array formed a strange contrast with the grim cliffs by which it was encircled, -a contrast that found its counterpart in the resplendent hulls of the "Hardinge" and "Lawrence", backed as they were by the dark line of warships lying across the entrance of the harbour.

Arrival Masgat.

A deputation from the Sultan shortly arrived on board the Deputation "Hardinge"; it included the Sultan's elder half-brother Saiyid Muhammad, the Sultan's eldest son, Saiyid Taimur, by whom the State of 'Oman had been represented at the Delhi Coronation Darbar, the Commandant of His Highness's land forces, and the Governor of Matrah. A metrical welcome in Arabic was read by one of the deputation, of which the translation ran as follows:-

The welcome and auspicious tidings have reached me, and I have been cheered with deep and complete happiness at the arrival of His Exalted and Noble Excellency Lord Curzon.

At his coming the suns of joy and gladness have risen and the moons of happiness and good cheer have shed their light.

All honour be to him of exalted rank and dignity, who comes in this great state.

To this end I have deputed my brother and my son, that they may both be honoured by meeting His Excellency on my behalf, and that they may pay respect to his august person and celebrate his auspicious arrival; and also as a mark of our joy at his coming, and as a sign of our exceeding gratification at his noble presence.

May he never cease to live in honour and splendour, high repute and prosperity, as long as the days and nights continue.

After inquiries as to His Excellency's health the deputation again withdrew, under a salute of 13 guns, specially awarded at the Sultan's request in consideration of their exalted rank.

Visit of the Sultan to the Viceroy. As soon as the deputation had reached the shore, His Highness Faisal-bin-Turki embarked in person to visit the Viceroy, accompanied by his suite and by Major Cox, the British Political Agent at Masqat. After steaming in a launch round the entire squadron and acknowledging the compliments of the crews of His Majesty's ships, the Sultān was received on board the "Hardinge" and conducted to His Excellency's presence on the quarter-deck, where a state reception room had been fitted up and decked with gold-worked carpets and handsome embroideries. Greetings were exchanged and a short conversation took place, after which the members of the Sultān's suite were severally presented to the Viceroy. Refreshments were then served, and a few moments later the Sultān took his departure under a salute of 21 guns fired by H.M.S. "Fox."

Visits of the French and American Vice-Consuls.

Visit of Lord Curzon to the British Agency. Between noon and one o'clock the Vice-Consuls of France and America at Masqat, M. Laronce and Mr. Mackirdy, proceeded on board the "Hardinge" to pay their respects to the Viceroy; they were accorded separate interviews and received the salutes of their rank at their departure.

At about 1-30 p.m., Lord Curzon left the "Hardinge" under a Viceregal salute, the ships of the squadron being at the same time dressed and manned, and landed with Rear-Admiral Atkinson-Willes and staff at a jetty which had been specially erected at the Customs wharf; here he was received by Colonel Kemball and Major Cox, and from this spot the Viceregal party walked—by a narrow, but carpeted and gaily decorated street—through the Indian quarter to the British Agency building, where they were entertained at lunch by the Political Agent. The Sultān's palace, his steamer the "Nūr-al-Bahr" and the forts of Jalāli and Mīrāni were profusely decorated with flags; and at the Sultān's desire, in order to symbolise the community of interests and sentiment between the Governments of Britain and 'Omān, the flagstaffs of his palace and the British Agency had been linked together by a graceful arc of bunting 300 yards in length.

After lunch a deputation representing the different classes of British subjects and protegés residing in 'Omān, principally Indian Muhammadans, Hindus, Parsis and Goanese, waited upon the Viceroy in a verandah of the Agency with an address which was read in English by Mr. Parshotam Dhanji, member of a Masqat firm of Hindu merchants. The address, which was presented in a silver casket of local design and manufacture, representing an Arab, a date tree and a camel, ran as follows:—

May it please Your Excellency,—We, the entire community of British subjects, both Hindu and Muhammadan, and other British protected persons, settled in the towns of Masqat and Matrah,* most respectfully beg, on behalf of ourselves and our fellow-subjects residing in other parts of His Highness the Sultān's dominions to offer Your Excellencies a most heartfelt welcome on the occasion of your visit to Masqat.

In doing so, we venture to congratulate Your Excellency, with much respect, on being the first Viceroy and Governor-General of India, since the passing of the destinies of the Indian Continent to the British Crown, to visit these distant shores, and to have thus inaugurated a new and vigorous political departure in a sphere where so many Indian interests are involved; and it has been a source of enhanced gratification

^{*} In this and in the other citations contained in the present Appendix the spellir g of proper names has been altered so as to agree with that used elsewhere in the Gazetteer.

to us to know that, since Your Excellency's happy decision to accept an extension of your term of office (a decision which has been received by all classes of His Majesty the King-Emperor's subjects with lively satisfaction), the first great act of policy which Your Excellency has undertaken has been this most ausploious tour in the Gulfs of 'Omān and Persia.

Accustomed, as the races peopling these shores are, to take impressions from outward appearances, we cannot but feel confident that this happy undertaking will prove to be an epoch-making event in the progress and enhancement of British prestige and influence. It will serve, too, as an abiding demonstration to the inhabitants of the littoral that the preponderating influence of Great Britain in these waters is no shadowy or remote force but a lively and dignified reality, and that the Viceroy of the King-Emperor, who holds benevalent sway over the millions of the vast continent of British India, watches with no less zeal and keen interest the welfare of His Most Gracious Majesty's subjects scattered all over the Gulf.

Except to give Your Excellencies a respectful and hearty welcome and to give expression to our loyalty and devotion to the Great Government whose subjects we are, we have little cause to trespass on Your Excellency's time, and, so far as our own local and particular needs and circumstances are concerned, have an encouraging tale to tell.

We enjoy in Masqat the rights and privileges of the most favoured nation; our interests are carefully guarded by our Consular authorities; and we experience complete toleration in matters of religion. There is an absence of unnecessary litigation amongst us British subjects; and justice is readily and promptly obtainable in the Agency Court.

In matters connected with our dealings; with the natives of 'Oman, while we are accustomed to receive a courteous hearing from His Highness, neverthless we often experience difficulty in obtaining relief; and this is partly owing, no doubt, to the unsettled state of the interior. In this latter connection we make bold to explain to Your Excellency that whereas, considering the degree of enlightenment among the Bedouin Arabs, inter-tribal strife and turbulence are within the nature of things, and when they are limited to the interior of the country do not immediately affect our welfare any more than that of other peaceable members of the community, nevertheless, when as is sometimes the case, the scene of the strife is transferred to the coast ports, or their immediate neighbourhood, our commercial interests do immediately suffer, and we are put to anxiety for the safety of the lives and properties of our fellow-subjects. For, as Your Excellency is aware, in many of the coast towns of 'Oman (often far removed from the capital) small communities of British Indian subjects reside, in whose hands all the local trade is centred, and who, in however humble a capacity, are the pioneers of British Indian commerce in these waters. Thanks to the wigilant activity of successive Political Agents, and men-of-war, at seasons of unrest, there is perhaps little actual danger to the lives and properties of these our fellow-subjects; but the detriment to their trading operations and ours is great, and we venture to hope that Your Excellency's Government will see its way, either by strengthening the hands of the Ruler, or by active interference on the coast, where necessary for the preservation of British interests, to take measures which will deter the unruly tribesmen of 'Oman from disturbing the commerce of the country by their dissensions.

In matters of commerce generally we continue to prosper, and, though during the last few years signs have not been wanting of foreign competition, Indian imports rule the market.

There is one depressing factor, however, of comparatively recent growth to which we make bold to draw Your Excellency's benevolent attention, and that is the demoralising fluctuations in the silver exchange.

Since the closing of the Indian mints in 1893, and the consequent fall in the price of silver, the local dollar exchange has not ceased to exhibit remarkable fluctuations, which greatly prejudice and impede the local import trade, from the fact that the currency value of the rupee is fixed, and that of the Masqat dollar is not. We therefore humbly commend the matter to Your Excellency's wise consideration, in the hope that, in co-operation with the Local Government, some means may be devised of bringing about a better state of things.

In conclusion, we beg to reiterate our welcome and to assure you that this visit of Your Excellency and your gifted consort will be a landmark in the history of Masqat, and will live green in our memories; and it is our earnest prayer to the

Supreme Being, in whose hands the destinies of us all lie, to vouchsafe to Your Excellency a continuance of bodily health and strength to enable you to render further great services to the Empire, and to bind fresh laurels on your brow.

His Excellency replied in the following terms:—

Lord Curzon's speech.

Gentlemen,—It is with much pleasure hat I have received the loyal and well-composed address which has just been read, and that on crossing the sea from India to the shores of another country I find a large and prosperous community of the subjects of His Majesty the King-Emperor existing and plying their trade here in conditions of security and contentment. I have made some attempt to ascertain the number of British Indian subjects who are thus to be found in Masqat and the other ports of 'Omān, and I find that they amount to no fewer than 1,300 persons, the majority of whom came originally, or come now, from the opposite shores of Sind and Kathiawar. The fact that these two coasts face each other at so inconsiderable a distance, and the well-known aptitudes of the particular communities that you represent, sufficiently explain the close mercantile connections that have grown up during the last century between Masqat and India, and leave one in no surprise at the commercial predominance of Great Britain in the trade and shipping of this State.

Gentlemen, the political stake of one country in another is sometimes measured by its commercial interests, but does not always lend itself readily to precise or mathematical definition. On the other hand, the commercial stake is more easily reduced to figures and calculations the effect of which is not open to dispute. I will take for instance the time in which I have been connected with the Government of India, namely, the last five years. When I find that during that period the British proportion of trade with the port of Masqat has averaged 84 per cent., and that of the total number of steamers that have entered and cleared from this port in the same time the average British percentage in each year has been 97, I am satisfied that the predominance of Great Britain in the mercantile interests of the State is supreme and incontestable, and I realise that in addressing you I am receiving a body of gentlemen who represent a not unimportant outpost of British commercial enterprise in the East, and whose labours have contributed, and still contribute, in no small degree to the material welfare of 'Omān.

I am glad to hear from you that in the pursuit of these peaceful avocations your interests are safeguarded by the successive Political Agents—and by none I am sure more diligently than by Major Cox—who have been sent here to represent the Government of India; that you obtain justice; that you abstain from litigation; and that you enjoy complete religious tolerance. These conditions are all favourable to the success of your operations, and they leave you with little ground for complaint.

In one paragraph of your address you have spoken of the disturbances that sometimes spring up in the interior, and which occasionally travel down to the coast ports and affect the security of the places in which you reside. The British Government have never embroiled themselves in this internal strife, which appears to be a hereditary legacy in 'Omān. But undoubtedly if it were to reach a point that seriously menaced the interests or imperilled the lives and property of British subjects lawfully trading upon the coast, we should feel called upon to intervene for their protection, and by no one, I am sure, would such intervention be more loyally welcomed, or more cordially assisted, than by His Highness.

You have referred in your address to the depreciation in the local exchange. This is a matter which I will take into consideration.

Gentlemen, I am obliged for the kind words in which you have welcomed me to Masqat. I understand that among those who present the address are representatives of other communities, such as the Portuguese of Goa, who enjoy British protection in this State. To all of you I wish a continuance of the conditions under which your trade exists and flourishes in 'Omān, and I rejoice that there has been presented to me the opportunity, while I am head of the Government of India, of testifying the interest which I feel in this outlying colony of Indian influence and trade.

It only remains for me to thank you for presenting your address in a specimen of silver work so characteristic of the tastes and customs of the locality. It will always be a memento to me of this agreeable meeting on the occasion of my present visit to Masqat.

zon's visit to

The next item in the programme was the return by the Viceroy of Lord Curthe visit which the Sultan had paid him on board the "Hardinge." From the Agency Lord Curzon returned by boat to the jetty, where he was received by the Sultan in person, a guard of honour of 30 British marines with a band being also in attendance; the way from the pier to the Sultan's palace lay along a street carpeted, sheltered by awnings, and completely lined by a guard of His Highness's 'Askaris. At length the Viceroy and his staff on foot, individually conducted by the Sultan and his suite, reached the Barzah or audience chamber of the palace, a long room upon the sea-front with an elevated dais at one end upon which the two principal personages took their seats; the staff and suite lined the walls, and in the body and at the further end of the hall were accommodated some 70 or 80 Shaikhs and representative men, from various parts of the interior, who had been summoned to Masqat for the occasion. The room was adorned with inscriptions in English capitals upon coloured grounds expressive of friendship for the British Crown. As soon as formal greetings had been exchanged, the principal native members of the assemblage were brought forward and presented to the Viceroy by the Political Agent, and thereafter an Arabic address of welcome was read on behalf of the Sultan and was cordially acknowledged by the Viceroy. Refreshments were next served, Saivid Taimur, the heir-apparent, personally waiting upon the Viceroy. The harmony of the proceedings was at one moment slightly disturbed by the conduct of Saivid Muhammad, the Sultan's half-brother, who stood up and requested a private interview with the Viceroy for the purpose of making a representation; it was understood that he wished to press his claims to succeed Saiyid Faisal, should the latter abdicate, in preference to Saiyid Taimūr, but he was easily pacified. At an interview with the Political Resident and the Political Agent the next morning, Saiyid Muhammad pressed his claims to the succession; but, when the weakness of his case was explained to him, he agreed to drop the matter. It should be noted that, at the Sultan's desire, Saiyid Muhammad received precedence over Saiyid Taimūr on all ceremonial occasions during the Viceroy's visit, upon the ground of his seniority in years. At the conclusion of the interview the Sultan conducted Lord Curzon back to the pier, and the Viceroy returned on board the "Hardinge" at about 5 P.M. Motley crowds of Masqatis and 'Omanis from the interior thronged the beach and streets throughout the day and evinced both curiosity and friendliness.

Meanwhile H. M. S. "Sphinx" had arrived from Bushehr bringing Sir A. Hardinge, His Britannic Majesty's Minister at Tehran, who desired to confer with the Viceroy before his arrival on the Persian Coast. There Persia. were now lying in the harbour six vessels of the Royal Navy, besides the "Hardinge" and the "Lawrence,"-by far the most powerful squadron that had ever flown the flag of a single power in the waters of Masgat.

In the evening Their Excellencies gave a large dinner party on board the "Hardinge," to which Sir Arthur Hardinge, Rear-Admiral Atkinson-Willes, the senior naval officers of the squadron, the local political officers and the Consular representatives of France and America were invited,—in all about 70 persons; and about 60 additional guests attended a reception which was held after the dinner.

Arrival of the British Minister in

Dinner and illuminaDuring and after the dinner the forts of Jalali and Mīrāni and the foreshore of the harbour were brilliantly illuminated with myriads of small lamps outlining the salient architectural features; and, beginning at 9 r.m., a display of fireworks was given from the high terraces of the two forts. This last exhibition was arranged by the British and Indian communities of Masqat and Matrah in honour of Lord Curzon's visit. The fleet also contributed to the magnificence of the spectacle, for, "whilst a network of coloured lanterns along the sea front and showers" "of rockets from the forts were reflected in tremulous lines of colour on" the placid waters of the bay, the ships of the squadron suddenly stood" ablaze against the deep blue sky, hulls and masts and funnels outlined in" fiery relief by the electrician's magic wand,—a vision of stately" beauty and power which startled even the stolid impassiveness of the "Arabs into admiring awe."

Darbar on H.M.S. "Argonant".

On the next day, the 19th of November, a great Darbar was held at 11-30 A.M. on board the "Argonaut", whose quarter-deck, ablaze with rich hangings and gold-embroidered carpets and draped with the flags of all nations, had been transformed into a splendid pavilion; a raised dais on the poop was reserved for the chief participants in the ceremony; and, at the opposite end, the elevated muzzles of two heavy guns frowned over the space which was about to be occupied by the body of the assemblage. Brilliant sunshine and a smooth sea lent beauty to the scene. For an hour before the commencement of the proceedings, boats containing native Darbaris continued to reach the "Argonaut"; and, as the appointed time drew near, the booming of guns announced the arrival on board first of the Naval Commander-in-Chief, then of the Sultan of 'Oman, and finally, when all were in their places, of His Excellency the Viceroy, who was received by a guard-of-honour of 100 British marines with a band. On the Viceroy's right, upon the high dais, sat His Highness the Sultan of 'Oman, on his left the Naval Commander-in Chief and the British Minister in Persia with their staffs; behind were seated the Viceroy's Private and Military Secretaries and His Excellency's Personal Staff. To the right front of the Viceroy on a lower level were placed the Political Agent at Masqat, the Sultan's half-brother Saiyid Muhammad, the heir-apparent Sayid Taimur, the Sultan's attendants, and the native spectators, all except the Political Agent in Arab costume; opposite these on the left were the representatives of the Foreign Department of the Government of India and the officers of His Majesty's ships, in full dress uniform.

Address on behalf of the Sultan. The Darbār having been declared open, the chief Arab notables were presented to the Viceroy by the Political Agent, and an Arabic address was read aloud on the Sultān's behalf by Shaikh Rāshid-bin-'Ozaia, Wāli of Samāil, His Highness's most erudite official; it was to the following effect:—

Your Excellency,—I trust it will not be amiss if I take advantage of this auspicious occasion to convey to Your Excellency some public expression of the pleasure and honour which it affords to me and mine, in the first place to be able to welcome Your two Excellencies and His Excellency the Admiral and your imposing and distinguished escort to our modest capital of 'Omān, and in the second place to be thus afforded an opportunity of manifesting our sentiments of sincere friendship and attachment to that Great Government of India, which Your Excellency directs, and to His Majesty the King-Emperor of happy name, whose Viceroy and proxy you are in these far off climes.

It is now more than a century since my forefathers first entered into treaty relations with Great Britain and that an English Resident has represented the Great Government in our Territory, and for a long period before that Masqat had been in constant commercial touch and intercourse with the English through the trading ports of India.

During that period the Rulers of 'Oman have been on terms of the closest friendship with Great Britain, and at many of those hours of need and difficulty, which are wont to arise so suddenly in an Eastern State, I and my forebears have been the grateful recipients, on innumerable occasions, of that moral and substantial support which the British Government, in the person of the Viceroy of India, has been ever ready to afford. I am therefore in no way different from my predecessors in owing a large debt of gratitude to the Viceroy of India; but there is one point in this connection in respect of which I do stand alone among the Saiyids of 'Oman, and that is in experiencing the great honour and pleasure of being able to welcome a Vicercy of India in person to Masqat, and to express my feelings to him face to face; and it is with grateful appreciation, and with the knowledge that my relations and my loval subjects will fully endorse what I say, that I declare that at no time in Masqat history, and from no Viceroy, has greater sympathy and kindness been extended to us than by this great Viceroy, Lord Curzon, whom I am privileged to address to-day. I consider myself particularly fortunate, therefore, in being able to testify before this august assemblage to the reality of our obligations and the sincerity of our appreciations of them. More than this I beg Your Excellency to believe me when I declare that neither I nor my brother nor my children, should they be called upon to follow after me, will ever cease to be mindful of the claims of that strong and ancient friendship which in time past has kept secure the bonds of union existing between Great Britain and ourselves, and that we will at all times remain loyal to those ties.

I am afraid that Masqat offers few attractions to the experienced traveller; and, except to put our houses and highways in order as far as circumstances have permitted, and to proclaim a general holiday during Your Excellencies' august presence here, there has been little that it has been possible for us to do in honour of this great occasion. In this regard I can only ask Your Excellency to call to mind the sentiments of the poet who sang:—

"It is not every thing that a man wants that he can achieve; nor can the speeding barque command the wind that she listeth."

At any rate I hope that Your Excellency and your fair and precious Lady, Her Excellency Lady Curzon, will not carry away with you from Masqat any but kindly recollections.

After the address had been interpreted by the Political Agent, Lord Curzon rose and replied in English in these terms:—

Lord Curzon's reply.

Your Highness, Your Excellency, and Gentlemen,—Your Highness has already addressed me yesterday in terms of warm welcome to your Capital and State; and to-day you have anticipated much of what I desire to say in the speech which you have just spontaneously delivered, and in which you have spoken in feeling language of the historic connection between the British Government and the State of 'Omān.

It was Your Highness's own great grandfather with whom the first Treaty was concluded with the East India Company 105 years ago. As you have further reminded me, for more than a century has a British representative been stationed at Masqat; and during that time the friendly intercourse between the two Governments has been demonstrated by a series of Treaties or Conventions of which I can trace no fewer than nine, and which have provided for the closest political and commercial relations, as well as for the suppression of the slave trade and of piracy, and for the extension of the electric telegraph. This series of agreements sufficiently testifies to the connections that have grown up between the two Governments and that have linked the State of 'Omān to the British Government by quite exceptional ties. But they have also been strengthened, as Your Highness has pointed out, by the support which has been given on critical occasions by the British Government to successive rulers of 'Omān; while a farther and natural bond of union is supplied by the fact that Masqat lies just opposite to the shores of India, that its trade is not only for the most part with India, but is largely in Indian hands, that a large number of

British Indian subjects reside here, and that the prosperity of the State is mainly dependent on these conditions. It is not surprising therefore, that the Government of India should feel a particular interest in this place, or that a Viceroy of India should desire to visit it and to make the acquaintance of its ruler. His pleasure in doing so is greatly enhanced when he learns from Your Highness's own lips that you and your children will ever be mindful of these strong and ancient obligations, and that to them you and they will always remain loyal. These are words which I shall cherish in friendly recollection not only on my own behalf, but on behalf of the Government which I represent.

Your Highness has now ruled your State for fifteen years. I had the pleasure of visiting it when you had only just succeeded fourteen years ago; and I am glad to congratulate Your Highness on the progress that has since been made. The volume of your trade is steadily increasing; the wise step which the Government of India os strongly urged on Your Highness a few years ago, of taking over the Customs of your State in preference to farming them to others, has been attended with largely increased profits; and it gave me much satisfaction two years ago, with Your Highness's permission, to bring your capital into still closer connection with the outer world by laying a telegraphic cable from Jāshk to Masqat. I also personally selected Major Cox, as an officer in whose discretion and ability I had perfect confidence, to represent the Government of India at your capital; and Your Highness has already assured me that you have found in him a prudent counsellor and friend.

At Delhi in January last, though Your Highness was unable yourself to accept my invitation to the great ceremony that we held there to celebrate the Coronation of His Majesty the King-Emperor, I had the pleasure of welcoming your son, Taimūr, and of conversing with him about the condition and welfare of 'Omān.

I have referred to the fact that the British Government have extended a peculiar measure of protection in the past to the State of 'Omān and its rulers. They have on more than one occasion intervened to save it from rebellion or disruption. Your Highness may rest assured that this policy will not be departed from. So long as the rulers of 'Omān continue to observe their Treaty engagements to the Government of India, and to administer their State with enlightenment and justice, they will continue to receive the support of the British Government, which is interested in preserving the peace of the country and the security of its trade. We cannot regard with satisfaction the attempts of discontented classes or persons among Your Highness's subjects to disturb the tranquillity of your State, because in so doing not only do they contest Your Highness's authority, but they are apt to injure the interests or British subjects also. These interests we are bound to protect for our own sake as well as for yours. We hope that Your Highness will continue to triumph over all such adversaries in the future as you have done in the past.

I trust that this important occasion, when for the first time a ruler of 'Omān and the representative in India of the illustrious British Sovereign exchange greetings in the waters of Masqat, may be a landmark in the history of the ever widening and deepening connection between our two States; that the firm friendship between them may continue to grow, and that Your Highness may be blessed with health and long life to rule over a pacified and loyal people.

I have still one agreeable function to perform. Only yesterday I received the gracious permission of His Majesty the King-Emperor to confer upon Your Highness the high honour of the Grand Cross of the Order of the Indian Empire. This distinction will be a proof to Your Highness of the sincere sentiments of friendship which are entertained towards you by the British Government; and it is also a recognition of the loyalty to which Your Highness has given such fervent expression on more than one occasion in the course of yesterday and to-day. It will now be my pleasing duty, as Grand Master of the Order, to proceed to the due and solemn investiture of Your Highness.

A translation of this speech was read by Khān Bahādur 'Abdur Rahīm Hakīm, Native Attaché in the Foreign Department, and was followed with the closest attention by the native spectators; the anouncement with which it concluded, in particular, was received with much applause. It should be mentioned that Saiyid Faisal had recently entertained an idea of abdicating in favour of his son Taimūr, and that on

the morning of the 19th Colonel Kemball and Major Cox were sent to interview the Sultan, who readily agreed to place himself, in the matter of his proposed abdication, in the hands of the British Government, and in no circumstances to take any further step in that direction except under their advice and with their concurrence. The only obstacle to his investiture had thus been removed.

The Darbār having been closed, the Viceroy retired to a robing room to prepare for the ceremony of investiture. A few moments later he returned dressed as Grand Master of the Order of the Indian Empire and resumed his seat upon the throne. A Chapter having been constituted, the Sultān was brought before him with due ceremony and was invested, according to the usual forms, with the ribbon, badge, star and collar of the Order. This concluded the proceedings, and the assembly dispersed, the native Darbāris returning to the shore in a flotilla of country boats which had lain alongside the "Argonaut" during the ceremonies, while the Viceroy, the Sultān and the Naval Commander-in-Chief also quitted the "Argonaut" in the order named, each receiving his appropriate salute as he left. The Sultān followed Lord Curzon on board the "Hardinge" in order to receive a personal interview and to bid farewell to his distinguished guest.

At this meeting, which took place at 1-15 P.M. and lasted about half-an-hour, Colonel Kemball, Major Cox and Mr. L. Dane, Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, were present. The Sultan had only two requests to make; the first was that his cousin 'Ali-bin-Salim might be allowed to return from Masgat to Zanzibar, whence he had been expelled for engaging in political intrigues; the second was that some mercy might be shown to 'Omani slave-traders who had been captured by the Portuguese in Mozambique in 1902 and sentenced to 25 years' imprisonment on the West Coast of Africa. Lord Curzon promised to see what could be done in both matters; but he considered that, as regarded the second, there was little hope for the time being that the Sultan's wishes could be gratified. At Major Cox's suggestion Lord Curzon impressed upon Saiyid Sir Faisal the desirability of his employing a financial expert or a competent committee to audit his accounts, and of his ceasing to draw in advance upon the receipts of his Customs, which were virtually the sole source of his revenue. The Sultan admitted that his expenditure was in excess of his income, but he was unwilling to make an innovation of the kind suggested; he was understood, however, to say that he would do what he could to meet His Excellency's wishes. The interview was free and informal; and the demeanour of Saiyid Sir Faisal was distinguished by dignity, courtesy and friendliness. He assured the Viceroy that he and his son Taimur were entirely at His Excellency's orders; nor did he withdraw until he had thanked His Excellency repeatedly for the honour he had conferred on him by coming to Masqat and investing him with the

The "Hardinge" left Masqat the same afternoon, accompanied by the ships of the squadron. The two days of the Viceregal visit had been observed on shore as a public holiday; and the native festivities culminated on the second afternoon, while the ships were preparing to get under way

G.C.I.E. The receipt of this decoration had evidently afforded the Sultan

much pleasure.

Close of the

Private interview of the Sultan with the Viceroy.

Departure from Masqat. in a series of native dances on the shore in front of the British Agency; these were maintained until darkness fell by 20 or 30 bands of dancers in grotesque costumes and quaint disguises.

Lord Curzon's report on his visit to Mascat. On his visit to Masqat, in its political aspect, Lord Curzon subsequently reported as follows to His Majesty's Government:—

His Highness the Sultan on all these occasions conducted himself with simpli-· city and dignity, his demeanour was that of a loyal feudatory of the British Crown rather than of an independent sovereign, and it is clear that he trusts implicitly to the British Power for support and protection. He did not plead for any further engagements, nor did he seek to extract any fresh pledge. The situation and its surroundings were evidently sufficient in his eyes to confirm him in reliance upon our friendship, and in an attitude of deference to our wishes, which is not only of good omen for the future, but which reflects the greatest credit upon Major Cox, the Political Agent whom I appointed to Masqat in 1899, and who in little more than four years has converted the ruler from feelings of suspicion, if not of direct hostility, to those of confidence and regard. On the other hand, in proportion as the desire of the Sultan to range himself so to speak, alongside of the Indian Princes in their relations to the British Crown was made manifest, so did the incongruity of his international position become more apparent: while the contradiction between the actual state of affairs with a ruler, a people, and a trade almost entirely dependent upon ourselves-and the theoretical status, under which France, represented only by a Consul, with no subjects, and next to no trade, enjoys a treaty equality with Great Britain - was such as to emphasize the desirability of terminating with as little delay as possible a situation so anomalous and it might almost be said so grotesque.

Examination of the Ruūs-al-Jibal coast, 20th November.

Early on the morning after leaving Masqat, the squadron came in sight of the Ruūs-al-Jibāl headland; and the whole day was devoted by the Vicerov and the Naval Commander in-Chief to an exploration, in the "Hardinge", of its more important and interesting inlets. On the eastern side of the promontory the "Hardinge" penetrated to the head of Ghubbat Ghazirah or Malcolm Inlet; in passing from the Gulf of 'Oman to that of Persia she made use of the famous Fakk-al-Asad strait, between Musandam island and the mainland; on her way down the western side of the peninsula she steamed slowly through the Khor Quwai channel under the shelter of Ghanam Island; and at length, early in the afternoon, she entered Khor-ash-Sham, passed Telegraph Islet on which the plinth of the old telegraph station was still visible, and anchored opposite the village of Sibi near the head of the inlet. Here Lord Curzon went ashore and ascended with a few members of his staff to the summit of the Maqlab isthmus near the point where the telegraph line formerly crossed it; from this place a fine view was obtained of the Malcolm and Elphinstone Inlets and of the surrounding mountains. In the evening the "Hardinge" dropped down Khor-ash-Sham and re-entered the open sea.

The results of this day's work were subsequently placed by Lord Curzon before His Majesty's Government in connection with the question of a British naval base in the Persian Gulf.

The visit to Sharjah, 21st November.

An anchorage off Sharjah was reached early on the following day; but Arrival off the shallowness of the water prevented the squadron from approaching Shārjāh. the shore, and a low-lying coast, with a fringe of date-palms and a line of substantial yellow buildings, was all that could be described from the decks of the ships. No salute was fired by the squadron on arrival, partly on account of the distance of the ships from the shore which was about five miles, and partly because the Shaikh of Sharjah had no means of returning one if given. A heavy swell, which was rolling in from the north-west, necessitated some changes in the official programme.

The Shaikhs of Trucial 'Oman were already collected on board the Darbar Indo-European Telegraph Department's vessel "Patrick Stewart" in charge of Mr. Gaskin, Assistant Political Agent in Bahrain; Colonel Kemball also was present, having hastened on ahead from Masqat in the "Lawrence"; and it only remained for the weather to moderate in order that the Darbar, which it was intended to hold, might take place. Eventually, but not without some difficulty, the Trucial Shaikhs-who, descendants though they were of pirates and buccaneers, had suffered severely from sea-sickness on board the "Patrick Stewart"-were transferred to the " Argonaut", where a Darbar room had been arranged on the quarter-deck in the same manner as at Masqat; and a number of the leading residents of Sharjah also were brought off to the "Argonaut" in a steam launch. The transhipment of the British spectators of the Darbar from the other ships to the "Argonaut" was attended by considerable inconvenience, on account of the heavy sea; but, the Admiral and the Vicerov having safely reached the "Argonaut" under the salutes appropriate to the occasion, the proceedings commenced at about 3-30 P.M. The ceremonial of the Darbar was much the same as at Masqat, and all officers were in full dress; but the place upon the dais at the Viceroy's right hand was filled by the Political Resident, and, Sir A. Hardinge having proceeded direct from Masgat to arrange for the impending visit of the squadron to Bandar 'Abbās, the corresponding place on His Excellency's left was occupied by the Naval Commander-in-Chief and his staff alone. A guard of honour of British marines with a band was in attendance. The Shaikhs present in person were Shaikh Zaid of Abu Dhabi with two sons; Shaikh Saqar of Shārjah and Shaikh Maktūm of Dihai, each accompanied by one son; and Shaikh 'Abdul 'Azīz of 'Ajmān alone, his son being ill: Shaikh Ahmad of Umm-al-Qaiwain, an old and infirm man who died a few months later, was represented by his son Rāshid who has since succeeded to the Shaikhship. The Shaikh of Hamriyah, who had for some time been endeavouring to assert an independence of Sharjah not recognised by the British Government, was not invited to attend. The Shaikhs present were all elderly or middle-aged men, and their dignified and independent air and the manly appearance of their followers occasioned general remark. After the Shaikhs had been formally presented to the Viceroy, His Excellency delivered an address in

II. M. "Argonant." English, which was in effect an epitome of British history in the Arab waters of the Gulf during the preceding century and ran as follows:—

Chiefs of the Arab Coast who are in Treaty relations with the British Government,—I have come here as the representative in the great Empire of India of the British authority which you and your fathers and fore-fathers have known and dealt with for more than a hundred years; and my object is to show you, that though you live at some distance from the shores of India, you are not forgotten by the Government, but that they adhere to the policy of guardianship and protection which has given you peace and guaranteed your rights for the best part of the century; and that the first Viceroy of India who has ever visited these waters does not quit them without seeking the opportunity of meeting you in person and of renewing the assurances and engagements by which we have been so long united.

Chiefs, your fathers and grandfathers before you have doubtless told you of the history of the past. You know that a hundred years ago there were constant trouble and fighting in the Gulf; almost every man was a marauder or a pirate; kidnapping and slave-trading flourished; fighting and bloodshed went on without stint or respite; no ship could put out to sea without fear of attack; the pearl fishery was a scene of annual conflict; and security of trade or peace there was none. Then it was that the British Government intervened and said that, in the interests of its own subjects and traders, and of its legitimate influence in the seas that wash the Indian coasts. this state of affairs must not continue. British flotillas appeared in these waters. British forces occupied the ports and towns on the coast that we see from this deck. The struggle was severe while it lasted but it was not long sustained. In 1820 the first general Treaty was signed between the British Government and the Chiefs; and of these or similar agreements there have been in all no fewer than eight. In 1839 the Maritime Truce was concluded, and was renewed from time to time until the year 1853 when it was succeeded by the Treaty of Perpetual Peace that has lasted ever since. Under that Treaty it was provided that there should be a complete cossation of hostilities at sea between the subjects of the signatory Chiefs, and a "perfect maritime truce"—to use the words that were employed—"for evermore"; that in the event of aggressions on anyone by sea, the injured parties should not retaliate, but should refer the matter to the British Resident in the Persian Gulf; and that the British Government should watch over the peace of the Gulf and ensure at all times the observance of the Treaty. Chiefs, that Treaty has not, of course, prevented occasional trouble and conflict; it has sometimes been neglected or infringed; but on the whole it has well deserved its name; and under it has grown up a condition of affairs so peaceful and secure that the oldest among you can only remember as a dim story the events of the past, while the younger have never seen warfare or bloodshed on the seas. It is now eleven years since the last disturbance of the peace occurred.

Chiefs, out of the relations that were thus created, and which by your own consent constituted the British Government the guardian of inter-tribal peace, there grew up political ties between the Government of India and yourselves, whereby the British Government became your overlords and protectors, and you have relations with no other Power. Every one of the States known as the Trucial States has bound itself, as you know, not to enter into any agreement or correspondence with any other Power, not to admit the agent of any other Government, and not to part with any portion of its territories. These engagements are binding on every one of you, and you have faithfully adhered to them. They are also binding in their reciprocal effect upon the British Government, and as long as they are faithfully observed by the Chiefs there is no fear that anyone else will be allowed to tamper with your rights or liberties.

Sometimes I think that the record of the past is in danger of being forgotten, and there are persons who ask—Why should great Britain continue to exercise these powers? The history of your States and of your families, and the present condition of the Gulf, are the answer. We were here before any other Power, in modern times, had shown its face in these waters. We found strife and we have created order. It was our commerce as well as your security that was threatened and called for protection. At every port along these coasts the subjects of the King of England still reside and trade. The great Empire of India, which it is our duty to defend, lies almost at your gates. We saved you iron extinction at the hands of your neighbours. We opened these seas to the ships of all nations, and enabled their flags to fly in peace. We have not seized or held your territory. We have not destroyed your independence but have

preserved it. We are not now going to throw away this century of costly and triumphant enterprise; we shall not wipe out the most unselfish page in history. The peace of these waters must still be maintained; your independence will continue to be upheld; and the influence of the British Government must remain supreme.

There is one respect, in which the Chiefs themselves can avert any renewal of trouble in the future. The British Government have no desire to interfere, and have never interfered, in your internal affairs, provided that the Chiefs govern their territories with justice, and respect the rights of the foreign traders residing therein. If any internal disputes occur, you will always find a friend in the British Resident, who will use his influence, as he has frequently done in the past, to prevent these dissensions from coming to a head, and to maintain the status quo, for we could not approve of one independent Chief attacking another Chief by land, simply because he was not permitted to do it by sea, and thus evading the spirit of his treaty obligations. I will mention a case that seems to lend itself to friendly settlement of the character that I have described. You are all of you aware that the strip of coast known as the Bātinah* Coast on the opposite side of the 'Omān Peninsula, is under the authority of the Chief of the Jowasmis. Nevertheless his authority is contested in some quarters. It is desirable that these disputes should cease, and that the peace should remain undisturbed.

Chiefs, these are the relations that subsist between the British Government and yourselves. The Sovereign of the British Empire lives so far away that none of you has ever seen or will ever see his face; but his orders are carried out everywhere throughout his vast dominions by the officers of his Government, and it is as his representative in India, who is responsible to him for your welfare, that I am here to-day to exchange greetings with you, to renew old assurances, and to wish you prosperity in the future.

An Arabic translation of this address having been read by Mr. Gaskin, Assistant Political Officer in Bahrain, handsome gifts were distributed; each Shaikh attending in person received a sword from the Viceroy's hands, besides which a gold watch and chain and a sporting rifle were given to every Shaikh, and a rifle to every Shaikh's son. As the month of Ramadhān had now begun, no refreshments were served. The Darbār was then closed, and the Viceroy, the Naval Commander-in-Chief and the Shaikhs in succession took their departure from the "Argonaut", each receiving the guns due to his rank as he quitted the ship.

In the evening the squadron with the Viceroy left Shārjah for Bandar 'Abbās.

The visit to Bandar 'Abbas, Hormuz and Qishm, 22nd November.

The anchorage off Bandar 'Abbās was reached at 8 A.M. on the morning of the 22nd November; Sir A. Hardinge had arrived in H.M.S. "Sphinx" on the previous day; and the Persian gunboat "Persepolis", which had brought the Sālār-i-Mu'azzam, Governor of the Gulf Ports, to receive Lord Curzon on behalf of His Majesty the Shāh, was with the "Sphinx" lying at anchor off the town. A salute of 31 guns was fired by the "Persepolis" in honour of the Viceroy's arrival, and a deputation was sent by the Governor in the "Persepolis" to enquire what time would be convenient for his visit; in consequence of a mistake, this deputation at first proceeded to the "Argonaut" instead of the

Arrival at Bandar 'Abhās. "Hardinge". At 11 A.M. the Governor came off from the shore and was received on the main deck of the "Hardinge", where the Shāh's message was officially delivered to the Viceroy and was acknowledged by him. Subsequently the Governor's visit was returned on shore by Sir A. Hardinge and Mr. Dane, Secretary to the Government of India in the Foreign Department, who were received by the Sālār-i-Mu'azzam in a tent upon the quay; the quay was covered with carpets, a guard-of-honour was in waiting, and the Minister's salute was fired by a shore battery.

Deputation and address of British Indian subjects. Later in the day a deputation of the British Indian subjects and traders residing at Bandar 'Abbās, over 30 in number, were received by the Viceroy on the main deck of the "Hardinge"; they were introduced by Captain Grey, Vice-Consul at Bandar 'Abbās, who accompanied the cruise from this place to Būshehr, and they presented an address of welcome which ran as follows:—

May it please Your Excellency,—We, the British Indian Subjects and Traders of Bandar 'Abbas, beg leave to offer to Your Excellency a respectful and cordial welcome.

Owing to the situation of this port at the entrance to the Gulf, the subjects of the British Empire residing in Bandar 'Abbās are privileged to enjoy the unique honour of being the first to welcome the first Viceroy of India who has visited the shores of this country.

We welcome Your Excellency to the land of ancient Īrān, a land which has passed through troubles and changes above its share, and which has ever been, and will ever be, to the rest of the world a land of absorbing interest, if only on account of its historical connections; we are, moreover, privileged to welcome Your Excellency not as a stranger, but as one who is intimately acquainted with Persia, and who takes the liveliest interest in her affairs.

The port of Bandar 'Abbās, although it is well known to be unhealthy, and has the reputation of being one of the hottest places in the world, enjoys an importance peculiar to itself. The neighbouring islands, in addition to the ruins of ancient fortresses, which were in former times scenes of encounters between powerful European Powers, abound in rich mineral cres, which will employ the attention of traders for many years to come. Our port itself, with its valuable import and export trade, may be considered the great emporium for the marts of Central and Southern Persia; and the fact that British subjects can, under the protecting hand of Government, lay claim to the greater part of this trade, is to us a source of pride and satisfaction.

Another fact which we beg to record on the present occasion is that of the establishment of a Vice-Consulate, which has taken place during Your Excellency's tenure of the Viceroyalty, and, for this marked proof of the interest taken by the Imperial Government in the advancement of our interests, we beg to offer our grateful acknowledgments. Since this Consulate has been founded our community has increased, our trade has risen to a higher level, and our merchants have penetrated into the furthest towns of Central Persia; and, although there are still adverse circumstances to contend with,—notably the absence of telegraphic communication with the outside world,—our unbounded confidence in the benignity of British rule leads us to hope for greater facilities in the future, to the increasing prosperity of British subjects, and the consequent enhancement of British prestige.

In conclusion, we desire humbly to express the hope that Your Excellency's past associations with this historic land will be strengthened by the present visit, and that of the memories of your tour in these waters not the least pleasant may be that of Your Excellency's reception by the British subjects in Bandar 'Abbās.

Lord Curzon replied to the address in the following terms:-

Lord Curzon's speech. Gentlemen,—In thanking you for your address, let me express my pleasure at meeting here a community of British Indian subjects of His Majesty the King-Emperor, enjoying the hospitality of a foreign and friendly land, and engaged in a

trade which is equally beneficial to this country and to yourselves. I am glad that Persia returns the compliment by sending a large number of her own gifted and intelligent subjects to trade in the ports of British India; for these relations are merely the continuance in modern times of a connection between Irān and India that has lasted for centuries, and that is based not merely upon geographical proximity alone, but upon original affinities of civilisation, language, and race. Bandar 'Abbas, both under its present name and under its former title of Gombrun, has also been intimately bound up with the history of British mercantile enterprise in Persia and the Persian Gulf, and I suppose that there is hardly a scene in the world that has witnessed more struggles for commercial supremacy, or has experienced more startling vicissitudes of political fortune, than the waters and islands that we can see from this very spot.

Should any one enquire why the Viceroy of India, while in the discharge of the duties of his office, should visit this place, the answer may be found in the facts which I have already mentioned, namely, in the uninterrupted historical connection which has existed between this locality and India for hundreds of years, and in the residence here of a flourishing colony of British Indian traders and trade. But the explanation goes much further than that, both in its local and in its general application; for here we are at the mouth of a sea which has been one of main and most beneficent areas of British exertion in the continent of Asia. The great maritime highway of the Persian Gulf has never failed to attract these nations who held, or aspired to hold, the ports of India; and having embarked upon the Indian enterprise in which they ultimately out-distanced all other competitors, it fell naturally to the British to pursue their successful activity in this direction, and thus gradually to acquire an ascendancy of trade and interest in the Persian Gulf which has never wavered until the present day, and which has been so far from selfish in its operation that it has brought wealth and security to the States and communities that are to be found upon these shores, has smoothed the path of every ship that navigates these waters, and has won for us the friendship and gratitude of the principal Governments, such as that of His Majesty the Shāh, with whom we have been brought in contact.

The ascendancy of which I have spoken is demonstrated by the fact that out of a total value of trade in the Gulf—including under that designation the ports on the Arab as well as on the Persian Coast, and embracing Muhammarch in the latter, but not including Basrah—amounting to nearly 6½ millions sterling in the last recorded year, 1901, close upon 5 millions of which was external trade, that is, trade with ports outside the Gulf, the British percentage of this external trade was 77, and the corresponding percentage of British steamers leaving and entering the Gulf ports was 97. If we restrict our observations to the Persian ports alone, we find that the total volume of trade in 1901 was close upon 4½ millions sterling, of which £4,232,000 was external, and that of the latter the British proportion was 66 per cent., and, the shipping by which it was carried 97 per cent. These figures show that, even in the much more acute competition that now prevails, the commercial superiority so long enjoyed by Great Britain in these seas still exists, if not unchallanged, at least unimpaired. On the other hand there are circumstances in the trade and position of Bandar 'Abbās which shew that the keenest efforts will be required to retain for this port the advantages which it has hitherto enjoyed.

You have called attention to other symptoms of Indian interest in Bandar 'Abbūs. My Government is represented here by an officer, appointed for the first time since I came to India, to safeguard the interests of British Indian trade in this place, and I am glad to learn from you that his arrival has been followed by an extension in certain aspects of your business, and that you have already derived berefit from his labours. It is to be remembered that Bandar 'Abbūs, though it has been shorn of much of its ancient fame, is the starting point from which almost immemorial caravan routes penetrate far into the interior, carrying what are for the most part British and Indian goods to the great towns of Central Persia on the north and west, and to the bazaars of Khurāsān, Afghānistān, and Central Asia on the north-east and east. This is a very important outpost, therefore, of Indian trade.

Again, let it be remembered that India is no remote country which is here busying itself at a great distance from its base. On the contrary, we are the nearest neighbours of Persia along her entire eastern frontier, firstly in the territories of Balüchistan, and

next in those of the Afghān ruler, whose foreign relations are in our hands. Countries and Powers which are thus placed in relation to each other can hardly fail to develop, and ought to encourage, the closest connections; and the more that those who are responsible for their administration see of each other and learn of each other's views and needs, the better must it be for both.

I think that I have said enough, therefore, to show that if it is a novel thing it is yet no unnatural thing that the Vicercy of India should come here to pay you a visit and to see how Indian interests and Indian subjects are faring in this allied and adjacent country. Perhaps in my own case the instification is not weakened by the fact that I have for many years taken a deep interest in Persia, and have always entertained the warmest desire that the ancient friendship between the British Government and the illustrious Sovereign of this country should be strengthened and deepened as time goes on.

Gentlemen, I concur with you in thinking that it would be a great advantage to you to be connected by telegraph with the outer world; and nothing would give me greater pleasure than to be instrumental, with the good offices of the Persian Government, in bringing about such a consummation. In conclusion let me offer you my best wishes for your continued and increasing prosperity in the future.

Visit to Hormūz and Qishm. In the afternoon the Viceregal party landed on the islands of Hormūz and Qishm, visiting the Portuguese Fort on Hormūz and the town of Qishm; the reception by the natives of Qishm of their unexpected guests was remarkable for its cordiality, and an ode in honour of the occasion was improvised and recited on the spot by a local bard. These visits to the islands afforded further material for a discussion between Lord Curzon, Sir A. Hardinge and Rear-Admiral Atkinson-Willes of the question of naval defence and strategy at the mouth of the Gulf. In the evening the town of Bandar 'Abbās was illuminated, but a display of fireworks which had been arranged was countermanded on account of the death of a Persian princess, a daughter of His Majesty the Shāh.

Examination of Hanjām, the southern coast of Qishm, and Bāsīdu 23rd and 24th November.

The squadron, which halted for the night off Qishm town, reached Hanjam at dawn on the morning of the 23rd of November, and a visit was paid to the site of the former British telegraph station; the result of the observations made here, and subsequently at Basidu, was to convince both the Viceroy and the Naval Commander-in-Chief that Hanjam was a better point than Basidu both for landing a submarine cable to establish telegraphic connection with Bandar 'Abbas, and for a signalling station at the mouth of the Gulf. From the Hanjam anchorage the "Lawrence", with the Viceroy, and H.M S. "Sphinx", carrying the Naval Commander-in-Chief, started in the early morning of the 24th and coasted along the southern shore of Qishm; a landing was made at two places near the Namakdan salt caves. In the evening the two ships reached Basidu, having followed the inner channel which adjoins the south-western corner of Qishm Island. At Bāsīdu the Viceroy's party went on shore about 5 P.M., and the site of the British station there was inspected.

Visit to Lingeh, 24th to 25th November.

Lingeh was reached on the evening of the same day, the 24th of November, the "Lawrence" and "Sphinx" being rejoined at this point by the East Indies squadron, which had parted from them at Hanjam. In the evening the town and the Persian war-vessel " Persepolis" were brilliantly illuminated, and the Viceroy entertained the Governor of the Gulf Ports and his brother, the Mujīr-us-Saltaneh, Deputy Governor of Lingeh, at a dinner on board the "Hardinge."

Arrival and dinner at Lingeh.

After dinner Lord Curzon proposed the health of the Shāh in these terms:-

I rise to propose the health of His Imperial Majesty the Shah of Persia. Two days ago, when we touched at the first port in His Majesty's dominions, I had the honour of being received by our guest of this evening, the Sālār-i-Mu'azzam, Governor of the Gulf Ports, who had been specially deputed by his royal master to greet me, and to whom it is my pleasant privilege to return the compliment this evening. A few days hence, when we arrive at Büshehr, I understand that I am further to be welcomed by one of the most distinguished of Persian statesmen, the A'la-ud-Dauleh, Governor-General of Fars, who has been specially commissioned by the Shah for that purpose. I desire to return my sincere thanks for the compliment thus conveyed to me, and to the Government which I represent, by Ilis Imperial Majesty. There is not one of us who does not feel a peculiar pleasure in touching upon Persian soil. For many centuries the British and Persian people have been connected together by the closest ties of friendship and esteem. Between India and Persia in particular there exist very intimate relations of politics, mutual interest, and trade. We hope that the friendship that has thus endured for so long may continue to grow, and that nothing may ever happen to disturb it. We entertain the warmest wishes for the integrity and welfare of His Majesty's dominions, and for the health and long rule of their illustrious Sovereign. It is with the utmost pleasure that I entertain his representative this evening, and that I now ask the present company to drink to the health of His Imperial Majesty the Shah.

The toast having been warmly received, the Governor rose and proposed the health of the King of England. He said that the Shah and every Persian cordially appreciated the great honour paid to Persia by the visit of so distinguished a representative of the British Empire. The Viceroy's visit could not fail to strengthen and increase the friendship and commercial relations which had existed for centuries between the two countries, and it was held by all as a mark of the continued interest which Great Britain took in Persia and her prosperity.

Next morning, the 25th of November, the British Minister called informally on the Deputy Governor at his house, and a large party from the "Hardinge" and the ships of the squadron went ashore. Sir A. Hardinge was successful in securing the punishment of a Persian Colonel and two soldiers who had insulted the Indian medical subordinate in charge of the quarantine arrangements at Lingeh. The same afternoon at 3 P.M. the squadron left Lingeh for Bahrain.

Other proceedings at Bandar 'Abbas.

Visit to Bahrain, 26th and 27th November.

The squadron, after a calm and cool voyage, arrived off Bahrain at 8 Arrival in A.M., on the 26th of November; but two hours more passed before the Bahrain.

"Hardinge", accompanied by the "Pomone", "Sphinx" and "Lawrence" only, had worked her way up to the inner anchorage. Meanwhile a salute of 31 guns was fired on shore; and, soon after the "Hardinge" had dropped anchor, Shaikh Hamad, the heir apparent to the Bahrain Shaikhship, and the Wazir of the Shaikh of Bahrain came on board to enquire after the Viceroy's health and to ask when His Excellency would be pleased to receive the Shaikh.

Public visit of the Shaikh to the Viceroy.

At 1-30 P. M. Shaikh 'Isa himself, accompanied by Mr. Gaskin, Assistant Political Agent in Bahrain, and attended by three sons, his grandson and his Wazir, arrived on board the "Hardinge." Guards were paraded in his honour on board H.M.S. "Pomone." The Viceroy received the Shaikh standing, and showed him to a seat at his right hand; on the right of the Shaikh were seated the Political Resident, the Assistant Political Agent in Bahrain and the Shaikh's attendants; on the left of the Viceroy were the British Minister at Tehrān, the Foreign Secretary and the Viceregal staff. Undress uniform was worn upon this occasion. A short conversation ensued in which the Shaikh referred to the prosperity of his State, attributing it to the British protectorate, thanked the Viceroy for taking so long a journey to show his interest in Bahrain, and expressed his gratitude for the formal recognition of his son Hamad as his successor, as well as his appreciation of the character of Sir L. Pelly, who had played an important part in the affairs of Bahrain nearly forty years before. After the conversation the Shaikh's sons and officials were presented to the Viceroy and, with the Shaikh, received valuable presents; the interview then terminated, and Shaikh 'Isa left the "Hardinge" under a salute of five guns. It was observed that the Shaikh kept his sandals on throughout the interview but his omission to remove them was evidently due to nervousness.

Informal visit of the Viceroy to Manamah.

In the afternoon the Vicerov with his staff paid an informal visit to the town of Manamah; he was met at the landing-place by the Shaikh, who conducted him to the British Agency. After sundown coffee was served at the Agency, and the attendants, in accordance with Arab custom, poured rose water on the hands of the guests and perfumed their beards and faces with the smoke of burning aloes. The Viceregal party then returned on board. The arrangements made for the landing and embarking of the Viceroy and his staff were inadequate, and the tide at both times was low, consequently 12 hours were lost in coming ashore and 2 hours in returning to the ship; the Shaikh also, after escorting Lord Curzon to the place of embarkation, was guilty of some discourtesy in leaving the spot before the whole party had got off in safety. For these shortcomings, however, he subsequently apologised through Colonel Kemball; and it must be remembered that the departure took place in the month of Ramadhan at sunset, when the Arabs must have been impatient to break their long day's fast.

Address by Hindu traders. After the Viceroy had left Manāmah for the "Hardinge," an address by the Hindu traders of Bahrain was brought forward; but, presented as it was unexpectedly, no opportunity for replying to it could be found. The address ran as follows:—

May it please Your Excellency,—We, the undersigned British Indian Merchants residing at Bahrain, have pleasure in taking advantage of your Lordship's visit to these Pearl Islands of the Gulf, to extend to you a most hearty welcome in the name of our community.

We hope you have had a pleasant passage on your way up the Gulf, that your short stay here will be agreeable to Your Lordship, and that your return voyage will be accomplised in safety and comfort. We consider ourselves specially fortunate in having this opportunity of meeting Your Excellency, as the Gulf was never honoured with a visit from a Viceroy of India and, as we know that Your Lordship takes a keen interest in questions affecting the Persian Gulf and the East in general, we sincerely hope and trust that this visit will be a harbinger of prosperity, felicity, and peace in the Gulf.

We beg to acknowledge the manifold blessings we have derived from the just and kind British rule. May it be known to Your Lordship that we came up to the Persian Gulf about two hundred years ago, when no steamers visited the Gulf and all business had to be done by means of sailing boats under very trying and disadvantageous circumstances. But now the times are changed, and British protection has brought with it its usual blessings—peace, safety, and prosperity—which reflects great credit on the British enterprise and civilization in the Gulf.

We have no desire on this occasion to trespass unduly on Your Excellency's precious time, but humbly venture to lay before you one or two questions of vital importance and considerable interest to Bahrain trade. This port is naturally placed in a very favourable situation for trade and is a commercial centre for Hasa, 'Oqair, Qatif, Qatar, and their hinterlands; and to accelerate the trade of this port a pier at Manamāh is absolutely necessary to enable lighters to ply at all times and tides, to give the steamers a speedy despatch. We most respectfully beg to put this want before your kind consideration.

In 1864 we opened trade relations with Qatif and did large business there. We generally command respect and enjoy some prestige in the Gulf, but, through misgovernment at Qatif, we were not only ignored but we sastained heavy losses and were exposed to insults. In 1895 one of us was attacked by pirates and his right hand was severed and pearls worth Rs. 40,000 were plundered from him. Our unprotected condition placed us at a great disadvantage there, and we had finally to retire from Qatif. Since Bahrain enjoyed unexceptionable tranquillity and great advantages for trade, both Arab and Persian traders have come and settled down here. The keen competition now prevailing here has made it necessary for us to seek new fields, and we are auxious to share in the growing trade of Qatif and Qatar, and pray Your Excellency to appoint officers at those unrepresented ports, or, if it be impracticable, to extend the authority of the Bahrain Political Agency over them.

In conclusion, we offer our prayers to the Almighty to bless and prolong the life of His Most Gracious Majesty the King-Emperor, under whose benign rule we are able to live here in peace and contentment, and we sincerely wish Your Lordship a

happy sojourn, prosperous career and long life.

On the morning of the 27th of November, at 11 A.M., a private visit was paid by Shaikh 'Isa to His Excellency on board the "Hardinge"; the Shaikh was accompanied only by Hamad, his eldest son and recognised successor. Mr. Dane, Foreign Secretary, and Colonel Kemball, Political Resident, were present; and Mr. Gaskin, the Assistant Political Agent in Bahrain, acted as interpreter. The Shaikh having stated that he had no requests to make, His Excellency referred to the murder of the Shaikh's relative, Salman-bin-Di'aij, on the Arabian mainland and advised the Shaikh to await the result of the negotiations then pending with the Porte adding that, should these fail, the propriety of taking further steps would be considered; and he also enquired what form of reparation would be acceptable to the Shaikh. The Viceroy then passed to the subject of the mismanagement of the Bahrain Customs and firmly impressed on the Shaikh the advantages and necessity of reform, not only in his own interests, but also in those of the British Government, by whom he was protected, and of the son whose title to succeed him had been recognised by the British authorities. The Shaikh showed himself very obstinate on this point and asked that the matter might be postponed during his lifetime, but this was not conceded. Eventually

Private interview of the Shaikh with the Viceroy. Shaikh 'Isa said that he would consider the subject with his sons and brother, and His Excellency admitted that this was a very proper course; but at the same time he warned the Shaikh that the matter could not be dropped, and that definite proposals for a change must be submitted shortly. After the interview had lasted more than half an hour the Shaikh took his leave.

Expected visit of the Shaikh of Dohah.

An opportunity had been arranged for Shaikh Ahmad of Dōhah in Qatar to meet the Viceroy at Bahrain for the purpose of paying his respects and stating his views concerning his relations with the British Government. Had he appeared he would have received an assurance, authorised by His Majesty's Government, that the friendship of the British Government would be continued to him so long as he abstained from entering into engagements with any other power; but, in consequence of the invitation sent by Colonel Kemball not reaching him in time, he was absent, and the assurance remained uncommunicated.

The visit to Kuwait, 28th and 29th November.

Arrival and informal visit of the Shaikh to the Viceroy.

At 10-30 a.m. on the morning of the 28th of November, the "Hardinge" reached Kuwait, whither the larger ships of the squadron had preceded her, and was accompanied by H. M. S. "Pomone" to the inner anchorage. A salute of 31 guns was fired from an antiquated battery in front of the Shaikh's residence, and the "Hardinge" had scarcely dropped anchor when Shaikh Mubārak himself stepped on board, accompanied by Colonel Kemball, the Political Resident, to enquire for Lord Curzon's health and to learn the time fixed for his official visit.

Formal visit of the Shaikh to the Viceroy.

At 3 o'clock in the afternoon, the hour appointed, he returned to the "Hardinge" accompanied only by Shaikh Jābir, his eldest son, and was received with precisely the same ceremonial and etiquette as had been observed at the formal visit of the Shaikh of Bahrain. Among the presents he received was a sword, and on taking it from His Excellency's hands the Shaikh remarked that he also required a belt, as he was now "one of the soldiers" (ahad min al 'asākir),—by which perhaps he meant a military official of the British Empire. At his departure he was honoured with a salute of five guns.

Exploration of the bay.

After the Shaikh's visit, Lord Curzon proceeded in the "Sphinx" to examine the headwaters of Kuwait Bay, in the neighbourhood of Kādhamah,— an operation which occupied the remaining hours of daylight and in the course of which the "Sphinx" was temporarily aground.

Visit of the Viceroy to Kuwait town.

At 10 A. M. on the 29th of November the Viceroy left the "Hardinge" under a salute of 31 guns from the "Pomone", and landed at Bandar Shuwaikh, a boat anchorage about three miles from the town, "where "Shaikh Mubārak, with his sons and chief retainers awaited him at the" head of a gallant gathering of Arab horsemen. The Viceroy and" Mubārak entered the only carriage which Kuwait boasts of, horses were" provided for His Excellency's suite, and then, amidst the firing of guns"

"and the guttural shouts of the Arabs, the procession set off, helter-" "skelter, for the town across the great open plain, surrounded by a crowd" "of horsemen, who galloped wildly ahead, hurled their spears or dis-" "charged their carbines in the air, curvetted, pirouetted, and went" "through all the time-honoured evolutions of an Arab field-day. "was a strikingly picturesque scene; the bright colours of the cavalcade," "their flowing robes of orange and red and golden brown flung to the" "wind as they careered about on their spirited Arab steeds; the more" "sedate and compact bodies of camelry trotting with silent footfall; the" "moving crowd of spectators shuffling along on foot; well-fed townsmen" "in their best dresses; Arabs from the desert, lean and hungry in their" "ragged 'Abas; veiled women with dark indigo cloaks thrown over their" "heads and long trailing skirts of gaudy cotton prints; black-eyed and " "brown-skinned children in every stage of undress; and in the back-" "ground, behind the black tents of a large Bedouin encampment, the " "white walls and flat roofs of the town gay with bunting, and far" "away across the pale blue waters of the bay, girt with the yellow" "desert, the fleet lying at anchor, grey and grim, with the 'Hardinge'" "all in white, conspicuous in their midst." In this reception over 200 horsemen and 20 camel riders took part, besides about 4,000 footmen, many of whom carried Martini-Henry rifles or carbines. The flag borne was a red Arab banner with the motto "Trusting in God" (Tawakkulan 'ala Allah). The Viceroy drove through the town to the Shaikh's residence on the sea front, where on his arrival a salute of 31 guns was fired. An interview followed in an upper chamber which is used by the Shaikh as a reception room and which was ornamented, on this occasion, with coloured portraits of the King and Queen of England and of Her late Majesty Queen Victoria. After the younger sons of the Shaikh had been presented to the Viceroy coffee was served. The Turkish flag, which had been flying over the Shaikh's house on the previous day, does not appear to have been hoisted on this occasion.

At 2 o'clock in the afternoon Shaikh Mubarak paid a private visit to the Viceroy on board the "Hardinge". The Shaikh, on being invited to speak, said that he had renounced his connection with the Turks and had come under the British protectorate; he had further refused the advances that had been made to him by the French and the Russians; and he hoped therefore that he might receive a title, or a decoration and an allowance. He dwelt at some length on the financial difficulties of his position. He then requested that his territory at Umm Qasr and Bubiyan might be freed of the presence of the Turks, who, he said, had seized it by stealth. To these remarks of the Shaikh Lord Curzon rejoined that he was glad to have learnt what the Shaikh had in his mind, and that he would fully consider his requests, though he could not promise that any of them would be granted. The case of the Shaikh's Basrah agent, who had been imprisoned by the Turkish Government for treason. was then mentioned; and the Shaikh was told that the British Ambassador was trying to secure a mitigation of the sentence passed upon him. Finally His Excellency reiterated the warnings which had already been given to the Shaikh through the Political Resident in the Gulf, that he should abstain from interference in the affairs of Central Arabia; the Shaikh promised to be guided by his advice in this respect, and withdrew, after repeatedly thanking the Viceroy for his visit to Kuwait and for the

Private interview of the Shaikh with the Viceroy.

protection afforded by the British Government. Mr. Dane, Foreign Secretary, and Colonel Kemball, the Political Resident in the Persian Gulf, were present at this interview.

Visit of the Shaikh to H.M.S. "Hyacinth."

From the "Hardinge" Shaikh Mubārak was taken by the Foreign Secretary on board H.M.S. "Hyacinth", the flagship of Rear-Admiral Atkinson-Willes; this was the first time that the Shaikh had set foot on the deck of a man-of-war, and he was much interested in the ship and her guns. After taking coffee in the Admiral's cabin, he left for the shore under a salute of five guns.

Departure of the Viceroy.

His Excellency the Viceroy left Kuwait at 10 p.m. the same evening in the "Lawrence", accompanied by the "Sphinx", for a visit of inspection to Khor 'Abdullah and Khor Mūsa; but the remainder of the squadron remained at Kuwait until the morning of the 1st December. The 30th of November was devoted by those who remained at Kuwait to the exploration of the town and its environs; and Her Excellency Lady Curzon with some members of the staff made a tour of the bay in a steam launch.

Lord Curzon's report on his visit to Kuwait.

In reporting the results of his tour to the Secretary of State, Lord Curzon subsequently remarked, with reference to his visit to Kuwait:—

Investigation of Khors 'Abdullah and Müsa, 30th November and 1st December.

Khor 'Ab-

The "Lawrence" and "Sphinx" entered Khor 'Abdullah early on the morning of the 30th November, and masthead flags were lowered at 6-30 A.M. in order to avoid the necessity of exchanging courtesies with Turkish posts in view of which it was necessary to pass, the existence of which was not recognised by the British Government; the first of these was the Ras-al-Qaid post on Bubiyan Island, where the Turkish flag was found hoisted. The "Lawrence" and "Sphinx" arrived at 11-30 A.M. at an anchorage below the junction of Khors Zubair and Umm Qasr, the "Lawrence" having touched slightly at the eastern end of Warbah Island through shaving the spit too closely. The Umm Qasr fort, two or three miles distant, was seen to be occupied, but no flag was visible on the flagstaff there during the stay of the ships, which lasted from 11-30 A.M. to 12-30 P.M.; in the evening, when the ships passed down Khor 'Abdullah on their return to the open waters of the Gulf, the Turkish flag was still floating over the post at Ras-al-Qaid. The entrance of Khor Musa was reached the same evening at 11-30 P.M.

Anchor was weighed at 6-30 A.M. on the morning of the 1st December, the tide being then nearly full, and the "Sphinx" and "Lawrence" proceeded to enter Khor Mūsa; but there was some delay in finding the channel. When this difficulty had been surmounted, the ships ran at full steam up Khor Mūsa to its junction with Khor Qanāqeh, and thence for a short distance up the Khor Qanāqeh branch. In the evening the "Lawrence" and "Sphinx" rejoined the squadron at a rendezvous in latitude 29° 48' north and longitude 49° 8' east.

Khor Musa.

As a result of these explorations Major Burton, Vice-Consul at Muhammareh, was ordered to investigate the land approaches to Khor Mūsa, and subsequently despatches were addressed by the Government of India to His Majesty's Government in which the extreme importance of both inlets was explained. In that relating to Khor 'Abdullah the desirability of steps being taken to secure the withdrawal of the Turks from Būbiyān Island was strongly emphasized.

Results of inspection.

No opportunity occurred for a meeting between the Viceroy and the Shaikh of Muhammareh in the territories of the latter, and it was considered inexpedient to arrange for an interview elsewhere. Shaikh Khaz'al however sent Lord Curzon a very courteous letter by the hand of Major Burton, Vice-Consul at Muhammareh, to which the Viceroy replied in a similar tone.

Correspondence with the Shaikh of Muhamananh.

The visit to Büshehr, 2nd and 3rd December.

Būshchr, which was reached on the morning of the 2nd December, was the scene of an incident by which the success and completeness of the Viceroy's tour were to some extent marred. In order that the circumstances may be understood, it is necessary to explain the arrangements which had been made with the Persian Government for the Viceroy's visit to the ports of the Persian coast.

Arrival at Bushchr.

The subject was first broached at Tehrān in a note which Sir A. Hardinge, the British Minister, addressed on the 26th of September 1903 to the Mushīr-ud-Dauleh, the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs; in this note the character and object of Lord Curzon's intended cruise were described, and it was suggested that receptions suitable to the Viceroy's rank should be arranged by the Persian Government at the places in Persian territory where he might touch. The Persian Government received the suggestion favourably, and about the 19th of October the A'la-ud-Dauleh, at the time Governor-General of Fārs was selected to welcome the Viceroy at Bandar 'Abbās on behalf of his royal master. On the 22nd of October Sir A. Hardinge informed the Viceroy of the detailed arrangements which he wished to propose to the Persian Government, and on the 25th of October Lord Curzon expressed his entire approval of Sir A. Hardinge's programme, which the Persian authorities also accepted without demur.

Preliminary arrangements with the Persian Court.

In view of this fact, and of the difficulties which subsequently arose, it is advisable that the principal items of the original programme should be

placed on record. At Bandar 'Abbās, the first port to be visited, the Persian Governor of the Gulf Ports would proceed on board the Viceroy's vessel and accompany the Viceroy ashore; at the landing place the Viceroy would be received by the Governor-General of Fārs, who would then accompany him to the British Vice-Consulate and pay him the first official visit; later the Viceroy would return the Governor-General's visit at the Persian Government House, and in the evening would dine with him. At Lingeh there would be no ceremonies of importance. At Būshehr the Governor of the Gulf Ports would visit the Viceroy on board his ship and present the Kārguzār and other Persian officials; in the evening the Governor-General of Fārs would dine with the Viceroy, and the next day would entertain him on shore at lunch or at dinner; but separate official visits would not be exchanged, these having taken place already at Bandar 'Abbās.

On the 25th of October Sir A. Hardinge had a farewell audience of the Shāh and was charged by His Majesty to convey to Lord Curzon assurances of his warm esteem, and of the pleasure which he felt at Lord Curzon's revisiting Persia; and on the 27th Sir A. Hardinge with Major Douglas, Military Attaché at Tehrān, started from Tehrān to join the Viceroy in the Gulf, leaving Mr. Grant-Duff, "Charge d'Affaires," to act as his locum tenens. The British Minister arrived at Būshehr on the 15th of November and left the same day in the "Sphinx" for Masqat, where, as we have seen, he met and conferred with the Viceroy on the 18th,

Modifications of programme introduced by the Parsian Government. Hardly had Sir A. Hardinge quitted the capital when the Persian Government began to depart from the accepted programme.

The A'la-ud-Dauleh had already commenced to make difficulties about meeting Lord Curzon at Bandar 'Abbās, which he said he could not reach in time, and he had demanded the sum of £5,000 from the Persian Government to enable him to take a large armed escort with him; but Sir A. Hardinge informed the Persian Government that it was desirable that the first meeting should take place at Bandar 'Abbas, rather than at Bushehr, and he also pointed out that, as the streets could be lined by the local garrison, the provision of a special escort was unnecessary. On the 26th of October however, before his departure from Tehran, Sir A. Hardinge was constrained to telegraph to the Viceroy inquiring whether he could visit Büshehr before Bandar 'Abbās, as the Governor-General of Fars was travelling with a large retinue and asked for more time to make his preparations. To this Lord Curzon on the 28th of October replied that, in consequence of engagements already undertaken, it was impossible that the order of his tour should be altered. On the 29th of October it became certain that the Governor-General of Fars would not meet the Viceroy at Bandar 'Abbas, and that it would be necessary to agree to a reception there by the Governor of the Gulf Ports. Subsequently, on the 11th of November, the Persian Government officially informed Mr. Grant-Duff at Tehran that the Salar-i-Mu'azzam, Governor of the Gulf Ports, would receive the Viceroy on the 22nd of November at Bandar 'Abbas, and that the A'la-ud-Dauleh would meet him at Bushchr on the 2nd of December. As we have already seen, the Sālār-i-Mu'azzam did, in accordance with this arrangement, meet Lord Curzon at Bandar 'Abbas: but His Excellency did not land as he would have done had the Governor-General of Fars been present there, as at first intended.

The second modification which the Persian authorities desired to introduce into the programme was of a more serious character, and their efforts to obtain it gradually brought about a situation in which Lord Curzon found himself obliged to decline landing at Büshehr. The first step was an offer made by the Persian Government on the 27th of October-the day of the British Minister's departure from Tehranto provide a residence for the Viceroy at Bandar 'Abbās and another at Bushehr; the terms in which the offer was made seemed to imply that the Persian Government expected the Viceroy to live on land during his stay at both places instead of on shipboard, and Lord Curzon accordingly asked Sir A. Hardinge to explain to the Persian Government the reasons which made it difficult for him to take up a fixed residence on shore. The Persian Government, however, continued to press their offer, and, on the 28th of October requested that the Viceroy would consider the house which they would provide as being an official residence for the reception of visitors on land; their invitation, as reported by the British Chargé d'Affaires at Tehran, concluded with the significant "phrases—"This will enable the Governor-General of Fars to pay the" "Viceroy the first visit. If the Viceroy has not an official residence" "provided by the Persian Government, the latter wish the following" "change to be made in the programme :- The Governor-General of Fars" "to receive the Viceroy at the landing place, and to proceed together to the" "Persian Government House, where the former will receive the Viceroy."

This was the first indication that the question was regarded by the Persians otherwise than as one of courtesy merely; but as they asked for an immediate reply, it seemed that they attached some importance to its settlement. On the 29th of October Sir A. Hardingethen at Kāshān on his way to Būshehr-recommended, in order to save discussion, the acceptance by Lord Curzon, at Bushchr at least, of a pro forma official residence on shore for the purpose of receiving the Persian Governor-General's official call; and the Viceroy on the same day decided to act upon this recommendation and also agreed to the proposal, advanced by the Persian Government on the 28th, that he should accompany the A'la-ud-Dauleh to the Persian Government House.

On the 30th of October further light was east upon the attitude of Negotiations. the Persian Government by a verbal message which the Mushir-ud-Dauleh sent to Mr. Grant-Duff, the British Chargé d'Affaires at Tchran; it was to the effect that the Persian Government expected the Viceroy to make the first visit unless he had an official residence provided by the Persian Government. This suggestion elicited a vehement protest from Sir A. Hardinge, who had now reached Isfahan in the course of his journey; and, on receipt of the Minister's letter from that place, about the 12th of November, the Mushir-ud-Dauleh endeavoured to repudiate his message to Mr. Grant-Duff. His explanations were incredible, for the message had been conveyed through Nawwab Husain Quli Khan, an official of the Persian Foreign Office, in consultation with whom Mr. Grant-Duff had drawn up his telegram reporting the message and by whom a copy of the telegram had been taken away for the information of his chief.

On the 2nd of November it transpired that the Governor-General of Fars would reside, during Lord Curzon's stay at Büshehr, at a house which was five miles from Büshehr and was connected with the town only by a very inferior road; also that he proposed to give the official Persian banquet in Lord Curzon's honour at this highly inconvenient place. The Viceroy, who at this time was suffering from indisposition, on becoming aware of these circumstances gave it to be known that, unless the banquet could be arranged in some Persian official residence at Büshehr town, he would be willing to dispense with the compliment-altogether.

Later it appeared that the house selected by the Persian Government for the Viceroy's residence on shore was one known as the Mid-hatnd-Dauleh's (or the Malik's) at Rishehr, * very difficult of access from Bushehr; and on the 22nd of November the Persian Government enquired whether the Viceroy would prefer this house or the Persian Government House, generally known as the Chaharburj, at Bushehr; in asking this question the Mushir-ed-Dauleh intimated, not obscurely, that it was hoped the Mid-hat-ud-Dauleh's house would be chosen. the 25th of November Sir A. Hardinge, replying on behalf of Lord Curzon to the Persian Government's inquiry of the 22nd, explained that the Mid-hat-ud-Dauleh's house was unsuitable, and proposed that, unless the official residence for the Viceroy could be provided in Bushehr town, the A'la-ud-Dauleh should pay his ceremonial visit to Lord Curzon on board ship or, preferably, at the British Residency at Bushehr. next day, the 26th, orders were given by the Persian Government to prepare the Chaharburj for His Excellency's reception; but, notwithstanding this, on the 27th a hint was indirectly conveyed to Sir A. Hardinge that the Shah would be annoyed, and would probably attribute it to the Minister's advice, if the Chahārburi were selected instead of the Midhat-ud-Dauleh's house. It should be noted that when Sir A. Hardinge met Lord Curzon at Masqat he did not anticipate any trouble about the arrangements at Bushehr; nor, indeed, did the difficulty become serious until the arrival at the latter port.

On the 30th of November Colonel Kemball arrived at Bushehr from Kuwait, and had an interview with the A'la-ud-Dauleh and his assistant, Nawwab Husain Quli Khan, C.B., the Persian Foreign Office functionary once already mentioned; this individual belonged to a family having connections with India, he had for may years been First Secretary of the Persian Legation in London, he spoke English and French. he had accompanied the Shah on his European tour of 1902, and on the present occasion he was attached to the Governor-General of Fars as a representative of the Persian Foreign Office. At his interview with Colonel Kemball the A'la-ud-Dauleh announced that he had received distinct orders from his Government and from the Shah which precluded his paying the first visit to the Vicerov at the British Residency; while Colonel Kemball on his side pointed out that, as the A'la-ud-Dauleh was himself occupying the Chahārburj, it could not be regarded as the Viceroy's exclusive residence, and that an interchange of visits between the two while occupying the same building would be little better than a farce. Various alternative arrangements were then discussed, and

^{*}The Mid-hat-d-Dau leh or Malik-u-Tujjār was a former Governor of the Gulf Ports

it was finally proposed that a house in Būshehr, on the sea face near the British Residency, which had been occupied by the late Kārguzār, should be prepared for the Viceroy's use; this was the "Amīrīyeh," a house built, and formerly occupied by the Darya Baigi, Governor of the Gulf Ports. Regarding this suggestion the A'la-ud-Dauleh promised to consult the Mushīr-ed-Dauleh at once by telegraph, for, the Shāh being now at Qum, his personal orders could no longer be obtained. Colonel Kemball at this time reported that great trouble had been taken by the A'la-ud-Dauleh in providing proper landing accommodation, and also in preparing the Chahārburj.

On the first of December Mr. Grant-Duff at Tehran visited the Mushir-ud-Dauleh, by whom he was informed that it was quite impossible that the Governor-General of Fars should visit the Viceroy at the British Residency, but that a telegram had been sent to the A'la-ud-Dauleh directing that either (1) another house should be prepared as the residence of the Viceroy, where the first visit should be paid him by the Governor-General, or (2) when the Vicerov arrived he should be conducted to the Chaharburj and there receive the Persian official visit; the Mushirud-Dauleh added that the programme had been approved by the Shah and could not be altered further, and that Lord Curzon, being the guest of the Shah, could not be allowed to occupy any but a Persian house. the same day a second interview took place at Bushehr between Colonel Kemball and the A'la-ud-Dauleh, at which the latter stated that the "Amīrīyeh", then in the occupation of the Persian Imperial Customs, had been chosen for the Viceroy's official residence; and that he, the A'laud-Dauleh, would accompany Lord Curzon to it from the Chaharburj and pay him the first visit there. The Sālār-i-Mu'azzam, alarmed at the turn matters were taking, now feigned sickness and asked for the services of the British Residency Surgeon.

Such was the position of affairs when Lord Curzon arrived off Bushehr on the 2nd of December, and it was immediately placed before him by Sir A. Hardinge. The "Amīrīyeh" could not be properly arranged in time, and it was out of the question that Lord Curzon should reside under the same roof as the A'la-ud-Dauleh, as in that case it would be believed in Persia that no visit had been paid him by the Persian representative. After consultation it was decided that, as no suitable house had been provided by the Persian Government, adherence should be required to the spirit of the original programme, by which the A'la-ud-Dauleh was bound to pay the first visit to the Viceroy at a British consular building. Sir A. Hardinge accordingly telegraphed to Mr. Grant-Duff, informing him that, at the desire of the Viceroy, the A'la-ud-Dauleh had been told that Lord Curzon must respectfully decline to land at Büshehr until he was assured that those courtesies would be paid him which he would receive in accordance with official etiquette in any other country, and that the reception had accordingly been postponed. Mr. Grant-Duff was further requested to make the necessary representations at Tehran, and he immediately proceeded to visit the Mushir-ud-Dauleh; but it was now the turn of that functionary to pretend to be ill, and the British Chargé d'Affaires was only unsuccessful in seeing his son, who stated that the 'Ain-ud-Dauleh had received the Shah's personal commands to prohibit the A'la-ud-

Decision of the Viceroy not to land at Bushehr.

Dauleh from accompanying the Viceroy to the British Residency and from visiting him there. Mr. Grant-Duff then went in search of the 'Ain-ud-Dauleh, but that official also succeeded in eluding his visit, although Mr. Grant-Duff remained in attendance at his house until 10 P.M. The same day, in compliance with telegraphic orders from Sir A. Hardinge, Mr. Grant-Duff addressed a note to the Mushir-ud-Dauleh, informing him that the Vicerov had explained to the Governor-General of Fars through the British Political Resident that the positive refusal of the Persian Government to authorise the ordinary courtesy of a first visit at the British Residency made the question one of principle, involving the dignity of His Majesty's Government, on which His Excellency could not compromise; that the Viceroy was accordingly compelled to abandon the idea of landing at Bushehr; and that he would sail for India on the evening of the next day. This note remained unanswered until the 5th of December, and the squadron left Bushehr on the evening of the 3rd.

Reasons for the decision. The reasons for declining the offer of the "Amīrīyeh" were that it was a hurried makeshift, acceptance of which would compromise the dignity of the Viceroy in the eyes of the Persian people, and that, after the stratagem used by the Persians to inveigle the Viceroy into paying an apparent first visit to the A'la-ud-Dauleh at the Chahārburj, it was necessary to make that dignity apparent by insisting on the Persian official visit being paid at the British Residency *; nevertheless the refusal was tempered by an offer on the part of Lord Curzon to make use of either the "Amīrīyeh" or the Chahārburj after the official visits had been exchanged.

Other difficulties.

Two other questions which entered into discussion had assisted to aggravate the controversy. The first was that of salutes. At Bandar 'Abbas no difficulty arose in connection with salutes; the port was saluted by the British flagship with 21 guns, which the Persian gunboat "Persepolis" returned; 31 guns were fired also by the Persians in the Vicerov's honour : and the Sālār-i-Mu'azzam on boarding the "Hardinge" was received with a salute of 17 guns. On behalf of the Vicerov a salute of 31 guns was at first claimed at Bushehr, this being the number ordinarily fired in his honour by the Governors of the French and Portuguese possessions in India; but the Persian Government, in promising to allow the Vicerov 31 guns at Bushehr, stipulated that the Governor-General of Fars should receive an equal number in case he visited any of the British ships. Lord Curzon had no objection to this arrangement; but, as under the British Admiralty Regulations not more than 19 guns could be fired in honour of the Persian Governor-General, it had to be renounced; and Lord Curzon consented to be received with 21 guns, the number originally proposed by the Persian Government. The second point occasioning friction was a suggestion which had been made to the A'la-ud-Dauleh, that, instead of paying the first visit to the Vicerov at the British Residency, he should pay it on board the "Hardinge." This suggestion was not strongly pressed, nevertheless it was misrepresented

^{*} In 1906 it was ascertained that it had always been the custom for the Governor of the Gulf Ports to pay the first visit to a British Admiral arriving at Büshehr, and that at the British Residency in the town. In April 1906 the Governor went even further and paid the first visit to Vice-Admiral Sir E. Poë on board the British flagship.

by the A'la-ud-Dauleh to his Government as an arbitrary demand that he should come off to the Viceroy's ship "like the Sultān of Masqat," and also as having been made by the British authorities an indispensable condition of the Viceroy's landing. The A'la-ud-Dauleh also failed to return an official call which was paid him by the British Naval Commander-in-Chief.

The incident, terminated on the spot, immediately became the subject of diplomatic discussions in which the initiative was taken by the Persian Government; on the 9th of December the Persian Minister in London informed Lord Lansdowne of the facts as communicated to him by the Persian Government and drew His Lordship's attention to "the very discourteous action of the Viceroy, which would be extremely" injurious to the relations of the two Governments."

Subsequent discussions.

On the minuter features of the controversy which followed it is unnecessary to dwell. The opinion of His Majesty's Government, reached on the 12th of January 1904, was that the matter was not one justifying a demand for a formal apology from the Persian Government. In the first place it could not, according to international practice, be claimed as of right that the Viceroy should be received as the King's representative when visiting, in the course of a tour, the dominions of an independent sovereign at whose court the King was already represented by a duly accredited Envoy: all that could be asked was that he should be treated with the courtesy and respect due to an official of the highest Again, there was no precedent for the claim that a Persian Governor should conduct a foreign representative, or official of whatever rank, to the Consulate of his country and there pay him the first visit; on the contrary, the ceremonial insisted on by the Shah was in exact accordance with the procedure laid down by the protocol of Turkmanchai for the reception of foreign Ambassadors in Persia. Besides, it would be difficult to argue that there was any want of courtesy or friendliness in the programme proposed by the Shah, inasmuch as it had been at first accepted in full by Lord Curzon. Nor was it unnatural for the Shah to feel that, by the adoption of the ceremonial desired by Lord Curzon, he might appear to acknowledge a claim on behalf of the Viceroy to some pre-eminent authority in a part of Persia; and, moreover, the ceremonial at Bushehr would form a precedent for the reception of a Russian Governor-General in Northern Persia.

Accordingly, on the 25th of January, a memorandum was delivered to the Persian Minister in London in which it was stated that His Majesty's Government saw no advantage in a discussion of the details of the incident; that they fully appreciated His Majesty the Shāh's desire to give a fitting and honourable reception to the Viceroy; and that they greatly regretted that His Imperial Majesty's intentions should have been defeated by local difficulties and objections: at the same time they thought that the arrangements made at Būshehr were hardly in accordance with the Shāh's courteous intentions, and they considered that the main responsibility for the unfortunate failure must rest with the Persian authorities. Attention was also drawn to the A'la-ud-Dauleh's omission to return the British Admiral's call.

The Persian Government, however, did not accept this view of the case, and the discussion was almost immediately re-opened in consequence

of a statement by Lord Percy in the House of Commons on the 3rd of February 1906, that "the form of ceremonial originally arranged between" "the Persian Government and His Majesty's Minister at Tehrān was" "subsequently modified by the former in certain particulars before the" "Viceroy's arrival at Būshehr," and that "the desire and intention" "expressed by His Majesty the Shāh of showing courtesy and hospita-" "lity to the Viceroy was unhappily frustrated owing to the arrangements" "locally made." On the 22nd of February the Persian Government, through the Persian Minister in London, formally signified their dissent from Lord Lansdowne's memorandum of the 25th January and their own opinion that the British officials were responsible for the Būshehr incident.

King Edward's message to the Shah.

The matter was now submitted to His Majesty King Edward. His Majesty was pleased to approve Lord Lansdowne's memorandum of the 25th January, and he commanded a special message to be conveyed to the Shah. In this message, while emphasis was laid on the friendly sentiments animating both nations and on the cordial reception given to the Viceroy at Bandar 'Abbās, it was intimated that the King was unable to consider that the proposals made by Lord Curzon and Sir A. Hardinge as to the ceremonial at Bushehr were in excess of what was suitable, or that the Viceroy was otherwise than justified in deciding that the alternatives offered to him were not such as could properly be accepted; but it was added that, in view of the friendship happily existing between the two countries, it would be a mistake to make the incident the subject of prolonged discussion. About the 23rd of March the A'la-us-Saltaneh, the Persian Minister in London, had an audience of the King at which a communication in the above terms was made to him, and the message was also sent to Sir A. Hardinge at Tehran for delivery to the Shah. When the royal message was delivered by Sir A. Hardinge to the Mushir-ud-Dauleh, a special audience of the Shah not having been deemed necessary,—it was found that the Persian Minister in London had conveyed to his Government an erroneous idea of the purport of the message, and efforts were thereupon made by the Persian authorities to obtain a modification of its terms. This was of course refused, and the British Minister at Tehran was cautioned to avoid using any expression which might be construed as an apology. The affair thus terminated.

Misrepresentations by the Persian Government.

While these discussions were in progress, the Persian officials and Government did not neglect means of giving currency to their version of the case. Shortly after Lord Curzon's departure an article appeared in the Persian newspaper "Muzaffari" at Büshehr, in which it was stated that, according to the arrangements agreed upon, the Viceroy was to have visited the A'la-ud-Dauleh first at the Chahārburj and that his call was to have been returned at the "Amīrīyeh", and the whole incident was represented as a striking example of British bad faith. It was believed that this article was inspired by the A'la-ud-Dauleh; but the Sālār-i-Mu'azzam showed scant consideration for the editor, whom he arrested and caused to be bastinadoed on the 11th of December. On the 25th of January 1904 the Persian Foreign Minister sent a cypher telegram to the Yamīn-i-Nizām in Sīstān in which, various essential particulars being suppressed, a misleading account was given of the arrangements for the Viceroy's visits to Bandar 'Abbās and Būshehr

and the breakdown was attributed to Lord Curzon's insistence that he occupy, and be conducted by the A'la-ud-Dauleh to, the British Residency instead of the house provided by the Persian Government. In the beginning of March 1904 a further written communication was received by the Yamīn-i-Nizām in which the false statement was added that the Viceroy had demanded that the A'la-ud-Dauleh should come on board his ship and conduct him ashore "as the Imam of Masqat had done": this second communication was in the form of a circular addressed by the Persian Minister for Foreign Affairs to all Persian Ambassadors and Ministers at Foreign Courts and it was dated the 14th of January 1904. Finally on the 12th of July 1904 the Persian Foreign Minister telegraphed to the Yamin-i-Nizam that the King of England had "personally expressed his regret" to the Persian Minister in London,

and that the incident might be considered closed.

That the Persian Government originally intended to give the Viceroy a highly honorific reception does not admit of doubt, nor that the visit was at one time within measurable distance of being an unprecedented and unique success. A friendly article which appeared in the Tehran newspaper "Iran" of the 3rd November 1903 exemplified the general state of feeling in Persia at the outset. The A'la-ud-Daulch, who was deputed to meet Lord Curzon, was a Qājār of the Persian royal family; he brought with him, to do honour to the Viceroy, 2,000 men from Shīrāz besides the chiefs of many of the principal tribes in Southern Persia; and he incurred lavish expenditure in decorations and other preparations at Bushehr. According to a statement made afterwards by the Mushir-ud-Dauleh it had been arranged that, during the banquet to be given in honour of the visit by the A'la-ud-Dauleh, a personal telegram should be received by the Viceroy from the Shah, conferring upon him the order of the "Timsal" in diamonds, which is usually bestowed on special Ambassadors. After the incident it seemed to be expected that the A'la-ud-Dauleh would be made a scape-goat, for he showed signs of great perturbation and disappeared suddenly from Bushchr on the 9th of December 1903, giving out that he was going to Basrah, but on the following day he unexpectedly returned. In February 1904 he was summoned to Tehran on business, and in the course of the year he temporarily lost his employment under Government, but the cause remained unknown. It is noteworthy that soon after Sir A. Hardinge's return to Tehran at the end of January 1904, at an andience which he had of the Shah, His Majesty's demeanour was extremely gracious and he made friendly inquiries about the Viceroy without referring at all to the Bushehr episode.

The unfortunate occurrence at Büshehr may probably be attributed, in part, to a remonstrance which it had been necessary to address a few days previously to the Persian Government with respect to Sistan affairs; in part to a fear, which gradually overcame the Shah, that the reception of Lord Curzon in the manner that the latter desired might be construed as an admission that the Viceroy of India enjoyed an exceptional position in regard to the coast of Southern Persia; and, in part, to wilful misrepresentations by the A'la-ud-Dauleh, who was possessed by inflated ideas of his own importance. It is possible also that the Viceroy's visits to Hormuz, Qishm and Hanjam may have produced an impression which

was not anticipated upon the Persian mind.

Good intentions of the Persian Government.

Explanation and results of the inciOn the whole the Persian Government, who posed as the aggrieved party yet did not obtain the reparation which they sought, must be regarded as having had the worse of the diplomatic encounter. The failure of the Būshehr visit probably gave satisfaction in some quarters, and the A'la-ud-Dauleh received a letter from the Russian Consul-General at Būshehr, of which he made free display, congratulating him on having struck a notable blow in the cause of Persian independence. As reported by His Highness the Agha Khān of Bombay, the non-official classes in Persia were much annoyed at the failure of the visit to Būshehr and ascribed the action of the Government at Tehrān to Russian influence.*

Deputation of British subjects and address by Lord Curzon. To return from this digression: on the afternoon of the 3rd December, before leaving Büshehr, the Viceroy received on board the "Hardinge" a large deputation of British subjects and residents, who presented an address of welcome. The address was couched in the following terms:—

May it please Your Excellency,—We, the British and British Indian subjects of His Majesty King Edward VII, Emperor of India, beg to offer to Your Excellency, on this memorable and auspicious occasion, our respectful welcome to Būshehr, and to express the gratitude which we feel towards Your Excellency for having deigned to visit these shores.

As residents of Büshehr, the most important trade centre in the Persian Gulf, and the place, which (since the year 1763) has been the headquarters of British commerce in the Gulf, we feel that our claim is a good one to welcome Your Excellency on behalf of the whole community of British subjects throughout the south of Persia.

Your Lordship will no doubt have observed that Būshehr possesses few natural facilities as a harbour and port of call for our steamers. Its position, however, as the starting point of the principal caravan route from the south into the interior of Persia, and the fact that it has been, for more than a century, the headquarters of the Resident in the Persian Gulf (an officer serving under Your Excellency's orders), have given it a special importance of both a commercial and political nature.

Of late years the stress of foreign competition has been somewhat severely felt, and we were, at one time, afraid that the interests of British trade might be to some extent forgotten. The recent action, therefore, of His Majesty's Government, in concluding a separate Commercial Agreement with Persia, thereby preventing any further alteration of the Customs Tariff without the consent of His Majesty's Government, is gratifying to us, as being a welcome, though perhaps a tardy proof, that our interests are not being neglected. We may also allude to the recent Commercial Mission to this country, and the advantages of the more rapid mail service, for which, we believe, we have to thank Your Excellency's Government, as further proofs that our Government is alive to our welfare.

We think there are several points of interest deserving consideration, amongst which we would mention the want of harbour facilities, the inadequate arrangements for the landing and delivery of cargo, and the great necessity for the improvement of the caravan communication with the interior. It would also be satisfactory if the Persian Government could carry out a scheme of reform, which, we have reason to believe, has for some time engaged the attention of its European advisors, for insuring the more rapid and efficient settlement of commercial claims. At present, complaints are frequent as to the difficulty of obtaining such settlement, owing to the dilatoriness of the existing procedure, the frequent conflict between concurrent authorities, and the consequent difficulty of procuring execution of judgments, even after they have been pronounced. We trust that the scheme of reform, to which we have ventured to allude above, will do something to remedy these evils.

It is a source of special gratification to us that it is Your Excellency who is the first Vicercy of India to pay a visit to the Persian Gulf. Your Lordship's interest in Persia is well known; the country and its politics are known to no one better; and the book which was written by Your Excellency some 13 years ago, still retains its place

^{*}Four years later the fact of Russian interference and irrefragable proof.

as the standard work on Persia in any language. We take this visit therefore to be a signal proof that Your Excellency's interest in the country remains unabated; and if we may be allowed to say so, it gives us a special encouragement in our endeavours to maintain the pre-eminence of British trade in the Persian Gulf and south of Persia.

We should take this opportunity of expressing our high appreciation of the valued assistance rendered to British interests and commerce by our esteemed Resident, Colonel Kemball.

In conclusion, Your Excellency, whilst reiterating most respectfully four welcome, we trust that Your Excellency's tour in these waters has been a pleasant one, and that Your Lordship will carry back to India not unpleasing recollections of your visit.

We beg to subscribe ourselves on behalf of the British and British Indian Community of Bushehr.

Your Excellency's Humble Servants,

E. GENTLEMAN.
G. C. GUNNING.
G. A. LAWES.
W. VAN LENNEP.
T. J. MALCOLM.
HAJI HABEEB ABDUL GANI.

Members of the deputation.

Būsненв;

The 4th December 1903.

To this address Lord Curzon replied as follows:—

Gentlemen,—I am very glad to see you here, and to receive your friendly address. I am sorry to have been prevented from receiving you on shore, when I might have been introduced to an even larger number of British residents and merchants at this important place.

A Viceroy of India coming to Bushehr in the year 1903, though he be the first occupant of that position to visit these waters during his term of office, is irresistibly remoded of his precursors a century gone by. He is, indeed, the logical as well as the historical successor of Sir John Malcolm, who came here more than once just a hundred years ago; and he is the latest link in an unbroken sequence of Political officers who have been deputed from India to represent British and Indian political interests, and to protect their corresponding commercial interests, in this neighbourhood since the appointment of the first Political Agent as far back as 1812. Even the British interests had been represented here for as much as half a century; since it was in 1763 that the East India Company first opened a factory at Bushehr. At that time one vessel a year from India was sufficient to accommodate the whole of British trade. In 1902, 136 steamers entered this port, and of these 133 were British. In the last twenty years the imports have increased from 135 lakhs, of which 117½ were from Great Britain and India, to 201½ lakhs in 1901, of which 152½ lakhs were tritish and Indian. In the same period the imports of tea trom India have risen from a value of Rs. 65,000 to a value of close upon 10 lakhs. These figures do not leave much doubt as to where the preponderance of trade lies.

This history of 140 years is without a parallel in the connection of any other foreign nation with these coasts; under it have grown up connections with the local Governments and peoples of close friendship and confidence; it is a chapter of history upon which we have every right to look back with pride; and it imposes upon us obligations which it is impossible that we should overlook, and which no Government, either of Great Britain or Iudia, is likely to ignore.

Rushehr is the headquarters of this long-standing connection. From here the British Resident exerts that mild control over the waters of the Gulf, and over the tribes upon its opposite shore, the results of which I have enjoyed so many opportuni-

ties of observing during my present cruise. From this place the principal caravan route strikes into the interior of Persia, tapping its chief cities in succession, and ultimately reaching the capital; here the wires of the Indo-European telegraph which in their earlier stages have brought Persia into connection with Europe, which nave done so much to strengthen the authority of the Shāh in his own dominions, and which carry the vast majority of the messages from India to England, dip into the sea; here is the residence of the Persian official who is charged with the Governorship of the Persian Gulf Ports by his Government, with whom our relations are invariably those of the friendliest nature; and under these combined auspices—the British bringing the bulk of the trade and policing the maritime highway and the Persians gradually consolidating an authority which, though once precarious, is now assured—this place has grown from a small fishing village into a flourishing town of 20,000 inhabitants; it has become the residence of foreign Consuls and Consular officers; the leading mercantile communities who trade in Southern Persia and Turkey have their offices and representatives here; there is seldom a day in which steamers are not lying off the port; and Būshehr has acquired a name which it is safe to say is known in every part of the world.

This development is the more remarkable because, as you have pointed out, no one could contend that trade is conducted here under favourable conditions; on the contrary there are few, if any, of the conditions that naturally mark out a place as an emporium or channel of commerce. Bushehr can hardly be said, even by the widest stretch of imagination, to possess a harbour. Landing is difficult and often impracticable. The trade-route that penetrates into the interior is one of the most difficult in Asia; and in land you do not find a people enjoying great wealth or a high standard of comfort or civilisation, but instead you encounter tribes leading a nomadic form of existence; and even when you come to the settled parts of the country and the larger cities, the purchasing power of the people does not appear to be great. The fact that a large and flourishing trade has grown up in spite of these drawbacks is an irrefutable proof of the dependence of Persia upon cutside supply for many of the necessities and most of the luxuries of life. Since I first visited Bushehr fourteen years ago I have always indulged the hope that, as time passed on, progress would be made in all these directions, and I agree with you in thinking that the Persian Government could embark upon no more remunerative form of expenditure than the improvement both of the maritime and the inland approaches to this place.

During the time in which I have filled my present office in India I have done my best to facilitate the progress of trade, and to ensure the adequate protection of British interests in the Gulf and in the adjoining provinces and territories. His Majesty's Government at home have also been warmly interested in the matter. The result of these efforts has been that we have gradually developed the Nushki-Sistan traderoute, which is now a recognised channel of commerce to Eastern Persia. We have appointed a Consul in Sistan, and are about to extend the telegraph thither. We now have Indian officers residing as Consul at Kirman, and as Vice-Consul at Bandar 'Abbas, where we are about to build a Consular residence; we have connected Masqat by cable with Jashk, and we hope for further telegraphic extensions in the interests of trade. We have established a Political Agent at Bahrain, and we now have a Consul at Muhammareh and a Vice-Consul at Ahwāz. The Kārun trade-route has made substantial progress, and has been supplemented by the newly opened road, with caravanserais and bridges, through the Bakhtiyari country to Isfahān. A British Consul has also been appointed to Shīrāz. We have improved and accelerated the mail service to all the Gulf ports. British India steamers now call at Kuwait as well. During the same period British medical officers have been lent by us to the Persian Government to conduct the quarantine arrangements in the Gulf. Simultaneously British interests have found a most vigilant spokesman at Tehran in His Majesty's Minister, Sir Arthur Hardinge, who has been good enough to accompany me throughout my present journey, and with whom I have enjoyed many opportunities of discussing common interests of the Home and Indian Governments in Persia. I hope that our discussions may be fraught with advantage to the interests that we jointly represent.

Altogether, Gentlemen, I think it may be said that in Büshehr, you receive an amount of attention that is not always extended in similar measure to places so remote from head-quarters, while the fact that a British Resident lives in your midst and is able personally to look after your concerns, which I am glad to learn from your address

that he does entirely to your satisfaction, is a further guarantee for their protection. I hope that the position which British interests thus enjoy, and which is neither artificial in origin nor recent in growth, since it is the result of nearly a century and a half of patient and laborious effort both by Government and by private enterprise, may long be maintained, and that Büshehr may continue in the future, as it has done in the past, to be the centre from which this benign and peaceful influence radiates throughout Southern Persia and the Persian Gulf.

Soon after the conclusion of this ceremony Sir A. Hardinge took leave of Lord Curzon and returned to the British Residency, whence he proceeded a few days later to Muhammareh and the Kārūn, afterwards returning vid Basrah, Baghdad and Kirmanshah to Tehran. The squadron also dispersed, H. M. S. "Fox" alone remaining on duty with the Viceroy and being despatched in advance to the port of Pasni in British Makran. Shortly before midnight the "Hardinge" left her anchorage off Bushehr and the return voyage to India was commenced.

Departure from Būsh-

End of the cruise, 4th to 7th December.

On the 4th of December the Persian coast remained in sight to the Voyage down northwards during the greater part of the run. Bare mountains, cleft by ravines and totally devoid of vegetation, appeared to rise directly from the water's edge though really distant many miles inland; here and there small fishing villages of a few huts, surrounded by trees, could be descried upon the shore. Rocky islets, among them Hindarabi, Qais and Farur, were passed by daylight, and, rounding Ras Musandam by night, the "Hardinge" again entered the Gulf of 'Oman. On the morning of the 5th of December she reached Jashk, where "the mountains in the back-" "ground are as bare as on other parts of the coast, but under the Eastern" "sun they present every shade of colour, from lilac and ochre to an" "almost ashen white."

the Gulf.

After a short halt at Jashk for the purpose of despatching and receiving telegraphic messaages, the "Hardinge" proceeded on her way to Pasni, where she arrived early on the 6th of December and was received with the usual honours by H. M. S. "Fox," the "Patrick Stewart" also being present in harbour. Lord Curzon landed to inspect the port, and in the afternoon a Darbar was held on board the "Hardinge" for the Chiefs and Sardars of Western and Southern Balüchistan, who were accompanied by Colonel Yate, Agent to the Governor-General in Baluchistan. This was the first visit paid by a Governor-General of India to any place in Makran. Just at sundown the Agent to the Governor-General left the "Hardinge." Immediately his salute had ceased, the bugles sounded the retreat and the flags fell simultaneously on board all three vessels, giving to the cruise a fitting and dramatic conclusion. The "Hardinge" weighed anchor after nightfall and entered Karachi at noon the next day, the 7th of December, under a salute of 31 guns from the Manorah fort.

Durbar at

From Bushehr to Jashk, a distance of 494 miles, the "Hardinge" had maintained a speed of 15½ knots an hour, and from Jāshk to Pasni the return a speed of 17 knots, the latter distance being 344 miles. Between voyage.

Speed of

Jāshk and Pasni the speed sometimes even exceeded 18 knots and was possibly greater than had been attained, up to that time, by any vessel in Persian or even in Indian waters.

General Remarks.

Weather.

The cruise was favoured by bright and pleasant weather, and the sea was smooth throughout, except during the visit to Shārjah. The heat of the sun at Masqat was considerable; but at Kuwait, on the contrary, the sky, after the Viceroy's departure on the "Lawrence," was overcast, and a cold breeze blew from the north. During the last two nights in the Gulf the moon was full, and its radiance, reflected from the sea, outvied the flashing fields of phosphorescence which had been a remarkable feature of the cruise by night at its commencement.

Political results.

The tour was an effectual demonstration of British power and influence, and it was carried out at an opportune moment, shortly after the stress of foreign rivalry in the Gulf had been overcome by other and more substantial means; it was without precedent in the history of the Gulf; and it is likely to remain for long an event without parallel in local annals. Perhaps the most solid results of the cruise were the joint observations made in connection with questions of naval strategy by the Viceroy and the Naval Commander-in-Chief; but the political results, also, must have been great, and on the whole they were auspicious. In Persia, it is true, the cruise had an ending which was not calculated to re-act favourably upon international relations; and it was afterwards reported to have excited alarm in Turkish 'Iraq and to have aroused Anglophobe feelings among the Turkish official class. On the Arabian coast of the Gulf, however, the visits to Masgat, Trucial 'Oman and Kuwait were entirely successful, and appreciably strengthened the political bonds which connect those principalities with the British power; of the visit to Bahrain it can only be said that, if it was not followed by any visible improvement in the behaviour of the recalcitrant and wrong-headed Shaikh of the islands, it marked at least, in an unmistakeable manner, the intention of Great Britain to exclude all foreign influence from that important centre.

APPENDIX Q.

BRITISH AND FOREIGN DIPLOMATIC, POLITICAL, AND CONSULAR REPRESENTATION IN THE COUNTRIES BORDERING ON THE PERSIAN GULF.

The following tables give the names, so far as ascertainable, of the British and other foreign representatives, in modern times, in the States and Principalities adjoining the Persian Gulf.

British Diplomatic Representatives at the Court of Persia, 1807-1905.

Name.	Rauk.	Date or period of appointment.
Sir Harford Jones (afterwards Sir Harford Jones Brydges).	Envoy Extraordinary .	5th June 1807 to November 1811.
Sir Gore Ouseley, Bart., (afterwards the Right Hon'ble).	Ambassador	6th March 1810 to June 1814.
Mr. James Morier	Minister Plenipotentiary ad interim.	18th April 1814 to October 1815.
Mr. (afterwards the Right Hon'ble Sir Henry) Ellis.	Minister Plenipotentiary in the event of Mr. Morier's absence.	13th April 1814.
Mr. H. Willcock	Chargé d'Affaires .	1st November 1815 to April 1822 and 13th November 1823 to September 1826.
Major G. Willcock	Ditto	May 1822 to 12th November 1823.
Colonel (afterwards Sir John) MacDonald.	Envoy Extraordinary from the Indian Government.	29th July 1826.
Sir John Campbell	Appointed to negotiate a Treaty.	4th December 1833.
The Right Hon'ble Henry Ellis.	Ambassador	8th July 1835 to August 1836.
Mr. (afterwards Sir John) MacNeill.	Minister Plenipotentiary.	9th February 1836.
Ditto .	Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.	25th May 1836 to 5th August 1842.

Name.	Rank.	Date or period of appointment.
Lieutenant-Colon el (afterwards Sir Justin) Sheil.	Appointed Secretary of Legation at Tehran, 16th February 1836, and appears to have conducted the affairs of the Mission during the periods specified in the next column.	January 1839 to October 1841 and 12th May 1842 to September 1844.
Ditto	Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.	17th September 1844 to 3rd September 1854 (he left Tehran early in March 1853).
Lieutenant-Colonel Francis Farrant.	Chargé d'Affaires	21st October 1847 to 20th October 1849.
Mr. (afterwards Sir William) Taylour Thom-	Ditto	6th to 29th November 1849.
on. Ditto	Chargé d'Affaires (Diplo- matic relations were suspended from 4th to 26th November 1853).	7th March 1853 to 17th April 1855.
The Hon'ble (afterwards the Hon'ble Sir) Charles Murray.	Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary (Diplomatic relations were suspended, 5th December 1855 till March 1857).	4th September 1854 to October 1858 (with an interval, see column 2 and preceding entry).
Mr. William Doria .	Chargé d'Affaires	6th October 1858 to 7th December 1859.
Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Henry Rawlinson.	Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.	16th April 1859 to April 1860.
Mr. (afterwards Sir Ronald) Thomson.	Chargé d'Affaires	21st November to 9th December 1859.
Mr. Charles Allson .	Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.	
Captain (afterwards Colonel Sir Lewis) Pelly.	Chargé d'Affaires	May to July 1860.
Mr. (afterwards Sir Ronald) Thomson.	Ditto	6th November to 12th December 1862.
Mr. Edward Eastwick .	Ditto	9th December 1862 to 23rd January 1863.
Mr. (afterwards Sir Ronald) Thomson.	Ditto	8th February to 13th September 1863 and 8th May 1869 to 20th April 1870.
Mr. William Dickson .	Ditto	30th April to 28th May 1872.

Name.	Rank.	Date or period of appointment.
Mr. (afterwards Sir Ronald) Thomson.	Chargé d'Affaires	29th May 1872 to 31st March 1873.
Mr. (afterwards Sir William) Taylour Thomson.	Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.	15th July 1872 to 31st March 1879.
Mr. (afterwards Sir Ronald) Thomson.	Chargé d'Affaires	5th April 1878 to 13th June 1879.
Ditto	Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.	14th June 1879 to 31st October 1887.
Mr. (afterwards the Right Hon'ble Sir Arthur) Nicolson.	Chargé d'Affaires .	4th November 1885 to 17th April 1888.
Sir (afterwards the Right Hon'ble Sir) Henry Drummond Wolff.	Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.	3rd December 1887 to 23rd July 1891.
Mr. Robert John Kennedy	Chargé d'Affaires	28th April to 16th November 1890 and 13th November 1890 to 14th November 1891.
Sir (afterwards the Right Hon'ble Sir) Frank Lascelles.	Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.	24th July 1891 to 9th March 1894.
Mr. (afterwards Sir) William Conynham Greene.	Chargé d'Affaires	14th February to 17th November 1894.
Sir (afterwards the Right Hon'ble Sir) Mortimer Durand.	Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.	lst May 1894 to 20th October 1900.
The Hon'ble Charles (afterwards Lord) Hardinge.	Chargé d'Affaires	15th February 1897 to 30th March 1898.
Mr. (afterwards Sir) Cecil Spring Rice.	Ditto	8th March 1900 to 9th February 1901.
The Hon'ble William Erskine.	Ditto	14th October to 11th November 1902.
Sir Arthur Henry Harding	Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary.	
Mr. Evelyn Grant Duff	. Chargé d'Affaires	13th October to 16th December 1904 and after 18th September 1905.

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British Diplomatic Representatives at the Court of Turkey, 1584—1905.

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Name.	Rank.	Date or period of appointment.
Mr. William Harborne .		Employed in 1584. Left Constantinople 3rd August 1588.
Mr. (afterwards Sir Edward) Barton.		Agent in charge from 3rd August 1588. Died towards the end of 1597.
Sir Henry Lello		Resident in February 1598. Credentials continuing employ- ment (about) 1603.
Sir Thomas Glover		Commission, 16th August 1606. Succeeded Sir H. Lello, 8th February 1607.
Sir P. Pindar	·····	Succeeded Sir T. Glover, 8th December 1611.
Sir John Eyre	40.40	Commission, 14th December 1619. Recalled 9th July 1621. Resigned charge to Mr. Chap- man 12th December 1621.
Mr. John Chapman (bearer of Sir J. Eyre's recall).		Appointed Resident 9th July 1621.
Sir T. Roe	,,,,, ,	Appointed 9th July 1621, vice Sir J. Eyre. Arrived 1st April 1622. Asked to be re- lieved 29th July 1626. Suc- ceeded by Sir P. Wych, 5th
[Sir T. Phillips		April 1628. Appointed 16th April 1625, and received credentials under that date, but apparently did not proceed to Constantinople.]
Sir P. Wych ("the 8th Ambassador").		Credentials, 20th March 1627. Arrived 5th April 1628.
Sir Sackville Crowe.		Credentials, 15th June 1638. Instructions, 14th July 1638. Arrived October 1638 in the absence of the Grand Seignor. Took charge of the Embassy April 1639.
Sir Thomas Bendysh .	*****	Credentials, 21st January 1647. Recalled 16th August 1653.
Mr. Richard Lawrence .		Appointed 16th August 1653, vice Sir T. Bendysh. Arrived March 1654.

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Name.		Rank.	Date or period of appointment.
Sir Thomas Bendysh			Reappointed in (or before) 1657. Succeeded by the Earl of Winchelsea March 1661.
The Earl of Winchelsea			Arrived 1st March 1661. Recalled 16th December 1667.
Sir D. Harvey .	•		Instructions, 3rd August 1668. Succeeded the Earl of Winchelsea December 1668. Died of fever 26th August 1672. [A Screetary of Embassy was in charge from 1672 to 1674.]
Sir John Finch			Credentials, November 1672. Arrived 1674, travelling viô Italy.
Lord Chandos	•	******	Succeeded Sir J. Finch, 22nd July 1681.
Sir W. Turnbull .			Succeeded Lord Chandos, 17th August 1687.
Sir W. Hussey .	•		Succeeded Sir W. Turnbull, June 1691. Died 14th September 1691.
Lord Paget			Arrived February 1693. Re- commended Sir R. Sutton as his successor 27th August 1700.
Sir Robert Sutton .			Presented his credentials 3rd March 1702.
Mr. Edward Wortley		117.119	Presented his credentials 31st March 1717.
Mr. Abraham Stanyan	•		Appointed 7th November 1717. Presented his credentials 28th April 1718.
The Earl of Kinnoull			Presented his credentials 12th May 1730. Recalled 22nd September 1735.
Sir Everard Fawkener	•	,,	Succeeded the Earl of Kinnoull 19th December 1735. Per- mitted to return to England 17th July 1742.
Mr. Stanhope Aspinwali	•	Chargé d'Affaires in place of Sir E. Fawkener.	8th November 1742.
Mr. James Porter .	•	******	Credentials dated 30th September 1746.

Name.	Rank.	Date or period of appointment.
Mr. Henry Grenville .		Presented his credentials 14th March 1762.
Mr. William Kinloch .	Chargé d'Affaires in charge	22nd November 1765 to 6th June 1766.
Mr. John Murray	10.101	Credentials dated 6th February 1766.
Mr. Anthony Hayes .	Chargé d'Affaires in charge	15th May 1775 to 2nd October 1776.
Sir Robert Ainslie		Credentials dated 17th April 1776. Resigned 17th February 1794.
Mr. Robert Liston		Credentials dated 22nd September 1793. Recalled 1796.
Mr. Francis James Jackson		Appointment notified on 23rd July 1796 and cancelled in 1798. Apparently did not go to Turkey.
Mr. J. Spencer Smith .	Chargé d'Affaires	4th November 1795. Secretary of Embassy 4th April 1798. Minister Plenipotentiary 14th October 1798.
Sir Sydney Smith	•••••	On a special mission, having full powers in conjunction with Mr. J. Spencer Smith from 30th September 1798.
[Brigadier-General Roehler	` <i>,,</i>	Was sent on a Military Mission, October to December 1798.]
The Earl of Elgin	Ambassador Extraordinary on a Special Mission.	Credentials dated 20th August 1799. Succeeded Mr. J. Spencer Smith, December 1799. Re- called 9th February 1803, but left Constantinople 16th Jan- uary 1803.
Mr. Alexander Straton .	Chargé d'Affaires	March to September 1802 and January to May 1803. Became Minister Plenipotentiary later.
Mr. William Drummond .	Ambassador Extraordinary	Credentials dated 9th February 1803. Succeeded by Arbuthnot June 1804.

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Name.	Rank,	Date or period of appointment,
Alexander Straton	Minister Plenipotentiary in Mr. W. Drummond's absence.	9th September 1803 to July 1804.
Mr. Charles Arbuthnot .	Ambassador Extraordinary*	Appointment notified to the Levant Company 6th June 1804. Succeeded Mr. W. Drummond 24th June 1804. Went on board the British Fleet 29th January 1807. Recalled May 1807.
Sir Arthur Paget	Ambassador Extraordinary	Credentials dated 15th May 1807.
Mr. Robert Adair		Chedentials dated 14th April 1809, and succeeded Sir A. Paget in that month. Handed over charge 12th July 1810 Recalled 17th July 1809.
Mr. Stratford Canning (afterwards Viscount Stratford de edcliffe).	Minister Plenipotentiary	Credentials dated 17th July 1809. Acted as Minister from 12th July 1810 to July 1812.
Mr. (afterwards the Right Hon'ble Sir Robert) Liston.	Ambassador Extraordinary	2nd March 1812 to 7th July 1821 (but left Constantinople 7th July 1820).
Mr. Bartholomew Frere .	In charge of the Embassy	23rd October 1815 to July 1817, Credentials dated 6th March 1820.
Ditto .	Minister Plenipotentiary in the absence of the Ambassador.	Acted as Minister from 7th July 1820 to 25th February 1821.
Percy Clinton, Viscount Strangford.	Ambassador	7th August 1820 to 29th September 1825, but left Constantinople 11th October 1824.
Mr. William Turner	Minister Plenipotentiary ad interim.	Acted as Minister from 14th October 1824 to February 1826.
The Right Hon'ble Strat- ford Canning (afterwards Viscount Stratford de Redeliffe).	Ambassador	10th October 1825 to January 1829, relieved 10th April 1829

^{*} The new "Palace" in Pera was built in his time for the British Embassy at a cost of £9,595.

Name.	Rank.	Date or period of appointment.
The Right Hon'ble (afterwards Sir) Robert Gordon.	Ambassador	8th April 1829 to 30th August 1831.
The Right Hon'ble Sir Stratford Canning (after- wards Viscount Stratford de Redeliffe).	Ditto on a special Mission.	31st October 1831.
Mr. John Mandeville	Minister Plenipotentiary ad interim.	Acted as Minister from 31st August 1831 to 13th May 1883, but was not so appointed till 11th November 1831.
John, Lord (afterwards Viscount) Ponsonby.	Ambassador	27th November 1832 to 10th October 1841.
Sir Charles Richard Vaughan.	Ditto (in the absence of Lord Ponsonby).	1st March 1837.
Mr. Charles Bankhead .	Minister Plenipotentiary ad interim.	31st October 1841 to 23rd January 1842.
The Right Hon'ble Sir Stratford ('anning (after- wards Viscount Stratford de Redcliffe).	Ambassador	16th October 1841. Remained Ambassador, with intervals, till May 1858 when he retired on pension, and was accredited during a portion of the period to various other States.
Mr. Charles Alison	Chargé d'Affaires	22nd March to 15th June 1848 and 12th December 1857 to 6th July 1858.
Mr. Henry Richard Charles Wellesley (afterwards Lord Cowley).	Minister Plenipotentiary ad interim.	Appointed 14th June 1845 and was in charge of the Embassy from 27th July 1846 to 21st March 1848.
Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Hugh Rose (afterwards Lord Strathnairn).	Chargé d'Affaires	28rd June 1852 to 4th April 1853.
The Right Hon'ble Sir Henry Bulwer Lytton (afterwards Lord Dalling).		10th May 1858 to 18th October 1865. (Sir H. Bulwer Lytton remained at his post up to a date subsequent to that of the appointment of Lord Lyons, his successor in office.)
Viscount Stratford de Bedel ffe (formerly Sir Stratford Canning).	On a Special Mission to take leave of the Sultan.	September 1858.
The Hon'ble Edward Morris Erskine.	Chargé d'Affaires	20th September 1862 to 10th January 1863 and 23rd Octo- ber 1863 to 7th March 1864.

Name.	Bank.	Date or period of a ppointment.
Richard Bickerton Pemell, Lord (afterwards Viscount) Lyons.	Ambassador	10th August 1865 to 5th July 1867.
The Hon'ble William Stuart.	Chargé d'Affaires	9th September 1864 to 14th May 1865.
The Right Hon'ble Henry George (afterwards Sir Henry) Elliot.	Ambassador	6th July 1867 to 30th December 1877.
Mr. Henry Barron (afterwards Sir Henry Page Turner).	Chargé d'Affaires	26th July to 19th October 1867 and 11th November 1869 to 7th May 1870.
Mr. (afterwards the Right Hon'ble Sir) Horace Rumbold.	Ditto .	9th January to 12th May 1878.
Mr. Sidney Locock	Ditto	7th January to 21st May 1874.
Robert Arthur Gascogne Cecil (Marquess of Salis- bury).	Special Ambassador .	8th November 1876. Returned to England 6th February 1877.
The Right Hon'ble Austin Henry (afterwards Sir Henry) Layard.	Special Ambassador ad interim.	31st March 1877.
Ditto .	Ambassador	31st December 1877 to 31st December 1880.
The Hon'ble Nassau Jocelyn.	Chargé d'Affaires .	26th January to 20th April 1877.
Mr. (afterwards the Right Hon'ble Sir) Baldwin Malet.	Minister Plenipotentiary ad interim.	22nd February to 5th May 1879.
The Right Hon'ble George (afterwards Viscount) Goschen.	Special Ambassador .	6th May 1880 to 25th May 1881.
Mr. (afterwards Sir) Frederick St. John.	Chargé d'Affaires	9th December 1880 to 11th February 1881.
The Hon'ble (afterwards the Right Hon'ble) Sir Francis Richard Plun- kett.	Ditto	27th May to 14th June 1881.
Frederick Temple, Earl of Dufferin (afterwards Marquess of Dufferin and Ava).	Ambassador	26th May 1881 to 20th October 1884.

Name.	Rank.	Date or period of appointment.
Mr. (afterwards Sir) George Hugh Wyndham.	Chargé d'Affaires	4th to 15th May 1882; 3rd November 1882 to 8th May 1883; 16th May to 29th Sep- tember 1883; and 17th Sep- tember 1884 to 27th April 1885.
The Right Hon'ble Sir Edward Thornton.	Ambassador	1st December 1884 to 31st December 1886.
Sir (afterwards the Right Hon'ble) William Arthur White.	Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary ad interim.	18th April 1885 to 22nd February 1886.
The Right Hon'ble Sir Henry Drummond Wolff.	Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary (on a Special Mission re- lative to Egypt).	3rd August 1885.
Mr. (afterwards Sir) Edmund V. D. Fane.	Chargé d'Affaires	5th to 18th September 1886 and 12th to 26th October 1886.
The Right Hon'ble Sir William Arthur White.	Special Ambassador .	11th October 1886.
Ditto	Ambassador	1st January 1887 to 27th December 1891.
Mr. Francis William Stronge.	Chargé_d'Affaires	20th to 24th June 1888.
Mr. (afterwards Sir) Edmund V. D. Fane.	Ditto	25th June to 12th July 1888; 17th June to 26th July 1890; 2nd July to 4th August 1891; and 22nd December 1891 to 20th January 1892.
The Right Hon'ble Sir Clare Ford.	Ambassador	12th January 1892 to, 25th December 1893.
Mr. (afterwards Sir) Edmund V. D. Fane.	Minister Plenipotentiary ad interim.	21st January 1892 to 26th February 1893.
Sir Arthur Nicolson (afterwards the Right Hon'ble Sir Arthur Nicolson, Bart.).	Chargé d'Affaires	16th June to 7th October 1893 and 9th December 1893 to 10th February 1894.
The Right Hon'ble Sir Philips Wodehouse (afterwards Lord) Currie.	Ambassador	1st January 1894 to 30th June 1898.
The Hon'ble (afterwards the Right Hon'ble Sir) Michael Herbert.	Chargé d'Affaires	29th October to 23rd November 1895 and 19th May to 8th September 1896.

Name.	Rank,	Date or period of appointment.
Mr. Maurice W. E. de Bunsen.	Chargé d'Affaires	27th May to 21st September 1898.
The Right Hon'ble Sir Nicholas Roderick O'Conor.	Ambassador	1st July 1898.
Mr. Maurice W. E. de Bunsen.	Chargé d'Affaires	13th September 1900 to 12th January 1901; 23rd Novem- ber to 24th December 1901; and 10th June to 29th August 1902.
Mr. James Beethom White- head.	Ditto	15th January to 21st February 1903.
Mr. Walter Beaupré Townley.	Ditto	11th October 1904 to 2nd March 1905.

BRITISH REPRESENTATION IN THE PERSIAN GULF Bushehr. REGION.

British Political Representatives in the Persian Gulf (headquarters Būshehr).

Residents.

Name.	Rank.	Date or period of appointment.
Mr. Benjamin Jervis .		1763.
Mr. William Bowyear (perished in the blowing up of the "Defiance," 1767).	******	1766.
Mr. James Morley		1768.

(Residency in abeyance from 1769 to 1775.)

Mr. John Beaumont .		1775.
Mr. Edward Galley .	******	1780.
Mr. Charles Watkins .	, es 11.4	About 1789.
Mr. Nicolas Hankey Smith	** ***	About 1795.

	Name.	Rank.	Date or period of appointment.
Būshehr.	Mehdi 'Ali Khān		1798—1803.
	Mr. T. H. Lovett		1803-04.
	Mr. Samuel Manesty (self-appointed).	••••••	1804.
	Lieutenant William Bruce, Bombay Marine (Acting).		1804—07.
	Mr. Nicolas Hankey Smith		1807-08.
	Captain C. Pasley	*** ***	1808.
	Mr. Nicolas Hankey Smith	;	1809—11.
	Lieutenant William Bruce (removed in 1822).		1811-22.
	Captain John McLeod, Bombay Engineers (died in 1823).	 .	1822-23.
	Colonel Stannus .		1827.
	Captain Wilson	,	1827.
	Dr. (afterwards Sir John) McNeill.		1831.
	Mr. D. A. Blane	*****	1831.
	Captain S. Hennell (acting)	*****	
	Major Morison	••• ,,	1837.
	Captain S. Hennell		1838.
	Captain Mackenzie (acting)		1841.
	Colonel S. Hennell	******	# 24 · **
	Lieutenant A.B. (afterwards Sir Arnold Burrowes) Kemball.		1852—56.
	Captain Felix Jones, Indian Navy.		1856—62.
	Lieutenant-Colonel L. (after- wards Sir Lewis) Pelly.	•/	1863 — 72.
	Lieutenant-Colonel E. C. (afterwards Sir Edward)		1872—91.
	Ross. Lieutenant-Colonel W. F. Prideaux (acting for 18 months).		1876-77.
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Name.	Rank,	Date or period of appointment.	
Lieutenant-Colonel S. B. Miles (acting, April to October).		1886.	Būshehr.
Lieutenant-Colonel A. C. Talbot.		March 1891 to 1893.	
Captain Godfrey (in temporary charge).			
Major J. Hayes Sadler (acting, June and July 1893).			
Mr. J. A. Crawford (acting, July to December 1893).		\ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \ \	
Major J. Hayes Sadler (acting, December 1893 to January 1894).			
Colonel F. A. Wilson .	*****	1894—97.	
Lieutenant-Colonel M. J. Meade.		1897—1900,	
Lieutenant-Colonel C. A. Kemball.	*** •	April 1900 to April 1904.	
Major P. Z. (afterwards Lieutenant-Colonel Sir Percy) Cox.		April 1904,	

British Representatives at Masqat.

Masqat

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	Residents.	
Assistant Surgeon A. H. Bogle (died in the appointment 1800).	 .	1800.
Captain David Seton, Bombay Army (on sick leave 1802-03, died in the appointment August 1809).		1801—09.
Lieutenant Watts (acting, died in the appointment 1808).		1808,
Mr. Bunce (acting, died in the appointment Decem- ber 1809).		1809.

Name.	Bank.	Date or period of appointment.

Masqati.

(The Masqat Residency remained in abeyance till 1840, Britain being represented in 'Omān during the interval by Native Agents.)

Captain Hamerton	•	****	1840.

(The Residency was shortly removed to Zanzibar, then the most important part of the Sultān of 'Omān's dominions, where it remained until after the separation of 'Omān and Zanzibar. A Native Agent-represented Britain at Masqat in the Resident's absence.)

Political Agents.

Name,	Rank.	Date of taking over and giving up charge.
Lieutenant W. M. Pengelley, Indian Navy.	******	May 1861 to January 1862.
Major M. Green	*****	February 1862 to October 1862.
Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert Disbrowe.	*****	January 1863 to February 1867.
Captain G. A. Atkinson .		March 1867 to February 1869.
Lieutenant-Colonel Herbert Disbrowe,	A41**P	April 1869 to January 1870.
Major A. Cotton Way (died by an accident at Mas- qat).		8th January 1870 to 1st May 1871.
Major E. C. (afterwards Colonel Sir Edward) Ross.	******	8th May 1871 to 14th December 1872.
Captain S. B. Miles		30th December 1872 to 6th June 1877.
Mr. P. J. C. Robertson .		7th June 1877 to 3rd January 1878.
Lieutenant-Colonel S. B. Miles.		4th January 1878 to 14th June 1879.
Major C. B. Euan Smith .	: #3 ***	16th July 1879 to 2nd January 1880.
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Name.		Rank.	Date of taking over and giving up charge.	
Major Charles Grant			25th February 1880 to 28th October 1880.	Masqat,
Lieutenant-Colonel S. Miles.	В.		29th October 1880 to 15th August 1881.	
Major Charles Grant	•		16th August 1881 to 22nd March 1883.	
Major E. Mockler .	•	•••••	20th April 1883 to 17th Sept- ember 1883.	
Liuetenant-Colonel S. Miles.	В.	•••••	20th September 1883 to 1st April 1886.	
Lieutenant-Colonel Mockler.	E.		2nd April 1886 to 25th October 1886.	
Lieutenant-Colonel S. Miles.	В.	•••••	1st November 1886 to 15th April 1887.	
Lieutenant-Colonel Mockler.*	E.		16th April 1897 to 1st March 1889.	
Lieutenant W. Stratton	•		31st March 1889 to 15th December 1889.	
Major C. E. Yate * .			16th December 1889 to 28th March 1890.	
Lieutenant-Colonel Mockler. *	E.	•••••	1st December 1890 to 13th October 1891.	
Major J. Hayes Sadler *			27th November 1892 to 18th April 1895.	
Captain J. F. Whyte		*****	23rd May 1895 to 23rd November 1895.	
Major J. Hayes Sadler			24th November 1895 to 16th April 1896.	
Captain F. A. Beville *	•	*****	17th April 1896 to 11th June 1897.	
Major C. G. F. Fagan	•		16th September 1897 to 30th September 1899.	
Major P. Z. (afterwar Colonel Sir Percy) Cox	rds •		1st October 1899 to 2nd January 1904.	
Major W. G. Grey .			From 11th January 1904.	

^{*} In the intervals following these appointments Dr. A. S. Jayakar, Agency Surgeon, acted as Political Agent.

Trucial British Political Representatives in Trucial 'Omān (headquarters 'Omān. Sharjah).

Native Agents.

Name,	Rank.	Date of taking over and giving up charge.
Mulla Husain		1829—49.
Muhammad-bin-Mullah (dismissed).	•••••	1849—50.
Ahmad-bin-Mullah Husain (dismissed).	,	About 1850.
Hāji Ya'qub (died)	*****	About 1850 to 1866.
Hāji Muhammad (trans- ferred to Lingeh).		1866.
Hāji 'Abdur Rahman .	*****	May 1866 to June 1880.
Hāji Abdul Qāsim (pensioned).	•••••	June 1880 to August 1890.
'Abdul Latif		Since 1890.

Bahrain.

British Political Representatives in Bahrain.

Native Agents. Assu 1829. Paman (acting) 1829. Chandu (acting) 1829 - 30.(Name unknown) 1833. Mirzā Muhammad Άli 1834-40. (dismissed). Hāji Jāsim . 1841--52. Mirza Ibrāhīm (died shortly). Hāji 'Abdur Nabi Safar October 1871 to July 1884. (died).

(China) december 1			
Name.	Rank.	Date of taking over and giving up charge.	
Hāji Ahmad-bīn-'Abdu Rasul (died).		July 1884 to November 1891.	
(Munshis deputed	from the Büshehr Resid	ency watched British interests	Bahrain.
	aber 1891 to March 189		
Haji Muhammad Amīn, Native Agent at Lingeh (acting).	·	March 1892 to November 1893.	
Agha Muhammad Rahīm Safar (died).		November 1893 to February 1900.	
	Assistant Political Ay	ent.	
Mr. John Calcott Gaskin .		February 1900 to October 1904.	
	Political Agent.		
Captain F. B. Prideaux .	******	From October 1904.	
British Po	litical Representative	es at Kuwait.	Kuwait.
	News Agent.		
Hāji 'Ali-bin-Mulla Ghulām Riza.	*****	August 1899 to August 1904.	
	Political Agent.		
Captain S. G. Knox		August 1904 to May 1905.	
Assistant Surgeon Dāūd-ar- Rahmān (in charge of the	•••••	May to October 1905.	
Agency).		1	
Captain S. G. Knox .		From October 1905.	
Captain S. G. Knox .		l	
Captain S. G. Knox . British Con	sular Representatives	in 'Arabistān.	'Arabis-
Captain S. G. Knox . British Con	sular Representatives c Majesty's Vice-Consul	in 'Arabistān.	'Arabis- tan. Muham-

	Name.	Rank.	Date of taking over and giving up charge.	
Muham- mareh	Mr. Samuel Butcher, Indo- European Telegraph De- partment (acting).		1st May 1896 to 23rd March 1897.	
	Mr. W. McDouall	•	23rd March 1897 to 1st July 1903.	
	Major E. B. Burton, 17th Bengal Lancers.	*****	1805. 1st July 1903 to 26th February 1904.	
	His Brita	l nnic Majesty's Consul at	t Muhammareh.	
	Mr. W. McDouall	****	From 26th February 1904.	
Ahwāz.	His Britannic Majesty's Vice-Consuls at Ahwāz.			

Lingeh. British Political Representatives at Persian Gulf Ports.

Lieutenant D. L. R. Lorimer Major W. R. Morton, R.E.

Captain D. L. R. Lorimer .

(acting).

Native Agents at Lingeh.

February 1904 to June 1905.

June 1905 to January 1906.

From January 1906.

	1830-31.
	1833 to June 1839.
	From July 1839.
	1846-52.
	1870.
	July 1876 to February 1877.
and set	1877 to August 1902.
,,,,,,	From 1902.

Bandar 'Abbās.

Bandar 'Abbās.

From 1877 onwards the British Indian Community at Bandar 'Abbas pressed for the appointment of a Native Agent there, and the question was considered by the Government of India in 1893, but action was postponed.

Assistant Resident and His Britunnic Majesty's Vice-Consul at Bandar

Name.	-	Date of taking over and giving up charge.	
Lieutenant V. de V. Hunt		March 1900 to March 1901.	Bandar 'Abbās.
Major D. C. Phillott (at the same time Consul at	•••••	June 1901 to December 1901.	ALD NAIS.
Kirmān). Captain E. H. S. Boxer (died in the appointment).		January to 4th June 1902.	
Captain W. G. Grey .	,	August 1902 to January 1904.	
Captain A. P. Trevor .	,	January to August 1904.	
Assistant Resident and	His Britannic Majesty	's Consul at Bandar 'Abbās.	
Lieutenant W. H. I. Shakes- pear.		From November 1904.	

British Representatives at the Basidu Station.

Bāsīdu.

From 1870 to May 1882 Assistant Surgeon 'Abdur Rahīm, Hakīm, was in general and political charge of the Bāsīdu station.

The Slave Agent at Bāsīdu in 1866 was Bashīr-bin-Hāji, Ya'qūb, appointed in that year, who resigned in 1867. He was succeeded by Mīrza Jawād, who was confirmed in 1869.

Hāji 'Abbās was appointed Coal Agent in June 1872 and was dismissed, for owning a slave, in March 1877. His successor was Muhammad Mahmūd. In June 1878 Hāji 'Abbās was reinstated, but resigned in July 1879. Muhammad Mahmūd was then appointed in his place and still held the post of Coal Agent in 1905.

British Political Representatives in Persian Makrān.

Persian Makrān.

Assistant Political Agents at Gwadar.

Name.	-	Date of taking over and giving up charge.
Captain E. C. (afterwards Colonel Sir Edward) Ross.	•••••	1863-71.
Captain S. B. Miles	•••••	1872.
Captain E. Mockler	••••••	1873.

Deputy Directors and Directors of the Persian Gulf Telegraphs.

	1 0	· ·	
	Name.	_	Date or period of appointment.
Persian Makārn.	Mr. B. T. Ffinch		From 6th August 1879 to 7th April 1881.
	Mr. L. Gabler		From 8th April 1881 to 2nd November 1882.
	Mr. B. T. Ffinch		From 3rd November 1882 to 1st March 1884.
			From 1st April 1884 to 1st August 1884 Political Agent, Kalat, held the post.
	Mr. B. T. Ffinch	144111	From 1st August 1884 to 8th April 1890.
	Mr. J. F. F. W. Possman.		From 9th April 1890 to 8th July 1890.
	Mr. B. T. Ffinch	• • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • • •	From 9th July 1890 to 12th May 1891.
	Mr. J. F. F. W. Possman.		From 13th May 1891 to 28th October 1891.
	Mr. B. T. Ffinch		From 29th October 1891 to 31st March 1893.
	Mr. J. F. F. W. Possman .	"	From 1st April 1893 to 6th April 1896.
	Mr. G. W. Sealy		From 7th April 1896 to 31st July 1898.
	LieutColonel H. L. Wells.		From 1st August 1898 to 31st August 1898.
	Mr. G. W. Sealy		From 1st September 1898 to 14th January 1900.
	Mr. H. Whitby Smith .		From 15th January 1900 to 16th April 1901.
	Mr. R. H. New	••••	From 17th April 1901 to 23rd December 1901.
	Mr. H. Whitby Smith		From 24th December 1901 to 17th March 1905.
	Mr. R. C. Campbell		From 18th March 1905 to 30th November 1905.
	Mr. H. Whitby Smith		From 1st December 1905.

BRITISH REPRESENTATION IN TURKISH IRĀQ.

Baghdād.

British Political Representatives at Baghdad.

Residents.

		1	
Name.	-	Date or period of appointment.	
Mr. James Morley	*141**	May to November 1766.	
(From 1766 to 179	8 the Residency was in	abeyance, but from 1781	
there was a Native Agent at Baghdad.)			
Mr. H. Jones (afterwards Sir Harford Jones Brydges).		August 1798 to January 1806.	
Dr. John Hine, Residency Surgeon (acting).		1806-08.	
Mr. Claudius James Rich .		1808-12.	

(In 1810 the Residency was amalgamated with that of Basrah, and in 1812 the combined Residencies were converted into a Political Agency in Turkish Arabia.)

Turkish Arabia.)		
,	Political Agents.	
Mr. Claudius James Rich (died in the appointment).	****	1812-21.
Captain R. Taylor, 3rd Bombay Native Infantry (promoted Major in 1827 and LieutColonel in 1831).	11	1822-43.
Major (afterwards General Sir) Henry C. Rawlinson.		6th December 1843 to 14th October 1849.
Major (afterwards General) Arnold B Kemball	,	15th October 1849 to 14th December 1851.
Major (afterwards General Sir) H. C. Rawlinson.		From 15th December 1851 to 28th February 1855.
Captain (afterwards General Sir) A. B. Kemball.		From 1st March 1855 to 23rd October 1859.
Dr. J. M. Hyslop, Residency Surgeon.	··· -	From 24th October 1859 to 28th April 1861.
Captain (afterwards General Sir) A. B. Kemball.		From 29th April 1861 to 31st August 1868.

	Name.		Date or period of appointment.
Baghdād.		Political Agents—con	td.
	Colonel C. Herbert		From 1st September 1868 to 20th December 1874.
	Colonel J. P. Nixon .		From 21st December 1874 to 6th July 1879.
		Residents.	
	Colonel S. M. Miles	10000	From 7th July 1879 to 28th September 1880.
	Mr. T. J. C. (afterwards Sir Trevor) Plowden, Indian Civil Service.		From 29th September 1880 to 20th February 1882.
	Colonel (afterwards General) W. Tweedie.		From 20th March 1882 to 11th November 1883.
	Mr. T. J. C. (afterwards Sir Trevor) Plowden, Indian Civil Service.	14	From 12th November 1883 to 31st May 1885.
	Colonel (afterwards General) W. Tweedie.		From 24th July 1885 to 24th June 1888.
	Major A. C. Talbot	111141	From 25th June 1888 to 3rd May 1889.
	Colonel (afterwards General) W. Tweedie.	··· ›··	From 4th May 1889 to 31st October 1891.
	Colonel E. Mockler	******	From 1st November 1891 to 11th April 1897.
	Lieutenant-Colonel W. Loch.	*****	From 12th April 1897 to 9th June 1898.
	Major P. J. Melvill	/ 	From 15th August 1898 to 31st March 1899.
	Lieutenant-Colonel W. Loch.	*** 266	From 1st April to 10th June 1899.
	Major P. J. Melvill .	****	From 11th June 1899 to 20th March 1902.
	Colonel L. S. Newmarch .		From 21st March 1902 to 28th March 1906.
	Colonel J. Ramsay	•••••	From 29th March 1906.

British Political and Consular Representatives at Basrah.

Basrah.

Residents.

Name.		Date or period of appointment.
Mr. Martin French (died în the appointment).		1728 to November 1737.
Mr. Nathaniel Whitwell .		1737-38.
Mr. Thomas Darrill	******	1739-45.
Mr. Thomas Grendon (deserted his post).		1747-48.
Mr. Nathaniel Pompet (in charge of the Residency).	•• …	At Mr. Grendon's departure.
Mr. Brabazon Ellis (per- haps only acting).		1751.
Mr. William Shaw		1753-61.
Mr. James Stuart (died in the appointment).		1761 to July 1762.
Mr. Dymock Lyster		1762.

(In 1763 an Agency in Council was instituted at Basrah, which became for a time the chief station of the Honourable East India Company in the Persian Gulf.)

Agents in Council.

Mr. William Andrew Price (provisional).		1763.
Mr. Dymock Lyster)		1764.
Mr. Robert Garden (acting).		2102.
Mr. Peter Elwin Wrench	•••••	1764-66.
Mr. Henry Moore		1767-75.

(The Agency was in abeyance, on account of plague, from April 1773 to January 1774; and again, on account of the Persian operations at Basrah, from April 1775 to 1776.)

Mr. La	William Fouche.	Digges		1776-78.
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	Name.	_	Date or period of appointment.	
Basrah.	(In 1778 the Agestuted.)	ency in Council was	abolished and a Residency	
	Residents.			
	Mr. William Digges LaTouche.	******	1778-84.	
	Mr. Samuel Manesty .	•••••	1784-86.	
	Mr. John Griffith	*****	March to December 1786.	
			1786-95. ne Basrah Residency was	
	located at Kuwait and s	o practically in abeyanc	e.)	
	Mr. N. Crow		January to September 1796.	
	Mr. S. Manesty	,	September 1796 to 1805.	
	Lieutenant E. H. Bellasis, Bombay Engineers (in temporary charge).	•••••	To July 1805.	
	Mr. J. Law (died in the appointment).	••••	From July 1805.	
	Lieutenant Eatwell, Bombay Marine.		1805 to June 1806.	
	Mr. Samuel Manesty (obliged to resign).		June 1806 to June 1810.	
	In 1810 the post	at Basrah was reduced	l to an Assistant Political	
	Agency dependent on the Political Agency in Turkish Arabia.			
		Assistant Political Agen	ts.	
	Dr. Colquhoun		1810—18.	
	Captain R. Taylor		1818—22.	
	(In 1822 the Basrah	post was further reduce	ed to a Native Agency.)	
		Native Agent.		
	Khōjah Parseigh Johannes		18221851.	
	(In 1851 a British	Agent was substituted	for a Native Agent.)	
	ı	British Agents.	,	
	Mr. J. Taylor (son of Colonel R. Taylor).		8th August 1851 to 30th September 1858.	
			a constructive designation of the second	

Basrah.

Name.	_	Date or period of appointment,
	British Agents—con	$_{ m td.}$
Mr. R. Rogers (ex-purser of the "Comet," died in the appointment).		1st October 1858 to 4th August 1862.
(A Drag	oman acted during this	s interval.)
Mr. W. Johnstone (a merchant).		8th May 1863 to 20th Apri 1868.
Mr. Patrick J. C. Robertson (a merchant).	1	21st April 1868 to 1873.
In 1873 the status of t	the British representati f Assistant Political Ag	ive was again raised to that
	Assistant Political Age	•
Mr. P. J. C. Robertson	·····	, 1873 to 30th May 1877.
Mr. F. F. Carter (acting irregularly without the approval of the Government of India).	,	31st May to 8th August 1877.
Captain Fraser		From 3rd August 1877 to 13th December 1877.
Mr. F. F. Carter	*****	From 14th February 1877 to 13th January 1878.
Mr. P. J. C. Robertson .	•• •••	From 14th January 1878 to 19th June 1881
Captain J. Newill	•••••	From 20th June 1881 to 6th December 1881.
Major E. Mockler		From 7th December 1881 to 13th February 1883.
Assistant Surgeon 'Abdur Rahīm, Hakīm.	·······	From 14th February 1883 to 30th May 1883.
ieutenant H. Ramsay	******	From 31st May 1883 to 17th October 1883.
Major E. Mockler		From 18th October 1883 to 6th January 1884.
Ir. P. J. C. Robertson .	·····	From 7th January 1884 to 9th April 1884.
Iajor E. Mockler		From 10th April 1884 to 31st August 1884.

Date or period of appointment. Name. Assistant Political Agents-contd. Basrah. From 1st September 1884 to Mr. P. J. C. Robertson 3rd October 1884. From 4th October 1884 to 18th Major E. Mockler . April 1886 (but from June 1885 to April 1886 Mr. Marine was in charge as Native Agent). From 19th April 1886 to 15th Mr. P. J. C Robertson January 1887. From 16th January 1887 to Lieutenant-Colonel E. 18th April 1889. Mockler. From 19th April 1889 to 21st Mr. P. J. C. Robertson August 1889. (died in the appointment) From 22nd August 1889 to 6th Mr. L. M. Dicey (Merchant) December 1889. From 7th December to 2nd Captain Ravenshaw . April 1890. From 3rd April 1890 to 30th Lieutenant W. Stratton March 1891. From 31st March 1891 to 22nd Captain Trench July 1891. From 23rd July 1891 to 31st Mr. L. M. Dicey (Merchant) January 1892. From 1st February 1892 to 3rd Major R. H. Jennings August 1892. From 4th August 1892 to 20th Captain F. G. Beville November 1894. From 21st November 1894 to Lieutenant S. G. Knox 24th November 1895. From 25th November 1895 to Captain J. F. Whyte 4th February 1897. From 5th February 1897 to Major C. G. F. Fagan 31st August 1897. From 1st September 1897 to Captain L. A. Forbes 25th June 1898. From 26th June 1898 to 12th Mr. Garden (Merchant) September 1898. From 13th September 1898 to Captain G. Ramsay 11th December 1898.

(In 1898 Basrah was transferred from the Government of India to Her Majesty's Government, the post was thereafter held by Consuls of the Levant Service.)

Basrah.

H. B. M.'s Consuls.

Name.		-	Date or period of appointment.	
Mr. A. C. Wratislaw		******	22nd September 1898 to 1st August 1903.	
Mr. E. F. Crow .	•		1st August 1903 to present time.	
Mr. Monahan .		•••••	Acting in 1904 to 1905 while Mr. Crow was on leave.	

British Consular Representatives at Mosul.

Mosul.

77.	\sim	7
Vice-	('Am e	21/0
7 000-	$\omega \omega u \omega$	woo.

Christian Anthony Rassam	••••	31st December 1839, died in 1872.
John Frederick Russell .	177111	8th February 1877 to 16th May 1883.
William Shortland Richards		16th May 1883 to 16th Nov- ember 1885.
Harry Harling Lamb		16th November 1885 to 22nd July 1886.
John Frederick Russell .		22nd July 1886 to 21st May 1887.

(Post suppressed between 1887 and 1893.)

Consular Agent.

Nimrod Rassam		24th August 1893 to 12th March 1908.
Į.	Vice-Consuls.	
Horace Edward Wilkie Young.	··· .,	12th March 1908 to 30th January 1910.
Charles Alexis Greig .	•••••	30th January 1910 to 8th November 1911.
I	Vice-Consul.	
Henry Charles Hony		From 8th November 1911.

Karbala. British Political and Consular Representatives at Karbala.

Native Agents.

Name.			Date or period of appointment.
Mīr Gulsha n 'Ali .	•	*** **	In 1870.
Ahmad 'Ali Khān .		••••	*****
Haidar 'Ali Khān .		*****	1877 – 84.
Muhammad Taqi Khān		••••	1884—92.
Agha Ibrāhim .		******	1892 – 93.

British Consular Agent (from 10th August 1893).

British Vice-Consul.

Mīrza Muhammad	Hasan	*****	From 1903.
Muhsin.			

FOREIGN REPRESENTATION IN THE PERSIAN GULF REGION.

'Arabis-

Foreign Consular Representation in 'Arabistan.

A Russian Consular Agency at Ahwāz was opened under Mr. P. ter Meulen, a Dutch Merchant, in December 1902.

Büshehr.

Foreign Consular Representatives at Būshehr.

Holland.

A Dutch Consulate was opened at Bushehr in 1869, when Mr. Richard Charles Keun, afterwards the Chevalier Keun de Hoogerwoerd, was appointed. He continued to hold charge, except for brief absences on leave during which temporary arrangements were made, until 1879

when he proceeded on furlough leaving the Persian Governor in charge of Dutch interests. After his return in 1884 or 1885 he remained at Büshehr with the rank of Consul-General till 1889, when he was transferred to Bangkok, and the charge of the Bushehr Consulate was handed over to the local representatives of the firm of Messrs. Hotz and Company.

Būshehr.

The Consuls under this arrangement were:-

Name,		-	Date of taking over and giving up charge.
Mr. W. Groeneweg		•••	From April 1889 to May 1891.
Mr. Vanderzee		*****	From May 1891 to May 1892.
Mr. W. Groeneweg			From May 1892 to April 1894.
Mr. Vanderzee		******	From April 1894 to July 1899.
Mr. Moesmann			From July 1899 to March 1903.
	- 1		

The charge of the Dutch Consulate was then handed over to the French Vice-Consul (Monsieur Chaloin) who retained it until he went on leave in May 1905. From May to November 1905 the Mirza of the French Vice-Consulate held charge, but in November 1905 transferred it to Monsieur Passek, the Russian Consul-General.

urkey.

A Turkish Consulate was opened at Bushehr in November 1871.

The post was reduced to a Vice-Consulate and the Consulate Mīrza,

Mīrza Hussain, appointed Acting Vice-Consul in December 1885.

France.

A French Vice-Consul was opened at Bushehr in March 1893 by Monsieur Piat.

Monsieur H. Gues succeeded M. Piat in April 1893 and held charge till April 1894.

Hāji Mīrza Hussain, Dragoman, then acted as Vice-Consul.

Monsieur Sante was Vice-Consul from March 1895 to April 1896, when the Dragoman again assumed charge.

Bushehr. Monsieur Ferrand held charge from 7th July to 30th October 1897, after which the Dragoman again officiated.

Monsieur Henri Bryois was in charge from 28th February 1898 to 8th August 1899; and the Dragoman then again officiated.

Monsieur R. Chaloin was Vice-Consul from 6th August 1901 to 25th July 1905; and after his departure the Dragoman was once more in charge.

Germany.

Dr. Robert Hauck opened a German Vice-Consulate at Bushehr in November 1897 and held charge till 15th June 1899. His successors were:—

 Dr. Reinhardt
 .
 .
 15th June 1899 to 30th April 1900;

 Dr. Roesler
 .
 .
 30th April 1900 to 5th March 1901;

 Dr. Reinhardt
 .
 .
 5th March 1901 to 26th March 1903;

 Herr von Mutius
 .
 .
 26th March 1903 to May 1905;

 Dr. Listemann
 .
 .
 .

Russia.

Monsieur G. Ovseenko opened a Russian Consulate-General at Büshehr on the 17th September 1901 and held officiating charge until 22nd July 1903.

Monsieur Passek assumed charge as Consul-General on the 27th April 1904 and held charge till May 1906, when he went on leave.

Monsieur André Miller then officiated in his place.

Bandar Abbās

Foreign Consular Representation at Bandar 'Abbās.

Russia.

A Russian Consular Agency was opened at Bandar 'Abbās in January 1904 by the Sadīd-us-Suitaneh. The post was subsequently raised to a Consulate and Mr. Ovseenko appointed. M. Ovseenko assumed charge on the 14th February 1906.

Foreign Consular Representation at Lingeh.

Lingeh.

Turkey.

A Turkish Consular Agent was posted at Lingeh in 1891 or 1892, but up to 1905 he was not officially recognised by the Persian Government.

France and Russia.

In 1905 there was a Consular Agent at Lingeh, Hāji Abdur Rahmān, who represented both France and Russia.

Foreign Consular Representation at Masqat.

Masgat.

United States of America.

Mr. Louis Maguire, a British merchant, was appointed American Consul at Masqat in 1880 or 1881. In 1905 the post had been held for some time by Mr. McKirdy, another British merchant, representing the firm of Messrs. M. Towell & Co.

France.

A French Vice-Consulate was opened at Masqat on 8th November 1894 by Monsieur P. Ottavi, who held charge until the 6th July 1901. Previously, in 1881 Mr. Maguire, the American Consul, had been recognised as Consular Agent for France. The successors of M. Ottavi were:—

Monsieur Laronce, 6th July 1901 to 14th March 1903:

Monsieur Durville, acting, 14th March 1903 to 3rd October 1903;

Monsieur Laronce, 3rd October 1903 to 12th July 1904;

Monsieur Billecocq, acting, 12th July 1904 to 23rd October 1905; and

Monsieur Laronce, from 23rd October 1905.

FOREIGN REPRESENTATION IN TURKISH 'IRAQ.

Baghdād.

Foreign Con ular Representation at Baghdad.

France.

France is the European power which has longest, Britain not excepted, maintained a Consular representative at Baghdād. The following is a list of her Consuls, etc., at Baghdād:—

Name.	_			Date of taking over and giving up charge.
Mgr. Baillet, a French Carmelite and Latin bishop of Baghdad, known also, it would seem, as Emmanuel de St. Albert.	Consul .	ŧ	•	1741—73
Mgr. Mirodot du Bourg Consul.	Consul .	•		1775—94
Mr. Jean Baptiste Rousseau	,,	•		1796—98
Mr. de Corancez	Consul-Général			1809
Jean Raymond	Gérant .	•		1812
Mon. Vigouroux (or de Pigouroux.)	,, .			1815—19
Mon. Georges Outrey .	Vice-Consul			1820
Mgr. Piere Alexandre de Coupperie.	Consul .	•		1824
Mr. Beuscher	Gérant .			1831
Mr. Honoré Vidal .	,,	•		1832
Mr. le Baron de Loeve- Weimar.	Consul-Général	•		1841
Mr. Geoffroy	Vice-Consul			1848
Mr. Augustin Chanteduc .	Gérant			1849
Mr. Favernier	Vice-Consul			1850
Mr. Nicolas	Consul .			1853
Major Rawlinson (the British Consul-General).	Gérant .	•		1854

^{*}Mgr. du Bourg was represented, at least part of the time, by his nephew the Abbé de Beauchamp.

Name,	_			Date of taking over and giving up charge.	
Captain Kemball (the British Consul-General).	Gérant .	•		1855	Baghdād.
Mr. Eugène Tastu	Consul-Général			1856	
Mr. Garnier Benois	Gérant .			1860	
Mr. Pertier	,, ,			1861	
Mr. Delaporte	Consul .			1862	
Mr. Pellissier de Regnault	,,			1864	
Mr. Guys	,,	•		1869	
Mr. Rogier	Gérant .			1872	
Mr. Destrées	Consul .			1873	
Mr. Bertrand	Górant .			1878	
Mr. Peretié	Consul .			1879	
Mr. E. de Sarzec	,, • •	•		1883	
Mr. H. Pegnon	,,			1887	
Mr. Jeannier	Gérant .	•		1892	
Mr. H. Pegnon	Consul .			1893	
Mr. V. Maschkow (the Russian Consul).	Gérant .	٠.	•	1896	
Mr. G Rouet	Vice-Consul			1897	
Mr. G. Rouet	Consul .			1906	

The French Consulate was charged up to 1905, with the interests of Italian subjects.

Russia.

A Russian occupied by—	Consula	te was established at	Baghdād in 1881. It was
Mr. L. Eberhard	• •		From 4th January 1881 to 31st December 1885, after which the French Consul was in charge of Russian interests from 1st January 1886 to 19th May 1889;
Mr. P. Ponafidine			From 20th May 1889 to 17th September 1892;

	Name.	_	Date of taking over and giving up charge.
Baghdād.	Mr. A. Krougloff, Secretary		In charge, from 20th September 1892 to 13th March 1895;
	Mr. V. Maschkow		14th March 1895 to 2nd March 1898; and
	Mr.A. Krougloff	••••••	From 3rd March 1898 to 11th May 1910.
	In 1901 the statu	s of the post was raise	ed to that of a Consulate-
	General, and it was the		
	Mr. A. Krougloff		From 11th May 1901 to 31st March 1902;
	Mr. W. de Nauphal		In charge, 1st April 1902 to 28th February 1903;
	Mr. A. Adamoff, acting .		From 1st March 1903 to 17th May 1904; and
	Mr. V. Maschkow	191.000	From 18th May 1904.

A Russian Vice-Consulate came into existence at Baghdad n 1899 the first incumbent being Mr. Adamoff.

Greece.

Under orders given in August 1887 Greek subjects and interests were under British protection at Baghdād until 1897, when the arrangement was modified, if not terminated, as a result of the war between Turkey and Greece.

United States of America.

Citizens of the United States formerly received protection of the British Consulate-General, unofficially, under an order of the 30th January 1882. After 1889 Consuls or Vice-Consuls were appointed.

American Consuls.

Mr. J. H. Haynes	*** ***	From 22nd May 1889 to 12th March 1891.
Colonel W. Tweedie (the British Consul-General), acting.	•••••	From 13th March 1891 to 31st October 1891.
Colonel Mockler (the British Consul-General), acting.		From 1st November 1891 to 12th March 1893.
Dr. J. Sundberg	317 ***	From 13th March 1893 to 27th September 1894.

Name.	_	Date of taking over and giving up charge.	
	American Vice-Cons	ul.	
Mr. R. Hurner	1	l From 28th September 1894.	Baghdād.
	Germany.		
The British Consul March 1883 to take Baghdād.	-General at Baghdad w charge of the interest	as instructed on the 24th s of German subjects at	
Mr. C. Richarz was appointed as the first German Consul at Baghdad.		On the 20th December 1894.	
On Mr. Richarz's taking leave in 1898, Doctor F. Rosen from the German Legation at Tehran acted as Consul.		From 1st February 1828 to 19th November 1898.	
Mr. Richarz went on leave again in 1904, and Herr Puttmann, Consul for Belgium, acted for him.	,,,,,	From 13th December 1904 to 19th November 1905.	
	 a private gentleman c German Consular servic	On the 20th November 1905. of independent means and e.)	
	Austro-Hungary		
Austro-Hungarian French Consul at Bagl	subjects were protect	eted before 1900 by the	
The first Austro-Hungarian Consul appointed was Mr. A. Rappaport, who held charge of the Consulate.	<u>.</u> .	From 6th May 1900 to 4th September 1903.	
Major L. S. Newmarch the (British Consul-General) was in charge of Austro- Hungarian interests.		From 5th September 1903 to 11th November 1904.	
The next regular Austro- Hungarian Consul was Mr. Jehlitschka, who re- mained at Baghdād.		From 12th November to 17th December 1904 only.	
Mr. G. Rouet (the French Consul) was entrusted with Austro-Hungarian interests.		From 18th December 1904.	

Belgium.

Baghdād.

A Belgian Consulate was established at Baghdad in 1904. The first incumbents were:—

Name.	_	Date of taking over and giving up charge.				
Mr. E. Püttmann, a German merchant.		3rd August 1904 to 16th March 1906.				
and Mr. Carl Berk, a German merchant, acting.		From 17th March 1906.				
Sweden and Norway.						

Mr. F. W. Parry, a British merchant, was Consul for Sweden and Norway at Baghdād.	From 27th September 1 4th June 1906.	1905 to
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Sweden only.

Mr. F. W. Parry was Consul for Sweden only after the 5th June 1906.

Persia.

Persia has for long maintained a Consular representative at Baghdād; and his status has been, at least in recent years, that of a Consul-General. The incumbent in 1891 was Mīrza Mahmūd Khān. There are also Persian Consular representatives at Karbala, Najaf, Sāmarrah. Khānaqīn, Badrah, Mandali, Kūt-al-Λmārah, 'Amārah, Hillah and Nāsirīyah, and, as mentioned below, at Basrah, but the rank of most of these is doubtful, and it is uncertain to what extent they are recognized by the Ottoman authorities.

Basrah.

Foreign Consular Representation at Basrah.

France.

At Basrah, as at Baghdad, France was first in the field.

A French Consulate existed at Basrah from 1679, and was held between that year and 1739 by 11 different priests. A lay consul, M. de Martainville, was then appointed; but died in 1741 soon after his appointment.

Basrah.

A French Residency was then instituted at Basrah. It was closed in 1748, but was opened again in 1755 by M. Perdria.

About 1780 there was again a French Consul at Basrah in the person of a M. Rousseau.

Nothing more is heard of the French at Basrah until the re-establishment, about 1870, of a French Vice-Consulate there. It was held for a time by Mr. E. de Sarzec, who became celebrated by his excavations at Tallo. In 1884 the French Vice-Consul, Mr. Brejard, committed suicide and the post was abolished.

After the establishment of a Russian Consulate at Basrah in 1899 French interests there were committed to its charge.

Russia.

A Russian Consulate was established at Basrah in 1809 under M. Adamoff, who remained until 1902. M. Savinow, Secretary, officiated in charge from 1902 to 1904, and M. Popoff, Secretary, from 1904.

United States of America.

About 1900 Mr. Hamilton, a British merchant, was appointed American Consular Agent at Basrah. He was succeeded by Dr. S. Thoms, a missionary, who was followed by a Mr. Havemeyer. The latter died in 1904, and in 1905 Mr. Chalk, a British merchant, represented America.

Austro-Hungary, Greece, and Italy.

The interests of these countries were represented in 1905 by the British Consul at Basrah.

Persia

At Basrah, as already mentioned, there is a Persian Consul General

Appendix R.

BOOKS OF REFERENCE.

ABBREVIATIONS.

J. A. S. B.	•	•	•	.	Bengal Asiatic Society's Journal.
Bull. S. G.		•			Bulletin de la Société de Géographie.
G. J	•	•	•		Geographical Journal.
J. Bo. Br. R.	A. S.	•	•	•	Journal of the Bombay Branch of the Royal Asiatic Society.
J. R. A. S.	•	•	,		Journal of the Royal Asiatic Society.
J. R. G. S.	•	•			Journal of the Royal Geographical Society.
Pr. R. G. S.				.	Proceedings of the Royal Geographical Society.
Tr. Bo. G. S.					Transactions of the Bombay Geographical Society.

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I.--PUBLISHED BOOKS AND ARTICLES.

Author. Place, date, etc.,	
publication.	REMARKS.
l. Ainsworth (W. F.) London, 1838 . Researches in Assyria, Bab and Chaldea.	ylonia
2. Ditto . London, 1844 . Travels in the track of the Thousand Greeks.	e Te n
3. Ditto . London, 1944 . Ditto ditto.	
4. Ditto A Personal Narrative of the Eutes Expedition.	aphra-
5. Ditto . London, 1890 . The River Karun.	
6. Aitchison (Sir C. V.) Calcutts, 1892 . A Collection of Treaties, Enments and Sanads relating to and Neighbouring Countries lumes IX to XI, 3rd edition).	India (Vo-
7. Albuquerque (A) See Birch.	
8. Alexander (Lieutenant J. E.) London, 1827 . Travels from India to England.	
9. 'Ali Bey London, 1816 . Travels of 'Ali Bey (Volume II	r).
10. Allemann (E.) . Le Tour du Monde February 1901. Mascate (2 parts).	
11. Amedroz (H. F.) . J. R. A. S. 1901 . Three Years of Buwaihid Ru Baghdad (2 parts).	nle in
12. Ditto . J. R. A. S., 1902 Three Arabic MSS. on the H of the City of Mayyafariqin.	istory
13. Andrew (W. P.) . London Momoir on the Euphrates Nonte to India.	Valley
14. Ditto Sir (W. P.) London, 1882 . The Euphrates Valley Route to	India.
15. Avril (A.d') . Paris, 1868 . L'Arabie contemporaine.	
16. Azuri (Najib) Le reveil de la nation arabe l'Asic turque.	dans
17. Badger (Rev. G. London, 1870 . History of the Imâms and Seyy 'Omân (Hakluyt Society). (See also Miles and Palgrav	
18. Barré (P.) Revue de Géographie, 1903.	
19. Batuta (Ibn) . 1829 (Travels of, translated by S. Le	ee.)

Author.	Place, date, etc., of publication.	Title.	REMARKS.
20. Beazly (C.R.) .	G. J. XII, Octo- ber 1898.	Nordenskjöld's "Periplus." (See also Nordenskjöld.)	
21. Behr	···	Behr's Diarium.	
22. Bell (Colonel M.)	Blackwood's Magazine, April 1889.	Visit to the Karun River and Kum.	
23. Benisch (Dr. A.) .	London, 1856 .	Travels of Rabbi Petachia.	
24. Benjamin (S. G.	London, 1887 .	Persia and the Persians.	
25. Ditto ·	London, 1888 .	Persia.	
26. Bent (J. T.)	Pr. R. G. S. 1890	The Bahrein Islands in the Persian Gulf.	
27. Ditto	G. J. August, 1895.	Exploration of the Frankincense Country, Southern Arabia.	
28. Ditto	The Nineteenth Century, Octo- ber 1895.	The Land of Frakincense and Myrrh.	
29. Ditto (Mrs. J.	London, 1900 .	Southern Arabia	
T.). 30. Berard (A.)	Bulletin de la Société Géogra- phie de l'Ain, 1887 (?).	La Route de l'Inde par la vallée du Tigre et de l'Euphrate.	
31. Bewsher (Lieutenant J. B.).	Pr. R. G. S. XI, 1866-1867.	On part of Mesopotamia between Sheriatel-Beytha on the Tigris to Tel Ibrahim.	
32. Binder (H.) .	Paris, 1887 .	Au Kurdistan, en Mésopotamie et en Perse.	
33. Binning (R. B. M.)	1857	Journal of two Years' Travel in Persia, etc. (2 volumes).	
34. Birch (W. de G.).	London, 1875— 1884.	The Commentaries of the Great Afonso Dalboquerque (4 volumes). (Hakluyt Society.)	
35. Bird (J.)	Tr. Bo. G. S. I-II, November 1838.	Illustrations of the Arab and Persian Geographers, or the Geography of the Middle Ages.	
36. Birwood (Dr.) .	Tr. Bo. G. S. XV, January 1860.	Remarks in connection with the trade between Bombay, the Gulf, the Red Sea and African Coast.	
37. Birwood (Sir G.).	London, 1886 .	The Dawn of British Trade in the East Indies.	
38. Ditto (Assisted by W. Foster).	London, 1893 .	The Register of Letters, etc., of the Governor and Company of Merchants of London trading into the East Indies, 1600—1619.	

Author.	Place, date, etc., of publication.	Title.	REMARKS.
39. Bishop (Mrs.) .	1891	Journeys in Persia and Kurdistan.	
40. Blunt (Lady Anne)	London, 1879 .	Bedouin Tribes of the Euphrates (2 volumes).	
41. Ditto .	London, 1881 .	A Pilgrimage to Nejd.	
42. Blunt (W. S.) .	Pr. R. G. S. II, 1880.	A visit to Jabal Shammar (Nejd).	
43. Bode (Baron C. A. de).	Pr. R. G. S. XIII, 1843.	Notes on a journey from Behbehan to Shushter.	
44. Ditto .	184 5 .	Travels in Luristan and Arabistan.	
45. Boehm (Sir E.) .	1904 .	The Persian Gulf and South Sea Isles	
46. Bosanquet (J. W.)	J. R. A. S. XVII, 1858-58.	Chronology of the Medes from the Reign of Deioces to the Reign of Darius, the son of Hystaspes, or Darius the Mede.	
47. Boscawen (W. S. C.).	1903	First of Empires.	
48. Bretschneider (E.)	London (Trübner). 1871.	On the knowledge possessed by the Ancient Chinese of the Arabs and Arabian colonies, ec.	
49. Brisse (A.)	Revue de Géogra- phie, 1902.	Les intérêts de L'Allemagne dans L' Empire Ottoman (4 parts).	
50. Bruce (J.)	London, 1810 .	Annals of the Honorable East India Company.	
51. Brydges (Sir Hartord Jones).	London, 1834 .	An account of the transactions of His Majesty's Mission to the Court of Persia in the years 1807—1811 (Volume I) and a Brief History of the Wahauby (Volume II)-	
52. Ditto	London, 1833 .	"The Dynasty of the Kajars."	}
53. Buckingham (J. S.)	London, 1827 .	Travels in Mesopotamia.	
54. D.tto	London, 1829 .	Travels in Assyria, Media and Persia.	
55. Buist (Dr. G.) .	J. Bo. Br. R. A. S. I.	Note on a series of Persian Gulf specimens.	
56. Ditto	Pr. R. G. S. IV, 1859-60.	The Curia Muria Islands.	
57. Bunbury (?) .	. ?	Ancient Geography.	
58. Burchardt (H.)		Zeitschrift der gesellschaft für Erdkunde zu Berlin, 1906, No. 5.	
59. Ditto	,	Ost-Arabien von Basrabis Maskat auf Grund eigner Reisen.	

	Author.	Place, date, etc., of publication.	Title.	Remarks.
60.	Burckhardt (J.	London, 1829 .	Travels in Arabia (2 volumes).	
61.	Ditto	London, 1831 .	Notes on the Bedowins and Wahaubys (2 volumes).	
62.	Burnes (Captain Sir A.)	London, 1839 .	Travels into Bakhard (3 volumes).	
63,	Burton (Sir R. F.)	London (reprint), 1898.	Personal Narrative of a pilgrimage to Al-Madinah and Meccah.	
6 4.	Ditto	? .	Arabian Nights entertainments.	
65.	Butler (A. J.) .	Oxford, 1902 .	The Arab Conquest of Egypt.	
66.	Buxton (T. F.) .	London, 1839 .	The African Slave Trade.	
67.	Cadoux (H. W.) .	G. J., Sept. 1906	Recent changes in the course of the Lower Euphrates.	
68.	Cahun (L.)	Paris, 1896 .	Introduction a l'Histoire de l'Asie.	
69.	Cameron (Commander V. L.).	London, 1880 .	Our Future Highway to India (2 volumes).	
70.	Cantamir (Prince D.)	?	History of the Oosman Empire.	
71.	Capper (James) .	London, 1785 .	Observations on the passage to India, etc., etc.	
72.	Carmichael (?) .	London, 1772 .	Journey from Aleppo to Bussrah (in Grose's "Voyage to the East Indies").	
73.	Carter (H. J.)	Pr. Bo. G. S. VII. Feb.—Dec. 1846.	A descriptive account of the Ruins of El Balad.	
74.	Ditto	J. Bo Br. R. A. S. II.	Notes on the Gharah Tribe.	
75.	Ditto	Ditto .	Notes on the Mahrah Tribe to which are appended additional observations on the Gara Tribe.	
7 6.	Ditto	Ditto .	A description of the Frankincense Tree of Arabia.	
77.	Ditto	Ditto .	Report accompanying Copper Ore from the Island of Maseera, etc.	
78.	Ditto	J. 80. Br. R. A S. III.	Geological Observations on the Igneous Rocks of Maskat and its Neighbourhood, etc.	
79.	Ditto	Ditto .	A Geographical Description of certain parts of the South-East Coast of Arabia, etc.	
80.	Ditto	J. Bo. Br. R. A. S. IV.	Memoir on the Geology of the South- East Coast of Arabia.	

Author.	Place, date, etc., of publication.	Title.	REMARKS.
81. Carter (H. J.) .	J. Bo. Br. R. A. S. IV.	Note on the Pliocene Deposits of the shores of the Arabian Sea.	
82. Ditto	Beng. A. S. J. Nos. 97 and 105, 1859.	Report on Geological Specimens from the Persian Gulf.	
83. Cassim Izzedine .		*	
84. Champain (Colonel J. V. Bateman).	Pr. R. G. S. V., 1883.	On the various Means of Com- munication between Central Persia and the Sea.	
85. Chardin (Sir J.) .	London, 1691 .	The Travels of Sir J. Chardin.	
86. Chéradame (A.) .	Paris, 1903 .	Le Chemin de Fer de Baghdad.	
87. Chesney (Colonel F. R.)	J. R. G. S. VII, 1837.	A General Statement of the Labours and Proceedings of the Expedition to the Euphrates.	
88. Ditto	London, 1850 .	The Expedition for the Survey of the Rivers Euphrates and Tigris.	
89. Ditto (General F. R.)	London, 1868 .	Narrative of the Euphrates Expedition.	
90. Chinnock (E. J.).	London, 1893 .	Arrian's Anabasis of Alexander and Indica.	
91. Chirol (V.)	London, 1903 .	The Middle Eastern Question.	
92. Cholet (Le Comte de).	Paris, 1892 .	Arménie, Kurdistan et Mesopotamie.	
93. Clowes (Sir W. L.)	London, 1900 .	The Royal Navy (6 volumes).	
94. Cole (C. S. D.) .	Tr. Bo. G. S. VIII, Jan. 1847 —Apr. 1848.	An account of an Overland Journey from Leshkairee to Maskat and the "Green Mountains" of Oman.	
95. Colvill (W. H.) .	Pr. R. G. S. XI, 1866-67.	Land Journey along the shores of the Persian Gulf from Bushire to Lingah.	
96. Constable (Lieut. C. G.)	Tr. Bo. G. S. XII. December 1854—March 1856.	Memoir relative to the Hydrography of the Persian Gulf and the know- ledge that we possess of that sea.	
97. Ditto	Tr. Bo. G. S. XV, November 1858.	Letter on the Physical Geography of the Persian Gulf.	
98. Coote (Sir Eyre.)	J. R. G. S. XXX, 1890, page 199.	Diary of a Journey with Sir Eyre Coote from Bussorah to Aleppo in 1780. (?)	
99. Corancez (L. A.)	Paris, 1810 .	Histoire des Wanabis.	
Cordier (H.) .		See Polo (Marco).	

Author.	Place, date, etc., of publication.	Title.	REMARKS.
100. Cowper (H. Swainson).	London, 1894 .	Through Turkish Arabia.	
101. Creasy (Professor E. S.).	London, 1854 .	History of the Ottoman Turks.	
102. Crichton (A.) .	Edinburgh, 1834.	History of Arabia, Ancient and Modern (2nd edition, 2 volumes).	
103. Cruttenden (C. J.)	Tr. Bo G S. I., 1836-1838.	Journal of an Excursion from Morebat to Dyreez, the principal town of Dofar.	
104. Cuinet (V.)	Paris, 1890—95.	La Turquis d'Asie (4 volumes).	
105	G. J., March 1896	Critique of the preceding.	
106. Curzon, (the Honourable G. N.).	Fortnightly Review, April and May 1890.	Leaves from a Diary on the Karun River.	
107. Ditto .	Pr R. G. S., 1891.	The Karun River and the Commercial Geography of South-West Persia.	
108. Ditto .		Russia in Central Asia.	
109. Ditto .	London, 1892 .	Persia and the Persian question.	
110. Curzon (the Hon. R.)	London, 1854 .	Armenia.	
111. Danvers (F. C.).	G. J. II, 1893 .	Portuguese East India Records.	
112. Ditto .	London 1894- 1902	The Portuguese in India (2 volumes).	
113	G. J., December 1895.	Critique of the foregoing.	
114. Ditto .	London, 1896 .	Letters received by the East India Company, 1602-1617 (6 volumes).	
115. Dellon (C.) .	1685 .	Voyage aux Indes Orientales.	
116. Dieulafoy (Madame J.).	1887 .	La Perse.	
117. Ditto .	1888 .	A Suse.	
118. Dieulafoy (M.).	1893 .	L'Acropole de Suse.	
119. Ditto .		L'Art antique de la Perse, (Parts 5).	
120. Dodd (G.) .	1859	History of the Indian Revolt and Expedition to Persia.	
121. Doughty (C. M.)	J. Bo. Br. R. A. S. XIV.	Notes of a visit to Inner, Arabia.	

Author.	Place, date, etc., of publication.	Title.	REMARKS.
122. Doughty (C. M.)	Pr. R. G. S. VI,	Travels in North Western Arabia and Nejd.	
123. Ditto .	Cambridge, 1888.	Travels in Arabia Deserta.	
124. Dozy (R. P. A.) .	Leiden, 1851 .	Catalogus Codicum Orientalium.	
125. Ditto .	Paris, 1879 .	Essai Sur l'Histoire de Islamisme.	
126. Dumont (A.) .	Bull, S. G., 1888.	Le chemin de for de la vallée de Euphrate.	
127. Durand (Lady) .	London, 1902 .	An Autumn Tour in Western Persia.	
128. Durand (Captain)	J. R. A. S., 1880.	Extracts from a Report on the Islands and Antiquities of Bahrein.	
129. Eastwick (E. B.,	London, 1864 .	Journal of a Diplomat's three years' Residence in Persia (2 volumes).	
130. Edye (J.)	J. R. A. S. L., 1834.	Description of the various classes of vessels constructed and employed by the Natives, etc.	
131. Ellis (T. J.)	London, 1881 .	On a Raft and through the Desert (2 volumes).	
132. Eloy (A.)	Paris, 1843 .	Relation de Voyages en Orient.	
133. Euting (J.) .	Leiden, 1896 .	Tagbuch Einer Reise in Inner	
134. Farley (J. L.) .	London, 1878 .	Arabien. Egypt, Cyprus and Asiatic Turkey.	
Fitch (R.)		See Ryley	
135. Flandin (E.)	Paris, 1851 .	Voyage en Perse. (Volume II, 2 volumes).	
136. Fletcher (Rev. J. P.).	London, 1850 .	Notes from Nineveh and Travels in Mesopotamia.	
137. Floyer () .		Unexplored Baluchistan.	
138. Flügel (G.) .	Vienna, 1865 .	Die Arabischen, Persischen, and Tür- kischen Handschriften der Kaiser- lich- Königlichen Hafbibliothek zu	
139. Fogg (W. P.) .	London, 1875 .	Wien. Arabistan.	
140. Fontanier (V.)	London, 1844 .	Narrative of a Mission to India.	
141. Forbes () .		Empires and Cities of Asia.	
142. Forder (Rev. A.)	G. J. XX, 1902 .	To the J of and Back.	
143. Ditto .	London, 1902 .	With the Arabs in Tent and Town.	
144. Forrest (G. W.).	Bombay, 1887 .	Selections from the Letters, Despatches and other State Papers preserved in the Bombay Secretariat (Volume I, Home Series).	

Author.	Place, date, etc., of publication.	Title.	REMARKS.
145. Forster (Rev. C.)	London, 1844	The Historical Geography of Arabia.	
146. Forster (G.)	London, 1798 .	A Journey from Bengal to India.	
147. Fodster (W.) .	G. J., August 1894.	A View of Ormus in 1627.	
148. Ditto	London, 1899 .	The Embassy of Sir Thomas Roe, (Hakluyt Society) (2 volumes).	
149. Francklin (Ensign W.)	London 1790 .	Observations made on a tour from Bengal to Persia.	
150. Fraser () .	London, 1825	Journey into Khorasan.	
151. Fraser (J. B.) .	Edinburgh, 1894	An Historical and Descriptive Account of Persia.	1
152. Ditto	London, 1838 .	Narrative of the Residence of the Persian Princes in London in 1835 and 1836.	
153. Ditto	London, 1840 .	Travels in Koordistan, Mesopotamia, etc. (2 volumes).	
154. Ditto	Transactions of the Geological Society Sec. Ser., Volume I.		
155. Frédé () .	Paris (1887 or), 1890.	La Pêche aux Perles en Perse et en Ceylan.	
156. Fryer (Dr. John)	1698	A new Account of East India and Persia, 1672-1681.	
157. Geary (Grattan)	London, 1878 .	Through Asiatic Turkey.	
158. Genthe (S.) .	Marburg, 1896 .	Der Persische Meerbusen.	
159. Gibbon (Eduard)		The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire.	
160. Glaser (Edward)	Berlin, 1899 .	Skizze der Geschichte and Geographie Arabiens.	
161. Gobineau (L e Comte A. de).	Paris, 1859 .	Trois Ans en Asic.	
162. Goeje (M. J. de)	Leiden, 1865, 1866, 1873, 1883.		
163. Ditto ,	•••••	Bibliotheca Geographorum Arabico- rum (Volumes i, ii, iii, v, vii, and viii) (Istakhri, Ibn Haukal, etc).	
164. Ditto	Leiden, 1886 .	Memoires d'Histoire et de Geographie Orientales: No. 1 Sur les Carmathes du Bahrain et les Fatimides.	3

Author.	Place, date, etc., of publication,	Title.	Remarks.
165. Goeje (M. J. de).	Leiden, 1903 .	Memoires d'Historie et de Géographie Orientales: No. 3 Sur les Migra- tions des Tsiganes à travers l'Asie.	
166. Goldsmid (Major F.)	Pr. R. G. S. VII, 1862-1863.	Exploration from Kurrachi to Gwadar along the Mekran Coast.	
167. Goldsmid (Colonel F. J.)	J. R. G. S. (?), 1867.	Notes on Eastern Persia and Western Baluchistan.	
168. Goldsmid (Sir F. J.)	London, 1874	Telegraph and Travel.	
169. Ditto	London, 1876 .	Eastern Persia.	
170. Ditto	G. J., May 1893	The Acropolis of Susa.	
171. Ditto	G. J., August 1895.	The Geography of Persia. (With reference to De Morgan's Mission.)	
172. Pitto	G. J. VIII, Nov- ember 1896.	De Morgan's Mission Scientifique to Persia.	
173. Götz (Dr. W.) .	Stuttgart, 1898 .	Die Verkehrswege im Dienste des Welthandels.	
174. Grandpré (L. de)	Paris, 1803 .	Voyage dans l'Inde.	
175. Grant (Capt a i n N. P.)	J. R. A. S. V, 1839.	Journal of a Route through the Western Parts of Makran.	
Grose () .		See Carmichael.	
176. Haines (Captain J. B.)	J. R. G. S. XIV, 1844.	Account of an Excursion in Hadra- mant by Adolphe Baron Wrede.	
177. Haines (Captain S. B.)	J. R. G. S. XV, 1845.	Memoir of the South East Coasts of Arabia. (Part 2.)	
178. Haines (Captain S B.)	Tr. Bo. G. S. XI, July 1852- December 1853.	Part Second of Captain S. B. Haines' (of the I. N.) Memoir of the South and East Coasts of Arabia with his Remarks on Winds, Currents, etc.	
179. Hakluyt (R.) .	•••••	The Principal Navigations of the English Nation. (Hakluyt Society.)	
180. Hamdani	Leiden, 1884 .	Sifat Jazirat-al-'Arab. (Edited by D. H. Müller.)	
181. Hamilton (Captain Alexander).	London, 1739 .	A new Account of the East Indies (1688-1723) (2 volumes).	
Haukal (Ibn) .	*****	See Goeje (de).	
182. Helfer (Madame)	London, 1878 .	Travels of Doctor and Madame Helfer. (Translated by Mrs. G. Sturge.) (2 volumes.)	
183. Herbert (Sir T.).	London, 1677 .	Some Yeares' Travels, etc.	

Author.	Place, date, etc., of publication.	Title.	Remarks.
184. Herdman (Professor W. A.).	Published by the Royal Society, London, 1903.	Report to the Government of Ceylon on the Pearl Oyster Fisheries of the Gulf of Manaar.	
185. Hilprecht (H. V.).	1903	Explorations in Bible Lands during the 19th Century.	
186. Hirsch (L.) .	Leiden, 1897 .	Reisen in Süd Arabien.	
187. Hogarth (D. G.)	London, 1904 ,	The Penetration of Arabia.	
188	G. J. XXIV, October 1904.	Review of the above.	
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499. Ditto .	Tr. Bo. G. S 1, 1836—1838, page 295.	Notes taken during a journey in 'Omān along the East Coast of Arabia.	
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505. Winchester (W.)	Tr. Bo. G. S. I-II November 1838	Memoir on the River Euphrates, etc., during the late Expedition of the II. C. Armed Steamer Euphrates.	
506. Ditto .	Ditto	Note on the Island of Karrack in the Gulf of Persia.	
507. Ditto (Dr. J. W.)	Tr. Bo. G. S. VI, September 1841 May 1844 (Re- print of 1865.)		(
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522.	•	•	٠	London, 1825 .	The Three Brothers, or the Travels and Adventures of Sir Authony, Sir Robert and Sir Thomas Sherley.	
523.	•	•	•	London, 1828 .	Sketches of Persia from the Journals of a Traveller in the East.	
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587.	Colling wood, Bewsher, and Selby.		Surveys in Mesopotamia, 1830—1866. (A collection in the Q. M. G.'s Branch.)	
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541. Douglas (Captain J. A.).	Simla, 1897	•	Report on a journey from India to the Mediterranean.	
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547. Herbert (A.) .	London, 1886		Report on the present state of Persia and her mineral resources. (Consular)	
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566. Rigby (Lieutenant-Colonel C. P.).	Bombay, 1861 .	Report on the Zanzibar Dominions. (Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government LIX, New Series.)	
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583.	Mesopotamia		1844—1852 .	Surveys in Mesopotamia (MSS.)	
5 84.	Ditto	•	Bombay, 1857 .	Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, New Series No. XLIII.	
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588.	Do.		Calcutta, 1885 .	Gazetteer of Persia (Part III).	
589.	Do.		Calcutta, 1892 .	Ditto (Part IV).	
590.	Do.	•	Simla, 1895— 1899.	Routes in Persia (Part II, 1895, with Appendix, 1899).	
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59F.	Do.	London, 1888 .	Agreement regarding Persian Telegraphs. (Parliamentary.)	
596.	Persian Gulf .	Bombay, 1856 .	Selections from the Records of the Bombay Government, New Series	
597.	Ditto	Calcutta, 1865 .	No. XXIV. Correspondence relating to the Arab Pearl Fisheries.	
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599.	Red Sea	London, 1900 .	Red Sea and Gulf of Aden Pilot (5th edition, Admiralty).	
600.	Slave Trade	1865, 1882 and 1892.	Instructions for the guidance of the Captains and Commanding Officers of Her Majesty's Ships of War employed in the Suppression of the Slave Trade.	
601.	Turkey .	. 1878	Reports in relation to Trade with Turkey in Asia, Persia, Central Asia. (Consular).	
602.	Turkey .	. Simla, 1889	Turkey in Asia and Persia (Sections II and III.)	
603.	Do.	. Simla, 1894	The Development of the Military Strength of Turkey. (Translation.)	
604.	Turkish Arabia	Calcutta, 1874	Précis (First Connection of the H.E.I.C. with Turkish Arabia).	
605.	Wahabees	. 1864 .	. The Wahabee Conspiracy.	
606.	Slave Trade	. 1890 .	Protocals and General Act of the Slave Trade Conference held at Brussels, 1889-90.	
607.	India .		Summary of the Principal Measures of the Viceroyalty of:— (1) The Marquess of Dufferin and Ava, December 1884—December 1888. (2) The Marquess of Lansdowne, December 1888—January 1894 (3) The Earl of Elgin and Kincardine, January 1894—January 1899. (4) Lord Curzon of Kedlestone.	
603.	East Indies, et	. London, 1862	. Calendar of State Papers, Colonial Series, East Indies, China, and Japan, 1513—1616. Edited by W. Noel Sainsbury.	
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V.—MONOGRAPHS CONTAINED IN THE PERSIAN GULF ADMINISTRATION REPORTS FROM 1873-74 TO 1904-1905.

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614. Do.		Date culture (Hakim)	1883-84 .	39-43.
615. Do.		Introduction of date palms into India (Hakim).	1885-86 .	16—20.
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617. Fish		Oman fisheries (MacIvor) .	1876-77 .	81.
618. Do.		Sea fisheries (MacIvor)	1880-81 .	4467.
619. Geography		Province of Fars	1875-76 .	6-27.
620. Do.		Karah Aghaj kiver (Andreas) .	1877-78 .	13-16.
621. Do.	•	Description of the Bahrain Islands (Durand).	1878-79 .	1518.
622. Do.	•	Topography of Khuzistan (Robertson.)	1878-79 .	19—26.
623. Do.		Geography of 'Oman (Miles)	1878-79 .	117—119.
624. Do.	•	Note on the tribes of 'Oman (Miles).	1880-81 .	19—34.
625. Do.		Visit to Ras Fartak (Miles.)	1884-85 .	19-23.
626. Do.	•	Notes of a tour through 'Oman and El Dhahineh (Miles).	1885-86	22—28.

Subject.		Article.	Administration Report.	Pages.
627. History .		Memoir on Nejd (Ross)	1879-80 .	3661.
628. Do		Summary of the history of 'Oman from 1728 to 1883 (Ross).	1882-83	22—29.
629. Do		Biography of Saiyid Sa'id (Miles) .	1883-84 .	2037.
6 3 0. Do		The Portuguese in Eastern Arabia (Miles).	1884-85 .	2 4—4 0.
631. Do		Biography of Saiyid Sultan (Miles) .	1887-88 .	22—31.
632. Do		Family of Ibn Rashid (Ross)	1888-89 .	15—17.
633. Do		Pedigree of 'Arabistan Chiefs	1889-90 .	12.
634. Meteorology		Medical topography of Masqat (Jayakar).	187 6- 77 .	96—105.
635. Do.		Climate of Bushchr	1877-78 .	9-10.
636. Mules .		Persian mules (MacIvor)	1879-80 .	15—35.
637. Opium .	•	Cultivation of opium in Persia and Exportation (Lucas).	1874-75 .	28 —3 1.
638. Do		Opium exported from Bushehr .	1877-78 .	87.
639. Do		Persian opium (Lucas)	1878-79 .	31—33.
640. Do		Opium exported from Bushehr .	1879-80 .	86.
641. Do		Ditto .	1880-81 .	90.
642. Religion .		Pilgrims from Persia	1877-78 .	88.
643. Do		Ibadhiyah sect of 'Oman	1880-81 .	35-41.
644. Salt .		Salt caves and trade (Hakim) .	1879-80 .	65—67.
645. Specie .		Specie movements	1877-78 .	126.
646. Surveys .		Persian surveys	1877-78 .	11—13.
647. Vessels .		Statistics of native craft	1878-79 .	40-42.
648. Weights, etc.	•	Persian weights, measures and time.	1877-78 .	22—24.

VI.—PRÉCIS CONNECTED WITH THE PERSIAN GULF GAZETTEER.

^{649 —}Selections from State Papers, Bombay, regarding the East India Company's connection with the Persian Gulf, with a Summary of events, 1600—1800. (Printed, 1906.)

^{650.—}Précis of Correspondence regarding the Affairs of the Persian Gulf, 1800-1853-(Printed, 1906.)

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- 651.—Précis on Maskat Affairs, 1856—1872. (Printed, 1905.)
- 652.—Précis of Maskat Affairs, 1892—1905. (Printed 1906.)
- 653.—Précis of Correspondence regarding Trucial Chiefs, 1854—1905. (Printed, 1906.)
- 654.—Persian Gulf Gazetteer: Part I.—Historical and Political Materials—Précis of Katar Affairs, 1873—1904. (Printed, 1904.)
- 655.—Persian Gulf Gazetteer: Part I.—Historical and Political Materials—Précis of Bahrein Affairs, 1854—1904. (Printed, 1904.)
- 656.—Persian Gulf Gazetteer: Part I Historical and Political Materials—Précis of Turkish Expansion on the Arab Littoral of the Persian Gulf and Hasa and Katif Affairs. (Printed, 1904.)
- 657.—Persian Gulf Gazetteer: Part I.—Historical and Political Materials—Précis of Koweit Affairs, 1896—1904. (Printed, 1904.)
- 658.—Persian Gulf Gazetteer: Part I.—Historical and Political Materials—Précis of Nejd Affairs, 1804—1904. (Printed, 1904.)
- G59.—Précis on Slave Trade in the Gulf of Oman and the Persian Gulf, 1873—1905.
 (With a Retrospect into previous history from 1852.) (Printed, 1906.)
- 660.—Précis on Naval Arrangements in the Persian Gulf, 1862—1905. (Printed, 1906.)
- 661.—Précis on Commerce and Communication in the Persian Gulf, 1801—1905. (Printed, 1906.)
- 662 —Précis of Correspondence on International Rivalry and British Policy in the Persian Gulf, 1872—1905. (Printed, 1906.)
- 663.—Précis of Mekran Affairs. (Printed, 1906.)
- 664.—Précis of Turkish Arabia Affairs, 1801—1905. (Printed, 1906.)
- 665.—Persian Gulf Gazetteer: Part I.—Historical and Political Materials—Précis of Persian Arabistan Affairs. (Printed, 1905).
- 666.—Précis of the Affairs of the Persian Coast and Islands, 1854—1905. (Printed, 1906).

APPENDIX S.

Explanation of the system of transliteration.

A few remarks are necessary to explain the system of transliteration adopted in the Gazetteer. Classical Arabic can be transliterated according to fixed principles, for not only is the spelling of every word well established by usage but the phonetic values of the characters are also invariable; in other words, the letters are known and they are always pronounced in the same way. Transliteration of the names falling within the scope of the present Gazetteer is, however, as will appear from the following considerations, a more difficult and complicated In the first place, though a majority of the names are Arabic, many are Persian and some are Baluchi. Further the correct spelling of a large proportion, even in the native character, is uncertain; indeed it may be said that those alone have an established orthography in the vernacular that are derived either from proper names or from commonnouns, and that the spelling of names of uncertain derivation is a matter of conjecture. More disconcerting still is the fact that local authorities frequently differ even as to the sounds of the names which they are invited to reduce to Arabic character. A final insuperable obstacle to "transliteration" in the strict sense is the circumstance that the same Arabic letter is not always pronounced alike in the various parts of the Gulf or even throughout the same district. In the circumstances it has been deemed best to attempt as far as possible a phonetic rendering of each name into English supported in every case by the equivalent in Arabic character: the place in the Gazetteer of the equivalent, which has invariably been obtained from native sources, can be ascertained by means of the index. An advantage of this double system is that it enables us to do away in the English with a multiplicity of marks distinguishing different uses of the same consonant and to dispense in the Arabic with vowel-marks which from the phonetic standpoint would sometimes be positively misleading.

The above considerations have therefore led to the adoption of the following system of Transliteration for the Gazetteer:—

I-Vowels.

1. The Vowel Fat-hah $\stackrel{\checkmark}{=}$ is represented in all cases by A. except in the majority of names, etc., in Persia when the vowel is followed by Persian IIe (3) in which case it is represented by E.

Examples—Bahrain, Bandar 'Abbas, Musallamiyah, Būshehr, Muhammareh, Nāsiriyah and Nāsiriyeh.

2. The Vowel Kasrah – is represented by I. Examples—Lingeh Dizful, Sikandariyah.

The above system, of which ξ and \ddot{o} are notable instances, has been adopted throughout, even in transliterating old and well-known names—generally spelt otherwise.

Examples—Makka, Madinah, Jashk, Qishm, Khurāsān, Qādhi and Masqat.

III-Signs.

1. The sign Hamzah علم has been omitted in transliteration as its effect is otherwise sufficiently distinguishable by the marks used on the vowel occurring immediately before or after it, e. g. Zāid الله عنائين إلى المنافقة الم

2. The tashdid — is represented by doubling the consonant over which it stands e. g. Muhammareh, Jinnah. In certain names Tashdid has also been placed on the last consonant to indicate the local pronunciation, e. g., Hadd, Hajj, Rass, Shaqq, Sirr and Taff.

3. Accents (i. e. syllabic emphasis) have not been marked, as there is ordinarily no accent when all the vowels of a word are short, and when two or more of the vowels are long, the stress is generally distributed equally between and among the long vowels and, when there is only one long vowel, the accent falls upon it. The accent is however indicated in certain more important and pronounced cases by the sign e. g. Jahálah, Kaháfah, Kibísah, Matti (Sabákhat), Qumárah, Sahábah.

IV .-- Compound Words.

- (a) The two components in a compound name (in the absence of the *Izafat* or JI between them) has each been written with a capital and without a hyphen connecting them, e. g., Bandar 'Abbas, Hayāt Dayud.
- (b) When, however, the second member of the compound is a verbal root or is inseparably connected with the first, the whole has been treated as one word whether written in vernacular as one word or two, e. g., Imamzādeh. Sabzabād
- (c) Components of a compound name of a thing (not of a person or place) without J₁ or *izafat* between them, have been treated as one or two words as in Rule (b) and (a) above according to local usage: examples—Alifdan, Āb Ambār, Namakdán.
- (d) Where there is an *izafat*, it is represented by I enclosed between two hyphens, as for example in Ab-i-Diz, Band-i-Qir.

The Arabic \cup 1 has been treated similarly. Examples—Bait-al-Falaj, Ruūs-al-Jibal.

(e) The J or Ji has been modified to correspond in sound with the following consonant, as for example - Jabal-ad-Dukhān, Sūq-ash-Shuyūkh.

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- (f) The vowel of J! has been written A when the J! is not preceded by another word in composition with it and also when it occurs in the middle of a compound word. But in some Persian names, when the J! occurs in the middle the vowel is represented by U instead of A. Examples—Shahab-us-Saltaneh, Muin-ut-Tujjár.
 - (g) The Arabic article JI prefixed to names has, in the majority of cases, been omitted in English. The Arabic equivalents have been utilised to indicate the principal cases in which the use of the article is obligatory.
 - (h) The word 'bin' occurring in the name of a person is written enclosed within two hyphens, e. g., Yusuf-bin-Ibrahim.

When however the word occurs in the name of a tribe or family or of a place associated with the name of a person or tribe, the hyphen is used only between Bin and the tribal or family name, e.g., Al Bin-Ali and "'Ain Bin-Muhanna (p. 1524).

(i) Compound names composed of more than two words, when not coming under rule (\$\bar{\lambda}\$) above, have usually been treated in accordance with rule (a). Example—Balad Bani Bu Hasan.

General.

Where necessary to prevent mistakes words have been divided into two syllables by means of a hyphen, e.g., Is-hāq شعاق which might otherwise be mistaken for I-shaq اشاق, and Rud-hilleh رور مناه for Rudh-illeh رور مناه و رور مناه و رور مناه

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